1 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
3 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
4 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
5 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
7 //! It does not manage routing logic (see ln::router for that) nor does it manage constructing
8 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
9 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
12 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
13 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
14 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
15 use bitcoin::util::hash::{BitcoinHash, Sha256dHash};
17 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
18 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Message};
19 use secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
22 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface,ChainListener,ChainWatchInterface,FeeEstimator};
23 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
24 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError};
25 use ln::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, ManyChannelMonitor, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS};
26 use ln::router::{Route,RouteHop};
28 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, HandleError};
29 use chain::keysinterface::KeysInterface;
30 use util::config::UserConfig;
31 use util::{byte_utils, events, internal_traits, rng};
32 use util::sha2::Sha256;
33 use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer};
34 use util::chacha20poly1305rfc::ChaCha20;
35 use util::logger::Logger;
36 use util::errors::APIError;
39 use crypto::mac::{Mac,MacResult};
40 use crypto::hmac::Hmac;
41 use crypto::digest::Digest;
42 use crypto::symmetriccipher::SynchronousStreamCipher;
44 use std::{cmp, ptr, mem};
45 use std::collections::{HashMap, hash_map, HashSet};
47 use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock};
48 use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
49 use std::time::{Instant,Duration};
51 /// We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
53 /// Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
54 /// forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
55 /// the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
57 /// When a Channel forwards an HTLC to its peer, it will give us back the PendingForwardHTLCInfo
58 /// which we will use to construct an outbound HTLC, with a relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData
59 /// filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use to either fail-backwards or fulfill
60 /// the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
61 /// Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
62 /// our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
63 mod channel_held_info {
65 use ln::router::Route;
66 use secp256k1::key::SecretKey;
68 /// Stores the info we will need to send when we want to forward an HTLC onwards
69 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
70 pub struct PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
71 pub(super) onion_packet: Option<msgs::OnionPacket>,
72 pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
73 pub(super) payment_hash: [u8; 32],
74 pub(super) short_channel_id: u64,
75 pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
76 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
79 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
80 pub enum HTLCFailureMsg {
81 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
82 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
85 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
86 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
87 pub enum PendingHTLCStatus {
88 Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo),
92 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
94 pub struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
95 pub(super) short_channel_id: u64,
96 pub(super) htlc_id: u64,
97 pub(super) incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
100 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
102 pub enum HTLCSource {
103 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
106 session_priv: SecretKey,
107 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
108 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
109 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
114 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
115 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
116 route: Route { hops: Vec::new() },
117 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&::secp256k1::Secp256k1::without_caps(), &[1; 32]).unwrap(),
118 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
123 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
124 pub(crate) enum HTLCFailReason {
126 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
134 pub(super) use self::channel_held_info::*;
136 type ShutdownResult = (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<(HTLCSource, [u8; 32])>);
138 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
139 err: msgs::HandleError,
140 needs_channel_force_close: bool,
141 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
143 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
145 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: &'static str, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
149 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
150 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
152 data: err.to_string()
156 needs_channel_force_close: false,
157 shutdown_finish: None,
161 fn send_err_msg_close_chan(err: &'static str, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
165 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
166 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
168 data: err.to_string()
172 needs_channel_force_close: true,
173 shutdown_finish: None,
177 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::HandleError) -> Self {
178 Self { err, needs_channel_force_close: false, shutdown_finish: None }
181 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: &'static str, channel_id: [u8; 32], shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
185 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
186 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
188 data: err.to_string()
192 needs_channel_force_close: false,
193 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
197 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
200 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => HandleError {
202 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError),
204 ChannelError::Close(msg) => HandleError {
206 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
207 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
209 data: msg.to_string()
214 needs_channel_force_close: false,
215 shutdown_finish: None,
219 fn from_chan_maybe_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
222 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => HandleError {
224 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError),
226 ChannelError::Close(msg) => HandleError {
228 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
229 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
231 data: msg.to_string()
236 needs_channel_force_close: true,
237 shutdown_finish: None,
242 /// Pass to fail_htlc_backwwards to indicate the reason to fail the payment
243 /// after a PaymentReceived event.
245 pub enum PaymentFailReason {
246 /// Indicate the preimage for payment_hash is not known after a PaymentReceived event
248 /// Indicate the payment amount is incorrect ( received is < expected or > 2*expected ) after a PaymentReceived event
252 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval in the range (this, 5*this). This
253 /// provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like 1 second
254 /// to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly. We could
255 /// probably increase this significantly.
256 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u32 = 50;
258 struct HTLCForwardInfo {
259 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
261 forward_info: PendingForwardHTLCInfo,
264 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
265 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
266 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
267 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
268 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
269 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
270 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
272 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
276 struct ChannelHolder {
277 by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel>,
278 short_to_id: HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
279 next_forward: Instant,
280 /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
281 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
282 /// guarantees are made about there existing a channel with the short id here, nor the short
283 /// ids in the PendingForwardHTLCInfo!
284 forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
285 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
286 /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
288 claimable_htlcs: HashMap<[u8; 32], Vec<HTLCPreviousHopData>>,
289 /// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
290 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
291 pending_msg_events: Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>,
293 struct MutChannelHolder<'a> {
294 by_id: &'a mut HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel>,
295 short_to_id: &'a mut HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
296 next_forward: &'a mut Instant,
297 forward_htlcs: &'a mut HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
298 claimable_htlcs: &'a mut HashMap<[u8; 32], Vec<HTLCPreviousHopData>>,
299 pending_msg_events: &'a mut Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>,
302 fn borrow_parts(&mut self) -> MutChannelHolder {
304 by_id: &mut self.by_id,
305 short_to_id: &mut self.short_to_id,
306 next_forward: &mut self.next_forward,
307 forward_htlcs: &mut self.forward_htlcs,
308 claimable_htlcs: &mut self.claimable_htlcs,
309 pending_msg_events: &mut self.pending_msg_events,
314 #[cfg(not(any(target_pointer_width = "32", target_pointer_width = "64")))]
315 const ERR: () = "You need at least 32 bit pointers (well, usize, but we'll assume they're the same) for ChannelManager::latest_block_height";
317 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
318 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
320 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
321 /// to individual Channels.
323 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
324 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
325 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
326 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
328 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
329 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
330 /// returning from ManyChannelMonitor::add_update_monitor, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
331 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
332 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
333 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
334 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
336 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (Sha256dHash, ChannelManager), which
337 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
338 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
339 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
341 pub struct ChannelManager {
342 default_configuration: UserConfig,
343 genesis_hash: Sha256dHash,
344 fee_estimator: Arc<FeeEstimator>,
345 monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>,
346 chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>,
347 tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>,
349 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize,
350 last_block_hash: Mutex<Sha256dHash>,
351 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
353 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder>,
354 our_network_key: SecretKey,
356 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
357 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
358 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
359 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
360 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
362 keys_manager: Arc<KeysInterface>,
367 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
368 /// HTLC's CLTV. This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
369 /// ie the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
370 /// the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
371 /// CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that its at least 3 blocks more).
372 const CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6 * 24 * 2; //TODO?
373 const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 6 * 24 * 7; //TODO?
375 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + 2*HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS, ie that
376 // if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS then we'll still have
377 // HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS left to fail it backwards ourselves before hitting the
378 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point and failing the channel on-chain to time out the HTLC.
381 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 2*HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
383 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying inbound claim. See
384 // ChannelMontior::would_broadcast_at_height for a description of why this is needed.
387 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
389 macro_rules! secp_call {
390 ( $res: expr, $err: expr ) => {
393 Err(_) => return Err($err),
400 shared_secret: SharedSecret,
402 blinding_factor: [u8; 32],
403 ephemeral_pubkey: PublicKey,
408 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
409 pub struct ChannelDetails {
410 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
411 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
412 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
413 /// lifetime of the channel.
414 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
415 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
416 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
417 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
418 /// The node_id of our counterparty
419 pub remote_network_id: PublicKey,
420 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
421 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
422 /// The user_id passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
426 macro_rules! handle_error {
427 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $their_node_id: expr) => {
430 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, needs_channel_force_close, shutdown_finish }) => {
431 if needs_channel_force_close {
433 &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg: Some(ref msg) }) => {
434 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
435 $self.peer_disconnected(&$their_node_id, true);
437 $self.force_close_channel(&msg.channel_id);
440 &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg: None }) => {},
441 &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) => {},
442 &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }) => {
443 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
444 $self.peer_disconnected(&$their_node_id, true);
446 $self.force_close_channel(&msg.channel_id);
452 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
453 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
454 if let Some(update) = update_option {
455 let mut channel_state = $self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
456 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
467 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
468 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
471 Err(ChannelError::Ignore(msg)) => {
472 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $entry.key().clone()))
474 Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => {
475 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
476 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
477 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
479 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
485 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
486 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
489 Err(ChannelError::Ignore(msg)) => {
490 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $entry.key().clone()))
492 Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => {
493 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
494 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
495 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
497 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
503 impl ChannelManager {
504 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
506 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
507 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
509 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
511 /// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= `MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS`!
512 pub fn new(network: Network, feeest: Arc<FeeEstimator>, monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>, chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>, tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>, logger: Arc<Logger>,keys_manager: Arc<KeysInterface>, config: UserConfig) -> Result<Arc<ChannelManager>, secp256k1::Error> {
513 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
515 let res = Arc::new(ChannelManager {
516 default_configuration: config.clone(),
517 genesis_hash: genesis_block(network).header.bitcoin_hash(),
518 fee_estimator: feeest.clone(),
519 monitor: monitor.clone(),
523 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(0), //TODO: Get an init value
524 last_block_hash: Mutex::new(Default::default()),
527 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
528 by_id: HashMap::new(),
529 short_to_id: HashMap::new(),
530 next_forward: Instant::now(),
531 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
532 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
533 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
535 our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
537 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
538 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
544 let weak_res = Arc::downgrade(&res);
545 res.chain_monitor.register_listener(weak_res);
549 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
551 /// user_id will be provided back as user_channel_id in FundingGenerationReady and
552 /// FundingBroadcastSafe events to allow tracking of which events correspond with which
553 /// create_channel call. Note that user_channel_id defaults to 0 for inbound channels, so you
554 /// may wish to avoid using 0 for user_id here.
556 /// If successful, will generate a SendOpenChannel message event, so you should probably poll
557 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
559 /// Raises APIError::APIMisuseError when channel_value_satoshis > 2**24 or push_msat is
560 /// greater than channel_value_satoshis * 1k or channel_value_satoshis is < 1000.
561 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
562 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
563 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "channel_value must be at least 1000 satoshis" });
566 let channel = Channel::new_outbound(&*self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_id, Arc::clone(&self.logger), &self.default_configuration)?;
567 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone(), &*self.fee_estimator);
569 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
570 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
571 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
572 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
573 if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
574 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG" });
576 panic!("RNG is bad???");
579 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
581 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
582 node_id: their_network_key,
588 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
589 /// more information.
590 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
591 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
592 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.by_id.len());
593 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
594 res.push(ChannelDetails {
595 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
596 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
597 remote_network_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
598 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
599 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
605 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
606 /// Router::get_route to ensure non-announced channels are used.
607 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
608 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
609 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.by_id.len());
610 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
611 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
612 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
613 // really wanted anyway.
614 if channel.is_live() {
615 res.push(ChannelDetails {
616 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
617 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
618 remote_network_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
619 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
620 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
627 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
628 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
629 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
631 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
632 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
633 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
635 let (mut failed_htlcs, chan_option) = {
636 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
637 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
638 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
639 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
640 let (shutdown_msg, failed_htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown()?;
641 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
642 node_id: chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id(),
645 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
646 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
647 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
649 (failed_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
650 } else { (failed_htlcs, None) }
652 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel"})
655 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
656 // unknown_next_peer...I dunno who that is anymore....
657 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() });
659 let chan_update = if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
660 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
665 if let Some(update) = chan_update {
666 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
667 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
676 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
677 let (local_txn, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
678 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
679 // unknown_next_peer...I dunno who that is anymore....
680 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() });
682 for tx in local_txn {
683 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
685 //TODO: We need to have a way where outbound HTLC claims can result in us claiming the
686 //now-on-chain HTLC output for ourselves (and, thereafter, passing the HTLC backwards).
687 //TODO: We need to handle monitoring of pending offered HTLCs which just hit the chain and
688 //may be claimed, resulting in us claiming the inbound HTLCs (and back-failing after
689 //timeouts are hit and our claims confirm).
690 //TODO: In any case, we need to make sure we remove any pending htlc tracking (via
691 //fail_backwards or claim_funds) eventually for all HTLCs that were in the channel
694 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to
695 /// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel.
696 pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) {
697 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
700 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
701 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
702 if let Some(chan) = channel_state.by_id.remove(channel_id) {
703 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
704 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
711 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown());
712 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
713 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
714 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
720 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
721 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
722 pub fn force_close_all_channels(&self) {
723 for chan in self.list_channels() {
724 self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
728 fn handle_monitor_update_fail(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>, channel_id: &[u8; 32], err: ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, reason: RAACommitmentOrder) {
730 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
732 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
733 let chan = channel_state.by_id.remove(channel_id).expect("monitor_update_failed must be called within the same lock as the channel get!");
734 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
735 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
739 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
740 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown());
741 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
742 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
743 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
748 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
749 let channel = channel_state_lock.by_id.get_mut(channel_id).expect("monitor_update_failed must be called within the same lock as the channel get!");
750 channel.monitor_update_failed(reason);
756 fn gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &[u8]) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
757 assert_eq!(shared_secret.len(), 32);
759 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x72, 0x68, 0x6f]); // rho
760 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
761 let mut res = [0; 32];
762 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
766 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x6d, 0x75]); // mu
767 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
768 let mut res = [0; 32];
769 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
775 fn gen_um_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &[u8]) -> [u8; 32] {
776 assert_eq!(shared_secret.len(), 32);
777 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x75, 0x6d]); // um
778 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
779 let mut res = [0; 32];
780 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
785 fn gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &[u8]) -> [u8; 32] {
786 assert_eq!(shared_secret.len(), 32);
787 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x61, 0x6d, 0x6d, 0x61, 0x67]); // ammag
788 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
789 let mut res = [0; 32];
790 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
794 // can only fail if an intermediary hop has an invalid public key or session_priv is invalid
796 fn construct_onion_keys_callback<T: secp256k1::Signing, FType: FnMut(SharedSecret, [u8; 32], PublicKey, &RouteHop)> (secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, route: &Route, session_priv: &SecretKey, mut callback: FType) -> Result<(), secp256k1::Error> {
797 let mut blinded_priv = session_priv.clone();
798 let mut blinded_pub = PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &blinded_priv);
800 for hop in route.hops.iter() {
801 let shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(secp_ctx, &hop.pubkey, &blinded_priv);
803 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
804 sha.input(&blinded_pub.serialize()[..]);
805 sha.input(&shared_secret[..]);
806 let mut blinding_factor = [0u8; 32];
807 sha.result(&mut blinding_factor);
809 let ephemeral_pubkey = blinded_pub;
811 blinded_priv.mul_assign(secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(secp_ctx, &blinding_factor)?)?;
812 blinded_pub = PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &blinded_priv);
814 callback(shared_secret, blinding_factor, ephemeral_pubkey, hop);
820 // can only fail if an intermediary hop has an invalid public key or session_priv is invalid
821 fn construct_onion_keys<T: secp256k1::Signing>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, route: &Route, session_priv: &SecretKey) -> Result<Vec<OnionKeys>, secp256k1::Error> {
822 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(route.hops.len());
824 Self::construct_onion_keys_callback(secp_ctx, route, session_priv, |shared_secret, _blinding_factor, ephemeral_pubkey, _| {
825 let (rho, mu) = ChannelManager::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret[..]);
831 blinding_factor: _blinding_factor,
841 /// returns the hop data, as well as the first-hop value_msat and CLTV value we should send.
842 fn build_onion_payloads(route: &Route, starting_htlc_offset: u32) -> Result<(Vec<msgs::OnionHopData>, u64, u32), APIError> {
843 let mut cur_value_msat = 0u64;
844 let mut cur_cltv = starting_htlc_offset;
845 let mut last_short_channel_id = 0;
846 let mut res: Vec<msgs::OnionHopData> = Vec::with_capacity(route.hops.len());
847 internal_traits::test_no_dealloc::<msgs::OnionHopData>(None);
848 unsafe { res.set_len(route.hops.len()); }
850 for (idx, hop) in route.hops.iter().enumerate().rev() {
851 // First hop gets special values so that it can check, on receipt, that everything is
852 // exactly as it should be (and the next hop isn't trying to probe to find out if we're
853 // the intended recipient).
854 let value_msat = if cur_value_msat == 0 { hop.fee_msat } else { cur_value_msat };
855 let cltv = if cur_cltv == starting_htlc_offset { hop.cltv_expiry_delta + starting_htlc_offset } else { cur_cltv };
856 res[idx] = msgs::OnionHopData {
858 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
859 short_channel_id: last_short_channel_id,
860 amt_to_forward: value_msat,
861 outgoing_cltv_value: cltv,
865 cur_value_msat += hop.fee_msat;
866 if cur_value_msat >= 21000000 * 100000000 * 1000 {
867 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Channel fees overflowed?!"});
869 cur_cltv += hop.cltv_expiry_delta as u32;
870 if cur_cltv >= 500000000 {
871 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Channel CLTV overflowed?!"});
873 last_short_channel_id = hop.short_channel_id;
875 Ok((res, cur_value_msat, cur_cltv))
879 fn shift_arr_right(arr: &mut [u8; 20*65]) {
881 ptr::copy(arr[0..].as_ptr(), arr[65..].as_mut_ptr(), 19*65);
889 fn xor_bufs(dst: &mut[u8], src: &[u8]) {
890 assert_eq!(dst.len(), src.len());
892 for i in 0..dst.len() {
897 const ZERO:[u8; 21*65] = [0; 21*65];
898 fn construct_onion_packet(mut payloads: Vec<msgs::OnionHopData>, onion_keys: Vec<OnionKeys>, associated_data: &[u8; 32]) -> msgs::OnionPacket {
899 let mut buf = Vec::with_capacity(21*65);
900 buf.resize(21*65, 0);
903 let iters = payloads.len() - 1;
904 let end_len = iters * 65;
905 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(end_len);
906 res.resize(end_len, 0);
908 for (i, keys) in onion_keys.iter().enumerate() {
909 if i == payloads.len() - 1 { continue; }
910 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&keys.rho, &[0u8; 8]);
911 chacha.process(&ChannelManager::ZERO, &mut buf); // We don't have a seek function :(
912 ChannelManager::xor_bufs(&mut res[0..(i + 1)*65], &buf[(20 - i)*65..21*65]);
917 let mut packet_data = [0; 20*65];
918 let mut hmac_res = [0; 32];
920 for (i, (payload, keys)) in payloads.iter_mut().zip(onion_keys.iter()).rev().enumerate() {
921 ChannelManager::shift_arr_right(&mut packet_data);
922 payload.hmac = hmac_res;
923 packet_data[0..65].copy_from_slice(&payload.encode()[..]);
925 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&keys.rho, &[0u8; 8]);
926 chacha.process(&packet_data, &mut buf[0..20*65]);
927 packet_data[..].copy_from_slice(&buf[0..20*65]);
930 packet_data[20*65 - filler.len()..20*65].copy_from_slice(&filler[..]);
933 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &keys.mu);
934 hmac.input(&packet_data);
935 hmac.input(&associated_data[..]);
936 hmac.raw_result(&mut hmac_res);
941 public_key: Ok(onion_keys.first().unwrap().ephemeral_pubkey),
942 hop_data: packet_data,
947 /// Encrypts a failure packet. raw_packet can either be a
948 /// msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket.encode() result or a msgs::OnionErrorPacket.data element.
949 fn encrypt_failure_packet(shared_secret: &[u8], raw_packet: &[u8]) -> msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
950 let ammag = ChannelManager::gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
952 let mut packet_crypted = Vec::with_capacity(raw_packet.len());
953 packet_crypted.resize(raw_packet.len(), 0);
954 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&ammag, &[0u8; 8]);
955 chacha.process(&raw_packet, &mut packet_crypted[..]);
956 msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
957 data: packet_crypted,
961 fn build_failure_packet(shared_secret: &[u8], failure_type: u16, failure_data: &[u8]) -> msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket {
962 assert_eq!(shared_secret.len(), 32);
963 assert!(failure_data.len() <= 256 - 2);
965 let um = ChannelManager::gen_um_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
968 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(2 + failure_data.len());
969 res.push(((failure_type >> 8) & 0xff) as u8);
970 res.push(((failure_type >> 0) & 0xff) as u8);
971 res.extend_from_slice(&failure_data[..]);
975 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(256 - 2 - failure_data.len());
976 res.resize(256 - 2 - failure_data.len(), 0);
979 let mut packet = msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket {
981 failuremsg: failuremsg,
985 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &um);
986 hmac.input(&packet.encode()[32..]);
987 hmac.raw_result(&mut packet.hmac);
993 fn build_first_hop_failure_packet(shared_secret: &[u8], failure_type: u16, failure_data: &[u8]) -> msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
994 let failure_packet = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(shared_secret, failure_type, failure_data);
995 ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(shared_secret, &failure_packet.encode()[..])
998 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>) {
999 macro_rules! get_onion_hash {
1002 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
1003 sha.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
1004 let mut onion_hash = [0; 32];
1005 sha.result(&mut onion_hash);
1011 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
1012 log_info!(self, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC with invalid ephemeral pubkey");
1013 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
1014 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
1015 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
1016 sha256_of_onion: get_onion_hash!(),
1017 failure_code: 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6,
1018 })), self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1021 let shared_secret = {
1022 let mut arr = [0; 32];
1023 arr.copy_from_slice(&SharedSecret::new(&self.secp_ctx, &msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key)[..]);
1026 let (rho, mu) = ChannelManager::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
1028 let mut channel_state = None;
1029 macro_rules! return_err {
1030 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
1032 log_info!(self, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
1033 if channel_state.is_none() {
1034 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1036 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
1037 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
1038 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
1039 reason: ChannelManager::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
1040 })), channel_state.unwrap());
1045 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
1046 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
1047 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
1048 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpuse - in the case of hashing all data, the
1049 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
1050 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
1051 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
1052 return_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4, &get_onion_hash!());
1055 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &mu);
1056 hmac.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
1057 hmac.input(&msg.payment_hash);
1058 if hmac.result() != MacResult::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac) {
1059 return_err!("HMAC Check failed", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 5, &get_onion_hash!());
1062 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&rho, &[0u8; 8]);
1063 let next_hop_data = {
1064 let mut decoded = [0; 65];
1065 chacha.process(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[0..65], &mut decoded);
1066 match msgs::OnionHopData::read(&mut Cursor::new(&decoded[..])) {
1068 let error_code = match err {
1069 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownVersion => 0x4000 | 1, // unknown realm byte
1070 _ => 0x2000 | 2, // Should never happen
1072 return_err!("Unable to decode our hop data", error_code, &[0;0]);
1078 let pending_forward_info = if next_hop_data.hmac == [0; 32] {
1080 // final_expiry_too_soon
1081 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + (CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS) as u64 {
1082 return_err!("The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle", 17, &[0;0]);
1084 // final_incorrect_htlc_amount
1085 if next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward > msg.amount_msat {
1086 return_err!("Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment", 19, &byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1088 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
1089 if next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value != msg.cltv_expiry {
1090 return_err!("Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value", 18, &byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1093 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
1094 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
1095 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
1096 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
1098 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
1100 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1101 short_channel_id: 0,
1102 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1103 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward,
1104 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1107 let mut new_packet_data = [0; 20*65];
1108 chacha.process(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[65..], &mut new_packet_data[0..19*65]);
1109 chacha.process(&ChannelManager::ZERO[0..65], &mut new_packet_data[19*65..]);
1111 let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
1113 let blinding_factor = {
1114 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
1115 sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
1116 sha.input(&shared_secret);
1117 let mut res = [0u8; 32];
1118 sha.result(&mut res);
1119 match SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &res) {
1121 return_err!("Blinding factor is an invalid private key", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6, &get_onion_hash!());
1127 if let Err(_) = new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor) {
1128 return_err!("New blinding factor is an invalid private key", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6, &get_onion_hash!());
1131 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
1133 public_key: Ok(new_pubkey),
1134 hop_data: new_packet_data,
1135 hmac: next_hop_data.hmac.clone(),
1138 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
1139 onion_packet: Some(outgoing_packet),
1140 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1141 short_channel_id: next_hop_data.data.short_channel_id,
1142 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1143 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward,
1144 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1148 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1149 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo { ref onion_packet, ref short_channel_id, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
1150 if onion_packet.is_some() { // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject them in the body here
1151 let id_option = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
1152 let forwarding_id = match id_option {
1153 None => { // unknown_next_peer
1154 return_err!("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, &[0;0]);
1156 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1158 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
1159 let chan = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
1161 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
1162 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
1163 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
1164 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
1165 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
1166 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
1167 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1169 if *amt_to_forward < chan.get_their_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
1170 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1172 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths() as u64).and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&*self.fee_estimator) as u64) });
1173 if fee.is_none() || msg.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() || (msg.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < *amt_to_forward { // fee_insufficient
1174 break Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1176 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
1177 break Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1179 let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
1180 // We want to have at least HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS to fail prior to going on chain CLAIM_BUFFER blocks before expiration
1181 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
1182 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1184 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
1185 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
1190 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
1191 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
1192 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1194 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
1195 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1197 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
1198 res.extend_from_slice(&chan_update.encode_with_len()[..]);
1200 return_err!(err, code, &res[..]);
1205 (pending_forward_info, channel_state.unwrap())
1208 /// only fails if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id
1209 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
1210 fn get_channel_update(&self, chan: &Channel) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, HandleError> {
1211 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() {
1212 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Channel not yet established", action: None}),
1216 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_their_node_id().serialize()[..];
1218 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
1219 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
1220 short_channel_id: short_channel_id,
1221 timestamp: chan.get_channel_update_count(),
1222 flags: (!were_node_one) as u16 | ((!chan.is_live() as u16) << 1),
1223 cltv_expiry_delta: CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA,
1224 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_our_htlc_minimum_msat(),
1225 fee_base_msat: chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&*self.fee_estimator),
1226 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
1227 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1230 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::from_data(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
1231 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&Message::from_slice(&msg_hash[..]).unwrap(), &self.our_network_key);
1233 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
1239 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
1241 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
1242 /// fields for more info.
1244 /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
1245 /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
1246 /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
1247 /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
1248 /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
1249 /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
1251 /// May generate a SendHTLCs message event on success, which should be relayed.
1253 /// Raises APIError::RoutError when invalid route or forward parameter
1254 /// (cltv_delta, fee, node public key) is specified
1255 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: Route, payment_hash: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1256 if route.hops.len() < 1 || route.hops.len() > 20 {
1257 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"});
1259 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
1260 for (idx, hop) in route.hops.iter().enumerate() {
1261 if idx != route.hops.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
1262 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"});
1266 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &{
1267 let mut session_key = [0; 32];
1268 rng::fill_bytes(&mut session_key);
1270 }).expect("RNG is bad!");
1272 let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
1274 let onion_keys = secp_call!(ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv),
1275 APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"});
1276 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = ChannelManager::build_onion_payloads(&route, cur_height)?;
1277 let onion_packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, &payment_hash);
1279 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1281 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
1282 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1284 let id = match channel_lock.short_to_id.get(&route.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
1285 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!"}),
1286 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1290 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1291 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(id) {
1292 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey {
1293 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
1295 if chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
1296 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
1298 if !chan.get().is_live() {
1299 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected!"});
1301 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
1302 route: route.clone(),
1303 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
1304 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
1305 }, onion_packet), channel_state, chan)
1306 } else { unreachable!(); }
1308 Some((update_add, commitment_signed, chan_monitor)) => {
1309 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1310 self.handle_monitor_update_fail(channel_lock, &id, e, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
1311 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
1314 channel_lock.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1315 node_id: route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey,
1316 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1317 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
1318 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1319 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1320 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1331 match handle_error!(self, err, route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
1332 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
1334 if let Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) = e.action {
1336 log_error!(self, "Got bad keys: {}!", e.err);
1337 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1338 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1339 node_id: route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey,
1343 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
1348 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
1350 /// Note that ALL inputs in the transaction pointed to by funding_txo MUST spend SegWit outputs
1351 /// or your counterparty can steal your funds!
1353 /// Panics if a funding transaction has already been provided for this channel.
1355 /// May panic if the funding_txo is duplicative with some other channel (note that this should
1356 /// be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction keys per-channel).
1357 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_txo: OutPoint) {
1358 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1360 let (chan, msg, chan_monitor) = {
1362 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1363 match channel_state.by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
1365 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_txo)
1366 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, chan.channel_id()))
1372 match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_their_node_id()) {
1373 Ok(funding_msg) => {
1374 (chan, funding_msg.0, funding_msg.1)
1377 log_error!(self, "Got bad signatures: {}!", e.err);
1378 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1379 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1380 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1387 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
1388 // lock before add_update_monitor
1389 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1393 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1394 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
1395 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1398 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
1399 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1400 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
1402 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1408 fn get_announcement_sigs(&self, chan: &Channel) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures> {
1409 if !chan.should_announce() { return None }
1411 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = match chan.get_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
1413 Err(_) => return None, // Only in case of state precondition violations eg channel is closing
1415 let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
1416 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
1418 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
1419 channel_id: chan.channel_id(),
1420 short_channel_id: chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
1421 node_signature: our_node_sig,
1422 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
1426 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
1428 /// Should only really ever be called in response to an PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
1429 /// Will likely generate further events.
1430 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
1431 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1433 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
1434 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
1436 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1437 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1439 if cfg!(not(feature = "fuzztarget")) && Instant::now() < *channel_state.next_forward {
1443 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
1444 if short_chan_id != 0 {
1445 let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) {
1446 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1448 failed_forwards.reserve(pending_forwards.len());
1449 for HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1450 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1451 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1452 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1453 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1455 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash, 0x4000 | 10, None));
1460 let forward_chan = &mut channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&forward_chan_id).unwrap();
1462 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
1463 for HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1464 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1465 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1466 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1467 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1469 match forward_chan.send_htlc(forward_info.amt_to_forward, forward_info.payment_hash, forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), forward_info.onion_packet.unwrap()) {
1471 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(forward_chan).unwrap();
1472 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash, 0x1000 | 7, Some(chan_update)));
1477 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
1479 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
1480 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
1481 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
1482 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
1483 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
1484 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
1485 // this channel currently :/.
1492 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
1493 let (commitment_msg, monitor) = match forward_chan.send_commitment() {
1496 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {
1497 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
1499 //TODO: Handle...this is bad!
1503 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
1504 unimplemented!();// but def dont push the event...
1506 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1507 node_id: forward_chan.get_their_node_id(),
1508 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1509 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
1510 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1511 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1512 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1514 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
1519 for HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1520 let prev_hop_data = HTLCPreviousHopData {
1521 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1522 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1523 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1525 match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(forward_info.payment_hash) {
1526 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => entry.get_mut().push(prev_hop_data),
1527 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(vec![prev_hop_data]); },
1529 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
1530 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
1531 amt: forward_info.amt_to_forward,
1538 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_code, update) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
1540 None => self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: Vec::new() }),
1541 Some(chan_update) => self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: chan_update.encode_with_len() }),
1545 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
1546 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1547 events.append(&mut new_events);
1550 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect after a PaymentReceived event.
1551 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &[u8; 32], reason: PaymentFailReason) -> bool {
1552 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1554 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1555 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
1556 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
1557 for htlc_with_hash in sources.drain(..) {
1558 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
1559 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(), HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_with_hash), payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: if reason == PaymentFailReason::PreimageUnknown {0x4000 | 15} else {0x4000 | 16}, data: Vec::new() });
1565 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
1566 /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here.
1567 /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes
1568 /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may
1569 /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to
1570 /// still-available channels.
1571 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &[u8; 32], onion_error: HTLCFailReason) {
1573 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
1574 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
1575 if let &HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { ref err } = &onion_error {
1576 let (channel_update, payment_retryable) = self.process_onion_failure(&source, err.data.clone());
1577 if let Some(update) = channel_update {
1578 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
1579 events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate {
1584 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
1585 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
1586 rejected_by_dest: !payment_retryable,
1589 panic!("should have onion error packet here");
1592 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret }) => {
1593 let err_packet = match onion_error {
1594 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
1595 let packet = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
1596 ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
1598 HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err } => {
1599 ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
1603 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1605 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id) {
1606 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1610 let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&chan_id).unwrap();
1611 match chan.get_update_fail_htlc_and_commit(htlc_id, err_packet) {
1612 Ok(Some((msg, commitment_msg, chan_monitor))) => {
1613 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1616 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1617 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1618 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1619 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1620 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1621 update_fail_htlcs: vec![msg],
1622 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1624 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
1630 //TODO: Do something with e?
1638 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to a PaymentReceived event, returning true and
1639 /// generating message events for the net layer to claim the payment, if possible. Thus, you
1640 /// should probably kick the net layer to go send messages if this returns true!
1642 /// May panic if called except in response to a PaymentReceived event.
1643 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) -> bool {
1644 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
1645 sha.input(&payment_preimage);
1646 let mut payment_hash = [0; 32];
1647 sha.result(&mut payment_hash);
1649 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1651 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1652 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash);
1653 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
1654 for htlc_with_hash in sources.drain(..) {
1655 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
1656 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(), HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_with_hash), payment_preimage);
1661 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) {
1663 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
1664 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
1665 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1666 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentSent {
1670 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, .. }) => {
1671 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
1672 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1674 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id) {
1675 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1677 // TODO: There is probably a channel manager somewhere that needs to
1678 // learn the preimage as the channel already hit the chain and that's
1684 let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&chan_id).unwrap();
1685 match chan.get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(htlc_id, payment_preimage) {
1686 Ok((msgs, monitor_option)) => {
1687 if let Some(chan_monitor) = monitor_option {
1688 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1689 unimplemented!();// but def dont push the event...
1692 if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
1693 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1694 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1695 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1696 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1697 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
1698 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1699 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1707 // TODO: There is probably a channel manager somewhere that needs to
1708 // learn the preimage as the channel may be about to hit the chain.
1709 //TODO: Do something with e?
1717 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
1718 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
1719 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key)
1722 /// Used to restore channels to normal operation after a
1723 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure was returned from a channel monitor update
1725 pub fn test_restore_channel_monitor(&self) {
1726 let mut close_results = Vec::new();
1727 let mut htlc_forwards = Vec::new();
1728 let mut htlc_failures = Vec::new();
1729 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1732 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1733 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1734 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
1735 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
1736 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
1737 if channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
1738 let chan_monitor = channel.channel_monitor();
1739 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1741 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
1742 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1743 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1745 close_results.push(channel.force_shutdown());
1746 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
1747 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1753 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => true,
1756 let (raa, commitment_update, order, pending_forwards, mut pending_failures) = channel.monitor_updating_restored();
1757 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
1758 htlc_forwards.push((channel.get_short_channel_id().expect("We can't have pending forwards before funding confirmation"), pending_forwards));
1760 htlc_failures.append(&mut pending_failures);
1762 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
1763 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
1764 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1765 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
1770 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
1771 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
1772 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
1773 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
1774 msg: revoke_and_ack,
1779 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
1783 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
1794 for failure in htlc_failures.drain(..) {
1795 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
1797 self.forward_htlcs(&mut htlc_forwards[..]);
1799 for res in close_results.drain(..) {
1800 self.finish_force_close_channel(res);
1804 fn internal_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1805 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
1806 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash", msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
1809 let channel = Channel::new_from_req(&*self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_node_id.clone(), msg, 0, Arc::clone(&self.logger), &self.default_configuration)
1810 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id))?;
1811 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1812 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1813 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
1814 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!", msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())),
1815 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1816 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
1817 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1818 msg: channel.get_accept_channel(),
1820 entry.insert(channel);
1826 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1827 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
1828 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1829 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1830 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
1831 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1832 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1833 //TODO: see issue #153, need a consistent behavior on obnoxious behavior from random node
1834 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.temporary_channel_id));
1836 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration), channel_state, chan);
1837 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
1839 //TODO: same as above
1840 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.temporary_channel_id))
1843 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1844 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
1845 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
1846 channel_value_satoshis: value,
1847 output_script: output_script,
1848 user_channel_id: user_id,
1853 fn internal_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1854 let ((funding_msg, monitor_update), chan) = {
1855 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1856 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1857 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
1858 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1859 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1860 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1861 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.temporary_channel_id));
1863 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg), channel_state, chan), chan.remove())
1865 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.temporary_channel_id))
1868 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
1869 // lock before add_update_monitor
1870 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor_update.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1873 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1874 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1875 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
1876 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1877 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id", funding_msg.channel_id))
1879 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1880 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
1881 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1890 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1891 let (funding_txo, user_id) = {
1892 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1893 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1894 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
1895 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1896 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1897 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1898 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1900 let chan_monitor = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg), channel_state, chan);
1901 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1904 (chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan.get().get_user_id())
1906 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1909 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1910 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingBroadcastSafe {
1911 funding_txo: funding_txo,
1912 user_channel_id: user_id,
1917 fn internal_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1918 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1919 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1920 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
1921 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1922 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1923 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1924 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1926 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_locked(&msg), channel_state, chan);
1927 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(chan.get()) {
1928 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
1929 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1930 msg: announcement_sigs,
1935 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1939 fn internal_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1940 let (mut dropped_htlcs, chan_option) = {
1941 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1942 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1944 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
1945 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1946 if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1947 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1948 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1950 let (shutdown, closing_signed, dropped_htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
1951 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
1952 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
1953 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1957 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
1958 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
1959 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1963 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1964 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1965 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1967 (dropped_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
1968 } else { (dropped_htlcs, None) }
1970 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1973 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
1974 // unknown_next_peer...I dunno who that is anymore....
1975 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() });
1977 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
1978 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1979 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1980 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1988 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1989 let (tx, chan_option) = {
1990 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1991 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1992 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
1993 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1994 if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1995 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1996 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1998 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
1999 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2000 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2001 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2006 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
2007 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
2008 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
2009 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
2010 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
2011 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
2012 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2014 (tx, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
2015 } else { (tx, None) }
2017 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2020 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
2021 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
2023 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
2024 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2025 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2026 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2034 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2035 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
2036 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
2037 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
2039 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
2040 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
2041 //encrypted with the same key. Its not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
2042 //but we should prevent it anyway.
2044 let (mut pending_forward_info, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
2045 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2047 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2048 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2049 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2050 //TODO: here MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2051 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2053 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
2054 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
2055 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
2056 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
2057 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo { incoming_shared_secret, .. }) = pending_forward_info {
2058 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(chan.get());
2059 pending_forward_info = PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2060 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2061 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2062 reason: if let Ok(update) = chan_update {
2063 ChannelManager::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&incoming_shared_secret, 0x1000|20, &update.encode_with_len()[..])
2065 // This can only happen if the channel isn't in the fully-funded
2066 // state yet, implying our counterparty is trying to route payments
2067 // over the channel back to themselves (cause no one else should
2068 // know the short_id is a lightning channel yet). We should have no
2069 // problem just calling this unknown_next_peer
2070 ChannelManager::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&incoming_shared_secret, 0x4000|10, &[])
2075 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info), channel_state, chan);
2077 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2082 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2083 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2085 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2086 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2087 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2088 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2089 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2090 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2092 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), channel_state, chan)
2094 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2097 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_lock, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone());
2101 // Process failure we got back from upstream on a payment we sent. Returns update and a boolean
2102 // indicating that the payment itself failed
2103 fn process_onion_failure(&self, htlc_source: &HTLCSource, mut packet_decrypted: Vec<u8>) -> (Option<msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate>, bool) {
2104 if let &HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref route, ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat } = htlc_source {
2105 macro_rules! onion_failure_log {
2106 ( $error_code_textual: expr, $error_code: expr, $reported_name: expr, $reported_value: expr ) => {
2107 log_trace!(self, "{}({:#x}) {}({})", $error_code_textual, $error_code, $reported_name, $reported_value);
2109 ( $error_code_textual: expr, $error_code: expr ) => {
2110 log_trace!(self, "{}({})", $error_code_textual, $error_code);
2114 const BADONION: u16 = 0x8000;
2115 const PERM: u16 = 0x4000;
2116 const UPDATE: u16 = 0x1000;
2119 let mut htlc_msat = *first_hop_htlc_msat;
2121 // Handle packed channel/node updates for passing back for the route handler
2122 Self::construct_onion_keys_callback(&self.secp_ctx, route, session_priv, |shared_secret, _, _, route_hop| {
2123 if res.is_some() { return; }
2125 let incoming_htlc_msat = htlc_msat;
2126 let amt_to_forward = htlc_msat - route_hop.fee_msat;
2127 htlc_msat = amt_to_forward;
2129 let ammag = ChannelManager::gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret[..]);
2131 let mut decryption_tmp = Vec::with_capacity(packet_decrypted.len());
2132 decryption_tmp.resize(packet_decrypted.len(), 0);
2133 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&ammag, &[0u8; 8]);
2134 chacha.process(&packet_decrypted, &mut decryption_tmp[..]);
2135 packet_decrypted = decryption_tmp;
2137 let is_from_final_node = route.hops.last().unwrap().pubkey == route_hop.pubkey;
2139 if let Ok(err_packet) = msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket::read(&mut Cursor::new(&packet_decrypted)) {
2140 let um = ChannelManager::gen_um_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret[..]);
2141 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &um);
2142 hmac.input(&err_packet.encode()[32..]);
2143 let mut calc_tag = [0u8; 32];
2144 hmac.raw_result(&mut calc_tag);
2146 if crypto::util::fixed_time_eq(&calc_tag, &err_packet.hmac) {
2147 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() < 2 {
2148 // Useless packet that we can't use but it passed HMAC, so it
2149 // definitely came from the peer in question
2150 res = Some((None, !is_from_final_node));
2152 let error_code = byte_utils::slice_to_be16(&err_packet.failuremsg[0..2]);
2154 match error_code & 0xff {
2156 // either from an intermediate or final node
2157 // invalid_realm(PERM|1),
2158 // temporary_node_failure(NODE|2)
2159 // permanent_node_failure(PERM|NODE|2)
2160 // required_node_feature_mssing(PERM|NODE|3)
2161 res = Some((Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure {
2162 node_id: route_hop.pubkey,
2163 is_permanent: error_code & PERM == PERM,
2164 }), !(error_code & PERM == PERM && is_from_final_node)));
2165 // node returning invalid_realm is removed from network_map,
2166 // although NODE flag is not set, TODO: or remove channel only?
2167 // retry payment when removed node is not a final node
2173 if is_from_final_node {
2174 let payment_retryable = match error_code {
2175 c if c == PERM|15 => false, // unknown_payment_hash
2176 c if c == PERM|16 => false, // incorrect_payment_amount
2177 17 => true, // final_expiry_too_soon
2178 18 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() == 6 => { // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
2179 let _reported_cltv_expiry = byte_utils::slice_to_be32(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..2+4]);
2182 19 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() == 10 => { // final_incorrect_htlc_amount
2183 let _reported_incoming_htlc_msat = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..2+8]);
2187 // A final node has sent us either an invalid code or an error_code that
2188 // MUST be sent from the processing node, or the formmat of failuremsg
2189 // does not coform to the spec.
2190 // Remove it from the network map and don't may retry payment
2191 res = Some((Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure {
2192 node_id: route_hop.pubkey,
2198 res = Some((None, payment_retryable));
2202 // now, error_code should be only from the intermediate nodes
2204 _c if error_code & PERM == PERM => {
2205 res = Some((Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed {
2206 short_channel_id: route_hop.short_channel_id,
2210 _c if error_code & UPDATE == UPDATE => {
2211 let offset = match error_code {
2212 c if c == UPDATE|7 => 0, // temporary_channel_failure
2213 c if c == UPDATE|11 => 8, // amount_below_minimum
2214 c if c == UPDATE|12 => 8, // fee_insufficient
2215 c if c == UPDATE|13 => 4, // incorrect_cltv_expiry
2216 c if c == UPDATE|14 => 0, // expiry_too_soon
2217 c if c == UPDATE|20 => 2, // channel_disabled
2219 // node sending unknown code
2220 res = Some((Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure {
2221 node_id: route_hop.pubkey,
2228 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() >= offset + 2 {
2229 let update_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be16(&err_packet.failuremsg[offset+2..offset+4]) as usize;
2230 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() >= offset + 4 + update_len {
2231 if let Ok(chan_update) = msgs::ChannelUpdate::read(&mut Cursor::new(&err_packet.failuremsg[offset + 4..offset + 4 + update_len])) {
2232 // if channel_update should NOT have caused the failure:
2233 // MAY treat the channel_update as invalid.
2234 let is_chan_update_invalid = match error_code {
2235 c if c == UPDATE|7 => { // temporary_channel_failure
2238 c if c == UPDATE|11 => { // amount_below_minimum
2239 let reported_htlc_msat = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..2+8]);
2240 onion_failure_log!("amount_below_minimum", UPDATE|11, "htlc_msat", reported_htlc_msat);
2241 incoming_htlc_msat > chan_update.contents.htlc_minimum_msat
2243 c if c == UPDATE|12 => { // fee_insufficient
2244 let reported_htlc_msat = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..2+8]);
2245 let new_fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan_update.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64).and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(chan_update.contents.fee_base_msat as u64) });
2246 onion_failure_log!("fee_insufficient", UPDATE|12, "htlc_msat", reported_htlc_msat);
2247 new_fee.is_none() || incoming_htlc_msat >= new_fee.unwrap() && incoming_htlc_msat >= amt_to_forward + new_fee.unwrap()
2249 c if c == UPDATE|13 => { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
2250 let reported_cltv_expiry = byte_utils::slice_to_be32(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..2+4]);
2251 onion_failure_log!("incorrect_cltv_expiry", UPDATE|13, "cltv_expiry", reported_cltv_expiry);
2252 route_hop.cltv_expiry_delta as u16 >= chan_update.contents.cltv_expiry_delta
2254 c if c == UPDATE|20 => { // channel_disabled
2255 let reported_flags = byte_utils::slice_to_be16(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..2+2]);
2256 onion_failure_log!("channel_disabled", UPDATE|20, "flags", reported_flags);
2257 chan_update.contents.flags & 0x01 == 0x01
2259 c if c == UPDATE|21 => true, // expiry_too_far
2260 _ => { unreachable!(); },
2263 let msg = if is_chan_update_invalid { None } else {
2264 Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage {
2268 res = Some((msg, true));
2274 _c if error_code & BADONION == BADONION => {
2277 14 => { // expiry_too_soon
2278 res = Some((None, true));
2282 // node sending unknown code
2283 res = Some((Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure {
2284 node_id: route_hop.pubkey,
2293 }).expect("Route that we sent via spontaneously grew invalid keys in the middle of it?");
2294 res.unwrap_or((None, true))
2295 } else { ((None, true)) }
2298 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2299 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2300 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2301 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2302 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2303 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2304 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2305 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2307 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err: msg.reason.clone() }), channel_state, chan);
2309 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2314 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2315 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2316 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2317 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2318 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2319 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2320 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2321 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2323 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
2324 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_close_chan("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set", msg.channel_id));
2326 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() }), channel_state, chan);
2329 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2333 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2334 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2335 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2336 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2337 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2338 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2339 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2340 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2342 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, closing_signed, chan_monitor) =
2343 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &*self.fee_estimator), channel_state, chan);
2344 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
2347 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
2348 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2349 msg: revoke_and_ack,
2351 if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
2352 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2353 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2354 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2355 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2356 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2357 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2358 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2360 commitment_signed: msg,
2364 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2365 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2366 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2372 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2377 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, Vec<(PendingForwardHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
2378 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
2379 let mut forward_event = None;
2380 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
2381 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2382 if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
2383 forward_event = Some(Instant::now() + Duration::from_millis(((rng::rand_f32() * 4.0 + 1.0) * MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS as f32) as u64));
2384 channel_state.next_forward = forward_event.unwrap();
2386 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2387 match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(forward_info.short_channel_id) {
2388 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
2389 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info });
2391 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2392 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info }));
2397 match forward_event {
2399 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2400 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
2401 time_forwardable: time
2409 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2410 let (pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, short_channel_id) = {
2411 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2412 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2413 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2414 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2415 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2416 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2417 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2419 let (commitment_update, pending_forwards, pending_failures, closing_signed, chan_monitor) =
2420 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &*self.fee_estimator), channel_state, chan);
2421 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
2424 if let Some(updates) = commitment_update {
2425 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2426 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2430 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2431 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2432 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2436 (pending_forwards, pending_failures, chan.get().get_short_channel_id().expect("RAA should only work on a short-id-available channel"))
2438 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2441 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
2442 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
2444 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, pending_forwards)]);
2449 fn internal_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2450 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2451 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2452 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2453 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2454 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2455 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2456 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2458 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan);
2460 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2465 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2466 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2467 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2469 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2470 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2471 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2472 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2474 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
2475 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(HandleError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError)}));
2478 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
2479 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) =
2480 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), self.genesis_hash.clone()), channel_state, chan);
2482 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_id;
2483 let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
2484 let bad_sig_action = MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_close_chan("Bad announcement_signatures node_signature", msg.channel_id);
2485 secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.node_id_2 } else { &announcement.node_id_1 }), bad_sig_action);
2486 secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.bitcoin_key_2 } else { &announcement.bitcoin_key_1 }), bad_sig_action);
2488 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
2490 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
2491 msg: msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
2492 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { msg.node_signature },
2493 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.node_signature } else { our_node_sig },
2494 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { msg.bitcoin_signature },
2495 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.bitcoin_signature } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
2496 contents: announcement,
2498 update_msg: self.get_channel_update(chan.get()).unwrap(), // can only fail if we're not in a ready state
2501 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2506 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2507 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2508 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2510 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2511 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2512 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2513 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2515 let (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, channel_monitor, order, shutdown) =
2516 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(msg), channel_state, chan);
2517 if let Some(monitor) = channel_monitor {
2518 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
2522 if let Some(msg) = funding_locked {
2523 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
2524 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2528 macro_rules! send_raa { () => {
2529 if let Some(msg) = revoke_and_ack {
2530 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
2531 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2536 macro_rules! send_cu { () => {
2537 if let Some(updates) = commitment_update {
2538 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2539 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2545 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
2549 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
2554 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
2555 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2556 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2562 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2566 /// Begin Update fee process. Allowed only on an outbound channel.
2567 /// If successful, will generate a UpdateHTLCs event, so you should probably poll
2568 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
2569 /// Note: This API is likely to change!
2571 pub fn update_fee(&self, channel_id: [u8;32], feerate_per_kw: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2572 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2573 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2574 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2576 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
2577 None => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel"}),
2579 if !chan.is_outbound() {
2580 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "update_fee cannot be sent for an inbound channel"});
2582 if chan.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
2583 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
2585 if !chan.is_live() {
2586 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel is either not yet fully established or peer is currently disconnected"});
2588 if let Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, chan_monitor)) = chan.send_update_fee_and_commit(feerate_per_kw)
2589 .map_err(|e| match e {
2590 ChannelError::Ignore(err) => APIError::APIMisuseError{err},
2591 ChannelError::Close(err) => {
2592 // TODO: We need to close the channel here, but for that to be safe we have
2593 // to do all channel closure inside the channel_state lock which is a
2594 // somewhat-larger refactor, so we leave that for later.
2595 APIError::APIMisuseError{err}
2598 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
2601 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2602 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
2603 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2604 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2605 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2606 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2607 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2608 update_fee: Some(update_fee),
2619 impl events::MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager {
2620 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<events::MessageSendEvent> {
2621 let mut ret = Vec::new();
2622 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2623 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events);
2628 impl events::EventsProvider for ChannelManager {
2629 fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
2630 let mut ret = Vec::new();
2631 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2632 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut *pending_events);
2637 impl ChainListener for ChannelManager {
2638 fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) {
2639 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2640 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2642 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2643 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2644 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
2645 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2646 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
2647 let chan_res = channel.block_connected(header, height, txn_matched, indexes_of_txn_matched);
2648 if let Ok(Some(funding_locked)) = chan_res {
2649 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
2650 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2651 msg: funding_locked,
2653 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
2654 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
2655 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2656 msg: announcement_sigs,
2659 short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
2660 } else if let Err(e) = chan_res {
2661 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2662 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2663 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: e }),
2667 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
2668 for tx in txn_matched {
2669 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
2670 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
2671 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
2672 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2674 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain. We go ahead and
2675 // broadcast our latest local state as well here, just in case its
2676 // some kind of SPV attack, though we expect these to be dropped.
2677 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown());
2678 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
2679 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2688 if channel.is_funding_initiated() && channel.channel_monitor().would_broadcast_at_height(height) {
2689 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
2690 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2692 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown());
2693 // If would_broadcast_at_height() is true, the channel_monitor will broadcast
2694 // the latest local tx for us, so we should skip that here (it doesn't really
2695 // hurt anything, but does make tests a bit simpler).
2696 failed_channels.last_mut().unwrap().0 = Vec::new();
2697 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
2698 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2707 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2708 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2710 self.latest_block_height.store(height as usize, Ordering::Release);
2711 *self.last_block_hash.try_lock().expect("block_(dis)connected must not be called in parallel") = header.bitcoin_hash();
2714 /// We force-close the channel without letting our counterparty participate in the shutdown
2715 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader) {
2716 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2717 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2719 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2720 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2721 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
2722 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2723 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, v| {
2724 if v.block_disconnected(header) {
2725 if let Some(short_id) = v.get_short_channel_id() {
2726 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2728 failed_channels.push(v.force_shutdown());
2729 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&v) {
2730 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2740 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2741 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2743 self.latest_block_height.fetch_sub(1, Ordering::AcqRel);
2744 *self.last_block_hash.try_lock().expect("block_(dis)connected must not be called in parallel") = header.bitcoin_hash();
2748 impl ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager {
2749 //TODO: Handle errors and close channel (or so)
2750 fn handle_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2751 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2752 handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2755 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2756 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2757 handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2760 fn handle_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2761 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2762 handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2765 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2766 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2767 handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2770 fn handle_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2771 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2772 handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_locked(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2775 fn handle_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2776 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2777 handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2780 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2781 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2782 handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2785 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), msgs::HandleError> {
2786 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2787 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2790 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2791 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2792 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2795 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2796 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2797 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2800 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2801 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2802 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2805 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2806 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2807 handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2810 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2811 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2812 handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2815 fn handle_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2816 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2817 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2820 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2821 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2822 handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2825 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2826 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2827 handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2830 fn peer_disconnected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
2831 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2832 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2833 let mut failed_payments = Vec::new();
2835 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2836 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2837 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
2838 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2839 if no_connection_possible {
2840 log_debug!(self, "Failing all channels with {} due to no_connection_possible", log_pubkey!(their_node_id));
2841 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2842 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2843 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
2844 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2846 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown());
2847 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2848 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2858 log_debug!(self, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates", log_pubkey!(their_node_id));
2859 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2860 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2861 //TODO: mark channel disabled (and maybe announce such after a timeout).
2862 let failed_adds = chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused();
2863 if !failed_adds.is_empty() {
2864 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(&chan).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe
2865 failed_payments.push((chan_update, failed_adds));
2867 if chan.is_shutdown() {
2868 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
2869 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2878 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2879 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2881 for (chan_update, mut htlc_sources) in failed_payments {
2882 for (htlc_source, payment_hash) in htlc_sources.drain(..) {
2883 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.clone() });
2888 fn peer_connected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey) {
2889 log_debug!(self, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(their_node_id));
2891 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2892 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2893 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2894 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2895 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2896 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2897 if !chan.have_received_message() {
2898 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
2899 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
2900 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
2904 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
2905 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
2906 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(),
2912 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
2915 fn handle_error(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
2916 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2918 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
2919 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2920 if chan.remote_network_id == *their_node_id {
2921 self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
2925 self.force_close_channel(&msg.channel_id);
2930 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
2931 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
2933 impl Writeable for PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
2934 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
2935 if let &Some(ref onion) = &self.onion_packet {
2937 onion.write(writer)?;
2941 self.incoming_shared_secret.write(writer)?;
2942 self.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
2943 self.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
2944 self.amt_to_forward.write(writer)?;
2945 self.outgoing_cltv_value.write(writer)?;
2950 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
2951 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<PendingForwardHTLCInfo, DecodeError> {
2952 let onion_packet = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2954 1 => Some(msgs::OnionPacket::read(reader)?),
2955 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2957 Ok(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
2959 incoming_shared_secret: Readable::read(reader)?,
2960 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
2961 short_channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
2962 amt_to_forward: Readable::read(reader)?,
2963 outgoing_cltv_value: Readable::read(reader)?,
2968 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
2969 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
2971 &HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(ref fail_msg) => {
2973 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
2975 &HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(ref fail_msg) => {
2977 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
2984 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for HTLCFailureMsg {
2985 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCFailureMsg, DecodeError> {
2986 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2987 0 => Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(Readable::read(reader)?)),
2988 1 => Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(Readable::read(reader)?)),
2989 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2994 impl Writeable for PendingHTLCStatus {
2995 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
2997 &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(ref forward_info) => {
2999 forward_info.write(writer)?;
3001 &PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(ref fail_msg) => {
3003 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
3010 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for PendingHTLCStatus {
3011 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<PendingHTLCStatus, DecodeError> {
3012 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3013 0 => Ok(PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3014 1 => Ok(PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3015 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3020 impl_writeable!(HTLCPreviousHopData, 0, {
3023 incoming_packet_shared_secret
3026 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
3027 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3029 &HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref hop_data) => {
3031 hop_data.write(writer)?;
3033 &HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref route, ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
3035 route.write(writer)?;
3036 session_priv.write(writer)?;
3037 first_hop_htlc_msat.write(writer)?;
3044 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for HTLCSource {
3045 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCSource, DecodeError> {
3046 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3047 0 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3048 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
3049 route: Readable::read(reader)?,
3050 session_priv: Readable::read(reader)?,
3051 first_hop_htlc_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
3053 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3058 impl Writeable for HTLCFailReason {
3059 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3061 &HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { ref err } => {
3065 &HTLCFailReason::Reason { ref failure_code, ref data } => {
3067 failure_code.write(writer)?;
3068 data.write(writer)?;
3075 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for HTLCFailReason {
3076 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCFailReason, DecodeError> {
3077 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3078 0 => Ok(HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err: Readable::read(reader)? }),
3079 1 => Ok(HTLCFailReason::Reason {
3080 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
3081 data: Readable::read(reader)?,
3083 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3088 impl_writeable!(HTLCForwardInfo, 0, {
3089 prev_short_channel_id,
3094 impl Writeable for ChannelManager {
3095 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3096 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
3098 writer.write_all(&[SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
3099 writer.write_all(&[MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
3101 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
3102 (self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
3103 self.last_block_hash.lock().unwrap().write(writer)?;
3105 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3106 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
3107 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
3108 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
3109 unfunded_channels += 1;
3112 ((channel_state.by_id.len() - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
3113 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
3114 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
3115 channel.write(writer)?;
3119 (channel_state.forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3120 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.iter() {
3121 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
3122 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3123 for forward in pending_forwards {
3124 forward.write(writer)?;
3128 (channel_state.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3129 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in channel_state.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
3130 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
3131 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3132 for previous_hop in previous_hops {
3133 previous_hop.write(writer)?;
3141 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
3143 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
3145 /// 1) Deserialize all stored ChannelMonitors.
3146 /// 2) Deserialize the ChannelManager by filling in this struct and calling <(Sha256dHash,
3147 /// ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args).
3148 /// This may result in closing some Channels if the ChannelMonitor is newer than the stored
3149 /// ChannelManager state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
3150 /// 3) Register all relevant ChannelMonitor outpoints with your chain watch mechanism using
3151 /// ChannelMonitor::get_monitored_outpoints and ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo().
3152 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your ChannelMonitors.
3153 /// 5) Move the ChannelMonitors into your local ManyChannelMonitor.
3154 /// 6) Disconnect/connect blocks on the ChannelManager.
3155 /// 7) Register the new ChannelManager with your ChainWatchInterface (this does not happen
3156 /// automatically as it does in ChannelManager::new()).
3157 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a> {
3158 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
3159 /// deserialization.
3160 pub keys_manager: Arc<KeysInterface>,
3162 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
3164 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
3165 pub fee_estimator: Arc<FeeEstimator>,
3166 /// The ManyChannelMonitor for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
3168 /// No calls to the ManyChannelMonitor will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
3169 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
3170 /// ManyChannelMonitor after deserializing this ChannelManager.
3171 pub monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>,
3172 /// The ChainWatchInterface for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
3174 /// No calls to the ChainWatchInterface will be made during deserialization.
3175 pub chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>,
3176 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
3177 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
3178 /// force-closed during deserialization.
3179 pub tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>,
3180 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
3181 /// deserialization.
3182 pub logger: Arc<Logger>,
3183 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
3184 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
3185 pub default_config: UserConfig,
3187 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
3188 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
3190 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
3191 /// be force-closed using the data in the channelmonitor and the Channel will be dropped. This
3192 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
3193 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
3195 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
3197 pub channel_monitors: &'a HashMap<OutPoint, &'a ChannelMonitor>,
3200 impl<'a, R : ::std::io::Read> ReadableArgs<R, ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a>> for (Sha256dHash, ChannelManager) {
3201 fn read(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
3202 let _ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3203 let min_ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3204 if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION {
3205 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion);
3208 let genesis_hash: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3209 let latest_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3210 let last_block_hash: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3212 let mut closed_channels = Vec::new();
3214 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3215 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
3216 let mut by_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
3217 let mut short_to_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
3218 for _ in 0..channel_count {
3219 let mut channel: Channel = ReadableArgs::read(reader, args.logger.clone())?;
3220 if channel.last_block_connected != last_block_hash {
3221 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3224 let funding_txo = channel.channel_monitor().get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
3225 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
3226 if let Some(monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo) {
3227 if channel.get_cur_local_commitment_transaction_number() != monitor.get_cur_local_commitment_number() ||
3228 channel.get_revoked_remote_commitment_transaction_number() != monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
3229 channel.get_cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number() != monitor.get_cur_remote_commitment_number() {
3230 let mut force_close_res = channel.force_shutdown();
3231 force_close_res.0 = monitor.get_latest_local_commitment_txn();
3232 closed_channels.push(force_close_res);
3234 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
3235 short_to_id.insert(short_channel_id, channel.channel_id());
3237 by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
3240 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3244 for (ref funding_txo, ref monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
3245 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
3246 closed_channels.push((monitor.get_latest_local_commitment_txn(), Vec::new()));
3250 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3251 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
3252 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
3253 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
3254 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3255 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, 128));
3256 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
3257 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
3259 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
3262 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3263 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
3264 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
3265 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3266 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3267 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, 2));
3268 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
3269 previous_hops.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
3271 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, previous_hops);
3274 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
3276 fee_estimator: args.fee_estimator,
3277 monitor: args.monitor,
3278 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
3279 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
3281 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(latest_block_height as usize),
3282 last_block_hash: Mutex::new(last_block_hash),
3283 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
3285 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder {
3288 next_forward: Instant::now(),
3291 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
3293 our_network_key: args.keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
3295 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
3296 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
3297 keys_manager: args.keys_manager,
3298 logger: args.logger,
3299 default_configuration: args.default_config,
3302 for close_res in closed_channels.drain(..) {
3303 channel_manager.finish_force_close_channel(close_res);
3304 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
3305 //connection or two.
3308 Ok((last_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
3314 use chain::chaininterface;
3315 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
3316 use chain::chaininterface::{ChainListener, ChainWatchInterface};
3317 use chain::keysinterface::{KeysInterface, SpendableOutputDescriptor};
3318 use chain::keysinterface;
3319 use ln::channel::{COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT, COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC};
3320 use ln::channelmanager::{ChannelManager,ChannelManagerReadArgs,OnionKeys,PaymentFailReason,RAACommitmentOrder};
3321 use ln::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS, ManyChannelMonitor};
3322 use ln::router::{Route, RouteHop, Router};
3324 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler,RoutingMessageHandler};
3325 use util::test_utils;
3326 use util::events::{Event, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
3327 use util::errors::APIError;
3328 use util::logger::Logger;
3329 use util::ser::{Writeable, Writer, ReadableArgs};
3330 use util::config::UserConfig;
3332 use bitcoin::util::hash::{BitcoinHash, Sha256dHash};
3333 use bitcoin::util::bip143;
3334 use bitcoin::util::address::Address;
3335 use bitcoin::util::bip32::{ChildNumber, ExtendedPubKey, ExtendedPrivKey};
3336 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
3337 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut, TxIn, SigHashType};
3338 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Builder, Script};
3339 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
3340 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
3341 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
3345 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1, Message};
3346 use secp256k1::key::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
3348 use crypto::sha2::Sha256;
3349 use crypto::digest::Digest;
3351 use rand::{thread_rng,Rng};
3353 use std::cell::RefCell;
3354 use std::collections::{BTreeSet, HashMap};
3355 use std::default::Default;
3357 use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
3358 use std::sync::atomic::Ordering;
3359 use std::time::Instant;
3362 fn build_test_onion_keys() -> Vec<OnionKeys> {
3363 // Keys from BOLT 4, used in both test vector tests
3364 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3369 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("02eec7245d6b7d2ccb30380bfbe2a3648cd7a942653f5aa340edcea1f283686619").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
3370 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
3373 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("0324653eac434488002cc06bbfb7f10fe18991e35f9fe4302dbea6d2353dc0ab1c").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
3374 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
3377 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("027f31ebc5462c1fdce1b737ecff52d37d75dea43ce11c74d25aa297165faa2007").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
3378 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
3381 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
3382 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
3385 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("02edabbd16b41c8371b92ef2f04c1185b4f03b6dcd52ba9b78d9d7c89c8f221145").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
3386 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
3391 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("4141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
3393 let onion_keys = ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
3394 assert_eq!(onion_keys.len(), route.hops.len());
3399 fn onion_vectors() {
3400 // Packet creation test vectors from BOLT 4
3401 let onion_keys = build_test_onion_keys();
3403 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("53eb63ea8a3fec3b3cd433b85cd62a4b145e1dda09391b348c4e1cd36a03ea66").unwrap()[..]);
3404 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("2ec2e5da605776054187180343287683aa6a51b4b1c04d6dd49c45d8cffb3c36").unwrap()[..]);
3405 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("02eec7245d6b7d2ccb30380bfbe2a3648cd7a942653f5aa340edcea1f283686619").unwrap()[..]);
3406 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].rho, hex::decode("ce496ec94def95aadd4bec15cdb41a740c9f2b62347c4917325fcc6fb0453986").unwrap()[..]);
3407 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].mu, hex::decode("b57061dc6d0a2b9f261ac410c8b26d64ac5506cbba30267a649c28c179400eba").unwrap()[..]);
3409 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("a6519e98832a0b179f62123b3567c106db99ee37bef036e783263602f3488fae").unwrap()[..]);
3410 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("bf66c28bc22e598cfd574a1931a2bafbca09163df2261e6d0056b2610dab938f").unwrap()[..]);
3411 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("028f9438bfbf7feac2e108d677e3a82da596be706cc1cf342b75c7b7e22bf4e6e2").unwrap()[..]);
3412 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].rho, hex::decode("450ffcabc6449094918ebe13d4f03e433d20a3d28a768203337bc40b6e4b2c59").unwrap()[..]);
3413 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].mu, hex::decode("05ed2b4a3fb023c2ff5dd6ed4b9b6ea7383f5cfe9d59c11d121ec2c81ca2eea9").unwrap()[..]);
3415 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("3a6b412548762f0dbccce5c7ae7bb8147d1caf9b5471c34120b30bc9c04891cc").unwrap()[..]);
3416 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("a1f2dadd184eb1627049673f18c6325814384facdee5bfd935d9cb031a1698a5").unwrap()[..]);
3417 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("03bfd8225241ea71cd0843db7709f4c222f62ff2d4516fd38b39914ab6b83e0da0").unwrap()[..]);
3418 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].rho, hex::decode("11bf5c4f960239cb37833936aa3d02cea82c0f39fd35f566109c41f9eac8deea").unwrap()[..]);
3419 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].mu, hex::decode("caafe2820fa00eb2eeb78695ae452eba38f5a53ed6d53518c5c6edf76f3f5b78").unwrap()[..]);
3421 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("21e13c2d7cfe7e18836df50872466117a295783ab8aab0e7ecc8c725503ad02d").unwrap()[..]);
3422 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("7cfe0b699f35525029ae0fa437c69d0f20f7ed4e3916133f9cacbb13c82ff262").unwrap()[..]);
3423 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("031dde6926381289671300239ea8e57ffaf9bebd05b9a5b95beaf07af05cd43595").unwrap()[..]);
3424 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].rho, hex::decode("cbe784ab745c13ff5cffc2fbe3e84424aa0fd669b8ead4ee562901a4a4e89e9e").unwrap()[..]);
3425 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].mu, hex::decode("5052aa1b3d9f0655a0932e50d42f0c9ba0705142c25d225515c45f47c0036ee9").unwrap()[..]);
3427 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("b5756b9b542727dbafc6765a49488b023a725d631af688fc031217e90770c328").unwrap()[..]);
3428 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("c96e00dddaf57e7edcd4fb5954be5b65b09f17cb6d20651b4e90315be5779205").unwrap()[..]);
3429 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("03a214ebd875aab6ddfd77f22c5e7311d7f77f17a169e599f157bbcdae8bf071f4").unwrap()[..]);
3430 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].rho, hex::decode("034e18b8cc718e8af6339106e706c52d8df89e2b1f7e9142d996acf88df8799b").unwrap()[..]);
3431 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].mu, hex::decode("8e45e5c61c2b24cb6382444db6698727afb063adecd72aada233d4bf273d975a").unwrap()[..]);
3433 // Test vectors below are flat-out wrong: they claim to set outgoing_cltv_value to non-0 :/
3434 let payloads = vec!(
3435 msgs::OnionHopData {
3437 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
3438 short_channel_id: 0,
3440 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
3444 msgs::OnionHopData {
3446 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
3447 short_channel_id: 0x0101010101010101,
3448 amt_to_forward: 0x0100000001,
3449 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
3453 msgs::OnionHopData {
3455 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
3456 short_channel_id: 0x0202020202020202,
3457 amt_to_forward: 0x0200000002,
3458 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
3462 msgs::OnionHopData {
3464 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
3465 short_channel_id: 0x0303030303030303,
3466 amt_to_forward: 0x0300000003,
3467 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
3471 msgs::OnionHopData {
3473 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
3474 short_channel_id: 0x0404040404040404,
3475 amt_to_forward: 0x0400000004,
3476 outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
3482 let packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(payloads, onion_keys, &[0x42; 32]);
3483 // Just check the final packet encoding, as it includes all the per-hop vectors in it
3485 assert_eq!(packet.encode(), hex::decode("0002eec7245d6b7d2ccb30380bfbe2a3648cd7a942653f5aa340edcea1f283686619e5f14350c2a76fc232b5e46d421e9615471ab9e0bc887beff8c95fdb878f7b3a716a996c7845c93d90e4ecbb9bde4ece2f69425c99e4bc820e44485455f135edc0d10f7d61ab590531cf08000179a333a347f8b4072f216400406bdf3bf038659793d4a1fd7b246979e3150a0a4cb052c9ec69acf0f48c3d39cd55675fe717cb7d80ce721caad69320c3a469a202f1e468c67eaf7a7cd8226d0fd32f7b48084dca885d56047694762b67021713ca673929c163ec36e04e40ca8e1c6d17569419d3039d9a1ec866abe044a9ad635778b961fc0776dc832b3a451bd5d35072d2269cf9b040f6b7a7dad84fb114ed413b1426cb96ceaf83825665ed5a1d002c1687f92465b49ed4c7f0218ff8c6c7dd7221d589c65b3b9aaa71a41484b122846c7c7b57e02e679ea8469b70e14fe4f70fee4d87b910cf144be6fe48eef24da475c0b0bcc6565ae82cd3f4e3b24c76eaa5616c6111343306ab35c1fe5ca4a77c0e314ed7dba39d6f1e0de791719c241a939cc493bea2bae1c1e932679ea94d29084278513c77b899cc98059d06a27d171b0dbdf6bee13ddc4fc17a0c4d2827d488436b57baa167544138ca2e64a11b43ac8a06cd0c2fba2d4d900ed2d9205305e2d7383cc98dacb078133de5f6fb6bed2ef26ba92cea28aafc3b9948dd9ae5559e8bd6920b8cea462aa445ca6a95e0e7ba52961b181c79e73bd581821df2b10173727a810c92b83b5ba4a0403eb710d2ca10689a35bec6c3a708e9e92f7d78ff3c5d9989574b00c6736f84c199256e76e19e78f0c98a9d580b4a658c84fc8f2096c2fbea8f5f8c59d0fdacb3be2802ef802abbecb3aba4acaac69a0e965abd8981e9896b1f6ef9d60f7a164b371af869fd0e48073742825e9434fc54da837e120266d53302954843538ea7c6c3dbfb4ff3b2fdbe244437f2a153ccf7bdb4c92aa08102d4f3cff2ae5ef86fab4653595e6a5837fa2f3e29f27a9cde5966843fb847a4a61f1e76c281fe8bb2b0a181d096100db5a1a5ce7a910238251a43ca556712eaadea167fb4d7d75825e440f3ecd782036d7574df8bceacb397abefc5f5254d2722215c53ff54af8299aaaad642c6d72a14d27882d9bbd539e1cc7a527526ba89b8c037ad09120e98ab042d3e8652b31ae0e478516bfaf88efca9f3676ffe99d2819dcaeb7610a626695f53117665d267d3f7abebd6bbd6733f645c72c389f03855bdf1e4b8075b516569b118233a0f0971d24b83113c0b096f5216a207ca99a7cddc81c130923fe3d91e7508c9ac5f2e914ff5dccab9e558566fa14efb34ac98d878580814b94b73acbfde9072f30b881f7f0fff42d4045d1ace6322d86a97d164aa84d93a60498065cc7c20e636f5862dc81531a88c60305a2e59a985be327a6902e4bed986dbf4a0b50c217af0ea7fdf9ab37f9ea1a1aaa72f54cf40154ea9b269f1a7c09f9f43245109431a175d50e2db0132337baa0ef97eed0fcf20489da36b79a1172faccc2f7ded7c60e00694282d93359c4682135642bc81f433574aa8ef0c97b4ade7ca372c5ffc23c7eddd839bab4e0f14d6df15c9dbeab176bec8b5701cf054eb3072f6dadc98f88819042bf10c407516ee58bce33fbe3b3d86a54255e577db4598e30a135361528c101683a5fcde7e8ba53f3456254be8f45fe3a56120ae96ea3773631fcb3873aa3abd91bcff00bd38bd43697a2e789e00da6077482e7b1b1a677b5afae4c54e6cbdf7377b694eb7d7a5b913476a5be923322d3de06060fd5e819635232a2cf4f0731da13b8546d1d6d4f8d75b9fce6c2341a71b0ea6f780df54bfdb0dd5cd9855179f602f9172307c7268724c3618e6817abd793adc214a0dc0bc616816632f27ea336fb56dfd").unwrap());
3489 fn test_failure_packet_onion() {
3490 // Returning Errors test vectors from BOLT 4
3492 let onion_keys = build_test_onion_keys();
3493 let onion_error = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(&onion_keys[4].shared_secret[..], 0x2002, &[0; 0]);
3494 assert_eq!(onion_error.encode(), hex::decode("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").unwrap());
3496 let onion_packet_1 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[4].shared_secret[..], &onion_error.encode()[..]);
3497 assert_eq!(onion_packet_1.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
3499 let onion_packet_2 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[3].shared_secret[..], &onion_packet_1.data[..]);
3500 assert_eq!(onion_packet_2.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
3502 let onion_packet_3 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[2].shared_secret[..], &onion_packet_2.data[..]);
3503 assert_eq!(onion_packet_3.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
3505 let onion_packet_4 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[1].shared_secret[..], &onion_packet_3.data[..]);
3506 assert_eq!(onion_packet_4.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
3508 let onion_packet_5 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[0].shared_secret[..], &onion_packet_4.data[..]);
3509 assert_eq!(onion_packet_5.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
3512 fn confirm_transaction(chain: &chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil, tx: &Transaction, chan_id: u32) {
3513 assert!(chain.does_match_tx(tx));
3514 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3515 chain.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[tx; 1], &[chan_id; 1]);
3517 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3518 chain.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &[tx; 0], &[0; 0]);
3523 chain_monitor: Arc<chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil>,
3524 tx_broadcaster: Arc<test_utils::TestBroadcaster>,
3525 chan_monitor: Arc<test_utils::TestChannelMonitor>,
3526 node: Arc<ChannelManager>,
3528 node_seed: [u8; 32],
3529 network_payment_count: Rc<RefCell<u8>>,
3530 network_chan_count: Rc<RefCell<u32>>,
3532 impl Drop for Node {
3533 fn drop(&mut self) {
3534 if !::std::thread::panicking() {
3535 // Check that we processed all pending events
3536 assert_eq!(self.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().len(), 0);
3537 assert_eq!(self.node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
3538 assert_eq!(self.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
3543 fn create_chan_between_nodes(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node) -> (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
3544 create_chan_between_nodes_with_value(node_a, node_b, 100000, 10001)
3547 fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, channel_value: u64, push_msat: u64) -> (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
3548 let (funding_locked, channel_id, tx) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(node_a, node_b, channel_value, push_msat);
3549 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(node_a, node_b, &funding_locked);
3550 (announcement, as_update, bs_update, channel_id, tx)
3553 macro_rules! get_revoke_commit_msgs {
3554 ($node: expr, $node_id: expr) => {
3556 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3557 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
3559 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3560 assert_eq!(*node_id, $node_id);
3563 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3564 }, match events[1] {
3565 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
3566 assert_eq!(*node_id, $node_id);
3567 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3568 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3569 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3570 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3571 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3572 updates.commitment_signed.clone()
3574 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3580 macro_rules! get_event_msg {
3581 ($node: expr, $event_type: path, $node_id: expr) => {
3583 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3584 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3586 $event_type { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3587 assert_eq!(*node_id, $node_id);
3590 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3596 macro_rules! get_htlc_update_msgs {
3597 ($node: expr, $node_id: expr) => {
3599 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3600 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3602 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
3603 assert_eq!(*node_id, $node_id);
3606 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3612 macro_rules! get_feerate {
3613 ($node: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
3615 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3616 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&$channel_id).unwrap();
3623 fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, channel_value: u64, push_msat: u64) -> Transaction {
3624 node_a.node.create_channel(node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value, push_msat, 42).unwrap();
3625 node_b.node.handle_open_channel(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.node.get_our_node_id())).unwrap();
3626 node_a.node.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.node.get_our_node_id())).unwrap();
3628 let chan_id = *node_a.network_chan_count.borrow();
3632 let events_2 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3633 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3635 Event::FundingGenerationReady { ref temporary_channel_id, ref channel_value_satoshis, ref output_script, user_channel_id } => {
3636 assert_eq!(*channel_value_satoshis, channel_value);
3637 assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
3639 tx = Transaction { version: chan_id as u32, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
3640 value: *channel_value_satoshis, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
3642 funding_output = OutPoint::new(tx.txid(), 0);
3644 node_a.node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, funding_output);
3645 let mut added_monitors = node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
3646 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
3647 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
3648 added_monitors.clear();
3650 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3653 node_b.node.handle_funding_created(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.node.get_our_node_id())).unwrap();
3655 let mut added_monitors = node_b.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
3656 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
3657 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
3658 added_monitors.clear();
3661 node_a.node.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.node.get_our_node_id())).unwrap();
3663 let mut added_monitors = node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
3664 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
3665 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
3666 added_monitors.clear();
3669 let events_4 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3670 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
3672 Event::FundingBroadcastSafe { ref funding_txo, user_channel_id } => {
3673 assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
3674 assert_eq!(*funding_txo, funding_output);
3676 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3682 fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, tx: &Transaction) -> ((msgs::FundingLocked, msgs::AnnouncementSignatures), [u8; 32]) {
3683 confirm_transaction(&node_b.chain_monitor, &tx, tx.version);
3684 node_a.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, node_a.node.get_our_node_id())).unwrap();
3688 confirm_transaction(&node_a.chain_monitor, &tx, tx.version);
3689 let events_6 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3690 assert_eq!(events_6.len(), 2);
3691 ((match events_6[0] {
3692 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3693 channel_id = msg.channel_id.clone();
3694 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
3697 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3698 }, match events_6[1] {
3699 MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3700 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
3703 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3707 fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, channel_value: u64, push_msat: u64) -> ((msgs::FundingLocked, msgs::AnnouncementSignatures), [u8; 32], Transaction) {
3708 let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(node_a, node_b, channel_value, push_msat);
3709 let (msgs, chan_id) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(node_a, node_b, &tx);
3713 fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, as_funding_msgs: &(msgs::FundingLocked, msgs::AnnouncementSignatures)) -> (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
3714 node_b.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_funding_msgs.0).unwrap();
3715 let bs_announcement_sigs = get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures, node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
3716 node_b.node.handle_announcement_signatures(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_funding_msgs.1).unwrap();
3718 let events_7 = node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3719 assert_eq!(events_7.len(), 1);
3720 let (announcement, bs_update) = match events_7[0] {
3721 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
3724 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3727 node_a.node.handle_announcement_signatures(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_announcement_sigs).unwrap();
3728 let events_8 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3729 assert_eq!(events_8.len(), 1);
3730 let as_update = match events_8[0] {
3731 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
3732 assert!(*announcement == *msg);
3735 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3738 *node_a.network_chan_count.borrow_mut() += 1;
3740 ((*announcement).clone(), (*as_update).clone(), (*bs_update).clone())
3743 fn create_announced_chan_between_nodes(nodes: &Vec<Node>, a: usize, b: usize) -> (msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
3744 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(nodes, a, b, 100000, 10001)
3747 fn create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(nodes: &Vec<Node>, a: usize, b: usize, channel_value: u64, push_msat: u64) -> (msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
3748 let chan_announcement = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes[a], &nodes[b], channel_value, push_msat);
3750 assert!(node.router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement.0).unwrap());
3751 node.router.handle_channel_update(&chan_announcement.1).unwrap();
3752 node.router.handle_channel_update(&chan_announcement.2).unwrap();
3754 (chan_announcement.1, chan_announcement.2, chan_announcement.3, chan_announcement.4)
3757 macro_rules! check_spends {
3758 ($tx: expr, $spends_tx: expr) => {
3760 let mut funding_tx_map = HashMap::new();
3761 let spends_tx = $spends_tx;
3762 funding_tx_map.insert(spends_tx.txid(), spends_tx);
3763 $tx.verify(&funding_tx_map).unwrap();
3768 macro_rules! get_closing_signed_broadcast {
3769 ($node: expr, $dest_pubkey: expr) => {
3771 let events = $node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3772 assert!(events.len() == 1 || events.len() == 2);
3773 (match events[events.len() - 1] {
3774 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
3775 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
3778 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3779 }, if events.len() == 2 {
3781 MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3782 assert_eq!(*node_id, $dest_pubkey);
3785 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3792 fn close_channel(outbound_node: &Node, inbound_node: &Node, channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_tx: Transaction, close_inbound_first: bool) -> (msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, Transaction) {
3793 let (node_a, broadcaster_a, struct_a) = if close_inbound_first { (&inbound_node.node, &inbound_node.tx_broadcaster, inbound_node) } else { (&outbound_node.node, &outbound_node.tx_broadcaster, outbound_node) };
3794 let (node_b, broadcaster_b) = if close_inbound_first { (&outbound_node.node, &outbound_node.tx_broadcaster) } else { (&inbound_node.node, &inbound_node.tx_broadcaster) };
3797 node_a.close_channel(channel_id).unwrap();
3798 node_b.handle_shutdown(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(struct_a, MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, node_b.get_our_node_id())).unwrap();
3800 let events_1 = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3801 assert!(events_1.len() >= 1);
3802 let shutdown_b = match events_1[0] {
3803 MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3804 assert_eq!(node_id, &node_a.get_our_node_id());
3807 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3810 let closing_signed_b = if !close_inbound_first {
3811 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3814 Some(match events_1[1] {
3815 MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3816 assert_eq!(node_id, &node_a.get_our_node_id());
3819 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3823 node_a.handle_shutdown(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &shutdown_b).unwrap();
3824 let (as_update, bs_update) = if close_inbound_first {
3825 assert!(node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3826 node_a.handle_closing_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_b.unwrap()).unwrap();
3827 assert_eq!(broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
3828 tx_a = broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
3829 let (as_update, closing_signed_a) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(node_a, node_b.get_our_node_id());
3831 node_b.handle_closing_signed(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_a.unwrap()).unwrap();
3832 let (bs_update, none_b) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(node_b, node_a.get_our_node_id());
3833 assert!(none_b.is_none());
3834 assert_eq!(broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
3835 tx_b = broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
3836 (as_update, bs_update)
3838 let closing_signed_a = get_event_msg!(struct_a, MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, node_b.get_our_node_id());
3840 node_b.handle_closing_signed(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_a).unwrap();
3841 assert_eq!(broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
3842 tx_b = broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
3843 let (bs_update, closing_signed_b) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(node_b, node_a.get_our_node_id());
3845 node_a.handle_closing_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_b.unwrap()).unwrap();
3846 let (as_update, none_a) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(node_a, node_b.get_our_node_id());
3847 assert!(none_a.is_none());
3848 assert_eq!(broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
3849 tx_a = broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
3850 (as_update, bs_update)
3852 assert_eq!(tx_a, tx_b);
3853 check_spends!(tx_a, funding_tx);
3855 (as_update, bs_update, tx_a)
3860 msgs: Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>,
3861 commitment_msg: msgs::CommitmentSigned,
3864 fn from_commitment_update(node_id: PublicKey, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate) -> SendEvent {
3865 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3866 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3867 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3868 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3869 SendEvent { node_id: node_id, msgs: updates.update_add_htlcs, commitment_msg: updates.commitment_signed }
3872 fn from_event(event: MessageSendEvent) -> SendEvent {
3874 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => SendEvent::from_commitment_update(node_id, updates),
3875 _ => panic!("Unexpected event type!"),
3880 macro_rules! check_added_monitors {
3881 ($node: expr, $count: expr) => {
3883 let mut added_monitors = $node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
3884 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), $count);
3885 added_monitors.clear();
3890 macro_rules! commitment_signed_dance {
3891 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr, $commitment_signed: expr, $fail_backwards: expr, true /* skip last step */) => {
3893 check_added_monitors!($node_a, 0);
3894 assert!($node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3895 $node_a.node.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &$commitment_signed).unwrap();
3896 check_added_monitors!($node_a, 1);
3897 commitment_signed_dance!($node_a, $node_b, (), $fail_backwards, true, false);
3900 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr, (), $fail_backwards: expr, true /* skip last step */, true /* return extra message */) => {
3902 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!($node_a, $node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
3903 check_added_monitors!($node_b, 0);
3904 assert!($node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3905 $node_b.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
3906 assert!($node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3907 check_added_monitors!($node_b, 1);
3908 $node_b.node.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed).unwrap();
3909 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, extra_msg_option) = {
3910 let events = $node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3911 assert!(events.len() <= 2);
3913 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3914 assert_eq!(*node_id, $node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
3917 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3918 }, events.get(1).map(|e| e.clone()))
3920 check_added_monitors!($node_b, 1);
3921 if $fail_backwards {
3922 assert!($node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3923 assert!($node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3925 $node_a.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
3927 let mut added_monitors = $node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
3928 if $fail_backwards {
3929 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 2);
3930 assert!(added_monitors[0].0 != added_monitors[1].0);
3932 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
3934 added_monitors.clear();
3939 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr, (), $fail_backwards: expr, true /* skip last step */, false /* no extra message */) => {
3941 assert!(commitment_signed_dance!($node_a, $node_b, (), $fail_backwards, true, true).is_none());
3944 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr, $commitment_signed: expr, $fail_backwards: expr) => {
3946 commitment_signed_dance!($node_a, $node_b, $commitment_signed, $fail_backwards, true);
3947 if $fail_backwards {
3948 let channel_state = $node_a.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3949 assert_eq!(channel_state.pending_msg_events.len(), 1);
3950 if let MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } = channel_state.pending_msg_events[0] {
3951 assert_ne!(*node_id, $node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
3952 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
3954 assert!($node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3960 macro_rules! get_payment_preimage_hash {
3963 let payment_preimage = [*$node.network_payment_count.borrow(); 32];
3964 *$node.network_payment_count.borrow_mut() += 1;
3965 let mut payment_hash = [0; 32];
3966 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
3967 sha.input(&payment_preimage[..]);
3968 sha.result(&mut payment_hash);
3969 (payment_preimage, payment_hash)
3974 fn send_along_route(origin_node: &Node, route: Route, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
3975 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(origin_node);
3977 let mut payment_event = {
3978 origin_node.node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
3979 check_added_monitors!(origin_node, 1);
3981 let mut events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3982 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3983 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3985 let mut prev_node = origin_node;
3987 for (idx, &node) in expected_route.iter().enumerate() {
3988 assert_eq!(node.node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
3990 node.node.handle_update_add_htlc(&prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
3991 check_added_monitors!(node, 0);
3992 commitment_signed_dance!(node, prev_node, payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
3994 let events_1 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3995 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3997 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3998 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4001 node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
4002 node.node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
4004 if idx == expected_route.len() - 1 {
4005 let events_2 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4006 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
4008 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
4009 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash);
4010 assert_eq!(amt, recv_value);
4012 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4015 let mut events_2 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4016 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
4017 check_added_monitors!(node, 1);
4018 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
4019 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
4025 (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash)
4028 fn claim_payment_along_route(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], skip_last: bool, our_payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) {
4029 assert!(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage));
4030 check_added_monitors!(expected_route.last().unwrap(), 1);
4032 let mut next_msgs: Option<(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)> = None;
4033 let mut expected_next_node = expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id();
4034 macro_rules! get_next_msgs {
4037 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4038 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4040 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
4041 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4042 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4043 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4044 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4045 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
4046 expected_next_node = node_id.clone();
4047 Some((update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone()))
4049 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4055 macro_rules! last_update_fulfill_dance {
4056 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr) => {
4058 $node.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().0).unwrap();
4059 check_added_monitors!($node, 0);
4060 assert!($node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4061 commitment_signed_dance!($node, $prev_node, next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().1, false);
4065 macro_rules! mid_update_fulfill_dance {
4066 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $new_msgs: expr) => {
4068 $node.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().0).unwrap();
4069 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
4070 let new_next_msgs = if $new_msgs {
4071 get_next_msgs!($node)
4073 assert!($node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4076 commitment_signed_dance!($node, $prev_node, next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().1, false);
4077 next_msgs = new_next_msgs;
4082 let mut prev_node = expected_route.last().unwrap();
4083 for (idx, node) in expected_route.iter().rev().enumerate() {
4084 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, node.node.get_our_node_id());
4085 let update_next_msgs = !skip_last || idx != expected_route.len() - 1;
4086 if next_msgs.is_some() {
4087 mid_update_fulfill_dance!(node, prev_node, update_next_msgs);
4088 } else if update_next_msgs {
4089 next_msgs = get_next_msgs!(node);
4091 assert!(node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4093 if !skip_last && idx == expected_route.len() - 1 {
4094 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, origin_node.node.get_our_node_id());
4101 last_update_fulfill_dance!(origin_node, expected_route.first().unwrap());
4102 let events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4103 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4105 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage } => {
4106 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage);
4108 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4113 fn claim_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], our_payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) {
4114 claim_payment_along_route(origin_node, expected_route, false, our_payment_preimage);
4117 const TEST_FINAL_CLTV: u32 = 32;
4119 fn route_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
4120 let route = origin_node.router.get_route(&expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), recv_value, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
4121 assert_eq!(route.hops.len(), expected_route.len());
4122 for (node, hop) in expected_route.iter().zip(route.hops.iter()) {
4123 assert_eq!(hop.pubkey, node.node.get_our_node_id());
4126 send_along_route(origin_node, route, expected_route, recv_value)
4129 fn route_over_limit(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) {
4130 let route = origin_node.router.get_route(&expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), recv_value, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
4131 assert_eq!(route.hops.len(), expected_route.len());
4132 for (node, hop) in expected_route.iter().zip(route.hops.iter()) {
4133 assert_eq!(hop.pubkey, node.node.get_our_node_id());
4136 let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(origin_node);
4138 let err = origin_node.node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap();
4140 APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our max HTLC value in flight"),
4141 _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
4145 fn send_payment(origin: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) {
4146 let our_payment_preimage = route_payment(&origin, expected_route, recv_value).0;
4147 claim_payment(&origin, expected_route, our_payment_preimage);
4150 fn fail_payment_along_route(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], skip_last: bool, our_payment_hash: [u8; 32]) {
4151 assert!(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash, PaymentFailReason::PreimageUnknown));
4152 check_added_monitors!(expected_route.last().unwrap(), 1);
4154 let mut next_msgs: Option<(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)> = None;
4155 macro_rules! update_fail_dance {
4156 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $last_node: expr) => {
4158 $node.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().0).unwrap();
4159 commitment_signed_dance!($node, $prev_node, next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().1, !$last_node);
4164 let mut expected_next_node = expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id();
4165 let mut prev_node = expected_route.last().unwrap();
4166 for (idx, node) in expected_route.iter().rev().enumerate() {
4167 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, node.node.get_our_node_id());
4168 if next_msgs.is_some() {
4169 // We may be the "last node" for the purpose of the commitment dance if we're
4170 // skipping the last node (implying it is disconnected) and we're the
4171 // second-to-last node!
4172 update_fail_dance!(node, prev_node, skip_last && idx == expected_route.len() - 1);
4175 let events = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4176 if !skip_last || idx != expected_route.len() - 1 {
4177 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4179 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
4180 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4181 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4182 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
4183 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4184 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
4185 expected_next_node = node_id.clone();
4186 next_msgs = Some((update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone()));
4188 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4191 assert!(events.is_empty());
4193 if !skip_last && idx == expected_route.len() - 1 {
4194 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, origin_node.node.get_our_node_id());
4201 update_fail_dance!(origin_node, expected_route.first().unwrap(), true);
4203 let events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4204 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4206 Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, rejected_by_dest } => {
4207 assert_eq!(payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
4208 assert!(rejected_by_dest);
4210 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4215 fn fail_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], our_payment_hash: [u8; 32]) {
4216 fail_payment_along_route(origin_node, expected_route, false, our_payment_hash);
4219 fn create_network(node_count: usize) -> Vec<Node> {
4220 let mut nodes = Vec::new();
4221 let mut rng = thread_rng();
4222 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4223 let logger: Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
4225 let chan_count = Rc::new(RefCell::new(0));
4226 let payment_count = Rc::new(RefCell::new(0));
4228 for _ in 0..node_count {
4229 let feeest = Arc::new(test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 });
4230 let chain_monitor = Arc::new(chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil::new(Network::Testnet, Arc::clone(&logger)));
4231 let tx_broadcaster = Arc::new(test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new())});
4232 let mut seed = [0; 32];
4233 rng.fill_bytes(&mut seed);
4234 let keys_manager = Arc::new(keysinterface::KeysManager::new(&seed, Network::Testnet, Arc::clone(&logger)));
4235 let chan_monitor = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChannelMonitor::new(chain_monitor.clone(), tx_broadcaster.clone(), logger.clone()));
4236 let mut config = UserConfig::new();
4237 config.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
4238 config.channel_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
4239 let node = ChannelManager::new(Network::Testnet, feeest.clone(), chan_monitor.clone(), chain_monitor.clone(), tx_broadcaster.clone(), Arc::clone(&logger), keys_manager.clone(), config).unwrap();
4240 let router = Router::new(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &keys_manager.get_node_secret()), chain_monitor.clone(), Arc::clone(&logger));
4241 nodes.push(Node { chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, chan_monitor, node, router, node_seed: seed,
4242 network_payment_count: payment_count.clone(),
4243 network_chan_count: chan_count.clone(),
4251 fn test_async_inbound_update_fee() {
4252 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
4253 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4254 let channel_id = chan.2;
4257 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
4261 // send (1) commitment_signed -.
4262 // <- update_add_htlc/commitment_signed
4263 // send (2) RAA (awaiting remote revoke) -.
4264 // (1) commitment_signed is delivered ->
4265 // .- send (3) RAA (awaiting remote revoke)
4266 // (2) RAA is delivered ->
4267 // .- send (4) commitment_signed
4268 // <- (3) RAA is delivered
4269 // send (5) commitment_signed -.
4270 // <- (4) commitment_signed is delivered
4272 // (5) commitment_signed is delivered ->
4274 // (6) RAA is delivered ->
4276 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
4277 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id) + 20).unwrap();
4278 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4280 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4281 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
4282 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
4283 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
4284 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
4286 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4289 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
4291 // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
4292 let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
4293 nodes[1].node.send_payment(nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 40000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap(), our_payment_hash).unwrap();
4294 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4296 let payment_event = {
4297 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4298 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
4299 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
4301 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4302 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
4304 // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
4305 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
4306 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap(); // (2)
4307 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4308 // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4309 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4311 // deliver(1), generate (3):
4312 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
4313 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4314 // nodes[1] is awaiting nodes[0] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4315 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4317 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap(); // deliver (2)
4318 let bs_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4319 assert!(bs_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
4320 assert!(bs_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
4321 assert!(bs_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
4322 assert!(bs_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
4323 assert!(bs_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (4)
4324 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4326 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap(); // deliver (3)
4327 let as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4328 assert!(as_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
4329 assert!(as_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
4330 assert!(as_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
4331 assert!(as_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
4332 assert!(as_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (5)
4333 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4335 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update.commitment_signed).unwrap(); // deliver (4)
4336 let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4337 // only (6) so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4338 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4340 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update.commitment_signed).unwrap(); // deliver (5)
4341 let bs_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4342 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4344 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke).unwrap();
4345 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4347 let events_2 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4348 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
4350 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {..} => {}, // If we actually processed we'd receive the payment
4351 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4354 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke).unwrap(); // deliver (6)
4355 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4359 fn test_update_fee_unordered_raa() {
4360 // Just the intro to the previous test followed by an out-of-order RAA (which caused a
4361 // crash in an earlier version of the update_fee patch)
4362 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
4363 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4364 let channel_id = chan.2;
4367 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
4369 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
4370 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id) + 20).unwrap();
4371 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4373 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4374 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
4375 let update_msg = match events_0[0] { // (1)
4376 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, .. }, .. } => {
4379 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4382 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
4384 // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
4385 let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
4386 nodes[1].node.send_payment(nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 40000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap(), our_payment_hash).unwrap();
4387 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4389 let payment_event = {
4390 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4391 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
4392 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
4394 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4395 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
4397 // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
4398 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
4399 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap(); // (2)
4400 let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4401 // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4402 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4404 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg).unwrap(); // deliver (2)
4405 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4407 // We can't continue, sadly, because our (1) now has a bogus signature
4411 fn test_multi_flight_update_fee() {
4412 let nodes = create_network(2);
4413 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4414 let channel_id = chan.2;
4417 // update_fee/commitment_signed ->
4418 // .- send (1) RAA and (2) commitment_signed
4419 // update_fee (never committed) ->
4420 // (3) update_fee ->
4421 // We have to manually generate the above update_fee, it is allowed by the protocol but we
4422 // don't track which updates correspond to which revoke_and_ack responses so we're in
4423 // AwaitingRAA mode and will not generate the update_fee yet.
4424 // <- (1) RAA delivered
4425 // (3) is generated and send (4) CS -.
4426 // Note that A cannot generate (4) prior to (1) being delivered as it otherwise doesn't
4427 // know the per_commitment_point to use for it.
4428 // <- (2) commitment_signed delivered
4429 // revoke_and_ack ->
4430 // B should send no response here
4431 // (4) commitment_signed delivered ->
4432 // <- RAA/commitment_signed delivered
4433 // revoke_and_ack ->
4435 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
4436 let initial_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id);
4437 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, initial_feerate + 20).unwrap();
4438 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4440 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4441 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
4442 let (update_msg_1, commitment_signed_1) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
4443 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
4444 (update_fee.as_ref().unwrap(), commitment_signed)
4446 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4449 // Deliver first update_fee/commitment_signed pair, generating (1) and (2):
4450 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg_1).unwrap();
4451 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed_1).unwrap();
4452 let (bs_revoke_msg, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4453 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4455 // nodes[0] is awaiting a revoke from nodes[1] before it will create a new commitment
4457 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, initial_feerate + 40).unwrap();
4458 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
4459 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4461 // Create the (3) update_fee message that nodes[0] will generate before it does...
4462 let mut update_msg_2 = msgs::UpdateFee {
4463 channel_id: update_msg_1.channel_id.clone(),
4464 feerate_per_kw: (initial_feerate + 30) as u32,
4467 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2).unwrap();
4469 update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw = (initial_feerate + 40) as u32;
4471 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2).unwrap();
4473 // Deliver (1), generating (3) and (4)
4474 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_msg).unwrap();
4475 let as_second_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4476 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4477 assert!(as_second_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4478 assert!(as_second_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4479 assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4480 assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4481 // Check that the update_fee newly generated matches what we delivered:
4482 assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().channel_id, update_msg_2.channel_id);
4483 assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().feerate_per_kw, update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw);
4485 // Deliver (2) commitment_signed
4486 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed).unwrap();
4487 let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4488 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4489 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4491 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg).unwrap();
4492 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4493 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4496 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
4497 let (bs_second_revoke, bs_second_commitment) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4498 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4500 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke).unwrap();
4501 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4502 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4504 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment).unwrap();
4505 let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4506 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4507 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4509 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke).unwrap();
4510 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4511 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4515 fn test_update_fee_vanilla() {
4516 let nodes = create_network(2);
4517 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4518 let channel_id = chan.2;
4520 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id);
4521 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+25).unwrap();
4522 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4524 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4525 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
4526 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
4527 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
4528 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
4530 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4532 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
4534 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
4535 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4536 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4538 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
4539 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4540 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4542 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap();
4543 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4544 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4545 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4547 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
4548 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4549 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4553 fn test_update_fee_that_funder_cannot_afford() {
4554 let nodes = create_network(2);
4555 let channel_value = 1888;
4556 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, 700000);
4557 let channel_id = chan.2;
4560 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate).unwrap();
4561 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4562 let update_msg = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4564 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg.update_fee.unwrap()).unwrap();
4566 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], update_msg.commitment_signed, false);
4568 //Confirm that the new fee based on the last local commitment txn is what we expected based on the feerate of 260 set above.
4569 //This value results in a fee that is exactly what the funder can afford (277 sat + 1000 sat channel reserve)
4571 let chan_lock = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4572 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
4574 //We made sure neither party's funds are below the dust limit so -2 non-HTLC txns from number of outputs
4575 let num_htlcs = chan.last_local_commitment_txn[0].output.len() - 2;
4576 let total_fee: u64 = feerate * (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + (num_htlcs as u64) * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
4577 let mut actual_fee = chan.last_local_commitment_txn[0].output.iter().fold(0, |acc, output| acc + output.value);
4578 actual_fee = channel_value - actual_fee;
4579 assert_eq!(total_fee, actual_fee);
4582 //Add 2 to the previous fee rate to the final fee increases by 1 (with no HTLCs the fee is essentially
4583 //fee_rate*(724/1000) so the increment of 1*0.724 is rounded back down)
4584 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+2).unwrap();
4585 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4587 let update2_msg = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4589 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update2_msg.update_fee.unwrap()).unwrap();
4591 //While producing the commitment_signed response after handling a received update_fee request the
4592 //check to see if the funder, who sent the update_fee request, can afford the new fee (funder_balance >= fee+channel_reserve)
4593 //Should produce and error.
4594 let err = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update2_msg.commitment_signed).unwrap_err();
4596 assert!(match err.err {
4597 "Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee" => true,
4601 //clear the message we could not handle
4602 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4606 fn test_update_fee_with_fundee_update_add_htlc() {
4607 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
4608 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4609 let channel_id = chan.2;
4612 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
4614 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id);
4615 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+20).unwrap();
4616 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4618 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4619 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
4620 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
4621 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
4622 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
4624 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4626 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
4627 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
4628 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4629 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4631 let route = nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 800000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
4633 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[1]);
4635 // nothing happens since node[1] is in AwaitingRemoteRevoke
4636 nodes[1].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
4638 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
4639 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 0);
4640 added_monitors.clear();
4642 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
4643 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4644 // node[1] has nothing to do
4646 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
4647 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4648 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4650 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap();
4651 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4652 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4653 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4654 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
4655 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4656 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke ends here
4658 let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4659 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
4660 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
4661 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 0);
4662 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
4663 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none(), true);
4665 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.update_add_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
4666 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
4667 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4668 let (revoke, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4670 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke).unwrap();
4671 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4672 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4674 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap();
4675 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4676 let revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4677 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4679 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke).unwrap();
4680 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4681 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4683 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4684 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4686 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
4687 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4689 nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
4690 nodes[0].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
4692 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4693 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4695 Event::PaymentReceived { .. } => { },
4696 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4699 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], our_payment_preimage);
4701 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 800000);
4702 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 800000);
4703 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
4707 fn test_update_fee() {
4708 let nodes = create_network(2);
4709 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4710 let channel_id = chan.2;
4713 // (1) update_fee/commitment_signed ->
4714 // <- (2) revoke_and_ack
4715 // .- send (3) commitment_signed
4716 // (4) update_fee/commitment_signed ->
4717 // .- send (5) revoke_and_ack (no CS as we're awaiting a revoke)
4718 // <- (3) commitment_signed delivered
4719 // send (6) revoke_and_ack -.
4720 // <- (5) deliver revoke_and_ack
4721 // (6) deliver revoke_and_ack ->
4722 // .- send (7) commitment_signed in response to (4)
4723 // <- (7) deliver commitment_signed
4724 // revoke_and_ack ->
4726 // Create and deliver (1)...
4727 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id);
4728 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+20).unwrap();
4729 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4731 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4732 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
4733 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
4734 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
4735 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
4737 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4739 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
4741 // Generate (2) and (3):
4742 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
4743 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed_0) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4744 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4747 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
4748 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4749 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4751 // Create and deliver (4)...
4752 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+30).unwrap();
4753 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4754 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4755 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
4756 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
4757 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
4758 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
4760 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4763 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
4764 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
4765 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4767 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4768 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4770 // Handle (3), creating (6):
4771 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed_0).unwrap();
4772 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4773 let revoke_msg_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4774 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4777 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
4778 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4779 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4781 // Deliver (6), creating (7):
4782 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg_0).unwrap();
4783 let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4784 assert!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4785 assert!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4786 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4787 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4788 assert!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none());
4789 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4792 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
4793 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4794 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4795 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4797 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
4798 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4799 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4801 assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id), feerate + 30);
4802 assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[1], channel_id), feerate + 30);
4803 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
4807 fn pre_funding_lock_shutdown_test() {
4808 // Test sending a shutdown prior to funding_locked after funding generation
4809 let nodes = create_network(2);
4810 let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 8000000, 0);
4811 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4812 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&tx; 1], &[1; 1]);
4813 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&tx; 1], &[1; 1]);
4815 nodes[0].node.close_channel(&OutPoint::new(tx.txid(), 0).to_channel_id()).unwrap();
4816 let node_0_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4817 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_shutdown).unwrap();
4818 let node_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4819 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_shutdown).unwrap();
4821 let node_0_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4822 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_closing_signed).unwrap();
4823 let (_, node_1_closing_signed) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4824 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_closing_signed.unwrap()).unwrap();
4825 let (_, node_0_none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4826 assert!(node_0_none.is_none());
4828 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
4829 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
4833 fn updates_shutdown_wait() {
4834 // Test sending a shutdown with outstanding updates pending
4835 let mut nodes = create_network(3);
4836 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4837 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
4838 let route_1 = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &[], 100000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
4839 let route_2 = nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &[], 100000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
4841 let (our_payment_preimage, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 100000);
4843 nodes[0].node.close_channel(&chan_1.2).unwrap();
4844 let node_0_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4845 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_shutdown).unwrap();
4846 let node_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4847 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_shutdown).unwrap();
4849 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4850 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4852 let (_, payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
4853 if let Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {..}) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route_1, payment_hash) {}
4854 else { panic!("New sends should fail!") };
4855 if let Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {..}) = nodes[1].node.send_payment(route_2, payment_hash) {}
4856 else { panic!("New sends should fail!") };
4858 assert!(nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage));
4859 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
4860 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4861 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4862 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4863 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4864 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
4865 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4866 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
4867 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4868 let updates_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4869 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false);
4871 assert!(updates_2.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4872 assert!(updates_2.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4873 assert!(updates_2.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4874 assert!(updates_2.update_fee.is_none());
4875 assert_eq!(updates_2.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4876 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates_2.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
4877 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates_2.commitment_signed, false, true);
4879 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4880 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4882 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
4883 assert_eq!(our_payment_preimage, *payment_preimage);
4885 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4888 let node_0_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4889 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_closing_signed).unwrap();
4890 let (_, node_1_closing_signed) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4891 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_closing_signed.unwrap()).unwrap();
4892 let (_, node_0_none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4893 assert!(node_0_none.is_none());
4895 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
4897 assert_eq!(nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
4898 nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
4899 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, true);
4900 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
4901 assert!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().is_empty());
4905 fn htlc_fail_async_shutdown() {
4906 // Test HTLCs fail if shutdown starts even if messages are delivered out-of-order
4907 let mut nodes = create_network(3);
4908 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4909 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
4911 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &[], 100000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
4912 let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
4913 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
4914 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4915 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4916 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
4917 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4918 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4919 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4920 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
4922 nodes[1].node.close_channel(&chan_1.2).unwrap();
4923 let node_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4924 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_shutdown).unwrap();
4925 let node_0_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4927 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
4928 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed).unwrap();
4929 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4930 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_shutdown).unwrap();
4931 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], (), false, true, false);
4933 let updates_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4934 assert!(updates_2.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4935 assert!(updates_2.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4936 assert_eq!(updates_2.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
4937 assert!(updates_2.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4938 assert!(updates_2.update_fee.is_none());
4940 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates_2.update_fail_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
4941 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates_2.commitment_signed, false, true);
4943 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4944 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4946 Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest } => {
4947 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash);
4948 assert!(!rejected_by_dest);
4950 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4953 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4954 let node_0_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4955 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_closing_signed).unwrap();
4956 let (_, node_1_closing_signed) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4957 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_closing_signed.unwrap()).unwrap();
4958 let (_, node_0_none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4959 assert!(node_0_none.is_none());
4961 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
4963 assert_eq!(nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
4964 nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
4965 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, true);
4966 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
4967 assert!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().is_empty());
4971 fn update_fee_async_shutdown() {
4972 // Test update_fee works after shutdown start if messages are delivered out-of-order
4973 let nodes = create_network(2);
4974 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4976 let starting_feerate = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().get_feerate();
4977 nodes[0].node.update_fee(chan_1.2.clone(), starting_feerate + 20).unwrap();
4978 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4979 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4980 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4981 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4982 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4983 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4984 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_some());
4986 nodes[1].node.close_channel(&chan_1.2).unwrap();
4987 let node_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4988 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_shutdown).unwrap();
4989 // Note that we don't actually test normative behavior here. The spec indicates we could
4990 // actually send a closing_signed here, but is kinda unclear and could possibly be amended
4991 // to require waiting on the full commitment dance before doing so (see
4992 // https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/499). In any case, to avoid
4993 // ambiguity, we should wait until after the full commitment dance to send closing_signed.
4994 let node_0_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4996 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fee.unwrap()).unwrap();
4997 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed).unwrap();
4998 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4999 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_shutdown).unwrap();
5000 let node_0_closing_signed = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], (), false, true, true);
5002 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5003 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), match node_0_closing_signed.unwrap() {
5004 MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
5005 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5008 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5010 let (_, node_1_closing_signed) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5011 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_closing_signed.unwrap()).unwrap();
5012 let (_, node_0_none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5013 assert!(node_0_none.is_none());
5016 fn do_test_shutdown_rebroadcast(recv_count: u8) {
5017 // Test that shutdown/closing_signed is re-sent on reconnect with a variable number of
5018 // messages delivered prior to disconnect
5019 let nodes = create_network(3);
5020 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5021 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
5023 let (our_payment_preimage, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 100000);
5025 nodes[1].node.close_channel(&chan_1.2).unwrap();
5026 let node_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5028 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_shutdown).unwrap();
5029 let node_0_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5031 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_shutdown).unwrap();
5035 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5036 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5038 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5039 let node_0_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5040 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5041 let node_1_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5043 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_reestablish).unwrap();
5044 let node_1_2nd_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5045 assert!(node_1_shutdown == node_1_2nd_shutdown);
5047 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_reestablish).unwrap();
5048 let node_0_2nd_shutdown = if recv_count > 0 {
5049 let node_0_2nd_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5050 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_2nd_shutdown).unwrap();
5053 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5054 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_2nd_shutdown).unwrap();
5055 get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id())
5057 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_2nd_shutdown).unwrap();
5059 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5060 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5062 assert!(nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage));
5063 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
5064 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5065 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5066 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5067 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5068 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
5069 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5070 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
5071 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5072 let updates_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5073 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false);
5075 assert!(updates_2.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5076 assert!(updates_2.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5077 assert!(updates_2.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5078 assert!(updates_2.update_fee.is_none());
5079 assert_eq!(updates_2.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5080 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates_2.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
5081 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates_2.commitment_signed, false, true);
5083 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5084 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5086 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
5087 assert_eq!(our_payment_preimage, *payment_preimage);
5089 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5092 let node_0_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5094 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_closing_signed).unwrap();
5095 let (_, node_1_closing_signed) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5096 assert!(node_1_closing_signed.is_some());
5099 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5100 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5102 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5103 let node_0_2nd_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5104 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5105 if recv_count == 0 {
5106 // If all closing_signeds weren't delivered we can just resume where we left off...
5107 let node_1_2nd_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5109 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_2nd_reestablish).unwrap();
5110 let node_0_3rd_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5111 assert!(node_0_2nd_shutdown == node_0_3rd_shutdown);
5113 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_2nd_reestablish).unwrap();
5114 let node_1_3rd_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5115 assert!(node_1_3rd_shutdown == node_1_2nd_shutdown);
5117 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_3rd_shutdown).unwrap();
5118 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5120 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_3rd_shutdown).unwrap();
5121 let node_0_2nd_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5122 assert!(node_0_closing_signed == node_0_2nd_closing_signed);
5124 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_2nd_closing_signed).unwrap();
5125 let (_, node_1_closing_signed) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5126 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_closing_signed.unwrap()).unwrap();
5127 let (_, node_0_none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5128 assert!(node_0_none.is_none());
5130 // If one node, however, received + responded with an identical closing_signed we end
5131 // up erroring and node[0] will try to broadcast its own latest commitment transaction.
5132 // There isn't really anything better we can do simply, but in the future we might
5133 // explore storing a set of recently-closed channels that got disconnected during
5134 // closing_signed and avoiding broadcasting local commitment txn for some timeout to
5135 // give our counterparty enough time to (potentially) broadcast a cooperative closing
5137 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5139 if let Err(msgs::HandleError{action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{msg}), ..}) =
5140 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_2nd_reestablish) {
5141 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
5142 let msgs::ErrorMessage {ref channel_id, ..} = msg;
5143 assert_eq!(*channel_id, chan_1.2);
5144 } else { panic!("Needed SendErrorMessage close"); }
5146 // get_closing_signed_broadcast usually eats the BroadcastChannelUpdate for us and
5147 // checks it, but in this case nodes[0] didn't ever get a chance to receive a
5148 // closing_signed so we do it ourselves
5149 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5150 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5152 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
5153 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
5155 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5159 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
5161 assert_eq!(nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
5162 nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
5163 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, true);
5164 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
5165 assert!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().is_empty());
5169 fn test_shutdown_rebroadcast() {
5170 do_test_shutdown_rebroadcast(0);
5171 do_test_shutdown_rebroadcast(1);
5172 do_test_shutdown_rebroadcast(2);
5176 fn fake_network_test() {
5177 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
5178 // tests that payments get routed and transactions broadcast in semi-reasonable ways.
5179 let nodes = create_network(4);
5181 // Create some initial channels
5182 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5183 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
5184 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
5186 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
5187 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
5188 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
5189 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
5190 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
5192 // Send some more payments
5193 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
5194 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], &nodes[0])[..], 1000000);
5195 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000);
5197 // Test failure packets
5198 let payment_hash_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000).1;
5199 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], payment_hash_1);
5201 // Add a new channel that skips 3
5202 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
5204 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
5205 send_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
5206 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
5207 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
5208 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
5209 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
5210 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
5212 // Do some rebalance loop payments, simultaneously
5213 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
5214 hops.push(RouteHop {
5215 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
5216 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
5218 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.0.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
5220 hops.push(RouteHop {
5221 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
5222 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
5224 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_4.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
5226 hops.push(RouteHop {
5227 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
5228 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
5230 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
5232 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_4.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_4.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
5233 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.0.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.0.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
5234 let payment_preimage_1 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { hops }, &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).0;
5236 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
5237 hops.push(RouteHop {
5238 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
5239 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
5241 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
5243 hops.push(RouteHop {
5244 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
5245 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
5247 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_2.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
5249 hops.push(RouteHop {
5250 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
5251 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
5253 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
5255 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_2.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_2.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
5256 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
5257 let payment_hash_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { hops }, &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).1;
5259 // Claim the rebalances...
5260 fail_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], payment_hash_2);
5261 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
5263 // Add a duplicate new channel from 2 to 4
5264 let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
5266 // Send some payments across both channels
5267 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
5268 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
5269 let payment_preimage_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
5271 route_over_limit(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000);
5273 //TODO: Test that routes work again here as we've been notified that the channel is full
5275 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_3);
5276 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_4);
5277 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_5);
5279 // Close down the channels...
5280 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan_1.2, chan_1.3, true);
5281 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, false);
5282 close_channel(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &chan_3.2, chan_3.3, true);
5283 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_4.2, chan_4.3, false);
5284 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_5.2, chan_5.3, false);
5288 fn duplicate_htlc_test() {
5289 // Test that we accept duplicate payment_hash HTLCs across the network and that
5290 // claiming/failing them are all separate and don't effect each other
5291 let mut nodes = create_network(6);
5293 // Create some initial channels to route via 3 to 4/5 from 0/1/2
5294 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3);
5295 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
5296 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
5297 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);
5298 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5);
5300 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 1000000);
5302 *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
5303 assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
5305 *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
5306 assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
5308 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], payment_preimage);
5309 fail_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], payment_hash);
5310 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage);
5313 #[derive(PartialEq)]
5314 enum HTLCType { NONE, TIMEOUT, SUCCESS }
5315 /// Tests that the given node has broadcast transactions for the given Channel
5317 /// First checks that the latest local commitment tx has been broadcast, unless an explicit
5318 /// commitment_tx is provided, which may be used to test that a remote commitment tx was
5319 /// broadcast and the revoked outputs were claimed.
5321 /// Next tests that there is (or is not) a transaction that spends the commitment transaction
5322 /// that appears to be the type of HTLC transaction specified in has_htlc_tx.
5324 /// All broadcast transactions must be accounted for in one of the above three types of we'll
5326 fn test_txn_broadcast(node: &Node, chan: &(msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction), commitment_tx: Option<Transaction>, has_htlc_tx: HTLCType) -> Vec<Transaction> {
5327 let mut node_txn = node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5328 assert!(node_txn.len() >= if commitment_tx.is_some() { 0 } else { 1 } + if has_htlc_tx == HTLCType::NONE { 0 } else { 1 });
5330 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(2);
5331 node_txn.retain(|tx| {
5332 if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == chan.3.txid() {
5333 check_spends!(tx, chan.3.clone());
5334 if commitment_tx.is_none() {
5335 res.push(tx.clone());
5340 if let Some(explicit_tx) = commitment_tx {
5341 res.push(explicit_tx.clone());
5344 assert_eq!(res.len(), 1);
5346 if has_htlc_tx != HTLCType::NONE {
5347 node_txn.retain(|tx| {
5348 if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == res[0].txid() {
5349 check_spends!(tx, res[0].clone());
5350 if has_htlc_tx == HTLCType::TIMEOUT {
5351 assert!(tx.lock_time != 0);
5353 assert!(tx.lock_time == 0);
5355 res.push(tx.clone());
5359 assert_eq!(res.len(), 2);
5362 assert!(node_txn.is_empty());
5366 /// Tests that the given node has broadcast a claim transaction against the provided revoked
5367 /// HTLC transaction.
5368 fn test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(node: &Node, revoked_tx: Transaction) {
5369 let mut node_txn = node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5370 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
5371 node_txn.retain(|tx| {
5372 if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_tx.txid() {
5373 check_spends!(tx, revoked_tx.clone());
5377 assert!(node_txn.is_empty());
5380 fn check_preimage_claim(node: &Node, prev_txn: &Vec<Transaction>) -> Vec<Transaction> {
5381 let mut node_txn = node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5383 assert!(node_txn.len() >= 1);
5384 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5385 let mut found_prev = false;
5387 for tx in prev_txn {
5388 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == tx.txid() {
5389 check_spends!(node_txn[0], tx.clone());
5390 assert!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness[2].len() > 106); // must spend an htlc output
5391 assert_eq!(tx.input.len(), 1); // must spend a commitment tx
5397 assert!(found_prev);
5399 let mut res = Vec::new();
5400 mem::swap(&mut *node_txn, &mut res);
5404 fn get_announce_close_broadcast_events(nodes: &Vec<Node>, a: usize, b: usize) {
5405 let events_1 = nodes[a].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5406 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
5407 let as_update = match events_1[0] {
5408 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
5411 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5414 let events_2 = nodes[b].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5415 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
5416 let bs_update = match events_2[0] {
5417 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
5420 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5424 node.router.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
5425 node.router.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
5429 macro_rules! expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable {
5431 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5432 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5434 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
5435 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5437 $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
5438 $node.node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
5442 fn do_channel_reserve_test(test_recv: bool) {
5444 use std::sync::atomic::Ordering;
5445 use ln::msgs::HandleError;
5447 macro_rules! get_channel_value_stat {
5448 ($node: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {{
5449 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5450 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&$channel_id).unwrap();
5451 chan.get_value_stat()
5455 let mut nodes = create_network(3);
5456 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1900, 1001);
5457 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 1900, 1001);
5459 let mut stat01 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5460 let mut stat11 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
5462 let mut stat12 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2);
5463 let mut stat22 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
5465 macro_rules! get_route_and_payment_hash {
5466 ($recv_value: expr) => {{
5467 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), $recv_value, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
5468 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
5469 (route, payment_hash, payment_preimage)
5473 macro_rules! expect_forward {
5475 let mut events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5476 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5477 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
5478 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
5483 macro_rules! expect_payment_received {
5484 ($node: expr, $expected_payment_hash: expr, $expected_recv_value: expr) => {
5485 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5486 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5488 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
5489 assert_eq!($expected_payment_hash, *payment_hash);
5490 assert_eq!($expected_recv_value, amt);
5492 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5497 let feemsat = 239; // somehow we know?
5498 let total_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * 239;
5500 let recv_value_0 = stat01.their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - total_fee_msat;
5502 // attempt to send amt_msat > their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
5504 let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_0 + 1);
5505 assert!(route.hops.iter().rev().skip(1).all(|h| h.fee_msat == feemsat));
5506 let err = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap();
5508 APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our max HTLC value in flight"),
5509 _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
5513 let mut htlc_id = 0;
5514 // channel reserve is bigger than their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat so loop to deplete
5515 // nodes[0]'s wealth
5517 let amt_msat = recv_value_0 + total_fee_msat;
5518 if stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat < stat01.channel_reserve_msat {
5521 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1], &nodes[2]][..], recv_value_0);
5524 let (stat01_, stat11_, stat12_, stat22_) = (
5525 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2),
5526 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2),
5527 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2),
5528 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2),
5531 assert_eq!(stat01_.value_to_self_msat, stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat);
5532 assert_eq!(stat11_.value_to_self_msat, stat11.value_to_self_msat + amt_msat);
5533 assert_eq!(stat12_.value_to_self_msat, stat12.value_to_self_msat - (amt_msat - feemsat));
5534 assert_eq!(stat22_.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + (amt_msat - feemsat));
5535 stat01 = stat01_; stat11 = stat11_; stat12 = stat12_; stat22 = stat22_;
5539 let recv_value = stat01.value_to_self_msat - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat;
5540 // attempt to get channel_reserve violation
5541 let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value + 1);
5542 let err = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), our_payment_hash).err().unwrap();
5544 APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our reserve value"),
5545 _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
5549 // adding pending output
5550 let recv_value_1 = (stat01.value_to_self_msat - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat)/2;
5551 let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat;
5553 let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_preimage_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_1);
5554 let payment_event_1 = {
5555 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route_1, our_payment_hash_1).unwrap();
5556 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5558 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5559 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5560 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
5562 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]).unwrap();
5564 // channel reserve test with htlc pending output > 0
5565 let recv_value_2 = stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat;
5567 let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_2 + 1);
5568 match nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap() {
5569 APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our reserve value"),
5570 _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
5575 // test channel_reserve test on nodes[1] side
5576 let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_2 + 1);
5578 // Need to manually create update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
5579 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5580 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &{
5581 let mut session_key = [0; 32];
5582 rng::fill_bytes(&mut session_key);
5584 }).expect("RNG is bad!");
5586 let cur_height = nodes[0].node.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
5587 let onion_keys = ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
5588 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = ChannelManager::build_onion_payloads(&route, cur_height).unwrap();
5589 let onion_packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, &our_payment_hash);
5590 let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
5591 channel_id: chan_1.2,
5593 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
5594 payment_hash: our_payment_hash,
5595 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
5596 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
5600 let err = nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg).err().unwrap();
5602 HandleError{err, .. } => assert_eq!(err, "Remote HTLC add would put them over their reserve value"),
5604 // If we send a garbage message, the channel should get closed, making the rest of this test case fail.
5605 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
5606 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
5607 let channel_close_broadcast = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5608 assert_eq!(channel_close_broadcast.len(), 1);
5609 match channel_close_broadcast[0] {
5610 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
5611 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
5613 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5619 // split the rest to test holding cell
5620 let recv_value_21 = recv_value_2/2;
5621 let recv_value_22 = recv_value_2 - recv_value_21 - total_fee_msat;
5623 let stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5624 assert_eq!(stat.value_to_self_msat - (stat.pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat + total_fee_msat), stat.channel_reserve_msat);
5627 // now see if they go through on both sides
5628 let (route_21, our_payment_hash_21, our_payment_preimage_21) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_21);
5629 // but this will stuck in the holding cell
5630 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route_21, our_payment_hash_21).unwrap();
5631 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
5632 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5633 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
5635 // test with outbound holding cell amount > 0
5637 let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_22+1);
5638 match nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap() {
5639 APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our reserve value"),
5640 _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
5644 let (route_22, our_payment_hash_22, our_payment_preimage_22) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_22);
5645 // this will also stuck in the holding cell
5646 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route_22, our_payment_hash_22).unwrap();
5647 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
5648 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
5649 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5651 // flush the pending htlc
5652 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.commitment_msg).unwrap();
5653 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5654 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5656 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
5657 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5658 let commitment_update_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5660 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed).unwrap();
5661 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5662 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
5663 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5665 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
5666 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5667 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5669 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5671 let ref payment_event_11 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
5672 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_11.msgs[0]).unwrap();
5673 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event_11.commitment_msg, false);
5675 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
5676 expect_payment_received!(nodes[2], our_payment_hash_1, recv_value_1);
5678 // flush the htlcs in the holding cell
5679 assert_eq!(commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs.len(), 2);
5680 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
5681 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[1]).unwrap();
5682 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], &commitment_update_2.commitment_signed, false);
5683 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5685 let ref payment_event_3 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
5686 assert_eq!(payment_event_3.msgs.len(), 2);
5687 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[0]).unwrap();
5688 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[1]).unwrap();
5690 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], &payment_event_3.commitment_msg, false);
5691 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
5693 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5694 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
5696 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
5697 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_21, *payment_hash);
5698 assert_eq!(recv_value_21, amt);
5700 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5703 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
5704 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_22, *payment_hash);
5705 assert_eq!(recv_value_22, amt);
5707 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5710 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_1);
5711 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_21);
5712 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_22);
5714 let expected_value_to_self = stat01.value_to_self_msat - (recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_21 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat);
5715 let stat0 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5716 assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, expected_value_to_self);
5717 assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, stat0.channel_reserve_msat);
5719 let stat2 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
5720 assert_eq!(stat2.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + recv_value_1 + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22);
5724 fn channel_reserve_test() {
5725 do_channel_reserve_test(false);
5726 do_channel_reserve_test(true);
5730 fn channel_monitor_network_test() {
5731 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
5732 // tests that ChannelMonitor is able to recover from various states.
5733 let nodes = create_network(5);
5735 // Create some initial channels
5736 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5737 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
5738 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
5739 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);
5741 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
5742 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
5743 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
5744 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
5745 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
5747 // Simple case with no pending HTLCs:
5748 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
5750 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5751 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5752 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn.drain(..).next().unwrap()] }, 1);
5753 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5755 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
5756 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5757 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
5759 // One pending HTLC is discarded by the force-close:
5760 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
5762 // Simple case of one pending HTLC to HTLC-Timeout
5763 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
5765 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
5766 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5767 nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn.drain(..).next().unwrap()] }, 1);
5768 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5770 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 1, 2);
5771 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5772 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
5774 macro_rules! claim_funds {
5775 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $preimage: expr) => {
5777 assert!($node.node.claim_funds($preimage));
5778 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
5780 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5781 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5783 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, .. } } => {
5784 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5785 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5786 assert_eq!(*node_id, $prev_node.node.get_our_node_id());
5788 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5794 // nodes[3] gets the preimage, but nodes[2] already disconnected, resulting in a nodes[2]
5795 // HTLC-Timeout and a nodes[3] claim against it (+ its own announces)
5796 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
5798 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
5800 // Claim the payment on nodes[3], giving it knowledge of the preimage
5801 claim_funds!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_preimage_1);
5803 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5804 nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
5806 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[3], &node_txn);
5808 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 2, 3);
5809 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5810 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
5812 { // Cheat and reset nodes[4]'s height to 1
5813 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5814 nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, 1);
5817 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire), 1);
5818 assert_eq!(nodes[4].node.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire), 1);
5819 // One pending HTLC to time out:
5820 let payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[4])[..], 3000000).0;
5821 // CLTV expires at TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1 (current height) + 1 (added in send_payment for
5825 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5826 nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 2, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
5827 for i in 3..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 2 + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS + 1 {
5828 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5829 nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
5832 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[3], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
5834 // Claim the payment on nodes[4], giving it knowledge of the preimage
5835 claim_funds!(nodes[4], nodes[3], payment_preimage_2);
5837 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5838 nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 2, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
5839 for i in 3..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 2 - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + 1 {
5840 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5841 nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
5844 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[4], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::SUCCESS);
5846 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5847 nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone()] }, TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 5);
5849 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[4], &node_txn);
5851 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 3, 4);
5852 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5853 assert_eq!(nodes[4].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5857 fn test_justice_tx() {
5858 // Test justice txn built on revoked HTLC-Success tx, against both sides
5860 let nodes = create_network(2);
5861 // Create some new channels:
5862 let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5864 // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
5865 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
5866 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[0]
5867 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.iter().next().unwrap().1.last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
5868 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // First commitment tx, then HTLC tx
5869 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5870 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_5.3.txid());
5871 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to 0 are present
5872 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5873 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
5874 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 133); // HTLC-Timeout
5875 // Revoke the old state
5876 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
5879 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5880 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
5882 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5883 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
5884 assert_eq!(node_txn.pop().unwrap(), node_txn[0]); // An outpoint registration will result in a 2nd block_connected
5885 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2); // We should claim the revoked output and the HTLC output
5887 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
5888 node_txn.swap_remove(0);
5890 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_5, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5892 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
5893 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_5, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
5894 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5895 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[1].clone()] }, 1);
5896 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], node_txn[1].clone());
5898 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
5900 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5901 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5903 // We test justice_tx build by A on B's revoked HTLC-Success tx
5904 // Create some new channels:
5905 let chan_6 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5907 // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
5908 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
5909 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from B
5910 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.iter().next().unwrap().1.last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
5911 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1); // Only commitment tx
5912 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5913 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_6.3.txid());
5914 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to A are present
5915 // Revoke the old state
5916 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_4);
5918 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5919 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
5921 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5922 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
5923 assert_eq!(node_txn.pop().unwrap(), node_txn[0]); // An outpoint registration will result in a 2nd block_connected
5924 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1); // We claim the received HTLC output
5926 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
5927 node_txn.swap_remove(0);
5929 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_6, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5931 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
5932 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_6, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::SUCCESS);
5933 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5934 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[1].clone()] }, 1);
5935 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], node_txn[1].clone());
5937 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
5938 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5939 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
5943 fn revoked_output_claim() {
5944 // Simple test to ensure a node will claim a revoked output when a stale remote commitment
5945 // transaction is broadcast by its counterparty
5946 let nodes = create_network(2);
5947 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5948 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim the revoked output
5949 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
5950 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1);
5951 // Only output is the full channel value back to nodes[0]:
5952 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
5953 // Send a payment through, updating everyone's latest commitment txn
5954 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 5000000);
5956 // Inform nodes[1] that nodes[0] broadcast a stale tx
5957 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5958 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
5959 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5960 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); // nodes[1] will broadcast justice tx twice, and its own local state once
5962 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[2]);
5964 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
5965 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3.clone());
5967 // Inform nodes[0] that a watchtower cheated on its behalf, so it will force-close the chan
5968 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
5969 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
5973 fn claim_htlc_outputs_shared_tx() {
5974 // Node revoked old state, htlcs haven't time out yet, claim them in shared justice tx
5975 let nodes = create_network(2);
5977 // Create some new channel:
5978 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5980 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
5981 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
5982 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx
5983 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
5984 let _payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000).0;
5986 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
5987 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
5988 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // commitment tx + 1 HTLC-Timeout tx
5989 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5990 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
5991 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5992 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
5993 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 133); // HTLC-Timeout
5994 check_spends!(revoked_local_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
5996 //Revoke the old state
5997 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
6000 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
6002 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
6004 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
6005 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
6006 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4);
6008 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Claim the revoked output + both revoked HTLC outputs
6009 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
6011 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]); // justice tx is duplicated due to block re-scanning
6013 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
6014 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
6015 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len());
6016 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[2].witness.last().unwrap().len());
6017 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
6018 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
6019 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), 133); // revoked offered HTLC
6020 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), 138); // revoked received HTLC
6022 // Next nodes[1] broadcasts its current local tx state:
6023 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
6024 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid()); //Spending funding tx unique txouput, tx broadcasted by ChannelManager
6026 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
6027 let witness_script = node_txn[2].clone().input[0].witness.pop().unwrap();
6028 assert_eq!(witness_script.len(), 133); //Spending an offered htlc output
6029 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[1].txid());
6030 assert_ne!(node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid);
6031 assert_ne!(node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output.txid);
6033 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
6034 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
6035 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
6039 fn claim_htlc_outputs_single_tx() {
6040 // Node revoked old state, htlcs have timed out, claim each of them in separated justice tx
6041 let nodes = create_network(2);
6043 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6045 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
6046 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
6047 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx, but this
6048 // time as two different claim transactions as we're gonna to timeout htlc with given a high current height
6049 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
6050 let _payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000).0;
6052 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
6053 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
6055 //Revoke the old state
6056 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
6059 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
6061 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 200);
6063 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 200);
6064 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
6065 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 12); // ChannelManager : 2, ChannelMontitor: 8 (1 standard revoked output, 2 revocation htlc tx, 1 local commitment tx + 1 htlc timeout tx) * 2 (block-rescan)
6067 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[7]);
6068 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[8]);
6069 assert_eq!(node_txn[2], node_txn[9]);
6070 assert_eq!(node_txn[3], node_txn[10]);
6071 assert_eq!(node_txn[4], node_txn[11]);
6072 assert_eq!(node_txn[3], node_txn[5]); //local commitment tx + htlc timeout tx broadcated by ChannelManger
6073 assert_eq!(node_txn[4], node_txn[6]);
6075 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
6076 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
6077 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
6079 let mut revoked_tx_map = HashMap::new();
6080 revoked_tx_map.insert(revoked_local_txn[0].txid(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
6081 node_txn[0].verify(&revoked_tx_map).unwrap();
6082 node_txn[1].verify(&revoked_tx_map).unwrap();
6083 node_txn[2].verify(&revoked_tx_map).unwrap();
6085 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
6086 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
6087 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
6088 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
6089 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
6090 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
6091 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), 133); // revoked offered HTLC
6092 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), 138); // revoked received HTLC
6094 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
6095 check_spends!(node_txn[3], chan_1.3.clone());
6097 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input.len(), 1);
6098 let witness_script = node_txn[4].input[0].witness.last().unwrap();
6099 assert_eq!(witness_script.len(), 133); //Spending an offered htlc output
6100 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[3].txid());
6101 assert_ne!(node_txn[4].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid);
6102 assert_ne!(node_txn[4].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid);
6104 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
6105 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
6106 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
6110 fn test_htlc_ignore_latest_remote_commitment() {
6111 // Test that HTLC transactions spending the latest remote commitment transaction are simply
6112 // ignored if we cannot claim them. This originally tickled an invalid unwrap().
6113 let nodes = create_network(2);
6114 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6116 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10000000);
6117 nodes[0].node.force_close_channel(&nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].channel_id);
6119 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6120 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6122 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
6123 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
6125 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6129 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
6130 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
6132 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
6133 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&node_txn[0], &node_txn[1]], &[1; 2]);
6136 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6137 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6139 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
6140 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
6142 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6146 // Duplicate the block_connected call since this may happen due to other listeners
6147 // registering new transactions
6148 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&node_txn[0], &node_txn[1]], &[1; 2]);
6152 fn test_force_close_fail_back() {
6153 // Check which HTLCs are failed-backwards on channel force-closure
6154 let mut nodes = create_network(3);
6155 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6156 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
6158 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, 42).unwrap();
6160 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
6162 let mut payment_event = {
6163 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
6164 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6166 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6167 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6168 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6171 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
6172 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6174 let events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6175 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
6177 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
6178 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6181 nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
6182 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
6184 let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6185 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
6186 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
6187 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
6189 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6190 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
6191 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap();
6192 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
6193 let (_, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6195 // nodes[2] now has the latest commitment transaction, but hasn't revoked its previous
6196 // state or updated nodes[1]' state. Now force-close and broadcast that commitment/HTLC
6197 // transaction and ensure nodes[1] doesn't fail-backwards (this was originally a bug!).
6199 nodes[2].node.force_close_channel(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id);
6200 let events_3 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6201 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
6203 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
6204 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
6206 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6210 let mut node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
6211 // Note that we don't bother broadcasting the HTLC-Success transaction here as we don't
6212 // have a use for it unless nodes[2] learns the preimage somehow, the funds will go
6213 // back to nodes[1] upon timeout otherwise.
6214 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
6218 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
6219 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&tx], &[1]);
6221 let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6222 // Note no UpdateHTLCs event here from nodes[1] to nodes[0]!
6223 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
6225 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
6226 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
6228 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6231 // Now check that if we add the preimage to ChannelMonitor it broadcasts our HTLC-Success..
6233 let mut monitors = nodes[2].chan_monitor.simple_monitor.monitors.lock().unwrap();
6234 monitors.get_mut(&OutPoint::new(Sha256dHash::from(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id[..]), 0)).unwrap()
6235 .provide_payment_preimage(&our_payment_hash, &our_payment_preimage);
6237 nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&tx], &[1]);
6238 let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
6239 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
6240 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
6241 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, tx.txid());
6242 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Must be an HTLC-Success
6243 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.len(), 5); // Must be an HTLC-Success
6245 check_spends!(node_txn[0], tx);
6249 fn test_unconf_chan() {
6250 // After creating a chan between nodes, we disconnect all blocks previously seen to force a channel close on nodes[0] side
6251 let nodes = create_network(2);
6252 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6254 let channel_state = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6255 assert_eq!(channel_state.by_id.len(), 1);
6256 assert_eq!(channel_state.short_to_id.len(), 1);
6257 mem::drop(channel_state);
6259 let mut headers = Vec::new();
6260 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
6261 headers.push(header.clone());
6263 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
6264 headers.push(header.clone());
6266 while !headers.is_empty() {
6267 nodes[0].node.block_disconnected(&headers.pop().unwrap());
6270 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6271 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6273 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
6274 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
6276 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6279 let channel_state = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6280 assert_eq!(channel_state.by_id.len(), 0);
6281 assert_eq!(channel_state.short_to_id.len(), 0);
6284 macro_rules! get_chan_reestablish_msgs {
6285 ($src_node: expr, $dst_node: expr) => {
6287 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(1);
6288 for msg in $src_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events() {
6289 if let MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, ref msg } = msg {
6290 assert_eq!(*node_id, $dst_node.node.get_our_node_id());
6291 res.push(msg.clone());
6293 panic!("Unexpected event")
6301 macro_rules! handle_chan_reestablish_msgs {
6302 ($src_node: expr, $dst_node: expr) => {
6304 let msg_events = $src_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6306 let funding_locked = if let Some(&MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg }) = msg_events.get(0) {
6308 assert_eq!(*node_id, $dst_node.node.get_our_node_id());
6314 let mut revoke_and_ack = None;
6315 let mut commitment_update = None;
6316 let order = if let Some(ev) = msg_events.get(idx) {
6319 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
6320 assert_eq!(*node_id, $dst_node.node.get_our_node_id());
6321 revoke_and_ack = Some(msg.clone());
6322 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst
6324 &MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
6325 assert_eq!(*node_id, $dst_node.node.get_our_node_id());
6326 commitment_update = Some(updates.clone());
6327 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst
6329 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6332 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst
6335 if let Some(ev) = msg_events.get(idx) {
6337 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
6338 assert_eq!(*node_id, $dst_node.node.get_our_node_id());
6339 assert!(revoke_and_ack.is_none());
6340 revoke_and_ack = Some(msg.clone());
6342 &MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
6343 assert_eq!(*node_id, $dst_node.node.get_our_node_id());
6344 assert!(commitment_update.is_none());
6345 commitment_update = Some(updates.clone());
6347 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6351 (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, order)
6356 /// pending_htlc_adds includes both the holding cell and in-flight update_add_htlcs, whereas
6357 /// for claims/fails they are separated out.
6358 fn reconnect_nodes(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, send_funding_locked: (bool, bool), pending_htlc_adds: (i64, i64), pending_htlc_claims: (usize, usize), pending_cell_htlc_claims: (usize, usize), pending_cell_htlc_fails: (usize, usize), pending_raa: (bool, bool)) {
6359 node_a.node.peer_connected(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
6360 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(node_a, node_b);
6361 node_b.node.peer_connected(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
6362 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(node_b, node_a);
6364 let mut resp_1 = Vec::new();
6365 for msg in reestablish_1 {
6366 node_b.node.handle_channel_reestablish(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &msg).unwrap();
6367 resp_1.push(handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(node_b, node_a));
6369 if pending_cell_htlc_claims.0 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_fails.0 != 0 {
6370 check_added_monitors!(node_b, 1);
6372 check_added_monitors!(node_b, 0);
6375 let mut resp_2 = Vec::new();
6376 for msg in reestablish_2 {
6377 node_a.node.handle_channel_reestablish(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &msg).unwrap();
6378 resp_2.push(handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(node_a, node_b));
6380 if pending_cell_htlc_claims.1 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_fails.1 != 0 {
6381 check_added_monitors!(node_a, 1);
6383 check_added_monitors!(node_a, 0);
6386 // We dont yet support both needing updates, as that would require a different commitment dance:
6387 assert!((pending_htlc_adds.0 == 0 && pending_htlc_claims.0 == 0 && pending_cell_htlc_claims.0 == 0 && pending_cell_htlc_fails.0 == 0) ||
6388 (pending_htlc_adds.1 == 0 && pending_htlc_claims.1 == 0 && pending_cell_htlc_claims.1 == 0 && pending_cell_htlc_fails.1 == 0));
6390 for chan_msgs in resp_1.drain(..) {
6391 if send_funding_locked.0 {
6392 node_a.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_msgs.0.unwrap()).unwrap();
6393 let announcement_event = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6394 if !announcement_event.is_empty() {
6395 assert_eq!(announcement_event.len(), 1);
6396 if let MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } = announcement_event[0] {
6397 //TODO: Test announcement_sigs re-sending
6398 } else { panic!("Unexpected event!"); }
6401 assert!(chan_msgs.0.is_none());
6404 assert!(chan_msgs.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst);
6405 node_a.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_msgs.1.unwrap()).unwrap();
6406 assert!(node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6407 check_added_monitors!(node_a, 1);
6409 assert!(chan_msgs.1.is_none());
6411 if pending_htlc_adds.0 != 0 || pending_htlc_claims.0 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_claims.0 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_fails.0 != 0 {
6412 let commitment_update = chan_msgs.2.unwrap();
6413 if pending_htlc_adds.0 != -1 { // We use -1 to denote a response commitment_signed
6414 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_adds.0 as usize);
6416 assert!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6418 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_claims.0 + pending_cell_htlc_claims.0);
6419 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), pending_cell_htlc_fails.0);
6420 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6421 for update_add in commitment_update.update_add_htlcs {
6422 node_a.node.handle_update_add_htlc(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add).unwrap();
6424 for update_fulfill in commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs {
6425 node_a.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill).unwrap();
6427 for update_fail in commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs {
6428 node_a.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail).unwrap();
6431 if pending_htlc_adds.0 != -1 { // We use -1 to denote a response commitment_signed
6432 commitment_signed_dance!(node_a, node_b, commitment_update.commitment_signed, false);
6434 node_a.node.handle_commitment_signed(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
6435 check_added_monitors!(node_a, 1);
6436 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(node_a, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
6437 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
6438 node_b.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
6439 assert!(node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6440 check_added_monitors!(node_b, 1);
6443 assert!(chan_msgs.2.is_none());
6447 for chan_msgs in resp_2.drain(..) {
6448 if send_funding_locked.1 {
6449 node_b.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_msgs.0.unwrap()).unwrap();
6450 let announcement_event = node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6451 if !announcement_event.is_empty() {
6452 assert_eq!(announcement_event.len(), 1);
6453 if let MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } = announcement_event[0] {
6454 //TODO: Test announcement_sigs re-sending
6455 } else { panic!("Unexpected event!"); }
6458 assert!(chan_msgs.0.is_none());
6461 assert!(chan_msgs.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst);
6462 node_b.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_msgs.1.unwrap()).unwrap();
6463 assert!(node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6464 check_added_monitors!(node_b, 1);
6466 assert!(chan_msgs.1.is_none());
6468 if pending_htlc_adds.1 != 0 || pending_htlc_claims.1 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_claims.1 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_fails.1 != 0 {
6469 let commitment_update = chan_msgs.2.unwrap();
6470 if pending_htlc_adds.1 != -1 { // We use -1 to denote a response commitment_signed
6471 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_adds.1 as usize);
6473 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_claims.0 + pending_cell_htlc_claims.0);
6474 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), pending_cell_htlc_fails.0);
6475 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6476 for update_add in commitment_update.update_add_htlcs {
6477 node_b.node.handle_update_add_htlc(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add).unwrap();
6479 for update_fulfill in commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs {
6480 node_b.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill).unwrap();
6482 for update_fail in commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs {
6483 node_b.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail).unwrap();
6486 if pending_htlc_adds.1 != -1 { // We use -1 to denote a response commitment_signed
6487 commitment_signed_dance!(node_b, node_a, commitment_update.commitment_signed, false);
6489 node_b.node.handle_commitment_signed(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
6490 check_added_monitors!(node_b, 1);
6491 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
6492 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
6493 node_a.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
6494 assert!(node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6495 check_added_monitors!(node_a, 1);
6498 assert!(chan_msgs.2.is_none());
6504 fn test_simple_peer_disconnect() {
6505 // Test that we can reconnect when there are no lost messages
6506 let nodes = create_network(3);
6507 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6508 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
6510 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6511 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6512 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
6514 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
6515 let payment_hash_2 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
6516 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_2);
6517 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_1);
6519 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6520 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6521 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
6523 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
6524 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
6525 let payment_hash_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
6526 let payment_hash_6 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
6528 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6529 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6531 claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), true, payment_preimage_3);
6532 fail_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], true, payment_hash_5);
6534 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (1, 0), (1, 0), (false, false));
6536 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6537 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
6539 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage } => {
6540 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, payment_preimage_3);
6542 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6545 Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, rejected_by_dest } => {
6546 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_5);
6547 assert!(rejected_by_dest);
6549 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6553 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_4);
6554 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_6);
6557 fn do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(messages_delivered: u8) {
6558 // Test that we can reconnect when in-flight HTLC updates get dropped
6559 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
6560 if messages_delivered == 0 {
6561 create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001);
6562 // nodes[1] doesn't receive the funding_locked message (it'll be re-sent on reconnect)
6564 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6567 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(&nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()), &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
6568 let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
6570 let payment_event = {
6571 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), payment_hash_1).unwrap();
6572 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6574 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6575 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6576 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6578 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
6580 if messages_delivered < 2 {
6581 // Drop the payment_event messages, and let them get re-generated in reconnect_nodes!
6583 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
6584 if messages_delivered >= 3 {
6585 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap();
6586 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6587 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6589 if messages_delivered >= 4 {
6590 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
6591 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6592 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6594 if messages_delivered >= 5 {
6595 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed).unwrap();
6596 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6597 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
6598 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6600 if messages_delivered >= 6 {
6601 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
6602 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6603 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6610 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6611 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6612 if messages_delivered < 3 {
6613 // Even if the funding_locked messages get exchanged, as long as nothing further was
6614 // received on either side, both sides will need to resend them.
6615 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
6616 } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
6617 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
6618 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
6619 } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
6620 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
6621 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
6622 } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
6623 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
6624 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
6625 } else if messages_delivered == 6 {
6626 // Everything was delivered...
6627 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
6630 let events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6631 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
6633 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
6634 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6637 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6638 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6639 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
6641 nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
6642 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
6644 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6645 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
6647 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
6648 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
6649 assert_eq!(amt, 1000000);
6651 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6654 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
6655 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6657 let events_3 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6658 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
6659 let (update_fulfill_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events_3[0] {
6660 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
6661 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6662 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6663 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6664 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6665 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6666 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
6667 (updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
6669 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6672 if messages_delivered >= 1 {
6673 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlc).unwrap();
6675 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6676 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
6678 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
6679 assert_eq!(payment_preimage_1, *payment_preimage);
6681 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6684 if messages_delivered >= 2 {
6685 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap();
6686 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6687 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6689 if messages_delivered >= 3 {
6690 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
6691 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6692 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6694 if messages_delivered >= 4 {
6695 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed).unwrap();
6696 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6697 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
6698 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6700 if messages_delivered >= 5 {
6701 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
6702 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6703 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6710 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6711 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6712 if messages_delivered < 2 {
6713 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
6714 //TODO: Deduplicate PaymentSent events, then enable this if:
6715 //if messages_delivered < 1 {
6716 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6717 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
6719 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
6720 assert_eq!(payment_preimage_1, *payment_preimage);
6722 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6725 } else if messages_delivered == 2 {
6726 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
6727 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
6728 } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
6729 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
6730 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
6731 } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
6732 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
6733 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
6734 } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
6735 // Everything was delivered...
6736 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
6739 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6740 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6741 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
6743 // Channel should still work fine...
6744 let payment_preimage_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
6745 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
6749 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_a() {
6750 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0);
6751 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(1);
6752 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(2);
6753 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(3);
6757 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_b() {
6758 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(4);
6759 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(5);
6760 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(6);
6764 fn test_funding_peer_disconnect() {
6765 // Test that we can lock in our funding tx while disconnected
6766 let nodes = create_network(2);
6767 let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001);
6769 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6770 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6772 confirm_transaction(&nodes[0].chain_monitor, &tx, tx.version);
6773 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6774 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
6776 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, msg: _ } => {
6777 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6779 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6782 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
6784 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6785 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6787 confirm_transaction(&nodes[1].chain_monitor, &tx, tx.version);
6788 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6789 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 2);
6791 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, msg: _ } => {
6792 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6794 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6797 MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, msg: _ } => {
6798 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6800 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6803 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
6805 // TODO: We shouldn't need to manually pass list_usable_chanels here once we support
6806 // rebroadcasting announcement_signatures upon reconnect.
6808 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(&nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()), &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
6809 let (payment_preimage, _) = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
6810 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage);
6814 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_dual_htlc() {
6815 // Test that we can handle reconnecting when both sides of a channel have pending
6816 // commitment_updates when we disconnect.
6817 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
6818 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6820 let (payment_preimage_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
6822 // Now try to send a second payment which will fail to send
6823 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
6824 let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
6826 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), payment_hash_2).unwrap();
6827 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6829 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6830 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
6832 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
6833 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6836 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1));
6837 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6839 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6840 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
6842 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
6843 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6844 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6845 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6846 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6847 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6848 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6850 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
6851 let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6852 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
6854 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
6855 assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
6857 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6860 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
6861 let _ = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6862 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
6863 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6865 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6868 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6869 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6871 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6872 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6873 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
6874 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6875 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6876 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
6878 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]).unwrap();
6879 let as_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6880 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]).unwrap();
6881 let bs_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6883 assert!(as_resp.0.is_none());
6884 assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none());
6886 assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
6887 assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
6889 assert!(as_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
6891 assert_eq!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
6892 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6893 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6894 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6895 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none());
6896 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
6897 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed).unwrap();
6898 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6899 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
6900 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6902 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), as_resp.1.as_ref().unwrap()).unwrap();
6903 let bs_second_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6904 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6905 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6906 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6907 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6908 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
6909 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6911 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
6912 let as_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6913 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6914 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6915 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6916 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6917 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
6918 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6920 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment_signed.commitment_signed).unwrap();
6921 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6922 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
6923 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6925 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed.commitment_signed).unwrap();
6926 let bs_second_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6927 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
6928 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6930 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
6931 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6932 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6934 let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6935 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
6937 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
6938 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6941 nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
6942 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
6944 let events_5 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6945 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
6947 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt: _ } => {
6948 assert_eq!(payment_hash_2, *payment_hash);
6950 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6953 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
6954 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6955 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6957 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
6961 fn test_simple_monitor_permanent_update_fail() {
6962 // Test that we handle a simple permanent monitor update failure
6963 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
6964 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6966 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
6967 let (_, payment_hash_1) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
6969 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure);
6970 if let Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, payment_hash_1) {} else { panic!(); }
6971 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6973 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6974 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
6976 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
6977 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6980 // TODO: Once we hit the chain with the failure transaction we should check that we get a
6981 // PaymentFailed event
6983 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
6986 fn do_test_simple_monitor_temporary_update_fail(disconnect: bool) {
6987 // Test that we can recover from a simple temporary monitor update failure optionally with
6988 // a disconnect in between
6989 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
6990 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6992 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
6993 let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
6995 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
6996 if let Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), payment_hash_1) {} else { panic!(); }
6997 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6999 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
7000 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7001 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
7004 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7005 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7006 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
7009 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(());
7010 nodes[0].node.test_restore_channel_monitor();
7011 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7013 let mut events_2 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7014 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
7015 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.pop().unwrap());
7016 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7017 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
7018 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7020 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7022 let events_3 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7023 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
7025 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
7026 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
7027 assert_eq!(amt, 1000000);
7029 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7032 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_1);
7034 // Now set it to failed again...
7035 let (_, payment_hash_2) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
7036 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
7037 if let Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, payment_hash_2) {} else { panic!(); }
7038 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7040 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
7041 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7042 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
7045 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7046 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7047 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
7050 // ...and make sure we can force-close a TemporaryFailure channel with a PermanentFailure
7051 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure);
7052 nodes[0].node.test_restore_channel_monitor();
7053 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7055 let events_5 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7056 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
7058 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
7059 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7062 // TODO: Once we hit the chain with the failure transaction we should check that we get a
7063 // PaymentFailed event
7065 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
7069 fn test_simple_monitor_temporary_update_fail() {
7070 do_test_simple_monitor_temporary_update_fail(false);
7071 do_test_simple_monitor_temporary_update_fail(true);
7074 fn do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(disconnect_count: usize) {
7075 let disconnect_flags = 8 | 16;
7077 // Test that we can recover from a temporary monitor update failure with some in-flight
7078 // HTLCs going on at the same time potentially with some disconnection thrown in.
7079 // * First we route a payment, then get a temporary monitor update failure when trying to
7080 // route a second payment. We then claim the first payment.
7081 // * If disconnect_count is set, we will disconnect at this point (which is likely as
7082 // TemporaryFailure likely indicates net disconnect which resulted in failing to update
7083 // the ChannelMonitor on a watchtower).
7084 // * If !(disconnect_count & 16) we deliver a update_fulfill_htlc/CS for the first payment
7085 // immediately, otherwise we wait sconnect and deliver them via the reconnect
7086 // channel_reestablish processing (ie disconnect_count & 16 makes no sense if
7087 // disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags is 0).
7088 // * We then update the channel monitor, reconnecting if disconnect_count is set and walk
7089 // through message sending, potentially disconnect/reconnecting multiple times based on
7090 // disconnect_count, to get the update_fulfill_htlc through.
7091 // * We then walk through more message exchanges to get the original update_add_htlc
7092 // through, swapping message ordering based on disconnect_count & 8 and optionally
7093 // disconnect/reconnecting based on disconnect_count.
7094 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
7095 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7097 let (payment_preimage_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7099 // Now try to send a second payment which will fail to send
7100 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
7101 let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
7103 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
7104 if let Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), payment_hash_2) {} else { panic!(); }
7105 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7107 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
7108 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7109 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
7111 // Claim the previous payment, which will result in a update_fulfill_htlc/CS from nodes[1]
7112 // but nodes[0] won't respond since it is frozen.
7113 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1));
7114 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7115 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7116 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
7117 let (bs_initial_fulfill, bs_initial_commitment_signed) = match events_2[0] {
7118 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
7119 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7120 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7121 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
7122 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7123 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7124 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
7126 if (disconnect_count & 16) == 0 {
7127 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
7128 let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7129 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
7131 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
7132 assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
7134 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7137 if let Err(msgs::HandleError{err, action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) }) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed) {
7138 assert_eq!(err, "Previous monitor update failure prevented generation of RAA");
7139 } else { panic!(); }
7142 (update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone())
7144 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7147 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 0 {
7148 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7149 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7152 // Now fix monitor updating...
7153 *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(());
7154 nodes[0].node.test_restore_channel_monitor();
7155 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7157 macro_rules! disconnect_reconnect_peers { () => { {
7158 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7159 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7161 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7162 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7163 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
7164 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7165 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7166 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
7168 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]).unwrap();
7169 let as_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7170 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]).unwrap();
7171 let bs_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7173 assert!(as_resp.0.is_none());
7174 assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none());
7176 (reestablish_1, reestablish_2, as_resp, bs_resp)
7179 let (payment_event, initial_revoke_and_ack) = if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 0 {
7180 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
7181 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7183 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7184 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7185 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
7186 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7187 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7188 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
7190 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]).unwrap();
7191 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
7192 let mut as_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7193 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]).unwrap();
7194 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7195 let mut bs_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7197 assert!(as_resp.0.is_none());
7198 assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none());
7200 assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
7201 if (disconnect_count & 16) == 0 {
7202 assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
7204 assert!(as_resp.1.is_some());
7205 assert!(as_resp.2.is_some());
7206 assert!(as_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
7208 assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7209 assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7210 assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7211 assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none());
7212 assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs == vec![bs_initial_fulfill]);
7213 assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed == bs_initial_commitment_signed);
7215 assert!(as_resp.1.is_none());
7217 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
7218 let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7219 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
7221 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
7222 assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
7224 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7227 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed).unwrap();
7228 let as_resp_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7229 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
7230 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7232 as_resp.1 = Some(as_resp_raa);
7236 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 1 {
7237 let (second_reestablish_1, second_reestablish_2, second_as_resp, second_bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
7239 if (disconnect_count & 16) == 0 {
7240 assert!(reestablish_1 == second_reestablish_1);
7241 assert!(reestablish_2 == second_reestablish_2);
7243 assert!(as_resp == second_as_resp);
7244 assert!(bs_resp == second_bs_resp);
7247 (SendEvent::from_commitment_update(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), as_resp.2.unwrap()), as_resp.1.unwrap())
7249 let mut events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7250 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 2);
7251 (SendEvent::from_event(events_4.remove(0)), match events_4[0] {
7252 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
7253 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7256 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7260 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7262 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
7263 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap();
7264 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7265 // nodes[1] is awaiting an RAA from nodes[0] still so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
7266 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7268 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 2 {
7269 let (_, _, as_resp, bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
7271 assert!(as_resp.1.unwrap() == initial_revoke_and_ack);
7272 assert!(bs_resp.1.unwrap() == bs_revoke_and_ack);
7274 assert!(as_resp.2.is_none());
7275 assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
7278 let as_commitment_update;
7279 let bs_second_commitment_update;
7281 macro_rules! handle_bs_raa { () => {
7282 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
7283 as_commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7284 assert!(as_commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7285 assert!(as_commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7286 assert!(as_commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7287 assert!(as_commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7288 assert!(as_commitment_update.update_fee.is_none());
7289 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7292 macro_rules! handle_initial_raa { () => {
7293 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
7294 bs_second_commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7295 assert!(bs_second_commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7296 assert!(bs_second_commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7297 assert!(bs_second_commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7298 assert!(bs_second_commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7299 assert!(bs_second_commitment_update.update_fee.is_none());
7300 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7303 if (disconnect_count & 8) == 0 {
7306 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 3 {
7307 let (_, _, as_resp, bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
7309 assert!(as_resp.1.unwrap() == initial_revoke_and_ack);
7310 assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
7312 assert!(as_resp.2.unwrap() == as_commitment_update);
7313 assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
7315 assert!(as_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst);
7318 handle_initial_raa!();
7320 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 4 {
7321 let (_, _, as_resp, bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
7323 assert!(as_resp.1.is_none());
7324 assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
7326 assert!(as_resp.2.unwrap() == as_commitment_update);
7327 assert!(bs_resp.2.unwrap() == bs_second_commitment_update);
7330 handle_initial_raa!();
7332 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 3 {
7333 let (_, _, as_resp, bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
7335 assert!(as_resp.1.is_none());
7336 assert!(bs_resp.1.unwrap() == bs_revoke_and_ack);
7338 assert!(as_resp.2.is_none());
7339 assert!(bs_resp.2.unwrap() == bs_second_commitment_update);
7341 assert!(bs_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst);
7346 if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 4 {
7347 let (_, _, as_resp, bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();
7349 assert!(as_resp.1.is_none());
7350 assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
7352 assert!(as_resp.2.unwrap() == as_commitment_update);
7353 assert!(bs_resp.2.unwrap() == bs_second_commitment_update);
7357 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
7358 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7359 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
7360 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7362 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
7363 let bs_second_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7364 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
7365 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7367 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
7368 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7369 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7371 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
7372 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7373 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7375 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7377 let events_5 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7378 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
7380 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
7381 assert_eq!(payment_hash_2, *payment_hash);
7382 assert_eq!(amt, 1000000);
7384 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7387 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
7391 fn test_monitor_temporary_update_fail_a() {
7392 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(0);
7393 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(1);
7394 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(2);
7395 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(3);
7396 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(4);
7397 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(5);
7401 fn test_monitor_temporary_update_fail_b() {
7402 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(2 | 8);
7403 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(3 | 8);
7404 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(4 | 8);
7405 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(5 | 8);
7409 fn test_monitor_temporary_update_fail_c() {
7410 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(1 | 16);
7411 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(2 | 16);
7412 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(3 | 16);
7413 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(2 | 8 | 16);
7414 do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(3 | 8 | 16);
7418 fn test_invalid_channel_announcement() {
7419 //Test BOLT 7 channel_announcement msg requirement for final node, gather data to build customed channel_announcement msgs
7420 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7421 let nodes = create_network(2);
7423 let chan_announcement = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
7425 let a_channel_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
7426 let b_channel_lock = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
7427 let as_chan = a_channel_lock.by_id.get(&chan_announcement.3).unwrap();
7428 let bs_chan = b_channel_lock.by_id.get(&chan_announcement.3).unwrap();
7430 let _ = nodes[0].router.handle_htlc_fail_channel_update(&msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { short_channel_id : as_chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), is_permanent: false } );
7432 let as_bitcoin_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &as_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
7433 let bs_bitcoin_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &bs_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
7435 let as_network_key = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
7436 let bs_network_key = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
7438 let were_node_one = as_bitcoin_key.serialize()[..] < bs_bitcoin_key.serialize()[..];
7440 let mut chan_announcement;
7442 macro_rules! dummy_unsigned_msg {
7444 msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
7445 features: msgs::GlobalFeatures::new(),
7446 chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.bitcoin_hash(),
7447 short_channel_id: as_chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
7448 node_id_1: if were_node_one { as_network_key } else { bs_network_key },
7449 node_id_2: if were_node_one { bs_network_key } else { as_network_key },
7450 bitcoin_key_1: if were_node_one { as_bitcoin_key } else { bs_bitcoin_key },
7451 bitcoin_key_2: if were_node_one { bs_bitcoin_key } else { as_bitcoin_key },
7452 excess_data: Vec::new(),
7457 macro_rules! sign_msg {
7458 ($unsigned_msg: expr) => {
7459 let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&$unsigned_msg.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
7460 let as_bitcoin_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &as_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
7461 let bs_bitcoin_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &bs_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
7462 let as_node_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &nodes[0].node.our_network_key);
7463 let bs_node_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &nodes[1].node.our_network_key);
7464 chan_announcement = msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
7465 node_signature_1 : if were_node_one { as_node_sig } else { bs_node_sig},
7466 node_signature_2 : if were_node_one { bs_node_sig } else { as_node_sig},
7467 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { as_bitcoin_sig } else { bs_bitcoin_sig },
7468 bitcoin_signature_2 : if were_node_one { bs_bitcoin_sig } else { as_bitcoin_sig },
7469 contents: $unsigned_msg
7474 let unsigned_msg = dummy_unsigned_msg!();
7475 sign_msg!(unsigned_msg);
7476 assert_eq!(nodes[0].router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).unwrap(), true);
7477 let _ = nodes[0].router.handle_htlc_fail_channel_update(&msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { short_channel_id : as_chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), is_permanent: false } );
7479 // Configured with Network::Testnet
7480 let mut unsigned_msg = dummy_unsigned_msg!();
7481 unsigned_msg.chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin).header.bitcoin_hash();
7482 sign_msg!(unsigned_msg);
7483 assert!(nodes[0].router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).is_err());
7485 let mut unsigned_msg = dummy_unsigned_msg!();
7486 unsigned_msg.chain_hash = Sha256dHash::from_data(&[1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9]);
7487 sign_msg!(unsigned_msg);
7488 assert!(nodes[0].router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).is_err());
7491 struct VecWriter(Vec<u8>);
7492 impl Writer for VecWriter {
7493 fn write_all(&mut self, buf: &[u8]) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
7494 self.0.extend_from_slice(buf);
7497 fn size_hint(&mut self, size: usize) {
7498 self.0.reserve_exact(size);
7503 fn test_no_txn_manager_serialize_deserialize() {
7504 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
7506 let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001);
7508 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7510 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
7511 let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = VecWriter(Vec::new());
7512 nodes[0].chan_monitor.simple_monitor.monitors.lock().unwrap().iter().next().unwrap().1.write_for_disk(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
7514 nodes[0].chan_monitor = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChannelMonitor::new(nodes[0].chain_monitor.clone(), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())));
7515 let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
7516 let (_, chan_0_monitor) = <(Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor)>::read(&mut chan_0_monitor_read, Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())).unwrap();
7517 assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
7519 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
7520 let config = UserConfig::new();
7521 let keys_manager = Arc::new(keysinterface::KeysManager::new(&nodes[0].node_seed, Network::Testnet, Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())));
7522 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized) = {
7523 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
7524 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), &chan_0_monitor);
7525 <(Sha256dHash, ChannelManager)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
7526 default_config: config,
7528 fee_estimator: Arc::new(test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 }),
7529 monitor: nodes[0].chan_monitor.clone(),
7530 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor.clone(),
7531 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
7532 logger: Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new()),
7533 channel_monitors: &channel_monitors,
7536 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
7538 assert!(nodes[0].chan_monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
7539 nodes[0].node = Arc::new(nodes_0_deserialized);
7540 let nodes_0_as_listener: Arc<ChainListener> = nodes[0].node.clone();
7541 nodes[0].chain_monitor.register_listener(Arc::downgrade(&nodes_0_as_listener));
7542 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
7543 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7545 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7546 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7547 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7548 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7550 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]).unwrap();
7551 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7552 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]).unwrap();
7553 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7555 let (funding_locked, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
7556 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked);
7557 for node in nodes.iter() {
7558 assert!(node.router.handle_channel_announcement(&announcement).unwrap());
7559 node.router.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
7560 node.router.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
7563 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7567 fn test_simple_manager_serialize_deserialize() {
7568 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
7569 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7571 let (our_payment_preimage, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7572 let (_, our_payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7574 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7576 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
7577 let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = VecWriter(Vec::new());
7578 nodes[0].chan_monitor.simple_monitor.monitors.lock().unwrap().iter().next().unwrap().1.write_for_disk(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
7580 nodes[0].chan_monitor = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChannelMonitor::new(nodes[0].chain_monitor.clone(), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())));
7581 let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
7582 let (_, chan_0_monitor) = <(Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor)>::read(&mut chan_0_monitor_read, Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())).unwrap();
7583 assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
7585 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
7586 let keys_manager = Arc::new(keysinterface::KeysManager::new(&nodes[0].node_seed, Network::Testnet, Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())));
7587 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized) = {
7588 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
7589 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), &chan_0_monitor);
7590 <(Sha256dHash, ChannelManager)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
7591 default_config: UserConfig::new(),
7593 fee_estimator: Arc::new(test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 }),
7594 monitor: nodes[0].chan_monitor.clone(),
7595 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor.clone(),
7596 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
7597 logger: Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new()),
7598 channel_monitors: &channel_monitors,
7601 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
7603 assert!(nodes[0].chan_monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
7604 nodes[0].node = Arc::new(nodes_0_deserialized);
7605 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7607 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
7609 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_hash);
7610 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
7614 fn test_manager_serialize_deserialize_inconsistent_monitor() {
7615 // Test deserializing a ChannelManager with a out-of-date ChannelMonitor
7616 let mut nodes = create_network(4);
7617 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7618 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 0);
7619 let (_, _, channel_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3);
7621 let (our_payment_preimage, _) = route_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[0], &nodes[1]], 1000000);
7623 // Serialize the ChannelManager here, but the monitor we keep up-to-date
7624 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
7626 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[3]], 1000000);
7627 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7628 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7629 nodes[3].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7631 // Now the ChannelMonitor (which is now out-of-sync with ChannelManager for channel w/
7633 let mut node_0_monitors_serialized = Vec::new();
7634 for monitor in nodes[0].chan_monitor.simple_monitor.monitors.lock().unwrap().iter() {
7635 let mut writer = VecWriter(Vec::new());
7636 monitor.1.write_for_disk(&mut writer).unwrap();
7637 node_0_monitors_serialized.push(writer.0);
7640 nodes[0].chan_monitor = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChannelMonitor::new(nodes[0].chain_monitor.clone(), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())));
7641 let mut node_0_monitors = Vec::new();
7642 for serialized in node_0_monitors_serialized.iter() {
7643 let mut read = &serialized[..];
7644 let (_, monitor) = <(Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor)>::read(&mut read, Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())).unwrap();
7645 assert!(read.is_empty());
7646 node_0_monitors.push(monitor);
7649 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
7650 let keys_manager = Arc::new(keysinterface::KeysManager::new(&nodes[0].node_seed, Network::Testnet, Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())));
7651 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized) = <(Sha256dHash, ChannelManager)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
7652 default_config: UserConfig::new(),
7654 fee_estimator: Arc::new(test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 }),
7655 monitor: nodes[0].chan_monitor.clone(),
7656 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor.clone(),
7657 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
7658 logger: Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new()),
7659 channel_monitors: &node_0_monitors.iter().map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) }).collect(),
7661 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
7663 { // Channel close should result in a commitment tx and an HTLC tx
7664 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7665 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
7666 assert_eq!(txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, funding_tx.txid());
7667 assert_eq!(txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, txn[0].txid());
7670 for monitor in node_0_monitors.drain(..) {
7671 assert!(nodes[0].chan_monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor).is_ok());
7672 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7674 nodes[0].node = Arc::new(nodes_0_deserialized);
7676 // nodes[1] and nodes[2] have no lost state with nodes[0]...
7677 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
7678 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[2], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
7679 //... and we can even still claim the payment!
7680 claim_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[0], &nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
7682 nodes[3].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7683 let reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[3], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7684 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
7685 if let Err(msgs::HandleError { action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg }), .. }) = nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish) {
7686 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, channel_id);
7687 } else { panic!("Unexpected result"); }
7690 macro_rules! check_dynamic_output_p2wsh {
7693 let events = $node.chan_monitor.simple_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7694 let mut txn = Vec::new();
7695 for event in events {
7697 Event::SpendableOutputs { ref outputs } => {
7698 for outp in outputs {
7700 SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WSH { ref outpoint, ref key, ref witness_script, ref to_self_delay, ref output } => {
7702 previous_output: outpoint.clone(),
7703 script_sig: Script::new(),
7704 sequence: *to_self_delay as u32,
7705 witness: Vec::new(),
7708 script_pubkey: Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::All::OP_RETURN).into_script(),
7709 value: output.value,
7711 let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
7717 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7718 let sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx).sighash_all(&spend_tx.input[0], witness_script, output.value)[..]).unwrap();
7719 let local_delaysig = secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, key);
7720 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(local_delaysig.serialize_der(&secp_ctx).to_vec());
7721 spend_tx.input[0].witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
7722 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(vec!(0));
7723 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(witness_script.clone().into_bytes());
7726 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7730 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7738 macro_rules! check_dynamic_output_p2wpkh {
7741 let events = $node.chan_monitor.simple_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7742 let mut txn = Vec::new();
7743 for event in events {
7745 Event::SpendableOutputs { ref outputs } => {
7746 for outp in outputs {
7748 SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WPKH { ref outpoint, ref key, ref output } => {
7750 previous_output: outpoint.clone(),
7751 script_sig: Script::new(),
7753 witness: Vec::new(),
7756 script_pubkey: Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::All::OP_RETURN).into_script(),
7757 value: output.value,
7759 let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
7765 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7766 let remotepubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &key);
7767 let witness_script = Address::p2pkh(&remotepubkey, Network::Testnet).script_pubkey();
7768 let sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx).sighash_all(&spend_tx.input[0], &witness_script, output.value)[..]).unwrap();
7769 let remotesig = secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, key);
7770 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(remotesig.serialize_der(&secp_ctx).to_vec());
7771 spend_tx.input[0].witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
7772 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(remotepubkey.serialize().to_vec());
7775 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7779 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7787 macro_rules! check_static_output {
7788 ($event: expr, $node: expr, $event_idx: expr, $output_idx: expr, $der_idx: expr, $idx_node: expr) => {
7789 match $event[$event_idx] {
7790 Event::SpendableOutputs { ref outputs } => {
7791 match outputs[$output_idx] {
7792 SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput { ref outpoint, ref output } => {
7793 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7795 previous_output: outpoint.clone(),
7796 script_sig: Script::new(),
7798 witness: Vec::new(),
7801 script_pubkey: Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::All::OP_RETURN).into_script(),
7802 value: output.value,
7804 let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
7808 output: vec![outp.clone()],
7811 match ExtendedPrivKey::new_master(&secp_ctx, Network::Testnet, &$node[$idx_node].node_seed) {
7813 match master_key.ckd_priv(&secp_ctx, ChildNumber::from_hardened_idx($der_idx)) {
7815 Err(_) => panic!("Your RNG is busted"),
7818 Err(_) => panic!("Your rng is busted"),
7821 let pubkey = ExtendedPubKey::from_private(&secp_ctx, &secret).public_key;
7822 let witness_script = Address::p2pkh(&pubkey, Network::Testnet).script_pubkey();
7823 let sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx).sighash_all(&spend_tx.input[0], &witness_script, output.value)[..]).unwrap();
7824 let sig = secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &secret.secret_key);
7825 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(sig.serialize_der(&secp_ctx).to_vec());
7826 spend_tx.input[0].witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
7827 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(pubkey.serialize().to_vec());
7830 _ => panic!("Unexpected event !"),
7833 _ => panic!("Unexpected event !"),
7839 fn test_claim_sizeable_push_msat() {
7840 // Incidentally test SpendableOutput event generation due to detection of to_local output on commitment tx
7841 let nodes = create_network(2);
7843 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 99000000);
7844 nodes[1].node.force_close_channel(&chan.2);
7845 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7847 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
7848 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7850 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7851 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7852 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3.clone());
7853 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
7855 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7856 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone()] }, 0);
7857 let spend_txn = check_dynamic_output_p2wsh!(nodes[1]);
7858 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
7859 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0].clone());
7863 fn test_claim_on_remote_sizeable_push_msat() {
7864 // Same test as precedent, just test on remote commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
7865 // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
7867 let nodes = create_network(2);
7869 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 99000000);
7870 nodes[0].node.force_close_channel(&chan.2);
7871 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7873 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
7874 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7876 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7877 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7878 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3.clone());
7879 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
7881 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7882 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone()] }, 0);
7883 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7885 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
7886 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7888 let spend_txn = check_dynamic_output_p2wpkh!(nodes[1]);
7889 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 2);
7890 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0], spend_txn[1]);
7891 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0].clone());
7895 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_preimage_tx() {
7896 let nodes = create_network(2);
7898 // Create some initial channels
7899 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7901 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
7903 let commitment_tx = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
7904 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
7905 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
7907 // Settle A's commitment tx on B's chain
7908 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7909 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
7910 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7911 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_tx[0].clone()] }, 1);
7912 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7914 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
7915 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7918 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
7919 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
7922 // Check B's monitor was able to send back output descriptor event for preimage tx on A's commitment tx
7923 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap(); // ChannelManager : 1 (local commitment tx), ChannelMonitor: 2 (1 preimage tx) * 2 (block-rescan)
7924 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0].clone());
7925 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[2]);
7926 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 133);
7927 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3.clone());
7929 let events = nodes[1].chan_monitor.simple_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7930 let spend_tx = check_static_output!(events, nodes, 0, 0, 1, 1);
7931 check_spends!(spend_tx, node_txn[0].clone());
7935 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_commitment_tx() {
7936 let nodes = create_network(2);
7938 // Create some initial channels
7939 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7941 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
7942 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.iter().next().unwrap().1.last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
7943 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7944 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
7946 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7948 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7949 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
7950 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7952 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
7953 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7955 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7956 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
7957 assert_eq!(node_txn.pop().unwrap(), node_txn[0]);
7958 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
7959 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
7961 let events = nodes[1].chan_monitor.simple_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7962 let spend_tx = check_static_output!(events, nodes, 0, 0, 1, 1);
7963 check_spends!(spend_tx, node_txn[0].clone());
7967 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_timeout_tx() {
7968 let nodes = create_network(2);
7970 // Create some initial channels
7971 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7973 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
7974 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
7975 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7976 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
7978 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7980 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7981 // A will generate HTLC-Timeout from revoked commitment tx
7982 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
7983 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7985 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
7986 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7988 let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7989 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 2);
7990 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7991 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 133);
7992 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
7994 // B will generate justice tx from A's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
7995 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
7996 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7998 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
7999 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8002 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8003 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4);
8004 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
8005 check_spends!(node_txn[3], revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone());
8007 let events = nodes[1].chan_monitor.simple_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8008 // Check B's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
8009 let spend_tx = check_static_output!(events, nodes, 1, 1, 1, 1);
8010 check_spends!(spend_tx, node_txn[3].clone());
8014 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_success_tx() {
8015 let nodes = create_network(2);
8017 // Create some initial channels
8018 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8020 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
8021 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
8022 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8023 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
8025 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
8027 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8028 // B will generate HTLC-Success from revoked commitment tx
8029 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
8030 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8032 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
8033 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8035 let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8037 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 2);
8038 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8039 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 138);
8040 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
8042 // A will generate justice tx from B's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
8043 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
8044 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8046 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
8047 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8050 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8051 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4);
8052 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
8053 check_spends!(node_txn[3], revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone());
8055 let events = nodes[0].chan_monitor.simple_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8056 // Check A's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
8057 let spend_tx = check_static_output!(events, nodes, 1, 2, 1, 0);
8058 check_spends!(spend_tx, node_txn[3].clone());
8062 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_success_tx() {
8063 let nodes = create_network(2);
8065 // Create some initial channels
8066 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8068 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000).0;
8069 let local_txn = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
8070 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8071 check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3.clone());
8073 // Give B knowledge of preimage to be able to generate a local HTLC-Success Tx
8074 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
8075 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8076 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8077 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
8078 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8080 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
8081 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8084 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
8085 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
8087 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8088 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8089 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 138);
8090 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn[0].clone());
8092 // Verify that B is able to spend its own HTLC-Success tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
8093 let spend_txn = check_dynamic_output_p2wsh!(nodes[1]);
8094 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
8095 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0].clone());
8099 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_timeout_tx() {
8100 let nodes = create_network(2);
8102 // Create some initial channels
8103 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8105 route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000).0;
8106 let local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
8107 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8108 check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3.clone());
8110 // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
8111 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8112 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![local_txn[0].clone()] }, 200);
8113 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8115 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
8116 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
8118 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8119 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8120 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 133);
8121 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn[0].clone());
8123 // Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
8124 let spend_txn = check_dynamic_output_p2wsh!(nodes[0]);
8125 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 4);
8126 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0], spend_txn[2]);
8127 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1], spend_txn[3]);
8128 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], local_txn[0].clone());
8129 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[0].clone());
8133 fn test_static_output_closing_tx() {
8134 let nodes = create_network(2);
8136 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8138 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
8139 let closing_tx = close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true).2;
8141 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8142 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![closing_tx.clone()] }, 1);
8143 let events = nodes[0].chan_monitor.simple_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8144 let spend_tx = check_static_output!(events, nodes, 0, 0, 2, 0);
8145 check_spends!(spend_tx, closing_tx.clone());
8147 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![closing_tx.clone()] }, 1);
8148 let events = nodes[1].chan_monitor.simple_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8149 let spend_tx = check_static_output!(events, nodes, 0, 0, 2, 1);
8150 check_spends!(spend_tx, closing_tx);