_ Git - rust-lightning/blob - src/ln/channelmanager.rs

   1 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
   2 //!
   3 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
   4 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
   5 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
   6 //!
   7 //! It does not manage routing logic (see ln::router for that) nor does it manage constructing
   8 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
   9 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
  10
  11 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
  12 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
  13 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
  14 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
  15 use bitcoin::network::serialize::BitcoinHash;
  16 use bitcoin::util::hash::Sha256dHash;
  17
  18 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
  19 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Message};
  20 use secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
  21 use secp256k1;
  22
  23 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface,ChainListener,ChainWatchInterface,FeeEstimator};
  24 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
  25 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError, ChannelKeys};
  26 use ln::channelmonitor::ManyChannelMonitor;
  27 use ln::router::{Route,RouteHop};
  28 use ln::msgs;
  29 use ln::msgs::{HandleError,ChannelMessageHandler};
  30 use util::{byte_utils, events, internal_traits, rng};
  31 use util::sha2::Sha256;
  32 use util::ser::{Readable, Writeable};
  33 use util::chacha20poly1305rfc::ChaCha20;
  34 use util::logger::Logger;
  35 use util::errors::APIError;
  36
  37 use crypto;
  38 use crypto::mac::{Mac,MacResult};
  39 use crypto::hmac::Hmac;
  40 use crypto::digest::Digest;
  41 use crypto::symmetriccipher::SynchronousStreamCipher;
  42
  43 use std::{ptr, mem};
  44 use std::collections::HashMap;
  45 use std::collections::hash_map;
  46 use std::io::Cursor;
  47 use std::sync::{Mutex,MutexGuard,Arc};
  48 use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
  49 use std::time::{Instant,Duration};
  50
  51 /// We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
  52 ///
  53 /// Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
  54 /// forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
  55 /// the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
  56 ///
  57 /// When a Channel forwards an HTLC to its peer, it will give us back the PendingForwardHTLCInfo
  58 /// which we will use to construct an outbound HTLC, with a relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData
  59 /// filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use to either fail-backwards or fulfill
  60 /// the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
  61 /// Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
  62 /// our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
  63 mod channel_held_info {
  64         use ln::msgs;
  65         use ln::router::Route;
  66         use secp256k1::key::SecretKey;
  67         use secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
  68
  69         /// Stores the info we will need to send when we want to forward an HTLC onwards
  70         #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
  71         pub struct PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
  72                 pub(super) onion_packet: Option<msgs::OnionPacket>,
  73                 pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: SharedSecret,
  74                 pub(super) payment_hash: [u8; 32],
  75                 pub(super) short_channel_id: u64,
  76                 pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
  77                 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
  78         }
  79
  80         #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
  81         pub enum HTLCFailureMsg {
  82                 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
  83                 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
  84         }
  85
  86         /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
  87         #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
  88         pub enum PendingHTLCStatus {
  89                 Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo),
  90                 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
  91         }
  92
  93         /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
  94         #[derive(Clone)]
  95         pub struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
  96                 pub(super) short_channel_id: u64,
  97                 pub(super) htlc_id: u64,
  98                 pub(super) incoming_packet_shared_secret: SharedSecret,
  99         }
 100
 101         /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
 102         #[derive(Clone)]
 103         pub enum HTLCSource {
 104                 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
 105                 OutboundRoute {
 106                         route: Route,
 107                         session_priv: SecretKey,
 108                 },
 109         }
 110         #[cfg(test)]
 111         impl HTLCSource {
 112                 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
 113                         HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
 114                                 route: Route { hops: Vec::new() },
 115                                 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&::secp256k1::Secp256k1::without_caps(), &[1; 32]).unwrap(),
 116                         }
 117                 }
 118         }
 119
 120         #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
 121         pub(crate) enum HTLCFailReason {
 122                 ErrorPacket {
 123                         err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
 124                 },
 125                 Reason {
 126                         failure_code: u16,
 127                         data: Vec<u8>,
 128                 }
 129         }
 130 }
 131 pub(super) use self::channel_held_info::*;
 132
 133 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
 134         err: msgs::HandleError,
 135         needs_channel_force_close: bool,
 136 }
 137 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
 138         #[inline]
 139         fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: &'static str, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
 140                 Self {
 141                         err: HandleError {
 142                                 err,
 143                                 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
 144                                         msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
 145                                                 channel_id,
 146                                                 data: err.to_string()
 147                                         },
 148                                 }),
 149                         },
 150                         needs_channel_force_close: false,
 151                 }
 152         }
 153         #[inline]
 154         fn send_err_msg_close_chan(err: &'static str, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
 155                 Self {
 156                         err: HandleError {
 157                                 err,
 158                                 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
 159                                         msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
 160                                                 channel_id,
 161                                                 data: err.to_string()
 162                                         },
 163                                 }),
 164                         },
 165                         needs_channel_force_close: true,
 166                 }
 167         }
 168         #[inline]
 169         fn from_maybe_close(err: msgs::HandleError) -> Self {
 170                 Self { err, needs_channel_force_close: true }
 171         }
 172         #[inline]
 173         fn from_no_close(err: msgs::HandleError) -> Self {
 174                 Self { err, needs_channel_force_close: false }
 175         }
 176         #[inline]
 177         fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
 178                 Self {
 179                         err: match err {
 180                                 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => HandleError {
 181                                         err: msg,
 182                                         action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError),
 183                                 },
 184                                 ChannelError::Close(msg) => HandleError {
 185                                         err: msg,
 186                                         action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
 187                                                 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
 188                                                         channel_id,
 189                                                         data: msg.to_string()
 190                                                 },
 191                                         }),
 192                                 },
 193                         },
 194                         needs_channel_force_close: false,
 195                 }
 196         }
 197         #[inline]
 198         fn from_chan_maybe_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
 199                 Self {
 200                         err: match err {
 201                                 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => HandleError {
 202                                         err: msg,
 203                                         action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError),
 204                                 },
 205                                 ChannelError::Close(msg) => HandleError {
 206                                         err: msg,
 207                                         action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
 208                                                 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
 209                                                         channel_id,
 210                                                         data: msg.to_string()
 211                                                 },
 212                                         }),
 213                                 },
 214                         },
 215                         needs_channel_force_close: true,
 216                 }
 217         }
 218 }
 219
 220 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval in the range (this, 5*this). This
 221 /// provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like 1 second
 222 /// to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly. We could
 223 /// probably increase this significantly.
 224 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u32 = 50;
 225
 226 struct HTLCForwardInfo {
 227         prev_short_channel_id: u64,
 228         prev_htlc_id: u64,
 229         forward_info: PendingForwardHTLCInfo,
 230 }
 231
 232 struct ChannelHolder {
 233         by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel>,
 234         short_to_id: HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
 235         next_forward: Instant,
 236         /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
 237         /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
 238         /// guarantees are made about there existing a channel with the short id here, nor the short
 239         /// ids in the PendingForwardHTLCInfo!
 240         forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
 241         /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
 242         /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
 243         /// go to read them!
 244         claimable_htlcs: HashMap<[u8; 32], Vec<HTLCPreviousHopData>>,
 245 }
 246 struct MutChannelHolder<'a> {
 247         by_id: &'a mut HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel>,
 248         short_to_id: &'a mut HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
 249         next_forward: &'a mut Instant,
 250         forward_htlcs: &'a mut HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
 251         claimable_htlcs: &'a mut HashMap<[u8; 32], Vec<HTLCPreviousHopData>>,
 252 }
 253 impl ChannelHolder {
 254         fn borrow_parts(&mut self) -> MutChannelHolder {
 255                 MutChannelHolder {
 256                         by_id: &mut self.by_id,
 257                         short_to_id: &mut self.short_to_id,
 258                         next_forward: &mut self.next_forward,
 259                         forward_htlcs: &mut self.forward_htlcs,
 260                         claimable_htlcs: &mut self.claimable_htlcs,
 261                 }
 262         }
 263 }
 264
 265 #[cfg(not(any(target_pointer_width = "32", target_pointer_width = "64")))]
 266 const ERR: () = "You need at least 32 bit pointers (well, usize, but we'll assume they're the same) for ChannelManager::latest_block_height";
 267
 268 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
 269 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
 270 ///
 271 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
 272 /// to individual Channels.
 273 pub struct ChannelManager {
 274         genesis_hash: Sha256dHash,
 275         fee_estimator: Arc<FeeEstimator>,
 276         monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>,
 277         chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>,
 278         tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>,
 279
 280         announce_channels_publicly: bool,
 281         fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
 282         latest_block_height: AtomicUsize,
 283         secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
 284
 285         channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder>,
 286         our_network_key: SecretKey,
 287
 288         pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
 289
 290         logger: Arc<Logger>,
 291 }
 292
 293 const CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6 * 24 * 2; //TODO?
 294
 295 macro_rules! secp_call {
 296         ( $res: expr, $err: expr ) => {
 297                 match $res {
 298                         Ok(key) => key,
 299                         Err(_) => return Err($err),
 300                 }
 301         };
 302 }
 303
 304 struct OnionKeys {
 305         #[cfg(test)]
 306         shared_secret: SharedSecret,
 307         #[cfg(test)]
 308         blinding_factor: [u8; 32],
 309         ephemeral_pubkey: PublicKey,
 310         rho: [u8; 32],
 311         mu: [u8; 32],
 312 }
 313
 314 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
 315 pub struct ChannelDetails {
 316         /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
 317         /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
 318         /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
 319         /// lifetime of the channel.
 320         pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
 321         /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
 322         /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
 323         pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
 324         /// The node_id of our counterparty
 325         pub remote_network_id: PublicKey,
 326         /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
 327         pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
 328         /// The user_id passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
 329         pub user_id: u64,
 330 }
 331
 332 impl ChannelManager {
 333         /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
 334         ///
 335         /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
 336         /// ChannelMessageHandler.
 337         ///
 338         /// fee_proportional_millionths is an optional fee to charge any payments routed through us.
 339         /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
 340         ///
 341         /// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= `MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS`!
 342         pub fn new(our_network_key: SecretKey, fee_proportional_millionths: u32, announce_channels_publicly: bool, network: Network, feeest: Arc<FeeEstimator>, monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>, chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>, tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>, logger: Arc<Logger>) -> Result<Arc<ChannelManager>, secp256k1::Error> {
 343                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
 344
 345                 let res = Arc::new(ChannelManager {
 346                         genesis_hash: genesis_block(network).header.bitcoin_hash(),
 347                         fee_estimator: feeest.clone(),
 348                         monitor: monitor.clone(),
 349                         chain_monitor,
 350                         tx_broadcaster,
 351
 352                         announce_channels_publicly,
 353                         fee_proportional_millionths,
 354                         latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(0), //TODO: Get an init value (generally need to replay recent chain on chain_monitor registration)
 355                         secp_ctx,
 356
 357                         channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
 358                                 by_id: HashMap::new(),
 359                                 short_to_id: HashMap::new(),
 360                                 next_forward: Instant::now(),
 361                                 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
 362                                 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
 363                         }),
 364                         our_network_key,
 365
 366                         pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
 367
 368                         logger,
 369                 });
 370                 let weak_res = Arc::downgrade(&res);
 371                 res.chain_monitor.register_listener(weak_res);
 372                 Ok(res)
 373         }
 374
 375         /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
 376         ///
 377         /// user_id will be provided back as user_channel_id in FundingGenerationReady and
 378         /// FundingBroadcastSafe events to allow tracking of which events correspond with which
 379         /// create_channel call. Note that user_channel_id defaults to 0 for inbound channels, so you
 380         /// may wish to avoid using 0 for user_id here.
 381         ///
 382         /// If successful, will generate a SendOpenChannel event, so you should probably poll
 383         /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
 384         ///
 385         /// Raises APIError::APIMisuseError when channel_value_satoshis > 2**24 or push_msat being greater than channel_value_satoshis * 1k
 386         pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
 387                 let chan_keys = if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
 388                         ChannelKeys {
 389                                 funding_key:               SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
 390                                 revocation_base_key:       SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
 391                                 payment_base_key:          SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
 392                                 delayed_payment_base_key:  SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
 393                                 htlc_base_key:             SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
 394                                 channel_close_key:         SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
 395                                 channel_monitor_claim_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
 396                                 commitment_seed: [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0],
 397                         }
 398                 } else {
 399                         let mut key_seed = [0u8; 32];
 400                         rng::fill_bytes(&mut key_seed);
 401                         match ChannelKeys::new_from_seed(&key_seed) {
 402                                 Ok(key) => key,
 403                                 Err(_) => panic!("RNG is busted!")
 404                         }
 405                 };
 406
 407                 let channel = Channel::new_outbound(&*self.fee_estimator, chan_keys, their_network_key, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, self.announce_channels_publicly, user_id, Arc::clone(&self.logger))?;
 408                 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone(), &*self.fee_estimator);
 409                 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
 410                 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
 411                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
 412                                 if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
 413                                         return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG" });
 414                                 } else {
 415                                         panic!("RNG is bad???");
 416                                 }
 417                         },
 418                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
 419                 }
 420
 421                 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
 422                 events.push(events::Event::SendOpenChannel {
 423                         node_id: their_network_key,
 424                         msg: res,
 425                 });
 426                 Ok(())
 427         }
 428
 429         /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
 430         /// more information.
 431         pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
 432                 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
 433                 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.by_id.len());
 434                 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
 435                         res.push(ChannelDetails {
 436                                 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
 437                                 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
 438                                 remote_network_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
 439                                 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
 440                                 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
 441                         });
 442                 }
 443                 res
 444         }
 445
 446         /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
 447         /// Router::get_route to ensure non-announced channels are used.
 448         pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
 449                 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
 450                 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.by_id.len());
 451                 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
 452                         if channel.is_usable() {
 453                                 res.push(ChannelDetails {
 454                                         channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
 455                                         short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
 456                                         remote_network_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
 457                                         channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
 458                                         user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
 459                                 });
 460                         }
 461                 }
 462                 res
 463         }
 464
 465         /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
 466         /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
 467         /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
 468         ///
 469         /// May generate a SendShutdown event on success, which should be relayed.
 470         pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
 471                 let (mut res, node_id, chan_option) = {
 472                         let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
 473                         let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
 474                         match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
 475                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
 476                                         let res = chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown()?;
 477                                         if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
 478                                                 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
 479                                                         channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
 480                                                 }
 481                                                 (res, chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id(), Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
 482                                         } else { (res, chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id(), None) }
 483                                 },
 484                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(HandleError{err: "No such channel", action: None})
 485                         }
 486                 };
 487                 for htlc_source in res.1.drain(..) {
 488                         // unknown_next_peer...I dunno who that is anymore....
 489                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() });
 490                 }
 491                 let chan_update = if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
 492                         if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
 493                                 Some(update)
 494                         } else { None }
 495                 } else { None };
 496
 497                 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
 498                 if let Some(update) = chan_update {
 499                         events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
 500                                 msg: update
 501                         });
 502                 }
 503                 events.push(events::Event::SendShutdown {
 504                         node_id,
 505                         msg: res.0
 506                 });
 507
 508                 Ok(())
 509         }
 510
 511         #[inline]
 512         fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<(HTLCSource, [u8; 32])>)) {
 513                 let (local_txn, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
 514                 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
 515                         // unknown_next_peer...I dunno who that is anymore....
 516                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() });
 517                 }
 518                 for tx in local_txn {
 519                         self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
 520                 }
 521                 //TODO: We need to have a way where outbound HTLC claims can result in us claiming the
 522                 //now-on-chain HTLC output for ourselves (and, thereafter, passing the HTLC backwards).
 523                 //TODO: We need to handle monitoring of pending offered HTLCs which just hit the chain and
 524                 //may be claimed, resulting in us claiming the inbound HTLCs (and back-failing after
 525                 //timeouts are hit and our claims confirm).
 526                 //TODO: In any case, we need to make sure we remove any pending htlc tracking (via
 527                 //fail_backwards or claim_funds) eventually for all HTLCs that were in the channel
 528         }
 529
 530         /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to
 531         /// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel.
 532         pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) {
 533                 let mut chan = {
 534                         let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
 535                         let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
 536                         if let Some(chan) = channel_state.by_id.remove(channel_id) {
 537                                 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
 538                                         channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
 539                                 }
 540                                 chan
 541                         } else {
 542                                 return;
 543                         }
 544                 };
 545                 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown());
 546                 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
 547                 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
 548                         events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
 549                                 msg: update
 550                         });
 551                 }
 552         }
 553
 554         /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
 555         /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
 556         pub fn force_close_all_channels(&self) {
 557                 for chan in self.list_channels() {
 558                         self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
 559                 }
 560         }
 561
 562         #[inline]
 563         fn gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &SharedSecret) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
 564                 ({
 565                         let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x72, 0x68, 0x6f]); // rho
 566                         hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
 567                         let mut res = [0; 32];
 568                         hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
 569                         res
 570                 },
 571                 {
 572                         let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x6d, 0x75]); // mu
 573                         hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
 574                         let mut res = [0; 32];
 575                         hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
 576                         res
 577                 })
 578         }
 579
 580         #[inline]
 581         fn gen_um_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &SharedSecret) -> [u8; 32] {
 582                 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x75, 0x6d]); // um
 583                 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
 584                 let mut res = [0; 32];
 585                 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
 586                 res
 587         }
 588
 589         #[inline]
 590         fn gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &SharedSecret) -> [u8; 32] {
 591                 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x61, 0x6d, 0x6d, 0x61, 0x67]); // ammag
 592                 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
 593                 let mut res = [0; 32];
 594                 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
 595                 res
 596         }
 597
 598         // can only fail if an intermediary hop has an invalid public key or session_priv is invalid
 599         #[inline]
 600         fn construct_onion_keys_callback<T: secp256k1::Signing, FType: FnMut(SharedSecret, [u8; 32], PublicKey, &RouteHop)> (secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, route: &Route, session_priv: &SecretKey, mut callback: FType) -> Result<(), secp256k1::Error> {
 601                 let mut blinded_priv = session_priv.clone();
 602                 let mut blinded_pub = PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &blinded_priv);
 603
 604                 for hop in route.hops.iter() {
 605                         let shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(secp_ctx, &hop.pubkey, &blinded_priv);
 606
 607                         let mut sha = Sha256::new();
 608                         sha.input(&blinded_pub.serialize()[..]);
 609                         sha.input(&shared_secret[..]);
 610                         let mut blinding_factor = [0u8; 32];
 611                         sha.result(&mut blinding_factor);
 612
 613                         let ephemeral_pubkey = blinded_pub;
 614
 615                         blinded_priv.mul_assign(secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(secp_ctx, &blinding_factor)?)?;
 616                         blinded_pub = PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &blinded_priv);
 617
 618                         callback(shared_secret, blinding_factor, ephemeral_pubkey, hop);
 619                 }
 620
 621                 Ok(())
 622         }
 623
 624         // can only fail if an intermediary hop has an invalid public key or session_priv is invalid
 625         fn construct_onion_keys<T: secp256k1::Signing>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, route: &Route, session_priv: &SecretKey) -> Result<Vec<OnionKeys>, secp256k1::Error> {
 626                 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(route.hops.len());
 627
 628                 Self::construct_onion_keys_callback(secp_ctx, route, session_priv, |shared_secret, _blinding_factor, ephemeral_pubkey, _| {
 629                         let (rho, mu) = ChannelManager::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
 630
 631                         res.push(OnionKeys {
 632                                 #[cfg(test)]
 633                                 shared_secret,
 634                                 #[cfg(test)]
 635                                 blinding_factor: _blinding_factor,
 636                                 ephemeral_pubkey,
 637                                 rho,
 638                                 mu,
 639                         });
 640                 })?;
 641
 642                 Ok(res)
 643         }
 644
 645         /// returns the hop data, as well as the first-hop value_msat and CLTV value we should send.
 646         fn build_onion_payloads(route: &Route, starting_htlc_offset: u32) -> Result<(Vec<msgs::OnionHopData>, u64, u32), APIError> {
 647                 let mut cur_value_msat = 0u64;
 648                 let mut cur_cltv = starting_htlc_offset;
 649                 let mut last_short_channel_id = 0;
 650                 let mut res: Vec<msgs::OnionHopData> = Vec::with_capacity(route.hops.len());
 651                 internal_traits::test_no_dealloc::<msgs::OnionHopData>(None);
 652                 unsafe { res.set_len(route.hops.len()); }
 653
 654                 for (idx, hop) in route.hops.iter().enumerate().rev() {
 655                         // First hop gets special values so that it can check, on receipt, that everything is
 656                         // exactly as it should be (and the next hop isn't trying to probe to find out if we're
 657                         // the intended recipient).
 658                         let value_msat = if cur_value_msat == 0 { hop.fee_msat } else { cur_value_msat };
 659                         let cltv = if cur_cltv == starting_htlc_offset { hop.cltv_expiry_delta + starting_htlc_offset } else { cur_cltv };
 660                         res[idx] = msgs::OnionHopData {
 661                                 realm: 0,
 662                                 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
 663                                         short_channel_id: last_short_channel_id,
 664                                         amt_to_forward: value_msat,
 665                                         outgoing_cltv_value: cltv,
 666                                 },
 667                                 hmac: [0; 32],
 668                         };
 669                         cur_value_msat += hop.fee_msat;
 670                         if cur_value_msat >= 21000000 * 100000000 * 1000 {
 671                                 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Channel fees overflowed?!"});
 672                         }
 673                         cur_cltv += hop.cltv_expiry_delta as u32;
 674                         if cur_cltv >= 500000000 {
 675                                 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Channel CLTV overflowed?!"});
 676                         }
 677                         last_short_channel_id = hop.short_channel_id;
 678                 }
 679                 Ok((res, cur_value_msat, cur_cltv))
 680         }
 681
 682         #[inline]
 683         fn shift_arr_right(arr: &mut [u8; 20*65]) {
 684                 unsafe {
 685                         ptr::copy(arr[0..].as_ptr(), arr[65..].as_mut_ptr(), 19*65);
 686                 }
 687                 for i in 0..65 {
 688                         arr[i] = 0;
 689                 }
 690         }
 691
 692         #[inline]
 693         fn xor_bufs(dst: &mut[u8], src: &[u8]) {
 694                 assert_eq!(dst.len(), src.len());
 695
 696                 for i in 0..dst.len() {
 697                         dst[i] ^= src[i];
 698                 }
 699         }
 700
 701         const ZERO:[u8; 21*65] = [0; 21*65];
 702         fn construct_onion_packet(mut payloads: Vec<msgs::OnionHopData>, onion_keys: Vec<OnionKeys>, associated_data: &[u8; 32]) -> msgs::OnionPacket {
 703                 let mut buf = Vec::with_capacity(21*65);
 704                 buf.resize(21*65, 0);
 705
 706                 let filler = {
 707                         let iters = payloads.len() - 1;
 708                         let end_len = iters * 65;
 709                         let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(end_len);
 710                         res.resize(end_len, 0);
 711
 712                         for (i, keys) in onion_keys.iter().enumerate() {
 713                                 if i == payloads.len() - 1 { continue; }
 714                                 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&keys.rho, &[0u8; 8]);
 715                                 chacha.process(&ChannelManager::ZERO, &mut buf); // We don't have a seek function :(
 716                                 ChannelManager::xor_bufs(&mut res[0..(i + 1)*65], &buf[(20 - i)*65..21*65]);
 717                         }
 718                         res
 719                 };
 720
 721                 let mut packet_data = [0; 20*65];
 722                 let mut hmac_res = [0; 32];
 723
 724                 for (i, (payload, keys)) in payloads.iter_mut().zip(onion_keys.iter()).rev().enumerate() {
 725                         ChannelManager::shift_arr_right(&mut packet_data);
 726                         payload.hmac = hmac_res;
 727                         packet_data[0..65].copy_from_slice(&payload.encode()[..]);
 728
 729                         let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&keys.rho, &[0u8; 8]);
 730                         chacha.process(&packet_data, &mut buf[0..20*65]);
 731                         packet_data[..].copy_from_slice(&buf[0..20*65]);
 732
 733                         if i == 0 {
 734                                 packet_data[20*65 - filler.len()..20*65].copy_from_slice(&filler[..]);
 735                         }
 736
 737                         let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &keys.mu);
 738                         hmac.input(&packet_data);
 739                         hmac.input(&associated_data[..]);
 740                         hmac.raw_result(&mut hmac_res);
 741                 }
 742
 743                 msgs::OnionPacket{
 744                         version: 0,
 745                         public_key: Ok(onion_keys.first().unwrap().ephemeral_pubkey),
 746                         hop_data: packet_data,
 747                         hmac: hmac_res,
 748                 }
 749         }
 750
 751         /// Encrypts a failure packet. raw_packet can either be a
 752         /// msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket.encode() result or a msgs::OnionErrorPacket.data element.
 753         fn encrypt_failure_packet(shared_secret: &SharedSecret, raw_packet: &[u8]) -> msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
 754                 let ammag = ChannelManager::gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
 755
 756                 let mut packet_crypted = Vec::with_capacity(raw_packet.len());
 757                 packet_crypted.resize(raw_packet.len(), 0);
 758                 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&ammag, &[0u8; 8]);
 759                 chacha.process(&raw_packet, &mut packet_crypted[..]);
 760                 msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
 761                         data: packet_crypted,
 762                 }
 763         }
 764
 765         fn build_failure_packet(shared_secret: &SharedSecret, failure_type: u16, failure_data: &[u8]) -> msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket {
 766                 assert!(failure_data.len() <= 256 - 2);
 767
 768                 let um = ChannelManager::gen_um_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
 769
 770                 let failuremsg = {
 771                         let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(2 + failure_data.len());
 772                         res.push(((failure_type >> 8) & 0xff) as u8);
 773                         res.push(((failure_type >> 0) & 0xff) as u8);
 774                         res.extend_from_slice(&failure_data[..]);
 775                         res
 776                 };
 777                 let pad = {
 778                         let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(256 - 2 - failure_data.len());
 779                         res.resize(256 - 2 - failure_data.len(), 0);
 780                         res
 781                 };
 782                 let mut packet = msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket {
 783                         hmac: [0; 32],
 784                         failuremsg: failuremsg,
 785                         pad: pad,
 786                 };
 787
 788                 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &um);
 789                 hmac.input(&packet.encode()[32..]);
 790                 hmac.raw_result(&mut packet.hmac);
 791
 792                 packet
 793         }
 794
 795         #[inline]
 796         fn build_first_hop_failure_packet(shared_secret: &SharedSecret, failure_type: u16, failure_data: &[u8]) -> msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
 797                 let failure_packet = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(shared_secret, failure_type, failure_data);
 798                 ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(shared_secret, &failure_packet.encode()[..])
 799         }
 800
 801         fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>) {
 802                 macro_rules! get_onion_hash {
 803                         () => {
 804                                 {
 805                                         let mut sha = Sha256::new();
 806                                         sha.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
 807                                         let mut onion_hash = [0; 32];
 808                                         sha.result(&mut onion_hash);
 809                                         onion_hash
 810                                 }
 811                         }
 812                 }
 813
 814                 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
 815                         log_info!(self, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC with invalid ephemeral pubkey");
 816                         return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
 817                                 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
 818                                 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
 819                                 sha256_of_onion: get_onion_hash!(),
 820                                 failure_code: 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6,
 821                         })), self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
 822                 }
 823
 824                 let shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(&self.secp_ctx, &msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key);
 825                 let (rho, mu) = ChannelManager::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
 826
 827                 let mut channel_state = None;
 828                 macro_rules! return_err {
 829                         ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
 830                                 {
 831                                         log_info!(self, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
 832                                         if channel_state.is_none() {
 833                                                 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
 834                                         }
 835                                         return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
 836                                                 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
 837                                                 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
 838                                                 reason: ChannelManager::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
 839                                         })), channel_state.unwrap());
 840                                 }
 841                         }
 842                 }
 843
 844                 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
 845                         //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
 846                         //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
 847                         //the hash doesn't really serve any purpuse - in the case of hashing all data, the
 848                         //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
 849                         //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
 850                         //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
 851                         return_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4, &get_onion_hash!());
 852                 }
 853
 854                 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &mu);
 855                 hmac.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
 856                 hmac.input(&msg.payment_hash);
 857                 if hmac.result() != MacResult::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac) {
 858                         return_err!("HMAC Check failed", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 5, &get_onion_hash!());
 859                 }
 860
 861                 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&rho, &[0u8; 8]);
 862                 let next_hop_data = {
 863                         let mut decoded = [0; 65];
 864                         chacha.process(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[0..65], &mut decoded);
 865                         match msgs::OnionHopData::read(&mut Cursor::new(&decoded[..])) {
 866                                 Err(err) => {
 867                                         let error_code = match err {
 868                                                 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownVersion => 0x4000 | 1, // unknown realm byte
 869                                                 _ => 0x2000 | 2, // Should never happen
 870                                         };
 871                                         return_err!("Unable to decode our hop data", error_code, &[0;0]);
 872                                 },
 873                                 Ok(msg) => msg
 874                         }
 875                 };
 876
 877                 //TODO: Check that msg.cltv_expiry is within acceptable bounds!
 878
 879                 let pending_forward_info = if next_hop_data.hmac == [0; 32] {
 880                                 // OUR PAYMENT!
 881                                 if next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward != msg.amount_msat {
 882                                         return_err!("Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment", 19, &byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
 883                                 }
 884                                 if next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value != msg.cltv_expiry {
 885                                         return_err!("Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value", 18, &byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
 886                                 }
 887
 888                                 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
 889                                 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
 890                                 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
 891                                 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
 892
 893                                 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
 894                                         onion_packet: None,
 895                                         payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
 896                                         short_channel_id: 0,
 897                                         incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret.clone(),
 898                                         amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward,
 899                                         outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value,
 900                                 })
 901                         } else {
 902                                 let mut new_packet_data = [0; 20*65];
 903                                 chacha.process(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[65..], &mut new_packet_data[0..19*65]);
 904                                 chacha.process(&ChannelManager::ZERO[0..65], &mut new_packet_data[19*65..]);
 905
 906                                 let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
 907
 908                                 let blinding_factor = {
 909                                         let mut sha = Sha256::new();
 910                                         sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
 911                                         sha.input(&shared_secret[..]);
 912                                         let mut res = [0u8; 32];
 913                                         sha.result(&mut res);
 914                                         match SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &res) {
 915                                                 Err(_) => {
 916                                                         return_err!("Blinding factor is an invalid private key", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6, &get_onion_hash!());
 917                                                 },
 918                                                 Ok(key) => key
 919                                         }
 920                                 };
 921
 922                                 if let Err(_) = new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor) {
 923                                         return_err!("New blinding factor is an invalid private key", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6, &get_onion_hash!());
 924                                 }
 925
 926                                 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
 927                                         version: 0,
 928                                         public_key: Ok(new_pubkey),
 929                                         hop_data: new_packet_data,
 930                                         hmac: next_hop_data.hmac.clone(),
 931                                 };
 932
 933                                 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
 934                                         onion_packet: Some(outgoing_packet),
 935                                         payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
 936                                         short_channel_id: next_hop_data.data.short_channel_id,
 937                                         incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret.clone(),
 938                                         amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward,
 939                                         outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value,
 940                                 })
 941                         };
 942
 943                 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
 944                 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo { ref onion_packet, ref short_channel_id, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
 945                         if onion_packet.is_some() { // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject them in the body here
 946                                 let id_option = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
 947                                 let forwarding_id = match id_option {
 948                                         None => {
 949                                                 return_err!("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, &[0;0]);
 950                                         },
 951                                         Some(id) => id.clone(),
 952                                 };
 953                                 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = {
 954                                         let chan = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
 955                                         if !chan.is_live() {
 956                                                 Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 7, self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap()))
 957                                         } else {
 958                                                 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(self.fee_proportional_millionths as u64).and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&*self.fee_estimator) as u64) });
 959                                                 if fee.is_none() || msg.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() || (msg.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < *amt_to_forward {
 960                                                         Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap()))
 961                                                 } else {
 962                                                         if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 {
 963                                                                 Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap()))
 964                                                         } else {
 965                                                                 None
 966                                                         }
 967                                                 }
 968                                         }
 969                                 } {
 970                                         return_err!(err, code, &chan_update.encode_with_len()[..]);
 971                                 }
 972                         }
 973                 }
 974
 975                 (pending_forward_info, channel_state.unwrap())
 976         }
 977
 978         /// only fails if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id
 979         fn get_channel_update(&self, chan: &Channel) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, HandleError> {
 980                 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() {
 981                         None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Channel not yet established", action: None}),
 982                         Some(id) => id,
 983                 };
 984
 985                 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_their_node_id().serialize()[..];
 986
 987                 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
 988                         chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
 989                         short_channel_id: short_channel_id,
 990                         timestamp: chan.get_channel_update_count(),
 991                         flags: (!were_node_one) as u16 | ((!chan.is_live() as u16) << 1),
 992                         cltv_expiry_delta: CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA,
 993                         htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_our_htlc_minimum_msat(),
 994                         fee_base_msat: chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&*self.fee_estimator),
 995                         fee_proportional_millionths: self.fee_proportional_millionths,
 996                         excess_data: Vec::new(),
 997                 };
 998
 999                 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::from_data(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
1000                 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&Message::from_slice(&msg_hash[..]).unwrap(), &self.our_network_key); //TODO Can we unwrap here?
1001
1002                 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
1003                         signature: sig,
1004                         contents: unsigned
1005                 })
1006         }
1007
1008         /// Sends a payment along a given route.
1009         ///
1010         /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
1011         /// fields for more info.
1012         ///
1013         /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
1014         /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
1015         /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
1016         /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
1017         /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
1018         /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
1019         ///
1020         /// May generate a SendHTLCs event on success, which should be relayed.
1021         ///
1022         /// Raises APIError::RoutError when invalid route or forward parameter
1023         /// (cltv_delta, fee, node public key) is specified
1024         pub fn send_payment(&self, route: Route, payment_hash: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1025                 if route.hops.len() < 1 || route.hops.len() > 20 {
1026                         return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"});
1027                 }
1028                 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
1029                 for (idx, hop) in route.hops.iter().enumerate() {
1030                         if idx != route.hops.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
1031                                 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"});
1032                         }
1033                 }
1034
1035                 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &{
1036                         let mut session_key = [0; 32];
1037                         rng::fill_bytes(&mut session_key);
1038                         session_key
1039                 }).expect("RNG is bad!");
1040
1041                 let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
1042
1043                 let onion_keys = secp_call!(ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv),
1044                                 APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"});
1045                 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = ChannelManager::build_onion_payloads(&route, cur_height)?;
1046                 let onion_packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, &payment_hash);
1047
1048                 let (first_hop_node_id, (update_add, commitment_signed, chan_monitor)) = {
1049                         let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1050                         let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1051
1052                         let id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&route.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
1053                                 None => return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "No channel available with first hop!"}),
1054                                 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1055                         };
1056
1057                         let res = {
1058                                 let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&id).unwrap();
1059                                 if chan.get_their_node_id() != route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey {
1060                                         return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
1061                                 }
1062                                 if !chan.is_live() {
1063                                         return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected!"});
1064                                 }
1065                                 chan.send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
1066                                         route: route.clone(),
1067                                         session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
1068                                 }, onion_packet).map_err(|he| APIError::RouteError{err: he.err})?
1069                         };
1070
1071                         let first_hop_node_id = route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey;
1072
1073                         match res {
1074                                 Some(msgs) => (first_hop_node_id, msgs),
1075                                 None => return Ok(()),
1076                         }
1077                 };
1078
1079                 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1080                         unimplemented!();
1081                 }
1082
1083                 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1084                 events.push(events::Event::UpdateHTLCs {
1085                         node_id: first_hop_node_id,
1086                         updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1087                                 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
1088                                 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1089                                 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1090                                 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1091                                 update_fee: None,
1092                                 commitment_signed,
1093                         },
1094                 });
1095                 Ok(())
1096         }
1097
1098         /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
1099         ///
1100         /// Panics if a funding transaction has already been provided for this channel.
1101         ///
1102         /// May panic if the funding_txo is duplicative with some other channel (note that this should
1103         /// be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction keys per-channel).
1104         pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_txo: OutPoint) {
1105
1106                 macro_rules! add_pending_event {
1107                         ($event: expr) => {
1108                                 {
1109                                         let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1110                                         pending_events.push($event);
1111                                 }
1112                         }
1113                 }
1114
1115                 let (chan, msg, chan_monitor) = {
1116                         let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1117                         match channel_state.by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
1118                                 Some(mut chan) => {
1119                                         match chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_txo) {
1120                                                 Ok(funding_msg) => {
1121                                                         (chan, funding_msg.0, funding_msg.1)
1122                                                 },
1123                                                 Err(e) => {
1124                                                         log_error!(self, "Got bad signatures: {}!", e.err);
1125                                                         mem::drop(channel_state);
1126                                                         add_pending_event!(events::Event::HandleError {
1127                                                                 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1128                                                                 action: e.action,
1129                                                         });
1130                                                         return;
1131                                                 },
1132                                         }
1133                                 },
1134                                 None => return
1135                         }
1136                 }; // Release channel lock for install_watch_outpoint call,
1137                 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1138                         unimplemented!();
1139                 }
1140                 add_pending_event!(events::Event::SendFundingCreated {
1141                         node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1142                         msg: msg,
1143                 });
1144
1145                 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1146                 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
1147                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1148                                 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
1149                         },
1150                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1151                                 e.insert(chan);
1152                         }
1153                 }
1154         }
1155
1156         fn get_announcement_sigs(&self, chan: &Channel) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures> {
1157                 if !chan.should_announce() { return None }
1158
1159                 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = match chan.get_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
1160                         Ok(res) => res,
1161                         Err(_) => return None, // Only in case of state precondition violations eg channel is closing
1162                 };
1163                 let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
1164                 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
1165
1166                 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
1167                         channel_id: chan.channel_id(),
1168                         short_channel_id: chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
1169                         node_signature: our_node_sig,
1170                         bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
1171                 })
1172         }
1173
1174         /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
1175         ///
1176         /// Should only really ever be called in response to an PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
1177         /// Will likely generate further events.
1178         pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
1179                 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
1180                 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
1181                 {
1182                         let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1183                         let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1184
1185                         if cfg!(not(feature = "fuzztarget")) && Instant::now() < *channel_state.next_forward {
1186                                 return;
1187                         }
1188
1189                         for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
1190                                 if short_chan_id != 0 {
1191                                         let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) {
1192                                                 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1193                                                 None => {
1194                                                         failed_forwards.reserve(pending_forwards.len());
1195                                                         for HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1196                                                                 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1197                                                                         short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1198                                                                         htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1199                                                                         incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1200                                                                 });
1201                                                                 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash, 0x4000 | 10, None));
1202                                                         }
1203                                                         continue;
1204                                                 }
1205                                         };
1206                                         let forward_chan = &mut channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&forward_chan_id).unwrap();
1207
1208                                         let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
1209                                         for HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1210                                                 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1211                                                         short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1212                                                         htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1213                                                         incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1214                                                 });
1215                                                 match forward_chan.send_htlc(forward_info.amt_to_forward, forward_info.payment_hash, forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), forward_info.onion_packet.unwrap()) {
1216                                                         Err(_e) => {
1217                                                                 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(forward_chan).unwrap();
1218                                                                 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash, 0x1000 | 7, Some(chan_update)));
1219                                                                 continue;
1220                                                         },
1221                                                         Ok(update_add) => {
1222                                                                 match update_add {
1223                                                                         Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
1224                                                                         None => {
1225                                                                                 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
1226                                                                                 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
1227                                                                                 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
1228                                                                                 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
1229                                                                                 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
1230                                                                                 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
1231                                                                                 // this channel currently :/.
1232                                                                         }
1233                                                                 }
1234                                                         }
1235                                                 }
1236                                         }
1237
1238                                         if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
1239                                                 let (commitment_msg, monitor) = match forward_chan.send_commitment() {
1240                                                         Ok(res) => res,
1241                                                         Err(e) => {
1242                                                                 if let &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer{msg: Some(ref _err_msg)}) = &e.action {
1243                                                                 } else if let &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{msg: ref _err_msg}) = &e.action {
1244                                                                 } else {
1245                                                                         panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
1246                                                                 }
1247                                                                 //TODO: Handle...this is bad!
1248                                                                 continue;
1249                                                         },
1250                                                 };
1251                                                 new_events.push((Some(monitor), events::Event::UpdateHTLCs {
1252                                                         node_id: forward_chan.get_their_node_id(),
1253                                                         updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1254                                                                 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
1255                                                                 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1256                                                                 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1257                                                                 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1258                                                                 update_fee: None,
1259                                                                 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
1260                                                         },
1261                                                 }));
1262                                         }
1263                                 } else {
1264                                         for HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1265                                                 let prev_hop_data = HTLCPreviousHopData {
1266                                                         short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1267                                                         htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1268                                                         incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1269                                                 };
1270                                                 match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(forward_info.payment_hash) {
1271                                                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => entry.get_mut().push(prev_hop_data),
1272                                                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(vec![prev_hop_data]); },
1273                                                 };
1274                                                 new_events.push((None, events::Event::PaymentReceived {
1275                                                         payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
1276                                                         amt: forward_info.amt_to_forward,
1277                                                 }));
1278                                         }
1279                                 }
1280                         }
1281                 }
1282
1283                 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_code, update) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
1284                         match update {
1285                                 None => self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: Vec::new() }),
1286                                 Some(chan_update) => self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: chan_update.encode_with_len() }),
1287                         };
1288                 }
1289
1290                 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
1291
1292                 new_events.retain(|event| {
1293                         if let &Some(ref monitor) = &event.0 {
1294                                 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor.clone()) {
1295                                         unimplemented!();// but def dont push the event...
1296                                 }
1297                         }
1298                         true
1299                 });
1300
1301                 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1302                 events.reserve(new_events.len());
1303                 for event in new_events.drain(..) {
1304                         events.push(event.1);
1305                 }
1306         }
1307
1308         /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown after a PaymentReceived event.
1309         pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &[u8; 32]) -> bool {
1310                 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1311                 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
1312                 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
1313                         for htlc_with_hash in sources.drain(..) {
1314                                 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
1315                                 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(), HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_with_hash), payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: Vec::new() });
1316                         }
1317                         true
1318                 } else { false }
1319         }
1320
1321         /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
1322         /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here.
1323         /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes
1324         /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may
1325         /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to
1326         /// still-available channels.
1327         fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &[u8; 32], onion_error: HTLCFailReason) {
1328                 match source {
1329                         HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
1330                                 mem::drop(channel_state);
1331
1332                                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1333                                 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
1334                                         payment_hash: payment_hash.clone()
1335                                 });
1336                         },
1337                         HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret }) => {
1338                                 let err_packet = match onion_error {
1339                                         HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
1340                                                 let packet = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
1341                                                 ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
1342                                         },
1343                                         HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err } => {
1344                                                 ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
1345                                         }
1346                                 };
1347
1348                                 let (node_id, fail_msgs) = {
1349                                         let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id) {
1350                                                 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1351                                                 None => return
1352                                         };
1353
1354                                         let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&chan_id).unwrap();
1355                                         match chan.get_update_fail_htlc_and_commit(htlc_id, err_packet) {
1356                                                 Ok(msg) => (chan.get_their_node_id(), msg),
1357                                                 Err(_e) => {
1358                                                         //TODO: Do something with e?
1359                                                         return;
1360                                                 },
1361                                         }
1362                                 };
1363
1364                                 match fail_msgs {
1365                                         Some((msg, commitment_msg, chan_monitor)) => {
1366                                                 mem::drop(channel_state);
1367
1368                                                 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1369                                                         unimplemented!();// but def dont push the event...
1370                                                 }
1371
1372                                                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1373                                                 pending_events.push(events::Event::UpdateHTLCs {
1374                                                         node_id,
1375                                                         updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1376                                                                 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1377                                                                 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1378                                                                 update_fail_htlcs: vec![msg],
1379                                                                 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1380                                                                 update_fee: None,
1381                                                                 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
1382                                                         },
1383                                                 });
1384                                         },
1385                                         None => {},
1386                                 }
1387                         },
1388                 }
1389         }
1390
1391         /// Provides a payment preimage in response to a PaymentReceived event, returning true and
1392         /// generating message events for the net layer to claim the payment, if possible. Thus, you
1393         /// should probably kick the net layer to go send messages if this returns true!
1394         ///
1395         /// May panic if called except in response to a PaymentReceived event.
1396         pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) -> bool {
1397                 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
1398                 sha.input(&payment_preimage);
1399                 let mut payment_hash = [0; 32];
1400                 sha.result(&mut payment_hash);
1401
1402                 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1403                 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash);
1404                 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
1405                         for htlc_with_hash in sources.drain(..) {
1406                                 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
1407                                 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(), HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_with_hash), payment_preimage);
1408                         }
1409                         true
1410                 } else { false }
1411         }
1412         fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) {
1413                 match source {
1414                         HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
1415                                 mem::drop(channel_state);
1416                                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1417                                 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentSent {
1418                                         payment_preimage
1419                                 });
1420                         },
1421                         HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, .. }) => {
1422                                 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
1423                                 let (node_id, fulfill_msgs) = {
1424                                         let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id) {
1425                                                 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1426                                                 None => {
1427                                                         // TODO: There is probably a channel manager somewhere that needs to
1428                                                         // learn the preimage as the channel already hit the chain and that's
1429                                                         // why its missing.
1430                                                         return
1431                                                 }
1432                                         };
1433
1434                                         let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&chan_id).unwrap();
1435                                         match chan.get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(htlc_id, payment_preimage) {
1436                                                 Ok(msg) => (chan.get_their_node_id(), msg),
1437                                                 Err(_e) => {
1438                                                         // TODO: There is probably a channel manager somewhere that needs to
1439                                                         // learn the preimage as the channel may be about to hit the chain.
1440                                                         //TODO: Do something with e?
1441                                                         return
1442                                                 },
1443                                         }
1444                                 };
1445
1446                                 mem::drop(channel_state);
1447                                 if let Some(chan_monitor) = fulfill_msgs.1 {
1448                                         if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1449                                                 unimplemented!();// but def dont push the event...
1450                                         }
1451                                 }
1452
1453                                 if let Some((msg, commitment_msg)) = fulfill_msgs.0 {
1454                                         let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1455                                         pending_events.push(events::Event::UpdateHTLCs {
1456                                                 node_id: node_id,
1457                                                 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1458                                                         update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1459                                                         update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
1460                                                         update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1461                                                         update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1462                                                         update_fee: None,
1463                                                         commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
1464                                                 }
1465                                         });
1466                                 }
1467                         },
1468                 }
1469         }
1470
1471         /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
1472         pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
1473                 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key)
1474         }
1475
1476         /// Used to restore channels to normal operation after a
1477         /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure was returned from a channel monitor update
1478         /// operation.
1479         pub fn test_restore_channel_monitor(&self) {
1480                 unimplemented!();
1481         }
1482
1483         fn internal_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<msgs::AcceptChannel, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1484                 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
1485                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash", msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
1486                 }
1487                 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1488                 if channel_state.by_id.contains_key(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
1489                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!", msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
1490                 }
1491
1492                 let chan_keys = if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
1493                         ChannelKeys {
1494                                 funding_key:               SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0]).unwrap(),
1495                                 revocation_base_key:       SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 2, 0]).unwrap(),
1496                                 payment_base_key:          SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 3, 0]).unwrap(),
1497                                 delayed_payment_base_key:  SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 4, 0]).unwrap(),
1498                                 htlc_base_key:             SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 5, 0]).unwrap(),
1499                                 channel_close_key:         SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 6, 0]).unwrap(),
1500                                 channel_monitor_claim_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 7, 0]).unwrap(),
1501                                 commitment_seed: [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0],
1502                         }
1503                 } else {
1504                         let mut key_seed = [0u8; 32];
1505                         rng::fill_bytes(&mut key_seed);
1506                         match ChannelKeys::new_from_seed(&key_seed) {
1507                                 Ok(key) => key,
1508                                 Err(_) => panic!("RNG is busted!")
1509                         }
1510                 };
1511
1512                 let channel = Channel::new_from_req(&*self.fee_estimator, chan_keys, their_node_id.clone(), msg, 0, false, self.announce_channels_publicly, Arc::clone(&self.logger))
1513                         .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id))?;
1514                 let accept_msg = channel.get_accept_channel();
1515                 channel_state.by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
1516                 Ok(accept_msg)
1517         }
1518
1519         fn internal_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1520                 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
1521                         let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1522                         match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
1523                                 Some(chan) => {
1524                                         if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1525                                                 //TODO: see issue #153, need a consistent behavior on obnoxious behavior from random node
1526                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.temporary_channel_id));
1527                                         }
1528                                         chan.accept_channel(&msg)
1529                                                 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id))?;
1530                                         (chan.get_value_satoshis(), chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get_user_id())
1531                                 },
1532                                 //TODO: same as above
1533                                 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.temporary_channel_id))
1534                         }
1535                 };
1536                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1537                 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
1538                         temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
1539                         channel_value_satoshis: value,
1540                         output_script: output_script,
1541                         user_channel_id: user_id,
1542                 });
1543                 Ok(())
1544         }
1545
1546         fn internal_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<msgs::FundingSigned, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1547                 let (chan, funding_msg, monitor_update) = {
1548                         let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1549                         match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
1550                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1551                                         if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1552                                                 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1553                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.temporary_channel_id));
1554                                         }
1555                                         match chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg) {
1556                                                 Ok((funding_msg, monitor_update)) => {
1557                                                         (chan.remove(), funding_msg, monitor_update)
1558                                                 },
1559                                                 Err(e) => {
1560                                                         return Err(e).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))
1561                                                 }
1562                                         }
1563                                 },
1564                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.temporary_channel_id))
1565                         }
1566                 }; // Release channel lock for install_watch_outpoint call,
1567                    // note that this means if the remote end is misbehaving and sends a message for the same
1568                    // channel back-to-back with funding_created, we'll end up thinking they sent a message
1569                    // for a bogus channel.
1570                 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor_update.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1571                         unimplemented!();
1572                 }
1573                 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1574                 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
1575                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1576                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id", funding_msg.channel_id))
1577                         },
1578                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1579                                 e.insert(chan);
1580                         }
1581                 }
1582                 Ok(funding_msg)
1583         }
1584
1585         fn internal_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1586                 let (funding_txo, user_id, monitor) = {
1587                         let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1588                         match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1589                                 Some(chan) => {
1590                                         if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1591                                                 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1592                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1593                                         }
1594                                         let chan_monitor = chan.funding_signed(&msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?;
1595                                         (chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan.get_user_id(), chan_monitor)
1596                                 },
1597                                 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1598                         }
1599                 };
1600                 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
1601                         unimplemented!();
1602                 }
1603                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1604                 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingBroadcastSafe {
1605                         funding_txo: funding_txo,
1606                         user_channel_id: user_id,
1607                 });
1608                 Ok(())
1609         }
1610
1611         fn internal_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1612                 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1613                 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1614                         Some(chan) => {
1615                                 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1616                                         //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1617                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1618                                 }
1619                                 chan.funding_locked(&msg)
1620                                         .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))?;
1621                                 return Ok(self.get_announcement_sigs(chan));
1622                         },
1623                         None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1624                 };
1625         }
1626
1627         fn internal_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1628                 let (mut res, chan_option) = {
1629                         let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1630                         let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1631
1632                         match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
1633                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1634                                         if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1635                                                 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1636                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1637                                         }
1638                                         let res = chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?;
1639                                         if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1640                                                 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1641                                                         channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1642                                                 }
1643                                                 (res, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
1644                                         } else { (res, None) }
1645                                 },
1646                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1647                         }
1648                 };
1649                 for htlc_source in res.2.drain(..) {
1650                         // unknown_next_peer...I dunno who that is anymore....
1651                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() });
1652                 }
1653                 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
1654                         if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1655                                 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1656                                 events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1657                                         msg: update
1658                                 });
1659                         }
1660                 }
1661                 Ok((res.0, res.1))
1662         }
1663
1664         fn internal_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1665                 let (res, chan_option) = {
1666                         let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1667                         let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1668                         match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
1669                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1670                                         if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1671                                                 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1672                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1673                                         }
1674                                         let res = chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?;
1675                                         if res.1.is_some() {
1676                                                 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
1677                                                 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
1678                                                 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
1679                                                 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
1680                                                 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
1681                                                 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1682                                                         channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1683                                                 }
1684                                                 (res, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
1685                                         } else { (res, None) }
1686                                 },
1687                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1688                         }
1689                 };
1690                 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = res.1 {
1691                         self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
1692                 }
1693                 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
1694                         if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1695                                 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1696                                 events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1697                                         msg: update
1698                                 });
1699                         }
1700                 }
1701                 Ok(res.0)
1702         }
1703
1704         fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1705                 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
1706                 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
1707                 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
1708                 //
1709                 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
1710                 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
1711                 //encrypted with the same key. Its not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
1712                 //but we should prevent it anyway.
1713
1714                 let (pending_forward_info, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
1715                 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1716
1717                 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1718                         Some(chan) => {
1719                                 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1720                                         //TODO: here MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1721                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1722                                 }
1723                                 if !chan.is_usable() {
1724                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(HandleError{err: "Channel not yet available for receiving HTLCs", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError)}));
1725                                 }
1726                                 chan.update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))
1727                         },
1728                         None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1729                 }
1730         }
1731
1732         fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1733                 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1734                 let htlc_source = match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1735                         Some(chan) => {
1736                                 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1737                                         //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1738                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1739                                 }
1740                                 chan.update_fulfill_htlc(&msg)
1741                                         .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))?.clone()
1742                         },
1743                         None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1744                 };
1745                 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_state, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone());
1746                 Ok(())
1747         }
1748
1749         fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<Option<msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate>, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1750                 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1751                 let htlc_source = match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1752                         Some(chan) => {
1753                                 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1754                                         //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1755                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1756                                 }
1757                                 chan.update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err: msg.reason.clone() })
1758                                         .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))
1759                         },
1760                         None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1761                 }?;
1762
1763                 match htlc_source {
1764                         &HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref route, ref session_priv, .. } => {
1765                                 // Handle packed channel/node updates for passing back for the route handler
1766                                 let mut packet_decrypted = msg.reason.data.clone();
1767                                 let mut res = None;
1768                                 Self::construct_onion_keys_callback(&self.secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv, |shared_secret, _, _, route_hop| {
1769                                         if res.is_some() { return; }
1770
1771                                         let ammag = ChannelManager::gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
1772
1773                                         let mut decryption_tmp = Vec::with_capacity(packet_decrypted.len());
1774                                         decryption_tmp.resize(packet_decrypted.len(), 0);
1775                                         let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&ammag, &[0u8; 8]);
1776                                         chacha.process(&packet_decrypted, &mut decryption_tmp[..]);
1777                                         packet_decrypted = decryption_tmp;
1778
1779                                         if let Ok(err_packet) = msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket::read(&mut Cursor::new(&packet_decrypted)) {
1780                                                 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() >= 2 {
1781                                                         let um = ChannelManager::gen_um_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
1782
1783                                                         let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &um);
1784                                                         hmac.input(&err_packet.encode()[32..]);
1785                                                         let mut calc_tag = [0u8; 32];
1786                                                         hmac.raw_result(&mut calc_tag);
1787                                                         if crypto::util::fixed_time_eq(&calc_tag, &err_packet.hmac) {
1788                                                                 const UNKNOWN_CHAN: u16 = 0x4000|10;
1789                                                                 const TEMP_CHAN_FAILURE: u16 = 0x4000|7;
1790                                                                 match byte_utils::slice_to_be16(&err_packet.failuremsg[0..2]) {
1791                                                                         TEMP_CHAN_FAILURE => {
1792                                                                                 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() >= 4 {
1793                                                                                         let update_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be16(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..4]) as usize;
1794                                                                                         if err_packet.failuremsg.len() >= 4 + update_len {
1795                                                                                                 if let Ok(chan_update) = msgs::ChannelUpdate::read(&mut Cursor::new(&err_packet.failuremsg[4..4 + update_len])) {
1796                                                                                                         res = Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage {
1797                                                                                                                 msg: chan_update,
1798                                                                                                         });
1799                                                                                                 }
1800                                                                                         }
1801                                                                                 }
1802                                                                         },
1803                                                                         UNKNOWN_CHAN => {
1804                                                                                 // No such next-hop. We know this came from the
1805                                                                                 // current node as the HMAC validated.
1806                                                                                 res = Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed {
1807                                                                                         short_channel_id: route_hop.short_channel_id
1808                                                                                 });
1809                                                                         },
1810                                                                         _ => {}, //TODO: Enumerate all of these!
1811                                                                 }
1812                                                         }
1813                                                 }
1814                                         }
1815                                 }).unwrap();
1816                                 Ok(res)
1817                         },
1818                         _ => { Ok(None) },
1819                 }
1820         }
1821
1822         fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1823                 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1824                 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1825                         Some(chan) => {
1826                                 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1827                                         //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1828                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1829                                 }
1830                                 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) != 0 {
1831                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_close_chan("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION set", msg.channel_id));
1832                                 }
1833                                 chan.update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() })
1834                                         .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))?;
1835                                 Ok(())
1836                         },
1837                         None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1838                 }
1839         }
1840
1841         fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(msgs::RevokeAndACK, Option<msgs::CommitmentSigned>), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1842                 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, chan_monitor) = {
1843                         let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1844                         match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1845                                 Some(chan) => {
1846                                         if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1847                                                 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1848                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1849                                         }
1850                                         chan.commitment_signed(&msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?
1851                                 },
1852                                 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1853                         }
1854                 };
1855                 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1856                         unimplemented!();
1857                 }
1858
1859                 Ok((revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed))
1860         }
1861
1862         fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1863                 let ((res, mut pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, chan_monitor), short_channel_id) = {
1864                         let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1865                         match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1866                                 Some(chan) => {
1867                                         if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1868                                                 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1869                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1870                                         }
1871                                         (chan.revoke_and_ack(&msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?, chan.get_short_channel_id().expect("RAA should only work on a short-id-available channel"))
1872                                 },
1873                                 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1874                         }
1875                 };
1876                 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1877                         unimplemented!();
1878                 }
1879                 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
1880                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
1881                 }
1882
1883                 let mut forward_event = None;
1884                 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
1885                         let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1886                         if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
1887                                 forward_event = Some(Instant::now() + Duration::from_millis(((rng::rand_f32() * 4.0 + 1.0) * MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS as f32) as u64));
1888                                 channel_state.next_forward = forward_event.unwrap();
1889                         }
1890                         for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1891                                 match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(forward_info.short_channel_id) {
1892                                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
1893                                                 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id: short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info });
1894                                         },
1895                                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1896                                                 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id: short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info }));
1897                                         }
1898                                 }
1899                         }
1900                 }
1901                 match forward_event {
1902                         Some(time) => {
1903                                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1904                                 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
1905                                         time_forwardable: time
1906                                 });
1907                         }
1908                         None => {},
1909                 }
1910
1911                 Ok(res)
1912         }
1913
1914         fn internal_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1915                 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1916                 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1917                         Some(chan) => {
1918                                 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1919                                         //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1920                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1921                                 }
1922                                 chan.update_fee(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))
1923                         },
1924                         None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1925                 }
1926         }
1927
1928         fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1929                 let (chan_announcement, chan_update) = {
1930                         let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1931                         match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1932                                 Some(chan) => {
1933                                         if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1934                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1935                                         }
1936                                         if !chan.is_usable() {
1937                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(HandleError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError)}));
1938                                         }
1939
1940                                         let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
1941                                         let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = chan.get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), self.genesis_hash.clone())
1942                                                 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?;
1943
1944                                         let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_id;
1945                                         let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
1946                                         let bad_sig_action = MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_close_chan("Bad announcement_signatures node_signature", msg.channel_id);
1947                                         secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.node_id_2 } else { &announcement.node_id_1 }), bad_sig_action);
1948                                         secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.bitcoin_key_2 } else { &announcement.bitcoin_key_1 }), bad_sig_action);
1949
1950                                         let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
1951
1952                                         (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
1953                                                 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { msg.node_signature },
1954                                                 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.node_signature } else { our_node_sig },
1955                                                 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { msg.bitcoin_signature },
1956                                                 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.bitcoin_signature } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
1957                                                 contents: announcement,
1958                                         }, self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap()) // can only fail if we're not in a ready state
1959                                 },
1960                                 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1961                         }
1962                 };
1963                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1964                 pending_events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { msg: chan_announcement, update_msg: chan_update });
1965                 Ok(())
1966         }
1967
1968         fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>, Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1969                 let (res, chan_monitor) = {
1970                         let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1971                         match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1972                                 Some(chan) => {
1973                                         if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1974                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1975                                         }
1976                                         let (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, channel_monitor) = chan.channel_reestablish(msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?;
1977                                         (Ok((funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update)), channel_monitor)
1978                                 },
1979                                 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1980                         }
1981                 };
1982                 if let Some(monitor) = chan_monitor {
1983                         if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
1984                                 unimplemented!();
1985                         }
1986                 }
1987                 res
1988         }
1989
1990         /// Begin Update fee process. Allowed only on an outbound channel.
1991         /// If successful, will generate a UpdateHTLCs event, so you should probably poll
1992         /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
1993         /// Note: This API is likely to change!
1994         #[doc(hidden)]
1995         pub fn update_fee(&self, channel_id: [u8;32], feerate_per_kw: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1996                 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1997                 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
1998                         None => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel"}),
1999                         Some(chan) => {
2000                                 if !chan.is_usable() {
2001                                         return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Channel is not in usuable state"});
2002                                 }
2003                                 if !chan.is_outbound() {
2004                                         return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "update_fee cannot be sent for an inbound channel"});
2005                                 }
2006                                 if let Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, chan_monitor)) = chan.send_update_fee_and_commit(feerate_per_kw).map_err(|e| APIError::APIMisuseError{err: e.err})? {
2007                                         if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
2008                                                 unimplemented!();
2009                                         }
2010                                         let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2011                                         pending_events.push(events::Event::UpdateHTLCs {
2012                                                 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
2013                                                 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2014                                                         update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2015                                                         update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2016                                                         update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2017                                                         update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2018                                                         update_fee: Some(update_fee),
2019                                                         commitment_signed,
2020                                                 },
2021                                         });
2022                                 }
2023                         },
2024                 }
2025                 Ok(())
2026         }
2027 }
2028
2029 impl events::EventsProvider for ChannelManager {
2030         fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
2031                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2032                 let mut ret = Vec::new();
2033                 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut *pending_events);
2034                 ret
2035         }
2036 }
2037
2038 impl ChainListener for ChannelManager {
2039         fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) {
2040                 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
2041                 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2042                 {
2043                         let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2044                         let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2045                         let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
2046                         channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
2047                                 let chan_res = channel.block_connected(header, height, txn_matched, indexes_of_txn_matched);
2048                                 if let Ok(Some(funding_locked)) = chan_res {
2049                                         let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel);
2050                                         new_events.push(events::Event::SendFundingLocked {
2051                                                 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2052                                                 msg: funding_locked,
2053                                                 announcement_sigs: announcement_sigs
2054                                         });
2055                                         short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
2056                                 } else if let Err(e) = chan_res {
2057                                         new_events.push(events::Event::HandleError {
2058                                                 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2059                                                 action: e.action,
2060                                         });
2061                                         if channel.is_shutdown() {
2062                                                 return false;
2063                                         }
2064                                 }
2065                                 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
2066                                         for tx in txn_matched {
2067                                                 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
2068                                                         if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
2069                                                                 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
2070                                                                         short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2071                                                                 }
2072                                                                 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain. We go ahead and
2073                                                                 // broadcast our latest local state as well here, just in case its
2074                                                                 // some kind of SPV attack, though we expect these to be dropped.
2075                                                                 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown());
2076                                                                 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
2077                                                                         new_events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2078                                                                                 msg: update
2079                                                                         });
2080                                                                 }
2081                                                                 return false;
2082                                                         }
2083                                                 }
2084                                         }
2085                                 }
2086                                 if channel.is_funding_initiated() && channel.channel_monitor().would_broadcast_at_height(height) {
2087                                         if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
2088                                                 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2089                                         }
2090                                         failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown());
2091                                         // If would_broadcast_at_height() is true, the channel_monitor will broadcast
2092                                         // the latest local tx for us, so we should skip that here (it doesn't really
2093                                         // hurt anything, but does make tests a bit simpler).
2094                                         failed_channels.last_mut().unwrap().0 = Vec::new();
2095                                         if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
2096                                                 new_events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2097                                                         msg: update
2098                                                 });
2099                                         }
2100                                         return false;
2101                                 }
2102                                 true
2103                         });
2104                 }
2105                 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2106                         self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2107                 }
2108                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2109                 for funding_locked in new_events.drain(..) {
2110                         pending_events.push(funding_locked);
2111                 }
2112                 self.latest_block_height.store(height as usize, Ordering::Release);
2113         }
2114
2115         /// We force-close the channel without letting our counterparty participate in the shutdown
2116         fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader) {
2117                 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
2118                 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2119                 {
2120                         let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2121                         let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2122                         let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
2123                         channel_state.by_id.retain(|_,  v| {
2124                                 if v.block_disconnected(header) {
2125                                         if let Some(short_id) = v.get_short_channel_id() {
2126                                                 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2127                                         }
2128                                         failed_channels.push(v.force_shutdown());
2129                                         if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&v) {
2130                                                 new_events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2131                                                         msg: update
2132                                                 });
2133                                         }
2134                                         false
2135                                 } else {
2136                                         true
2137                                 }
2138                         });
2139                 }
2140                 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2141                         self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2142                 }
2143                 if !new_events.is_empty() {
2144                         let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2145                         for funding_locked in new_events.drain(..) {
2146                                 pending_events.push(funding_locked);
2147                         }
2148                 }
2149                 self.latest_block_height.fetch_sub(1, Ordering::AcqRel);
2150         }
2151 }
2152
2153 macro_rules! handle_error {
2154         ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $their_node_id: expr) => {
2155                 match $internal {
2156                         Ok(msg) => Ok(msg),
2157                         Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, needs_channel_force_close }) => {
2158                                 if needs_channel_force_close {
2159                                         match &err.action {
2160                                                 &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg: Some(ref msg) }) => {
2161                                                         if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
2162                                                                 $self.peer_disconnected(&$their_node_id, true);
2163                                                         } else {
2164                                                                 $self.force_close_channel(&msg.channel_id);
2165                                                         }
2166                                                 },
2167                                                 &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg: None }) => {},
2168                                                 &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) => {},
2169                                                 &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }) => {
2170                                                         if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
2171                                                                 $self.peer_disconnected(&$their_node_id, true);
2172                                                         } else {
2173                                                                 $self.force_close_channel(&msg.channel_id);
2174                                                         }
2175                                                 },
2176                                                 &None => {},
2177                                         }
2178                                 }
2179                                 Err(err)
2180                         },
2181                 }
2182         }
2183 }
2184
2185 impl ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager {
2186         //TODO: Handle errors and close channel (or so)
2187         fn handle_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<msgs::AcceptChannel, HandleError> {
2188                 handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2189         }
2190
2191         fn handle_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2192                 handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2193         }
2194
2195         fn handle_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<msgs::FundingSigned, HandleError> {
2196                 handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2197         }
2198
2199         fn handle_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2200                 handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2201         }
2202
2203         fn handle_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, HandleError> {
2204                 handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_locked(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2205         }
2206
2207         fn handle_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>), HandleError> {
2208                 handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2209         }
2210
2211         fn handle_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, HandleError> {
2212                 handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2213         }
2214
2215         fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), msgs::HandleError> {
2216                 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2217         }
2218
2219         fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2220                 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2221         }
2222
2223         fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<Option<msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate>, HandleError> {
2224                 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2225         }
2226
2227         fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2228                 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2229         }
2230
2231         fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(msgs::RevokeAndACK, Option<msgs::CommitmentSigned>), HandleError> {
2232                 handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2233         }
2234
2235         fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, HandleError> {
2236                 handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2237         }
2238
2239         fn handle_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2240                 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2241         }
2242
2243         fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2244                 handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2245         }
2246
2247         fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>, Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>), HandleError> {
2248                 handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2249         }
2250
2251         fn peer_disconnected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
2252                 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
2253                 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2254                 let mut failed_payments = Vec::new();
2255                 {
2256                         let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2257                         let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2258                         let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
2259                         if no_connection_possible {
2260                                 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2261                                         if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2262                                                 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
2263                                                         short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2264                                                 }
2265                                                 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown());
2266                                                 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2267                                                         new_events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2268                                                                 msg: update
2269                                                         });
2270                                                 }
2271                                                 false
2272                                         } else {
2273                                                 true
2274                                         }
2275                                 });
2276                         } else {
2277                                 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2278                                         if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2279                                                 //TODO: mark channel disabled (and maybe announce such after a timeout).
2280                                                 let failed_adds = chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused();
2281                                                 if !failed_adds.is_empty() {
2282                                                         let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(&chan).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe
2283                                                         failed_payments.push((chan_update, failed_adds));
2284                                                 }
2285                                                 if chan.is_shutdown() {
2286                                                         if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
2287                                                                 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2288                                                         }
2289                                                         return false;
2290                                                 }
2291                                         }
2292                                         true
2293                                 })
2294                         }
2295                 }
2296                 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2297                         self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2298                 }
2299                 if !new_events.is_empty() {
2300                         let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2301                         for event in new_events.drain(..) {
2302                                 pending_events.push(event);
2303                         }
2304                 }
2305                 for (chan_update, mut htlc_sources) in failed_payments {
2306                         for (htlc_source, payment_hash) in htlc_sources.drain(..) {
2307                                 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.clone() });
2308                         }
2309                 }
2310         }
2311
2312         fn peer_connected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Vec<msgs::ChannelReestablish> {
2313                 let mut res = Vec::new();
2314                 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2315                 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2316                         if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2317                                 if !chan.have_received_message() {
2318                                         // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
2319                                         // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
2320                                         // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
2321                                         // drop it.
2322                                         false
2323                                 } else {
2324                                         res.push(chan.get_channel_reestablish());
2325                                         true
2326                                 }
2327                         } else { true }
2328                 });
2329                 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
2330                 res
2331         }
2332
2333         fn handle_error(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
2334                 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
2335                         for chan in self.list_channels() {
2336                                 if chan.remote_network_id == *their_node_id {
2337                                         self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
2338                                 }
2339                         }
2340                 } else {
2341                         self.force_close_channel(&msg.channel_id);
2342                 }
2343         }
2344 }
2345
2346 #[cfg(test)]
2347 mod tests {
2348         use chain::chaininterface;
2349         use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
2350         use chain::chaininterface::ChainListener;
2351         use ln::channelmanager::{ChannelManager,OnionKeys};
2352         use ln::router::{Route, RouteHop, Router};
2353         use ln::msgs;
2354         use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler,RoutingMessageHandler};
2355         use util::test_utils;
2356         use util::events::{Event, EventsProvider};
2357         use util::errors::APIError;
2358         use util::logger::Logger;
2359         use util::ser::Writeable;
2360
2361         use bitcoin::util::hash::Sha256dHash;
2362         use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
2363         use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
2364         use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
2365         use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
2366         use bitcoin::network::serialize::serialize;
2367         use bitcoin::network::serialize::BitcoinHash;
2368
2369         use hex;
2370
2371         use secp256k1::{Secp256k1, Message};
2372         use secp256k1::key::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
2373
2374         use crypto::sha2::Sha256;
2375         use crypto::digest::Digest;
2376
2377         use rand::{thread_rng,Rng};
2378
2379         use std::cell::RefCell;
2380         use std::collections::{BTreeSet, HashMap};
2381         use std::default::Default;
2382         use std::rc::Rc;
2383         use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
2384         use std::time::Instant;
2385         use std::mem;
2386
2387         fn build_test_onion_keys() -> Vec<OnionKeys> {
2388                 // Keys from BOLT 4, used in both test vector tests
2389                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2390
2391                 let route = Route {
2392                         hops: vec!(
2393                                         RouteHop {
2394                                                 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("02eec7245d6b7d2ccb30380bfbe2a3648cd7a942653f5aa340edcea1f283686619").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
2395                                                 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
2396                                         },
2397                                         RouteHop {
2398                                                 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("0324653eac434488002cc06bbfb7f10fe18991e35f9fe4302dbea6d2353dc0ab1c").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
2399                                                 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
2400                                         },
2401                                         RouteHop {
2402                                                 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("027f31ebc5462c1fdce1b737ecff52d37d75dea43ce11c74d25aa297165faa2007").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
2403                                                 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
2404                                         },
2405                                         RouteHop {
2406                                                 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
2407                                                 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
2408                                         },
2409                                         RouteHop {
2410                                                 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("02edabbd16b41c8371b92ef2f04c1185b4f03b6dcd52ba9b78d9d7c89c8f221145").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
2411                                                 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
2412                                         },
2413                         ),
2414                 };
2415
2416                 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("4141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
2417
2418                 let onion_keys = ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
2419                 assert_eq!(onion_keys.len(), route.hops.len());
2420                 onion_keys
2421         }
2422
2423         #[test]
2424         fn onion_vectors() {
2425                 // Packet creation test vectors from BOLT 4
2426                 let onion_keys = build_test_onion_keys();
2427
2428                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("53eb63ea8a3fec3b3cd433b85cd62a4b145e1dda09391b348c4e1cd36a03ea66").unwrap()[..]);
2429                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("2ec2e5da605776054187180343287683aa6a51b4b1c04d6dd49c45d8cffb3c36").unwrap()[..]);
2430                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("02eec7245d6b7d2ccb30380bfbe2a3648cd7a942653f5aa340edcea1f283686619").unwrap()[..]);
2431                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].rho, hex::decode("ce496ec94def95aadd4bec15cdb41a740c9f2b62347c4917325fcc6fb0453986").unwrap()[..]);
2432                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].mu, hex::decode("b57061dc6d0a2b9f261ac410c8b26d64ac5506cbba30267a649c28c179400eba").unwrap()[..]);
2433
2434                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("a6519e98832a0b179f62123b3567c106db99ee37bef036e783263602f3488fae").unwrap()[..]);
2435                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("bf66c28bc22e598cfd574a1931a2bafbca09163df2261e6d0056b2610dab938f").unwrap()[..]);
2436                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("028f9438bfbf7feac2e108d677e3a82da596be706cc1cf342b75c7b7e22bf4e6e2").unwrap()[..]);
2437                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].rho, hex::decode("450ffcabc6449094918ebe13d4f03e433d20a3d28a768203337bc40b6e4b2c59").unwrap()[..]);
2438                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].mu, hex::decode("05ed2b4a3fb023c2ff5dd6ed4b9b6ea7383f5cfe9d59c11d121ec2c81ca2eea9").unwrap()[..]);
2439
2440                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("3a6b412548762f0dbccce5c7ae7bb8147d1caf9b5471c34120b30bc9c04891cc").unwrap()[..]);
2441                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("a1f2dadd184eb1627049673f18c6325814384facdee5bfd935d9cb031a1698a5").unwrap()[..]);
2442                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("03bfd8225241ea71cd0843db7709f4c222f62ff2d4516fd38b39914ab6b83e0da0").unwrap()[..]);
2443                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].rho, hex::decode("11bf5c4f960239cb37833936aa3d02cea82c0f39fd35f566109c41f9eac8deea").unwrap()[..]);
2444                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].mu, hex::decode("caafe2820fa00eb2eeb78695ae452eba38f5a53ed6d53518c5c6edf76f3f5b78").unwrap()[..]);
2445
2446                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("21e13c2d7cfe7e18836df50872466117a295783ab8aab0e7ecc8c725503ad02d").unwrap()[..]);
2447                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("7cfe0b699f35525029ae0fa437c69d0f20f7ed4e3916133f9cacbb13c82ff262").unwrap()[..]);
2448                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("031dde6926381289671300239ea8e57ffaf9bebd05b9a5b95beaf07af05cd43595").unwrap()[..]);
2449                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].rho, hex::decode("cbe784ab745c13ff5cffc2fbe3e84424aa0fd669b8ead4ee562901a4a4e89e9e").unwrap()[..]);
2450                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].mu, hex::decode("5052aa1b3d9f0655a0932e50d42f0c9ba0705142c25d225515c45f47c0036ee9").unwrap()[..]);
2451
2452                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("b5756b9b542727dbafc6765a49488b023a725d631af688fc031217e90770c328").unwrap()[..]);
2453                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("c96e00dddaf57e7edcd4fb5954be5b65b09f17cb6d20651b4e90315be5779205").unwrap()[..]);
2454                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("03a214ebd875aab6ddfd77f22c5e7311d7f77f17a169e599f157bbcdae8bf071f4").unwrap()[..]);
2455                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].rho, hex::decode("034e18b8cc718e8af6339106e706c52d8df89e2b1f7e9142d996acf88df8799b").unwrap()[..]);
2456                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].mu, hex::decode("8e45e5c61c2b24cb6382444db6698727afb063adecd72aada233d4bf273d975a").unwrap()[..]);
2457
2458                 // Test vectors below are flat-out wrong: they claim to set outgoing_cltv_value to non-0 :/
2459                 let payloads = vec!(
2460                         msgs::OnionHopData {
2461                                 realm: 0,
2462                                 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
2463                                         short_channel_id: 0,
2464                                         amt_to_forward: 0,
2465                                         outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
2466                                 },
2467                                 hmac: [0; 32],
2468                         },
2469                         msgs::OnionHopData {
2470                                 realm: 0,
2471                                 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
2472                                         short_channel_id: 0x0101010101010101,
2473                                         amt_to_forward: 0x0100000001,
2474                                         outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
2475                                 },
2476                                 hmac: [0; 32],
2477                         },
2478                         msgs::OnionHopData {
2479                                 realm: 0,
2480                                 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
2481                                         short_channel_id: 0x0202020202020202,
2482                                         amt_to_forward: 0x0200000002,
2483                                         outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
2484                                 },
2485                                 hmac: [0; 32],
2486                         },
2487                         msgs::OnionHopData {
2488                                 realm: 0,
2489                                 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
2490                                         short_channel_id: 0x0303030303030303,
2491                                         amt_to_forward: 0x0300000003,
2492                                         outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
2493                                 },
2494                                 hmac: [0; 32],
2495                         },
2496                         msgs::OnionHopData {
2497                                 realm: 0,
2498                                 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
2499                                         short_channel_id: 0x0404040404040404,
2500                                         amt_to_forward: 0x0400000004,
2501                                         outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
2502                                 },
2503                                 hmac: [0; 32],
2504                         },
2505                 );
2506
2507                 let packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(payloads, onion_keys, &[0x42; 32]);
2508                 // Just check the final packet encoding, as it includes all the per-hop vectors in it
2509                 // anyway...
2510                 assert_eq!(packet.encode(), hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2511         }
2512
2513         #[test]
2514         fn test_failure_packet_onion() {
2515                 // Returning Errors test vectors from BOLT 4
2516
2517                 let onion_keys = build_test_onion_keys();
2518                 let onion_error = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(&onion_keys[4].shared_secret, 0x2002, &[0; 0]);
2519                 assert_eq!(onion_error.encode(), hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2520
2521                 let onion_packet_1 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[4].shared_secret, &onion_error.encode()[..]);
2522                 assert_eq!(onion_packet_1.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2523
2524                 let onion_packet_2 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[3].shared_secret, &onion_packet_1.data[..]);
2525                 assert_eq!(onion_packet_2.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2526
2527                 let onion_packet_3 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[2].shared_secret, &onion_packet_2.data[..]);
2528                 assert_eq!(onion_packet_3.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2529
2530                 let onion_packet_4 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[1].shared_secret, &onion_packet_3.data[..]);
2531                 assert_eq!(onion_packet_4.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2532
2533                 let onion_packet_5 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[0].shared_secret, &onion_packet_4.data[..]);
2534                 assert_eq!(onion_packet_5.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2535         }
2536
2537         fn confirm_transaction(chain: &chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil, tx: &Transaction, chan_id: u32) {
2538                 assert!(chain.does_match_tx(tx));
2539                 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
2540                 chain.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[tx; 1], &[chan_id; 1]);
2541                 for i in 2..100 {
2542                         header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
2543                         chain.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &[tx; 0], &[0; 0]);
2544                 }
2545         }
2546
2547         struct Node {
2548                 chain_monitor: Arc<chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil>,
2549                 tx_broadcaster: Arc<test_utils::TestBroadcaster>,
2550                 chan_monitor: Arc<test_utils::TestChannelMonitor>,
2551                 node: Arc<ChannelManager>,
2552                 router: Router,
2553                 network_payment_count: Rc<RefCell<u8>>,
2554                 network_chan_count: Rc<RefCell<u32>>,
2555         }
2556         impl Drop for Node {
2557                 fn drop(&mut self) {
2558                         if !::std::thread::panicking() {
2559                                 // Check that we processed all pending events
2560                                 assert_eq!(self.node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
2561                                 assert_eq!(self.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
2562                         }
2563                 }
2564         }
2565
2566         fn create_chan_between_nodes(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node) -> (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
2567                 node_a.node.create_channel(node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42).unwrap();
2568
2569                 let events_1 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2570                 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
2571                 let accept_chan = match events_1[0] {
2572                         Event::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
2573                                 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
2574                                 node_b.node.handle_open_channel(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), msg).unwrap()
2575                         },
2576                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2577                 };
2578
2579                 node_a.node.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_chan).unwrap();
2580
2581                 let chan_id = *node_a.network_chan_count.borrow();
2582                 let tx;
2583                 let funding_output;
2584
2585                 let events_2 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2586                 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
2587                 match events_2[0] {
2588                         Event::FundingGenerationReady { ref temporary_channel_id, ref channel_value_satoshis, ref output_script, user_channel_id } => {
2589                                 assert_eq!(*channel_value_satoshis, 100000);
2590                                 assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
2591
2592                                 tx = Transaction { version: chan_id as u32, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
2593                                         value: *channel_value_satoshis, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
2594                                 }]};
2595                                 funding_output = OutPoint::new(Sha256dHash::from_data(&serialize(&tx).unwrap()[..]), 0);
2596
2597                                 node_a.node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, funding_output);
2598                                 let mut added_monitors = node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2599                                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2600                                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
2601                                 added_monitors.clear();
2602                         },
2603                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2604                 }
2605
2606                 let events_3 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2607                 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
2608                 let funding_signed = match events_3[0] {
2609                         Event::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
2610                                 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
2611                                 let res = node_b.node.handle_funding_created(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), msg).unwrap();
2612                                 let mut added_monitors = node_b.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2613                                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2614                                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
2615                                 added_monitors.clear();
2616                                 res
2617                         },
2618                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2619                 };
2620
2621                 node_a.node.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed).unwrap();
2622                 {
2623                         let mut added_monitors = node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2624                         assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2625                         assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
2626                         added_monitors.clear();
2627                 }
2628
2629                 let events_4 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2630                 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
2631                 match events_4[0] {
2632                         Event::FundingBroadcastSafe { ref funding_txo, user_channel_id } => {
2633                                 assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
2634                                 assert_eq!(*funding_txo, funding_output);
2635                         },
2636                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2637                 };
2638
2639                 confirm_transaction(&node_a.chain_monitor, &tx, chan_id);
2640                 let events_5 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2641                 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
2642                 match events_5[0] {
2643                         Event::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg, ref announcement_sigs } => {
2644                                 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
2645                                 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none());
2646                                 node_b.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), msg).unwrap()
2647                         },
2648                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2649                 };
2650
2651                 let channel_id;
2652
2653                 confirm_transaction(&node_b.chain_monitor, &tx, chan_id);
2654                 let events_6 = node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2655                 assert_eq!(events_6.len(), 1);
2656                 let as_announcement_sigs = match events_6[0] {
2657                         Event::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg, ref announcement_sigs } => {
2658                                 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
2659                                 channel_id = msg.channel_id.clone();
2660                                 let as_announcement_sigs = node_a.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), msg).unwrap().unwrap();
2661                                 node_a.node.handle_announcement_signatures(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &(*announcement_sigs).clone().unwrap()).unwrap();
2662                                 as_announcement_sigs
2663                         },
2664                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2665                 };
2666
2667                 let events_7 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2668                 assert_eq!(events_7.len(), 1);
2669                 let (announcement, as_update) = match events_7[0] {
2670                         Event::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
2671                                 (msg, update_msg)
2672                         },
2673                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2674                 };
2675
2676                 node_b.node.handle_announcement_signatures(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_announcement_sigs).unwrap();
2677                 let events_8 = node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2678                 assert_eq!(events_8.len(), 1);
2679                 let bs_update = match events_8[0] {
2680                         Event::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
2681                                 assert!(*announcement == *msg);
2682                                 update_msg
2683                         },
2684                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2685                 };
2686
2687                 *node_a.network_chan_count.borrow_mut() += 1;
2688
2689                 ((*announcement).clone(), (*as_update).clone(), (*bs_update).clone(), channel_id, tx)
2690         }
2691
2692         fn create_announced_chan_between_nodes(nodes: &Vec<Node>, a: usize, b: usize) -> (msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
2693                 let chan_announcement = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[a], &nodes[b]);
2694                 for node in nodes {
2695                         assert!(node.router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement.0).unwrap());
2696                         node.router.handle_channel_update(&chan_announcement.1).unwrap();
2697                         node.router.handle_channel_update(&chan_announcement.2).unwrap();
2698                 }
2699                 (chan_announcement.1, chan_announcement.2, chan_announcement.3, chan_announcement.4)
2700         }
2701
2702         macro_rules! check_spends {
2703                 ($tx: expr, $spends_tx: expr) => {
2704                         {
2705                                 let mut funding_tx_map = HashMap::new();
2706                                 let spends_tx = $spends_tx;
2707                                 funding_tx_map.insert(spends_tx.txid(), spends_tx);
2708                                 $tx.verify(&funding_tx_map).unwrap();
2709                         }
2710                 }
2711         }
2712
2713         fn close_channel(outbound_node: &Node, inbound_node: &Node, channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_tx: Transaction, close_inbound_first: bool) -> (msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
2714                 let (node_a, broadcaster_a) = if close_inbound_first { (&inbound_node.node, &inbound_node.tx_broadcaster) } else { (&outbound_node.node, &outbound_node.tx_broadcaster) };
2715                 let (node_b, broadcaster_b) = if close_inbound_first { (&outbound_node.node, &outbound_node.tx_broadcaster) } else { (&inbound_node.node, &inbound_node.tx_broadcaster) };
2716                 let (tx_a, tx_b);
2717
2718                 node_a.close_channel(channel_id).unwrap();
2719                 let events_1 = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2720                 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
2721                 let shutdown_a = match events_1[0] {
2722                         Event::SendShutdown { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
2723                                 assert_eq!(node_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id());
2724                                 msg.clone()
2725                         },
2726                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2727                 };
2728
2729                 let (shutdown_b, mut closing_signed_b) = node_b.handle_shutdown(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &shutdown_a).unwrap();
2730                 if !close_inbound_first {
2731                         assert!(closing_signed_b.is_none());
2732                 }
2733                 let (empty_a, mut closing_signed_a) = node_a.handle_shutdown(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &shutdown_b.unwrap()).unwrap();
2734                 assert!(empty_a.is_none());
2735                 if close_inbound_first {
2736                         assert!(closing_signed_a.is_none());
2737                         closing_signed_a = node_a.handle_closing_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_b.unwrap()).unwrap();
2738                         assert_eq!(broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
2739                         tx_a = broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
2740
2741                         let empty_b = node_b.handle_closing_signed(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_a.unwrap()).unwrap();
2742                         assert!(empty_b.is_none());
2743                         assert_eq!(broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
2744                         tx_b = broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
2745                 } else {
2746                         closing_signed_b = node_b.handle_closing_signed(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_a.unwrap()).unwrap();
2747                         assert_eq!(broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
2748                         tx_b = broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
2749
2750                         let empty_a2 = node_a.handle_closing_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_b.unwrap()).unwrap();
2751                         assert!(empty_a2.is_none());
2752                         assert_eq!(broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
2753                         tx_a = broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
2754                 }
2755                 assert_eq!(tx_a, tx_b);
2756                 check_spends!(tx_a, funding_tx);
2757
2758                 let events_2 = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2759                 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
2760                 let as_update = match events_2[0] {
2761                         Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2762                                 msg.clone()
2763                         },
2764                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2765                 };
2766
2767                 let events_3 = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2768                 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
2769                 let bs_update = match events_3[0] {
2770                         Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2771                                 msg.clone()
2772                         },
2773                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2774                 };
2775
2776                 (as_update, bs_update)
2777         }
2778
2779         struct SendEvent {
2780                 node_id: PublicKey,
2781                 msgs: Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>,
2782                 commitment_msg: msgs::CommitmentSigned,
2783         }
2784         impl SendEvent {
2785                 fn from_event(event: Event) -> SendEvent {
2786                         match event {
2787                                 Event::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs, update_fee, commitment_signed } } => {
2788                                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2789                                         assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2790                                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2791                                         assert!(update_fee.is_none());
2792                                         SendEvent { node_id: node_id, msgs: update_add_htlcs, commitment_msg: commitment_signed }
2793                                 },
2794                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event type!"),
2795                         }
2796                 }
2797         }
2798
2799         macro_rules! check_added_monitors {
2800                 ($node: expr, $count: expr) => {
2801                         {
2802                                 let mut added_monitors = $node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2803                                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), $count);
2804                                 added_monitors.clear();
2805                         }
2806                 }
2807         }
2808
2809         macro_rules! commitment_signed_dance {
2810                 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr, $commitment_signed: expr, $fail_backwards: expr) => {
2811                         {
2812                                 check_added_monitors!($node_a, 0);
2813                                 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = $node_a.node.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &$commitment_signed).unwrap();
2814                                 check_added_monitors!($node_a, 1);
2815                                 check_added_monitors!($node_b, 0);
2816                                 assert!($node_b.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().is_none());
2817                                 check_added_monitors!($node_b, 1);
2818                                 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_none) = $node_b.node.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed.unwrap()).unwrap();
2819                                 assert!(bs_none.is_none());
2820                                 check_added_monitors!($node_b, 1);
2821                                 if $fail_backwards {
2822                                         assert!($node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2823                                 }
2824                                 assert!($node_a.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().is_none());
2825                                 {
2826                                         let mut added_monitors = $node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2827                                         if $fail_backwards {
2828                                                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 2);
2829                                                 assert!(added_monitors[0].0 != added_monitors[1].0);
2830                                         } else {
2831                                                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2832                                         }
2833                                         added_monitors.clear();
2834                                 }
2835                         }
2836                 }
2837         }
2838
2839         macro_rules! get_payment_preimage_hash {
2840                 ($node: expr) => {
2841                         {
2842                                 let payment_preimage = [*$node.network_payment_count.borrow(); 32];
2843                                 *$node.network_payment_count.borrow_mut() += 1;
2844                                 let mut payment_hash = [0; 32];
2845                                 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
2846                                 sha.input(&payment_preimage[..]);
2847                                 sha.result(&mut payment_hash);
2848                                 (payment_preimage, payment_hash)
2849                         }
2850                 }
2851         }
2852
2853         fn send_along_route(origin_node: &Node, route: Route, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
2854                 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(origin_node);
2855
2856                 let mut payment_event = {
2857                         origin_node.node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
2858                         check_added_monitors!(origin_node, 1);
2859
2860                         let mut events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2861                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2862                         SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
2863                 };
2864                 let mut prev_node = origin_node;
2865
2866                 for (idx, &node) in expected_route.iter().enumerate() {
2867                         assert_eq!(node.node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
2868
2869                         node.node.handle_update_add_htlc(&prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
2870                         check_added_monitors!(node, 0);
2871                         commitment_signed_dance!(node, prev_node, payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
2872
2873                         let events_1 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2874                         assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
2875                         match events_1[0] {
2876                                 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
2877                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2878                         };
2879
2880                         node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
2881                         node.node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
2882
2883                         let mut events_2 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2884                         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
2885                         if idx == expected_route.len() - 1 {
2886                                 match events_2[0] {
2887                                         Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
2888                                                 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash);
2889                                                 assert_eq!(amt, recv_value);
2890                                         },
2891                                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2892                                 }
2893                         } else {
2894                                 check_added_monitors!(node, 1);
2895                                 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
2896                                 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
2897                         }
2898
2899                         prev_node = node;
2900                 }
2901
2902                 (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash)
2903         }
2904
2905         fn claim_payment_along_route(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], skip_last: bool, our_payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) {
2906                 assert!(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage));
2907                 check_added_monitors!(expected_route.last().unwrap(), 1);
2908
2909                 let mut next_msgs: Option<(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)> = None;
2910                 macro_rules! update_fulfill_dance {
2911                         ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $last_node: expr) => {
2912                                 {
2913                                         $node.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().0).unwrap();
2914                                         if $last_node {
2915                                                 check_added_monitors!($node, 0);
2916                                         } else {
2917                                                 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
2918                                         }
2919                                         commitment_signed_dance!($node, $prev_node, next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().1, false);
2920                                 }
2921                         }
2922                 }
2923
2924                 let mut expected_next_node = expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id();
2925                 let mut prev_node = expected_route.last().unwrap();
2926                 for (idx, node) in expected_route.iter().rev().enumerate() {
2927                         assert_eq!(expected_next_node, node.node.get_our_node_id());
2928                         if next_msgs.is_some() {
2929                                 update_fulfill_dance!(node, prev_node, false);
2930                         }
2931
2932                         let events = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2933                         if !skip_last || idx != expected_route.len() - 1 {
2934                                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2935                                 match events[0] {
2936                                         Event::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
2937                                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2938                                                 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
2939                                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2940                                                 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2941                                                 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
2942                                                 expected_next_node = node_id.clone();
2943                                                 next_msgs = Some((update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone()));
2944                                         },
2945                                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2946                                 }
2947                         } else {
2948                                 assert!(events.is_empty());
2949                         }
2950                         if !skip_last && idx == expected_route.len() - 1 {
2951                                 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, origin_node.node.get_our_node_id());
2952                         }
2953
2954                         prev_node = node;
2955                 }
2956
2957                 if !skip_last {
2958                         update_fulfill_dance!(origin_node, expected_route.first().unwrap(), true);
2959                         let events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2960                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2961                         match events[0] {
2962                                 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage } => {
2963                                         assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage);
2964                                 },
2965                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2966                         }
2967                 }
2968         }
2969
2970         fn claim_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], our_payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) {
2971                 claim_payment_along_route(origin_node, expected_route, false, our_payment_preimage);
2972         }
2973
2974         const TEST_FINAL_CLTV: u32 = 32;
2975
2976         fn route_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
2977                 let route = origin_node.router.get_route(&expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), recv_value, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
2978                 assert_eq!(route.hops.len(), expected_route.len());
2979                 for (node, hop) in expected_route.iter().zip(route.hops.iter()) {
2980                         assert_eq!(hop.pubkey, node.node.get_our_node_id());
2981                 }
2982
2983                 send_along_route(origin_node, route, expected_route, recv_value)
2984         }
2985
2986         fn route_over_limit(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) {
2987                 let route = origin_node.router.get_route(&expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), recv_value, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
2988                 assert_eq!(route.hops.len(), expected_route.len());
2989                 for (node, hop) in expected_route.iter().zip(route.hops.iter()) {
2990                         assert_eq!(hop.pubkey, node.node.get_our_node_id());
2991                 }
2992
2993                 let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(origin_node);
2994
2995                 let err = origin_node.node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap();
2996                 match err {
2997                         APIError::RouteError{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our max HTLC value in flight"),
2998                         _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
2999                 };
3000         }
3001
3002         fn send_payment(origin: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) {
3003                 let our_payment_preimage = route_payment(&origin, expected_route, recv_value).0;
3004                 claim_payment(&origin, expected_route, our_payment_preimage);
3005         }
3006
3007         fn fail_payment_along_route(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], skip_last: bool, our_payment_hash: [u8; 32]) {
3008                 assert!(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash));
3009                 check_added_monitors!(expected_route.last().unwrap(), 1);
3010
3011                 let mut next_msgs: Option<(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)> = None;
3012                 macro_rules! update_fail_dance {
3013                         ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $last_node: expr) => {
3014                                 {
3015                                         $node.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().0).unwrap();
3016                                         commitment_signed_dance!($node, $prev_node, next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().1, !$last_node);
3017                                 }
3018                         }
3019                 }
3020
3021                 let mut expected_next_node = expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id();
3022                 let mut prev_node = expected_route.last().unwrap();
3023                 for (idx, node) in expected_route.iter().rev().enumerate() {
3024                         assert_eq!(expected_next_node, node.node.get_our_node_id());
3025                         if next_msgs.is_some() {
3026                                 // We may be the "last node" for the purpose of the commitment dance if we're
3027                                 // skipping the last node (implying it is disconnected) and we're the
3028                                 // second-to-last node!
3029                                 update_fail_dance!(node, prev_node, skip_last && idx == expected_route.len() - 1);
3030                         }
3031
3032                         let events = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3033                         if !skip_last || idx != expected_route.len() - 1 {
3034                                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3035                                 match events[0] {
3036                                         Event::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
3037                                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3038                                                 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3039                                                 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3040                                                 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3041                                                 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
3042                                                 expected_next_node = node_id.clone();
3043                                                 next_msgs = Some((update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone()));
3044                                         },
3045                                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3046                                 }
3047                         } else {
3048                                 assert!(events.is_empty());
3049                         }
3050                         if !skip_last && idx == expected_route.len() - 1 {
3051                                 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, origin_node.node.get_our_node_id());
3052                         }
3053
3054                         prev_node = node;
3055                 }
3056
3057                 if !skip_last {
3058                         update_fail_dance!(origin_node, expected_route.first().unwrap(), true);
3059
3060                         let events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3061                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3062                         match events[0] {
3063                                 Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash } => {
3064                                         assert_eq!(payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
3065                                 },
3066                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3067                         }
3068                 }
3069         }
3070
3071         fn fail_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], our_payment_hash: [u8; 32]) {
3072                 fail_payment_along_route(origin_node, expected_route, false, our_payment_hash);
3073         }
3074
3075         fn create_network(node_count: usize) -> Vec<Node> {
3076                 let mut nodes = Vec::new();
3077                 let mut rng = thread_rng();
3078                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3079                 let logger: Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
3080
3081                 let chan_count = Rc::new(RefCell::new(0));
3082                 let payment_count = Rc::new(RefCell::new(0));
3083
3084                 for _ in 0..node_count {
3085                         let feeest = Arc::new(test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 });
3086                         let chain_monitor = Arc::new(chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil::new(Network::Testnet, Arc::clone(&logger)));
3087                         let tx_broadcaster = Arc::new(test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new())});
3088                         let chan_monitor = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChannelMonitor::new(chain_monitor.clone(), tx_broadcaster.clone()));
3089                         let node_id = {
3090                                 let mut key_slice = [0; 32];
3091                                 rng.fill_bytes(&mut key_slice);
3092                                 SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &key_slice).unwrap()
3093                         };
3094                         let node = ChannelManager::new(node_id.clone(), 0, true, Network::Testnet, feeest.clone(), chan_monitor.clone(), chain_monitor.clone(), tx_broadcaster.clone(), Arc::clone(&logger)).unwrap();
3095                         let router = Router::new(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &node_id), chain_monitor.clone(), Arc::clone(&logger));
3096                         nodes.push(Node { chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, chan_monitor, node, router,
3097                                 network_payment_count: payment_count.clone(),
3098                                 network_chan_count: chan_count.clone(),
3099                         });
3100                 }
3101
3102                 nodes
3103         }
3104
3105         #[test]
3106         fn test_async_inbound_update_fee() {
3107                 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
3108                 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3109                 let channel_id = chan.2;
3110
3111                 macro_rules! get_feerate {
3112                         ($node: expr) => {{
3113                                 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3114                                 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
3115                                 chan.get_feerate()
3116                         }}
3117                 }
3118
3119                 // balancing
3120                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
3121
3122                 // A                                        B
3123                 // update_fee                            ->
3124                 // send (1) commitment_signed            -.
3125                 //                                       <- update_add_htlc/commitment_signed
3126                 // send (2) RAA (awaiting remote revoke) -.
3127                 // (1) commitment_signed is delivered    ->
3128                 //                                       .- send (3) RAA (awaiting remote revoke)
3129                 // (2) RAA is delivered                  ->
3130                 //                                       .- send (4) commitment_signed
3131                 //                                       <- (3) RAA is delivered
3132                 // send (5) commitment_signed            -.
3133                 //                                       <- (4) commitment_signed is delivered
3134                 // send (6) RAA                          -.
3135                 // (5) commitment_signed is delivered    ->
3136                 //                                       <- RAA
3137                 // (6) RAA is delivered                  ->
3138
3139                 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
3140                 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, get_feerate!(nodes[0]) + 20).unwrap();
3141                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3142
3143                 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3144                 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
3145                 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
3146                         Event::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
3147                                 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
3148                         },
3149                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3150                 };
3151
3152                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
3153
3154                 // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
3155                 let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
3156                 nodes[1].node.send_payment(nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 40000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap(), our_payment_hash).unwrap();
3157                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3158
3159                 let payment_event = {
3160                         let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3161                         assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3162                         SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
3163                 };
3164                 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3165                 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3166
3167                 // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
3168                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
3169                 let (as_revoke_msg, as_commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap(); // (2)
3170                 assert!(as_commitment_signed.is_none()); // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack
3171                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3172
3173                 // deliver(1), generate (3):
3174                 let (bs_revoke_msg, bs_commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
3175                 assert!(bs_commitment_signed.is_none()); // nodes[1] is awaiting nodes[0] revoke_and_ack
3176                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3177
3178                 let bs_update = nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg).unwrap(); // deliver (2)
3179                 assert!(bs_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
3180                 assert!(bs_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
3181                 assert!(bs_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
3182                 assert!(bs_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
3183                 assert!(bs_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none()); // (4)
3184                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3185
3186                 let as_update = nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_msg).unwrap(); // deliver (3)
3187                 assert!(as_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
3188                 assert!(as_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
3189                 assert!(as_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
3190                 assert!(as_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
3191                 assert!(as_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none()); // (5)
3192                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3193
3194                 let (as_second_revoke, as_second_commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update.unwrap().commitment_signed).unwrap(); // deliver (4)
3195                 assert!(as_second_commitment_signed.is_none()); // only (6)
3196                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3197
3198                 let (bs_second_revoke, bs_second_commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update.unwrap().commitment_signed).unwrap(); // deliver (5)
3199                 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.is_none());
3200                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3201
3202                 assert!(nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke).unwrap().is_none());
3203                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3204
3205                 let events_2 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3206                 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3207                 match events_2[0] {
3208                         Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {..} => {}, // If we actually processed we'd receive the payment
3209                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3210                 }
3211
3212                 assert!(nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke).unwrap().is_none()); // deliver (6)
3213                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3214         }
3215
3216         #[test]
3217         fn test_update_fee_unordered_raa() {
3218                 // Just the intro to the previous test followed by an out-of-order RAA (which caused a
3219                 // crash in an earlier version of the update_fee patch)
3220                 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
3221                 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3222                 let channel_id = chan.2;
3223
3224                 macro_rules! get_feerate {
3225                         ($node: expr) => {{
3226                                 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3227                                 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
3228                                 chan.get_feerate()
3229                         }}
3230                 }
3231
3232                 // balancing
3233                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
3234
3235                 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
3236                 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, get_feerate!(nodes[0]) + 20).unwrap();
3237                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3238
3239                 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3240                 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
3241                 let update_msg = match events_0[0] { // (1)
3242                         Event::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, .. }, .. } => {
3243                                 update_fee.as_ref()
3244                         },
3245                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3246                 };
3247
3248                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
3249
3250                 // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
3251                 let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
3252                 nodes[1].node.send_payment(nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 40000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap(), our_payment_hash).unwrap();
3253                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3254
3255                 let payment_event = {
3256                         let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3257                         assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3258                         SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
3259                 };
3260                 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3261                 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3262
3263                 // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
3264                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
3265                 let (as_revoke_msg, as_commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap(); // (2)
3266                 assert!(as_commitment_signed.is_none()); // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack
3267                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3268
3269                 assert!(nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg).unwrap().is_none()); // deliver (2)
3270                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3271
3272                 // We can't continue, sadly, because our (1) now has a bogus signature
3273         }
3274
3275         #[test]
3276         fn test_multi_flight_update_fee() {
3277                 let nodes = create_network(2);
3278                 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3279                 let channel_id = chan.2;
3280
3281                 macro_rules! get_feerate {
3282                         ($node: expr) => {{
3283                                 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3284                                 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
3285                                 chan.get_feerate()
3286                         }}
3287                 }
3288
3289                 // A                                        B
3290                 // update_fee/commitment_signed          ->
3291                 //                                       .- send (1) RAA and (2) commitment_signed
3292                 // update_fee (never committed)          ->
3293                 // (3) update_fee                        ->
3294                 // We have to manually generate the above update_fee, it is allowed by the protocol but we
3295                 // don't track which updates correspond to which revoke_and_ack responses so we're in
3296                 // AwaitingRAA mode and will not generate the update_fee yet.
3297                 //                                       <- (1) RAA delivered
3298                 // (3) is generated and send (4) CS      -.
3299                 // Note that A cannot generate (4) prior to (1) being delivered as it otherwise doesn't
3300                 // know the per_commitment_point to use for it.
3301                 //                                       <- (2) commitment_signed delivered
3302                 // revoke_and_ack                        ->
3303                 //                                          B should send no response here
3304                 // (4) commitment_signed delivered       ->
3305                 //                                       <- RAA/commitment_signed delivered
3306                 // revoke_and_ack                        ->
3307
3308                 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
3309                 let initial_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0]);
3310                 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, initial_feerate + 20).unwrap();
3311                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3312
3313                 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3314                 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
3315                 let (update_msg_1, commitment_signed_1) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
3316                         Event::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
3317                                 (update_fee.as_ref().unwrap(), commitment_signed)
3318                         },
3319                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3320                 };
3321
3322                 // Deliver first update_fee/commitment_signed pair, generating (1) and (2):
3323                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg_1).unwrap();
3324                 let (bs_revoke_msg, bs_commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed_1).unwrap();
3325                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3326
3327                 // nodes[0] is awaiting a revoke from nodes[1] before it will create a new commitment
3328                 // transaction:
3329                 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, initial_feerate + 40).unwrap();
3330                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3331
3332                 // Create the (3) update_fee message that nodes[0] will generate before it does...
3333                 let mut update_msg_2 = msgs::UpdateFee {
3334                         channel_id: update_msg_1.channel_id.clone(),
3335                         feerate_per_kw: (initial_feerate + 30) as u32,
3336                 };
3337
3338                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2).unwrap();
3339
3340                 update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw = (initial_feerate + 40) as u32;
3341                 // Deliver (3)
3342                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2).unwrap();
3343
3344                 // Deliver (1), generating (3) and (4)
3345                 let as_second_update = nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_msg).unwrap();
3346                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3347                 assert!(as_second_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3348                 assert!(as_second_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3349                 assert!(as_second_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3350                 assert!(as_second_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3351                 // Check that the update_fee newly generated matches what we delivered:
3352                 assert_eq!(as_second_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().channel_id, update_msg_2.channel_id);
3353                 assert_eq!(as_second_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().feerate_per_kw, update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw);
3354
3355                 // Deliver (2) commitment_signed
3356                 let (as_revoke_msg, as_commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), bs_commitment_signed.as_ref().unwrap()).unwrap();
3357                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3358                 assert!(as_commitment_signed.is_none());
3359
3360                 assert!(nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg).unwrap().is_none());
3361                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3362
3363                 // Delever (4)
3364                 let (bs_second_revoke, bs_second_commitment) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_update.unwrap().commitment_signed).unwrap();
3365                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3366
3367                 assert!(nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke).unwrap().is_none());
3368                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3369
3370                 let (as_second_revoke, as_second_commitment) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment.unwrap()).unwrap();
3371                 assert!(as_second_commitment.is_none());
3372                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3373
3374                 assert!(nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke).unwrap().is_none());
3375                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3376         }
3377
3378         #[test]
3379         fn test_update_fee_vanilla() {
3380                 let nodes = create_network(2);
3381                 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3382                 let channel_id = chan.2;
3383
3384                 macro_rules! get_feerate {
3385                         ($node: expr) => {{
3386                                 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3387                                 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
3388                                 chan.get_feerate()
3389                         }}
3390                 }
3391
3392                 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0]);
3393                 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+20).unwrap();
3394
3395                 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3396                 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
3397                 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
3398                                 Event::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
3399                                 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
3400                         },
3401                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3402                 };
3403                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
3404
3405                 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
3406                 let commitment_signed = commitment_signed.unwrap();
3407                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3408                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3409
3410                 let resp_option = nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
3411                 assert!(resp_option.is_none());
3412                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3413
3414                 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap();
3415                 assert!(commitment_signed.is_none());
3416                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3417
3418                 let resp_option = nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
3419                 assert!(resp_option.is_none());
3420                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3421         }
3422
3423         #[test]
3424         fn test_update_fee_with_fundee_update_add_htlc() {
3425                 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
3426                 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3427                 let channel_id = chan.2;
3428
3429                 macro_rules! get_feerate {
3430                         ($node: expr) => {{
3431                                 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3432                                 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
3433                                 chan.get_feerate()
3434                         }}
3435                 }
3436
3437                 // balancing
3438                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
3439
3440                 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0]);
3441                 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+20).unwrap();
3442
3443                 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3444                 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
3445                 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
3446                                 Event::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
3447                                 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
3448                         },
3449                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3450                 };
3451                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
3452                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3453                 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
3454                 let commitment_signed = commitment_signed.unwrap();
3455                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3456
3457                 let route = nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 800000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
3458
3459                 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[1]);
3460
3461                 // nothing happens since node[1] is in AwaitingRemoteRevoke
3462                 nodes[1].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
3463                 {
3464                         let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
3465                         assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 0);
3466                         added_monitors.clear();
3467                 }
3468                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3469                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
3470                 // node[1] has nothing to do
3471
3472                 let resp_option = nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
3473                 assert!(resp_option.is_none());
3474                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3475
3476                 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap();
3477                 assert!(commitment_signed.is_none());
3478                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3479                 let resp_option = nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
3480                 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke ends here
3481
3482                 let commitment_update = resp_option.unwrap();
3483                 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
3484                 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
3485                 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 0);
3486                 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
3487                 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none(), true);
3488
3489                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.update_add_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
3490                 let (revoke, commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
3491                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3492                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3493                 let commitment_signed = commitment_signed.unwrap();
3494                 let resp_option = nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke).unwrap();
3495                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3496                 assert!(resp_option.is_none());
3497
3498                 let (revoke, commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap();
3499                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3500                 assert!(commitment_signed.is_none());
3501                 let resp_option = nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke).unwrap();
3502                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3503                 assert!(resp_option.is_none());
3504
3505                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3506                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3507                 match events[0] {
3508                         Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3509                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3510                 };
3511                 nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
3512                 nodes[0].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3513
3514                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3515                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3516                 match events[0] {
3517                         Event::PaymentReceived { .. } => { },
3518                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3519                 };
3520
3521                 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], our_payment_preimage);
3522
3523                 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 800000);
3524                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 800000);
3525                 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
3526         }
3527
3528         #[test]
3529         fn test_update_fee() {
3530                 let nodes = create_network(2);
3531                 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3532                 let channel_id = chan.2;
3533
3534                 macro_rules! get_feerate {
3535                         ($node: expr) => {{
3536                                 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3537                                 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
3538                                 chan.get_feerate()
3539                         }}
3540                 }
3541
3542                 // A                                        B
3543                 // (1) update_fee/commitment_signed      ->
3544                 //                                       <- (2) revoke_and_ack
3545                 //                                       .- send (3) commitment_signed
3546                 // (4) update_fee/commitment_signed      ->
3547                 //                                       .- send (5) revoke_and_ack (no CS as we're awaiting a revoke)
3548                 //                                       <- (3) commitment_signed delivered
3549                 // send (6) revoke_and_ack               -.
3550                 //                                       <- (5) deliver revoke_and_ack
3551                 // (6) deliver revoke_and_ack            ->
3552                 //                                       .- send (7) commitment_signed in response to (4)
3553                 //                                       <- (7) deliver commitment_signed
3554                 // revoke_and_ack                        ->
3555
3556                 // Create and deliver (1)...
3557                 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0]);
3558                 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+20).unwrap();
3559
3560                 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3561                 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
3562                 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
3563                                 Event::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
3564                                 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
3565                         },
3566                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3567                 };
3568                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
3569
3570                 // Generate (2) and (3):
3571                 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
3572                 let commitment_signed_0 = commitment_signed.unwrap();
3573                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3574                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3575
3576                 // Deliver (2):
3577                 let resp_option = nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
3578                 assert!(resp_option.is_none());
3579                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3580
3581                 // Create and deliver (4)...
3582                 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+30).unwrap();
3583                 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3584                 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
3585                 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
3586                                 Event::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
3587                                 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
3588                         },
3589                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3590                 };
3591                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
3592
3593                 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
3594                 // ... creating (5)
3595                 assert!(commitment_signed.is_none());
3596                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3597                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3598
3599                 // Handle (3), creating (6):
3600                 let (revoke_msg_0, commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed_0).unwrap();
3601                 assert!(commitment_signed.is_none());
3602                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3603
3604                 // Deliver (5):
3605                 let resp_option = nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
3606                 assert!(resp_option.is_none());
3607                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3608
3609                 // Deliver (6), creating (7):
3610                 let resp_option = nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg_0).unwrap();
3611                 let commitment_signed = resp_option.unwrap().commitment_signed;
3612                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3613
3614                 // Deliver (7)
3615                 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap();
3616                 assert!(commitment_signed.is_none());
3617                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3618                 let resp_option = nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
3619                 assert!(resp_option.is_none());
3620                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3621
3622                 assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[0]), feerate + 30);
3623                 assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[1]), feerate + 30);
3624                 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
3625         }
3626
3627         #[test]
3628         fn fake_network_test() {
3629                 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
3630                 // tests that payments get routed and transactions broadcast in semi-reasonable ways.
3631                 let nodes = create_network(4);
3632
3633                 // Create some initial channels
3634                 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3635                 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
3636                 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
3637
3638                 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
3639                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
3640                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
3641                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
3642                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
3643
3644                 // Send some more payments
3645                 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
3646                 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], &nodes[0])[..], 1000000);
3647                 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000);
3648
3649                 // Test failure packets
3650                 let payment_hash_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000).1;
3651                 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], payment_hash_1);
3652
3653                 // Add a new channel that skips 3
3654                 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
3655
3656                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
3657                 send_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
3658                 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
3659                 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
3660                 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
3661                 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
3662                 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
3663
3664                 // Do some rebalance loop payments, simultaneously
3665                 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
3666                 hops.push(RouteHop {
3667                         pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
3668                         short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
3669                         fee_msat: 0,
3670                         cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.0.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
3671                 });
3672                 hops.push(RouteHop {
3673                         pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
3674                         short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
3675                         fee_msat: 0,
3676                         cltv_expiry_delta: chan_4.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
3677                 });
3678                 hops.push(RouteHop {
3679                         pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
3680                         short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
3681                         fee_msat: 1000000,
3682                         cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
3683                 });
3684                 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_4.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_4.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
3685                 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.0.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.0.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
3686                 let payment_preimage_1 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { hops }, &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).0;
3687
3688                 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
3689                 hops.push(RouteHop {
3690                         pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
3691                         short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
3692                         fee_msat: 0,
3693                         cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
3694                 });
3695                 hops.push(RouteHop {
3696                         pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
3697                         short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
3698                         fee_msat: 0,
3699                         cltv_expiry_delta: chan_2.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
3700                 });
3701                 hops.push(RouteHop {
3702                         pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
3703                         short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
3704                         fee_msat: 1000000,
3705                         cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
3706                 });
3707                 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_2.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_2.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
3708                 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
3709                 let payment_hash_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { hops }, &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).1;
3710
3711                 // Claim the rebalances...
3712                 fail_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], payment_hash_2);
3713                 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
3714
3715                 // Add a duplicate new channel from 2 to 4
3716                 let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
3717
3718                 // Send some payments across both channels
3719                 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
3720                 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
3721                 let payment_preimage_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
3722
3723                 route_over_limit(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000);
3724
3725                 //TODO: Test that routes work again here as we've been notified that the channel is full
3726
3727                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_3);
3728                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_4);
3729                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_5);
3730
3731                 // Close down the channels...
3732                 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan_1.2, chan_1.3, true);
3733                 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, false);
3734                 close_channel(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &chan_3.2, chan_3.3, true);
3735                 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_4.2, chan_4.3, false);
3736                 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_5.2, chan_5.3, false);
3737         }
3738
3739         #[test]
3740         fn duplicate_htlc_test() {
3741                 // Test that we accept duplicate payment_hash HTLCs across the network and that
3742                 // claiming/failing them are all separate and don't effect each other
3743                 let mut nodes = create_network(6);
3744
3745                 // Create some initial channels to route via 3 to 4/5 from 0/1/2
3746                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3);
3747                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
3748                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
3749                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);
3750                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5);
3751
3752                 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 1000000);
3753
3754                 *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
3755                 assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
3756
3757                 *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
3758                 assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
3759
3760                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], payment_preimage);
3761                 fail_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], payment_hash);
3762                 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage);
3763         }
3764
3765         #[derive(PartialEq)]
3766         enum HTLCType { NONE, TIMEOUT, SUCCESS }
3767         /// Tests that the given node has broadcast transactions for the given Channel
3768         ///
3769         /// First checks that the latest local commitment tx has been broadcast, unless an explicit
3770         /// commitment_tx is provided, which may be used to test that a remote commitment tx was
3771         /// broadcast and the revoked outputs were claimed.
3772         ///
3773         /// Next tests that there is (or is not) a transaction that spends the commitment transaction
3774         /// that appears to be the type of HTLC transaction specified in has_htlc_tx.
3775         ///
3776         /// All broadcast transactions must be accounted for in one of the above three types of we'll
3777         /// also fail.
3778         fn test_txn_broadcast(node: &Node, chan: &(msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction), commitment_tx: Option<Transaction>, has_htlc_tx: HTLCType) -> Vec<Transaction> {
3779                 let mut node_txn = node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3780                 assert!(node_txn.len() >= if commitment_tx.is_some() { 0 } else { 1 } + if has_htlc_tx == HTLCType::NONE { 0 } else { 1 });
3781
3782                 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(2);
3783                 node_txn.retain(|tx| {
3784                         if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == chan.3.txid() {
3785                                 check_spends!(tx, chan.3.clone());
3786                                 if commitment_tx.is_none() {
3787                                         res.push(tx.clone());
3788                                 }
3789                                 false
3790                         } else { true }
3791                 });
3792                 if let Some(explicit_tx) = commitment_tx {
3793                         res.push(explicit_tx.clone());
3794                 }
3795
3796                 assert_eq!(res.len(), 1);
3797
3798                 if has_htlc_tx != HTLCType::NONE {
3799                         node_txn.retain(|tx| {
3800                                 if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == res[0].txid() {
3801                                         check_spends!(tx, res[0].clone());
3802                                         if has_htlc_tx == HTLCType::TIMEOUT {
3803                                                 assert!(tx.lock_time != 0);
3804                                         } else {
3805                                                 assert!(tx.lock_time == 0);
3806                                         }
3807                                         res.push(tx.clone());
3808                                         false
3809                                 } else { true }
3810                         });
3811                         assert_eq!(res.len(), 2);
3812                 }
3813
3814                 assert!(node_txn.is_empty());
3815                 res
3816         }
3817
3818         /// Tests that the given node has broadcast a claim transaction against the provided revoked
3819         /// HTLC transaction.
3820         fn test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(node: &Node, revoked_tx: Transaction) {
3821                 let mut node_txn = node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3822                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3823                 node_txn.retain(|tx| {
3824                         if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_tx.txid() {
3825                                 check_spends!(tx, revoked_tx.clone());
3826                                 false
3827                         } else { true }
3828                 });
3829                 assert!(node_txn.is_empty());
3830         }
3831
3832         fn check_preimage_claim(node: &Node, prev_txn: &Vec<Transaction>) -> Vec<Transaction> {
3833                 let mut node_txn = node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3834
3835                 assert!(node_txn.len() >= 1);
3836                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
3837                 let mut found_prev = false;
3838
3839                 for tx in prev_txn {
3840                         if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == tx.txid() {
3841                                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], tx.clone());
3842                                 assert!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness[2].len() > 106); // must spend an htlc output
3843                                 assert_eq!(tx.input.len(), 1); // must spend a commitment tx
3844
3845                                 found_prev = true;
3846                                 break;
3847                         }
3848                 }
3849                 assert!(found_prev);
3850
3851                 let mut res = Vec::new();
3852                 mem::swap(&mut *node_txn, &mut res);
3853                 res
3854         }
3855
3856         fn get_announce_close_broadcast_events(nodes: &Vec<Node>, a: usize, b: usize) {
3857                 let events_1 = nodes[a].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3858                 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3859                 let as_update = match events_1[0] {
3860                         Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
3861                                 msg.clone()
3862                         },
3863                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3864                 };
3865
3866                 let events_2 = nodes[b].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3867                 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3868                 let bs_update = match events_2[0] {
3869                         Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
3870                                 msg.clone()
3871                         },
3872                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3873                 };
3874
3875                 for node in nodes {
3876                         node.router.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
3877                         node.router.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
3878                 }
3879         }
3880
3881         #[test]
3882         fn channel_monitor_network_test() {
3883                 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
3884                 // tests that ChannelMonitor is able to recover from various states.
3885                 let nodes = create_network(5);
3886
3887                 // Create some initial channels
3888                 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3889                 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
3890                 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
3891                 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);
3892
3893                 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
3894                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
3895                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
3896                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
3897                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
3898
3899                 // Simple case with no pending HTLCs:
3900                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
3901                 {
3902                         let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
3903                         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3904                         nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn.drain(..).next().unwrap()] }, 1);
3905                         test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
3906                 }
3907                 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
3908                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
3909                 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
3910
3911                 // One pending HTLC is discarded by the force-close:
3912                 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
3913
3914                 // Simple case of one pending HTLC to HTLC-Timeout
3915                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
3916                 {
3917                         let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
3918                         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3919                         nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn.drain(..).next().unwrap()] }, 1);
3920                         test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
3921                 }
3922                 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 1, 2);
3923                 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
3924                 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
3925
3926                 macro_rules! claim_funds {
3927                         ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $preimage: expr) => {
3928                                 {
3929                                         assert!($node.node.claim_funds($preimage));
3930                                         check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
3931
3932                                         let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3933                                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3934                                         match events[0] {
3935                                                 Event::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, .. } } => {
3936                                                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3937                                                         assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3938                                                         assert_eq!(*node_id, $prev_node.node.get_our_node_id());
3939                                                 },
3940                                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3941                                         };
3942                                 }
3943                         }
3944                 }
3945
3946                 // nodes[3] gets the preimage, but nodes[2] already disconnected, resulting in a nodes[2]
3947                 // HTLC-Timeout and a nodes[3] claim against it (+ its own announces)
3948                 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
3949                 {
3950                         let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
3951
3952                         // Claim the payment on nodes[3], giving it knowledge of the preimage
3953                         claim_funds!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_preimage_1);
3954
3955                         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3956                         nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
3957
3958                         check_preimage_claim(&nodes[3], &node_txn);
3959                 }
3960                 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 2, 3);
3961                 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
3962                 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
3963
3964                 // One pending HTLC to time out:
3965                 let payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[4])[..], 3000000).0;
3966
3967                 {
3968                         let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3969                         nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
3970                         for i in 2..TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 3 {
3971                                 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3972                                 nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
3973                         }
3974
3975                         let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[3], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
3976
3977                         // Claim the payment on nodes[4], giving it knowledge of the preimage
3978                         claim_funds!(nodes[4], nodes[3], payment_preimage_2);
3979
3980                         header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3981                         nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
3982                         for i in 2..TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 3 {
3983                                 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3984                                 nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
3985                         }
3986
3987                         test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[4], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::SUCCESS);
3988
3989                         header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3990                         nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone()] }, TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 5);
3991
3992                         check_preimage_claim(&nodes[4], &node_txn);
3993                 }
3994                 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 3, 4);
3995                 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
3996                 assert_eq!(nodes[4].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
3997
3998                 // Create some new channels:
3999                 let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4000
4001                 // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
4002                 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4003                 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[0]
4004                 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.iter().next().unwrap().1.last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
4005                 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // First commitment tx, then HTLC tx
4006                 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4007                 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_5.3.txid());
4008                 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to 0 are present
4009                 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4010                 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
4011                 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 133); // HTLC-Timeout
4012                 // Revoke the old state
4013                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
4014
4015                 {
4016                         let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4017                         nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
4018                         {
4019                                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4020                                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
4021                                 assert_eq!(node_txn.pop().unwrap(), node_txn[0]); // An outpoint registration will result in a 2nd block_connected
4022                                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2); // We should claim the revoked output and the HTLC output
4023
4024                                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
4025                                 node_txn.swap_remove(0);
4026                         }
4027                         test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_5, None, HTLCType::NONE);
4028
4029                         nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
4030                         let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_5, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
4031                         header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4032                         nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[1].clone()] }, 1);
4033                         test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], node_txn[1].clone());
4034                 }
4035                 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
4036                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4037                 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4038         }
4039
4040         #[test]
4041         fn revoked_output_claim() {
4042                 // Simple test to ensure a node will claim a revoked output when a stale remote commitment
4043                 // transaction is broadcast by its counterparty
4044                 let nodes = create_network(2);
4045                 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4046                 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim the revoked output
4047                 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
4048                 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1);
4049                 // Only output is the full channel value back to nodes[0]:
4050                 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
4051                 // Send a payment through, updating everyone's latest commitment txn
4052                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 5000000);
4053
4054                 // Inform nodes[1] that nodes[0] broadcast a stale tx
4055                 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4056                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
4057                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4058                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); // nodes[1] will broadcast justice tx twice, and its own local state once
4059
4060                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[2]);
4061
4062                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
4063                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3.clone());
4064
4065                 // Inform nodes[0] that a watchtower cheated on its behalf, so it will force-close the chan
4066                 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
4067                 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
4068         }
4069
4070         #[test]
4071         fn claim_htlc_outputs_shared_tx() {
4072                 // Node revoked old state, htlcs haven't time out yet, claim them in shared justice tx
4073                 let nodes = create_network(2);
4074
4075                 // Create some new channel:
4076                 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4077
4078                 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
4079                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
4080                 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx
4081                 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4082                 let _payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000).0;
4083
4084                 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
4085                 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
4086                 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // commitment tx + 1 HTLC-Timeout tx
4087                 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4088                 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4089                 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4090                 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
4091                 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 133); // HTLC-Timeout
4092                 check_spends!(revoked_local_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
4093
4094                 //Revoke the old state
4095                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
4096
4097                 {
4098                         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4099
4100                         nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
4101
4102                         nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
4103                         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4104                         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4);
4105
4106                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Claim the revoked output + both revoked HTLC outputs
4107                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
4108
4109                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]); // justice tx is duplicated due to block re-scanning
4110
4111                         let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
4112                         witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
4113                         witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len());
4114                         witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[2].witness.last().unwrap().len());
4115                         assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
4116                         assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
4117                         assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), 133); // revoked offered HTLC
4118                         assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), 138); // revoked received HTLC
4119
4120                         // Next nodes[1] broadcasts its current local tx state:
4121                         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4122                         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid()); //Spending funding tx unique txouput, tx broadcasted by ChannelManager
4123
4124                         assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
4125                         let witness_script = node_txn[2].clone().input[0].witness.pop().unwrap();
4126                         assert_eq!(witness_script.len(), 133); //Spending an offered htlc output
4127                         assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[1].txid());
4128                         assert_ne!(node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid);
4129                         assert_ne!(node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output.txid);
4130                 }
4131                 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
4132                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4133                 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4134         }
4135
4136         #[test]
4137         fn claim_htlc_outputs_single_tx() {
4138                 // Node revoked old state, htlcs have timed out, claim each of them in separated justice tx
4139                 let nodes = create_network(2);
4140
4141                 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4142
4143                 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
4144                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
4145                 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx, but this
4146                 // time as two different claim transactions as we're gonna to timeout htlc with given a high current height
4147                 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4148                 let _payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000).0;
4149
4150                 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
4151                 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
4152
4153                 //Revoke the old state
4154                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
4155
4156                 {
4157                         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4158
4159                         nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 200);
4160
4161                         nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 200);
4162                         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4163                         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 12); // ChannelManager : 2, ChannelMontitor: 8 (1 standard revoked output, 2 revocation htlc tx, 1 local commitment tx + 1 htlc timeout tx) * 2 (block-rescan)
4164
4165                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[7]);
4166                         assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[8]);
4167                         assert_eq!(node_txn[2], node_txn[9]);
4168                         assert_eq!(node_txn[3], node_txn[10]);
4169                         assert_eq!(node_txn[4], node_txn[11]);
4170                         assert_eq!(node_txn[3], node_txn[5]); //local commitment tx + htlc timeout tx broadcated by ChannelManger
4171                         assert_eq!(node_txn[4], node_txn[6]);
4172
4173                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4174                         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4175                         assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
4176
4177                         let mut revoked_tx_map = HashMap::new();
4178                         revoked_tx_map.insert(revoked_local_txn[0].txid(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
4179                         node_txn[0].verify(&revoked_tx_map).unwrap();
4180                         node_txn[1].verify(&revoked_tx_map).unwrap();
4181                         node_txn[2].verify(&revoked_tx_map).unwrap();
4182
4183                         let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
4184                         witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
4185                         witness_lens.insert(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
4186                         witness_lens.insert(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
4187                         assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
4188                         assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
4189                         assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), 133); // revoked offered HTLC
4190                         assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), 138); // revoked received HTLC
4191
4192                         assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
4193                         check_spends!(node_txn[3], chan_1.3.clone());
4194
4195                         assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input.len(), 1);
4196                         let witness_script = node_txn[4].input[0].witness.last().unwrap();
4197                         assert_eq!(witness_script.len(), 133); //Spending an offered htlc output
4198                         assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[3].txid());
4199                         assert_ne!(node_txn[4].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid);
4200                         assert_ne!(node_txn[4].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid);
4201                 }
4202                 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
4203                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4204                 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4205         }
4206
4207         #[test]
4208         fn test_htlc_ignore_latest_remote_commitment() {
4209                 // Test that HTLC transactions spending the latest remote commitment transaction are simply
4210                 // ignored if we cannot claim them. This originally tickled an invalid unwrap().
4211                 let nodes = create_network(2);
4212                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4213
4214                 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10000000);
4215                 nodes[0].node.force_close_channel(&nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].channel_id);
4216                 {
4217                         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4218                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4219                         match events[0] {
4220                                 Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
4221                                         assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
4222                                 },
4223                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4224                         }
4225                 }
4226
4227                 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4228                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
4229
4230                 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4231                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&node_txn[0], &node_txn[1]], &[1; 2]);
4232
4233                 {
4234                         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4235                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4236                         match events[0] {
4237                                 Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
4238                                         assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
4239                                 },
4240                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4241                         }
4242                 }
4243
4244                 // Duplicate the block_connected call since this may happen due to other listeners
4245                 // registering new transactions
4246                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&node_txn[0], &node_txn[1]], &[1; 2]);
4247         }
4248
4249         #[test]
4250         fn test_force_close_fail_back() {
4251                 // Check which HTLCs are failed-backwards on channel force-closure
4252                 let mut nodes = create_network(3);
4253                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4254                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
4255
4256                 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, 42).unwrap();
4257
4258                 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
4259
4260                 let mut payment_event = {
4261                         nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
4262                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4263
4264                         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4265                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4266                         SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
4267                 };
4268
4269                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
4270                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
4271
4272                 let events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4273                 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
4274                 match events_1[0] {
4275                         Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
4276                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4277                 };
4278
4279                 nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
4280                 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
4281
4282                 let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4283                 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
4284                 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
4285                 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
4286
4287                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4288                 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
4289                 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap();
4290                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
4291
4292                 // nodes[2] now has the latest commitment transaction, but hasn't revoked its previous
4293                 // state or updated nodes[1]' state. Now force-close and broadcast that commitment/HTLC
4294                 // transaction and ensure nodes[1] doesn't fail-backwards (this was originally a bug!).
4295
4296                 nodes[2].node.force_close_channel(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id);
4297                 let events_3 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4298                 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
4299                 match events_3[0] {
4300                         Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
4301                                 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
4302                         },
4303                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4304                 }
4305
4306                 let tx = {
4307                         let mut node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4308                         // Note that we don't bother broadcasting the HTLC-Success transaction here as we don't
4309                         // have a use for it unless nodes[2] learns the preimage somehow, the funds will go
4310                         // back to nodes[1] upon timeout otherwise.
4311                         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4312                         node_txn.remove(0)
4313                 };
4314
4315                 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4316                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&tx], &[1]);
4317
4318                 let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4319                 // Note no UpdateHTLCs event here from nodes[1] to nodes[0]!
4320                 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
4321                 match events_4[0] {
4322                         Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
4323                                 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
4324                         },
4325                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4326                 }
4327
4328                 // Now check that if we add the preimage to ChannelMonitor it broadcasts our HTLC-Success..
4329                 {
4330                         let mut monitors = nodes[2].chan_monitor.simple_monitor.monitors.lock().unwrap();
4331                         monitors.get_mut(&OutPoint::new(Sha256dHash::from(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id[..]), 0)).unwrap()
4332                                 .provide_payment_preimage(&our_payment_hash, &our_payment_preimage);
4333                 }
4334                 nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&tx], &[1]);
4335                 let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4336                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4337                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4338                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, tx.txid());
4339                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Must be an HTLC-Success
4340                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.len(), 5); // Must be an HTLC-Success
4341
4342                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], tx);
4343         }
4344
4345         #[test]
4346         fn test_unconf_chan() {
4347                 // After creating a chan between nodes, we disconnect all blocks previously seen to force a channel close on nodes[0] side
4348                 let nodes = create_network(2);
4349                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4350
4351                 let channel_state = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4352                 assert_eq!(channel_state.by_id.len(), 1);
4353                 assert_eq!(channel_state.short_to_id.len(), 1);
4354                 mem::drop(channel_state);
4355
4356                 let mut headers = Vec::new();
4357                 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4358                 headers.push(header.clone());
4359                 for _i in 2..100 {
4360                         header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4361                         headers.push(header.clone());
4362                 }
4363                 while !headers.is_empty() {
4364                         nodes[0].node.block_disconnected(&headers.pop().unwrap());
4365                 }
4366                 {
4367                         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4368                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4369                         match events[0] {
4370                                 Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
4371                                         assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
4372                                 },
4373                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4374                         }
4375                 }
4376                 let channel_state = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4377                 assert_eq!(channel_state.by_id.len(), 0);
4378                 assert_eq!(channel_state.short_to_id.len(), 0);
4379         }
4380
4381         fn reconnect_nodes(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, pre_all_htlcs: bool, pending_htlc_claims: (usize, usize), pending_htlc_fails: (usize, usize)) {
4382                 let reestablish_1 = node_a.node.peer_connected(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
4383                 let reestablish_2 = node_b.node.peer_connected(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
4384
4385                 let mut resp_1 = Vec::new();
4386                 for msg in reestablish_1 {
4387                         resp_1.push(node_b.node.handle_channel_reestablish(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &msg).unwrap());
4388                 }
4389                 if pending_htlc_claims.0 != 0 || pending_htlc_fails.0 != 0 {
4390                         check_added_monitors!(node_b, 1);
4391                 } else {
4392                         check_added_monitors!(node_b, 0);
4393                 }
4394
4395                 let mut resp_2 = Vec::new();
4396                 for msg in reestablish_2 {
4397                         resp_2.push(node_a.node.handle_channel_reestablish(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &msg).unwrap());
4398                 }
4399                 if pending_htlc_claims.1 != 0 || pending_htlc_fails.1 != 0 {
4400                         check_added_monitors!(node_a, 1);
4401                 } else {
4402                         check_added_monitors!(node_a, 0);
4403                 }
4404
4405                 // We dont yet support both needing updates, as that would require a different commitment dance:
4406                 assert!((pending_htlc_claims.0 == 0 && pending_htlc_fails.0 == 0) || (pending_htlc_claims.1 == 0 && pending_htlc_fails.1 == 0));
4407
4408                 for chan_msgs in resp_1.drain(..) {
4409                         if pre_all_htlcs {
4410                                 let _announcement_sigs_opt = node_a.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_msgs.0.unwrap()).unwrap();
4411                                 //TODO: Test announcement_sigs re-sending when we've implemented it
4412                         } else {
4413                                 assert!(chan_msgs.0.is_none());
4414                         }
4415                         assert!(chan_msgs.1.is_none());
4416                         if pending_htlc_claims.0 != 0 || pending_htlc_fails.0 != 0 {
4417                                 let commitment_update = chan_msgs.2.unwrap();
4418                                 assert!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // We can't relay while disconnected
4419                                 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_claims.0);
4420                                 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_fails.0);
4421                                 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4422                                 for update_fulfill in commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs {
4423                                         node_a.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill).unwrap();
4424                                 }
4425                                 for update_fail in commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs {
4426                                         node_a.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail).unwrap();
4427                                 }
4428
4429                                 commitment_signed_dance!(node_a, node_b, commitment_update.commitment_signed, false);
4430                         } else {
4431                                 assert!(chan_msgs.2.is_none());
4432                         }
4433                 }
4434
4435                 for chan_msgs in resp_2.drain(..) {
4436                         if pre_all_htlcs {
4437                                 let _announcement_sigs_opt = node_b.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_msgs.0.unwrap()).unwrap();
4438                                 //TODO: Test announcement_sigs re-sending when we've implemented it
4439                         } else {
4440                                 assert!(chan_msgs.0.is_none());
4441                         }
4442                         assert!(chan_msgs.1.is_none());
4443                         if pending_htlc_claims.1 != 0 || pending_htlc_fails.1 != 0 {
4444                                 let commitment_update = chan_msgs.2.unwrap();
4445                                 assert!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // We can't relay while disconnected
4446                                 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_claims.0);
4447                                 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_fails.0);
4448                                 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4449                                 for update_fulfill in commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs {
4450                                         node_b.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill).unwrap();
4451                                 }
4452                                 for update_fail in commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs {
4453                                         node_b.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail).unwrap();
4454                                 }
4455
4456                                 commitment_signed_dance!(node_b, node_a, commitment_update.commitment_signed, false);
4457                         } else {
4458                                 assert!(chan_msgs.2.is_none());
4459                         }
4460                 }
4461         }
4462
4463         #[test]
4464         fn test_simple_peer_disconnect() {
4465                 // Test that we can reconnect when there are no lost messages
4466                 let nodes = create_network(3);
4467                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4468                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
4469
4470                 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4471                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4472                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], true, (0, 0), (0, 0));
4473
4474                 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
4475                 let payment_hash_2 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
4476                 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_2);
4477                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_1);
4478
4479                 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4480                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4481                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0));
4482
4483                 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
4484                 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
4485                 let payment_hash_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
4486                 let payment_hash_6 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
4487
4488                 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4489                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4490
4491                 claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), true, payment_preimage_3);
4492                 fail_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], true, payment_hash_5);
4493
4494                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (1, 0), (1, 0));
4495                 {
4496                         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4497                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
4498                         match events[0] {
4499                                 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage } => {
4500                                         assert_eq!(payment_preimage, payment_preimage_3);
4501                                 },
4502                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4503                         }
4504                         match events[1] {
4505                                 Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash } => {
4506                                         assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_5);
4507                                 },
4508                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4509                         }
4510                 }
4511
4512                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_4);
4513                 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_6);
4514         }
4515
4516         #[test]
4517         fn test_invalid_channel_announcement() {
4518                 //Test BOLT 7 channel_announcement msg requirement for final node, gather data to build customed channel_announcement msgs
4519                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4520                 let nodes = create_network(2);
4521
4522                 let chan_announcement = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
4523
4524                 let a_channel_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4525                 let b_channel_lock = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4526                 let as_chan = a_channel_lock.by_id.get(&chan_announcement.3).unwrap();
4527                 let bs_chan = b_channel_lock.by_id.get(&chan_announcement.3).unwrap();
4528
4529                 let _ = nodes[0].router.handle_htlc_fail_channel_update(&msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { short_channel_id : as_chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap() } );
4530
4531                 let as_bitcoin_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &as_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
4532                 let bs_bitcoin_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &bs_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
4533
4534                 let as_network_key = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
4535                 let bs_network_key = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
4536
4537                 let were_node_one = as_bitcoin_key.serialize()[..] < bs_bitcoin_key.serialize()[..];
4538
4539                 let mut chan_announcement;
4540
4541                 macro_rules! dummy_unsigned_msg {
4542                         () => {
4543                                 msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
4544                                         features: msgs::GlobalFeatures::new(),
4545                                         chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.bitcoin_hash(),
4546                                         short_channel_id: as_chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
4547                                         node_id_1: if were_node_one { as_network_key } else { bs_network_key },
4548                                         node_id_2: if were_node_one { bs_network_key } else { as_network_key },
4549                                         bitcoin_key_1: if were_node_one { as_bitcoin_key } else { bs_bitcoin_key },
4550                                         bitcoin_key_2: if were_node_one { bs_bitcoin_key } else { as_bitcoin_key },
4551                                         excess_data: Vec::new(),
4552                                 };
4553                         }
4554                 }
4555
4556                 macro_rules! sign_msg {
4557                         ($unsigned_msg: expr) => {
4558                                 let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&$unsigned_msg.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
4559                                 let as_bitcoin_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &as_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
4560                                 let bs_bitcoin_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &bs_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
4561                                 let as_node_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &nodes[0].node.our_network_key);
4562                                 let bs_node_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &nodes[1].node.our_network_key);
4563                                 chan_announcement = msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
4564                                         node_signature_1 : if were_node_one { as_node_sig } else { bs_node_sig},
4565                                         node_signature_2 : if were_node_one { bs_node_sig } else { as_node_sig},
4566                                         bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { as_bitcoin_sig } else { bs_bitcoin_sig },
4567                                         bitcoin_signature_2 : if were_node_one { bs_bitcoin_sig } else { as_bitcoin_sig },
4568                                         contents: $unsigned_msg
4569                                 }
4570                         }
4571                 }
4572
4573                 let unsigned_msg = dummy_unsigned_msg!();
4574                 sign_msg!(unsigned_msg);
4575                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).unwrap(), true);
4576                 let _ = nodes[0].router.handle_htlc_fail_channel_update(&msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { short_channel_id : as_chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap() } );
4577
4578                 // Configured with Network::Testnet
4579                 let mut unsigned_msg = dummy_unsigned_msg!();
4580                 unsigned_msg.chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin).header.bitcoin_hash();
4581                 sign_msg!(unsigned_msg);
4582                 assert!(nodes[0].router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).is_err());
4583
4584                 let mut unsigned_msg = dummy_unsigned_msg!();
4585                 unsigned_msg.chain_hash = Sha256dHash::from_data(&[1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9]);
4586                 sign_msg!(unsigned_msg);
4587                 assert!(nodes[0].router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).is_err());
4588         }
4589 }