Use live, not usable for list_usable_channels
[rust-lightning] / src / ln / channelmanager.rs
1 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
2 //!
3 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
4 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
5 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
6 //!
7 //! It does not manage routing logic (see ln::router for that) nor does it manage constructing
8 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
9 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
10
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
12 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
13 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
14 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
15 use bitcoin::network::serialize::BitcoinHash;
16 use bitcoin::util::hash::Sha256dHash;
17
18 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
19 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Message};
20 use secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
21 use secp256k1;
22
23 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface,ChainListener,ChainWatchInterface,FeeEstimator};
24 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
25 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError, ChannelKeys};
26 use ln::channelmonitor::ManyChannelMonitor;
27 use ln::router::{Route,RouteHop};
28 use ln::msgs;
29 use ln::msgs::{HandleError,ChannelMessageHandler};
30 use util::{byte_utils, events, internal_traits, rng};
31 use util::sha2::Sha256;
32 use util::ser::{Readable, Writeable};
33 use util::chacha20poly1305rfc::ChaCha20;
34 use util::logger::Logger;
35 use util::errors::APIError;
36
37 use crypto;
38 use crypto::mac::{Mac,MacResult};
39 use crypto::hmac::Hmac;
40 use crypto::digest::Digest;
41 use crypto::symmetriccipher::SynchronousStreamCipher;
42
43 use std::{ptr, mem};
44 use std::collections::HashMap;
45 use std::collections::hash_map;
46 use std::io::Cursor;
47 use std::sync::{Mutex,MutexGuard,Arc};
48 use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
49 use std::time::{Instant,Duration};
50
51 /// We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
52 ///
53 /// Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
54 /// forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
55 /// the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
56 ///
57 /// When a Channel forwards an HTLC to its peer, it will give us back the PendingForwardHTLCInfo
58 /// which we will use to construct an outbound HTLC, with a relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData
59 /// filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use to either fail-backwards or fulfill
60 /// the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
61 /// Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
62 /// our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
63 mod channel_held_info {
64         use ln::msgs;
65         use ln::router::Route;
66         use secp256k1::key::SecretKey;
67         use secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
68
69         /// Stores the info we will need to send when we want to forward an HTLC onwards
70         #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
71         pub struct PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
72                 pub(super) onion_packet: Option<msgs::OnionPacket>,
73                 pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: SharedSecret,
74                 pub(super) payment_hash: [u8; 32],
75                 pub(super) short_channel_id: u64,
76                 pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
77                 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
78         }
79
80         #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
81         pub enum HTLCFailureMsg {
82                 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
83                 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
84         }
85
86         /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
87         #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
88         pub enum PendingHTLCStatus {
89                 Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo),
90                 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
91         }
92
93         /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
94         #[derive(Clone)]
95         pub struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
96                 pub(super) short_channel_id: u64,
97                 pub(super) htlc_id: u64,
98                 pub(super) incoming_packet_shared_secret: SharedSecret,
99         }
100
101         /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
102         #[derive(Clone)]
103         pub enum HTLCSource {
104                 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
105                 OutboundRoute {
106                         route: Route,
107                         session_priv: SecretKey,
108                 },
109         }
110         #[cfg(test)]
111         impl HTLCSource {
112                 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
113                         HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
114                                 route: Route { hops: Vec::new() },
115                                 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&::secp256k1::Secp256k1::without_caps(), &[1; 32]).unwrap(),
116                         }
117                 }
118         }
119
120         #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
121         pub(crate) enum HTLCFailReason {
122                 ErrorPacket {
123                         err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
124                 },
125                 Reason {
126                         failure_code: u16,
127                         data: Vec<u8>,
128                 }
129         }
130 }
131 pub(super) use self::channel_held_info::*;
132
133 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
134         err: msgs::HandleError,
135         needs_channel_force_close: bool,
136 }
137 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
138         #[inline]
139         fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: &'static str, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
140                 Self {
141                         err: HandleError {
142                                 err,
143                                 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
144                                         msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
145                                                 channel_id,
146                                                 data: err.to_string()
147                                         },
148                                 }),
149                         },
150                         needs_channel_force_close: false,
151                 }
152         }
153         #[inline]
154         fn send_err_msg_close_chan(err: &'static str, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
155                 Self {
156                         err: HandleError {
157                                 err,
158                                 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
159                                         msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
160                                                 channel_id,
161                                                 data: err.to_string()
162                                         },
163                                 }),
164                         },
165                         needs_channel_force_close: true,
166                 }
167         }
168         #[inline]
169         fn from_maybe_close(err: msgs::HandleError) -> Self {
170                 Self { err, needs_channel_force_close: true }
171         }
172         #[inline]
173         fn from_no_close(err: msgs::HandleError) -> Self {
174                 Self { err, needs_channel_force_close: false }
175         }
176         #[inline]
177         fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
178                 Self {
179                         err: match err {
180                                 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => HandleError {
181                                         err: msg,
182                                         action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError),
183                                 },
184                                 ChannelError::Close(msg) => HandleError {
185                                         err: msg,
186                                         action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
187                                                 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
188                                                         channel_id,
189                                                         data: msg.to_string()
190                                                 },
191                                         }),
192                                 },
193                         },
194                         needs_channel_force_close: false,
195                 }
196         }
197         #[inline]
198         fn from_chan_maybe_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
199                 Self {
200                         err: match err {
201                                 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => HandleError {
202                                         err: msg,
203                                         action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError),
204                                 },
205                                 ChannelError::Close(msg) => HandleError {
206                                         err: msg,
207                                         action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
208                                                 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
209                                                         channel_id,
210                                                         data: msg.to_string()
211                                                 },
212                                         }),
213                                 },
214                         },
215                         needs_channel_force_close: true,
216                 }
217         }
218 }
219
220 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval in the range (this, 5*this). This
221 /// provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like 1 second
222 /// to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly. We could
223 /// probably increase this significantly.
224 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u32 = 50;
225
226 struct HTLCForwardInfo {
227         prev_short_channel_id: u64,
228         prev_htlc_id: u64,
229         forward_info: PendingForwardHTLCInfo,
230 }
231
232 struct ChannelHolder {
233         by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel>,
234         short_to_id: HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
235         next_forward: Instant,
236         /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
237         /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
238         /// guarantees are made about there existing a channel with the short id here, nor the short
239         /// ids in the PendingForwardHTLCInfo!
240         forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
241         /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
242         /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
243         /// go to read them!
244         claimable_htlcs: HashMap<[u8; 32], Vec<HTLCPreviousHopData>>,
245 }
246 struct MutChannelHolder<'a> {
247         by_id: &'a mut HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel>,
248         short_to_id: &'a mut HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
249         next_forward: &'a mut Instant,
250         forward_htlcs: &'a mut HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
251         claimable_htlcs: &'a mut HashMap<[u8; 32], Vec<HTLCPreviousHopData>>,
252 }
253 impl ChannelHolder {
254         fn borrow_parts(&mut self) -> MutChannelHolder {
255                 MutChannelHolder {
256                         by_id: &mut self.by_id,
257                         short_to_id: &mut self.short_to_id,
258                         next_forward: &mut self.next_forward,
259                         forward_htlcs: &mut self.forward_htlcs,
260                         claimable_htlcs: &mut self.claimable_htlcs,
261                 }
262         }
263 }
264
265 #[cfg(not(any(target_pointer_width = "32", target_pointer_width = "64")))]
266 const ERR: () = "You need at least 32 bit pointers (well, usize, but we'll assume they're the same) for ChannelManager::latest_block_height";
267
268 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
269 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
270 ///
271 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
272 /// to individual Channels.
273 pub struct ChannelManager {
274         genesis_hash: Sha256dHash,
275         fee_estimator: Arc<FeeEstimator>,
276         monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>,
277         chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>,
278         tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>,
279
280         announce_channels_publicly: bool,
281         fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
282         latest_block_height: AtomicUsize,
283         secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
284
285         channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder>,
286         our_network_key: SecretKey,
287
288         pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
289
290         logger: Arc<Logger>,
291 }
292
293 const CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6 * 24 * 2; //TODO?
294
295 macro_rules! secp_call {
296         ( $res: expr, $err: expr ) => {
297                 match $res {
298                         Ok(key) => key,
299                         Err(_) => return Err($err),
300                 }
301         };
302 }
303
304 struct OnionKeys {
305         #[cfg(test)]
306         shared_secret: SharedSecret,
307         #[cfg(test)]
308         blinding_factor: [u8; 32],
309         ephemeral_pubkey: PublicKey,
310         rho: [u8; 32],
311         mu: [u8; 32],
312 }
313
314 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
315 pub struct ChannelDetails {
316         /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
317         /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
318         /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
319         /// lifetime of the channel.
320         pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
321         /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
322         /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
323         pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
324         /// The node_id of our counterparty
325         pub remote_network_id: PublicKey,
326         /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
327         pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
328         /// The user_id passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
329         pub user_id: u64,
330 }
331
332 impl ChannelManager {
333         /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
334         ///
335         /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
336         /// ChannelMessageHandler.
337         ///
338         /// fee_proportional_millionths is an optional fee to charge any payments routed through us.
339         /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
340         ///
341         /// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= `MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS`!
342         pub fn new(our_network_key: SecretKey, fee_proportional_millionths: u32, announce_channels_publicly: bool, network: Network, feeest: Arc<FeeEstimator>, monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>, chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>, tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>, logger: Arc<Logger>) -> Result<Arc<ChannelManager>, secp256k1::Error> {
343                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
344
345                 let res = Arc::new(ChannelManager {
346                         genesis_hash: genesis_block(network).header.bitcoin_hash(),
347                         fee_estimator: feeest.clone(),
348                         monitor: monitor.clone(),
349                         chain_monitor,
350                         tx_broadcaster,
351
352                         announce_channels_publicly,
353                         fee_proportional_millionths,
354                         latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(0), //TODO: Get an init value (generally need to replay recent chain on chain_monitor registration)
355                         secp_ctx,
356
357                         channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
358                                 by_id: HashMap::new(),
359                                 short_to_id: HashMap::new(),
360                                 next_forward: Instant::now(),
361                                 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
362                                 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
363                         }),
364                         our_network_key,
365
366                         pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
367
368                         logger,
369                 });
370                 let weak_res = Arc::downgrade(&res);
371                 res.chain_monitor.register_listener(weak_res);
372                 Ok(res)
373         }
374
375         /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
376         ///
377         /// user_id will be provided back as user_channel_id in FundingGenerationReady and
378         /// FundingBroadcastSafe events to allow tracking of which events correspond with which
379         /// create_channel call. Note that user_channel_id defaults to 0 for inbound channels, so you
380         /// may wish to avoid using 0 for user_id here.
381         ///
382         /// If successful, will generate a SendOpenChannel event, so you should probably poll
383         /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
384         ///
385         /// Raises APIError::APIMisuseError when channel_value_satoshis > 2**24 or push_msat being greater than channel_value_satoshis * 1k
386         pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
387                 let chan_keys = if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
388                         ChannelKeys {
389                                 funding_key:               SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
390                                 revocation_base_key:       SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
391                                 payment_base_key:          SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
392                                 delayed_payment_base_key:  SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
393                                 htlc_base_key:             SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
394                                 channel_close_key:         SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
395                                 channel_monitor_claim_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
396                                 commitment_seed: [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0],
397                         }
398                 } else {
399                         let mut key_seed = [0u8; 32];
400                         rng::fill_bytes(&mut key_seed);
401                         match ChannelKeys::new_from_seed(&key_seed) {
402                                 Ok(key) => key,
403                                 Err(_) => panic!("RNG is busted!")
404                         }
405                 };
406
407                 let channel = Channel::new_outbound(&*self.fee_estimator, chan_keys, their_network_key, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, self.announce_channels_publicly, user_id, Arc::clone(&self.logger))?;
408                 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone(), &*self.fee_estimator);
409                 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
410                 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
411                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
412                                 if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
413                                         return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG" });
414                                 } else {
415                                         panic!("RNG is bad???");
416                                 }
417                         },
418                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
419                 }
420
421                 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
422                 events.push(events::Event::SendOpenChannel {
423                         node_id: their_network_key,
424                         msg: res,
425                 });
426                 Ok(())
427         }
428
429         /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
430         /// more information.
431         pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
432                 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
433                 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.by_id.len());
434                 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
435                         res.push(ChannelDetails {
436                                 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
437                                 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
438                                 remote_network_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
439                                 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
440                                 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
441                         });
442                 }
443                 res
444         }
445
446         /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
447         /// Router::get_route to ensure non-announced channels are used.
448         pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
449                 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
450                 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.by_id.len());
451                 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
452                         // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
453                         // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
454                         // really wanted anyway.
455                         if channel.is_live() {
456                                 res.push(ChannelDetails {
457                                         channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
458                                         short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
459                                         remote_network_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
460                                         channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
461                                         user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
462                                 });
463                         }
464                 }
465                 res
466         }
467
468         /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
469         /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
470         /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
471         ///
472         /// May generate a SendShutdown event on success, which should be relayed.
473         pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
474                 let (mut res, node_id, chan_option) = {
475                         let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
476                         let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
477                         match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
478                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
479                                         let res = chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown()?;
480                                         if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
481                                                 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
482                                                         channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
483                                                 }
484                                                 (res, chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id(), Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
485                                         } else { (res, chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id(), None) }
486                                 },
487                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel"})
488                         }
489                 };
490                 for htlc_source in res.1.drain(..) {
491                         // unknown_next_peer...I dunno who that is anymore....
492                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() });
493                 }
494                 let chan_update = if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
495                         if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
496                                 Some(update)
497                         } else { None }
498                 } else { None };
499
500                 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
501                 if let Some(update) = chan_update {
502                         events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
503                                 msg: update
504                         });
505                 }
506                 events.push(events::Event::SendShutdown {
507                         node_id,
508                         msg: res.0
509                 });
510
511                 Ok(())
512         }
513
514         #[inline]
515         fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<(HTLCSource, [u8; 32])>)) {
516                 let (local_txn, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
517                 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
518                         // unknown_next_peer...I dunno who that is anymore....
519                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() });
520                 }
521                 for tx in local_txn {
522                         self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
523                 }
524                 //TODO: We need to have a way where outbound HTLC claims can result in us claiming the
525                 //now-on-chain HTLC output for ourselves (and, thereafter, passing the HTLC backwards).
526                 //TODO: We need to handle monitoring of pending offered HTLCs which just hit the chain and
527                 //may be claimed, resulting in us claiming the inbound HTLCs (and back-failing after
528                 //timeouts are hit and our claims confirm).
529                 //TODO: In any case, we need to make sure we remove any pending htlc tracking (via
530                 //fail_backwards or claim_funds) eventually for all HTLCs that were in the channel
531         }
532
533         /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to
534         /// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel.
535         pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) {
536                 let mut chan = {
537                         let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
538                         let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
539                         if let Some(chan) = channel_state.by_id.remove(channel_id) {
540                                 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
541                                         channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
542                                 }
543                                 chan
544                         } else {
545                                 return;
546                         }
547                 };
548                 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown());
549                 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
550                 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
551                         events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
552                                 msg: update
553                         });
554                 }
555         }
556
557         /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
558         /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
559         pub fn force_close_all_channels(&self) {
560                 for chan in self.list_channels() {
561                         self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
562                 }
563         }
564
565         #[inline]
566         fn gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &SharedSecret) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
567                 ({
568                         let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x72, 0x68, 0x6f]); // rho
569                         hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
570                         let mut res = [0; 32];
571                         hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
572                         res
573                 },
574                 {
575                         let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x6d, 0x75]); // mu
576                         hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
577                         let mut res = [0; 32];
578                         hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
579                         res
580                 })
581         }
582
583         #[inline]
584         fn gen_um_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &SharedSecret) -> [u8; 32] {
585                 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x75, 0x6d]); // um
586                 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
587                 let mut res = [0; 32];
588                 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
589                 res
590         }
591
592         #[inline]
593         fn gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &SharedSecret) -> [u8; 32] {
594                 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x61, 0x6d, 0x6d, 0x61, 0x67]); // ammag
595                 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
596                 let mut res = [0; 32];
597                 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
598                 res
599         }
600
601         // can only fail if an intermediary hop has an invalid public key or session_priv is invalid
602         #[inline]
603         fn construct_onion_keys_callback<T: secp256k1::Signing, FType: FnMut(SharedSecret, [u8; 32], PublicKey, &RouteHop)> (secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, route: &Route, session_priv: &SecretKey, mut callback: FType) -> Result<(), secp256k1::Error> {
604                 let mut blinded_priv = session_priv.clone();
605                 let mut blinded_pub = PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &blinded_priv);
606
607                 for hop in route.hops.iter() {
608                         let shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(secp_ctx, &hop.pubkey, &blinded_priv);
609
610                         let mut sha = Sha256::new();
611                         sha.input(&blinded_pub.serialize()[..]);
612                         sha.input(&shared_secret[..]);
613                         let mut blinding_factor = [0u8; 32];
614                         sha.result(&mut blinding_factor);
615
616                         let ephemeral_pubkey = blinded_pub;
617
618                         blinded_priv.mul_assign(secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(secp_ctx, &blinding_factor)?)?;
619                         blinded_pub = PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &blinded_priv);
620
621                         callback(shared_secret, blinding_factor, ephemeral_pubkey, hop);
622                 }
623
624                 Ok(())
625         }
626
627         // can only fail if an intermediary hop has an invalid public key or session_priv is invalid
628         fn construct_onion_keys<T: secp256k1::Signing>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, route: &Route, session_priv: &SecretKey) -> Result<Vec<OnionKeys>, secp256k1::Error> {
629                 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(route.hops.len());
630
631                 Self::construct_onion_keys_callback(secp_ctx, route, session_priv, |shared_secret, _blinding_factor, ephemeral_pubkey, _| {
632                         let (rho, mu) = ChannelManager::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
633
634                         res.push(OnionKeys {
635                                 #[cfg(test)]
636                                 shared_secret,
637                                 #[cfg(test)]
638                                 blinding_factor: _blinding_factor,
639                                 ephemeral_pubkey,
640                                 rho,
641                                 mu,
642                         });
643                 })?;
644
645                 Ok(res)
646         }
647
648         /// returns the hop data, as well as the first-hop value_msat and CLTV value we should send.
649         fn build_onion_payloads(route: &Route, starting_htlc_offset: u32) -> Result<(Vec<msgs::OnionHopData>, u64, u32), APIError> {
650                 let mut cur_value_msat = 0u64;
651                 let mut cur_cltv = starting_htlc_offset;
652                 let mut last_short_channel_id = 0;
653                 let mut res: Vec<msgs::OnionHopData> = Vec::with_capacity(route.hops.len());
654                 internal_traits::test_no_dealloc::<msgs::OnionHopData>(None);
655                 unsafe { res.set_len(route.hops.len()); }
656
657                 for (idx, hop) in route.hops.iter().enumerate().rev() {
658                         // First hop gets special values so that it can check, on receipt, that everything is
659                         // exactly as it should be (and the next hop isn't trying to probe to find out if we're
660                         // the intended recipient).
661                         let value_msat = if cur_value_msat == 0 { hop.fee_msat } else { cur_value_msat };
662                         let cltv = if cur_cltv == starting_htlc_offset { hop.cltv_expiry_delta + starting_htlc_offset } else { cur_cltv };
663                         res[idx] = msgs::OnionHopData {
664                                 realm: 0,
665                                 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
666                                         short_channel_id: last_short_channel_id,
667                                         amt_to_forward: value_msat,
668                                         outgoing_cltv_value: cltv,
669                                 },
670                                 hmac: [0; 32],
671                         };
672                         cur_value_msat += hop.fee_msat;
673                         if cur_value_msat >= 21000000 * 100000000 * 1000 {
674                                 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Channel fees overflowed?!"});
675                         }
676                         cur_cltv += hop.cltv_expiry_delta as u32;
677                         if cur_cltv >= 500000000 {
678                                 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Channel CLTV overflowed?!"});
679                         }
680                         last_short_channel_id = hop.short_channel_id;
681                 }
682                 Ok((res, cur_value_msat, cur_cltv))
683         }
684
685         #[inline]
686         fn shift_arr_right(arr: &mut [u8; 20*65]) {
687                 unsafe {
688                         ptr::copy(arr[0..].as_ptr(), arr[65..].as_mut_ptr(), 19*65);
689                 }
690                 for i in 0..65 {
691                         arr[i] = 0;
692                 }
693         }
694
695         #[inline]
696         fn xor_bufs(dst: &mut[u8], src: &[u8]) {
697                 assert_eq!(dst.len(), src.len());
698
699                 for i in 0..dst.len() {
700                         dst[i] ^= src[i];
701                 }
702         }
703
704         const ZERO:[u8; 21*65] = [0; 21*65];
705         fn construct_onion_packet(mut payloads: Vec<msgs::OnionHopData>, onion_keys: Vec<OnionKeys>, associated_data: &[u8; 32]) -> msgs::OnionPacket {
706                 let mut buf = Vec::with_capacity(21*65);
707                 buf.resize(21*65, 0);
708
709                 let filler = {
710                         let iters = payloads.len() - 1;
711                         let end_len = iters * 65;
712                         let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(end_len);
713                         res.resize(end_len, 0);
714
715                         for (i, keys) in onion_keys.iter().enumerate() {
716                                 if i == payloads.len() - 1 { continue; }
717                                 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&keys.rho, &[0u8; 8]);
718                                 chacha.process(&ChannelManager::ZERO, &mut buf); // We don't have a seek function :(
719                                 ChannelManager::xor_bufs(&mut res[0..(i + 1)*65], &buf[(20 - i)*65..21*65]);
720                         }
721                         res
722                 };
723
724                 let mut packet_data = [0; 20*65];
725                 let mut hmac_res = [0; 32];
726
727                 for (i, (payload, keys)) in payloads.iter_mut().zip(onion_keys.iter()).rev().enumerate() {
728                         ChannelManager::shift_arr_right(&mut packet_data);
729                         payload.hmac = hmac_res;
730                         packet_data[0..65].copy_from_slice(&payload.encode()[..]);
731
732                         let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&keys.rho, &[0u8; 8]);
733                         chacha.process(&packet_data, &mut buf[0..20*65]);
734                         packet_data[..].copy_from_slice(&buf[0..20*65]);
735
736                         if i == 0 {
737                                 packet_data[20*65 - filler.len()..20*65].copy_from_slice(&filler[..]);
738                         }
739
740                         let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &keys.mu);
741                         hmac.input(&packet_data);
742                         hmac.input(&associated_data[..]);
743                         hmac.raw_result(&mut hmac_res);
744                 }
745
746                 msgs::OnionPacket{
747                         version: 0,
748                         public_key: Ok(onion_keys.first().unwrap().ephemeral_pubkey),
749                         hop_data: packet_data,
750                         hmac: hmac_res,
751                 }
752         }
753
754         /// Encrypts a failure packet. raw_packet can either be a
755         /// msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket.encode() result or a msgs::OnionErrorPacket.data element.
756         fn encrypt_failure_packet(shared_secret: &SharedSecret, raw_packet: &[u8]) -> msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
757                 let ammag = ChannelManager::gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
758
759                 let mut packet_crypted = Vec::with_capacity(raw_packet.len());
760                 packet_crypted.resize(raw_packet.len(), 0);
761                 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&ammag, &[0u8; 8]);
762                 chacha.process(&raw_packet, &mut packet_crypted[..]);
763                 msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
764                         data: packet_crypted,
765                 }
766         }
767
768         fn build_failure_packet(shared_secret: &SharedSecret, failure_type: u16, failure_data: &[u8]) -> msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket {
769                 assert!(failure_data.len() <= 256 - 2);
770
771                 let um = ChannelManager::gen_um_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
772
773                 let failuremsg = {
774                         let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(2 + failure_data.len());
775                         res.push(((failure_type >> 8) & 0xff) as u8);
776                         res.push(((failure_type >> 0) & 0xff) as u8);
777                         res.extend_from_slice(&failure_data[..]);
778                         res
779                 };
780                 let pad = {
781                         let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(256 - 2 - failure_data.len());
782                         res.resize(256 - 2 - failure_data.len(), 0);
783                         res
784                 };
785                 let mut packet = msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket {
786                         hmac: [0; 32],
787                         failuremsg: failuremsg,
788                         pad: pad,
789                 };
790
791                 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &um);
792                 hmac.input(&packet.encode()[32..]);
793                 hmac.raw_result(&mut packet.hmac);
794
795                 packet
796         }
797
798         #[inline]
799         fn build_first_hop_failure_packet(shared_secret: &SharedSecret, failure_type: u16, failure_data: &[u8]) -> msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
800                 let failure_packet = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(shared_secret, failure_type, failure_data);
801                 ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(shared_secret, &failure_packet.encode()[..])
802         }
803
804         fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>) {
805                 macro_rules! get_onion_hash {
806                         () => {
807                                 {
808                                         let mut sha = Sha256::new();
809                                         sha.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
810                                         let mut onion_hash = [0; 32];
811                                         sha.result(&mut onion_hash);
812                                         onion_hash
813                                 }
814                         }
815                 }
816
817                 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
818                         log_info!(self, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC with invalid ephemeral pubkey");
819                         return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
820                                 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
821                                 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
822                                 sha256_of_onion: get_onion_hash!(),
823                                 failure_code: 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6,
824                         })), self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
825                 }
826
827                 let shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(&self.secp_ctx, &msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key);
828                 let (rho, mu) = ChannelManager::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
829
830                 let mut channel_state = None;
831                 macro_rules! return_err {
832                         ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
833                                 {
834                                         log_info!(self, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
835                                         if channel_state.is_none() {
836                                                 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
837                                         }
838                                         return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
839                                                 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
840                                                 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
841                                                 reason: ChannelManager::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
842                                         })), channel_state.unwrap());
843                                 }
844                         }
845                 }
846
847                 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
848                         //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
849                         //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
850                         //the hash doesn't really serve any purpuse - in the case of hashing all data, the
851                         //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
852                         //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
853                         //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
854                         return_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4, &get_onion_hash!());
855                 }
856
857                 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &mu);
858                 hmac.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
859                 hmac.input(&msg.payment_hash);
860                 if hmac.result() != MacResult::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac) {
861                         return_err!("HMAC Check failed", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 5, &get_onion_hash!());
862                 }
863
864                 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&rho, &[0u8; 8]);
865                 let next_hop_data = {
866                         let mut decoded = [0; 65];
867                         chacha.process(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[0..65], &mut decoded);
868                         match msgs::OnionHopData::read(&mut Cursor::new(&decoded[..])) {
869                                 Err(err) => {
870                                         let error_code = match err {
871                                                 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownVersion => 0x4000 | 1, // unknown realm byte
872                                                 _ => 0x2000 | 2, // Should never happen
873                                         };
874                                         return_err!("Unable to decode our hop data", error_code, &[0;0]);
875                                 },
876                                 Ok(msg) => msg
877                         }
878                 };
879
880                 //TODO: Check that msg.cltv_expiry is within acceptable bounds!
881
882                 let pending_forward_info = if next_hop_data.hmac == [0; 32] {
883                                 // OUR PAYMENT!
884                                 if next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward != msg.amount_msat {
885                                         return_err!("Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment", 19, &byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
886                                 }
887                                 if next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value != msg.cltv_expiry {
888                                         return_err!("Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value", 18, &byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
889                                 }
890
891                                 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
892                                 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
893                                 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
894                                 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
895
896                                 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
897                                         onion_packet: None,
898                                         payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
899                                         short_channel_id: 0,
900                                         incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret.clone(),
901                                         amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward,
902                                         outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value,
903                                 })
904                         } else {
905                                 let mut new_packet_data = [0; 20*65];
906                                 chacha.process(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[65..], &mut new_packet_data[0..19*65]);
907                                 chacha.process(&ChannelManager::ZERO[0..65], &mut new_packet_data[19*65..]);
908
909                                 let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
910
911                                 let blinding_factor = {
912                                         let mut sha = Sha256::new();
913                                         sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
914                                         sha.input(&shared_secret[..]);
915                                         let mut res = [0u8; 32];
916                                         sha.result(&mut res);
917                                         match SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &res) {
918                                                 Err(_) => {
919                                                         return_err!("Blinding factor is an invalid private key", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6, &get_onion_hash!());
920                                                 },
921                                                 Ok(key) => key
922                                         }
923                                 };
924
925                                 if let Err(_) = new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor) {
926                                         return_err!("New blinding factor is an invalid private key", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6, &get_onion_hash!());
927                                 }
928
929                                 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
930                                         version: 0,
931                                         public_key: Ok(new_pubkey),
932                                         hop_data: new_packet_data,
933                                         hmac: next_hop_data.hmac.clone(),
934                                 };
935
936                                 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
937                                         onion_packet: Some(outgoing_packet),
938                                         payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
939                                         short_channel_id: next_hop_data.data.short_channel_id,
940                                         incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret.clone(),
941                                         amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward,
942                                         outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value,
943                                 })
944                         };
945
946                 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
947                 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo { ref onion_packet, ref short_channel_id, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
948                         if onion_packet.is_some() { // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject them in the body here
949                                 let id_option = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
950                                 let forwarding_id = match id_option {
951                                         None => {
952                                                 return_err!("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, &[0;0]);
953                                         },
954                                         Some(id) => id.clone(),
955                                 };
956                                 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = {
957                                         let chan = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
958                                         if !chan.is_live() {
959                                                 Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 7, self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap()))
960                                         } else {
961                                                 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(self.fee_proportional_millionths as u64).and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&*self.fee_estimator) as u64) });
962                                                 if fee.is_none() || msg.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() || (msg.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < *amt_to_forward {
963                                                         Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap()))
964                                                 } else {
965                                                         if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 {
966                                                                 Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap()))
967                                                         } else {
968                                                                 None
969                                                         }
970                                                 }
971                                         }
972                                 } {
973                                         return_err!(err, code, &chan_update.encode_with_len()[..]);
974                                 }
975                         }
976                 }
977
978                 (pending_forward_info, channel_state.unwrap())
979         }
980
981         /// only fails if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id
982         fn get_channel_update(&self, chan: &Channel) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, HandleError> {
983                 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() {
984                         None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Channel not yet established", action: None}),
985                         Some(id) => id,
986                 };
987
988                 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_their_node_id().serialize()[..];
989
990                 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
991                         chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
992                         short_channel_id: short_channel_id,
993                         timestamp: chan.get_channel_update_count(),
994                         flags: (!were_node_one) as u16 | ((!chan.is_live() as u16) << 1),
995                         cltv_expiry_delta: CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA,
996                         htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_our_htlc_minimum_msat(),
997                         fee_base_msat: chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&*self.fee_estimator),
998                         fee_proportional_millionths: self.fee_proportional_millionths,
999                         excess_data: Vec::new(),
1000                 };
1001
1002                 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::from_data(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
1003                 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&Message::from_slice(&msg_hash[..]).unwrap(), &self.our_network_key); //TODO Can we unwrap here?
1004
1005                 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
1006                         signature: sig,
1007                         contents: unsigned
1008                 })
1009         }
1010
1011         /// Sends a payment along a given route.
1012         ///
1013         /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
1014         /// fields for more info.
1015         ///
1016         /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
1017         /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
1018         /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
1019         /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
1020         /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
1021         /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
1022         ///
1023         /// May generate a SendHTLCs event on success, which should be relayed.
1024         ///
1025         /// Raises APIError::RoutError when invalid route or forward parameter
1026         /// (cltv_delta, fee, node public key) is specified
1027         pub fn send_payment(&self, route: Route, payment_hash: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1028                 if route.hops.len() < 1 || route.hops.len() > 20 {
1029                         return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"});
1030                 }
1031                 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
1032                 for (idx, hop) in route.hops.iter().enumerate() {
1033                         if idx != route.hops.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
1034                                 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"});
1035                         }
1036                 }
1037
1038                 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &{
1039                         let mut session_key = [0; 32];
1040                         rng::fill_bytes(&mut session_key);
1041                         session_key
1042                 }).expect("RNG is bad!");
1043
1044                 let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
1045
1046                 let onion_keys = secp_call!(ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv),
1047                                 APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"});
1048                 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = ChannelManager::build_onion_payloads(&route, cur_height)?;
1049                 let onion_packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, &payment_hash);
1050
1051                 let (first_hop_node_id, (update_add, commitment_signed, chan_monitor)) = {
1052                         let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1053                         let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1054
1055                         let id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&route.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
1056                                 None => return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "No channel available with first hop!"}),
1057                                 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1058                         };
1059
1060                         let res = {
1061                                 let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&id).unwrap();
1062                                 if chan.get_their_node_id() != route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey {
1063                                         return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
1064                                 }
1065                                 if !chan.is_live() {
1066                                         return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected!"});
1067                                 }
1068                                 chan.send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
1069                                         route: route.clone(),
1070                                         session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
1071                                 }, onion_packet).map_err(|he| APIError::RouteError{err: he.err})?
1072                         };
1073
1074                         let first_hop_node_id = route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey;
1075
1076                         match res {
1077                                 Some(msgs) => (first_hop_node_id, msgs),
1078                                 None => return Ok(()),
1079                         }
1080                 };
1081
1082                 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1083                         unimplemented!();
1084                 }
1085
1086                 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1087                 events.push(events::Event::UpdateHTLCs {
1088                         node_id: first_hop_node_id,
1089                         updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1090                                 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
1091                                 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1092                                 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1093                                 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1094                                 update_fee: None,
1095                                 commitment_signed,
1096                         },
1097                 });
1098                 Ok(())
1099         }
1100
1101         /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
1102         ///
1103         /// Panics if a funding transaction has already been provided for this channel.
1104         ///
1105         /// May panic if the funding_txo is duplicative with some other channel (note that this should
1106         /// be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction keys per-channel).
1107         pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_txo: OutPoint) {
1108
1109                 macro_rules! add_pending_event {
1110                         ($event: expr) => {
1111                                 {
1112                                         let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1113                                         pending_events.push($event);
1114                                 }
1115                         }
1116                 }
1117
1118                 let (chan, msg, chan_monitor) = {
1119                         let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1120                         match channel_state.by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
1121                                 Some(mut chan) => {
1122                                         match chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_txo) {
1123                                                 Ok(funding_msg) => {
1124                                                         (chan, funding_msg.0, funding_msg.1)
1125                                                 },
1126                                                 Err(e) => {
1127                                                         log_error!(self, "Got bad signatures: {}!", e.err);
1128                                                         mem::drop(channel_state);
1129                                                         add_pending_event!(events::Event::HandleError {
1130                                                                 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1131                                                                 action: e.action,
1132                                                         });
1133                                                         return;
1134                                                 },
1135                                         }
1136                                 },
1137                                 None => return
1138                         }
1139                 }; // Release channel lock for install_watch_outpoint call,
1140                 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1141                         unimplemented!();
1142                 }
1143                 add_pending_event!(events::Event::SendFundingCreated {
1144                         node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1145                         msg: msg,
1146                 });
1147
1148                 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1149                 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
1150                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1151                                 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
1152                         },
1153                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1154                                 e.insert(chan);
1155                         }
1156                 }
1157         }
1158
1159         fn get_announcement_sigs(&self, chan: &Channel) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures> {
1160                 if !chan.should_announce() { return None }
1161
1162                 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = match chan.get_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
1163                         Ok(res) => res,
1164                         Err(_) => return None, // Only in case of state precondition violations eg channel is closing
1165                 };
1166                 let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
1167                 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
1168
1169                 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
1170                         channel_id: chan.channel_id(),
1171                         short_channel_id: chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
1172                         node_signature: our_node_sig,
1173                         bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
1174                 })
1175         }
1176
1177         /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
1178         ///
1179         /// Should only really ever be called in response to an PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
1180         /// Will likely generate further events.
1181         pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
1182                 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
1183                 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
1184                 {
1185                         let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1186                         let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1187
1188                         if cfg!(not(feature = "fuzztarget")) && Instant::now() < *channel_state.next_forward {
1189                                 return;
1190                         }
1191
1192                         for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
1193                                 if short_chan_id != 0 {
1194                                         let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) {
1195                                                 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1196                                                 None => {
1197                                                         failed_forwards.reserve(pending_forwards.len());
1198                                                         for HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1199                                                                 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1200                                                                         short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1201                                                                         htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1202                                                                         incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1203                                                                 });
1204                                                                 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash, 0x4000 | 10, None));
1205                                                         }
1206                                                         continue;
1207                                                 }
1208                                         };
1209                                         let forward_chan = &mut channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&forward_chan_id).unwrap();
1210
1211                                         let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
1212                                         for HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1213                                                 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1214                                                         short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1215                                                         htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1216                                                         incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1217                                                 });
1218                                                 match forward_chan.send_htlc(forward_info.amt_to_forward, forward_info.payment_hash, forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), forward_info.onion_packet.unwrap()) {
1219                                                         Err(_e) => {
1220                                                                 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(forward_chan).unwrap();
1221                                                                 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash, 0x1000 | 7, Some(chan_update)));
1222                                                                 continue;
1223                                                         },
1224                                                         Ok(update_add) => {
1225                                                                 match update_add {
1226                                                                         Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
1227                                                                         None => {
1228                                                                                 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
1229                                                                                 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
1230                                                                                 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
1231                                                                                 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
1232                                                                                 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
1233                                                                                 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
1234                                                                                 // this channel currently :/.
1235                                                                         }
1236                                                                 }
1237                                                         }
1238                                                 }
1239                                         }
1240
1241                                         if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
1242                                                 let (commitment_msg, monitor) = match forward_chan.send_commitment() {
1243                                                         Ok(res) => res,
1244                                                         Err(e) => {
1245                                                                 if let &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer{msg: Some(ref _err_msg)}) = &e.action {
1246                                                                 } else if let &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{msg: ref _err_msg}) = &e.action {
1247                                                                 } else {
1248                                                                         panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
1249                                                                 }
1250                                                                 //TODO: Handle...this is bad!
1251                                                                 continue;
1252                                                         },
1253                                                 };
1254                                                 new_events.push((Some(monitor), events::Event::UpdateHTLCs {
1255                                                         node_id: forward_chan.get_their_node_id(),
1256                                                         updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1257                                                                 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
1258                                                                 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1259                                                                 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1260                                                                 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1261                                                                 update_fee: None,
1262                                                                 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
1263                                                         },
1264                                                 }));
1265                                         }
1266                                 } else {
1267                                         for HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1268                                                 let prev_hop_data = HTLCPreviousHopData {
1269                                                         short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1270                                                         htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1271                                                         incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1272                                                 };
1273                                                 match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(forward_info.payment_hash) {
1274                                                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => entry.get_mut().push(prev_hop_data),
1275                                                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(vec![prev_hop_data]); },
1276                                                 };
1277                                                 new_events.push((None, events::Event::PaymentReceived {
1278                                                         payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
1279                                                         amt: forward_info.amt_to_forward,
1280                                                 }));
1281                                         }
1282                                 }
1283                         }
1284                 }
1285
1286                 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_code, update) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
1287                         match update {
1288                                 None => self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: Vec::new() }),
1289                                 Some(chan_update) => self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: chan_update.encode_with_len() }),
1290                         };
1291                 }
1292
1293                 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
1294
1295                 new_events.retain(|event| {
1296                         if let &Some(ref monitor) = &event.0 {
1297                                 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor.clone()) {
1298                                         unimplemented!();// but def dont push the event...
1299                                 }
1300                         }
1301                         true
1302                 });
1303
1304                 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1305                 events.reserve(new_events.len());
1306                 for event in new_events.drain(..) {
1307                         events.push(event.1);
1308                 }
1309         }
1310
1311         /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown after a PaymentReceived event.
1312         pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &[u8; 32]) -> bool {
1313                 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1314                 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
1315                 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
1316                         for htlc_with_hash in sources.drain(..) {
1317                                 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
1318                                 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(), HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_with_hash), payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: Vec::new() });
1319                         }
1320                         true
1321                 } else { false }
1322         }
1323
1324         /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
1325         /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here.
1326         /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes
1327         /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may
1328         /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to
1329         /// still-available channels.
1330         fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &[u8; 32], onion_error: HTLCFailReason) {
1331                 match source {
1332                         HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
1333                                 mem::drop(channel_state);
1334
1335                                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1336                                 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
1337                                         payment_hash: payment_hash.clone()
1338                                 });
1339                         },
1340                         HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret }) => {
1341                                 let err_packet = match onion_error {
1342                                         HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
1343                                                 let packet = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
1344                                                 ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
1345                                         },
1346                                         HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err } => {
1347                                                 ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
1348                                         }
1349                                 };
1350
1351                                 let (node_id, fail_msgs) = {
1352                                         let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id) {
1353                                                 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1354                                                 None => return
1355                                         };
1356
1357                                         let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&chan_id).unwrap();
1358                                         match chan.get_update_fail_htlc_and_commit(htlc_id, err_packet) {
1359                                                 Ok(msg) => (chan.get_their_node_id(), msg),
1360                                                 Err(_e) => {
1361                                                         //TODO: Do something with e?
1362                                                         return;
1363                                                 },
1364                                         }
1365                                 };
1366
1367                                 match fail_msgs {
1368                                         Some((msg, commitment_msg, chan_monitor)) => {
1369                                                 mem::drop(channel_state);
1370
1371                                                 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1372                                                         unimplemented!();// but def dont push the event...
1373                                                 }
1374
1375                                                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1376                                                 pending_events.push(events::Event::UpdateHTLCs {
1377                                                         node_id,
1378                                                         updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1379                                                                 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1380                                                                 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1381                                                                 update_fail_htlcs: vec![msg],
1382                                                                 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1383                                                                 update_fee: None,
1384                                                                 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
1385                                                         },
1386                                                 });
1387                                         },
1388                                         None => {},
1389                                 }
1390                         },
1391                 }
1392         }
1393
1394         /// Provides a payment preimage in response to a PaymentReceived event, returning true and
1395         /// generating message events for the net layer to claim the payment, if possible. Thus, you
1396         /// should probably kick the net layer to go send messages if this returns true!
1397         ///
1398         /// May panic if called except in response to a PaymentReceived event.
1399         pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) -> bool {
1400                 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
1401                 sha.input(&payment_preimage);
1402                 let mut payment_hash = [0; 32];
1403                 sha.result(&mut payment_hash);
1404
1405                 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1406                 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash);
1407                 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
1408                         for htlc_with_hash in sources.drain(..) {
1409                                 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
1410                                 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(), HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_with_hash), payment_preimage);
1411                         }
1412                         true
1413                 } else { false }
1414         }
1415         fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) {
1416                 match source {
1417                         HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
1418                                 mem::drop(channel_state);
1419                                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1420                                 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentSent {
1421                                         payment_preimage
1422                                 });
1423                         },
1424                         HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, .. }) => {
1425                                 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
1426                                 let (node_id, fulfill_msgs) = {
1427                                         let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id) {
1428                                                 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1429                                                 None => {
1430                                                         // TODO: There is probably a channel manager somewhere that needs to
1431                                                         // learn the preimage as the channel already hit the chain and that's
1432                                                         // why its missing.
1433                                                         return
1434                                                 }
1435                                         };
1436
1437                                         let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&chan_id).unwrap();
1438                                         match chan.get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(htlc_id, payment_preimage) {
1439                                                 Ok(msg) => (chan.get_their_node_id(), msg),
1440                                                 Err(_e) => {
1441                                                         // TODO: There is probably a channel manager somewhere that needs to
1442                                                         // learn the preimage as the channel may be about to hit the chain.
1443                                                         //TODO: Do something with e?
1444                                                         return
1445                                                 },
1446                                         }
1447                                 };
1448
1449                                 mem::drop(channel_state);
1450                                 if let Some(chan_monitor) = fulfill_msgs.1 {
1451                                         if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1452                                                 unimplemented!();// but def dont push the event...
1453                                         }
1454                                 }
1455
1456                                 if let Some((msg, commitment_msg)) = fulfill_msgs.0 {
1457                                         let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1458                                         pending_events.push(events::Event::UpdateHTLCs {
1459                                                 node_id: node_id,
1460                                                 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1461                                                         update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1462                                                         update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
1463                                                         update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1464                                                         update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1465                                                         update_fee: None,
1466                                                         commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
1467                                                 }
1468                                         });
1469                                 }
1470                         },
1471                 }
1472         }
1473
1474         /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
1475         pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
1476                 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key)
1477         }
1478
1479         /// Used to restore channels to normal operation after a
1480         /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure was returned from a channel monitor update
1481         /// operation.
1482         pub fn test_restore_channel_monitor(&self) {
1483                 unimplemented!();
1484         }
1485
1486         fn internal_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<msgs::AcceptChannel, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1487                 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
1488                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash", msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
1489                 }
1490                 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1491                 if channel_state.by_id.contains_key(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
1492                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!", msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
1493                 }
1494
1495                 let chan_keys = if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
1496                         ChannelKeys {
1497                                 funding_key:               SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0]).unwrap(),
1498                                 revocation_base_key:       SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 2, 0]).unwrap(),
1499                                 payment_base_key:          SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 3, 0]).unwrap(),
1500                                 delayed_payment_base_key:  SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 4, 0]).unwrap(),
1501                                 htlc_base_key:             SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 5, 0]).unwrap(),
1502                                 channel_close_key:         SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 6, 0]).unwrap(),
1503                                 channel_monitor_claim_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 7, 0]).unwrap(),
1504                                 commitment_seed: [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0],
1505                         }
1506                 } else {
1507                         let mut key_seed = [0u8; 32];
1508                         rng::fill_bytes(&mut key_seed);
1509                         match ChannelKeys::new_from_seed(&key_seed) {
1510                                 Ok(key) => key,
1511                                 Err(_) => panic!("RNG is busted!")
1512                         }
1513                 };
1514
1515                 let channel = Channel::new_from_req(&*self.fee_estimator, chan_keys, their_node_id.clone(), msg, 0, false, self.announce_channels_publicly, Arc::clone(&self.logger))
1516                         .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id))?;
1517                 let accept_msg = channel.get_accept_channel();
1518                 channel_state.by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
1519                 Ok(accept_msg)
1520         }
1521
1522         fn internal_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1523                 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
1524                         let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1525                         match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
1526                                 Some(chan) => {
1527                                         if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1528                                                 //TODO: see issue #153, need a consistent behavior on obnoxious behavior from random node
1529                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.temporary_channel_id));
1530                                         }
1531                                         chan.accept_channel(&msg)
1532                                                 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id))?;
1533                                         (chan.get_value_satoshis(), chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get_user_id())
1534                                 },
1535                                 //TODO: same as above
1536                                 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.temporary_channel_id))
1537                         }
1538                 };
1539                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1540                 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
1541                         temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
1542                         channel_value_satoshis: value,
1543                         output_script: output_script,
1544                         user_channel_id: user_id,
1545                 });
1546                 Ok(())
1547         }
1548
1549         fn internal_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<msgs::FundingSigned, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1550                 let (chan, funding_msg, monitor_update) = {
1551                         let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1552                         match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
1553                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1554                                         if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1555                                                 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1556                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.temporary_channel_id));
1557                                         }
1558                                         match chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg) {
1559                                                 Ok((funding_msg, monitor_update)) => {
1560                                                         (chan.remove(), funding_msg, monitor_update)
1561                                                 },
1562                                                 Err(e) => {
1563                                                         return Err(e).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))
1564                                                 }
1565                                         }
1566                                 },
1567                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.temporary_channel_id))
1568                         }
1569                 }; // Release channel lock for install_watch_outpoint call,
1570                    // note that this means if the remote end is misbehaving and sends a message for the same
1571                    // channel back-to-back with funding_created, we'll end up thinking they sent a message
1572                    // for a bogus channel.
1573                 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor_update.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1574                         unimplemented!();
1575                 }
1576                 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1577                 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
1578                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1579                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id", funding_msg.channel_id))
1580                         },
1581                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1582                                 e.insert(chan);
1583                         }
1584                 }
1585                 Ok(funding_msg)
1586         }
1587
1588         fn internal_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1589                 let (funding_txo, user_id, monitor) = {
1590                         let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1591                         match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1592                                 Some(chan) => {
1593                                         if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1594                                                 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1595                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1596                                         }
1597                                         let chan_monitor = chan.funding_signed(&msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?;
1598                                         (chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan.get_user_id(), chan_monitor)
1599                                 },
1600                                 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1601                         }
1602                 };
1603                 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
1604                         unimplemented!();
1605                 }
1606                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1607                 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingBroadcastSafe {
1608                         funding_txo: funding_txo,
1609                         user_channel_id: user_id,
1610                 });
1611                 Ok(())
1612         }
1613
1614         fn internal_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1615                 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1616                 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1617                         Some(chan) => {
1618                                 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1619                                         //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1620                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1621                                 }
1622                                 chan.funding_locked(&msg)
1623                                         .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))?;
1624                                 return Ok(self.get_announcement_sigs(chan));
1625                         },
1626                         None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1627                 };
1628         }
1629
1630         fn internal_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1631                 let (mut res, chan_option) = {
1632                         let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1633                         let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1634
1635                         match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
1636                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1637                                         if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1638                                                 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1639                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1640                                         }
1641                                         let res = chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?;
1642                                         if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1643                                                 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1644                                                         channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1645                                                 }
1646                                                 (res, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
1647                                         } else { (res, None) }
1648                                 },
1649                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1650                         }
1651                 };
1652                 for htlc_source in res.2.drain(..) {
1653                         // unknown_next_peer...I dunno who that is anymore....
1654                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() });
1655                 }
1656                 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
1657                         if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1658                                 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1659                                 events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1660                                         msg: update
1661                                 });
1662                         }
1663                 }
1664                 Ok((res.0, res.1))
1665         }
1666
1667         fn internal_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1668                 let (res, chan_option) = {
1669                         let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1670                         let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1671                         match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
1672                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1673                                         if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1674                                                 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1675                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1676                                         }
1677                                         let res = chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?;
1678                                         if res.1.is_some() {
1679                                                 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
1680                                                 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
1681                                                 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
1682                                                 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
1683                                                 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
1684                                                 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1685                                                         channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1686                                                 }
1687                                                 (res, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
1688                                         } else { (res, None) }
1689                                 },
1690                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1691                         }
1692                 };
1693                 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = res.1 {
1694                         self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
1695                 }
1696                 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
1697                         if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1698                                 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1699                                 events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1700                                         msg: update
1701                                 });
1702                         }
1703                 }
1704                 Ok(res.0)
1705         }
1706
1707         fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1708                 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
1709                 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
1710                 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
1711                 //
1712                 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
1713                 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
1714                 //encrypted with the same key. Its not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
1715                 //but we should prevent it anyway.
1716
1717                 let (pending_forward_info, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
1718                 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1719
1720                 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1721                         Some(chan) => {
1722                                 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1723                                         //TODO: here MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1724                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1725                                 }
1726                                 if !chan.is_usable() {
1727                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(HandleError{err: "Channel not yet available for receiving HTLCs", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError)}));
1728                                 }
1729                                 chan.update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))
1730                         },
1731                         None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1732                 }
1733         }
1734
1735         fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1736                 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1737                 let htlc_source = match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1738                         Some(chan) => {
1739                                 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1740                                         //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1741                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1742                                 }
1743                                 chan.update_fulfill_htlc(&msg)
1744                                         .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))?.clone()
1745                         },
1746                         None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1747                 };
1748                 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_state, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone());
1749                 Ok(())
1750         }
1751
1752         fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<Option<msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate>, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1753                 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1754                 let htlc_source = match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1755                         Some(chan) => {
1756                                 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1757                                         //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1758                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1759                                 }
1760                                 chan.update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err: msg.reason.clone() })
1761                                         .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))
1762                         },
1763                         None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1764                 }?;
1765
1766                 match htlc_source {
1767                         &HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref route, ref session_priv, .. } => {
1768                                 // Handle packed channel/node updates for passing back for the route handler
1769                                 let mut packet_decrypted = msg.reason.data.clone();
1770                                 let mut res = None;
1771                                 Self::construct_onion_keys_callback(&self.secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv, |shared_secret, _, _, route_hop| {
1772                                         if res.is_some() { return; }
1773
1774                                         let ammag = ChannelManager::gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
1775
1776                                         let mut decryption_tmp = Vec::with_capacity(packet_decrypted.len());
1777                                         decryption_tmp.resize(packet_decrypted.len(), 0);
1778                                         let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&ammag, &[0u8; 8]);
1779                                         chacha.process(&packet_decrypted, &mut decryption_tmp[..]);
1780                                         packet_decrypted = decryption_tmp;
1781
1782                                         if let Ok(err_packet) = msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket::read(&mut Cursor::new(&packet_decrypted)) {
1783                                                 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() >= 2 {
1784                                                         let um = ChannelManager::gen_um_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
1785
1786                                                         let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &um);
1787                                                         hmac.input(&err_packet.encode()[32..]);
1788                                                         let mut calc_tag = [0u8; 32];
1789                                                         hmac.raw_result(&mut calc_tag);
1790                                                         if crypto::util::fixed_time_eq(&calc_tag, &err_packet.hmac) {
1791                                                                 const UNKNOWN_CHAN: u16 = 0x4000|10;
1792                                                                 const TEMP_CHAN_FAILURE: u16 = 0x4000|7;
1793                                                                 match byte_utils::slice_to_be16(&err_packet.failuremsg[0..2]) {
1794                                                                         TEMP_CHAN_FAILURE => {
1795                                                                                 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() >= 4 {
1796                                                                                         let update_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be16(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..4]) as usize;
1797                                                                                         if err_packet.failuremsg.len() >= 4 + update_len {
1798                                                                                                 if let Ok(chan_update) = msgs::ChannelUpdate::read(&mut Cursor::new(&err_packet.failuremsg[4..4 + update_len])) {
1799                                                                                                         res = Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage {
1800                                                                                                                 msg: chan_update,
1801                                                                                                         });
1802                                                                                                 }
1803                                                                                         }
1804                                                                                 }
1805                                                                         },
1806                                                                         UNKNOWN_CHAN => {
1807                                                                                 // No such next-hop. We know this came from the
1808                                                                                 // current node as the HMAC validated.
1809                                                                                 res = Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed {
1810                                                                                         short_channel_id: route_hop.short_channel_id
1811                                                                                 });
1812                                                                         },
1813                                                                         _ => {}, //TODO: Enumerate all of these!
1814                                                                 }
1815                                                         }
1816                                                 }
1817                                         }
1818                                 }).unwrap();
1819                                 Ok(res)
1820                         },
1821                         _ => { Ok(None) },
1822                 }
1823         }
1824
1825         fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1826                 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1827                 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1828                         Some(chan) => {
1829                                 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1830                                         //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1831                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1832                                 }
1833                                 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) != 0 {
1834                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_close_chan("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION set", msg.channel_id));
1835                                 }
1836                                 chan.update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() })
1837                                         .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))?;
1838                                 Ok(())
1839                         },
1840                         None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1841                 }
1842         }
1843
1844         fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(msgs::RevokeAndACK, Option<msgs::CommitmentSigned>), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1845                 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, chan_monitor) = {
1846                         let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1847                         match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1848                                 Some(chan) => {
1849                                         if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1850                                                 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1851                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1852                                         }
1853                                         chan.commitment_signed(&msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?
1854                                 },
1855                                 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1856                         }
1857                 };
1858                 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1859                         unimplemented!();
1860                 }
1861
1862                 Ok((revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed))
1863         }
1864
1865         fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1866                 let ((res, mut pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, chan_monitor), short_channel_id) = {
1867                         let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1868                         match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1869                                 Some(chan) => {
1870                                         if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1871                                                 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1872                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1873                                         }
1874                                         (chan.revoke_and_ack(&msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?, chan.get_short_channel_id().expect("RAA should only work on a short-id-available channel"))
1875                                 },
1876                                 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1877                         }
1878                 };
1879                 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1880                         unimplemented!();
1881                 }
1882                 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
1883                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
1884                 }
1885
1886                 let mut forward_event = None;
1887                 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
1888                         let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1889                         if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
1890                                 forward_event = Some(Instant::now() + Duration::from_millis(((rng::rand_f32() * 4.0 + 1.0) * MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS as f32) as u64));
1891                                 channel_state.next_forward = forward_event.unwrap();
1892                         }
1893                         for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1894                                 match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(forward_info.short_channel_id) {
1895                                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
1896                                                 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id: short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info });
1897                                         },
1898                                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1899                                                 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id: short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info }));
1900                                         }
1901                                 }
1902                         }
1903                 }
1904                 match forward_event {
1905                         Some(time) => {
1906                                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1907                                 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
1908                                         time_forwardable: time
1909                                 });
1910                         }
1911                         None => {},
1912                 }
1913
1914                 Ok(res)
1915         }
1916
1917         fn internal_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1918                 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1919                 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1920                         Some(chan) => {
1921                                 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1922                                         //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1923                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1924                                 }
1925                                 chan.update_fee(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))
1926                         },
1927                         None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1928                 }
1929         }
1930
1931         fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1932                 let (chan_announcement, chan_update) = {
1933                         let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1934                         match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1935                                 Some(chan) => {
1936                                         if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1937                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1938                                         }
1939                                         if !chan.is_usable() {
1940                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(HandleError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError)}));
1941                                         }
1942
1943                                         let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
1944                                         let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = chan.get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), self.genesis_hash.clone())
1945                                                 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))?;
1946
1947                                         let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_id;
1948                                         let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
1949                                         let bad_sig_action = MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_close_chan("Bad announcement_signatures node_signature", msg.channel_id);
1950                                         secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.node_id_2 } else { &announcement.node_id_1 }), bad_sig_action);
1951                                         secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.bitcoin_key_2 } else { &announcement.bitcoin_key_1 }), bad_sig_action);
1952
1953                                         let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
1954
1955                                         (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
1956                                                 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { msg.node_signature },
1957                                                 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.node_signature } else { our_node_sig },
1958                                                 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { msg.bitcoin_signature },
1959                                                 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.bitcoin_signature } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
1960                                                 contents: announcement,
1961                                         }, self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap()) // can only fail if we're not in a ready state
1962                                 },
1963                                 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1964                         }
1965                 };
1966                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1967                 pending_events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { msg: chan_announcement, update_msg: chan_update });
1968                 Ok(())
1969         }
1970
1971         fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>, Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1972                 let (res, chan_monitor) = {
1973                         let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1974                         match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1975                                 Some(chan) => {
1976                                         if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1977                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1978                                         }
1979                                         let (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, channel_monitor) = chan.channel_reestablish(msg)
1980                                                 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))?;
1981                                         (Ok((funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update)), channel_monitor)
1982                                 },
1983                                 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1984                         }
1985                 };
1986                 if let Some(monitor) = chan_monitor {
1987                         if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
1988                                 unimplemented!();
1989                         }
1990                 }
1991                 res
1992         }
1993
1994         /// Begin Update fee process. Allowed only on an outbound channel.
1995         /// If successful, will generate a UpdateHTLCs event, so you should probably poll
1996         /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
1997         /// Note: This API is likely to change!
1998         #[doc(hidden)]
1999         pub fn update_fee(&self, channel_id: [u8;32], feerate_per_kw: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2000                 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2001                 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
2002                         None => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel"}),
2003                         Some(chan) => {
2004                                 if !chan.is_usable() {
2005                                         return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Channel is not in usuable state"});
2006                                 }
2007                                 if !chan.is_outbound() {
2008                                         return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "update_fee cannot be sent for an inbound channel"});
2009                                 }
2010                                 if let Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, chan_monitor)) = chan.send_update_fee_and_commit(feerate_per_kw).map_err(|e| APIError::APIMisuseError{err: e.err})? {
2011                                         if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
2012                                                 unimplemented!();
2013                                         }
2014                                         let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2015                                         pending_events.push(events::Event::UpdateHTLCs {
2016                                                 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
2017                                                 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2018                                                         update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2019                                                         update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2020                                                         update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2021                                                         update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2022                                                         update_fee: Some(update_fee),
2023                                                         commitment_signed,
2024                                                 },
2025                                         });
2026                                 }
2027                         },
2028                 }
2029                 Ok(())
2030         }
2031 }
2032
2033 impl events::EventsProvider for ChannelManager {
2034         fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
2035                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2036                 let mut ret = Vec::new();
2037                 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut *pending_events);
2038                 ret
2039         }
2040 }
2041
2042 impl ChainListener for ChannelManager {
2043         fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) {
2044                 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
2045                 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2046                 {
2047                         let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2048                         let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2049                         let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
2050                         channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
2051                                 let chan_res = channel.block_connected(header, height, txn_matched, indexes_of_txn_matched);
2052                                 if let Ok(Some(funding_locked)) = chan_res {
2053                                         let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel);
2054                                         new_events.push(events::Event::SendFundingLocked {
2055                                                 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2056                                                 msg: funding_locked,
2057                                                 announcement_sigs: announcement_sigs
2058                                         });
2059                                         short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
2060                                 } else if let Err(e) = chan_res {
2061                                         new_events.push(events::Event::HandleError {
2062                                                 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2063                                                 action: e.action,
2064                                         });
2065                                         if channel.is_shutdown() {
2066                                                 return false;
2067                                         }
2068                                 }
2069                                 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
2070                                         for tx in txn_matched {
2071                                                 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
2072                                                         if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
2073                                                                 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
2074                                                                         short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2075                                                                 }
2076                                                                 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain. We go ahead and
2077                                                                 // broadcast our latest local state as well here, just in case its
2078                                                                 // some kind of SPV attack, though we expect these to be dropped.
2079                                                                 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown());
2080                                                                 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
2081                                                                         new_events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2082                                                                                 msg: update
2083                                                                         });
2084                                                                 }
2085                                                                 return false;
2086                                                         }
2087                                                 }
2088                                         }
2089                                 }
2090                                 if channel.is_funding_initiated() && channel.channel_monitor().would_broadcast_at_height(height) {
2091                                         if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
2092                                                 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2093                                         }
2094                                         failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown());
2095                                         // If would_broadcast_at_height() is true, the channel_monitor will broadcast
2096                                         // the latest local tx for us, so we should skip that here (it doesn't really
2097                                         // hurt anything, but does make tests a bit simpler).
2098                                         failed_channels.last_mut().unwrap().0 = Vec::new();
2099                                         if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
2100                                                 new_events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2101                                                         msg: update
2102                                                 });
2103                                         }
2104                                         return false;
2105                                 }
2106                                 true
2107                         });
2108                 }
2109                 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2110                         self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2111                 }
2112                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2113                 for funding_locked in new_events.drain(..) {
2114                         pending_events.push(funding_locked);
2115                 }
2116                 self.latest_block_height.store(height as usize, Ordering::Release);
2117         }
2118
2119         /// We force-close the channel without letting our counterparty participate in the shutdown
2120         fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader) {
2121                 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
2122                 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2123                 {
2124                         let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2125                         let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2126                         let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
2127                         channel_state.by_id.retain(|_,  v| {
2128                                 if v.block_disconnected(header) {
2129                                         if let Some(short_id) = v.get_short_channel_id() {
2130                                                 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2131                                         }
2132                                         failed_channels.push(v.force_shutdown());
2133                                         if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&v) {
2134                                                 new_events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2135                                                         msg: update
2136                                                 });
2137                                         }
2138                                         false
2139                                 } else {
2140                                         true
2141                                 }
2142                         });
2143                 }
2144                 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2145                         self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2146                 }
2147                 if !new_events.is_empty() {
2148                         let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2149                         for funding_locked in new_events.drain(..) {
2150                                 pending_events.push(funding_locked);
2151                         }
2152                 }
2153                 self.latest_block_height.fetch_sub(1, Ordering::AcqRel);
2154         }
2155 }
2156
2157 macro_rules! handle_error {
2158         ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $their_node_id: expr) => {
2159                 match $internal {
2160                         Ok(msg) => Ok(msg),
2161                         Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, needs_channel_force_close }) => {
2162                                 if needs_channel_force_close {
2163                                         match &err.action {
2164                                                 &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg: Some(ref msg) }) => {
2165                                                         if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
2166                                                                 $self.peer_disconnected(&$their_node_id, true);
2167                                                         } else {
2168                                                                 $self.force_close_channel(&msg.channel_id);
2169                                                         }
2170                                                 },
2171                                                 &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg: None }) => {},
2172                                                 &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) => {},
2173                                                 &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }) => {
2174                                                         if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
2175                                                                 $self.peer_disconnected(&$their_node_id, true);
2176                                                         } else {
2177                                                                 $self.force_close_channel(&msg.channel_id);
2178                                                         }
2179                                                 },
2180                                                 &None => {},
2181                                         }
2182                                 }
2183                                 Err(err)
2184                         },
2185                 }
2186         }
2187 }
2188
2189 impl ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager {
2190         //TODO: Handle errors and close channel (or so)
2191         fn handle_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<msgs::AcceptChannel, HandleError> {
2192                 handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2193         }
2194
2195         fn handle_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2196                 handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2197         }
2198
2199         fn handle_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<msgs::FundingSigned, HandleError> {
2200                 handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2201         }
2202
2203         fn handle_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2204                 handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2205         }
2206
2207         fn handle_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, HandleError> {
2208                 handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_locked(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2209         }
2210
2211         fn handle_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>), HandleError> {
2212                 handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2213         }
2214
2215         fn handle_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, HandleError> {
2216                 handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2217         }
2218
2219         fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), msgs::HandleError> {
2220                 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2221         }
2222
2223         fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2224                 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2225         }
2226
2227         fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<Option<msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate>, HandleError> {
2228                 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2229         }
2230
2231         fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2232                 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2233         }
2234
2235         fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(msgs::RevokeAndACK, Option<msgs::CommitmentSigned>), HandleError> {
2236                 handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2237         }
2238
2239         fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, HandleError> {
2240                 handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2241         }
2242
2243         fn handle_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2244                 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2245         }
2246
2247         fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2248                 handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2249         }
2250
2251         fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>, Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>), HandleError> {
2252                 handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2253         }
2254
2255         fn peer_disconnected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
2256                 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
2257                 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2258                 let mut failed_payments = Vec::new();
2259                 {
2260                         let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2261                         let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2262                         let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
2263                         if no_connection_possible {
2264                                 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2265                                         if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2266                                                 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
2267                                                         short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2268                                                 }
2269                                                 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown());
2270                                                 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2271                                                         new_events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2272                                                                 msg: update
2273                                                         });
2274                                                 }
2275                                                 false
2276                                         } else {
2277                                                 true
2278                                         }
2279                                 });
2280                         } else {
2281                                 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2282                                         if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2283                                                 //TODO: mark channel disabled (and maybe announce such after a timeout).
2284                                                 let failed_adds = chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused();
2285                                                 if !failed_adds.is_empty() {
2286                                                         let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(&chan).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe
2287                                                         failed_payments.push((chan_update, failed_adds));
2288                                                 }
2289                                                 if chan.is_shutdown() {
2290                                                         if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
2291                                                                 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2292                                                         }
2293                                                         return false;
2294                                                 }
2295                                         }
2296                                         true
2297                                 })
2298                         }
2299                 }
2300                 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2301                         self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2302                 }
2303                 if !new_events.is_empty() {
2304                         let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2305                         for event in new_events.drain(..) {
2306                                 pending_events.push(event);
2307                         }
2308                 }
2309                 for (chan_update, mut htlc_sources) in failed_payments {
2310                         for (htlc_source, payment_hash) in htlc_sources.drain(..) {
2311                                 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.clone() });
2312                         }
2313                 }
2314         }
2315
2316         fn peer_connected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Vec<msgs::ChannelReestablish> {
2317                 let mut res = Vec::new();
2318                 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2319                 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2320                         if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2321                                 if !chan.have_received_message() {
2322                                         // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
2323                                         // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
2324                                         // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
2325                                         // drop it.
2326                                         false
2327                                 } else {
2328                                         res.push(chan.get_channel_reestablish());
2329                                         true
2330                                 }
2331                         } else { true }
2332                 });
2333                 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
2334                 res
2335         }
2336
2337         fn handle_error(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
2338                 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
2339                         for chan in self.list_channels() {
2340                                 if chan.remote_network_id == *their_node_id {
2341                                         self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
2342                                 }
2343                         }
2344                 } else {
2345                         self.force_close_channel(&msg.channel_id);
2346                 }
2347         }
2348 }
2349
2350 #[cfg(test)]
2351 mod tests {
2352         use chain::chaininterface;
2353         use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
2354         use chain::chaininterface::ChainListener;
2355         use ln::channelmanager::{ChannelManager,OnionKeys};
2356         use ln::router::{Route, RouteHop, Router};
2357         use ln::msgs;
2358         use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler,RoutingMessageHandler};
2359         use util::test_utils;
2360         use util::events::{Event, EventsProvider};
2361         use util::errors::APIError;
2362         use util::logger::Logger;
2363         use util::ser::Writeable;
2364
2365         use bitcoin::util::hash::Sha256dHash;
2366         use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
2367         use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
2368         use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
2369         use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
2370         use bitcoin::network::serialize::serialize;
2371         use bitcoin::network::serialize::BitcoinHash;
2372
2373         use hex;
2374
2375         use secp256k1::{Secp256k1, Message};
2376         use secp256k1::key::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
2377
2378         use crypto::sha2::Sha256;
2379         use crypto::digest::Digest;
2380
2381         use rand::{thread_rng,Rng};
2382
2383         use std::cell::RefCell;
2384         use std::collections::{BTreeSet, HashMap};
2385         use std::default::Default;
2386         use std::rc::Rc;
2387         use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
2388         use std::time::Instant;
2389         use std::mem;
2390
2391         fn build_test_onion_keys() -> Vec<OnionKeys> {
2392                 // Keys from BOLT 4, used in both test vector tests
2393                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2394
2395                 let route = Route {
2396                         hops: vec!(
2397                                         RouteHop {
2398                                                 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("02eec7245d6b7d2ccb30380bfbe2a3648cd7a942653f5aa340edcea1f283686619").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
2399                                                 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
2400                                         },
2401                                         RouteHop {
2402                                                 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("0324653eac434488002cc06bbfb7f10fe18991e35f9fe4302dbea6d2353dc0ab1c").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
2403                                                 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
2404                                         },
2405                                         RouteHop {
2406                                                 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("027f31ebc5462c1fdce1b737ecff52d37d75dea43ce11c74d25aa297165faa2007").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
2407                                                 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
2408                                         },
2409                                         RouteHop {
2410                                                 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
2411                                                 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
2412                                         },
2413                                         RouteHop {
2414                                                 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("02edabbd16b41c8371b92ef2f04c1185b4f03b6dcd52ba9b78d9d7c89c8f221145").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
2415                                                 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
2416                                         },
2417                         ),
2418                 };
2419
2420                 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("4141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
2421
2422                 let onion_keys = ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
2423                 assert_eq!(onion_keys.len(), route.hops.len());
2424                 onion_keys
2425         }
2426
2427         #[test]
2428         fn onion_vectors() {
2429                 // Packet creation test vectors from BOLT 4
2430                 let onion_keys = build_test_onion_keys();
2431
2432                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("53eb63ea8a3fec3b3cd433b85cd62a4b145e1dda09391b348c4e1cd36a03ea66").unwrap()[..]);
2433                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("2ec2e5da605776054187180343287683aa6a51b4b1c04d6dd49c45d8cffb3c36").unwrap()[..]);
2434                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("02eec7245d6b7d2ccb30380bfbe2a3648cd7a942653f5aa340edcea1f283686619").unwrap()[..]);
2435                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].rho, hex::decode("ce496ec94def95aadd4bec15cdb41a740c9f2b62347c4917325fcc6fb0453986").unwrap()[..]);
2436                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].mu, hex::decode("b57061dc6d0a2b9f261ac410c8b26d64ac5506cbba30267a649c28c179400eba").unwrap()[..]);
2437
2438                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("a6519e98832a0b179f62123b3567c106db99ee37bef036e783263602f3488fae").unwrap()[..]);
2439                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("bf66c28bc22e598cfd574a1931a2bafbca09163df2261e6d0056b2610dab938f").unwrap()[..]);
2440                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("028f9438bfbf7feac2e108d677e3a82da596be706cc1cf342b75c7b7e22bf4e6e2").unwrap()[..]);
2441                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].rho, hex::decode("450ffcabc6449094918ebe13d4f03e433d20a3d28a768203337bc40b6e4b2c59").unwrap()[..]);
2442                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].mu, hex::decode("05ed2b4a3fb023c2ff5dd6ed4b9b6ea7383f5cfe9d59c11d121ec2c81ca2eea9").unwrap()[..]);
2443
2444                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("3a6b412548762f0dbccce5c7ae7bb8147d1caf9b5471c34120b30bc9c04891cc").unwrap()[..]);
2445                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("a1f2dadd184eb1627049673f18c6325814384facdee5bfd935d9cb031a1698a5").unwrap()[..]);
2446                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("03bfd8225241ea71cd0843db7709f4c222f62ff2d4516fd38b39914ab6b83e0da0").unwrap()[..]);
2447                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].rho, hex::decode("11bf5c4f960239cb37833936aa3d02cea82c0f39fd35f566109c41f9eac8deea").unwrap()[..]);
2448                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].mu, hex::decode("caafe2820fa00eb2eeb78695ae452eba38f5a53ed6d53518c5c6edf76f3f5b78").unwrap()[..]);
2449
2450                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("21e13c2d7cfe7e18836df50872466117a295783ab8aab0e7ecc8c725503ad02d").unwrap()[..]);
2451                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("7cfe0b699f35525029ae0fa437c69d0f20f7ed4e3916133f9cacbb13c82ff262").unwrap()[..]);
2452                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("031dde6926381289671300239ea8e57ffaf9bebd05b9a5b95beaf07af05cd43595").unwrap()[..]);
2453                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].rho, hex::decode("cbe784ab745c13ff5cffc2fbe3e84424aa0fd669b8ead4ee562901a4a4e89e9e").unwrap()[..]);
2454                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].mu, hex::decode("5052aa1b3d9f0655a0932e50d42f0c9ba0705142c25d225515c45f47c0036ee9").unwrap()[..]);
2455
2456                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("b5756b9b542727dbafc6765a49488b023a725d631af688fc031217e90770c328").unwrap()[..]);
2457                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("c96e00dddaf57e7edcd4fb5954be5b65b09f17cb6d20651b4e90315be5779205").unwrap()[..]);
2458                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("03a214ebd875aab6ddfd77f22c5e7311d7f77f17a169e599f157bbcdae8bf071f4").unwrap()[..]);
2459                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].rho, hex::decode("034e18b8cc718e8af6339106e706c52d8df89e2b1f7e9142d996acf88df8799b").unwrap()[..]);
2460                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].mu, hex::decode("8e45e5c61c2b24cb6382444db6698727afb063adecd72aada233d4bf273d975a").unwrap()[..]);
2461
2462                 // Test vectors below are flat-out wrong: they claim to set outgoing_cltv_value to non-0 :/
2463                 let payloads = vec!(
2464                         msgs::OnionHopData {
2465                                 realm: 0,
2466                                 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
2467                                         short_channel_id: 0,
2468                                         amt_to_forward: 0,
2469                                         outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
2470                                 },
2471                                 hmac: [0; 32],
2472                         },
2473                         msgs::OnionHopData {
2474                                 realm: 0,
2475                                 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
2476                                         short_channel_id: 0x0101010101010101,
2477                                         amt_to_forward: 0x0100000001,
2478                                         outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
2479                                 },
2480                                 hmac: [0; 32],
2481                         },
2482                         msgs::OnionHopData {
2483                                 realm: 0,
2484                                 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
2485                                         short_channel_id: 0x0202020202020202,
2486                                         amt_to_forward: 0x0200000002,
2487                                         outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
2488                                 },
2489                                 hmac: [0; 32],
2490                         },
2491                         msgs::OnionHopData {
2492                                 realm: 0,
2493                                 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
2494                                         short_channel_id: 0x0303030303030303,
2495                                         amt_to_forward: 0x0300000003,
2496                                         outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
2497                                 },
2498                                 hmac: [0; 32],
2499                         },
2500                         msgs::OnionHopData {
2501                                 realm: 0,
2502                                 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
2503                                         short_channel_id: 0x0404040404040404,
2504                                         amt_to_forward: 0x0400000004,
2505                                         outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
2506                                 },
2507                                 hmac: [0; 32],
2508                         },
2509                 );
2510
2511                 let packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(payloads, onion_keys, &[0x42; 32]);
2512                 // Just check the final packet encoding, as it includes all the per-hop vectors in it
2513                 // anyway...
2514                 assert_eq!(packet.encode(), hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2515         }
2516
2517         #[test]
2518         fn test_failure_packet_onion() {
2519                 // Returning Errors test vectors from BOLT 4
2520
2521                 let onion_keys = build_test_onion_keys();
2522                 let onion_error = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(&onion_keys[4].shared_secret, 0x2002, &[0; 0]);
2523                 assert_eq!(onion_error.encode(), hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2524
2525                 let onion_packet_1 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[4].shared_secret, &onion_error.encode()[..]);
2526                 assert_eq!(onion_packet_1.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2527
2528                 let onion_packet_2 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[3].shared_secret, &onion_packet_1.data[..]);
2529                 assert_eq!(onion_packet_2.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2530
2531                 let onion_packet_3 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[2].shared_secret, &onion_packet_2.data[..]);
2532                 assert_eq!(onion_packet_3.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2533
2534                 let onion_packet_4 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[1].shared_secret, &onion_packet_3.data[..]);
2535                 assert_eq!(onion_packet_4.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2536
2537                 let onion_packet_5 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[0].shared_secret, &onion_packet_4.data[..]);
2538                 assert_eq!(onion_packet_5.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2539         }
2540
2541         fn confirm_transaction(chain: &chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil, tx: &Transaction, chan_id: u32) {
2542                 assert!(chain.does_match_tx(tx));
2543                 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
2544                 chain.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[tx; 1], &[chan_id; 1]);
2545                 for i in 2..100 {
2546                         header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
2547                         chain.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &[tx; 0], &[0; 0]);
2548                 }
2549         }
2550
2551         struct Node {
2552                 chain_monitor: Arc<chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil>,
2553                 tx_broadcaster: Arc<test_utils::TestBroadcaster>,
2554                 chan_monitor: Arc<test_utils::TestChannelMonitor>,
2555                 node: Arc<ChannelManager>,
2556                 router: Router,
2557                 network_payment_count: Rc<RefCell<u8>>,
2558                 network_chan_count: Rc<RefCell<u32>>,
2559         }
2560         impl Drop for Node {
2561                 fn drop(&mut self) {
2562                         if !::std::thread::panicking() {
2563                                 // Check that we processed all pending events
2564                                 assert_eq!(self.node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
2565                                 assert_eq!(self.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
2566                         }
2567                 }
2568         }
2569
2570         fn create_chan_between_nodes(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node) -> (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
2571                 create_chan_between_nodes_with_value(node_a, node_b, 100000, 10001)
2572         }
2573
2574         fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, channel_value: u64, push_msat: u64) -> (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
2575                 let (funding_locked, channel_id, tx) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(node_a, node_b, channel_value, push_msat);
2576                 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(node_a, node_b, &funding_locked);
2577                 (announcement, as_update, bs_update, channel_id, tx)
2578         }
2579
2580         fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, channel_value: u64, push_msat: u64) -> Transaction {
2581                 node_a.node.create_channel(node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value, push_msat, 42).unwrap();
2582
2583                 let events_1 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2584                 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
2585                 let accept_chan = match events_1[0] {
2586                         Event::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
2587                                 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
2588                                 node_b.node.handle_open_channel(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), msg).unwrap()
2589                         },
2590                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2591                 };
2592
2593                 node_a.node.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_chan).unwrap();
2594
2595                 let chan_id = *node_a.network_chan_count.borrow();
2596                 let tx;
2597                 let funding_output;
2598
2599                 let events_2 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2600                 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
2601                 match events_2[0] {
2602                         Event::FundingGenerationReady { ref temporary_channel_id, ref channel_value_satoshis, ref output_script, user_channel_id } => {
2603                                 assert_eq!(*channel_value_satoshis, channel_value);
2604                                 assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
2605
2606                                 tx = Transaction { version: chan_id as u32, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
2607                                         value: *channel_value_satoshis, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
2608                                 }]};
2609                                 funding_output = OutPoint::new(Sha256dHash::from_data(&serialize(&tx).unwrap()[..]), 0);
2610
2611                                 node_a.node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, funding_output);
2612                                 let mut added_monitors = node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2613                                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2614                                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
2615                                 added_monitors.clear();
2616                         },
2617                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2618                 }
2619
2620                 let events_3 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2621                 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
2622                 let funding_signed = match events_3[0] {
2623                         Event::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
2624                                 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
2625                                 let res = node_b.node.handle_funding_created(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), msg).unwrap();
2626                                 let mut added_monitors = node_b.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2627                                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2628                                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
2629                                 added_monitors.clear();
2630                                 res
2631                         },
2632                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2633                 };
2634
2635                 node_a.node.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed).unwrap();
2636                 {
2637                         let mut added_monitors = node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2638                         assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2639                         assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
2640                         added_monitors.clear();
2641                 }
2642
2643                 let events_4 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2644                 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
2645                 match events_4[0] {
2646                         Event::FundingBroadcastSafe { ref funding_txo, user_channel_id } => {
2647                                 assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
2648                                 assert_eq!(*funding_txo, funding_output);
2649                         },
2650                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2651                 };
2652
2653                 tx
2654         }
2655
2656         fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, tx: &Transaction) -> ((msgs::FundingLocked, msgs::AnnouncementSignatures), [u8; 32]) {
2657                 confirm_transaction(&node_b.chain_monitor, &tx, tx.version);
2658                 let events_5 = node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2659                 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
2660                 match events_5[0] {
2661                         Event::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg, ref announcement_sigs } => {
2662                                 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
2663                                 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none());
2664                                 node_a.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), msg).unwrap()
2665                         },
2666                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2667                 };
2668
2669                 let channel_id;
2670
2671                 confirm_transaction(&node_a.chain_monitor, &tx, tx.version);
2672                 let events_6 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2673                 assert_eq!(events_6.len(), 1);
2674                 (match events_6[0] {
2675                         Event::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg, ref announcement_sigs } => {
2676                                 channel_id = msg.channel_id.clone();
2677                                 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
2678                                 (msg.clone(), announcement_sigs.clone().unwrap())
2679                         },
2680                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2681                 }, channel_id)
2682         }
2683
2684         fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, channel_value: u64, push_msat: u64) -> ((msgs::FundingLocked, msgs::AnnouncementSignatures), [u8; 32], Transaction) {
2685                 let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(node_a, node_b, channel_value, push_msat);
2686                 let (msgs, chan_id) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(node_a, node_b, &tx);
2687                 (msgs, chan_id, tx)
2688         }
2689
2690         fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, as_funding_msgs: &(msgs::FundingLocked, msgs::AnnouncementSignatures)) -> (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
2691                 let bs_announcement_sigs = {
2692                         let bs_announcement_sigs = node_b.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_funding_msgs.0).unwrap().unwrap();
2693                         node_b.node.handle_announcement_signatures(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_funding_msgs.1).unwrap();
2694                         bs_announcement_sigs
2695                 };
2696
2697                 let events_7 = node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2698                 assert_eq!(events_7.len(), 1);
2699                 let (announcement, bs_update) = match events_7[0] {
2700                         Event::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
2701                                 (msg, update_msg)
2702                         },
2703                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2704                 };
2705
2706                 node_a.node.handle_announcement_signatures(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_announcement_sigs).unwrap();
2707                 let events_8 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2708                 assert_eq!(events_8.len(), 1);
2709                 let as_update = match events_8[0] {
2710                         Event::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
2711                                 assert!(*announcement == *msg);
2712                                 update_msg
2713                         },
2714                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2715                 };
2716
2717                 *node_a.network_chan_count.borrow_mut() += 1;
2718
2719                 ((*announcement).clone(), (*as_update).clone(), (*bs_update).clone())
2720         }
2721
2722         fn create_announced_chan_between_nodes(nodes: &Vec<Node>, a: usize, b: usize) -> (msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
2723                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(nodes, a, b, 100000, 10001)
2724         }
2725
2726         fn create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(nodes: &Vec<Node>, a: usize, b: usize, channel_value: u64, push_msat: u64) -> (msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
2727                 let chan_announcement = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes[a], &nodes[b], channel_value, push_msat);
2728                 for node in nodes {
2729                         assert!(node.router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement.0).unwrap());
2730                         node.router.handle_channel_update(&chan_announcement.1).unwrap();
2731                         node.router.handle_channel_update(&chan_announcement.2).unwrap();
2732                 }
2733                 (chan_announcement.1, chan_announcement.2, chan_announcement.3, chan_announcement.4)
2734         }
2735
2736         macro_rules! check_spends {
2737                 ($tx: expr, $spends_tx: expr) => {
2738                         {
2739                                 let mut funding_tx_map = HashMap::new();
2740                                 let spends_tx = $spends_tx;
2741                                 funding_tx_map.insert(spends_tx.txid(), spends_tx);
2742                                 $tx.verify(&funding_tx_map).unwrap();
2743                         }
2744                 }
2745         }
2746
2747         fn close_channel(outbound_node: &Node, inbound_node: &Node, channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_tx: Transaction, close_inbound_first: bool) -> (msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
2748                 let (node_a, broadcaster_a) = if close_inbound_first { (&inbound_node.node, &inbound_node.tx_broadcaster) } else { (&outbound_node.node, &outbound_node.tx_broadcaster) };
2749                 let (node_b, broadcaster_b) = if close_inbound_first { (&outbound_node.node, &outbound_node.tx_broadcaster) } else { (&inbound_node.node, &inbound_node.tx_broadcaster) };
2750                 let (tx_a, tx_b);
2751
2752                 node_a.close_channel(channel_id).unwrap();
2753                 let events_1 = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2754                 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
2755                 let shutdown_a = match events_1[0] {
2756                         Event::SendShutdown { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
2757                                 assert_eq!(node_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id());
2758                                 msg.clone()
2759                         },
2760                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2761                 };
2762
2763                 let (shutdown_b, mut closing_signed_b) = node_b.handle_shutdown(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &shutdown_a).unwrap();
2764                 if !close_inbound_first {
2765                         assert!(closing_signed_b.is_none());
2766                 }
2767                 let (empty_a, mut closing_signed_a) = node_a.handle_shutdown(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &shutdown_b.unwrap()).unwrap();
2768                 assert!(empty_a.is_none());
2769                 if close_inbound_first {
2770                         assert!(closing_signed_a.is_none());
2771                         closing_signed_a = node_a.handle_closing_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_b.unwrap()).unwrap();
2772                         assert_eq!(broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
2773                         tx_a = broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
2774
2775                         let empty_b = node_b.handle_closing_signed(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_a.unwrap()).unwrap();
2776                         assert!(empty_b.is_none());
2777                         assert_eq!(broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
2778                         tx_b = broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
2779                 } else {
2780                         closing_signed_b = node_b.handle_closing_signed(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_a.unwrap()).unwrap();
2781                         assert_eq!(broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
2782                         tx_b = broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
2783
2784                         let empty_a2 = node_a.handle_closing_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_b.unwrap()).unwrap();
2785                         assert!(empty_a2.is_none());
2786                         assert_eq!(broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
2787                         tx_a = broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
2788                 }
2789                 assert_eq!(tx_a, tx_b);
2790                 check_spends!(tx_a, funding_tx);
2791
2792                 let events_2 = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2793                 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
2794                 let as_update = match events_2[0] {
2795                         Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2796                                 msg.clone()
2797                         },
2798                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2799                 };
2800
2801                 let events_3 = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2802                 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
2803                 let bs_update = match events_3[0] {
2804                         Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2805                                 msg.clone()
2806                         },
2807                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2808                 };
2809
2810                 (as_update, bs_update)
2811         }
2812
2813         struct SendEvent {
2814                 node_id: PublicKey,
2815                 msgs: Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>,
2816                 commitment_msg: msgs::CommitmentSigned,
2817         }
2818         impl SendEvent {
2819                 fn from_event(event: Event) -> SendEvent {
2820                         match event {
2821                                 Event::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs, update_fee, commitment_signed } } => {
2822                                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2823                                         assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2824                                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2825                                         assert!(update_fee.is_none());
2826                                         SendEvent { node_id: node_id, msgs: update_add_htlcs, commitment_msg: commitment_signed }
2827                                 },
2828                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event type!"),
2829                         }
2830                 }
2831         }
2832
2833         macro_rules! check_added_monitors {
2834                 ($node: expr, $count: expr) => {
2835                         {
2836                                 let mut added_monitors = $node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2837                                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), $count);
2838                                 added_monitors.clear();
2839                         }
2840                 }
2841         }
2842
2843         macro_rules! commitment_signed_dance {
2844                 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr, $commitment_signed: expr, $fail_backwards: expr) => {
2845                         {
2846                                 check_added_monitors!($node_a, 0);
2847                                 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = $node_a.node.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &$commitment_signed).unwrap();
2848                                 check_added_monitors!($node_a, 1);
2849                                 check_added_monitors!($node_b, 0);
2850                                 assert!($node_b.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().is_none());
2851                                 check_added_monitors!($node_b, 1);
2852                                 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_none) = $node_b.node.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed.unwrap()).unwrap();
2853                                 assert!(bs_none.is_none());
2854                                 check_added_monitors!($node_b, 1);
2855                                 if $fail_backwards {
2856                                         assert!($node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2857                                 }
2858                                 assert!($node_a.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().is_none());
2859                                 {
2860                                         let mut added_monitors = $node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2861                                         if $fail_backwards {
2862                                                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 2);
2863                                                 assert!(added_monitors[0].0 != added_monitors[1].0);
2864                                         } else {
2865                                                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2866                                         }
2867                                         added_monitors.clear();
2868                                 }
2869                         }
2870                 }
2871         }
2872
2873         macro_rules! get_payment_preimage_hash {
2874                 ($node: expr) => {
2875                         {
2876                                 let payment_preimage = [*$node.network_payment_count.borrow(); 32];
2877                                 *$node.network_payment_count.borrow_mut() += 1;
2878                                 let mut payment_hash = [0; 32];
2879                                 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
2880                                 sha.input(&payment_preimage[..]);
2881                                 sha.result(&mut payment_hash);
2882                                 (payment_preimage, payment_hash)
2883                         }
2884                 }
2885         }
2886
2887         fn send_along_route(origin_node: &Node, route: Route, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
2888                 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(origin_node);
2889
2890                 let mut payment_event = {
2891                         origin_node.node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
2892                         check_added_monitors!(origin_node, 1);
2893
2894                         let mut events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2895                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2896                         SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
2897                 };
2898                 let mut prev_node = origin_node;
2899
2900                 for (idx, &node) in expected_route.iter().enumerate() {
2901                         assert_eq!(node.node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
2902
2903                         node.node.handle_update_add_htlc(&prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
2904                         check_added_monitors!(node, 0);
2905                         commitment_signed_dance!(node, prev_node, payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
2906
2907                         let events_1 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2908                         assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
2909                         match events_1[0] {
2910                                 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
2911                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2912                         };
2913
2914                         node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
2915                         node.node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
2916
2917                         let mut events_2 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2918                         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
2919                         if idx == expected_route.len() - 1 {
2920                                 match events_2[0] {
2921                                         Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
2922                                                 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash);
2923                                                 assert_eq!(amt, recv_value);
2924                                         },
2925                                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2926                                 }
2927                         } else {
2928                                 check_added_monitors!(node, 1);
2929                                 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
2930                                 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
2931                         }
2932
2933                         prev_node = node;
2934                 }
2935
2936                 (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash)
2937         }
2938
2939         fn claim_payment_along_route(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], skip_last: bool, our_payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) {
2940                 assert!(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage));
2941                 check_added_monitors!(expected_route.last().unwrap(), 1);
2942
2943                 let mut next_msgs: Option<(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)> = None;
2944                 macro_rules! update_fulfill_dance {
2945                         ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $last_node: expr) => {
2946                                 {
2947                                         $node.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().0).unwrap();
2948                                         if $last_node {
2949                                                 check_added_monitors!($node, 0);
2950                                         } else {
2951                                                 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
2952                                         }
2953                                         commitment_signed_dance!($node, $prev_node, next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().1, false);
2954                                 }
2955                         }
2956                 }
2957
2958                 let mut expected_next_node = expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id();
2959                 let mut prev_node = expected_route.last().unwrap();
2960                 for (idx, node) in expected_route.iter().rev().enumerate() {
2961                         assert_eq!(expected_next_node, node.node.get_our_node_id());
2962                         if next_msgs.is_some() {
2963                                 update_fulfill_dance!(node, prev_node, false);
2964                         }
2965
2966                         let events = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2967                         if !skip_last || idx != expected_route.len() - 1 {
2968                                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2969                                 match events[0] {
2970                                         Event::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
2971                                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2972                                                 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
2973                                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2974                                                 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2975                                                 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
2976                                                 expected_next_node = node_id.clone();
2977                                                 next_msgs = Some((update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone()));
2978                                         },
2979                                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2980                                 }
2981                         } else {
2982                                 assert!(events.is_empty());
2983                         }
2984                         if !skip_last && idx == expected_route.len() - 1 {
2985                                 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, origin_node.node.get_our_node_id());
2986                         }
2987
2988                         prev_node = node;
2989                 }
2990
2991                 if !skip_last {
2992                         update_fulfill_dance!(origin_node, expected_route.first().unwrap(), true);
2993                         let events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2994                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2995                         match events[0] {
2996                                 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage } => {
2997                                         assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage);
2998                                 },
2999                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3000                         }
3001                 }
3002         }
3003
3004         fn claim_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], our_payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) {
3005                 claim_payment_along_route(origin_node, expected_route, false, our_payment_preimage);
3006         }
3007
3008         const TEST_FINAL_CLTV: u32 = 32;
3009
3010         fn route_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
3011                 let route = origin_node.router.get_route(&expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), recv_value, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
3012                 assert_eq!(route.hops.len(), expected_route.len());
3013                 for (node, hop) in expected_route.iter().zip(route.hops.iter()) {
3014                         assert_eq!(hop.pubkey, node.node.get_our_node_id());
3015                 }
3016
3017                 send_along_route(origin_node, route, expected_route, recv_value)
3018         }
3019
3020         fn route_over_limit(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) {
3021                 let route = origin_node.router.get_route(&expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), recv_value, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
3022                 assert_eq!(route.hops.len(), expected_route.len());
3023                 for (node, hop) in expected_route.iter().zip(route.hops.iter()) {
3024                         assert_eq!(hop.pubkey, node.node.get_our_node_id());
3025                 }
3026
3027                 let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(origin_node);
3028
3029                 let err = origin_node.node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap();
3030                 match err {
3031                         APIError::RouteError{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our max HTLC value in flight"),
3032                         _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
3033                 };
3034         }
3035
3036         fn send_payment(origin: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) {
3037                 let our_payment_preimage = route_payment(&origin, expected_route, recv_value).0;
3038                 claim_payment(&origin, expected_route, our_payment_preimage);
3039         }
3040
3041         fn fail_payment_along_route(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], skip_last: bool, our_payment_hash: [u8; 32]) {
3042                 assert!(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash));
3043                 check_added_monitors!(expected_route.last().unwrap(), 1);
3044
3045                 let mut next_msgs: Option<(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)> = None;
3046                 macro_rules! update_fail_dance {
3047                         ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $last_node: expr) => {
3048                                 {
3049                                         $node.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().0).unwrap();
3050                                         commitment_signed_dance!($node, $prev_node, next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().1, !$last_node);
3051                                 }
3052                         }
3053                 }
3054
3055                 let mut expected_next_node = expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id();
3056                 let mut prev_node = expected_route.last().unwrap();
3057                 for (idx, node) in expected_route.iter().rev().enumerate() {
3058                         assert_eq!(expected_next_node, node.node.get_our_node_id());
3059                         if next_msgs.is_some() {
3060                                 // We may be the "last node" for the purpose of the commitment dance if we're
3061                                 // skipping the last node (implying it is disconnected) and we're the
3062                                 // second-to-last node!
3063                                 update_fail_dance!(node, prev_node, skip_last && idx == expected_route.len() - 1);
3064                         }
3065
3066                         let events = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3067                         if !skip_last || idx != expected_route.len() - 1 {
3068                                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3069                                 match events[0] {
3070                                         Event::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
3071                                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3072                                                 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3073                                                 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3074                                                 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3075                                                 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
3076                                                 expected_next_node = node_id.clone();
3077                                                 next_msgs = Some((update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone()));
3078                                         },
3079                                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3080                                 }
3081                         } else {
3082                                 assert!(events.is_empty());
3083                         }
3084                         if !skip_last && idx == expected_route.len() - 1 {
3085                                 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, origin_node.node.get_our_node_id());
3086                         }
3087
3088                         prev_node = node;
3089                 }
3090
3091                 if !skip_last {
3092                         update_fail_dance!(origin_node, expected_route.first().unwrap(), true);
3093
3094                         let events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3095                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3096                         match events[0] {
3097                                 Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash } => {
3098                                         assert_eq!(payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
3099                                 },
3100                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3101                         }
3102                 }
3103         }
3104
3105         fn fail_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], our_payment_hash: [u8; 32]) {
3106                 fail_payment_along_route(origin_node, expected_route, false, our_payment_hash);
3107         }
3108
3109         fn create_network(node_count: usize) -> Vec<Node> {
3110                 let mut nodes = Vec::new();
3111                 let mut rng = thread_rng();
3112                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3113                 let logger: Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
3114
3115                 let chan_count = Rc::new(RefCell::new(0));
3116                 let payment_count = Rc::new(RefCell::new(0));
3117
3118                 for _ in 0..node_count {
3119                         let feeest = Arc::new(test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 });
3120                         let chain_monitor = Arc::new(chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil::new(Network::Testnet, Arc::clone(&logger)));
3121                         let tx_broadcaster = Arc::new(test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new())});
3122                         let chan_monitor = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChannelMonitor::new(chain_monitor.clone(), tx_broadcaster.clone()));
3123                         let node_id = {
3124                                 let mut key_slice = [0; 32];
3125                                 rng.fill_bytes(&mut key_slice);
3126                                 SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &key_slice).unwrap()
3127                         };
3128                         let node = ChannelManager::new(node_id.clone(), 0, true, Network::Testnet, feeest.clone(), chan_monitor.clone(), chain_monitor.clone(), tx_broadcaster.clone(), Arc::clone(&logger)).unwrap();
3129                         let router = Router::new(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &node_id), chain_monitor.clone(), Arc::clone(&logger));
3130                         nodes.push(Node { chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, chan_monitor, node, router,
3131                                 network_payment_count: payment_count.clone(),
3132                                 network_chan_count: chan_count.clone(),
3133                         });
3134                 }
3135
3136                 nodes
3137         }
3138
3139         #[test]
3140         fn test_async_inbound_update_fee() {
3141                 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
3142                 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3143                 let channel_id = chan.2;
3144
3145                 macro_rules! get_feerate {
3146                         ($node: expr) => {{
3147                                 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3148                                 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
3149                                 chan.get_feerate()
3150                         }}
3151                 }
3152
3153                 // balancing
3154                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
3155
3156                 // A                                        B
3157                 // update_fee                            ->
3158                 // send (1) commitment_signed            -.
3159                 //                                       <- update_add_htlc/commitment_signed
3160                 // send (2) RAA (awaiting remote revoke) -.
3161                 // (1) commitment_signed is delivered    ->
3162                 //                                       .- send (3) RAA (awaiting remote revoke)
3163                 // (2) RAA is delivered                  ->
3164                 //                                       .- send (4) commitment_signed
3165                 //                                       <- (3) RAA is delivered
3166                 // send (5) commitment_signed            -.
3167                 //                                       <- (4) commitment_signed is delivered
3168                 // send (6) RAA                          -.
3169                 // (5) commitment_signed is delivered    ->
3170                 //                                       <- RAA
3171                 // (6) RAA is delivered                  ->
3172
3173                 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
3174                 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, get_feerate!(nodes[0]) + 20).unwrap();
3175                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3176
3177                 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3178                 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
3179                 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
3180                         Event::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
3181                                 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
3182                         },
3183                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3184                 };
3185
3186                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
3187
3188                 // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
3189                 let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
3190                 nodes[1].node.send_payment(nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 40000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap(), our_payment_hash).unwrap();
3191                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3192
3193                 let payment_event = {
3194                         let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3195                         assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3196                         SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
3197                 };
3198                 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3199                 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3200
3201                 // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
3202                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
3203                 let (as_revoke_msg, as_commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap(); // (2)
3204                 assert!(as_commitment_signed.is_none()); // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack
3205                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3206
3207                 // deliver(1), generate (3):
3208                 let (bs_revoke_msg, bs_commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
3209                 assert!(bs_commitment_signed.is_none()); // nodes[1] is awaiting nodes[0] revoke_and_ack
3210                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3211
3212                 let bs_update = nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg).unwrap(); // deliver (2)
3213                 assert!(bs_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
3214                 assert!(bs_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
3215                 assert!(bs_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
3216                 assert!(bs_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
3217                 assert!(bs_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none()); // (4)
3218                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3219
3220                 let as_update = nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_msg).unwrap(); // deliver (3)
3221                 assert!(as_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
3222                 assert!(as_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
3223                 assert!(as_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
3224                 assert!(as_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
3225                 assert!(as_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none()); // (5)
3226                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3227
3228                 let (as_second_revoke, as_second_commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update.unwrap().commitment_signed).unwrap(); // deliver (4)
3229                 assert!(as_second_commitment_signed.is_none()); // only (6)
3230                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3231
3232                 let (bs_second_revoke, bs_second_commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update.unwrap().commitment_signed).unwrap(); // deliver (5)
3233                 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.is_none());
3234                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3235
3236                 assert!(nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke).unwrap().is_none());
3237                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3238
3239                 let events_2 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3240                 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3241                 match events_2[0] {
3242                         Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {..} => {}, // If we actually processed we'd receive the payment
3243                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3244                 }
3245
3246                 assert!(nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke).unwrap().is_none()); // deliver (6)
3247                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3248         }
3249
3250         #[test]
3251         fn test_update_fee_unordered_raa() {
3252                 // Just the intro to the previous test followed by an out-of-order RAA (which caused a
3253                 // crash in an earlier version of the update_fee patch)
3254                 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
3255                 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3256                 let channel_id = chan.2;
3257
3258                 macro_rules! get_feerate {
3259                         ($node: expr) => {{
3260                                 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3261                                 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
3262                                 chan.get_feerate()
3263                         }}
3264                 }
3265
3266                 // balancing
3267                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
3268
3269                 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
3270                 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, get_feerate!(nodes[0]) + 20).unwrap();
3271                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3272
3273                 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3274                 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
3275                 let update_msg = match events_0[0] { // (1)
3276                         Event::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, .. }, .. } => {
3277                                 update_fee.as_ref()
3278                         },
3279                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3280                 };
3281
3282                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
3283
3284                 // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
3285                 let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
3286                 nodes[1].node.send_payment(nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 40000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap(), our_payment_hash).unwrap();
3287                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3288
3289                 let payment_event = {
3290                         let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3291                         assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3292                         SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
3293                 };
3294                 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3295                 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3296
3297                 // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
3298                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
3299                 let (as_revoke_msg, as_commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap(); // (2)
3300                 assert!(as_commitment_signed.is_none()); // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack
3301                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3302
3303                 assert!(nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg).unwrap().is_none()); // deliver (2)
3304                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3305
3306                 // We can't continue, sadly, because our (1) now has a bogus signature
3307         }
3308
3309         #[test]
3310         fn test_multi_flight_update_fee() {
3311                 let nodes = create_network(2);
3312                 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3313                 let channel_id = chan.2;
3314
3315                 macro_rules! get_feerate {
3316                         ($node: expr) => {{
3317                                 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3318                                 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
3319                                 chan.get_feerate()
3320                         }}
3321                 }
3322
3323                 // A                                        B
3324                 // update_fee/commitment_signed          ->
3325                 //                                       .- send (1) RAA and (2) commitment_signed
3326                 // update_fee (never committed)          ->
3327                 // (3) update_fee                        ->
3328                 // We have to manually generate the above update_fee, it is allowed by the protocol but we
3329                 // don't track which updates correspond to which revoke_and_ack responses so we're in
3330                 // AwaitingRAA mode and will not generate the update_fee yet.
3331                 //                                       <- (1) RAA delivered
3332                 // (3) is generated and send (4) CS      -.
3333                 // Note that A cannot generate (4) prior to (1) being delivered as it otherwise doesn't
3334                 // know the per_commitment_point to use for it.
3335                 //                                       <- (2) commitment_signed delivered
3336                 // revoke_and_ack                        ->
3337                 //                                          B should send no response here
3338                 // (4) commitment_signed delivered       ->
3339                 //                                       <- RAA/commitment_signed delivered
3340                 // revoke_and_ack                        ->
3341
3342                 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
3343                 let initial_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0]);
3344                 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, initial_feerate + 20).unwrap();
3345                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3346
3347                 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3348                 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
3349                 let (update_msg_1, commitment_signed_1) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
3350                         Event::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
3351                                 (update_fee.as_ref().unwrap(), commitment_signed)
3352                         },
3353                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3354                 };
3355
3356                 // Deliver first update_fee/commitment_signed pair, generating (1) and (2):
3357                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg_1).unwrap();
3358                 let (bs_revoke_msg, bs_commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed_1).unwrap();
3359                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3360
3361                 // nodes[0] is awaiting a revoke from nodes[1] before it will create a new commitment
3362                 // transaction:
3363                 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, initial_feerate + 40).unwrap();
3364                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3365
3366                 // Create the (3) update_fee message that nodes[0] will generate before it does...
3367                 let mut update_msg_2 = msgs::UpdateFee {
3368                         channel_id: update_msg_1.channel_id.clone(),
3369                         feerate_per_kw: (initial_feerate + 30) as u32,
3370                 };
3371
3372                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2).unwrap();
3373
3374                 update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw = (initial_feerate + 40) as u32;
3375                 // Deliver (3)
3376                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2).unwrap();
3377
3378                 // Deliver (1), generating (3) and (4)
3379                 let as_second_update = nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_msg).unwrap();
3380                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3381                 assert!(as_second_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3382                 assert!(as_second_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3383                 assert!(as_second_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3384                 assert!(as_second_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3385                 // Check that the update_fee newly generated matches what we delivered:
3386                 assert_eq!(as_second_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().channel_id, update_msg_2.channel_id);
3387                 assert_eq!(as_second_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().feerate_per_kw, update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw);
3388
3389                 // Deliver (2) commitment_signed
3390                 let (as_revoke_msg, as_commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), bs_commitment_signed.as_ref().unwrap()).unwrap();
3391                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3392                 assert!(as_commitment_signed.is_none());
3393
3394                 assert!(nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg).unwrap().is_none());
3395                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3396
3397                 // Delever (4)
3398                 let (bs_second_revoke, bs_second_commitment) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_update.unwrap().commitment_signed).unwrap();
3399                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3400
3401                 assert!(nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke).unwrap().is_none());
3402                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3403
3404                 let (as_second_revoke, as_second_commitment) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment.unwrap()).unwrap();
3405                 assert!(as_second_commitment.is_none());
3406                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3407
3408                 assert!(nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke).unwrap().is_none());
3409                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3410         }
3411
3412         #[test]
3413         fn test_update_fee_vanilla() {
3414                 let nodes = create_network(2);
3415                 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3416                 let channel_id = chan.2;
3417
3418                 macro_rules! get_feerate {
3419                         ($node: expr) => {{
3420                                 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3421                                 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
3422                                 chan.get_feerate()
3423                         }}
3424                 }
3425
3426                 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0]);
3427                 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+20).unwrap();
3428
3429                 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3430                 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
3431                 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
3432                                 Event::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
3433                                 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
3434                         },
3435                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3436                 };
3437                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
3438
3439                 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
3440                 let commitment_signed = commitment_signed.unwrap();
3441                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3442                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3443
3444                 let resp_option = nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
3445                 assert!(resp_option.is_none());
3446                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3447
3448                 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap();
3449                 assert!(commitment_signed.is_none());
3450                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3451
3452                 let resp_option = nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
3453                 assert!(resp_option.is_none());
3454                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3455         }
3456
3457         #[test]
3458         fn test_update_fee_with_fundee_update_add_htlc() {
3459                 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
3460                 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3461                 let channel_id = chan.2;
3462
3463                 macro_rules! get_feerate {
3464                         ($node: expr) => {{
3465                                 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3466                                 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
3467                                 chan.get_feerate()
3468                         }}
3469                 }
3470
3471                 // balancing
3472                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
3473
3474                 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0]);
3475                 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+20).unwrap();
3476
3477                 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3478                 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
3479                 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
3480                                 Event::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
3481                                 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
3482                         },
3483                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3484                 };
3485                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
3486                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3487                 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
3488                 let commitment_signed = commitment_signed.unwrap();
3489                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3490
3491                 let route = nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 800000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
3492
3493                 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[1]);
3494
3495                 // nothing happens since node[1] is in AwaitingRemoteRevoke
3496                 nodes[1].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
3497                 {
3498                         let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
3499                         assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 0);
3500                         added_monitors.clear();
3501                 }
3502                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3503                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
3504                 // node[1] has nothing to do
3505
3506                 let resp_option = nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
3507                 assert!(resp_option.is_none());
3508                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3509
3510                 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap();
3511                 assert!(commitment_signed.is_none());
3512                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3513                 let resp_option = nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
3514                 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke ends here
3515
3516                 let commitment_update = resp_option.unwrap();
3517                 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
3518                 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
3519                 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 0);
3520                 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
3521                 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none(), true);
3522
3523                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.update_add_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
3524                 let (revoke, commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
3525                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3526                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3527                 let commitment_signed = commitment_signed.unwrap();
3528                 let resp_option = nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke).unwrap();
3529                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3530                 assert!(resp_option.is_none());
3531
3532                 let (revoke, commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap();
3533                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3534                 assert!(commitment_signed.is_none());
3535                 let resp_option = nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke).unwrap();
3536                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3537                 assert!(resp_option.is_none());
3538
3539                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3540                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3541                 match events[0] {
3542                         Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3543                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3544                 };
3545                 nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
3546                 nodes[0].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3547
3548                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3549                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3550                 match events[0] {
3551                         Event::PaymentReceived { .. } => { },
3552                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3553                 };
3554
3555                 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], our_payment_preimage);
3556
3557                 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 800000);
3558                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 800000);
3559                 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
3560         }
3561
3562         #[test]
3563         fn test_update_fee() {
3564                 let nodes = create_network(2);
3565                 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3566                 let channel_id = chan.2;
3567
3568                 macro_rules! get_feerate {
3569                         ($node: expr) => {{
3570                                 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3571                                 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
3572                                 chan.get_feerate()
3573                         }}
3574                 }
3575
3576                 // A                                        B
3577                 // (1) update_fee/commitment_signed      ->
3578                 //                                       <- (2) revoke_and_ack
3579                 //                                       .- send (3) commitment_signed
3580                 // (4) update_fee/commitment_signed      ->
3581                 //                                       .- send (5) revoke_and_ack (no CS as we're awaiting a revoke)
3582                 //                                       <- (3) commitment_signed delivered
3583                 // send (6) revoke_and_ack               -.
3584                 //                                       <- (5) deliver revoke_and_ack
3585                 // (6) deliver revoke_and_ack            ->
3586                 //                                       .- send (7) commitment_signed in response to (4)
3587                 //                                       <- (7) deliver commitment_signed
3588                 // revoke_and_ack                        ->
3589
3590                 // Create and deliver (1)...
3591                 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0]);
3592                 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+20).unwrap();
3593
3594                 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3595                 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
3596                 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
3597                                 Event::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
3598                                 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
3599                         },
3600                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3601                 };
3602                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
3603
3604                 // Generate (2) and (3):
3605                 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
3606                 let commitment_signed_0 = commitment_signed.unwrap();
3607                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3608                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3609
3610                 // Deliver (2):
3611                 let resp_option = nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
3612                 assert!(resp_option.is_none());
3613                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3614
3615                 // Create and deliver (4)...
3616                 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+30).unwrap();
3617                 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3618                 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
3619                 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
3620                                 Event::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
3621                                 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
3622                         },
3623                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3624                 };
3625                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
3626
3627                 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
3628                 // ... creating (5)
3629                 assert!(commitment_signed.is_none());
3630                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3631                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3632
3633                 // Handle (3), creating (6):
3634                 let (revoke_msg_0, commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed_0).unwrap();
3635                 assert!(commitment_signed.is_none());
3636                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3637
3638                 // Deliver (5):
3639                 let resp_option = nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
3640                 assert!(resp_option.is_none());
3641                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3642
3643                 // Deliver (6), creating (7):
3644                 let resp_option = nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg_0).unwrap();
3645                 let commitment_signed = resp_option.unwrap().commitment_signed;
3646                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3647
3648                 // Deliver (7)
3649                 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap();
3650                 assert!(commitment_signed.is_none());
3651                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3652                 let resp_option = nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
3653                 assert!(resp_option.is_none());
3654                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3655
3656                 assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[0]), feerate + 30);
3657                 assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[1]), feerate + 30);
3658                 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
3659         }
3660
3661         #[test]
3662         fn fake_network_test() {
3663                 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
3664                 // tests that payments get routed and transactions broadcast in semi-reasonable ways.
3665                 let nodes = create_network(4);
3666
3667                 // Create some initial channels
3668                 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3669                 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
3670                 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
3671
3672                 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
3673                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
3674                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
3675                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
3676                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
3677
3678                 // Send some more payments
3679                 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
3680                 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], &nodes[0])[..], 1000000);
3681                 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000);
3682
3683                 // Test failure packets
3684                 let payment_hash_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000).1;
3685                 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], payment_hash_1);
3686
3687                 // Add a new channel that skips 3
3688                 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
3689
3690                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
3691                 send_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
3692                 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
3693                 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
3694                 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
3695                 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
3696                 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
3697
3698                 // Do some rebalance loop payments, simultaneously
3699                 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
3700                 hops.push(RouteHop {
3701                         pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
3702                         short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
3703                         fee_msat: 0,
3704                         cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.0.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
3705                 });
3706                 hops.push(RouteHop {
3707                         pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
3708                         short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
3709                         fee_msat: 0,
3710                         cltv_expiry_delta: chan_4.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
3711                 });
3712                 hops.push(RouteHop {
3713                         pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
3714                         short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
3715                         fee_msat: 1000000,
3716                         cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
3717                 });
3718                 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_4.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_4.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
3719                 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.0.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.0.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
3720                 let payment_preimage_1 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { hops }, &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).0;
3721
3722                 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
3723                 hops.push(RouteHop {
3724                         pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
3725                         short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
3726                         fee_msat: 0,
3727                         cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
3728                 });
3729                 hops.push(RouteHop {
3730                         pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
3731                         short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
3732                         fee_msat: 0,
3733                         cltv_expiry_delta: chan_2.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
3734                 });
3735                 hops.push(RouteHop {
3736                         pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
3737                         short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
3738                         fee_msat: 1000000,
3739                         cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
3740                 });
3741                 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_2.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_2.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
3742                 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
3743                 let payment_hash_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { hops }, &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).1;
3744
3745                 // Claim the rebalances...
3746                 fail_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], payment_hash_2);
3747                 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
3748
3749                 // Add a duplicate new channel from 2 to 4
3750                 let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
3751
3752                 // Send some payments across both channels
3753                 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
3754                 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
3755                 let payment_preimage_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
3756
3757                 route_over_limit(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000);
3758
3759                 //TODO: Test that routes work again here as we've been notified that the channel is full
3760
3761                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_3);
3762                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_4);
3763                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_5);
3764
3765                 // Close down the channels...
3766                 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan_1.2, chan_1.3, true);
3767                 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, false);
3768                 close_channel(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &chan_3.2, chan_3.3, true);
3769                 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_4.2, chan_4.3, false);
3770                 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_5.2, chan_5.3, false);
3771         }
3772
3773         #[test]
3774         fn duplicate_htlc_test() {
3775                 // Test that we accept duplicate payment_hash HTLCs across the network and that
3776                 // claiming/failing them are all separate and don't effect each other
3777                 let mut nodes = create_network(6);
3778
3779                 // Create some initial channels to route via 3 to 4/5 from 0/1/2
3780                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3);
3781                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
3782                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
3783                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);
3784                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5);
3785
3786                 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 1000000);
3787
3788                 *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
3789                 assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
3790
3791                 *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
3792                 assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
3793
3794                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], payment_preimage);
3795                 fail_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], payment_hash);
3796                 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage);
3797         }
3798
3799         #[derive(PartialEq)]
3800         enum HTLCType { NONE, TIMEOUT, SUCCESS }
3801         /// Tests that the given node has broadcast transactions for the given Channel
3802         ///
3803         /// First checks that the latest local commitment tx has been broadcast, unless an explicit
3804         /// commitment_tx is provided, which may be used to test that a remote commitment tx was
3805         /// broadcast and the revoked outputs were claimed.
3806         ///
3807         /// Next tests that there is (or is not) a transaction that spends the commitment transaction
3808         /// that appears to be the type of HTLC transaction specified in has_htlc_tx.
3809         ///
3810         /// All broadcast transactions must be accounted for in one of the above three types of we'll
3811         /// also fail.
3812         fn test_txn_broadcast(node: &Node, chan: &(msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction), commitment_tx: Option<Transaction>, has_htlc_tx: HTLCType) -> Vec<Transaction> {
3813                 let mut node_txn = node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3814                 assert!(node_txn.len() >= if commitment_tx.is_some() { 0 } else { 1 } + if has_htlc_tx == HTLCType::NONE { 0 } else { 1 });
3815
3816                 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(2);
3817                 node_txn.retain(|tx| {
3818                         if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == chan.3.txid() {
3819                                 check_spends!(tx, chan.3.clone());
3820                                 if commitment_tx.is_none() {
3821                                         res.push(tx.clone());
3822                                 }
3823                                 false
3824                         } else { true }
3825                 });
3826                 if let Some(explicit_tx) = commitment_tx {
3827                         res.push(explicit_tx.clone());
3828                 }
3829
3830                 assert_eq!(res.len(), 1);
3831
3832                 if has_htlc_tx != HTLCType::NONE {
3833                         node_txn.retain(|tx| {
3834                                 if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == res[0].txid() {
3835                                         check_spends!(tx, res[0].clone());
3836                                         if has_htlc_tx == HTLCType::TIMEOUT {
3837                                                 assert!(tx.lock_time != 0);
3838                                         } else {
3839                                                 assert!(tx.lock_time == 0);
3840                                         }
3841                                         res.push(tx.clone());
3842                                         false
3843                                 } else { true }
3844                         });
3845                         assert_eq!(res.len(), 2);
3846                 }
3847
3848                 assert!(node_txn.is_empty());
3849                 res
3850         }
3851
3852         /// Tests that the given node has broadcast a claim transaction against the provided revoked
3853         /// HTLC transaction.
3854         fn test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(node: &Node, revoked_tx: Transaction) {
3855                 let mut node_txn = node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3856                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3857                 node_txn.retain(|tx| {
3858                         if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_tx.txid() {
3859                                 check_spends!(tx, revoked_tx.clone());
3860                                 false
3861                         } else { true }
3862                 });
3863                 assert!(node_txn.is_empty());
3864         }
3865
3866         fn check_preimage_claim(node: &Node, prev_txn: &Vec<Transaction>) -> Vec<Transaction> {
3867                 let mut node_txn = node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3868
3869                 assert!(node_txn.len() >= 1);
3870                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
3871                 let mut found_prev = false;
3872
3873                 for tx in prev_txn {
3874                         if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == tx.txid() {
3875                                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], tx.clone());
3876                                 assert!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness[2].len() > 106); // must spend an htlc output
3877                                 assert_eq!(tx.input.len(), 1); // must spend a commitment tx
3878
3879                                 found_prev = true;
3880                                 break;
3881                         }
3882                 }
3883                 assert!(found_prev);
3884
3885                 let mut res = Vec::new();
3886                 mem::swap(&mut *node_txn, &mut res);
3887                 res
3888         }
3889
3890         fn get_announce_close_broadcast_events(nodes: &Vec<Node>, a: usize, b: usize) {
3891                 let events_1 = nodes[a].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3892                 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3893                 let as_update = match events_1[0] {
3894                         Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
3895                                 msg.clone()
3896                         },
3897                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3898                 };
3899
3900                 let events_2 = nodes[b].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3901                 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3902                 let bs_update = match events_2[0] {
3903                         Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
3904                                 msg.clone()
3905                         },
3906                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3907                 };
3908
3909                 for node in nodes {
3910                         node.router.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
3911                         node.router.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
3912                 }
3913         }
3914
3915         #[test]
3916         fn channel_reserve_test() {
3917                 use util::rng;
3918                 use std::sync::atomic::Ordering;
3919                 use ln::msgs::HandleError;
3920
3921                 macro_rules! get_channel_value_stat {
3922                         ($node: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {{
3923                                 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3924                                 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&$channel_id).unwrap();
3925                                 chan.get_value_stat()
3926                         }}
3927                 }
3928
3929                 let mut nodes = create_network(3);
3930                 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1900, 1001);
3931                 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 1900, 1001);
3932
3933                 let mut stat01 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
3934                 let mut stat11 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
3935
3936                 let mut stat12 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2);
3937                 let mut stat22 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
3938
3939                 macro_rules! get_route_and_payment_hash {
3940                         ($recv_value: expr) => {{
3941                                 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), $recv_value, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
3942                                 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
3943                                 (route, payment_hash, payment_preimage)
3944                         }}
3945                 };
3946
3947                 macro_rules! expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable {
3948                         ($node: expr) => {{
3949                                 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3950                                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3951                                 match events[0] {
3952                                         Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3953                                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3954                                 };
3955                                 $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
3956                                 $node.node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3957                         }}
3958                 };
3959
3960                 macro_rules! expect_forward {
3961                         ($node: expr) => {{
3962                                 let mut events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3963                                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3964                                 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
3965                                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
3966                                 payment_event
3967                         }}
3968                 }
3969
3970                 macro_rules! expect_payment_received {
3971                         ($node: expr, $expected_payment_hash: expr, $expected_recv_value: expr) => {
3972                                 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3973                                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3974                                 match events[0] {
3975                                         Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
3976                                                 assert_eq!($expected_payment_hash, *payment_hash);
3977                                                 assert_eq!($expected_recv_value, amt);
3978                                         },
3979                                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3980                                 }
3981                         }
3982                 };
3983
3984                 let feemsat = 239; // somehow we know?
3985                 let total_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * 239;
3986
3987                 let recv_value_0 = stat01.their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - total_fee_msat;
3988
3989                 // attempt to send amt_msat > their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
3990                 {
3991                         let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_0 + 1);
3992                         assert!(route.hops.iter().rev().skip(1).all(|h| h.fee_msat == feemsat));
3993                         let err = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap();
3994                         match err {
3995                                 APIError::RouteError{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our max HTLC value in flight"),
3996                                 _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
3997                         }
3998                 }
3999
4000                 let mut htlc_id = 0;
4001                 // channel reserve is bigger than their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat so loop to deplete
4002                 // nodes[0]'s wealth
4003                 loop {
4004                         let amt_msat = recv_value_0 + total_fee_msat;
4005                         if stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat < stat01.channel_reserve_msat {
4006                                 break;
4007                         }
4008                         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1], &nodes[2]][..], recv_value_0);
4009                         htlc_id += 1;
4010
4011                         let (stat01_, stat11_, stat12_, stat22_) = (
4012                                 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2),
4013                                 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2),
4014                                 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2),
4015                                 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2),
4016                         );
4017
4018                         assert_eq!(stat01_.value_to_self_msat, stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat);
4019                         assert_eq!(stat11_.value_to_self_msat, stat11.value_to_self_msat + amt_msat);
4020                         assert_eq!(stat12_.value_to_self_msat, stat12.value_to_self_msat - (amt_msat - feemsat));
4021                         assert_eq!(stat22_.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + (amt_msat - feemsat));
4022                         stat01 = stat01_; stat11 = stat11_; stat12 = stat12_; stat22 = stat22_;
4023                 }
4024
4025                 {
4026                         let recv_value = stat01.value_to_self_msat - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat;
4027                         // attempt to get channel_reserve violation
4028                         let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value + 1);
4029                         let err = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), our_payment_hash).err().unwrap();
4030                         match err {
4031                                 APIError::RouteError{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our reserve value"),
4032                                 _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
4033                         }
4034                 }
4035
4036                 // adding pending output
4037                 let recv_value_1 = (stat01.value_to_self_msat - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat)/2;
4038                 let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat;
4039
4040                 let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_preimage_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_1);
4041                 let payment_event_1 = {
4042                         nodes[0].node.send_payment(route_1, our_payment_hash_1).unwrap();
4043                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4044
4045                         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4046                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4047                         SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
4048                 };
4049                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]).unwrap();
4050
4051                 // channel reserve test with htlc pending output > 0
4052                 let recv_value_2 = stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat;
4053                 {
4054                         let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_2 + 1);
4055                         match nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap() {
4056                                 APIError::RouteError{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our reserve value"),
4057                                 _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
4058                         }
4059                 }
4060
4061                 {
4062                         // test channel_reserve test on nodes[1] side
4063                         let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_2 + 1);
4064
4065                         // Need to manually create update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
4066                         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4067                         let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &{
4068                                 let mut session_key = [0; 32];
4069                                 rng::fill_bytes(&mut session_key);
4070                                 session_key
4071                         }).expect("RNG is bad!");
4072
4073                         let cur_height = nodes[0].node.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
4074                         let onion_keys = ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
4075                         let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = ChannelManager::build_onion_payloads(&route, cur_height).unwrap();
4076                         let onion_packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, &our_payment_hash);
4077                         let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
4078                                 channel_id: chan_1.2,
4079                                 htlc_id,
4080                                 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
4081                                 payment_hash: our_payment_hash,
4082                                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
4083                                 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
4084                         };
4085
4086                         let err = nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg).err().unwrap();
4087                         match err {
4088                                 HandleError{err, .. } => assert_eq!(err, "Remote HTLC add would put them over their reserve value"),
4089                         }
4090                 }
4091
4092                 // split the rest to test holding cell
4093                 let recv_value_21 = recv_value_2/2;
4094                 let recv_value_22 = recv_value_2 - recv_value_21 - total_fee_msat;
4095                 {
4096                         let stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4097                         assert_eq!(stat.value_to_self_msat - (stat.pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat + total_fee_msat), stat.channel_reserve_msat);
4098                 }
4099
4100                 // now see if they go through on both sides
4101                 let (route_21, our_payment_hash_21, our_payment_preimage_21) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_21);
4102                 // but this will stuck in the holding cell
4103                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route_21, our_payment_hash_21).unwrap();
4104                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
4105                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4106                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
4107
4108                 // test with outbound holding cell amount > 0
4109                 {
4110                         let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_22+1);
4111                         match nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap() {
4112                                 APIError::RouteError{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our reserve value"),
4113                                 _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
4114                         }
4115                 }
4116
4117                 let (route_22, our_payment_hash_22, our_payment_preimage_22) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_22);
4118                 // this will also stuck in the holding cell
4119                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route_22, our_payment_hash_22).unwrap();
4120                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
4121                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4122                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
4123
4124                 // flush the pending htlc
4125                 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.commitment_msg).unwrap();
4126                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4127
4128                 let commitment_update_2 = nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().unwrap();
4129                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4130                 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_none) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed.unwrap()).unwrap();
4131                 assert!(bs_none.is_none());
4132                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4133                 assert!(nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().is_none());
4134                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4135
4136                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4137
4138                 let ref payment_event_11 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
4139                 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_11.msgs[0]).unwrap();
4140                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event_11.commitment_msg, false);
4141
4142                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
4143                 expect_payment_received!(nodes[2], our_payment_hash_1, recv_value_1);
4144
4145                 // flush the htlcs in the holding cell
4146                 assert_eq!(commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs.len(), 2);
4147                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
4148                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[1]).unwrap();
4149                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], &commitment_update_2.commitment_signed, false);
4150                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4151
4152                 let ref payment_event_3 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
4153                 assert_eq!(payment_event_3.msgs.len(), 2);
4154                 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[0]).unwrap();
4155                 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[1]).unwrap();
4156
4157                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], &payment_event_3.commitment_msg, false);
4158                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
4159
4160                 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4161                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
4162                 match events[0] {
4163                         Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
4164                                 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_21, *payment_hash);
4165                                 assert_eq!(recv_value_21, amt);
4166                         },
4167                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4168                 }
4169                 match events[1] {
4170                         Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
4171                                 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_22, *payment_hash);
4172                                 assert_eq!(recv_value_22, amt);
4173                         },
4174                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4175                 }
4176
4177                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_1);
4178                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_21);
4179                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_22);
4180
4181                 let expected_value_to_self = stat01.value_to_self_msat - (recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_21 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat);
4182                 let stat0 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4183                 assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, expected_value_to_self);
4184                 assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, stat0.channel_reserve_msat);
4185
4186                 let stat2 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
4187                 assert_eq!(stat2.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + recv_value_1 + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22);
4188         }
4189
4190         #[test]
4191         fn channel_monitor_network_test() {
4192                 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
4193                 // tests that ChannelMonitor is able to recover from various states.
4194                 let nodes = create_network(5);
4195
4196                 // Create some initial channels
4197                 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4198                 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
4199                 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
4200                 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);
4201
4202                 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
4203                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
4204                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
4205                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
4206                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
4207
4208                 // Simple case with no pending HTLCs:
4209                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
4210                 {
4211                         let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
4212                         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4213                         nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn.drain(..).next().unwrap()] }, 1);
4214                         test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
4215                 }
4216                 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
4217                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4218                 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
4219
4220                 // One pending HTLC is discarded by the force-close:
4221                 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
4222
4223                 // Simple case of one pending HTLC to HTLC-Timeout
4224                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
4225                 {
4226                         let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
4227                         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4228                         nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn.drain(..).next().unwrap()] }, 1);
4229                         test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
4230                 }
4231                 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 1, 2);
4232                 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4233                 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
4234
4235                 macro_rules! claim_funds {
4236                         ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $preimage: expr) => {
4237                                 {
4238                                         assert!($node.node.claim_funds($preimage));
4239                                         check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
4240
4241                                         let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4242                                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4243                                         match events[0] {
4244                                                 Event::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, .. } } => {
4245                                                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4246                                                         assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4247                                                         assert_eq!(*node_id, $prev_node.node.get_our_node_id());
4248                                                 },
4249                                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4250                                         };
4251                                 }
4252                         }
4253                 }
4254
4255                 // nodes[3] gets the preimage, but nodes[2] already disconnected, resulting in a nodes[2]
4256                 // HTLC-Timeout and a nodes[3] claim against it (+ its own announces)
4257                 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
4258                 {
4259                         let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
4260
4261                         // Claim the payment on nodes[3], giving it knowledge of the preimage
4262                         claim_funds!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_preimage_1);
4263
4264                         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4265                         nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
4266
4267                         check_preimage_claim(&nodes[3], &node_txn);
4268                 }
4269                 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 2, 3);
4270                 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4271                 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
4272
4273                 // One pending HTLC to time out:
4274                 let payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[4])[..], 3000000).0;
4275
4276                 {
4277                         let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4278                         nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
4279                         for i in 2..TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 3 {
4280                                 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4281                                 nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
4282                         }
4283
4284                         let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[3], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
4285
4286                         // Claim the payment on nodes[4], giving it knowledge of the preimage
4287                         claim_funds!(nodes[4], nodes[3], payment_preimage_2);
4288
4289                         header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4290                         nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
4291                         for i in 2..TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 3 {
4292                                 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4293                                 nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
4294                         }
4295
4296                         test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[4], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::SUCCESS);
4297
4298                         header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4299                         nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone()] }, TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 5);
4300
4301                         check_preimage_claim(&nodes[4], &node_txn);
4302                 }
4303                 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 3, 4);
4304                 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4305                 assert_eq!(nodes[4].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4306
4307                 // Create some new channels:
4308                 let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4309
4310                 // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
4311                 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4312                 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[0]
4313                 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.iter().next().unwrap().1.last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
4314                 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // First commitment tx, then HTLC tx
4315                 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4316                 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_5.3.txid());
4317                 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to 0 are present
4318                 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4319                 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
4320                 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 133); // HTLC-Timeout
4321                 // Revoke the old state
4322                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
4323
4324                 {
4325                         let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4326                         nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
4327                         {
4328                                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4329                                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
4330                                 assert_eq!(node_txn.pop().unwrap(), node_txn[0]); // An outpoint registration will result in a 2nd block_connected
4331                                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2); // We should claim the revoked output and the HTLC output
4332
4333                                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
4334                                 node_txn.swap_remove(0);
4335                         }
4336                         test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_5, None, HTLCType::NONE);
4337
4338                         nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
4339                         let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_5, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
4340                         header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4341                         nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[1].clone()] }, 1);
4342                         test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], node_txn[1].clone());
4343                 }
4344                 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
4345                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4346                 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4347         }
4348
4349         #[test]
4350         fn revoked_output_claim() {
4351                 // Simple test to ensure a node will claim a revoked output when a stale remote commitment
4352                 // transaction is broadcast by its counterparty
4353                 let nodes = create_network(2);
4354                 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4355                 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim the revoked output
4356                 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
4357                 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1);
4358                 // Only output is the full channel value back to nodes[0]:
4359                 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
4360                 // Send a payment through, updating everyone's latest commitment txn
4361                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 5000000);
4362
4363                 // Inform nodes[1] that nodes[0] broadcast a stale tx
4364                 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4365                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
4366                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4367                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); // nodes[1] will broadcast justice tx twice, and its own local state once
4368
4369                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[2]);
4370
4371                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
4372                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3.clone());
4373
4374                 // Inform nodes[0] that a watchtower cheated on its behalf, so it will force-close the chan
4375                 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
4376                 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
4377         }
4378
4379         #[test]
4380         fn claim_htlc_outputs_shared_tx() {
4381                 // Node revoked old state, htlcs haven't time out yet, claim them in shared justice tx
4382                 let nodes = create_network(2);
4383
4384                 // Create some new channel:
4385                 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4386
4387                 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
4388                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
4389                 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx
4390                 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4391                 let _payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000).0;
4392
4393                 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
4394                 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
4395                 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // commitment tx + 1 HTLC-Timeout tx
4396                 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4397                 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4398                 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4399                 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
4400                 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 133); // HTLC-Timeout
4401                 check_spends!(revoked_local_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
4402
4403                 //Revoke the old state
4404                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
4405
4406                 {
4407                         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4408
4409                         nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
4410
4411                         nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
4412                         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4413                         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4);
4414
4415                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Claim the revoked output + both revoked HTLC outputs
4416                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
4417
4418                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]); // justice tx is duplicated due to block re-scanning
4419
4420                         let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
4421                         witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
4422                         witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len());
4423                         witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[2].witness.last().unwrap().len());
4424                         assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
4425                         assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
4426                         assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), 133); // revoked offered HTLC
4427                         assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), 138); // revoked received HTLC
4428
4429                         // Next nodes[1] broadcasts its current local tx state:
4430                         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4431                         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid()); //Spending funding tx unique txouput, tx broadcasted by ChannelManager
4432
4433                         assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
4434                         let witness_script = node_txn[2].clone().input[0].witness.pop().unwrap();
4435                         assert_eq!(witness_script.len(), 133); //Spending an offered htlc output
4436                         assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[1].txid());
4437                         assert_ne!(node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid);
4438                         assert_ne!(node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output.txid);
4439                 }
4440                 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
4441                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4442                 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4443         }
4444
4445         #[test]
4446         fn claim_htlc_outputs_single_tx() {
4447                 // Node revoked old state, htlcs have timed out, claim each of them in separated justice tx
4448                 let nodes = create_network(2);
4449
4450                 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4451
4452                 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
4453                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
4454                 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx, but this
4455                 // time as two different claim transactions as we're gonna to timeout htlc with given a high current height
4456                 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4457                 let _payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000).0;
4458
4459                 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
4460                 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
4461
4462                 //Revoke the old state
4463                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
4464
4465                 {
4466                         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4467
4468                         nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 200);
4469
4470                         nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 200);
4471                         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4472                         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 12); // ChannelManager : 2, ChannelMontitor: 8 (1 standard revoked output, 2 revocation htlc tx, 1 local commitment tx + 1 htlc timeout tx) * 2 (block-rescan)
4473
4474                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[7]);
4475                         assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[8]);
4476                         assert_eq!(node_txn[2], node_txn[9]);
4477                         assert_eq!(node_txn[3], node_txn[10]);
4478                         assert_eq!(node_txn[4], node_txn[11]);
4479                         assert_eq!(node_txn[3], node_txn[5]); //local commitment tx + htlc timeout tx broadcated by ChannelManger
4480                         assert_eq!(node_txn[4], node_txn[6]);
4481
4482                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4483                         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4484                         assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
4485
4486                         let mut revoked_tx_map = HashMap::new();
4487                         revoked_tx_map.insert(revoked_local_txn[0].txid(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
4488                         node_txn[0].verify(&revoked_tx_map).unwrap();
4489                         node_txn[1].verify(&revoked_tx_map).unwrap();
4490                         node_txn[2].verify(&revoked_tx_map).unwrap();
4491
4492                         let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
4493                         witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
4494                         witness_lens.insert(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
4495                         witness_lens.insert(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
4496                         assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
4497                         assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
4498                         assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), 133); // revoked offered HTLC
4499                         assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), 138); // revoked received HTLC
4500
4501                         assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
4502                         check_spends!(node_txn[3], chan_1.3.clone());
4503
4504                         assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input.len(), 1);
4505                         let witness_script = node_txn[4].input[0].witness.last().unwrap();
4506                         assert_eq!(witness_script.len(), 133); //Spending an offered htlc output
4507                         assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[3].txid());
4508                         assert_ne!(node_txn[4].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid);
4509                         assert_ne!(node_txn[4].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid);
4510                 }
4511                 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
4512                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4513                 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4514         }
4515
4516         #[test]
4517         fn test_htlc_ignore_latest_remote_commitment() {
4518                 // Test that HTLC transactions spending the latest remote commitment transaction are simply
4519                 // ignored if we cannot claim them. This originally tickled an invalid unwrap().
4520                 let nodes = create_network(2);
4521                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4522
4523                 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10000000);
4524                 nodes[0].node.force_close_channel(&nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].channel_id);
4525                 {
4526                         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4527                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4528                         match events[0] {
4529                                 Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
4530                                         assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
4531                                 },
4532                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4533                         }
4534                 }
4535
4536                 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4537                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
4538
4539                 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4540                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&node_txn[0], &node_txn[1]], &[1; 2]);
4541
4542                 {
4543                         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4544                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4545                         match events[0] {
4546                                 Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
4547                                         assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
4548                                 },
4549                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4550                         }
4551                 }
4552
4553                 // Duplicate the block_connected call since this may happen due to other listeners
4554                 // registering new transactions
4555                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&node_txn[0], &node_txn[1]], &[1; 2]);
4556         }
4557
4558         #[test]
4559         fn test_force_close_fail_back() {
4560                 // Check which HTLCs are failed-backwards on channel force-closure
4561                 let mut nodes = create_network(3);
4562                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4563                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
4564
4565                 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, 42).unwrap();
4566
4567                 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
4568
4569                 let mut payment_event = {
4570                         nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
4571                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4572
4573                         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4574                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4575                         SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
4576                 };
4577
4578                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
4579                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
4580
4581                 let events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4582                 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
4583                 match events_1[0] {
4584                         Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
4585                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4586                 };
4587
4588                 nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
4589                 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
4590
4591                 let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4592                 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
4593                 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
4594                 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
4595
4596                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4597                 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
4598                 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap();
4599                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
4600
4601                 // nodes[2] now has the latest commitment transaction, but hasn't revoked its previous
4602                 // state or updated nodes[1]' state. Now force-close and broadcast that commitment/HTLC
4603                 // transaction and ensure nodes[1] doesn't fail-backwards (this was originally a bug!).
4604
4605                 nodes[2].node.force_close_channel(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id);
4606                 let events_3 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4607                 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
4608                 match events_3[0] {
4609                         Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
4610                                 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
4611                         },
4612                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4613                 }
4614
4615                 let tx = {
4616                         let mut node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4617                         // Note that we don't bother broadcasting the HTLC-Success transaction here as we don't
4618                         // have a use for it unless nodes[2] learns the preimage somehow, the funds will go
4619                         // back to nodes[1] upon timeout otherwise.
4620                         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4621                         node_txn.remove(0)
4622                 };
4623
4624                 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4625                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&tx], &[1]);
4626
4627                 let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4628                 // Note no UpdateHTLCs event here from nodes[1] to nodes[0]!
4629                 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
4630                 match events_4[0] {
4631                         Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
4632                                 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
4633                         },
4634                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4635                 }
4636
4637                 // Now check that if we add the preimage to ChannelMonitor it broadcasts our HTLC-Success..
4638                 {
4639                         let mut monitors = nodes[2].chan_monitor.simple_monitor.monitors.lock().unwrap();
4640                         monitors.get_mut(&OutPoint::new(Sha256dHash::from(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id[..]), 0)).unwrap()
4641                                 .provide_payment_preimage(&our_payment_hash, &our_payment_preimage);
4642                 }
4643                 nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&tx], &[1]);
4644                 let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4645                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4646                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4647                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, tx.txid());
4648                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Must be an HTLC-Success
4649                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.len(), 5); // Must be an HTLC-Success
4650
4651                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], tx);
4652         }
4653
4654         #[test]
4655         fn test_unconf_chan() {
4656                 // After creating a chan between nodes, we disconnect all blocks previously seen to force a channel close on nodes[0] side
4657                 let nodes = create_network(2);
4658                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4659
4660                 let channel_state = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4661                 assert_eq!(channel_state.by_id.len(), 1);
4662                 assert_eq!(channel_state.short_to_id.len(), 1);
4663                 mem::drop(channel_state);
4664
4665                 let mut headers = Vec::new();
4666                 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4667                 headers.push(header.clone());
4668                 for _i in 2..100 {
4669                         header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4670                         headers.push(header.clone());
4671                 }
4672                 while !headers.is_empty() {
4673                         nodes[0].node.block_disconnected(&headers.pop().unwrap());
4674                 }
4675                 {
4676                         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4677                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4678                         match events[0] {
4679                                 Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
4680                                         assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
4681                                 },
4682                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4683                         }
4684                 }
4685                 let channel_state = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4686                 assert_eq!(channel_state.by_id.len(), 0);
4687                 assert_eq!(channel_state.short_to_id.len(), 0);
4688         }
4689
4690         /// pending_htlc_adds includes both the holding cell and in-flight update_add_htlcs, whereas
4691         /// for claims/fails they are separated out.
4692         fn reconnect_nodes(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, pre_all_htlcs: bool, pending_htlc_adds: (i64, i64), pending_htlc_claims: (usize, usize), pending_cell_htlc_claims: (usize, usize), pending_cell_htlc_fails: (usize, usize), pending_raa: (bool, bool)) {
4693                 let reestablish_1 = node_a.node.peer_connected(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
4694                 let reestablish_2 = node_b.node.peer_connected(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
4695
4696                 let mut resp_1 = Vec::new();
4697                 for msg in reestablish_1 {
4698                         resp_1.push(node_b.node.handle_channel_reestablish(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &msg).unwrap());
4699                 }
4700                 if pending_cell_htlc_claims.0 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_fails.0 != 0 {
4701                         check_added_monitors!(node_b, 1);
4702                 } else {
4703                         check_added_monitors!(node_b, 0);
4704                 }
4705
4706                 let mut resp_2 = Vec::new();
4707                 for msg in reestablish_2 {
4708                         resp_2.push(node_a.node.handle_channel_reestablish(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &msg).unwrap());
4709                 }
4710                 if pending_cell_htlc_claims.1 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_fails.1 != 0 {
4711                         check_added_monitors!(node_a, 1);
4712                 } else {
4713                         check_added_monitors!(node_a, 0);
4714                 }
4715
4716                 // We dont yet support both needing updates, as that would require a different commitment dance:
4717                 assert!((pending_htlc_adds.0 == 0 && pending_htlc_claims.0 == 0 && pending_cell_htlc_claims.0 == 0 && pending_cell_htlc_fails.0 == 0) ||
4718                         (pending_htlc_adds.1 == 0 && pending_htlc_claims.1 == 0 && pending_cell_htlc_claims.1 == 0 && pending_cell_htlc_fails.1 == 0));
4719
4720                 for chan_msgs in resp_1.drain(..) {
4721                         if pre_all_htlcs {
4722                                 let a = node_a.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_msgs.0.unwrap());
4723                                 let _announcement_sigs_opt = a.unwrap();
4724                                 //TODO: Test announcement_sigs re-sending when we've implemented it
4725                         } else {
4726                                 assert!(chan_msgs.0.is_none());
4727                         }
4728                         if pending_raa.0 {
4729                                 assert!(node_a.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_msgs.1.unwrap()).unwrap().is_none());
4730                                 check_added_monitors!(node_a, 1);
4731                         } else {
4732                                 assert!(chan_msgs.1.is_none());
4733                         }
4734                         if pending_htlc_adds.0 != 0 || pending_htlc_claims.0 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_claims.0 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_fails.0 != 0 {
4735                                 let commitment_update = chan_msgs.2.unwrap();
4736                                 if pending_htlc_adds.0 != -1 { // We use -1 to denote a response commitment_signed
4737                                         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_adds.0 as usize);
4738                                 } else {
4739                                         assert!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4740                                 }
4741                                 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_claims.0 + pending_cell_htlc_claims.0);
4742                                 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), pending_cell_htlc_fails.0);
4743                                 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4744                                 for update_add in commitment_update.update_add_htlcs {
4745                                         node_a.node.handle_update_add_htlc(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add).unwrap();
4746                                 }
4747                                 for update_fulfill in commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs {
4748                                         node_a.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill).unwrap();
4749                                 }
4750                                 for update_fail in commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs {
4751                                         node_a.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail).unwrap();
4752                                 }
4753
4754                                 if pending_htlc_adds.0 != -1 { // We use -1 to denote a response commitment_signed
4755                                         commitment_signed_dance!(node_a, node_b, commitment_update.commitment_signed, false);
4756                                 } else {
4757                                         let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = node_a.node.handle_commitment_signed(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
4758                                         check_added_monitors!(node_a, 1);
4759                                         assert!(as_commitment_signed.is_none());
4760                                         assert!(node_b.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().is_none());
4761                                         check_added_monitors!(node_b, 1);
4762                                 }
4763                         } else {
4764                                 assert!(chan_msgs.2.is_none());
4765                         }
4766                 }
4767
4768                 for chan_msgs in resp_2.drain(..) {
4769                         if pre_all_htlcs {
4770                                 let _announcement_sigs_opt = node_b.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_msgs.0.unwrap()).unwrap();
4771                                 //TODO: Test announcement_sigs re-sending when we've implemented it
4772                         } else {
4773                                 assert!(chan_msgs.0.is_none());
4774                         }
4775                         if pending_raa.1 {
4776                                 assert!(node_b.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_msgs.1.unwrap()).unwrap().is_none());
4777                                 check_added_monitors!(node_b, 1);
4778                         } else {
4779                                 assert!(chan_msgs.1.is_none());
4780                         }
4781                         if pending_htlc_adds.1 != 0 || pending_htlc_claims.1 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_claims.1 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_fails.1 != 0 {
4782                                 let commitment_update = chan_msgs.2.unwrap();
4783                                 if pending_htlc_adds.1 != -1 { // We use -1 to denote a response commitment_signed
4784                                         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_adds.1 as usize);
4785                                 }
4786                                 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_claims.0 + pending_cell_htlc_claims.0);
4787                                 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), pending_cell_htlc_fails.0);
4788                                 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4789                                 for update_add in commitment_update.update_add_htlcs {
4790                                         node_b.node.handle_update_add_htlc(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add).unwrap();
4791                                 }
4792                                 for update_fulfill in commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs {
4793                                         node_b.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill).unwrap();
4794                                 }
4795                                 for update_fail in commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs {
4796                                         node_b.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail).unwrap();
4797                                 }
4798
4799                                 if pending_htlc_adds.1 != -1 { // We use -1 to denote a response commitment_signed
4800                                         commitment_signed_dance!(node_b, node_a, commitment_update.commitment_signed, false);
4801                                 } else {
4802                                         let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = node_b.node.handle_commitment_signed(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
4803                                         check_added_monitors!(node_b, 1);
4804                                         assert!(bs_commitment_signed.is_none());
4805                                         assert!(node_a.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().is_none());
4806                                         check_added_monitors!(node_a, 1);
4807                                 }
4808                         } else {
4809                                 assert!(chan_msgs.2.is_none());
4810                         }
4811                 }
4812         }
4813
4814         #[test]
4815         fn test_simple_peer_disconnect() {
4816                 // Test that we can reconnect when there are no lost messages
4817                 let nodes = create_network(3);
4818                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4819                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
4820
4821                 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4822                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4823                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], true, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4824
4825                 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
4826                 let payment_hash_2 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
4827                 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_2);
4828                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_1);
4829
4830                 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4831                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4832                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4833
4834                 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
4835                 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
4836                 let payment_hash_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
4837                 let payment_hash_6 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
4838
4839                 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4840                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4841
4842                 claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), true, payment_preimage_3);
4843                 fail_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], true, payment_hash_5);
4844
4845                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (1, 0), (1, 0), (false, false));
4846                 {
4847                         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4848                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
4849                         match events[0] {
4850                                 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage } => {
4851                                         assert_eq!(payment_preimage, payment_preimage_3);
4852                                 },
4853                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4854                         }
4855                         match events[1] {
4856                                 Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash } => {
4857                                         assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_5);
4858                                 },
4859                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4860                         }
4861                 }
4862
4863                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_4);
4864                 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_6);
4865         }
4866
4867         fn do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(messages_delivered: u8) {
4868                 // Test that we can reconnect when in-flight HTLC updates get dropped
4869                 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
4870                 if messages_delivered == 0 {
4871                         create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001);
4872                         // nodes[1] doesn't receive the funding_locked message (it'll be re-sent on reconnect)
4873                 } else {
4874                         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4875                 }
4876
4877                 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(&nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()), &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
4878                 let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
4879
4880                 let payment_event = {
4881                         nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), payment_hash_1).unwrap();
4882                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4883
4884                         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4885                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4886                         SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
4887                 };
4888                 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
4889
4890                 if messages_delivered < 2 {
4891                         // Drop the payment_event messages, and let them get re-generated in reconnect_nodes!
4892                 } else {
4893                         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
4894                         let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap();
4895                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4896
4897                         if messages_delivered >= 3 {
4898                                 assert!(nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().is_none());
4899                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4900
4901                                 if messages_delivered >= 4 {
4902                                         let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed.unwrap()).unwrap();
4903                                         assert!(as_commitment_signed.is_none());
4904                                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4905
4906                                         if messages_delivered >= 5 {
4907                                                 assert!(nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().is_none());
4908                                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4909                                         }
4910                                 }
4911                         }
4912                 }
4913
4914                 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4915                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4916                 if messages_delivered < 2 {
4917                         // Even if the funding_locked messages get exchanged, as long as nothing further was
4918                         // received on either side, both sides will need to resend them.
4919                         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], true, (0, 1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4920                 } else if messages_delivered == 2 {
4921                         // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
4922                         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
4923                 } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
4924                         // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
4925                         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4926                 } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
4927                         // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
4928                         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
4929                 } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
4930                         // Everything was delivered...
4931                         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4932                 }
4933
4934                 let events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4935                 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
4936                 match events_1[0] {
4937                         Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
4938                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4939                 };
4940
4941                 nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
4942                 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
4943
4944                 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4945                 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
4946                 match events_2[0] {
4947                         Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
4948                                 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
4949                                 assert_eq!(amt, 1000000);
4950                         },
4951                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4952                 }
4953
4954                 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
4955                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4956
4957                 let events_3 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4958                 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
4959                 let (update_fulfill_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events_3[0] {
4960                         Event::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
4961                                 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4962                                 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4963                                 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4964                                 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4965                                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4966                                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
4967                                 (updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
4968                         },
4969                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4970                 };
4971
4972                 if messages_delivered >= 1 {
4973                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlc).unwrap();
4974
4975                         let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4976                         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
4977                         match events_4[0] {
4978                                 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
4979                                         assert_eq!(payment_preimage_1, *payment_preimage);
4980                                 },
4981                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4982                         }
4983
4984                         if messages_delivered >= 2 {
4985                                 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap();
4986                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4987
4988                                 if messages_delivered >= 3 {
4989                                         assert!(nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().is_none());
4990                                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4991
4992                                         if messages_delivered >= 4 {
4993                                                 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed.unwrap()).unwrap();
4994                                                 assert!(bs_commitment_signed.is_none());
4995                                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4996
4997                                                 if messages_delivered >= 5 {
4998                                                         assert!(nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().is_none());
4999                                                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5000                                                 }
5001                                         }
5002                                 }
5003                         }
5004                 }
5005
5006                 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5007                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5008                 if messages_delivered < 2 {
5009                         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
5010                         //TODO: Deduplicate PaymentSent events, then enable this if:
5011                         //if messages_delivered < 1 {
5012                                 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5013                                 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
5014                                 match events_4[0] {
5015                                         Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
5016                                                 assert_eq!(payment_preimage_1, *payment_preimage);
5017                                         },
5018                                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5019                                 }
5020                         //}
5021                 } else if messages_delivered == 2 {
5022                         // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
5023                         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
5024                 } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
5025                         // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
5026                         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
5027                 } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
5028                         // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
5029                         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
5030                 } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
5031                         // Everything was delivered...
5032                         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
5033                 }
5034
5035                 // Channel should still work fine...
5036                 let payment_preimage_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
5037                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
5038         }
5039
5040         #[test]
5041         fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_a() {
5042                 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0);
5043                 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(1);
5044                 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(2);
5045         }
5046
5047         #[test]
5048         fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_b() {
5049                 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(3);
5050                 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(4);
5051                 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(5);
5052         }
5053
5054         #[test]
5055         fn test_funding_peer_disconnect() {
5056                 // Test that we can lock in our funding tx while disconnected
5057                 let nodes = create_network(2);
5058                 let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001);
5059
5060                 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5061                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5062
5063                 confirm_transaction(&nodes[0].chain_monitor, &tx, tx.version);
5064                 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5065                 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
5066                 match events_1[0] {
5067                         Event::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, msg: _, ref announcement_sigs } => {
5068                                 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5069                                 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none());
5070                         },
5071                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5072                 }
5073
5074                 confirm_transaction(&nodes[1].chain_monitor, &tx, tx.version);
5075                 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5076                 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
5077                 match events_2[0] {
5078                         Event::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, msg: _, ref announcement_sigs } => {
5079                                 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5080                                 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none());
5081                         },
5082                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5083                 }
5084
5085                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], true, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
5086
5087                 // TODO: We shouldn't need to manually pass list_usable_chanels here once we support
5088                 // rebroadcasting announcement_signatures upon reconnect.
5089
5090                 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(&nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()), &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
5091                 let (payment_preimage, _) = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
5092                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage);
5093         }
5094
5095         #[test]
5096         fn test_invalid_channel_announcement() {
5097                 //Test BOLT 7 channel_announcement msg requirement for final node, gather data to build customed channel_announcement msgs
5098                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5099                 let nodes = create_network(2);
5100
5101                 let chan_announcement = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
5102
5103                 let a_channel_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5104                 let b_channel_lock = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5105                 let as_chan = a_channel_lock.by_id.get(&chan_announcement.3).unwrap();
5106                 let bs_chan = b_channel_lock.by_id.get(&chan_announcement.3).unwrap();
5107
5108                 let _ = nodes[0].router.handle_htlc_fail_channel_update(&msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { short_channel_id : as_chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap() } );
5109
5110                 let as_bitcoin_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &as_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
5111                 let bs_bitcoin_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &bs_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
5112
5113                 let as_network_key = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
5114                 let bs_network_key = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
5115
5116                 let were_node_one = as_bitcoin_key.serialize()[..] < bs_bitcoin_key.serialize()[..];
5117
5118                 let mut chan_announcement;
5119
5120                 macro_rules! dummy_unsigned_msg {
5121                         () => {
5122                                 msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
5123                                         features: msgs::GlobalFeatures::new(),
5124                                         chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.bitcoin_hash(),
5125                                         short_channel_id: as_chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
5126                                         node_id_1: if were_node_one { as_network_key } else { bs_network_key },
5127                                         node_id_2: if were_node_one { bs_network_key } else { as_network_key },
5128                                         bitcoin_key_1: if were_node_one { as_bitcoin_key } else { bs_bitcoin_key },
5129                                         bitcoin_key_2: if were_node_one { bs_bitcoin_key } else { as_bitcoin_key },
5130                                         excess_data: Vec::new(),
5131                                 };
5132                         }
5133                 }
5134
5135                 macro_rules! sign_msg {
5136                         ($unsigned_msg: expr) => {
5137                                 let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&$unsigned_msg.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
5138                                 let as_bitcoin_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &as_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
5139                                 let bs_bitcoin_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &bs_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
5140                                 let as_node_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &nodes[0].node.our_network_key);
5141                                 let bs_node_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &nodes[1].node.our_network_key);
5142                                 chan_announcement = msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
5143                                         node_signature_1 : if were_node_one { as_node_sig } else { bs_node_sig},
5144                                         node_signature_2 : if were_node_one { bs_node_sig } else { as_node_sig},
5145                                         bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { as_bitcoin_sig } else { bs_bitcoin_sig },
5146                                         bitcoin_signature_2 : if were_node_one { bs_bitcoin_sig } else { as_bitcoin_sig },
5147                                         contents: $unsigned_msg
5148                                 }
5149                         }
5150                 }
5151
5152                 let unsigned_msg = dummy_unsigned_msg!();
5153                 sign_msg!(unsigned_msg);
5154                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).unwrap(), true);
5155                 let _ = nodes[0].router.handle_htlc_fail_channel_update(&msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { short_channel_id : as_chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap() } );
5156
5157                 // Configured with Network::Testnet
5158                 let mut unsigned_msg = dummy_unsigned_msg!();
5159                 unsigned_msg.chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin).header.bitcoin_hash();
5160                 sign_msg!(unsigned_msg);
5161                 assert!(nodes[0].router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).is_err());
5162
5163                 let mut unsigned_msg = dummy_unsigned_msg!();
5164                 unsigned_msg.chain_hash = Sha256dHash::from_data(&[1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9]);
5165                 sign_msg!(unsigned_msg);
5166                 assert!(nodes[0].router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).is_err());
5167         }
5168 }