_ Git - rust-lightning/blob - src/ln/channelmanager.rs

   1 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
   2 //!
   3 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
   4 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
   5 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
   6 //!
   7 //! It does not manage routing logic (see ln::router for that) nor does it manage constructing
   8 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
   9 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
  10
  11 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
  12 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
  13 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
  14 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
  15 use bitcoin::network::serialize::BitcoinHash;
  16 use bitcoin::util::hash::Sha256dHash;
  17
  18 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
  19 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Message};
  20 use secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
  21 use secp256k1;
  22
  23 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface,ChainListener,ChainWatchInterface,FeeEstimator};
  24 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
  25 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError, ChannelKeys};
  26 use ln::channelmonitor::{ManyChannelMonitor, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS};
  27 use ln::router::{Route,RouteHop};
  28 use ln::msgs;
  29 use ln::msgs::{HandleError,ChannelMessageHandler};
  30 use util::{byte_utils, events, internal_traits, rng};
  31 use util::sha2::Sha256;
  32 use util::ser::{Readable, Writeable};
  33 use util::chacha20poly1305rfc::ChaCha20;
  34 use util::logger::Logger;
  35 use util::errors::APIError;
  36
  37 use crypto;
  38 use crypto::mac::{Mac,MacResult};
  39 use crypto::hmac::Hmac;
  40 use crypto::digest::Digest;
  41 use crypto::symmetriccipher::SynchronousStreamCipher;
  42
  43 use std::{ptr, mem};
  44 use std::collections::HashMap;
  45 use std::collections::hash_map;
  46 use std::io::Cursor;
  47 use std::sync::{Mutex,MutexGuard,Arc};
  48 use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
  49 use std::time::{Instant,Duration};
  50
  51 /// We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
  52 ///
  53 /// Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
  54 /// forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
  55 /// the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
  56 ///
  57 /// When a Channel forwards an HTLC to its peer, it will give us back the PendingForwardHTLCInfo
  58 /// which we will use to construct an outbound HTLC, with a relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData
  59 /// filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use to either fail-backwards or fulfill
  60 /// the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
  61 /// Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
  62 /// our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
  63 mod channel_held_info {
  64         use ln::msgs;
  65         use ln::router::Route;
  66         use secp256k1::key::SecretKey;
  67         use secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
  68
  69         /// Stores the info we will need to send when we want to forward an HTLC onwards
  70         #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
  71         pub struct PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
  72                 pub(super) onion_packet: Option<msgs::OnionPacket>,
  73                 pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: SharedSecret,
  74                 pub(super) payment_hash: [u8; 32],
  75                 pub(super) short_channel_id: u64,
  76                 pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
  77                 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
  78         }
  79
  80         #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
  81         pub enum HTLCFailureMsg {
  82                 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
  83                 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
  84         }
  85
  86         /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
  87         #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
  88         pub enum PendingHTLCStatus {
  89                 Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo),
  90                 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
  91         }
  92
  93         /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
  94         #[derive(Clone)]
  95         pub struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
  96                 pub(super) short_channel_id: u64,
  97                 pub(super) htlc_id: u64,
  98                 pub(super) incoming_packet_shared_secret: SharedSecret,
  99         }
 100
 101         /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
 102         #[derive(Clone)]
 103         pub enum HTLCSource {
 104                 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
 105                 OutboundRoute {
 106                         route: Route,
 107                         session_priv: SecretKey,
 108                 },
 109         }
 110         #[cfg(test)]
 111         impl HTLCSource {
 112                 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
 113                         HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
 114                                 route: Route { hops: Vec::new() },
 115                                 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&::secp256k1::Secp256k1::without_caps(), &[1; 32]).unwrap(),
 116                         }
 117                 }
 118         }
 119
 120         #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
 121         pub(crate) enum HTLCFailReason {
 122                 ErrorPacket {
 123                         err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
 124                 },
 125                 Reason {
 126                         failure_code: u16,
 127                         data: Vec<u8>,
 128                 }
 129         }
 130 }
 131 pub(super) use self::channel_held_info::*;
 132
 133 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
 134         err: msgs::HandleError,
 135         needs_channel_force_close: bool,
 136 }
 137 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
 138         #[inline]
 139         fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: &'static str, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
 140                 Self {
 141                         err: HandleError {
 142                                 err,
 143                                 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
 144                                         msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
 145                                                 channel_id,
 146                                                 data: err.to_string()
 147                                         },
 148                                 }),
 149                         },
 150                         needs_channel_force_close: false,
 151                 }
 152         }
 153         #[inline]
 154         fn send_err_msg_close_chan(err: &'static str, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
 155                 Self {
 156                         err: HandleError {
 157                                 err,
 158                                 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
 159                                         msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
 160                                                 channel_id,
 161                                                 data: err.to_string()
 162                                         },
 163                                 }),
 164                         },
 165                         needs_channel_force_close: true,
 166                 }
 167         }
 168         #[inline]
 169         fn from_maybe_close(err: msgs::HandleError) -> Self {
 170                 Self { err, needs_channel_force_close: true }
 171         }
 172         #[inline]
 173         fn from_no_close(err: msgs::HandleError) -> Self {
 174                 Self { err, needs_channel_force_close: false }
 175         }
 176         #[inline]
 177         fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
 178                 Self {
 179                         err: match err {
 180                                 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => HandleError {
 181                                         err: msg,
 182                                         action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError),
 183                                 },
 184                                 ChannelError::Close(msg) => HandleError {
 185                                         err: msg,
 186                                         action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
 187                                                 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
 188                                                         channel_id,
 189                                                         data: msg.to_string()
 190                                                 },
 191                                         }),
 192                                 },
 193                         },
 194                         needs_channel_force_close: false,
 195                 }
 196         }
 197         #[inline]
 198         fn from_chan_maybe_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
 199                 Self {
 200                         err: match err {
 201                                 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => HandleError {
 202                                         err: msg,
 203                                         action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError),
 204                                 },
 205                                 ChannelError::Close(msg) => HandleError {
 206                                         err: msg,
 207                                         action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
 208                                                 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
 209                                                         channel_id,
 210                                                         data: msg.to_string()
 211                                                 },
 212                                         }),
 213                                 },
 214                         },
 215                         needs_channel_force_close: true,
 216                 }
 217         }
 218 }
 219
 220 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval in the range (this, 5*this). This
 221 /// provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like 1 second
 222 /// to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly. We could
 223 /// probably increase this significantly.
 224 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u32 = 50;
 225
 226 struct HTLCForwardInfo {
 227         prev_short_channel_id: u64,
 228         prev_htlc_id: u64,
 229         forward_info: PendingForwardHTLCInfo,
 230 }
 231
 232 struct ChannelHolder {
 233         by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel>,
 234         short_to_id: HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
 235         next_forward: Instant,
 236         /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
 237         /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
 238         /// guarantees are made about there existing a channel with the short id here, nor the short
 239         /// ids in the PendingForwardHTLCInfo!
 240         forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
 241         /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
 242         /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
 243         /// go to read them!
 244         claimable_htlcs: HashMap<[u8; 32], Vec<HTLCPreviousHopData>>,
 245 }
 246 struct MutChannelHolder<'a> {
 247         by_id: &'a mut HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel>,
 248         short_to_id: &'a mut HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
 249         next_forward: &'a mut Instant,
 250         forward_htlcs: &'a mut HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
 251         claimable_htlcs: &'a mut HashMap<[u8; 32], Vec<HTLCPreviousHopData>>,
 252 }
 253 impl ChannelHolder {
 254         fn borrow_parts(&mut self) -> MutChannelHolder {
 255                 MutChannelHolder {
 256                         by_id: &mut self.by_id,
 257                         short_to_id: &mut self.short_to_id,
 258                         next_forward: &mut self.next_forward,
 259                         forward_htlcs: &mut self.forward_htlcs,
 260                         claimable_htlcs: &mut self.claimable_htlcs,
 261                 }
 262         }
 263 }
 264
 265 #[cfg(not(any(target_pointer_width = "32", target_pointer_width = "64")))]
 266 const ERR: () = "You need at least 32 bit pointers (well, usize, but we'll assume they're the same) for ChannelManager::latest_block_height";
 267
 268 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
 269 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
 270 ///
 271 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
 272 /// to individual Channels.
 273 pub struct ChannelManager {
 274         genesis_hash: Sha256dHash,
 275         fee_estimator: Arc<FeeEstimator>,
 276         monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>,
 277         chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>,
 278         tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>,
 279
 280         announce_channels_publicly: bool,
 281         fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
 282         latest_block_height: AtomicUsize,
 283         secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
 284
 285         channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder>,
 286         our_network_key: SecretKey,
 287
 288         pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
 289
 290         logger: Arc<Logger>,
 291 }
 292
 293 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
 294 /// HTLC's CLTV. This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
 295 /// ie the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
 296 /// the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
 297 /// CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that its at least 3 blocks more).
 298 const CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6 * 24 * 2; //TODO?
 299
 300 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + 2*HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS, ie that
 301 // if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS then we'll still have
 302 // HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS left to fail it backwards ourselves before hitting the
 303 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point and failing the channel on-chain to time out the HTLC.
 304 #[deny(const_err)]
 305 #[allow(dead_code)]
 306 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 2*HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
 307
 308 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying inbound claim. See
 309 // ChannelMontior::would_broadcast_at_height for a description of why this is needed.
 310 #[deny(const_err)]
 311 #[allow(dead_code)]
 312 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
 313
 314 macro_rules! secp_call {
 315         ( $res: expr, $err: expr ) => {
 316                 match $res {
 317                         Ok(key) => key,
 318                         Err(_) => return Err($err),
 319                 }
 320         };
 321 }
 322
 323 struct OnionKeys {
 324         #[cfg(test)]
 325         shared_secret: SharedSecret,
 326         #[cfg(test)]
 327         blinding_factor: [u8; 32],
 328         ephemeral_pubkey: PublicKey,
 329         rho: [u8; 32],
 330         mu: [u8; 32],
 331 }
 332
 333 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
 334 pub struct ChannelDetails {
 335         /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
 336         /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
 337         /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
 338         /// lifetime of the channel.
 339         pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
 340         /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
 341         /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
 342         pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
 343         /// The node_id of our counterparty
 344         pub remote_network_id: PublicKey,
 345         /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
 346         pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
 347         /// The user_id passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
 348         pub user_id: u64,
 349 }
 350
 351 impl ChannelManager {
 352         /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
 353         ///
 354         /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
 355         /// ChannelMessageHandler.
 356         ///
 357         /// fee_proportional_millionths is an optional fee to charge any payments routed through us.
 358         /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
 359         ///
 360         /// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= `MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS`!
 361         pub fn new(our_network_key: SecretKey, fee_proportional_millionths: u32, announce_channels_publicly: bool, network: Network, feeest: Arc<FeeEstimator>, monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>, chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>, tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>, logger: Arc<Logger>) -> Result<Arc<ChannelManager>, secp256k1::Error> {
 362                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
 363
 364                 let res = Arc::new(ChannelManager {
 365                         genesis_hash: genesis_block(network).header.bitcoin_hash(),
 366                         fee_estimator: feeest.clone(),
 367                         monitor: monitor.clone(),
 368                         chain_monitor,
 369                         tx_broadcaster,
 370
 371                         announce_channels_publicly,
 372                         fee_proportional_millionths,
 373                         latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(0), //TODO: Get an init value (generally need to replay recent chain on chain_monitor registration)
 374                         secp_ctx,
 375
 376                         channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
 377                                 by_id: HashMap::new(),
 378                                 short_to_id: HashMap::new(),
 379                                 next_forward: Instant::now(),
 380                                 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
 381                                 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
 382                         }),
 383                         our_network_key,
 384
 385                         pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
 386
 387                         logger,
 388                 });
 389                 let weak_res = Arc::downgrade(&res);
 390                 res.chain_monitor.register_listener(weak_res);
 391                 Ok(res)
 392         }
 393
 394         /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
 395         ///
 396         /// user_id will be provided back as user_channel_id in FundingGenerationReady and
 397         /// FundingBroadcastSafe events to allow tracking of which events correspond with which
 398         /// create_channel call. Note that user_channel_id defaults to 0 for inbound channels, so you
 399         /// may wish to avoid using 0 for user_id here.
 400         ///
 401         /// If successful, will generate a SendOpenChannel event, so you should probably poll
 402         /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
 403         ///
 404         /// Raises APIError::APIMisuseError when channel_value_satoshis > 2**24 or push_msat being greater than channel_value_satoshis * 1k
 405         pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
 406                 let chan_keys = if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
 407                         ChannelKeys {
 408                                 funding_key:               SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
 409                                 revocation_base_key:       SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
 410                                 payment_base_key:          SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
 411                                 delayed_payment_base_key:  SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
 412                                 htlc_base_key:             SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
 413                                 channel_close_key:         SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
 414                                 channel_monitor_claim_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap(),
 415                                 commitment_seed: [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0],
 416                         }
 417                 } else {
 418                         let mut key_seed = [0u8; 32];
 419                         rng::fill_bytes(&mut key_seed);
 420                         match ChannelKeys::new_from_seed(&key_seed) {
 421                                 Ok(key) => key,
 422                                 Err(_) => panic!("RNG is busted!")
 423                         }
 424                 };
 425
 426                 let channel = Channel::new_outbound(&*self.fee_estimator, chan_keys, their_network_key, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, self.announce_channels_publicly, user_id, Arc::clone(&self.logger))?;
 427                 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone(), &*self.fee_estimator);
 428                 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
 429                 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
 430                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
 431                                 if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
 432                                         return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG" });
 433                                 } else {
 434                                         panic!("RNG is bad???");
 435                                 }
 436                         },
 437                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
 438                 }
 439
 440                 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
 441                 events.push(events::Event::SendOpenChannel {
 442                         node_id: their_network_key,
 443                         msg: res,
 444                 });
 445                 Ok(())
 446         }
 447
 448         /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
 449         /// more information.
 450         pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
 451                 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
 452                 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.by_id.len());
 453                 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
 454                         res.push(ChannelDetails {
 455                                 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
 456                                 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
 457                                 remote_network_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
 458                                 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
 459                                 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
 460                         });
 461                 }
 462                 res
 463         }
 464
 465         /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
 466         /// Router::get_route to ensure non-announced channels are used.
 467         pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
 468                 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
 469                 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.by_id.len());
 470                 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
 471                         // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
 472                         // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
 473                         // really wanted anyway.
 474                         if channel.is_live() {
 475                                 res.push(ChannelDetails {
 476                                         channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
 477                                         short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
 478                                         remote_network_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
 479                                         channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
 480                                         user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
 481                                 });
 482                         }
 483                 }
 484                 res
 485         }
 486
 487         /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
 488         /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
 489         /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
 490         ///
 491         /// May generate a SendShutdown event on success, which should be relayed.
 492         pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
 493                 let (mut res, node_id, chan_option) = {
 494                         let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
 495                         let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
 496                         match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
 497                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
 498                                         let res = chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown()?;
 499                                         if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
 500                                                 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
 501                                                         channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
 502                                                 }
 503                                                 (res, chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id(), Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
 504                                         } else { (res, chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id(), None) }
 505                                 },
 506                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel"})
 507                         }
 508                 };
 509                 for htlc_source in res.1.drain(..) {
 510                         // unknown_next_peer...I dunno who that is anymore....
 511                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() });
 512                 }
 513                 let chan_update = if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
 514                         if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
 515                                 Some(update)
 516                         } else { None }
 517                 } else { None };
 518
 519                 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
 520                 if let Some(update) = chan_update {
 521                         events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
 522                                 msg: update
 523                         });
 524                 }
 525                 events.push(events::Event::SendShutdown {
 526                         node_id,
 527                         msg: res.0
 528                 });
 529
 530                 Ok(())
 531         }
 532
 533         #[inline]
 534         fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<(HTLCSource, [u8; 32])>)) {
 535                 let (local_txn, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
 536                 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
 537                         // unknown_next_peer...I dunno who that is anymore....
 538                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() });
 539                 }
 540                 for tx in local_txn {
 541                         self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
 542                 }
 543                 //TODO: We need to have a way where outbound HTLC claims can result in us claiming the
 544                 //now-on-chain HTLC output for ourselves (and, thereafter, passing the HTLC backwards).
 545                 //TODO: We need to handle monitoring of pending offered HTLCs which just hit the chain and
 546                 //may be claimed, resulting in us claiming the inbound HTLCs (and back-failing after
 547                 //timeouts are hit and our claims confirm).
 548                 //TODO: In any case, we need to make sure we remove any pending htlc tracking (via
 549                 //fail_backwards or claim_funds) eventually for all HTLCs that were in the channel
 550         }
 551
 552         /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to
 553         /// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel.
 554         pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) {
 555                 let mut chan = {
 556                         let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
 557                         let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
 558                         if let Some(chan) = channel_state.by_id.remove(channel_id) {
 559                                 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
 560                                         channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
 561                                 }
 562                                 chan
 563                         } else {
 564                                 return;
 565                         }
 566                 };
 567                 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown());
 568                 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
 569                 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
 570                         events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
 571                                 msg: update
 572                         });
 573                 }
 574         }
 575
 576         /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
 577         /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
 578         pub fn force_close_all_channels(&self) {
 579                 for chan in self.list_channels() {
 580                         self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
 581                 }
 582         }
 583
 584         #[inline]
 585         fn gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &SharedSecret) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
 586                 ({
 587                         let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x72, 0x68, 0x6f]); // rho
 588                         hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
 589                         let mut res = [0; 32];
 590                         hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
 591                         res
 592                 },
 593                 {
 594                         let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x6d, 0x75]); // mu
 595                         hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
 596                         let mut res = [0; 32];
 597                         hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
 598                         res
 599                 })
 600         }
 601
 602         #[inline]
 603         fn gen_um_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &SharedSecret) -> [u8; 32] {
 604                 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x75, 0x6d]); // um
 605                 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
 606                 let mut res = [0; 32];
 607                 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
 608                 res
 609         }
 610
 611         #[inline]
 612         fn gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &SharedSecret) -> [u8; 32] {
 613                 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x61, 0x6d, 0x6d, 0x61, 0x67]); // ammag
 614                 hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
 615                 let mut res = [0; 32];
 616                 hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
 617                 res
 618         }
 619
 620         // can only fail if an intermediary hop has an invalid public key or session_priv is invalid
 621         #[inline]
 622         fn construct_onion_keys_callback<T: secp256k1::Signing, FType: FnMut(SharedSecret, [u8; 32], PublicKey, &RouteHop)> (secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, route: &Route, session_priv: &SecretKey, mut callback: FType) -> Result<(), secp256k1::Error> {
 623                 let mut blinded_priv = session_priv.clone();
 624                 let mut blinded_pub = PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &blinded_priv);
 625
 626                 for hop in route.hops.iter() {
 627                         let shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(secp_ctx, &hop.pubkey, &blinded_priv);
 628
 629                         let mut sha = Sha256::new();
 630                         sha.input(&blinded_pub.serialize()[..]);
 631                         sha.input(&shared_secret[..]);
 632                         let mut blinding_factor = [0u8; 32];
 633                         sha.result(&mut blinding_factor);
 634
 635                         let ephemeral_pubkey = blinded_pub;
 636
 637                         blinded_priv.mul_assign(secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(secp_ctx, &blinding_factor)?)?;
 638                         blinded_pub = PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &blinded_priv);
 639
 640                         callback(shared_secret, blinding_factor, ephemeral_pubkey, hop);
 641                 }
 642
 643                 Ok(())
 644         }
 645
 646         // can only fail if an intermediary hop has an invalid public key or session_priv is invalid
 647         fn construct_onion_keys<T: secp256k1::Signing>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, route: &Route, session_priv: &SecretKey) -> Result<Vec<OnionKeys>, secp256k1::Error> {
 648                 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(route.hops.len());
 649
 650                 Self::construct_onion_keys_callback(secp_ctx, route, session_priv, |shared_secret, _blinding_factor, ephemeral_pubkey, _| {
 651                         let (rho, mu) = ChannelManager::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
 652
 653                         res.push(OnionKeys {
 654                                 #[cfg(test)]
 655                                 shared_secret,
 656                                 #[cfg(test)]
 657                                 blinding_factor: _blinding_factor,
 658                                 ephemeral_pubkey,
 659                                 rho,
 660                                 mu,
 661                         });
 662                 })?;
 663
 664                 Ok(res)
 665         }
 666
 667         /// returns the hop data, as well as the first-hop value_msat and CLTV value we should send.
 668         fn build_onion_payloads(route: &Route, starting_htlc_offset: u32) -> Result<(Vec<msgs::OnionHopData>, u64, u32), APIError> {
 669                 let mut cur_value_msat = 0u64;
 670                 let mut cur_cltv = starting_htlc_offset;
 671                 let mut last_short_channel_id = 0;
 672                 let mut res: Vec<msgs::OnionHopData> = Vec::with_capacity(route.hops.len());
 673                 internal_traits::test_no_dealloc::<msgs::OnionHopData>(None);
 674                 unsafe { res.set_len(route.hops.len()); }
 675
 676                 for (idx, hop) in route.hops.iter().enumerate().rev() {
 677                         // First hop gets special values so that it can check, on receipt, that everything is
 678                         // exactly as it should be (and the next hop isn't trying to probe to find out if we're
 679                         // the intended recipient).
 680                         let value_msat = if cur_value_msat == 0 { hop.fee_msat } else { cur_value_msat };
 681                         let cltv = if cur_cltv == starting_htlc_offset { hop.cltv_expiry_delta + starting_htlc_offset } else { cur_cltv };
 682                         res[idx] = msgs::OnionHopData {
 683                                 realm: 0,
 684                                 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
 685                                         short_channel_id: last_short_channel_id,
 686                                         amt_to_forward: value_msat,
 687                                         outgoing_cltv_value: cltv,
 688                                 },
 689                                 hmac: [0; 32],
 690                         };
 691                         cur_value_msat += hop.fee_msat;
 692                         if cur_value_msat >= 21000000 * 100000000 * 1000 {
 693                                 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Channel fees overflowed?!"});
 694                         }
 695                         cur_cltv += hop.cltv_expiry_delta as u32;
 696                         if cur_cltv >= 500000000 {
 697                                 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Channel CLTV overflowed?!"});
 698                         }
 699                         last_short_channel_id = hop.short_channel_id;
 700                 }
 701                 Ok((res, cur_value_msat, cur_cltv))
 702         }
 703
 704         #[inline]
 705         fn shift_arr_right(arr: &mut [u8; 20*65]) {
 706                 unsafe {
 707                         ptr::copy(arr[0..].as_ptr(), arr[65..].as_mut_ptr(), 19*65);
 708                 }
 709                 for i in 0..65 {
 710                         arr[i] = 0;
 711                 }
 712         }
 713
 714         #[inline]
 715         fn xor_bufs(dst: &mut[u8], src: &[u8]) {
 716                 assert_eq!(dst.len(), src.len());
 717
 718                 for i in 0..dst.len() {
 719                         dst[i] ^= src[i];
 720                 }
 721         }
 722
 723         const ZERO:[u8; 21*65] = [0; 21*65];
 724         fn construct_onion_packet(mut payloads: Vec<msgs::OnionHopData>, onion_keys: Vec<OnionKeys>, associated_data: &[u8; 32]) -> msgs::OnionPacket {
 725                 let mut buf = Vec::with_capacity(21*65);
 726                 buf.resize(21*65, 0);
 727
 728                 let filler = {
 729                         let iters = payloads.len() - 1;
 730                         let end_len = iters * 65;
 731                         let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(end_len);
 732                         res.resize(end_len, 0);
 733
 734                         for (i, keys) in onion_keys.iter().enumerate() {
 735                                 if i == payloads.len() - 1 { continue; }
 736                                 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&keys.rho, &[0u8; 8]);
 737                                 chacha.process(&ChannelManager::ZERO, &mut buf); // We don't have a seek function :(
 738                                 ChannelManager::xor_bufs(&mut res[0..(i + 1)*65], &buf[(20 - i)*65..21*65]);
 739                         }
 740                         res
 741                 };
 742
 743                 let mut packet_data = [0; 20*65];
 744                 let mut hmac_res = [0; 32];
 745
 746                 for (i, (payload, keys)) in payloads.iter_mut().zip(onion_keys.iter()).rev().enumerate() {
 747                         ChannelManager::shift_arr_right(&mut packet_data);
 748                         payload.hmac = hmac_res;
 749                         packet_data[0..65].copy_from_slice(&payload.encode()[..]);
 750
 751                         let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&keys.rho, &[0u8; 8]);
 752                         chacha.process(&packet_data, &mut buf[0..20*65]);
 753                         packet_data[..].copy_from_slice(&buf[0..20*65]);
 754
 755                         if i == 0 {
 756                                 packet_data[20*65 - filler.len()..20*65].copy_from_slice(&filler[..]);
 757                         }
 758
 759                         let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &keys.mu);
 760                         hmac.input(&packet_data);
 761                         hmac.input(&associated_data[..]);
 762                         hmac.raw_result(&mut hmac_res);
 763                 }
 764
 765                 msgs::OnionPacket{
 766                         version: 0,
 767                         public_key: Ok(onion_keys.first().unwrap().ephemeral_pubkey),
 768                         hop_data: packet_data,
 769                         hmac: hmac_res,
 770                 }
 771         }
 772
 773         /// Encrypts a failure packet. raw_packet can either be a
 774         /// msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket.encode() result or a msgs::OnionErrorPacket.data element.
 775         fn encrypt_failure_packet(shared_secret: &SharedSecret, raw_packet: &[u8]) -> msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
 776                 let ammag = ChannelManager::gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
 777
 778                 let mut packet_crypted = Vec::with_capacity(raw_packet.len());
 779                 packet_crypted.resize(raw_packet.len(), 0);
 780                 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&ammag, &[0u8; 8]);
 781                 chacha.process(&raw_packet, &mut packet_crypted[..]);
 782                 msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
 783                         data: packet_crypted,
 784                 }
 785         }
 786
 787         fn build_failure_packet(shared_secret: &SharedSecret, failure_type: u16, failure_data: &[u8]) -> msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket {
 788                 assert!(failure_data.len() <= 256 - 2);
 789
 790                 let um = ChannelManager::gen_um_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
 791
 792                 let failuremsg = {
 793                         let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(2 + failure_data.len());
 794                         res.push(((failure_type >> 8) & 0xff) as u8);
 795                         res.push(((failure_type >> 0) & 0xff) as u8);
 796                         res.extend_from_slice(&failure_data[..]);
 797                         res
 798                 };
 799                 let pad = {
 800                         let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(256 - 2 - failure_data.len());
 801                         res.resize(256 - 2 - failure_data.len(), 0);
 802                         res
 803                 };
 804                 let mut packet = msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket {
 805                         hmac: [0; 32],
 806                         failuremsg: failuremsg,
 807                         pad: pad,
 808                 };
 809
 810                 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &um);
 811                 hmac.input(&packet.encode()[32..]);
 812                 hmac.raw_result(&mut packet.hmac);
 813
 814                 packet
 815         }
 816
 817         #[inline]
 818         fn build_first_hop_failure_packet(shared_secret: &SharedSecret, failure_type: u16, failure_data: &[u8]) -> msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
 819                 let failure_packet = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(shared_secret, failure_type, failure_data);
 820                 ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(shared_secret, &failure_packet.encode()[..])
 821         }
 822
 823         fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>) {
 824                 macro_rules! get_onion_hash {
 825                         () => {
 826                                 {
 827                                         let mut sha = Sha256::new();
 828                                         sha.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
 829                                         let mut onion_hash = [0; 32];
 830                                         sha.result(&mut onion_hash);
 831                                         onion_hash
 832                                 }
 833                         }
 834                 }
 835
 836                 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
 837                         log_info!(self, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC with invalid ephemeral pubkey");
 838                         return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
 839                                 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
 840                                 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
 841                                 sha256_of_onion: get_onion_hash!(),
 842                                 failure_code: 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6,
 843                         })), self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
 844                 }
 845
 846                 let shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(&self.secp_ctx, &msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key);
 847                 let (rho, mu) = ChannelManager::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
 848
 849                 let mut channel_state = None;
 850                 macro_rules! return_err {
 851                         ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
 852                                 {
 853                                         log_info!(self, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
 854                                         if channel_state.is_none() {
 855                                                 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
 856                                         }
 857                                         return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
 858                                                 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
 859                                                 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
 860                                                 reason: ChannelManager::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
 861                                         })), channel_state.unwrap());
 862                                 }
 863                         }
 864                 }
 865
 866                 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
 867                         //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
 868                         //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
 869                         //the hash doesn't really serve any purpuse - in the case of hashing all data, the
 870                         //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
 871                         //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
 872                         //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
 873                         return_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4, &get_onion_hash!());
 874                 }
 875
 876                 let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &mu);
 877                 hmac.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
 878                 hmac.input(&msg.payment_hash);
 879                 if hmac.result() != MacResult::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac) {
 880                         return_err!("HMAC Check failed", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 5, &get_onion_hash!());
 881                 }
 882
 883                 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&rho, &[0u8; 8]);
 884                 let next_hop_data = {
 885                         let mut decoded = [0; 65];
 886                         chacha.process(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[0..65], &mut decoded);
 887                         match msgs::OnionHopData::read(&mut Cursor::new(&decoded[..])) {
 888                                 Err(err) => {
 889                                         let error_code = match err {
 890                                                 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownVersion => 0x4000 | 1, // unknown realm byte
 891                                                 _ => 0x2000 | 2, // Should never happen
 892                                         };
 893                                         return_err!("Unable to decode our hop data", error_code, &[0;0]);
 894                                 },
 895                                 Ok(msg) => msg
 896                         }
 897                 };
 898
 899                 //TODO: Check that msg.cltv_expiry is within acceptable bounds!
 900
 901                 let pending_forward_info = if next_hop_data.hmac == [0; 32] {
 902                                 // OUR PAYMENT!
 903                                 if next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward != msg.amount_msat {
 904                                         return_err!("Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment", 19, &byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
 905                                 }
 906                                 if next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value != msg.cltv_expiry {
 907                                         return_err!("Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value", 18, &byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
 908                                 }
 909
 910                                 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
 911                                 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
 912                                 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
 913                                 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
 914
 915                                 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
 916                                         onion_packet: None,
 917                                         payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
 918                                         short_channel_id: 0,
 919                                         incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret.clone(),
 920                                         amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward,
 921                                         outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value,
 922                                 })
 923                         } else {
 924                                 let mut new_packet_data = [0; 20*65];
 925                                 chacha.process(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[65..], &mut new_packet_data[0..19*65]);
 926                                 chacha.process(&ChannelManager::ZERO[0..65], &mut new_packet_data[19*65..]);
 927
 928                                 let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
 929
 930                                 let blinding_factor = {
 931                                         let mut sha = Sha256::new();
 932                                         sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
 933                                         sha.input(&shared_secret[..]);
 934                                         let mut res = [0u8; 32];
 935                                         sha.result(&mut res);
 936                                         match SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &res) {
 937                                                 Err(_) => {
 938                                                         return_err!("Blinding factor is an invalid private key", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6, &get_onion_hash!());
 939                                                 },
 940                                                 Ok(key) => key
 941                                         }
 942                                 };
 943
 944                                 if let Err(_) = new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor) {
 945                                         return_err!("New blinding factor is an invalid private key", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6, &get_onion_hash!());
 946                                 }
 947
 948                                 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
 949                                         version: 0,
 950                                         public_key: Ok(new_pubkey),
 951                                         hop_data: new_packet_data,
 952                                         hmac: next_hop_data.hmac.clone(),
 953                                 };
 954
 955                                 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
 956                                         onion_packet: Some(outgoing_packet),
 957                                         payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
 958                                         short_channel_id: next_hop_data.data.short_channel_id,
 959                                         incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret.clone(),
 960                                         amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward,
 961                                         outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value,
 962                                 })
 963                         };
 964
 965                 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
 966                 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo { ref onion_packet, ref short_channel_id, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
 967                         if onion_packet.is_some() { // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject them in the body here
 968                                 let id_option = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
 969                                 let forwarding_id = match id_option {
 970                                         None => {
 971                                                 return_err!("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, &[0;0]);
 972                                         },
 973                                         Some(id) => id.clone(),
 974                                 };
 975                                 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = {
 976                                         let chan = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
 977                                         if !chan.is_live() {
 978                                                 Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 7, self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap()))
 979                                         } else {
 980                                                 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(self.fee_proportional_millionths as u64).and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&*self.fee_estimator) as u64) });
 981                                                 if fee.is_none() || msg.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() || (msg.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < *amt_to_forward {
 982                                                         Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap()))
 983                                                 } else {
 984                                                         if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 {
 985                                                                 Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap()))
 986                                                         } else {
 987                                                                 None
 988                                                         }
 989                                                 }
 990                                         }
 991                                 } {
 992                                         return_err!(err, code, &chan_update.encode_with_len()[..]);
 993                                 }
 994                         }
 995                 }
 996
 997                 (pending_forward_info, channel_state.unwrap())
 998         }
 999
1000         /// only fails if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id
1001         fn get_channel_update(&self, chan: &Channel) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, HandleError> {
1002                 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() {
1003                         None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Channel not yet established", action: None}),
1004                         Some(id) => id,
1005                 };
1006
1007                 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_their_node_id().serialize()[..];
1008
1009                 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
1010                         chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
1011                         short_channel_id: short_channel_id,
1012                         timestamp: chan.get_channel_update_count(),
1013                         flags: (!were_node_one) as u16 | ((!chan.is_live() as u16) << 1),
1014                         cltv_expiry_delta: CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA,
1015                         htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_our_htlc_minimum_msat(),
1016                         fee_base_msat: chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&*self.fee_estimator),
1017                         fee_proportional_millionths: self.fee_proportional_millionths,
1018                         excess_data: Vec::new(),
1019                 };
1020
1021                 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::from_data(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
1022                 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&Message::from_slice(&msg_hash[..]).unwrap(), &self.our_network_key);
1023
1024                 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
1025                         signature: sig,
1026                         contents: unsigned
1027                 })
1028         }
1029
1030         /// Sends a payment along a given route.
1031         ///
1032         /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
1033         /// fields for more info.
1034         ///
1035         /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
1036         /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
1037         /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
1038         /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
1039         /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
1040         /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
1041         ///
1042         /// May generate a SendHTLCs event on success, which should be relayed.
1043         ///
1044         /// Raises APIError::RoutError when invalid route or forward parameter
1045         /// (cltv_delta, fee, node public key) is specified
1046         pub fn send_payment(&self, route: Route, payment_hash: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1047                 if route.hops.len() < 1 || route.hops.len() > 20 {
1048                         return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"});
1049                 }
1050                 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
1051                 for (idx, hop) in route.hops.iter().enumerate() {
1052                         if idx != route.hops.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
1053                                 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"});
1054                         }
1055                 }
1056
1057                 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &{
1058                         let mut session_key = [0; 32];
1059                         rng::fill_bytes(&mut session_key);
1060                         session_key
1061                 }).expect("RNG is bad!");
1062
1063                 let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
1064
1065                 let onion_keys = secp_call!(ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv),
1066                                 APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"});
1067                 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = ChannelManager::build_onion_payloads(&route, cur_height)?;
1068                 let onion_packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, &payment_hash);
1069
1070                 let (first_hop_node_id, (update_add, commitment_signed, chan_monitor)) = {
1071                         let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1072                         let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1073
1074                         let id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&route.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
1075                                 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!"}),
1076                                 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1077                         };
1078
1079                         let res = {
1080                                 let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&id).unwrap();
1081                                 if chan.get_their_node_id() != route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey {
1082                                         return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
1083                                 }
1084                                 if !chan.is_live() {
1085                                         return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected!"});
1086                                 }
1087                                 chan.send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
1088                                         route: route.clone(),
1089                                         session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
1090                                 }, onion_packet).map_err(|he| APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: he.err})?
1091                         };
1092
1093                         let first_hop_node_id = route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey;
1094
1095                         match res {
1096                                 Some(msgs) => (first_hop_node_id, msgs),
1097                                 None => return Ok(()),
1098                         }
1099                 };
1100
1101                 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1102                         unimplemented!();
1103                 }
1104
1105                 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1106                 events.push(events::Event::UpdateHTLCs {
1107                         node_id: first_hop_node_id,
1108                         updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1109                                 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
1110                                 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1111                                 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1112                                 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1113                                 update_fee: None,
1114                                 commitment_signed,
1115                         },
1116                 });
1117                 Ok(())
1118         }
1119
1120         /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
1121         ///
1122         /// Panics if a funding transaction has already been provided for this channel.
1123         ///
1124         /// May panic if the funding_txo is duplicative with some other channel (note that this should
1125         /// be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction keys per-channel).
1126         pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_txo: OutPoint) {
1127                 macro_rules! add_pending_event {
1128                         ($event: expr) => {
1129                                 {
1130                                         let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1131                                         pending_events.push($event);
1132                                 }
1133                         }
1134                 }
1135
1136                 let (chan, msg, chan_monitor) = {
1137                         let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1138                         match channel_state.by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
1139                                 Some(mut chan) => {
1140                                         match chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_txo) {
1141                                                 Ok(funding_msg) => {
1142                                                         (chan, funding_msg.0, funding_msg.1)
1143                                                 },
1144                                                 Err(e) => {
1145                                                         log_error!(self, "Got bad signatures: {}!", e.err);
1146                                                         mem::drop(channel_state);
1147                                                         add_pending_event!(events::Event::HandleError {
1148                                                                 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1149                                                                 action: e.action,
1150                                                         });
1151                                                         return;
1152                                                 },
1153                                         }
1154                                 },
1155                                 None => return
1156                         }
1157                 }; // Release channel lock for install_watch_outpoint call,
1158                 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1159                         unimplemented!();
1160                 }
1161                 add_pending_event!(events::Event::SendFundingCreated {
1162                         node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1163                         msg: msg,
1164                 });
1165
1166                 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1167                 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
1168                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1169                                 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
1170                         },
1171                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1172                                 e.insert(chan);
1173                         }
1174                 }
1175         }
1176
1177         fn get_announcement_sigs(&self, chan: &Channel) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures> {
1178                 if !chan.should_announce() { return None }
1179
1180                 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = match chan.get_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
1181                         Ok(res) => res,
1182                         Err(_) => return None, // Only in case of state precondition violations eg channel is closing
1183                 };
1184                 let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
1185                 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
1186
1187                 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
1188                         channel_id: chan.channel_id(),
1189                         short_channel_id: chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
1190                         node_signature: our_node_sig,
1191                         bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
1192                 })
1193         }
1194
1195         /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
1196         ///
1197         /// Should only really ever be called in response to an PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
1198         /// Will likely generate further events.
1199         pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
1200                 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
1201                 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
1202                 {
1203                         let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1204                         let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1205
1206                         if cfg!(not(feature = "fuzztarget")) && Instant::now() < *channel_state.next_forward {
1207                                 return;
1208                         }
1209
1210                         for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
1211                                 if short_chan_id != 0 {
1212                                         let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) {
1213                                                 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1214                                                 None => {
1215                                                         failed_forwards.reserve(pending_forwards.len());
1216                                                         for HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1217                                                                 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1218                                                                         short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1219                                                                         htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1220                                                                         incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1221                                                                 });
1222                                                                 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash, 0x4000 | 10, None));
1223                                                         }
1224                                                         continue;
1225                                                 }
1226                                         };
1227                                         let forward_chan = &mut channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&forward_chan_id).unwrap();
1228
1229                                         let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
1230                                         for HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1231                                                 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1232                                                         short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1233                                                         htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1234                                                         incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1235                                                 });
1236                                                 match forward_chan.send_htlc(forward_info.amt_to_forward, forward_info.payment_hash, forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), forward_info.onion_packet.unwrap()) {
1237                                                         Err(_e) => {
1238                                                                 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(forward_chan).unwrap();
1239                                                                 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash, 0x1000 | 7, Some(chan_update)));
1240                                                                 continue;
1241                                                         },
1242                                                         Ok(update_add) => {
1243                                                                 match update_add {
1244                                                                         Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
1245                                                                         None => {
1246                                                                                 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
1247                                                                                 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
1248                                                                                 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
1249                                                                                 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
1250                                                                                 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
1251                                                                                 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
1252                                                                                 // this channel currently :/.
1253                                                                         }
1254                                                                 }
1255                                                         }
1256                                                 }
1257                                         }
1258
1259                                         if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
1260                                                 let (commitment_msg, monitor) = match forward_chan.send_commitment() {
1261                                                         Ok(res) => res,
1262                                                         Err(e) => {
1263                                                                 if let &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer{msg: Some(ref _err_msg)}) = &e.action {
1264                                                                 } else if let &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{msg: ref _err_msg}) = &e.action {
1265                                                                 } else {
1266                                                                         panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
1267                                                                 }
1268                                                                 //TODO: Handle...this is bad!
1269                                                                 continue;
1270                                                         },
1271                                                 };
1272                                                 new_events.push((Some(monitor), events::Event::UpdateHTLCs {
1273                                                         node_id: forward_chan.get_their_node_id(),
1274                                                         updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1275                                                                 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
1276                                                                 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1277                                                                 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1278                                                                 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1279                                                                 update_fee: None,
1280                                                                 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
1281                                                         },
1282                                                 }));
1283                                         }
1284                                 } else {
1285                                         for HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1286                                                 let prev_hop_data = HTLCPreviousHopData {
1287                                                         short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1288                                                         htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1289                                                         incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1290                                                 };
1291                                                 match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(forward_info.payment_hash) {
1292                                                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => entry.get_mut().push(prev_hop_data),
1293                                                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(vec![prev_hop_data]); },
1294                                                 };
1295                                                 new_events.push((None, events::Event::PaymentReceived {
1296                                                         payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
1297                                                         amt: forward_info.amt_to_forward,
1298                                                 }));
1299                                         }
1300                                 }
1301                         }
1302                 }
1303
1304                 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_code, update) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
1305                         match update {
1306                                 None => self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: Vec::new() }),
1307                                 Some(chan_update) => self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: chan_update.encode_with_len() }),
1308                         };
1309                 }
1310
1311                 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
1312
1313                 new_events.retain(|event| {
1314                         if let &Some(ref monitor) = &event.0 {
1315                                 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor.clone()) {
1316                                         unimplemented!();// but def dont push the event...
1317                                 }
1318                         }
1319                         true
1320                 });
1321
1322                 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1323                 events.reserve(new_events.len());
1324                 for event in new_events.drain(..) {
1325                         events.push(event.1);
1326                 }
1327         }
1328
1329         /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown after a PaymentReceived event.
1330         pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &[u8; 32]) -> bool {
1331                 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1332                 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
1333                 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
1334                         for htlc_with_hash in sources.drain(..) {
1335                                 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
1336                                 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(), HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_with_hash), payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: Vec::new() });
1337                         }
1338                         true
1339                 } else { false }
1340         }
1341
1342         /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
1343         /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here.
1344         /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes
1345         /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may
1346         /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to
1347         /// still-available channels.
1348         fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &[u8; 32], onion_error: HTLCFailReason) {
1349                 match source {
1350                         HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
1351                                 mem::drop(channel_state);
1352
1353                                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1354                                 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
1355                                         payment_hash: payment_hash.clone()
1356                                 });
1357                         },
1358                         HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret }) => {
1359                                 let err_packet = match onion_error {
1360                                         HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
1361                                                 let packet = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
1362                                                 ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
1363                                         },
1364                                         HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err } => {
1365                                                 ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
1366                                         }
1367                                 };
1368
1369                                 let (node_id, fail_msgs) = {
1370                                         let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id) {
1371                                                 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1372                                                 None => return
1373                                         };
1374
1375                                         let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&chan_id).unwrap();
1376                                         match chan.get_update_fail_htlc_and_commit(htlc_id, err_packet) {
1377                                                 Ok(msg) => (chan.get_their_node_id(), msg),
1378                                                 Err(_e) => {
1379                                                         //TODO: Do something with e?
1380                                                         return;
1381                                                 },
1382                                         }
1383                                 };
1384
1385                                 match fail_msgs {
1386                                         Some((msg, commitment_msg, chan_monitor)) => {
1387                                                 mem::drop(channel_state);
1388
1389                                                 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1390                                                         unimplemented!();// but def dont push the event...
1391                                                 }
1392
1393                                                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1394                                                 pending_events.push(events::Event::UpdateHTLCs {
1395                                                         node_id,
1396                                                         updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1397                                                                 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1398                                                                 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1399                                                                 update_fail_htlcs: vec![msg],
1400                                                                 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1401                                                                 update_fee: None,
1402                                                                 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
1403                                                         },
1404                                                 });
1405                                         },
1406                                         None => {},
1407                                 }
1408                         },
1409                 }
1410         }
1411
1412         /// Provides a payment preimage in response to a PaymentReceived event, returning true and
1413         /// generating message events for the net layer to claim the payment, if possible. Thus, you
1414         /// should probably kick the net layer to go send messages if this returns true!
1415         ///
1416         /// May panic if called except in response to a PaymentReceived event.
1417         pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) -> bool {
1418                 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
1419                 sha.input(&payment_preimage);
1420                 let mut payment_hash = [0; 32];
1421                 sha.result(&mut payment_hash);
1422
1423                 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1424                 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash);
1425                 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
1426                         for htlc_with_hash in sources.drain(..) {
1427                                 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
1428                                 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(), HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_with_hash), payment_preimage);
1429                         }
1430                         true
1431                 } else { false }
1432         }
1433         fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) {
1434                 match source {
1435                         HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
1436                                 mem::drop(channel_state);
1437                                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1438                                 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentSent {
1439                                         payment_preimage
1440                                 });
1441                         },
1442                         HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, .. }) => {
1443                                 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
1444                                 let (node_id, fulfill_msgs) = {
1445                                         let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id) {
1446                                                 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1447                                                 None => {
1448                                                         // TODO: There is probably a channel manager somewhere that needs to
1449                                                         // learn the preimage as the channel already hit the chain and that's
1450                                                         // why its missing.
1451                                                         return
1452                                                 }
1453                                         };
1454
1455                                         let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&chan_id).unwrap();
1456                                         match chan.get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(htlc_id, payment_preimage) {
1457                                                 Ok(msg) => (chan.get_their_node_id(), msg),
1458                                                 Err(_e) => {
1459                                                         // TODO: There is probably a channel manager somewhere that needs to
1460                                                         // learn the preimage as the channel may be about to hit the chain.
1461                                                         //TODO: Do something with e?
1462                                                         return
1463                                                 },
1464                                         }
1465                                 };
1466
1467                                 mem::drop(channel_state);
1468                                 if let Some(chan_monitor) = fulfill_msgs.1 {
1469                                         if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1470                                                 unimplemented!();// but def dont push the event...
1471                                         }
1472                                 }
1473
1474                                 if let Some((msg, commitment_msg)) = fulfill_msgs.0 {
1475                                         let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1476                                         pending_events.push(events::Event::UpdateHTLCs {
1477                                                 node_id: node_id,
1478                                                 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1479                                                         update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1480                                                         update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
1481                                                         update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1482                                                         update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1483                                                         update_fee: None,
1484                                                         commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
1485                                                 }
1486                                         });
1487                                 }
1488                         },
1489                 }
1490         }
1491
1492         /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
1493         pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
1494                 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key)
1495         }
1496
1497         /// Used to restore channels to normal operation after a
1498         /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure was returned from a channel monitor update
1499         /// operation.
1500         pub fn test_restore_channel_monitor(&self) {
1501                 unimplemented!();
1502         }
1503
1504         fn internal_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<msgs::AcceptChannel, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1505                 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
1506                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash", msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
1507                 }
1508                 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1509                 if channel_state.by_id.contains_key(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
1510                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!", msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
1511                 }
1512
1513                 let chan_keys = if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
1514                         ChannelKeys {
1515                                 funding_key:               SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0]).unwrap(),
1516                                 revocation_base_key:       SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 2, 0]).unwrap(),
1517                                 payment_base_key:          SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 3, 0]).unwrap(),
1518                                 delayed_payment_base_key:  SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 4, 0]).unwrap(),
1519                                 htlc_base_key:             SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 5, 0]).unwrap(),
1520                                 channel_close_key:         SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 6, 0]).unwrap(),
1521                                 channel_monitor_claim_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 7, 0]).unwrap(),
1522                                 commitment_seed: [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0],
1523                         }
1524                 } else {
1525                         let mut key_seed = [0u8; 32];
1526                         rng::fill_bytes(&mut key_seed);
1527                         match ChannelKeys::new_from_seed(&key_seed) {
1528                                 Ok(key) => key,
1529                                 Err(_) => panic!("RNG is busted!")
1530                         }
1531                 };
1532
1533                 let channel = Channel::new_from_req(&*self.fee_estimator, chan_keys, their_node_id.clone(), msg, 0, false, self.announce_channels_publicly, Arc::clone(&self.logger))
1534                         .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id))?;
1535                 let accept_msg = channel.get_accept_channel();
1536                 channel_state.by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
1537                 Ok(accept_msg)
1538         }
1539
1540         fn internal_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1541                 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
1542                         let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1543                         match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
1544                                 Some(chan) => {
1545                                         if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1546                                                 //TODO: see issue #153, need a consistent behavior on obnoxious behavior from random node
1547                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.temporary_channel_id));
1548                                         }
1549                                         chan.accept_channel(&msg)
1550                                                 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id))?;
1551                                         (chan.get_value_satoshis(), chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get_user_id())
1552                                 },
1553                                 //TODO: same as above
1554                                 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.temporary_channel_id))
1555                         }
1556                 };
1557                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1558                 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
1559                         temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
1560                         channel_value_satoshis: value,
1561                         output_script: output_script,
1562                         user_channel_id: user_id,
1563                 });
1564                 Ok(())
1565         }
1566
1567         fn internal_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<msgs::FundingSigned, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1568                 let (chan, funding_msg, monitor_update) = {
1569                         let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1570                         match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
1571                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1572                                         if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1573                                                 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1574                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.temporary_channel_id));
1575                                         }
1576                                         match chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg) {
1577                                                 Ok((funding_msg, monitor_update)) => {
1578                                                         (chan.remove(), funding_msg, monitor_update)
1579                                                 },
1580                                                 Err(e) => {
1581                                                         return Err(e).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))
1582                                                 }
1583                                         }
1584                                 },
1585                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.temporary_channel_id))
1586                         }
1587                 }; // Release channel lock for install_watch_outpoint call,
1588                    // note that this means if the remote end is misbehaving and sends a message for the same
1589                    // channel back-to-back with funding_created, we'll end up thinking they sent a message
1590                    // for a bogus channel.
1591                 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor_update.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1592                         unimplemented!();
1593                 }
1594                 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1595                 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
1596                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1597                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id", funding_msg.channel_id))
1598                         },
1599                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1600                                 e.insert(chan);
1601                         }
1602                 }
1603                 Ok(funding_msg)
1604         }
1605
1606         fn internal_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1607                 let (funding_txo, user_id, monitor) = {
1608                         let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1609                         match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1610                                 Some(chan) => {
1611                                         if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1612                                                 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1613                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1614                                         }
1615                                         let chan_monitor = chan.funding_signed(&msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?;
1616                                         (chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan.get_user_id(), chan_monitor)
1617                                 },
1618                                 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1619                         }
1620                 };
1621                 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
1622                         unimplemented!();
1623                 }
1624                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1625                 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingBroadcastSafe {
1626                         funding_txo: funding_txo,
1627                         user_channel_id: user_id,
1628                 });
1629                 Ok(())
1630         }
1631
1632         fn internal_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1633                 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1634                 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1635                         Some(chan) => {
1636                                 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1637                                         //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1638                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1639                                 }
1640                                 chan.funding_locked(&msg)
1641                                         .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))?;
1642                                 return Ok(self.get_announcement_sigs(chan));
1643                         },
1644                         None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1645                 };
1646         }
1647
1648         fn internal_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1649                 let (mut res, chan_option) = {
1650                         let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1651                         let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1652
1653                         match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
1654                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1655                                         if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1656                                                 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1657                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1658                                         }
1659                                         let res = chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?;
1660                                         if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1661                                                 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1662                                                         channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1663                                                 }
1664                                                 (res, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
1665                                         } else { (res, None) }
1666                                 },
1667                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1668                         }
1669                 };
1670                 for htlc_source in res.2.drain(..) {
1671                         // unknown_next_peer...I dunno who that is anymore....
1672                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() });
1673                 }
1674                 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
1675                         if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1676                                 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1677                                 events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1678                                         msg: update
1679                                 });
1680                         }
1681                 }
1682                 Ok((res.0, res.1))
1683         }
1684
1685         fn internal_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1686                 let (res, chan_option) = {
1687                         let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1688                         let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1689                         match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
1690                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1691                                         if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1692                                                 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1693                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1694                                         }
1695                                         let res = chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?;
1696                                         if res.1.is_some() {
1697                                                 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
1698                                                 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
1699                                                 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
1700                                                 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
1701                                                 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
1702                                                 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1703                                                         channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1704                                                 }
1705                                                 (res, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
1706                                         } else { (res, None) }
1707                                 },
1708                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1709                         }
1710                 };
1711                 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = res.1 {
1712                         self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
1713                 }
1714                 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
1715                         if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1716                                 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1717                                 events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1718                                         msg: update
1719                                 });
1720                         }
1721                 }
1722                 Ok(res.0)
1723         }
1724
1725         fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1726                 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
1727                 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
1728                 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
1729                 //
1730                 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
1731                 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
1732                 //encrypted with the same key. Its not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
1733                 //but we should prevent it anyway.
1734
1735                 let (pending_forward_info, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
1736                 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1737
1738                 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1739                         Some(chan) => {
1740                                 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1741                                         //TODO: here MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1742                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1743                                 }
1744                                 if !chan.is_usable() {
1745                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(HandleError{err: "Channel not yet available for receiving HTLCs", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError)}));
1746                                 }
1747                                 chan.update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))
1748                         },
1749                         None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1750                 }
1751         }
1752
1753         fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1754                 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1755                 let htlc_source = match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1756                         Some(chan) => {
1757                                 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1758                                         //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1759                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1760                                 }
1761                                 chan.update_fulfill_htlc(&msg)
1762                                         .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))?.clone()
1763                         },
1764                         None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1765                 };
1766                 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_state, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone());
1767                 Ok(())
1768         }
1769
1770         fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<Option<msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate>, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1771                 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1772                 let htlc_source = match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1773                         Some(chan) => {
1774                                 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1775                                         //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1776                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1777                                 }
1778                                 chan.update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err: msg.reason.clone() })
1779                                         .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))
1780                         },
1781                         None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1782                 }?;
1783
1784                 match htlc_source {
1785                         &HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref route, ref session_priv, .. } => {
1786                                 // Handle packed channel/node updates for passing back for the route handler
1787                                 let mut packet_decrypted = msg.reason.data.clone();
1788                                 let mut res = None;
1789                                 Self::construct_onion_keys_callback(&self.secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv, |shared_secret, _, _, route_hop| {
1790                                         if res.is_some() { return; }
1791
1792                                         let ammag = ChannelManager::gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
1793
1794                                         let mut decryption_tmp = Vec::with_capacity(packet_decrypted.len());
1795                                         decryption_tmp.resize(packet_decrypted.len(), 0);
1796                                         let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&ammag, &[0u8; 8]);
1797                                         chacha.process(&packet_decrypted, &mut decryption_tmp[..]);
1798                                         packet_decrypted = decryption_tmp;
1799
1800                                         if let Ok(err_packet) = msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket::read(&mut Cursor::new(&packet_decrypted)) {
1801                                                 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() >= 2 {
1802                                                         let um = ChannelManager::gen_um_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
1803
1804                                                         let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &um);
1805                                                         hmac.input(&err_packet.encode()[32..]);
1806                                                         let mut calc_tag = [0u8; 32];
1807                                                         hmac.raw_result(&mut calc_tag);
1808                                                         if crypto::util::fixed_time_eq(&calc_tag, &err_packet.hmac) {
1809                                                                 const UNKNOWN_CHAN: u16 = 0x4000|10;
1810                                                                 const TEMP_CHAN_FAILURE: u16 = 0x4000|7;
1811                                                                 match byte_utils::slice_to_be16(&err_packet.failuremsg[0..2]) {
1812                                                                         TEMP_CHAN_FAILURE => {
1813                                                                                 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() >= 4 {
1814                                                                                         let update_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be16(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..4]) as usize;
1815                                                                                         if err_packet.failuremsg.len() >= 4 + update_len {
1816                                                                                                 if let Ok(chan_update) = msgs::ChannelUpdate::read(&mut Cursor::new(&err_packet.failuremsg[4..4 + update_len])) {
1817                                                                                                         res = Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage {
1818                                                                                                                 msg: chan_update,
1819                                                                                                         });
1820                                                                                                 }
1821                                                                                         }
1822                                                                                 }
1823                                                                         },
1824                                                                         UNKNOWN_CHAN => {
1825                                                                                 // No such next-hop. We know this came from the
1826                                                                                 // current node as the HMAC validated.
1827                                                                                 res = Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed {
1828                                                                                         short_channel_id: route_hop.short_channel_id,
1829                                                                                         is_permanent: true,
1830                                                                                 });
1831                                                                         },
1832                                                                         _ => {}, //TODO: Enumerate all of these!
1833                                                                 }
1834                                                         }
1835                                                 }
1836                                         }
1837                                 }).unwrap();
1838                                 Ok(res)
1839                         },
1840                         _ => { Ok(None) },
1841                 }
1842         }
1843
1844         fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1845                 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1846                 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1847                         Some(chan) => {
1848                                 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1849                                         //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1850                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1851                                 }
1852                                 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) != 0 {
1853                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_close_chan("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION set", msg.channel_id));
1854                                 }
1855                                 chan.update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() })
1856                                         .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))?;
1857                                 Ok(())
1858                         },
1859                         None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1860                 }
1861         }
1862
1863         fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(msgs::RevokeAndACK, Option<msgs::CommitmentSigned>), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1864                 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, chan_monitor) = {
1865                         let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1866                         match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1867                                 Some(chan) => {
1868                                         if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1869                                                 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1870                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1871                                         }
1872                                         chan.commitment_signed(&msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?
1873                                 },
1874                                 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1875                         }
1876                 };
1877                 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1878                         unimplemented!();
1879                 }
1880
1881                 Ok((revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed))
1882         }
1883
1884         fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1885                 let ((res, mut pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, chan_monitor), short_channel_id) = {
1886                         let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1887                         match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1888                                 Some(chan) => {
1889                                         if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1890                                                 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1891                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1892                                         }
1893                                         (chan.revoke_and_ack(&msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?, chan.get_short_channel_id().expect("RAA should only work on a short-id-available channel"))
1894                                 },
1895                                 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1896                         }
1897                 };
1898                 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1899                         unimplemented!();
1900                 }
1901                 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
1902                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
1903                 }
1904
1905                 let mut forward_event = None;
1906                 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
1907                         let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1908                         if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
1909                                 forward_event = Some(Instant::now() + Duration::from_millis(((rng::rand_f32() * 4.0 + 1.0) * MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS as f32) as u64));
1910                                 channel_state.next_forward = forward_event.unwrap();
1911                         }
1912                         for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1913                                 match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(forward_info.short_channel_id) {
1914                                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
1915                                                 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id: short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info });
1916                                         },
1917                                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1918                                                 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id: short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info }));
1919                                         }
1920                                 }
1921                         }
1922                 }
1923                 match forward_event {
1924                         Some(time) => {
1925                                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1926                                 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
1927                                         time_forwardable: time
1928                                 });
1929                         }
1930                         None => {},
1931                 }
1932
1933                 Ok(res)
1934         }
1935
1936         fn internal_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1937                 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1938                 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1939                         Some(chan) => {
1940                                 if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1941                                         //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1942                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1943                                 }
1944                                 chan.update_fee(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))
1945                         },
1946                         None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1947                 }
1948         }
1949
1950         fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1951                 let (chan_announcement, chan_update) = {
1952                         let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1953                         match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1954                                 Some(chan) => {
1955                                         if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1956                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1957                                         }
1958                                         if !chan.is_usable() {
1959                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(HandleError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError)}));
1960                                         }
1961
1962                                         let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
1963                                         let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = chan.get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), self.genesis_hash.clone())
1964                                                 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))?;
1965
1966                                         let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_id;
1967                                         let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
1968                                         let bad_sig_action = MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_close_chan("Bad announcement_signatures node_signature", msg.channel_id);
1969                                         secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.node_id_2 } else { &announcement.node_id_1 }), bad_sig_action);
1970                                         secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.bitcoin_key_2 } else { &announcement.bitcoin_key_1 }), bad_sig_action);
1971
1972                                         let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
1973
1974                                         (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
1975                                                 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { msg.node_signature },
1976                                                 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.node_signature } else { our_node_sig },
1977                                                 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { msg.bitcoin_signature },
1978                                                 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.bitcoin_signature } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
1979                                                 contents: announcement,
1980                                         }, self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap()) // can only fail if we're not in a ready state
1981                                 },
1982                                 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1983                         }
1984                 };
1985                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1986                 pending_events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { msg: chan_announcement, update_msg: chan_update });
1987                 Ok(())
1988         }
1989
1990         fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>, Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1991                 let (res, chan_monitor) = {
1992                         let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1993                         match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
1994                                 Some(chan) => {
1995                                         if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1996                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1997                                         }
1998                                         let (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, channel_monitor) = chan.channel_reestablish(msg)
1999                                                 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))?;
2000                                         (Ok((funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update)), channel_monitor)
2001                                 },
2002                                 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2003                         }
2004                 };
2005                 if let Some(monitor) = chan_monitor {
2006                         if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
2007                                 unimplemented!();
2008                         }
2009                 }
2010                 res
2011         }
2012
2013         /// Begin Update fee process. Allowed only on an outbound channel.
2014         /// If successful, will generate a UpdateHTLCs event, so you should probably poll
2015         /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
2016         /// Note: This API is likely to change!
2017         #[doc(hidden)]
2018         pub fn update_fee(&self, channel_id: [u8;32], feerate_per_kw: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2019                 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2020                 match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
2021                         None => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel"}),
2022                         Some(chan) => {
2023                                 if !chan.is_outbound() {
2024                                         return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "update_fee cannot be sent for an inbound channel"});
2025                                 }
2026                                 if !chan.is_live() {
2027                                         return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel is either not yet fully established or peer is currently disconnected"});
2028                                 }
2029                                 if let Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, chan_monitor)) = chan.send_update_fee_and_commit(feerate_per_kw).map_err(|e| APIError::APIMisuseError{err: e.err})? {
2030                                         if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
2031                                                 unimplemented!();
2032                                         }
2033                                         let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2034                                         pending_events.push(events::Event::UpdateHTLCs {
2035                                                 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
2036                                                 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2037                                                         update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2038                                                         update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2039                                                         update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2040                                                         update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2041                                                         update_fee: Some(update_fee),
2042                                                         commitment_signed,
2043                                                 },
2044                                         });
2045                                 }
2046                         },
2047                 }
2048                 Ok(())
2049         }
2050 }
2051
2052 impl events::EventsProvider for ChannelManager {
2053         fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
2054                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2055                 let mut ret = Vec::new();
2056                 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut *pending_events);
2057                 ret
2058         }
2059 }
2060
2061 impl ChainListener for ChannelManager {
2062         fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) {
2063                 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
2064                 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2065                 {
2066                         let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2067                         let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2068                         let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
2069                         channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
2070                                 let chan_res = channel.block_connected(header, height, txn_matched, indexes_of_txn_matched);
2071                                 if let Ok(Some(funding_locked)) = chan_res {
2072                                         let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel);
2073                                         new_events.push(events::Event::SendFundingLocked {
2074                                                 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2075                                                 msg: funding_locked,
2076                                                 announcement_sigs: announcement_sigs
2077                                         });
2078                                         short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
2079                                 } else if let Err(e) = chan_res {
2080                                         new_events.push(events::Event::HandleError {
2081                                                 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2082                                                 action: e.action,
2083                                         });
2084                                         if channel.is_shutdown() {
2085                                                 return false;
2086                                         }
2087                                 }
2088                                 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
2089                                         for tx in txn_matched {
2090                                                 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
2091                                                         if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
2092                                                                 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
2093                                                                         short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2094                                                                 }
2095                                                                 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain. We go ahead and
2096                                                                 // broadcast our latest local state as well here, just in case its
2097                                                                 // some kind of SPV attack, though we expect these to be dropped.
2098                                                                 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown());
2099                                                                 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
2100                                                                         new_events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2101                                                                                 msg: update
2102                                                                         });
2103                                                                 }
2104                                                                 return false;
2105                                                         }
2106                                                 }
2107                                         }
2108                                 }
2109                                 if channel.is_funding_initiated() && channel.channel_monitor().would_broadcast_at_height(height) {
2110                                         if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
2111                                                 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2112                                         }
2113                                         failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown());
2114                                         // If would_broadcast_at_height() is true, the channel_monitor will broadcast
2115                                         // the latest local tx for us, so we should skip that here (it doesn't really
2116                                         // hurt anything, but does make tests a bit simpler).
2117                                         failed_channels.last_mut().unwrap().0 = Vec::new();
2118                                         if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
2119                                                 new_events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2120                                                         msg: update
2121                                                 });
2122                                         }
2123                                         return false;
2124                                 }
2125                                 true
2126                         });
2127                 }
2128                 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2129                         self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2130                 }
2131                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2132                 for funding_locked in new_events.drain(..) {
2133                         pending_events.push(funding_locked);
2134                 }
2135                 self.latest_block_height.store(height as usize, Ordering::Release);
2136         }
2137
2138         /// We force-close the channel without letting our counterparty participate in the shutdown
2139         fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader) {
2140                 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
2141                 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2142                 {
2143                         let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2144                         let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2145                         let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
2146                         channel_state.by_id.retain(|_,  v| {
2147                                 if v.block_disconnected(header) {
2148                                         if let Some(short_id) = v.get_short_channel_id() {
2149                                                 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2150                                         }
2151                                         failed_channels.push(v.force_shutdown());
2152                                         if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&v) {
2153                                                 new_events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2154                                                         msg: update
2155                                                 });
2156                                         }
2157                                         false
2158                                 } else {
2159                                         true
2160                                 }
2161                         });
2162                 }
2163                 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2164                         self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2165                 }
2166                 if !new_events.is_empty() {
2167                         let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2168                         for funding_locked in new_events.drain(..) {
2169                                 pending_events.push(funding_locked);
2170                         }
2171                 }
2172                 self.latest_block_height.fetch_sub(1, Ordering::AcqRel);
2173         }
2174 }
2175
2176 macro_rules! handle_error {
2177         ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $their_node_id: expr) => {
2178                 match $internal {
2179                         Ok(msg) => Ok(msg),
2180                         Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, needs_channel_force_close }) => {
2181                                 if needs_channel_force_close {
2182                                         match &err.action {
2183                                                 &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg: Some(ref msg) }) => {
2184                                                         if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
2185                                                                 $self.peer_disconnected(&$their_node_id, true);
2186                                                         } else {
2187                                                                 $self.force_close_channel(&msg.channel_id);
2188                                                         }
2189                                                 },
2190                                                 &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg: None }) => {},
2191                                                 &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) => {},
2192                                                 &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }) => {
2193                                                         if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
2194                                                                 $self.peer_disconnected(&$their_node_id, true);
2195                                                         } else {
2196                                                                 $self.force_close_channel(&msg.channel_id);
2197                                                         }
2198                                                 },
2199                                                 &None => {},
2200                                         }
2201                                 }
2202                                 Err(err)
2203                         },
2204                 }
2205         }
2206 }
2207
2208 impl ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager {
2209         //TODO: Handle errors and close channel (or so)
2210         fn handle_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<msgs::AcceptChannel, HandleError> {
2211                 handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2212         }
2213
2214         fn handle_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2215                 handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2216         }
2217
2218         fn handle_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<msgs::FundingSigned, HandleError> {
2219                 handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2220         }
2221
2222         fn handle_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2223                 handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2224         }
2225
2226         fn handle_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, HandleError> {
2227                 handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_locked(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2228         }
2229
2230         fn handle_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>), HandleError> {
2231                 handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2232         }
2233
2234         fn handle_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, HandleError> {
2235                 handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2236         }
2237
2238         fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), msgs::HandleError> {
2239                 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2240         }
2241
2242         fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2243                 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2244         }
2245
2246         fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<Option<msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate>, HandleError> {
2247                 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2248         }
2249
2250         fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2251                 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2252         }
2253
2254         fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(msgs::RevokeAndACK, Option<msgs::CommitmentSigned>), HandleError> {
2255                 handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2256         }
2257
2258         fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, HandleError> {
2259                 handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2260         }
2261
2262         fn handle_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2263                 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2264         }
2265
2266         fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2267                 handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2268         }
2269
2270         fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>, Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>), HandleError> {
2271                 handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2272         }
2273
2274         fn peer_disconnected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
2275                 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
2276                 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2277                 let mut failed_payments = Vec::new();
2278                 {
2279                         let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2280                         let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2281                         let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
2282                         if no_connection_possible {
2283                                 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2284                                         if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2285                                                 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
2286                                                         short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2287                                                 }
2288                                                 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown());
2289                                                 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2290                                                         new_events.push(events::Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2291                                                                 msg: update
2292                                                         });
2293                                                 }
2294                                                 false
2295                                         } else {
2296                                                 true
2297                                         }
2298                                 });
2299                         } else {
2300                                 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2301                                         if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2302                                                 //TODO: mark channel disabled (and maybe announce such after a timeout).
2303                                                 let failed_adds = chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused();
2304                                                 if !failed_adds.is_empty() {
2305                                                         let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(&chan).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe
2306                                                         failed_payments.push((chan_update, failed_adds));
2307                                                 }
2308                                                 if chan.is_shutdown() {
2309                                                         if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
2310                                                                 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2311                                                         }
2312                                                         return false;
2313                                                 }
2314                                         }
2315                                         true
2316                                 })
2317                         }
2318                 }
2319                 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2320                         self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2321                 }
2322                 if !new_events.is_empty() {
2323                         let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2324                         for event in new_events.drain(..) {
2325                                 pending_events.push(event);
2326                         }
2327                 }
2328                 for (chan_update, mut htlc_sources) in failed_payments {
2329                         for (htlc_source, payment_hash) in htlc_sources.drain(..) {
2330                                 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.clone() });
2331                         }
2332                 }
2333         }
2334
2335         fn peer_connected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Vec<msgs::ChannelReestablish> {
2336                 let mut res = Vec::new();
2337                 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2338                 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2339                         if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2340                                 if !chan.have_received_message() {
2341                                         // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
2342                                         // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
2343                                         // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
2344                                         // drop it.
2345                                         false
2346                                 } else {
2347                                         res.push(chan.get_channel_reestablish());
2348                                         true
2349                                 }
2350                         } else { true }
2351                 });
2352                 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
2353                 res
2354         }
2355
2356         fn handle_error(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
2357                 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
2358                         for chan in self.list_channels() {
2359                                 if chan.remote_network_id == *their_node_id {
2360                                         self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
2361                                 }
2362                         }
2363                 } else {
2364                         self.force_close_channel(&msg.channel_id);
2365                 }
2366         }
2367 }
2368
2369 #[cfg(test)]
2370 mod tests {
2371         use chain::chaininterface;
2372         use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
2373         use chain::chaininterface::ChainListener;
2374         use ln::channelmanager::{ChannelManager,OnionKeys};
2375         use ln::channelmonitor::{CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS};
2376         use ln::router::{Route, RouteHop, Router};
2377         use ln::msgs;
2378         use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler,RoutingMessageHandler};
2379         use util::test_utils;
2380         use util::events::{Event, EventsProvider};
2381         use util::errors::APIError;
2382         use util::logger::Logger;
2383         use util::ser::Writeable;
2384
2385         use bitcoin::util::hash::Sha256dHash;
2386         use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
2387         use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
2388         use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
2389         use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
2390         use bitcoin::network::serialize::serialize;
2391         use bitcoin::network::serialize::BitcoinHash;
2392
2393         use hex;
2394
2395         use secp256k1::{Secp256k1, Message};
2396         use secp256k1::key::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
2397
2398         use crypto::sha2::Sha256;
2399         use crypto::digest::Digest;
2400
2401         use rand::{thread_rng,Rng};
2402
2403         use std::cell::RefCell;
2404         use std::collections::{BTreeSet, HashMap};
2405         use std::default::Default;
2406         use std::rc::Rc;
2407         use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
2408         use std::sync::atomic::Ordering;
2409         use std::time::Instant;
2410         use std::mem;
2411
2412         fn build_test_onion_keys() -> Vec<OnionKeys> {
2413                 // Keys from BOLT 4, used in both test vector tests
2414                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2415
2416                 let route = Route {
2417                         hops: vec!(
2418                                         RouteHop {
2419                                                 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("02eec7245d6b7d2ccb30380bfbe2a3648cd7a942653f5aa340edcea1f283686619").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
2420                                                 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
2421                                         },
2422                                         RouteHop {
2423                                                 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("0324653eac434488002cc06bbfb7f10fe18991e35f9fe4302dbea6d2353dc0ab1c").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
2424                                                 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
2425                                         },
2426                                         RouteHop {
2427                                                 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("027f31ebc5462c1fdce1b737ecff52d37d75dea43ce11c74d25aa297165faa2007").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
2428                                                 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
2429                                         },
2430                                         RouteHop {
2431                                                 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
2432                                                 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
2433                                         },
2434                                         RouteHop {
2435                                                 pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("02edabbd16b41c8371b92ef2f04c1185b4f03b6dcd52ba9b78d9d7c89c8f221145").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
2436                                                 short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
2437                                         },
2438                         ),
2439                 };
2440
2441                 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("4141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
2442
2443                 let onion_keys = ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
2444                 assert_eq!(onion_keys.len(), route.hops.len());
2445                 onion_keys
2446         }
2447
2448         #[test]
2449         fn onion_vectors() {
2450                 // Packet creation test vectors from BOLT 4
2451                 let onion_keys = build_test_onion_keys();
2452
2453                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("53eb63ea8a3fec3b3cd433b85cd62a4b145e1dda09391b348c4e1cd36a03ea66").unwrap()[..]);
2454                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("2ec2e5da605776054187180343287683aa6a51b4b1c04d6dd49c45d8cffb3c36").unwrap()[..]);
2455                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("02eec7245d6b7d2ccb30380bfbe2a3648cd7a942653f5aa340edcea1f283686619").unwrap()[..]);
2456                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].rho, hex::decode("ce496ec94def95aadd4bec15cdb41a740c9f2b62347c4917325fcc6fb0453986").unwrap()[..]);
2457                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].mu, hex::decode("b57061dc6d0a2b9f261ac410c8b26d64ac5506cbba30267a649c28c179400eba").unwrap()[..]);
2458
2459                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("a6519e98832a0b179f62123b3567c106db99ee37bef036e783263602f3488fae").unwrap()[..]);
2460                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("bf66c28bc22e598cfd574a1931a2bafbca09163df2261e6d0056b2610dab938f").unwrap()[..]);
2461                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("028f9438bfbf7feac2e108d677e3a82da596be706cc1cf342b75c7b7e22bf4e6e2").unwrap()[..]);
2462                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].rho, hex::decode("450ffcabc6449094918ebe13d4f03e433d20a3d28a768203337bc40b6e4b2c59").unwrap()[..]);
2463                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].mu, hex::decode("05ed2b4a3fb023c2ff5dd6ed4b9b6ea7383f5cfe9d59c11d121ec2c81ca2eea9").unwrap()[..]);
2464
2465                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("3a6b412548762f0dbccce5c7ae7bb8147d1caf9b5471c34120b30bc9c04891cc").unwrap()[..]);
2466                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("a1f2dadd184eb1627049673f18c6325814384facdee5bfd935d9cb031a1698a5").unwrap()[..]);
2467                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("03bfd8225241ea71cd0843db7709f4c222f62ff2d4516fd38b39914ab6b83e0da0").unwrap()[..]);
2468                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].rho, hex::decode("11bf5c4f960239cb37833936aa3d02cea82c0f39fd35f566109c41f9eac8deea").unwrap()[..]);
2469                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].mu, hex::decode("caafe2820fa00eb2eeb78695ae452eba38f5a53ed6d53518c5c6edf76f3f5b78").unwrap()[..]);
2470
2471                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("21e13c2d7cfe7e18836df50872466117a295783ab8aab0e7ecc8c725503ad02d").unwrap()[..]);
2472                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("7cfe0b699f35525029ae0fa437c69d0f20f7ed4e3916133f9cacbb13c82ff262").unwrap()[..]);
2473                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("031dde6926381289671300239ea8e57ffaf9bebd05b9a5b95beaf07af05cd43595").unwrap()[..]);
2474                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].rho, hex::decode("cbe784ab745c13ff5cffc2fbe3e84424aa0fd669b8ead4ee562901a4a4e89e9e").unwrap()[..]);
2475                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].mu, hex::decode("5052aa1b3d9f0655a0932e50d42f0c9ba0705142c25d225515c45f47c0036ee9").unwrap()[..]);
2476
2477                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("b5756b9b542727dbafc6765a49488b023a725d631af688fc031217e90770c328").unwrap()[..]);
2478                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("c96e00dddaf57e7edcd4fb5954be5b65b09f17cb6d20651b4e90315be5779205").unwrap()[..]);
2479                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("03a214ebd875aab6ddfd77f22c5e7311d7f77f17a169e599f157bbcdae8bf071f4").unwrap()[..]);
2480                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].rho, hex::decode("034e18b8cc718e8af6339106e706c52d8df89e2b1f7e9142d996acf88df8799b").unwrap()[..]);
2481                 assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].mu, hex::decode("8e45e5c61c2b24cb6382444db6698727afb063adecd72aada233d4bf273d975a").unwrap()[..]);
2482
2483                 // Test vectors below are flat-out wrong: they claim to set outgoing_cltv_value to non-0 :/
2484                 let payloads = vec!(
2485                         msgs::OnionHopData {
2486                                 realm: 0,
2487                                 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
2488                                         short_channel_id: 0,
2489                                         amt_to_forward: 0,
2490                                         outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
2491                                 },
2492                                 hmac: [0; 32],
2493                         },
2494                         msgs::OnionHopData {
2495                                 realm: 0,
2496                                 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
2497                                         short_channel_id: 0x0101010101010101,
2498                                         amt_to_forward: 0x0100000001,
2499                                         outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
2500                                 },
2501                                 hmac: [0; 32],
2502                         },
2503                         msgs::OnionHopData {
2504                                 realm: 0,
2505                                 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
2506                                         short_channel_id: 0x0202020202020202,
2507                                         amt_to_forward: 0x0200000002,
2508                                         outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
2509                                 },
2510                                 hmac: [0; 32],
2511                         },
2512                         msgs::OnionHopData {
2513                                 realm: 0,
2514                                 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
2515                                         short_channel_id: 0x0303030303030303,
2516                                         amt_to_forward: 0x0300000003,
2517                                         outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
2518                                 },
2519                                 hmac: [0; 32],
2520                         },
2521                         msgs::OnionHopData {
2522                                 realm: 0,
2523                                 data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
2524                                         short_channel_id: 0x0404040404040404,
2525                                         amt_to_forward: 0x0400000004,
2526                                         outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
2527                                 },
2528                                 hmac: [0; 32],
2529                         },
2530                 );
2531
2532                 let packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(payloads, onion_keys, &[0x42; 32]);
2533                 // Just check the final packet encoding, as it includes all the per-hop vectors in it
2534                 // anyway...
2535                 assert_eq!(packet.encode(), hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2536         }
2537
2538         #[test]
2539         fn test_failure_packet_onion() {
2540                 // Returning Errors test vectors from BOLT 4
2541
2542                 let onion_keys = build_test_onion_keys();
2543                 let onion_error = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(&onion_keys[4].shared_secret, 0x2002, &[0; 0]);
2544                 assert_eq!(onion_error.encode(), hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2545
2546                 let onion_packet_1 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[4].shared_secret, &onion_error.encode()[..]);
2547                 assert_eq!(onion_packet_1.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2548
2549                 let onion_packet_2 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[3].shared_secret, &onion_packet_1.data[..]);
2550                 assert_eq!(onion_packet_2.data, hex::decode("c49a1ce81680f78f5f2000cda36268de34a3f0a0662f55b4e837c83a8773c22aa081bab1616a0011585323930fa5b9fae0c85770a2279ff59ec427ad1bbff9001c0cd1497004bd2a0f68b50704cf6d6a4bf3c8b6a0833399a24b3456961ba00736785112594f65b6b2d44d9f5ea4e49b5e1ec2af978cbe31c67114440ac51a62081df0ed46d4a3df295da0b0fe25c0115019f03f15ec86fabb4c852f83449e812f141a9395b3f70b766ebbd4ec2fae2b6955bd8f32684c15abfe8fd3a6261e52650e8807a92158d9f1463261a925e4bfba44bd20b166d532f0017185c3a6ac7957adefe45559e3072c8dc35abeba835a8cb01a71a15c736911126f27d46a36168ca5ef7dccd4e2886212602b181463e0dd30185c96348f9743a02aca8ec27c0b90dca270").unwrap());
2551
2552                 let onion_packet_3 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[2].shared_secret, &onion_packet_2.data[..]);
2553                 assert_eq!(onion_packet_3.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2554
2555                 let onion_packet_4 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[1].shared_secret, &onion_packet_3.data[..]);
2556                 assert_eq!(onion_packet_4.data, hex::decode("aac3200c4968f56b21f53e5e374e3a2383ad2b1b6501bbcc45abc31e59b26881b7dfadbb56ec8dae8857add94e6702fb4c3a4de22e2e669e1ed926b04447fc73034bb730f4932acd62727b75348a648a1128744657ca6a4e713b9b646c3ca66cac02cdab44dd3439890ef3aaf61708714f7375349b8da541b2548d452d84de7084bb95b3ac2345201d624d31f4d52078aa0fa05a88b4e20202bd2b86ac5b52919ea305a8949de95e935eed0319cf3cf19ebea61d76ba92532497fcdc9411d06bcd4275094d0a4a3c5d3a945e43305a5a9256e333e1f64dbca5fcd4e03a39b9012d197506e06f29339dfee3331995b21615337ae060233d39befea925cc262873e0530408e6990f1cbd233a150ef7b004ff6166c70c68d9f8c853c1abca640b8660db2921").unwrap());
2557
2558                 let onion_packet_5 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[0].shared_secret, &onion_packet_4.data[..]);
2559                 assert_eq!(onion_packet_5.data, hex::decode("9c5add3963fc7f6ed7f148623c84134b5647e1306419dbe2174e523fa9e2fbed3a06a19f899145610741c83ad40b7712aefaddec8c6baf7325d92ea4ca4d1df8bce517f7e54554608bf2bd8071a4f52a7a2f7ffbb1413edad81eeea5785aa9d990f2865dc23b4bc3c301a94eec4eabebca66be5cf638f693ec256aec514620cc28ee4a94bd9565bc4d4962b9d3641d4278fb319ed2b84de5b665f307a2db0f7fbb757366067d88c50f7e829138fde4f78d39b5b5802f1b92a8a820865af5cc79f9f30bc3f461c66af95d13e5e1f0381c184572a91dee1c849048a647a1158cf884064deddbf1b0b88dfe2f791428d0ba0f6fb2f04e14081f69165ae66d9297c118f0907705c9c4954a199bae0bb96fad763d690e7daa6cfda59ba7f2c8d11448b604d12d").unwrap());
2560         }
2561
2562         fn confirm_transaction(chain: &chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil, tx: &Transaction, chan_id: u32) {
2563                 assert!(chain.does_match_tx(tx));
2564                 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
2565                 chain.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[tx; 1], &[chan_id; 1]);
2566                 for i in 2..100 {
2567                         header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
2568                         chain.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &[tx; 0], &[0; 0]);
2569                 }
2570         }
2571
2572         struct Node {
2573                 chain_monitor: Arc<chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil>,
2574                 tx_broadcaster: Arc<test_utils::TestBroadcaster>,
2575                 chan_monitor: Arc<test_utils::TestChannelMonitor>,
2576                 node: Arc<ChannelManager>,
2577                 router: Router,
2578                 network_payment_count: Rc<RefCell<u8>>,
2579                 network_chan_count: Rc<RefCell<u32>>,
2580         }
2581         impl Drop for Node {
2582                 fn drop(&mut self) {
2583                         if !::std::thread::panicking() {
2584                                 // Check that we processed all pending events
2585                                 assert_eq!(self.node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
2586                                 assert_eq!(self.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
2587                         }
2588                 }
2589         }
2590
2591         fn create_chan_between_nodes(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node) -> (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
2592                 create_chan_between_nodes_with_value(node_a, node_b, 100000, 10001)
2593         }
2594
2595         fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, channel_value: u64, push_msat: u64) -> (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
2596                 let (funding_locked, channel_id, tx) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(node_a, node_b, channel_value, push_msat);
2597                 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(node_a, node_b, &funding_locked);
2598                 (announcement, as_update, bs_update, channel_id, tx)
2599         }
2600
2601         fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, channel_value: u64, push_msat: u64) -> Transaction {
2602                 node_a.node.create_channel(node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value, push_msat, 42).unwrap();
2603
2604                 let events_1 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2605                 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
2606                 let accept_chan = match events_1[0] {
2607                         Event::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
2608                                 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
2609                                 node_b.node.handle_open_channel(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), msg).unwrap()
2610                         },
2611                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2612                 };
2613
2614                 node_a.node.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_chan).unwrap();
2615
2616                 let chan_id = *node_a.network_chan_count.borrow();
2617                 let tx;
2618                 let funding_output;
2619
2620                 let events_2 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2621                 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
2622                 match events_2[0] {
2623                         Event::FundingGenerationReady { ref temporary_channel_id, ref channel_value_satoshis, ref output_script, user_channel_id } => {
2624                                 assert_eq!(*channel_value_satoshis, channel_value);
2625                                 assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
2626
2627                                 tx = Transaction { version: chan_id as u32, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
2628                                         value: *channel_value_satoshis, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
2629                                 }]};
2630                                 funding_output = OutPoint::new(Sha256dHash::from_data(&serialize(&tx).unwrap()[..]), 0);
2631
2632                                 node_a.node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, funding_output);
2633                                 let mut added_monitors = node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2634                                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2635                                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
2636                                 added_monitors.clear();
2637                         },
2638                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2639                 }
2640
2641                 let events_3 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2642                 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
2643                 let funding_signed = match events_3[0] {
2644                         Event::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
2645                                 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
2646                                 let res = node_b.node.handle_funding_created(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), msg).unwrap();
2647                                 let mut added_monitors = node_b.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2648                                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2649                                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
2650                                 added_monitors.clear();
2651                                 res
2652                         },
2653                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2654                 };
2655
2656                 node_a.node.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed).unwrap();
2657                 {
2658                         let mut added_monitors = node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2659                         assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2660                         assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
2661                         added_monitors.clear();
2662                 }
2663
2664                 let events_4 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2665                 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
2666                 match events_4[0] {
2667                         Event::FundingBroadcastSafe { ref funding_txo, user_channel_id } => {
2668                                 assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
2669                                 assert_eq!(*funding_txo, funding_output);
2670                         },
2671                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2672                 };
2673
2674                 tx
2675         }
2676
2677         fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, tx: &Transaction) -> ((msgs::FundingLocked, msgs::AnnouncementSignatures), [u8; 32]) {
2678                 confirm_transaction(&node_b.chain_monitor, &tx, tx.version);
2679                 let events_5 = node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2680                 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
2681                 match events_5[0] {
2682                         Event::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg, ref announcement_sigs } => {
2683                                 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
2684                                 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none());
2685                                 node_a.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), msg).unwrap()
2686                         },
2687                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2688                 };
2689
2690                 let channel_id;
2691
2692                 confirm_transaction(&node_a.chain_monitor, &tx, tx.version);
2693                 let events_6 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2694                 assert_eq!(events_6.len(), 1);
2695                 (match events_6[0] {
2696                         Event::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg, ref announcement_sigs } => {
2697                                 channel_id = msg.channel_id.clone();
2698                                 assert_eq!(*node_id, node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
2699                                 (msg.clone(), announcement_sigs.clone().unwrap())
2700                         },
2701                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2702                 }, channel_id)
2703         }
2704
2705         fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, channel_value: u64, push_msat: u64) -> ((msgs::FundingLocked, msgs::AnnouncementSignatures), [u8; 32], Transaction) {
2706                 let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(node_a, node_b, channel_value, push_msat);
2707                 let (msgs, chan_id) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(node_a, node_b, &tx);
2708                 (msgs, chan_id, tx)
2709         }
2710
2711         fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, as_funding_msgs: &(msgs::FundingLocked, msgs::AnnouncementSignatures)) -> (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
2712                 let bs_announcement_sigs = {
2713                         let bs_announcement_sigs = node_b.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_funding_msgs.0).unwrap().unwrap();
2714                         node_b.node.handle_announcement_signatures(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_funding_msgs.1).unwrap();
2715                         bs_announcement_sigs
2716                 };
2717
2718                 let events_7 = node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2719                 assert_eq!(events_7.len(), 1);
2720                 let (announcement, bs_update) = match events_7[0] {
2721                         Event::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
2722                                 (msg, update_msg)
2723                         },
2724                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2725                 };
2726
2727                 node_a.node.handle_announcement_signatures(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_announcement_sigs).unwrap();
2728                 let events_8 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2729                 assert_eq!(events_8.len(), 1);
2730                 let as_update = match events_8[0] {
2731                         Event::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
2732                                 assert!(*announcement == *msg);
2733                                 update_msg
2734                         },
2735                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2736                 };
2737
2738                 *node_a.network_chan_count.borrow_mut() += 1;
2739
2740                 ((*announcement).clone(), (*as_update).clone(), (*bs_update).clone())
2741         }
2742
2743         fn create_announced_chan_between_nodes(nodes: &Vec<Node>, a: usize, b: usize) -> (msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
2744                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(nodes, a, b, 100000, 10001)
2745         }
2746
2747         fn create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(nodes: &Vec<Node>, a: usize, b: usize, channel_value: u64, push_msat: u64) -> (msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
2748                 let chan_announcement = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes[a], &nodes[b], channel_value, push_msat);
2749                 for node in nodes {
2750                         assert!(node.router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement.0).unwrap());
2751                         node.router.handle_channel_update(&chan_announcement.1).unwrap();
2752                         node.router.handle_channel_update(&chan_announcement.2).unwrap();
2753                 }
2754                 (chan_announcement.1, chan_announcement.2, chan_announcement.3, chan_announcement.4)
2755         }
2756
2757         macro_rules! check_spends {
2758                 ($tx: expr, $spends_tx: expr) => {
2759                         {
2760                                 let mut funding_tx_map = HashMap::new();
2761                                 let spends_tx = $spends_tx;
2762                                 funding_tx_map.insert(spends_tx.txid(), spends_tx);
2763                                 $tx.verify(&funding_tx_map).unwrap();
2764                         }
2765                 }
2766         }
2767
2768         fn close_channel(outbound_node: &Node, inbound_node: &Node, channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_tx: Transaction, close_inbound_first: bool) -> (msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
2769                 let (node_a, broadcaster_a) = if close_inbound_first { (&inbound_node.node, &inbound_node.tx_broadcaster) } else { (&outbound_node.node, &outbound_node.tx_broadcaster) };
2770                 let (node_b, broadcaster_b) = if close_inbound_first { (&outbound_node.node, &outbound_node.tx_broadcaster) } else { (&inbound_node.node, &inbound_node.tx_broadcaster) };
2771                 let (tx_a, tx_b);
2772
2773                 node_a.close_channel(channel_id).unwrap();
2774                 let events_1 = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2775                 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
2776                 let shutdown_a = match events_1[0] {
2777                         Event::SendShutdown { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
2778                                 assert_eq!(node_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id());
2779                                 msg.clone()
2780                         },
2781                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2782                 };
2783
2784                 let (shutdown_b, mut closing_signed_b) = node_b.handle_shutdown(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &shutdown_a).unwrap();
2785                 if !close_inbound_first {
2786                         assert!(closing_signed_b.is_none());
2787                 }
2788                 let (empty_a, mut closing_signed_a) = node_a.handle_shutdown(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &shutdown_b.unwrap()).unwrap();
2789                 assert!(empty_a.is_none());
2790                 if close_inbound_first {
2791                         assert!(closing_signed_a.is_none());
2792                         closing_signed_a = node_a.handle_closing_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_b.unwrap()).unwrap();
2793                         assert_eq!(broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
2794                         tx_a = broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
2795
2796                         let empty_b = node_b.handle_closing_signed(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_a.unwrap()).unwrap();
2797                         assert!(empty_b.is_none());
2798                         assert_eq!(broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
2799                         tx_b = broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
2800                 } else {
2801                         closing_signed_b = node_b.handle_closing_signed(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_a.unwrap()).unwrap();
2802                         assert_eq!(broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
2803                         tx_b = broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
2804
2805                         let empty_a2 = node_a.handle_closing_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_b.unwrap()).unwrap();
2806                         assert!(empty_a2.is_none());
2807                         assert_eq!(broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
2808                         tx_a = broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
2809                 }
2810                 assert_eq!(tx_a, tx_b);
2811                 check_spends!(tx_a, funding_tx);
2812
2813                 let events_2 = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2814                 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
2815                 let as_update = match events_2[0] {
2816                         Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2817                                 msg.clone()
2818                         },
2819                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2820                 };
2821
2822                 let events_3 = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2823                 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
2824                 let bs_update = match events_3[0] {
2825                         Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2826                                 msg.clone()
2827                         },
2828                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2829                 };
2830
2831                 (as_update, bs_update)
2832         }
2833
2834         struct SendEvent {
2835                 node_id: PublicKey,
2836                 msgs: Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>,
2837                 commitment_msg: msgs::CommitmentSigned,
2838         }
2839         impl SendEvent {
2840                 fn from_event(event: Event) -> SendEvent {
2841                         match event {
2842                                 Event::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs, update_fee, commitment_signed } } => {
2843                                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2844                                         assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2845                                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2846                                         assert!(update_fee.is_none());
2847                                         SendEvent { node_id: node_id, msgs: update_add_htlcs, commitment_msg: commitment_signed }
2848                                 },
2849                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event type!"),
2850                         }
2851                 }
2852         }
2853
2854         macro_rules! check_added_monitors {
2855                 ($node: expr, $count: expr) => {
2856                         {
2857                                 let mut added_monitors = $node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2858                                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), $count);
2859                                 added_monitors.clear();
2860                         }
2861                 }
2862         }
2863
2864         macro_rules! commitment_signed_dance {
2865                 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr, $commitment_signed: expr, $fail_backwards: expr) => {
2866                         {
2867                                 check_added_monitors!($node_a, 0);
2868                                 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = $node_a.node.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &$commitment_signed).unwrap();
2869                                 check_added_monitors!($node_a, 1);
2870                                 check_added_monitors!($node_b, 0);
2871                                 assert!($node_b.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().is_none());
2872                                 check_added_monitors!($node_b, 1);
2873                                 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_none) = $node_b.node.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed.unwrap()).unwrap();
2874                                 assert!(bs_none.is_none());
2875                                 check_added_monitors!($node_b, 1);
2876                                 if $fail_backwards {
2877                                         assert!($node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2878                                 }
2879                                 assert!($node_a.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().is_none());
2880                                 {
2881                                         let mut added_monitors = $node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2882                                         if $fail_backwards {
2883                                                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 2);
2884                                                 assert!(added_monitors[0].0 != added_monitors[1].0);
2885                                         } else {
2886                                                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2887                                         }
2888                                         added_monitors.clear();
2889                                 }
2890                         }
2891                 }
2892         }
2893
2894         macro_rules! get_payment_preimage_hash {
2895                 ($node: expr) => {
2896                         {
2897                                 let payment_preimage = [*$node.network_payment_count.borrow(); 32];
2898                                 *$node.network_payment_count.borrow_mut() += 1;
2899                                 let mut payment_hash = [0; 32];
2900                                 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
2901                                 sha.input(&payment_preimage[..]);
2902                                 sha.result(&mut payment_hash);
2903                                 (payment_preimage, payment_hash)
2904                         }
2905                 }
2906         }
2907
2908         fn send_along_route(origin_node: &Node, route: Route, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
2909                 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(origin_node);
2910
2911                 let mut payment_event = {
2912                         origin_node.node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
2913                         check_added_monitors!(origin_node, 1);
2914
2915                         let mut events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2916                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2917                         SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
2918                 };
2919                 let mut prev_node = origin_node;
2920
2921                 for (idx, &node) in expected_route.iter().enumerate() {
2922                         assert_eq!(node.node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
2923
2924                         node.node.handle_update_add_htlc(&prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
2925                         check_added_monitors!(node, 0);
2926                         commitment_signed_dance!(node, prev_node, payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
2927
2928                         let events_1 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2929                         assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
2930                         match events_1[0] {
2931                                 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
2932                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2933                         };
2934
2935                         node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
2936                         node.node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
2937
2938                         let mut events_2 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2939                         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
2940                         if idx == expected_route.len() - 1 {
2941                                 match events_2[0] {
2942                                         Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
2943                                                 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash);
2944                                                 assert_eq!(amt, recv_value);
2945                                         },
2946                                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2947                                 }
2948                         } else {
2949                                 check_added_monitors!(node, 1);
2950                                 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
2951                                 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
2952                         }
2953
2954                         prev_node = node;
2955                 }
2956
2957                 (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash)
2958         }
2959
2960         fn claim_payment_along_route(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], skip_last: bool, our_payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) {
2961                 assert!(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage));
2962                 check_added_monitors!(expected_route.last().unwrap(), 1);
2963
2964                 let mut next_msgs: Option<(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)> = None;
2965                 macro_rules! update_fulfill_dance {
2966                         ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $last_node: expr) => {
2967                                 {
2968                                         $node.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().0).unwrap();
2969                                         if $last_node {
2970                                                 check_added_monitors!($node, 0);
2971                                         } else {
2972                                                 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
2973                                         }
2974                                         commitment_signed_dance!($node, $prev_node, next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().1, false);
2975                                 }
2976                         }
2977                 }
2978
2979                 let mut expected_next_node = expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id();
2980                 let mut prev_node = expected_route.last().unwrap();
2981                 for (idx, node) in expected_route.iter().rev().enumerate() {
2982                         assert_eq!(expected_next_node, node.node.get_our_node_id());
2983                         if next_msgs.is_some() {
2984                                 update_fulfill_dance!(node, prev_node, false);
2985                         }
2986
2987                         let events = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2988                         if !skip_last || idx != expected_route.len() - 1 {
2989                                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2990                                 match events[0] {
2991                                         Event::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
2992                                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2993                                                 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
2994                                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2995                                                 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2996                                                 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
2997                                                 expected_next_node = node_id.clone();
2998                                                 next_msgs = Some((update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone()));
2999                                         },
3000                                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3001                                 }
3002                         } else {
3003                                 assert!(events.is_empty());
3004                         }
3005                         if !skip_last && idx == expected_route.len() - 1 {
3006                                 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, origin_node.node.get_our_node_id());
3007                         }
3008
3009                         prev_node = node;
3010                 }
3011
3012                 if !skip_last {
3013                         update_fulfill_dance!(origin_node, expected_route.first().unwrap(), true);
3014                         let events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3015                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3016                         match events[0] {
3017                                 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage } => {
3018                                         assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage);
3019                                 },
3020                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3021                         }
3022                 }
3023         }
3024
3025         fn claim_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], our_payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) {
3026                 claim_payment_along_route(origin_node, expected_route, false, our_payment_preimage);
3027         }
3028
3029         const TEST_FINAL_CLTV: u32 = 32;
3030
3031         fn route_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
3032                 let route = origin_node.router.get_route(&expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), recv_value, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
3033                 assert_eq!(route.hops.len(), expected_route.len());
3034                 for (node, hop) in expected_route.iter().zip(route.hops.iter()) {
3035                         assert_eq!(hop.pubkey, node.node.get_our_node_id());
3036                 }
3037
3038                 send_along_route(origin_node, route, expected_route, recv_value)
3039         }
3040
3041         fn route_over_limit(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) {
3042                 let route = origin_node.router.get_route(&expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), recv_value, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
3043                 assert_eq!(route.hops.len(), expected_route.len());
3044                 for (node, hop) in expected_route.iter().zip(route.hops.iter()) {
3045                         assert_eq!(hop.pubkey, node.node.get_our_node_id());
3046                 }
3047
3048                 let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(origin_node);
3049
3050                 let err = origin_node.node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap();
3051                 match err {
3052                         APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our max HTLC value in flight"),
3053                         _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
3054                 };
3055         }
3056
3057         fn send_payment(origin: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) {
3058                 let our_payment_preimage = route_payment(&origin, expected_route, recv_value).0;
3059                 claim_payment(&origin, expected_route, our_payment_preimage);
3060         }
3061
3062         fn fail_payment_along_route(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], skip_last: bool, our_payment_hash: [u8; 32]) {
3063                 assert!(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash));
3064                 check_added_monitors!(expected_route.last().unwrap(), 1);
3065
3066                 let mut next_msgs: Option<(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)> = None;
3067                 macro_rules! update_fail_dance {
3068                         ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $last_node: expr) => {
3069                                 {
3070                                         $node.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().0).unwrap();
3071                                         commitment_signed_dance!($node, $prev_node, next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().1, !$last_node);
3072                                 }
3073                         }
3074                 }
3075
3076                 let mut expected_next_node = expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id();
3077                 let mut prev_node = expected_route.last().unwrap();
3078                 for (idx, node) in expected_route.iter().rev().enumerate() {
3079                         assert_eq!(expected_next_node, node.node.get_our_node_id());
3080                         if next_msgs.is_some() {
3081                                 // We may be the "last node" for the purpose of the commitment dance if we're
3082                                 // skipping the last node (implying it is disconnected) and we're the
3083                                 // second-to-last node!
3084                                 update_fail_dance!(node, prev_node, skip_last && idx == expected_route.len() - 1);
3085                         }
3086
3087                         let events = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3088                         if !skip_last || idx != expected_route.len() - 1 {
3089                                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3090                                 match events[0] {
3091                                         Event::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
3092                                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3093                                                 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3094                                                 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3095                                                 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3096                                                 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
3097                                                 expected_next_node = node_id.clone();
3098                                                 next_msgs = Some((update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone()));
3099                                         },
3100                                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3101                                 }
3102                         } else {
3103                                 assert!(events.is_empty());
3104                         }
3105                         if !skip_last && idx == expected_route.len() - 1 {
3106                                 assert_eq!(expected_next_node, origin_node.node.get_our_node_id());
3107                         }
3108
3109                         prev_node = node;
3110                 }
3111
3112                 if !skip_last {
3113                         update_fail_dance!(origin_node, expected_route.first().unwrap(), true);
3114
3115                         let events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3116                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3117                         match events[0] {
3118                                 Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash } => {
3119                                         assert_eq!(payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
3120                                 },
3121                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3122                         }
3123                 }
3124         }
3125
3126         fn fail_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], our_payment_hash: [u8; 32]) {
3127                 fail_payment_along_route(origin_node, expected_route, false, our_payment_hash);
3128         }
3129
3130         fn create_network(node_count: usize) -> Vec<Node> {
3131                 let mut nodes = Vec::new();
3132                 let mut rng = thread_rng();
3133                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3134                 let logger: Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
3135
3136                 let chan_count = Rc::new(RefCell::new(0));
3137                 let payment_count = Rc::new(RefCell::new(0));
3138
3139                 for _ in 0..node_count {
3140                         let feeest = Arc::new(test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 });
3141                         let chain_monitor = Arc::new(chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil::new(Network::Testnet, Arc::clone(&logger)));
3142                         let tx_broadcaster = Arc::new(test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new())});
3143                         let chan_monitor = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChannelMonitor::new(chain_monitor.clone(), tx_broadcaster.clone()));
3144                         let node_id = {
3145                                 let mut key_slice = [0; 32];
3146                                 rng.fill_bytes(&mut key_slice);
3147                                 SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &key_slice).unwrap()
3148                         };
3149                         let node = ChannelManager::new(node_id.clone(), 0, true, Network::Testnet, feeest.clone(), chan_monitor.clone(), chain_monitor.clone(), tx_broadcaster.clone(), Arc::clone(&logger)).unwrap();
3150                         let router = Router::new(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &node_id), chain_monitor.clone(), Arc::clone(&logger));
3151                         nodes.push(Node { chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, chan_monitor, node, router,
3152                                 network_payment_count: payment_count.clone(),
3153                                 network_chan_count: chan_count.clone(),
3154                         });
3155                 }
3156
3157                 nodes
3158         }
3159
3160         #[test]
3161         fn test_async_inbound_update_fee() {
3162                 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
3163                 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3164                 let channel_id = chan.2;
3165
3166                 macro_rules! get_feerate {
3167                         ($node: expr) => {{
3168                                 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3169                                 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
3170                                 chan.get_feerate()
3171                         }}
3172                 }
3173
3174                 // balancing
3175                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
3176
3177                 // A                                        B
3178                 // update_fee                            ->
3179                 // send (1) commitment_signed            -.
3180                 //                                       <- update_add_htlc/commitment_signed
3181                 // send (2) RAA (awaiting remote revoke) -.
3182                 // (1) commitment_signed is delivered    ->
3183                 //                                       .- send (3) RAA (awaiting remote revoke)
3184                 // (2) RAA is delivered                  ->
3185                 //                                       .- send (4) commitment_signed
3186                 //                                       <- (3) RAA is delivered
3187                 // send (5) commitment_signed            -.
3188                 //                                       <- (4) commitment_signed is delivered
3189                 // send (6) RAA                          -.
3190                 // (5) commitment_signed is delivered    ->
3191                 //                                       <- RAA
3192                 // (6) RAA is delivered                  ->
3193
3194                 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
3195                 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, get_feerate!(nodes[0]) + 20).unwrap();
3196                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3197
3198                 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3199                 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
3200                 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
3201                         Event::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
3202                                 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
3203                         },
3204                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3205                 };
3206
3207                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
3208
3209                 // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
3210                 let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
3211                 nodes[1].node.send_payment(nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 40000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap(), our_payment_hash).unwrap();
3212                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3213
3214                 let payment_event = {
3215                         let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3216                         assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3217                         SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
3218                 };
3219                 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3220                 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3221
3222                 // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
3223                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
3224                 let (as_revoke_msg, as_commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap(); // (2)
3225                 assert!(as_commitment_signed.is_none()); // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack
3226                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3227
3228                 // deliver(1), generate (3):
3229                 let (bs_revoke_msg, bs_commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
3230                 assert!(bs_commitment_signed.is_none()); // nodes[1] is awaiting nodes[0] revoke_and_ack
3231                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3232
3233                 let bs_update = nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg).unwrap(); // deliver (2)
3234                 assert!(bs_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
3235                 assert!(bs_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
3236                 assert!(bs_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
3237                 assert!(bs_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
3238                 assert!(bs_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none()); // (4)
3239                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3240
3241                 let as_update = nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_msg).unwrap(); // deliver (3)
3242                 assert!(as_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
3243                 assert!(as_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
3244                 assert!(as_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
3245                 assert!(as_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
3246                 assert!(as_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none()); // (5)
3247                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3248
3249                 let (as_second_revoke, as_second_commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update.unwrap().commitment_signed).unwrap(); // deliver (4)
3250                 assert!(as_second_commitment_signed.is_none()); // only (6)
3251                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3252
3253                 let (bs_second_revoke, bs_second_commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update.unwrap().commitment_signed).unwrap(); // deliver (5)
3254                 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.is_none());
3255                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3256
3257                 assert!(nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke).unwrap().is_none());
3258                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3259
3260                 let events_2 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3261                 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3262                 match events_2[0] {
3263                         Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {..} => {}, // If we actually processed we'd receive the payment
3264                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3265                 }
3266
3267                 assert!(nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke).unwrap().is_none()); // deliver (6)
3268                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3269         }
3270
3271         #[test]
3272         fn test_update_fee_unordered_raa() {
3273                 // Just the intro to the previous test followed by an out-of-order RAA (which caused a
3274                 // crash in an earlier version of the update_fee patch)
3275                 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
3276                 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3277                 let channel_id = chan.2;
3278
3279                 macro_rules! get_feerate {
3280                         ($node: expr) => {{
3281                                 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3282                                 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
3283                                 chan.get_feerate()
3284                         }}
3285                 }
3286
3287                 // balancing
3288                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
3289
3290                 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
3291                 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, get_feerate!(nodes[0]) + 20).unwrap();
3292                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3293
3294                 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3295                 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
3296                 let update_msg = match events_0[0] { // (1)
3297                         Event::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, .. }, .. } => {
3298                                 update_fee.as_ref()
3299                         },
3300                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3301                 };
3302
3303                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
3304
3305                 // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
3306                 let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
3307                 nodes[1].node.send_payment(nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 40000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap(), our_payment_hash).unwrap();
3308                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3309
3310                 let payment_event = {
3311                         let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3312                         assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3313                         SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
3314                 };
3315                 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3316                 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3317
3318                 // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
3319                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
3320                 let (as_revoke_msg, as_commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap(); // (2)
3321                 assert!(as_commitment_signed.is_none()); // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack
3322                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3323
3324                 assert!(nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg).unwrap().is_none()); // deliver (2)
3325                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3326
3327                 // We can't continue, sadly, because our (1) now has a bogus signature
3328         }
3329
3330         #[test]
3331         fn test_multi_flight_update_fee() {
3332                 let nodes = create_network(2);
3333                 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3334                 let channel_id = chan.2;
3335
3336                 macro_rules! get_feerate {
3337                         ($node: expr) => {{
3338                                 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3339                                 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
3340                                 chan.get_feerate()
3341                         }}
3342                 }
3343
3344                 // A                                        B
3345                 // update_fee/commitment_signed          ->
3346                 //                                       .- send (1) RAA and (2) commitment_signed
3347                 // update_fee (never committed)          ->
3348                 // (3) update_fee                        ->
3349                 // We have to manually generate the above update_fee, it is allowed by the protocol but we
3350                 // don't track which updates correspond to which revoke_and_ack responses so we're in
3351                 // AwaitingRAA mode and will not generate the update_fee yet.
3352                 //                                       <- (1) RAA delivered
3353                 // (3) is generated and send (4) CS      -.
3354                 // Note that A cannot generate (4) prior to (1) being delivered as it otherwise doesn't
3355                 // know the per_commitment_point to use for it.
3356                 //                                       <- (2) commitment_signed delivered
3357                 // revoke_and_ack                        ->
3358                 //                                          B should send no response here
3359                 // (4) commitment_signed delivered       ->
3360                 //                                       <- RAA/commitment_signed delivered
3361                 // revoke_and_ack                        ->
3362
3363                 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
3364                 let initial_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0]);
3365                 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, initial_feerate + 20).unwrap();
3366                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3367
3368                 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3369                 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
3370                 let (update_msg_1, commitment_signed_1) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
3371                         Event::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
3372                                 (update_fee.as_ref().unwrap(), commitment_signed)
3373                         },
3374                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3375                 };
3376
3377                 // Deliver first update_fee/commitment_signed pair, generating (1) and (2):
3378                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg_1).unwrap();
3379                 let (bs_revoke_msg, bs_commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed_1).unwrap();
3380                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3381
3382                 // nodes[0] is awaiting a revoke from nodes[1] before it will create a new commitment
3383                 // transaction:
3384                 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, initial_feerate + 40).unwrap();
3385                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3386
3387                 // Create the (3) update_fee message that nodes[0] will generate before it does...
3388                 let mut update_msg_2 = msgs::UpdateFee {
3389                         channel_id: update_msg_1.channel_id.clone(),
3390                         feerate_per_kw: (initial_feerate + 30) as u32,
3391                 };
3392
3393                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2).unwrap();
3394
3395                 update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw = (initial_feerate + 40) as u32;
3396                 // Deliver (3)
3397                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2).unwrap();
3398
3399                 // Deliver (1), generating (3) and (4)
3400                 let as_second_update = nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_msg).unwrap();
3401                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3402                 assert!(as_second_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3403                 assert!(as_second_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3404                 assert!(as_second_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3405                 assert!(as_second_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3406                 // Check that the update_fee newly generated matches what we delivered:
3407                 assert_eq!(as_second_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().channel_id, update_msg_2.channel_id);
3408                 assert_eq!(as_second_update.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().feerate_per_kw, update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw);
3409
3410                 // Deliver (2) commitment_signed
3411                 let (as_revoke_msg, as_commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), bs_commitment_signed.as_ref().unwrap()).unwrap();
3412                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3413                 assert!(as_commitment_signed.is_none());
3414
3415                 assert!(nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg).unwrap().is_none());
3416                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3417
3418                 // Delever (4)
3419                 let (bs_second_revoke, bs_second_commitment) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_update.unwrap().commitment_signed).unwrap();
3420                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3421
3422                 assert!(nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke).unwrap().is_none());
3423                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3424
3425                 let (as_second_revoke, as_second_commitment) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment.unwrap()).unwrap();
3426                 assert!(as_second_commitment.is_none());
3427                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3428
3429                 assert!(nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke).unwrap().is_none());
3430                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3431         }
3432
3433         #[test]
3434         fn test_update_fee_vanilla() {
3435                 let nodes = create_network(2);
3436                 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3437                 let channel_id = chan.2;
3438
3439                 macro_rules! get_feerate {
3440                         ($node: expr) => {{
3441                                 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3442                                 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
3443                                 chan.get_feerate()
3444                         }}
3445                 }
3446
3447                 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0]);
3448                 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+20).unwrap();
3449
3450                 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3451                 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
3452                 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
3453                                 Event::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
3454                                 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
3455                         },
3456                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3457                 };
3458                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
3459
3460                 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
3461                 let commitment_signed = commitment_signed.unwrap();
3462                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3463                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3464
3465                 let resp_option = nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
3466                 assert!(resp_option.is_none());
3467                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3468
3469                 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap();
3470                 assert!(commitment_signed.is_none());
3471                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3472
3473                 let resp_option = nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
3474                 assert!(resp_option.is_none());
3475                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3476         }
3477
3478         #[test]
3479         fn test_update_fee_with_fundee_update_add_htlc() {
3480                 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
3481                 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3482                 let channel_id = chan.2;
3483
3484                 macro_rules! get_feerate {
3485                         ($node: expr) => {{
3486                                 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3487                                 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
3488                                 chan.get_feerate()
3489                         }}
3490                 }
3491
3492                 // balancing
3493                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
3494
3495                 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0]);
3496                 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+20).unwrap();
3497
3498                 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3499                 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
3500                 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
3501                                 Event::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
3502                                 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
3503                         },
3504                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3505                 };
3506                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
3507                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3508                 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
3509                 let commitment_signed = commitment_signed.unwrap();
3510                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3511
3512                 let route = nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 800000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
3513
3514                 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[1]);
3515
3516                 // nothing happens since node[1] is in AwaitingRemoteRevoke
3517                 nodes[1].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
3518                 {
3519                         let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
3520                         assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 0);
3521                         added_monitors.clear();
3522                 }
3523                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3524                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
3525                 // node[1] has nothing to do
3526
3527                 let resp_option = nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
3528                 assert!(resp_option.is_none());
3529                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3530
3531                 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap();
3532                 assert!(commitment_signed.is_none());
3533                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3534                 let resp_option = nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
3535                 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke ends here
3536
3537                 let commitment_update = resp_option.unwrap();
3538                 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
3539                 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
3540                 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 0);
3541                 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
3542                 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none(), true);
3543
3544                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.update_add_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
3545                 let (revoke, commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
3546                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3547                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3548                 let commitment_signed = commitment_signed.unwrap();
3549                 let resp_option = nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke).unwrap();
3550                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3551                 assert!(resp_option.is_none());
3552
3553                 let (revoke, commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap();
3554                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3555                 assert!(commitment_signed.is_none());
3556                 let resp_option = nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke).unwrap();
3557                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3558                 assert!(resp_option.is_none());
3559
3560                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3561                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3562                 match events[0] {
3563                         Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3564                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3565                 };
3566                 nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
3567                 nodes[0].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3568
3569                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3570                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3571                 match events[0] {
3572                         Event::PaymentReceived { .. } => { },
3573                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3574                 };
3575
3576                 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], our_payment_preimage);
3577
3578                 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 800000);
3579                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 800000);
3580                 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
3581         }
3582
3583         #[test]
3584         fn test_update_fee() {
3585                 let nodes = create_network(2);
3586                 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3587                 let channel_id = chan.2;
3588
3589                 macro_rules! get_feerate {
3590                         ($node: expr) => {{
3591                                 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3592                                 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
3593                                 chan.get_feerate()
3594                         }}
3595                 }
3596
3597                 // A                                        B
3598                 // (1) update_fee/commitment_signed      ->
3599                 //                                       <- (2) revoke_and_ack
3600                 //                                       .- send (3) commitment_signed
3601                 // (4) update_fee/commitment_signed      ->
3602                 //                                       .- send (5) revoke_and_ack (no CS as we're awaiting a revoke)
3603                 //                                       <- (3) commitment_signed delivered
3604                 // send (6) revoke_and_ack               -.
3605                 //                                       <- (5) deliver revoke_and_ack
3606                 // (6) deliver revoke_and_ack            ->
3607                 //                                       .- send (7) commitment_signed in response to (4)
3608                 //                                       <- (7) deliver commitment_signed
3609                 // revoke_and_ack                        ->
3610
3611                 // Create and deliver (1)...
3612                 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0]);
3613                 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+20).unwrap();
3614
3615                 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3616                 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
3617                 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
3618                                 Event::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
3619                                 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
3620                         },
3621                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3622                 };
3623                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
3624
3625                 // Generate (2) and (3):
3626                 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
3627                 let commitment_signed_0 = commitment_signed.unwrap();
3628                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3629                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3630
3631                 // Deliver (2):
3632                 let resp_option = nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
3633                 assert!(resp_option.is_none());
3634                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3635
3636                 // Create and deliver (4)...
3637                 nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+30).unwrap();
3638                 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3639                 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
3640                 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
3641                                 Event::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
3642                                 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
3643                         },
3644                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3645                 };
3646                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
3647
3648                 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
3649                 // ... creating (5)
3650                 assert!(commitment_signed.is_none());
3651                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3652                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3653
3654                 // Handle (3), creating (6):
3655                 let (revoke_msg_0, commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed_0).unwrap();
3656                 assert!(commitment_signed.is_none());
3657                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3658
3659                 // Deliver (5):
3660                 let resp_option = nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
3661                 assert!(resp_option.is_none());
3662                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3663
3664                 // Deliver (6), creating (7):
3665                 let resp_option = nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg_0).unwrap();
3666                 let commitment_signed = resp_option.unwrap().commitment_signed;
3667                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3668
3669                 // Deliver (7)
3670                 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap();
3671                 assert!(commitment_signed.is_none());
3672                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3673                 let resp_option = nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
3674                 assert!(resp_option.is_none());
3675                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3676
3677                 assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[0]), feerate + 30);
3678                 assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[1]), feerate + 30);
3679                 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
3680         }
3681
3682         #[test]
3683         fn fake_network_test() {
3684                 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
3685                 // tests that payments get routed and transactions broadcast in semi-reasonable ways.
3686                 let nodes = create_network(4);
3687
3688                 // Create some initial channels
3689                 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3690                 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
3691                 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
3692
3693                 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
3694                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
3695                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
3696                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
3697                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
3698
3699                 // Send some more payments
3700                 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
3701                 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], &nodes[0])[..], 1000000);
3702                 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000);
3703
3704                 // Test failure packets
3705                 let payment_hash_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000).1;
3706                 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], payment_hash_1);
3707
3708                 // Add a new channel that skips 3
3709                 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
3710
3711                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
3712                 send_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
3713                 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
3714                 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
3715                 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
3716                 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
3717                 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
3718
3719                 // Do some rebalance loop payments, simultaneously
3720                 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
3721                 hops.push(RouteHop {
3722                         pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
3723                         short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
3724                         fee_msat: 0,
3725                         cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.0.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
3726                 });
3727                 hops.push(RouteHop {
3728                         pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
3729                         short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
3730                         fee_msat: 0,
3731                         cltv_expiry_delta: chan_4.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
3732                 });
3733                 hops.push(RouteHop {
3734                         pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
3735                         short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
3736                         fee_msat: 1000000,
3737                         cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
3738                 });
3739                 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_4.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_4.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
3740                 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.0.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.0.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
3741                 let payment_preimage_1 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { hops }, &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).0;
3742
3743                 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
3744                 hops.push(RouteHop {
3745                         pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
3746                         short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
3747                         fee_msat: 0,
3748                         cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
3749                 });
3750                 hops.push(RouteHop {
3751                         pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
3752                         short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
3753                         fee_msat: 0,
3754                         cltv_expiry_delta: chan_2.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
3755                 });
3756                 hops.push(RouteHop {
3757                         pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
3758                         short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
3759                         fee_msat: 1000000,
3760                         cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
3761                 });
3762                 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_2.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_2.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
3763                 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
3764                 let payment_hash_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { hops }, &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).1;
3765
3766                 // Claim the rebalances...
3767                 fail_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], payment_hash_2);
3768                 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
3769
3770                 // Add a duplicate new channel from 2 to 4
3771                 let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
3772
3773                 // Send some payments across both channels
3774                 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
3775                 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
3776                 let payment_preimage_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
3777
3778                 route_over_limit(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000);
3779
3780                 //TODO: Test that routes work again here as we've been notified that the channel is full
3781
3782                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_3);
3783                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_4);
3784                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_5);
3785
3786                 // Close down the channels...
3787                 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan_1.2, chan_1.3, true);
3788                 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, false);
3789                 close_channel(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &chan_3.2, chan_3.3, true);
3790                 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_4.2, chan_4.3, false);
3791                 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_5.2, chan_5.3, false);
3792         }
3793
3794         #[test]
3795         fn duplicate_htlc_test() {
3796                 // Test that we accept duplicate payment_hash HTLCs across the network and that
3797                 // claiming/failing them are all separate and don't effect each other
3798                 let mut nodes = create_network(6);
3799
3800                 // Create some initial channels to route via 3 to 4/5 from 0/1/2
3801                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3);
3802                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
3803                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
3804                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);
3805                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5);
3806
3807                 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 1000000);
3808
3809                 *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
3810                 assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
3811
3812                 *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
3813                 assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
3814
3815                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], payment_preimage);
3816                 fail_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], payment_hash);
3817                 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage);
3818         }
3819
3820         #[derive(PartialEq)]
3821         enum HTLCType { NONE, TIMEOUT, SUCCESS }
3822         /// Tests that the given node has broadcast transactions for the given Channel
3823         ///
3824         /// First checks that the latest local commitment tx has been broadcast, unless an explicit
3825         /// commitment_tx is provided, which may be used to test that a remote commitment tx was
3826         /// broadcast and the revoked outputs were claimed.
3827         ///
3828         /// Next tests that there is (or is not) a transaction that spends the commitment transaction
3829         /// that appears to be the type of HTLC transaction specified in has_htlc_tx.
3830         ///
3831         /// All broadcast transactions must be accounted for in one of the above three types of we'll
3832         /// also fail.
3833         fn test_txn_broadcast(node: &Node, chan: &(msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction), commitment_tx: Option<Transaction>, has_htlc_tx: HTLCType) -> Vec<Transaction> {
3834                 let mut node_txn = node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3835                 assert!(node_txn.len() >= if commitment_tx.is_some() { 0 } else { 1 } + if has_htlc_tx == HTLCType::NONE { 0 } else { 1 });
3836
3837                 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(2);
3838                 node_txn.retain(|tx| {
3839                         if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == chan.3.txid() {
3840                                 check_spends!(tx, chan.3.clone());
3841                                 if commitment_tx.is_none() {
3842                                         res.push(tx.clone());
3843                                 }
3844                                 false
3845                         } else { true }
3846                 });
3847                 if let Some(explicit_tx) = commitment_tx {
3848                         res.push(explicit_tx.clone());
3849                 }
3850
3851                 assert_eq!(res.len(), 1);
3852
3853                 if has_htlc_tx != HTLCType::NONE {
3854                         node_txn.retain(|tx| {
3855                                 if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == res[0].txid() {
3856                                         check_spends!(tx, res[0].clone());
3857                                         if has_htlc_tx == HTLCType::TIMEOUT {
3858                                                 assert!(tx.lock_time != 0);
3859                                         } else {
3860                                                 assert!(tx.lock_time == 0);
3861                                         }
3862                                         res.push(tx.clone());
3863                                         false
3864                                 } else { true }
3865                         });
3866                         assert_eq!(res.len(), 2);
3867                 }
3868
3869                 assert!(node_txn.is_empty());
3870                 res
3871         }
3872
3873         /// Tests that the given node has broadcast a claim transaction against the provided revoked
3874         /// HTLC transaction.
3875         fn test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(node: &Node, revoked_tx: Transaction) {
3876                 let mut node_txn = node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3877                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3878                 node_txn.retain(|tx| {
3879                         if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_tx.txid() {
3880                                 check_spends!(tx, revoked_tx.clone());
3881                                 false
3882                         } else { true }
3883                 });
3884                 assert!(node_txn.is_empty());
3885         }
3886
3887         fn check_preimage_claim(node: &Node, prev_txn: &Vec<Transaction>) -> Vec<Transaction> {
3888                 let mut node_txn = node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3889
3890                 assert!(node_txn.len() >= 1);
3891                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
3892                 let mut found_prev = false;
3893
3894                 for tx in prev_txn {
3895                         if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == tx.txid() {
3896                                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], tx.clone());
3897                                 assert!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness[2].len() > 106); // must spend an htlc output
3898                                 assert_eq!(tx.input.len(), 1); // must spend a commitment tx
3899
3900                                 found_prev = true;
3901                                 break;
3902                         }
3903                 }
3904                 assert!(found_prev);
3905
3906                 let mut res = Vec::new();
3907                 mem::swap(&mut *node_txn, &mut res);
3908                 res
3909         }
3910
3911         fn get_announce_close_broadcast_events(nodes: &Vec<Node>, a: usize, b: usize) {
3912                 let events_1 = nodes[a].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3913                 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3914                 let as_update = match events_1[0] {
3915                         Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
3916                                 msg.clone()
3917                         },
3918                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3919                 };
3920
3921                 let events_2 = nodes[b].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3922                 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3923                 let bs_update = match events_2[0] {
3924                         Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
3925                                 msg.clone()
3926                         },
3927                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3928                 };
3929
3930                 for node in nodes {
3931                         node.router.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
3932                         node.router.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
3933                 }
3934         }
3935
3936         #[test]
3937         fn channel_reserve_test() {
3938                 use util::rng;
3939                 use std::sync::atomic::Ordering;
3940                 use ln::msgs::HandleError;
3941
3942                 macro_rules! get_channel_value_stat {
3943                         ($node: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {{
3944                                 let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3945                                 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&$channel_id).unwrap();
3946                                 chan.get_value_stat()
3947                         }}
3948                 }
3949
3950                 let mut nodes = create_network(3);
3951                 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1900, 1001);
3952                 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 1900, 1001);
3953
3954                 let mut stat01 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
3955                 let mut stat11 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
3956
3957                 let mut stat12 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2);
3958                 let mut stat22 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
3959
3960                 macro_rules! get_route_and_payment_hash {
3961                         ($recv_value: expr) => {{
3962                                 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), $recv_value, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
3963                                 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
3964                                 (route, payment_hash, payment_preimage)
3965                         }}
3966                 };
3967
3968                 macro_rules! expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable {
3969                         ($node: expr) => {{
3970                                 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3971                                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3972                                 match events[0] {
3973                                         Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3974                                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3975                                 };
3976                                 $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
3977                                 $node.node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3978                         }}
3979                 };
3980
3981                 macro_rules! expect_forward {
3982                         ($node: expr) => {{
3983                                 let mut events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3984                                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3985                                 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
3986                                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
3987                                 payment_event
3988                         }}
3989                 }
3990
3991                 macro_rules! expect_payment_received {
3992                         ($node: expr, $expected_payment_hash: expr, $expected_recv_value: expr) => {
3993                                 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3994                                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3995                                 match events[0] {
3996                                         Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
3997                                                 assert_eq!($expected_payment_hash, *payment_hash);
3998                                                 assert_eq!($expected_recv_value, amt);
3999                                         },
4000                                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4001                                 }
4002                         }
4003                 };
4004
4005                 let feemsat = 239; // somehow we know?
4006                 let total_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * 239;
4007
4008                 let recv_value_0 = stat01.their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - total_fee_msat;
4009
4010                 // attempt to send amt_msat > their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
4011                 {
4012                         let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_0 + 1);
4013                         assert!(route.hops.iter().rev().skip(1).all(|h| h.fee_msat == feemsat));
4014                         let err = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap();
4015                         match err {
4016                                 APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our max HTLC value in flight"),
4017                                 _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
4018                         }
4019                 }
4020
4021                 let mut htlc_id = 0;
4022                 // channel reserve is bigger than their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat so loop to deplete
4023                 // nodes[0]'s wealth
4024                 loop {
4025                         let amt_msat = recv_value_0 + total_fee_msat;
4026                         if stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat < stat01.channel_reserve_msat {
4027                                 break;
4028                         }
4029                         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1], &nodes[2]][..], recv_value_0);
4030                         htlc_id += 1;
4031
4032                         let (stat01_, stat11_, stat12_, stat22_) = (
4033                                 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2),
4034                                 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2),
4035                                 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2),
4036                                 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2),
4037                         );
4038
4039                         assert_eq!(stat01_.value_to_self_msat, stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat);
4040                         assert_eq!(stat11_.value_to_self_msat, stat11.value_to_self_msat + amt_msat);
4041                         assert_eq!(stat12_.value_to_self_msat, stat12.value_to_self_msat - (amt_msat - feemsat));
4042                         assert_eq!(stat22_.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + (amt_msat - feemsat));
4043                         stat01 = stat01_; stat11 = stat11_; stat12 = stat12_; stat22 = stat22_;
4044                 }
4045
4046                 {
4047                         let recv_value = stat01.value_to_self_msat - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat;
4048                         // attempt to get channel_reserve violation
4049                         let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value + 1);
4050                         let err = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), our_payment_hash).err().unwrap();
4051                         match err {
4052                                 APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our reserve value"),
4053                                 _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
4054                         }
4055                 }
4056
4057                 // adding pending output
4058                 let recv_value_1 = (stat01.value_to_self_msat - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat)/2;
4059                 let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat;
4060
4061                 let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_preimage_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_1);
4062                 let payment_event_1 = {
4063                         nodes[0].node.send_payment(route_1, our_payment_hash_1).unwrap();
4064                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4065
4066                         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4067                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4068                         SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
4069                 };
4070                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]).unwrap();
4071
4072                 // channel reserve test with htlc pending output > 0
4073                 let recv_value_2 = stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat;
4074                 {
4075                         let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_2 + 1);
4076                         match nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap() {
4077                                 APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our reserve value"),
4078                                 _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
4079                         }
4080                 }
4081
4082                 {
4083                         // test channel_reserve test on nodes[1] side
4084                         let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_2 + 1);
4085
4086                         // Need to manually create update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
4087                         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4088                         let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &{
4089                                 let mut session_key = [0; 32];
4090                                 rng::fill_bytes(&mut session_key);
4091                                 session_key
4092                         }).expect("RNG is bad!");
4093
4094                         let cur_height = nodes[0].node.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
4095                         let onion_keys = ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
4096                         let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = ChannelManager::build_onion_payloads(&route, cur_height).unwrap();
4097                         let onion_packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, &our_payment_hash);
4098                         let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
4099                                 channel_id: chan_1.2,
4100                                 htlc_id,
4101                                 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
4102                                 payment_hash: our_payment_hash,
4103                                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
4104                                 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
4105                         };
4106
4107                         let err = nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg).err().unwrap();
4108                         match err {
4109                                 HandleError{err, .. } => assert_eq!(err, "Remote HTLC add would put them over their reserve value"),
4110                         }
4111                 }
4112
4113                 // split the rest to test holding cell
4114                 let recv_value_21 = recv_value_2/2;
4115                 let recv_value_22 = recv_value_2 - recv_value_21 - total_fee_msat;
4116                 {
4117                         let stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4118                         assert_eq!(stat.value_to_self_msat - (stat.pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat + total_fee_msat), stat.channel_reserve_msat);
4119                 }
4120
4121                 // now see if they go through on both sides
4122                 let (route_21, our_payment_hash_21, our_payment_preimage_21) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_21);
4123                 // but this will stuck in the holding cell
4124                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route_21, our_payment_hash_21).unwrap();
4125                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
4126                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4127                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
4128
4129                 // test with outbound holding cell amount > 0
4130                 {
4131                         let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_22+1);
4132                         match nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap() {
4133                                 APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our reserve value"),
4134                                 _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
4135                         }
4136                 }
4137
4138                 let (route_22, our_payment_hash_22, our_payment_preimage_22) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_22);
4139                 // this will also stuck in the holding cell
4140                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(route_22, our_payment_hash_22).unwrap();
4141                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
4142                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4143                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
4144
4145                 // flush the pending htlc
4146                 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.commitment_msg).unwrap();
4147                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4148
4149                 let commitment_update_2 = nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().unwrap();
4150                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4151                 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_none) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed.unwrap()).unwrap();
4152                 assert!(bs_none.is_none());
4153                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4154                 assert!(nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().is_none());
4155                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4156
4157                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4158
4159                 let ref payment_event_11 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
4160                 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_11.msgs[0]).unwrap();
4161                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event_11.commitment_msg, false);
4162
4163                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
4164                 expect_payment_received!(nodes[2], our_payment_hash_1, recv_value_1);
4165
4166                 // flush the htlcs in the holding cell
4167                 assert_eq!(commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs.len(), 2);
4168                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
4169                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[1]).unwrap();
4170                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], &commitment_update_2.commitment_signed, false);
4171                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4172
4173                 let ref payment_event_3 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
4174                 assert_eq!(payment_event_3.msgs.len(), 2);
4175                 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[0]).unwrap();
4176                 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[1]).unwrap();
4177
4178                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], &payment_event_3.commitment_msg, false);
4179                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
4180
4181                 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4182                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
4183                 match events[0] {
4184                         Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
4185                                 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_21, *payment_hash);
4186                                 assert_eq!(recv_value_21, amt);
4187                         },
4188                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4189                 }
4190                 match events[1] {
4191                         Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
4192                                 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_22, *payment_hash);
4193                                 assert_eq!(recv_value_22, amt);
4194                         },
4195                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4196                 }
4197
4198                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_1);
4199                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_21);
4200                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_22);
4201
4202                 let expected_value_to_self = stat01.value_to_self_msat - (recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_21 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat);
4203                 let stat0 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4204                 assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, expected_value_to_self);
4205                 assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, stat0.channel_reserve_msat);
4206
4207                 let stat2 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
4208                 assert_eq!(stat2.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + recv_value_1 + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22);
4209         }
4210
4211         #[test]
4212         fn channel_monitor_network_test() {
4213                 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
4214                 // tests that ChannelMonitor is able to recover from various states.
4215                 let nodes = create_network(5);
4216
4217                 // Create some initial channels
4218                 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4219                 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
4220                 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
4221                 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);
4222
4223                 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
4224                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
4225                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
4226                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
4227                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
4228
4229                 // Simple case with no pending HTLCs:
4230                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
4231                 {
4232                         let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
4233                         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4234                         nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn.drain(..).next().unwrap()] }, 1);
4235                         test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
4236                 }
4237                 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
4238                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4239                 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
4240
4241                 // One pending HTLC is discarded by the force-close:
4242                 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
4243
4244                 // Simple case of one pending HTLC to HTLC-Timeout
4245                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
4246                 {
4247                         let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
4248                         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4249                         nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn.drain(..).next().unwrap()] }, 1);
4250                         test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
4251                 }
4252                 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 1, 2);
4253                 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4254                 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
4255
4256                 macro_rules! claim_funds {
4257                         ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $preimage: expr) => {
4258                                 {
4259                                         assert!($node.node.claim_funds($preimage));
4260                                         check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
4261
4262                                         let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4263                                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4264                                         match events[0] {
4265                                                 Event::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, .. } } => {
4266                                                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4267                                                         assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4268                                                         assert_eq!(*node_id, $prev_node.node.get_our_node_id());
4269                                                 },
4270                                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4271                                         };
4272                                 }
4273                         }
4274                 }
4275
4276                 // nodes[3] gets the preimage, but nodes[2] already disconnected, resulting in a nodes[2]
4277                 // HTLC-Timeout and a nodes[3] claim against it (+ its own announces)
4278                 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
4279                 {
4280                         let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
4281
4282                         // Claim the payment on nodes[3], giving it knowledge of the preimage
4283                         claim_funds!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_preimage_1);
4284
4285                         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4286                         nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
4287
4288                         check_preimage_claim(&nodes[3], &node_txn);
4289                 }
4290                 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 2, 3);
4291                 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4292                 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
4293
4294                 { // Cheat and reset nodes[4]'s height to 1
4295                         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4296                         nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, 1);
4297                 }
4298
4299                 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire), 1);
4300                 assert_eq!(nodes[4].node.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire), 1);
4301                 // One pending HTLC to time out:
4302                 let payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[4])[..], 3000000).0;
4303                 // CLTV expires at TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1 (current height) + 1 (added in send_payment for
4304                 // buffer space).
4305
4306                 {
4307                         let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4308                         nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 2, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
4309                         for i in 3..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 2 + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS + 1 {
4310                                 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4311                                 nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
4312                         }
4313
4314                         let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[3], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
4315
4316                         // Claim the payment on nodes[4], giving it knowledge of the preimage
4317                         claim_funds!(nodes[4], nodes[3], payment_preimage_2);
4318
4319                         header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4320                         nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 2, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
4321                         for i in 3..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 2 - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + 1 {
4322                                 header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4323                                 nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
4324                         }
4325
4326                         test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[4], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::SUCCESS);
4327
4328                         header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4329                         nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone()] }, TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 5);
4330
4331                         check_preimage_claim(&nodes[4], &node_txn);
4332                 }
4333                 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 3, 4);
4334                 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4335                 assert_eq!(nodes[4].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4336
4337                 // Create some new channels:
4338                 let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4339
4340                 // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
4341                 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4342                 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[0]
4343                 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.iter().next().unwrap().1.last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
4344                 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // First commitment tx, then HTLC tx
4345                 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4346                 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_5.3.txid());
4347                 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to 0 are present
4348                 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4349                 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
4350                 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 133); // HTLC-Timeout
4351                 // Revoke the old state
4352                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
4353
4354                 {
4355                         let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4356                         nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
4357                         {
4358                                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4359                                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
4360                                 assert_eq!(node_txn.pop().unwrap(), node_txn[0]); // An outpoint registration will result in a 2nd block_connected
4361                                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2); // We should claim the revoked output and the HTLC output
4362
4363                                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
4364                                 node_txn.swap_remove(0);
4365                         }
4366                         test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_5, None, HTLCType::NONE);
4367
4368                         nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
4369                         let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_5, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
4370                         header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4371                         nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[1].clone()] }, 1);
4372                         test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], node_txn[1].clone());
4373                 }
4374                 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
4375                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4376                 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4377         }
4378
4379         #[test]
4380         fn revoked_output_claim() {
4381                 // Simple test to ensure a node will claim a revoked output when a stale remote commitment
4382                 // transaction is broadcast by its counterparty
4383                 let nodes = create_network(2);
4384                 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4385                 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim the revoked output
4386                 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
4387                 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1);
4388                 // Only output is the full channel value back to nodes[0]:
4389                 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
4390                 // Send a payment through, updating everyone's latest commitment txn
4391                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 5000000);
4392
4393                 // Inform nodes[1] that nodes[0] broadcast a stale tx
4394                 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4395                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
4396                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4397                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); // nodes[1] will broadcast justice tx twice, and its own local state once
4398
4399                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[2]);
4400
4401                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
4402                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3.clone());
4403
4404                 // Inform nodes[0] that a watchtower cheated on its behalf, so it will force-close the chan
4405                 nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
4406                 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
4407         }
4408
4409         #[test]
4410         fn claim_htlc_outputs_shared_tx() {
4411                 // Node revoked old state, htlcs haven't time out yet, claim them in shared justice tx
4412                 let nodes = create_network(2);
4413
4414                 // Create some new channel:
4415                 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4416
4417                 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
4418                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
4419                 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx
4420                 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4421                 let _payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000).0;
4422
4423                 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
4424                 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
4425                 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // commitment tx + 1 HTLC-Timeout tx
4426                 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4427                 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4428                 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4429                 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
4430                 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 133); // HTLC-Timeout
4431                 check_spends!(revoked_local_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
4432
4433                 //Revoke the old state
4434                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
4435
4436                 {
4437                         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4438
4439                         nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
4440
4441                         nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
4442                         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4443                         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4);
4444
4445                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Claim the revoked output + both revoked HTLC outputs
4446                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
4447
4448                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]); // justice tx is duplicated due to block re-scanning
4449
4450                         let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
4451                         witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
4452                         witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len());
4453                         witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[2].witness.last().unwrap().len());
4454                         assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
4455                         assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
4456                         assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), 133); // revoked offered HTLC
4457                         assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), 138); // revoked received HTLC
4458
4459                         // Next nodes[1] broadcasts its current local tx state:
4460                         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4461                         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid()); //Spending funding tx unique txouput, tx broadcasted by ChannelManager
4462
4463                         assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
4464                         let witness_script = node_txn[2].clone().input[0].witness.pop().unwrap();
4465                         assert_eq!(witness_script.len(), 133); //Spending an offered htlc output
4466                         assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[1].txid());
4467                         assert_ne!(node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid);
4468                         assert_ne!(node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output.txid);
4469                 }
4470                 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
4471                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4472                 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4473         }
4474
4475         #[test]
4476         fn claim_htlc_outputs_single_tx() {
4477                 // Node revoked old state, htlcs have timed out, claim each of them in separated justice tx
4478                 let nodes = create_network(2);
4479
4480                 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4481
4482                 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
4483                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
4484                 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx, but this
4485                 // time as two different claim transactions as we're gonna to timeout htlc with given a high current height
4486                 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4487                 let _payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000).0;
4488
4489                 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
4490                 let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
4491
4492                 //Revoke the old state
4493                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
4494
4495                 {
4496                         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4497
4498                         nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 200);
4499
4500                         nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 200);
4501                         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4502                         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 12); // ChannelManager : 2, ChannelMontitor: 8 (1 standard revoked output, 2 revocation htlc tx, 1 local commitment tx + 1 htlc timeout tx) * 2 (block-rescan)
4503
4504                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[7]);
4505                         assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[8]);
4506                         assert_eq!(node_txn[2], node_txn[9]);
4507                         assert_eq!(node_txn[3], node_txn[10]);
4508                         assert_eq!(node_txn[4], node_txn[11]);
4509                         assert_eq!(node_txn[3], node_txn[5]); //local commitment tx + htlc timeout tx broadcated by ChannelManger
4510                         assert_eq!(node_txn[4], node_txn[6]);
4511
4512                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4513                         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4514                         assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
4515
4516                         let mut revoked_tx_map = HashMap::new();
4517                         revoked_tx_map.insert(revoked_local_txn[0].txid(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
4518                         node_txn[0].verify(&revoked_tx_map).unwrap();
4519                         node_txn[1].verify(&revoked_tx_map).unwrap();
4520                         node_txn[2].verify(&revoked_tx_map).unwrap();
4521
4522                         let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
4523                         witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
4524                         witness_lens.insert(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
4525                         witness_lens.insert(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
4526                         assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
4527                         assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
4528                         assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), 133); // revoked offered HTLC
4529                         assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), 138); // revoked received HTLC
4530
4531                         assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
4532                         check_spends!(node_txn[3], chan_1.3.clone());
4533
4534                         assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input.len(), 1);
4535                         let witness_script = node_txn[4].input[0].witness.last().unwrap();
4536                         assert_eq!(witness_script.len(), 133); //Spending an offered htlc output
4537                         assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[3].txid());
4538                         assert_ne!(node_txn[4].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid);
4539                         assert_ne!(node_txn[4].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid);
4540                 }
4541                 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
4542                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4543                 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
4544         }
4545
4546         #[test]
4547         fn test_htlc_ignore_latest_remote_commitment() {
4548                 // Test that HTLC transactions spending the latest remote commitment transaction are simply
4549                 // ignored if we cannot claim them. This originally tickled an invalid unwrap().
4550                 let nodes = create_network(2);
4551                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4552
4553                 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10000000);
4554                 nodes[0].node.force_close_channel(&nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].channel_id);
4555                 {
4556                         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4557                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4558                         match events[0] {
4559                                 Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
4560                                         assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
4561                                 },
4562                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4563                         }
4564                 }
4565
4566                 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4567                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
4568
4569                 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4570                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&node_txn[0], &node_txn[1]], &[1; 2]);
4571
4572                 {
4573                         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4574                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4575                         match events[0] {
4576                                 Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
4577                                         assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
4578                                 },
4579                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4580                         }
4581                 }
4582
4583                 // Duplicate the block_connected call since this may happen due to other listeners
4584                 // registering new transactions
4585                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&node_txn[0], &node_txn[1]], &[1; 2]);
4586         }
4587
4588         #[test]
4589         fn test_force_close_fail_back() {
4590                 // Check which HTLCs are failed-backwards on channel force-closure
4591                 let mut nodes = create_network(3);
4592                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4593                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
4594
4595                 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, 42).unwrap();
4596
4597                 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
4598
4599                 let mut payment_event = {
4600                         nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
4601                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4602
4603                         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4604                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4605                         SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
4606                 };
4607
4608                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
4609                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
4610
4611                 let events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4612                 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
4613                 match events_1[0] {
4614                         Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
4615                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4616                 };
4617
4618                 nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
4619                 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
4620
4621                 let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4622                 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
4623                 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
4624                 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
4625
4626                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4627                 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
4628                 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap();
4629                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
4630
4631                 // nodes[2] now has the latest commitment transaction, but hasn't revoked its previous
4632                 // state or updated nodes[1]' state. Now force-close and broadcast that commitment/HTLC
4633                 // transaction and ensure nodes[1] doesn't fail-backwards (this was originally a bug!).
4634
4635                 nodes[2].node.force_close_channel(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id);
4636                 let events_3 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4637                 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
4638                 match events_3[0] {
4639                         Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
4640                                 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
4641                         },
4642                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4643                 }
4644
4645                 let tx = {
4646                         let mut node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4647                         // Note that we don't bother broadcasting the HTLC-Success transaction here as we don't
4648                         // have a use for it unless nodes[2] learns the preimage somehow, the funds will go
4649                         // back to nodes[1] upon timeout otherwise.
4650                         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4651                         node_txn.remove(0)
4652                 };
4653
4654                 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4655                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&tx], &[1]);
4656
4657                 let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4658                 // Note no UpdateHTLCs event here from nodes[1] to nodes[0]!
4659                 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
4660                 match events_4[0] {
4661                         Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
4662                                 assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
4663                         },
4664                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4665                 }
4666
4667                 // Now check that if we add the preimage to ChannelMonitor it broadcasts our HTLC-Success..
4668                 {
4669                         let mut monitors = nodes[2].chan_monitor.simple_monitor.monitors.lock().unwrap();
4670                         monitors.get_mut(&OutPoint::new(Sha256dHash::from(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id[..]), 0)).unwrap()
4671                                 .provide_payment_preimage(&our_payment_hash, &our_payment_preimage);
4672                 }
4673                 nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&tx], &[1]);
4674                 let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4675                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4676                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4677                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, tx.txid());
4678                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Must be an HTLC-Success
4679                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.len(), 5); // Must be an HTLC-Success
4680
4681                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], tx);
4682         }
4683
4684         #[test]
4685         fn test_unconf_chan() {
4686                 // After creating a chan between nodes, we disconnect all blocks previously seen to force a channel close on nodes[0] side
4687                 let nodes = create_network(2);
4688                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4689
4690                 let channel_state = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4691                 assert_eq!(channel_state.by_id.len(), 1);
4692                 assert_eq!(channel_state.short_to_id.len(), 1);
4693                 mem::drop(channel_state);
4694
4695                 let mut headers = Vec::new();
4696                 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4697                 headers.push(header.clone());
4698                 for _i in 2..100 {
4699                         header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4700                         headers.push(header.clone());
4701                 }
4702                 while !headers.is_empty() {
4703                         nodes[0].node.block_disconnected(&headers.pop().unwrap());
4704                 }
4705                 {
4706                         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4707                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4708                         match events[0] {
4709                                 Event::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
4710                                         assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
4711                                 },
4712                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4713                         }
4714                 }
4715                 let channel_state = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4716                 assert_eq!(channel_state.by_id.len(), 0);
4717                 assert_eq!(channel_state.short_to_id.len(), 0);
4718         }
4719
4720         /// pending_htlc_adds includes both the holding cell and in-flight update_add_htlcs, whereas
4721         /// for claims/fails they are separated out.
4722         fn reconnect_nodes(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, pre_all_htlcs: bool, pending_htlc_adds: (i64, i64), pending_htlc_claims: (usize, usize), pending_cell_htlc_claims: (usize, usize), pending_cell_htlc_fails: (usize, usize), pending_raa: (bool, bool)) {
4723                 let reestablish_1 = node_a.node.peer_connected(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
4724                 let reestablish_2 = node_b.node.peer_connected(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
4725
4726                 let mut resp_1 = Vec::new();
4727                 for msg in reestablish_1 {
4728                         resp_1.push(node_b.node.handle_channel_reestablish(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &msg).unwrap());
4729                 }
4730                 if pending_cell_htlc_claims.0 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_fails.0 != 0 {
4731                         check_added_monitors!(node_b, 1);
4732                 } else {
4733                         check_added_monitors!(node_b, 0);
4734                 }
4735
4736                 let mut resp_2 = Vec::new();
4737                 for msg in reestablish_2 {
4738                         resp_2.push(node_a.node.handle_channel_reestablish(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &msg).unwrap());
4739                 }
4740                 if pending_cell_htlc_claims.1 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_fails.1 != 0 {
4741                         check_added_monitors!(node_a, 1);
4742                 } else {
4743                         check_added_monitors!(node_a, 0);
4744                 }
4745
4746                 // We dont yet support both needing updates, as that would require a different commitment dance:
4747                 assert!((pending_htlc_adds.0 == 0 && pending_htlc_claims.0 == 0 && pending_cell_htlc_claims.0 == 0 && pending_cell_htlc_fails.0 == 0) ||
4748                         (pending_htlc_adds.1 == 0 && pending_htlc_claims.1 == 0 && pending_cell_htlc_claims.1 == 0 && pending_cell_htlc_fails.1 == 0));
4749
4750                 for chan_msgs in resp_1.drain(..) {
4751                         if pre_all_htlcs {
4752                                 let a = node_a.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_msgs.0.unwrap());
4753                                 let _announcement_sigs_opt = a.unwrap();
4754                                 //TODO: Test announcement_sigs re-sending when we've implemented it
4755                         } else {
4756                                 assert!(chan_msgs.0.is_none());
4757                         }
4758                         if pending_raa.0 {
4759                                 assert!(node_a.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_msgs.1.unwrap()).unwrap().is_none());
4760                                 check_added_monitors!(node_a, 1);
4761                         } else {
4762                                 assert!(chan_msgs.1.is_none());
4763                         }
4764                         if pending_htlc_adds.0 != 0 || pending_htlc_claims.0 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_claims.0 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_fails.0 != 0 {
4765                                 let commitment_update = chan_msgs.2.unwrap();
4766                                 if pending_htlc_adds.0 != -1 { // We use -1 to denote a response commitment_signed
4767                                         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_adds.0 as usize);
4768                                 } else {
4769                                         assert!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4770                                 }
4771                                 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_claims.0 + pending_cell_htlc_claims.0);
4772                                 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), pending_cell_htlc_fails.0);
4773                                 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4774                                 for update_add in commitment_update.update_add_htlcs {
4775                                         node_a.node.handle_update_add_htlc(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add).unwrap();
4776                                 }
4777                                 for update_fulfill in commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs {
4778                                         node_a.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill).unwrap();
4779                                 }
4780                                 for update_fail in commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs {
4781                                         node_a.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail).unwrap();
4782                                 }
4783
4784                                 if pending_htlc_adds.0 != -1 { // We use -1 to denote a response commitment_signed
4785                                         commitment_signed_dance!(node_a, node_b, commitment_update.commitment_signed, false);
4786                                 } else {
4787                                         let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = node_a.node.handle_commitment_signed(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
4788                                         check_added_monitors!(node_a, 1);
4789                                         assert!(as_commitment_signed.is_none());
4790                                         assert!(node_b.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().is_none());
4791                                         check_added_monitors!(node_b, 1);
4792                                 }
4793                         } else {
4794                                 assert!(chan_msgs.2.is_none());
4795                         }
4796                 }
4797
4798                 for chan_msgs in resp_2.drain(..) {
4799                         if pre_all_htlcs {
4800                                 let _announcement_sigs_opt = node_b.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_msgs.0.unwrap()).unwrap();
4801                                 //TODO: Test announcement_sigs re-sending when we've implemented it
4802                         } else {
4803                                 assert!(chan_msgs.0.is_none());
4804                         }
4805                         if pending_raa.1 {
4806                                 assert!(node_b.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_msgs.1.unwrap()).unwrap().is_none());
4807                                 check_added_monitors!(node_b, 1);
4808                         } else {
4809                                 assert!(chan_msgs.1.is_none());
4810                         }
4811                         if pending_htlc_adds.1 != 0 || pending_htlc_claims.1 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_claims.1 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_fails.1 != 0 {
4812                                 let commitment_update = chan_msgs.2.unwrap();
4813                                 if pending_htlc_adds.1 != -1 { // We use -1 to denote a response commitment_signed
4814                                         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_adds.1 as usize);
4815                                 }
4816                                 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_claims.0 + pending_cell_htlc_claims.0);
4817                                 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), pending_cell_htlc_fails.0);
4818                                 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4819                                 for update_add in commitment_update.update_add_htlcs {
4820                                         node_b.node.handle_update_add_htlc(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add).unwrap();
4821                                 }
4822                                 for update_fulfill in commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs {
4823                                         node_b.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill).unwrap();
4824                                 }
4825                                 for update_fail in commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs {
4826                                         node_b.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail).unwrap();
4827                                 }
4828
4829                                 if pending_htlc_adds.1 != -1 { // We use -1 to denote a response commitment_signed
4830                                         commitment_signed_dance!(node_b, node_a, commitment_update.commitment_signed, false);
4831                                 } else {
4832                                         let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = node_b.node.handle_commitment_signed(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
4833                                         check_added_monitors!(node_b, 1);
4834                                         assert!(bs_commitment_signed.is_none());
4835                                         assert!(node_a.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().is_none());
4836                                         check_added_monitors!(node_a, 1);
4837                                 }
4838                         } else {
4839                                 assert!(chan_msgs.2.is_none());
4840                         }
4841                 }
4842         }
4843
4844         #[test]
4845         fn test_simple_peer_disconnect() {
4846                 // Test that we can reconnect when there are no lost messages
4847                 let nodes = create_network(3);
4848                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4849                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
4850
4851                 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4852                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4853                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], true, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4854
4855                 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
4856                 let payment_hash_2 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
4857                 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_2);
4858                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_1);
4859
4860                 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4861                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4862                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4863
4864                 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
4865                 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
4866                 let payment_hash_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
4867                 let payment_hash_6 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
4868
4869                 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4870                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4871
4872                 claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), true, payment_preimage_3);
4873                 fail_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], true, payment_hash_5);
4874
4875                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (1, 0), (1, 0), (false, false));
4876                 {
4877                         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4878                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
4879                         match events[0] {
4880                                 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage } => {
4881                                         assert_eq!(payment_preimage, payment_preimage_3);
4882                                 },
4883                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4884                         }
4885                         match events[1] {
4886                                 Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash } => {
4887                                         assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_5);
4888                                 },
4889                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4890                         }
4891                 }
4892
4893                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_4);
4894                 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_6);
4895         }
4896
4897         fn do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(messages_delivered: u8) {
4898                 // Test that we can reconnect when in-flight HTLC updates get dropped
4899                 let mut nodes = create_network(2);
4900                 if messages_delivered == 0 {
4901                         create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001);
4902                         // nodes[1] doesn't receive the funding_locked message (it'll be re-sent on reconnect)
4903                 } else {
4904                         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4905                 }
4906
4907                 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(&nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()), &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
4908                 let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
4909
4910                 let payment_event = {
4911                         nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), payment_hash_1).unwrap();
4912                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4913
4914                         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4915                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4916                         SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
4917                 };
4918                 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
4919
4920                 if messages_delivered < 2 {
4921                         // Drop the payment_event messages, and let them get re-generated in reconnect_nodes!
4922                 } else {
4923                         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
4924                         let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap();
4925                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4926
4927                         if messages_delivered >= 3 {
4928                                 assert!(nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().is_none());
4929                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4930
4931                                 if messages_delivered >= 4 {
4932                                         let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed.unwrap()).unwrap();
4933                                         assert!(as_commitment_signed.is_none());
4934                                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4935
4936                                         if messages_delivered >= 5 {
4937                                                 assert!(nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().is_none());
4938                                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4939                                         }
4940                                 }
4941                         }
4942                 }
4943
4944                 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4945                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4946                 if messages_delivered < 2 {
4947                         // Even if the funding_locked messages get exchanged, as long as nothing further was
4948                         // received on either side, both sides will need to resend them.
4949                         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], true, (0, 1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4950                 } else if messages_delivered == 2 {
4951                         // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
4952                         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
4953                 } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
4954                         // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
4955                         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4956                 } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
4957                         // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
4958                         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
4959                 } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
4960                         // Everything was delivered...
4961                         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4962                 }
4963
4964                 let events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4965                 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
4966                 match events_1[0] {
4967                         Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
4968                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4969                 };
4970
4971                 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4972                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4973                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4974
4975                 nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
4976                 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
4977
4978                 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4979                 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
4980                 match events_2[0] {
4981                         Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
4982                                 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
4983                                 assert_eq!(amt, 1000000);
4984                         },
4985                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4986                 }
4987
4988                 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
4989                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4990
4991                 let events_3 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4992                 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
4993                 let (update_fulfill_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events_3[0] {
4994                         Event::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
4995                                 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4996                                 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4997                                 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4998                                 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4999                                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5000                                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
5001                                 (updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
5002                         },
5003                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5004                 };
5005
5006                 if messages_delivered >= 1 {
5007                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlc).unwrap();
5008
5009                         let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5010                         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
5011                         match events_4[0] {
5012                                 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
5013                                         assert_eq!(payment_preimage_1, *payment_preimage);
5014                                 },
5015                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5016                         }
5017
5018                         if messages_delivered >= 2 {
5019                                 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap();
5020                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5021
5022                                 if messages_delivered >= 3 {
5023                                         assert!(nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().is_none());
5024                                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5025
5026                                         if messages_delivered >= 4 {
5027                                                 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed.unwrap()).unwrap();
5028                                                 assert!(bs_commitment_signed.is_none());
5029                                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5030
5031                                                 if messages_delivered >= 5 {
5032                                                         assert!(nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap().is_none());
5033                                                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5034                                                 }
5035                                         }
5036                                 }
5037                         }
5038                 }
5039
5040                 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5041                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5042                 if messages_delivered < 2 {
5043                         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
5044                         //TODO: Deduplicate PaymentSent events, then enable this if:
5045                         //if messages_delivered < 1 {
5046                                 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5047                                 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
5048                                 match events_4[0] {
5049                                         Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
5050                                                 assert_eq!(payment_preimage_1, *payment_preimage);
5051                                         },
5052                                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5053                                 }
5054                         //}
5055                 } else if messages_delivered == 2 {
5056                         // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
5057                         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
5058                 } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
5059                         // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
5060                         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
5061                 } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
5062                         // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
5063                         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
5064                 } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
5065                         // Everything was delivered...
5066                         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
5067                 }
5068
5069                 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5070                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5071                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
5072
5073                 // Channel should still work fine...
5074                 let payment_preimage_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
5075                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
5076         }
5077
5078         #[test]
5079         fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_a() {
5080                 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0);
5081                 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(1);
5082                 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(2);
5083         }
5084
5085         #[test]
5086         fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_b() {
5087                 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(3);
5088                 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(4);
5089                 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(5);
5090         }
5091
5092         #[test]
5093         fn test_funding_peer_disconnect() {
5094                 // Test that we can lock in our funding tx while disconnected
5095                 let nodes = create_network(2);
5096                 let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001);
5097
5098                 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5099                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5100
5101                 confirm_transaction(&nodes[0].chain_monitor, &tx, tx.version);
5102                 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5103                 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
5104                 match events_1[0] {
5105                         Event::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, msg: _, ref announcement_sigs } => {
5106                                 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5107                                 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none());
5108                         },
5109                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5110                 }
5111
5112                 confirm_transaction(&nodes[1].chain_monitor, &tx, tx.version);
5113                 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5114                 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
5115                 match events_2[0] {
5116                         Event::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, msg: _, ref announcement_sigs } => {
5117                                 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5118                                 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none());
5119                         },
5120                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5121                 }
5122
5123                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], true, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
5124                 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5125                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
5126                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], true, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
5127
5128                 // TODO: We shouldn't need to manually pass list_usable_chanels here once we support
5129                 // rebroadcasting announcement_signatures upon reconnect.
5130
5131                 let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(&nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()), &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
5132                 let (payment_preimage, _) = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
5133                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage);
5134         }
5135
5136         #[test]
5137         fn test_invalid_channel_announcement() {
5138                 //Test BOLT 7 channel_announcement msg requirement for final node, gather data to build customed channel_announcement msgs
5139                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5140                 let nodes = create_network(2);
5141
5142                 let chan_announcement = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
5143
5144                 let a_channel_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5145                 let b_channel_lock = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5146                 let as_chan = a_channel_lock.by_id.get(&chan_announcement.3).unwrap();
5147                 let bs_chan = b_channel_lock.by_id.get(&chan_announcement.3).unwrap();
5148
5149                 let _ = nodes[0].router.handle_htlc_fail_channel_update(&msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { short_channel_id : as_chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), is_permanent: false } );
5150
5151                 let as_bitcoin_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &as_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
5152                 let bs_bitcoin_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &bs_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
5153
5154                 let as_network_key = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
5155                 let bs_network_key = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
5156
5157                 let were_node_one = as_bitcoin_key.serialize()[..] < bs_bitcoin_key.serialize()[..];
5158
5159                 let mut chan_announcement;
5160
5161                 macro_rules! dummy_unsigned_msg {
5162                         () => {
5163                                 msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
5164                                         features: msgs::GlobalFeatures::new(),
5165                                         chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.bitcoin_hash(),
5166                                         short_channel_id: as_chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
5167                                         node_id_1: if were_node_one { as_network_key } else { bs_network_key },
5168                                         node_id_2: if were_node_one { bs_network_key } else { as_network_key },
5169                                         bitcoin_key_1: if were_node_one { as_bitcoin_key } else { bs_bitcoin_key },
5170                                         bitcoin_key_2: if were_node_one { bs_bitcoin_key } else { as_bitcoin_key },
5171                                         excess_data: Vec::new(),
5172                                 };
5173                         }
5174                 }
5175
5176                 macro_rules! sign_msg {
5177                         ($unsigned_msg: expr) => {
5178                                 let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&$unsigned_msg.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
5179                                 let as_bitcoin_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &as_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
5180                                 let bs_bitcoin_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &bs_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
5181                                 let as_node_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &nodes[0].node.our_network_key);
5182                                 let bs_node_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &nodes[1].node.our_network_key);
5183                                 chan_announcement = msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
5184                                         node_signature_1 : if were_node_one { as_node_sig } else { bs_node_sig},
5185                                         node_signature_2 : if were_node_one { bs_node_sig } else { as_node_sig},
5186                                         bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { as_bitcoin_sig } else { bs_bitcoin_sig },
5187                                         bitcoin_signature_2 : if were_node_one { bs_bitcoin_sig } else { as_bitcoin_sig },
5188                                         contents: $unsigned_msg
5189                                 }
5190                         }
5191                 }
5192
5193                 let unsigned_msg = dummy_unsigned_msg!();
5194                 sign_msg!(unsigned_msg);
5195                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).unwrap(), true);
5196                 let _ = nodes[0].router.handle_htlc_fail_channel_update(&msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { short_channel_id : as_chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), is_permanent: false } );
5197
5198                 // Configured with Network::Testnet
5199                 let mut unsigned_msg = dummy_unsigned_msg!();
5200                 unsigned_msg.chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin).header.bitcoin_hash();
5201                 sign_msg!(unsigned_msg);
5202                 assert!(nodes[0].router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).is_err());
5203
5204                 let mut unsigned_msg = dummy_unsigned_msg!();
5205                 unsigned_msg.chain_hash = Sha256dHash::from_data(&[1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9]);
5206                 sign_msg!(unsigned_msg);
5207                 assert!(nodes[0].router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).is_err());
5208         }
5209 }