Store [u8; 32]s instead of SharedSecrets (for deserialization)

[rust-lightning] / src / ln / channelmanager.rs

//! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
//!
//! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
//! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
//! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
//!
//! It does not manage routing logic (see ln::router for that) nor does it manage constructing
//! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
//! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).

use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
use bitcoin::network::serialize::BitcoinHash;
use bitcoin::util::hash::Sha256dHash;

use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
use secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Message};
use secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
use secp256k1;

use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface,ChainListener,ChainWatchInterface,FeeEstimator};
use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError};
use ln::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, ManyChannelMonitor, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS};
use ln::router::{Route,RouteHop};
use ln::msgs;
use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, HandleError};
use chain::keysinterface::KeysInterface;
use util::{byte_utils, events, internal_traits, rng};
use util::sha2::Sha256;
use util::ser::{Readable, Writeable};
use util::chacha20poly1305rfc::ChaCha20;
use util::logger::Logger;
use util::errors::APIError;

use crypto;
use crypto::mac::{Mac,MacResult};
use crypto::hmac::Hmac;
use crypto::digest::Digest;
use crypto::symmetriccipher::SynchronousStreamCipher;

use std::{ptr, mem};
use std::collections::HashMap;
use std::collections::hash_map;
use std::io::Cursor;
use std::sync::{Mutex,MutexGuard,Arc};
use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
use std::time::{Instant,Duration};

/// We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
///
/// Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
/// forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
/// the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
///
/// When a Channel forwards an HTLC to its peer, it will give us back the PendingForwardHTLCInfo
/// which we will use to construct an outbound HTLC, with a relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData
/// filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use to either fail-backwards or fulfill
/// the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
/// Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
/// our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
mod channel_held_info {
        use ln::msgs;
        use ln::router::Route;
        use secp256k1::key::SecretKey;

        /// Stores the info we will need to send when we want to forward an HTLC onwards
        #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
        pub struct PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
                pub(super) onion_packet: Option<msgs::OnionPacket>,
                pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
                pub(super) payment_hash: [u8; 32],
                pub(super) short_channel_id: u64,
                pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
                pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
        }

        #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
        pub enum HTLCFailureMsg {
                Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
                Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
        }

        /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
        #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
        pub enum PendingHTLCStatus {
                Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo),
                Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
        }

        /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
        #[derive(Clone)]
        pub struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
                pub(super) short_channel_id: u64,
                pub(super) htlc_id: u64,
                pub(super) incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
        }

        /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
        #[derive(Clone)]
        pub enum HTLCSource {
                PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
                OutboundRoute {
                        route: Route,
                        session_priv: SecretKey,
                        /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
                        /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
                        first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
                },
        }
        #[cfg(test)]
        impl HTLCSource {
                pub fn dummy() -> Self {
                        HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
                                route: Route { hops: Vec::new() },
                                session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&::secp256k1::Secp256k1::without_caps(), &[1; 32]).unwrap(),
                                first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
                        }
                }
        }

        #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
        pub(crate) enum HTLCFailReason {
                ErrorPacket {
                        err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
                },
                Reason {
                        failure_code: u16,
                        data: Vec<u8>,
                }
        }
}
pub(super) use self::channel_held_info::*;

struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
        err: msgs::HandleError,
        needs_channel_force_close: bool,
}
impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
        #[inline]
        fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: &'static str, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
                Self {
                        err: HandleError {
                                err,
                                action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
                                        msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
                                                channel_id,
                                                data: err.to_string()
                                        },
                                }),
                        },
                        needs_channel_force_close: false,
                }
        }
        #[inline]
        fn send_err_msg_close_chan(err: &'static str, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
                Self {
                        err: HandleError {
                                err,
                                action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
                                        msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
                                                channel_id,
                                                data: err.to_string()
                                        },
                                }),
                        },
                        needs_channel_force_close: true,
                }
        }
        #[inline]
        fn from_maybe_close(err: msgs::HandleError) -> Self {
                Self { err, needs_channel_force_close: true }
        }
        #[inline]
        fn from_no_close(err: msgs::HandleError) -> Self {
                Self { err, needs_channel_force_close: false }
        }
        #[inline]
        fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
                Self {
                        err: match err {
                                ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => HandleError {
                                        err: msg,
                                        action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError),
                                },
                                ChannelError::Close(msg) => HandleError {
                                        err: msg,
                                        action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
                                                msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
                                                        channel_id,
                                                        data: msg.to_string()
                                                },
                                        }),
                                },
                        },
                        needs_channel_force_close: false,
                }
        }
        #[inline]
        fn from_chan_maybe_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
                Self {
                        err: match err {
                                ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => HandleError {
                                        err: msg,
                                        action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError),
                                },
                                ChannelError::Close(msg) => HandleError {
                                        err: msg,
                                        action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
                                                msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
                                                        channel_id,
                                                        data: msg.to_string()
                                                },
                                        }),
                                },
                        },
                        needs_channel_force_close: true,
                }
        }
}

/// Pass to fail_htlc_backwwards to indicate the reason to fail the payment
/// after a PaymentReceived event.
#[derive(PartialEq)]
pub enum PaymentFailReason {
        /// Indicate the preimage for payment_hash is not known after a PaymentReceived event
        PreimageUnknown,
        /// Indicate the payment amount is incorrect ( received is < expected or > 2*expected ) after a PaymentReceived event
        AmountMismatch,
}

/// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval in the range (this, 5*this). This
/// provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like 1 second
/// to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly. We could
/// probably increase this significantly.
const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u32 = 50;

struct HTLCForwardInfo {
        prev_short_channel_id: u64,
        prev_htlc_id: u64,
        forward_info: PendingForwardHTLCInfo,
}

/// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
/// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
/// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
/// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
#[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
        /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
        CommitmentFirst,
        /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
        RevokeAndACKFirst,
}

struct ChannelHolder {
        by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel>,
        short_to_id: HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
        next_forward: Instant,
        /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
        /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
        /// guarantees are made about there existing a channel with the short id here, nor the short
        /// ids in the PendingForwardHTLCInfo!
        forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
        /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
        /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
        /// go to read them!
        claimable_htlcs: HashMap<[u8; 32], Vec<HTLCPreviousHopData>>,
        /// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
        /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
        pending_msg_events: Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>,
}
struct MutChannelHolder<'a> {
        by_id: &'a mut HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel>,
        short_to_id: &'a mut HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
        next_forward: &'a mut Instant,
        forward_htlcs: &'a mut HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
        claimable_htlcs: &'a mut HashMap<[u8; 32], Vec<HTLCPreviousHopData>>,
        pending_msg_events: &'a mut Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>,
}
impl ChannelHolder {
        fn borrow_parts(&mut self) -> MutChannelHolder {
                MutChannelHolder {
                        by_id: &mut self.by_id,
                        short_to_id: &mut self.short_to_id,
                        next_forward: &mut self.next_forward,
                        forward_htlcs: &mut self.forward_htlcs,
                        claimable_htlcs: &mut self.claimable_htlcs,
                        pending_msg_events: &mut self.pending_msg_events,
                }
        }
}

#[cfg(not(any(target_pointer_width = "32", target_pointer_width = "64")))]
const ERR: () = "You need at least 32 bit pointers (well, usize, but we'll assume they're the same) for ChannelManager::latest_block_height";

/// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
/// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
///
/// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
/// to individual Channels.
pub struct ChannelManager {
        genesis_hash: Sha256dHash,
        fee_estimator: Arc<FeeEstimator>,
        monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>,
        chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>,
        tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>,

        announce_channels_publicly: bool,
        fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
        latest_block_height: AtomicUsize,
        secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,

        channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder>,
        our_network_key: SecretKey,

        pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,

        keys_manager: Arc<KeysInterface>,

        logger: Arc<Logger>,
}

/// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
/// HTLC's CLTV. This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
/// ie the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
/// the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
/// CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that its at least 3 blocks more).
const CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6 * 24 * 2; //TODO?
const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 6 * 24 * 7; //TODO?

// Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + 2*HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS, ie that
// if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS then we'll still have
// HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS left to fail it backwards ourselves before hitting the
// CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point and failing the channel on-chain to time out the HTLC.
#[deny(const_err)]
#[allow(dead_code)]
const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 2*HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;

// Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying inbound claim. See
// ChannelMontior::would_broadcast_at_height for a description of why this is needed.
#[deny(const_err)]
#[allow(dead_code)]
const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;

macro_rules! secp_call {
        ( $res: expr, $err: expr ) => {
                match $res {
                        Ok(key) => key,
                        Err(_) => return Err($err),
                }
        };
}

struct OnionKeys {
        #[cfg(test)]
        shared_secret: SharedSecret,
        #[cfg(test)]
        blinding_factor: [u8; 32],
        ephemeral_pubkey: PublicKey,
        rho: [u8; 32],
        mu: [u8; 32],
}

/// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
pub struct ChannelDetails {
        /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
        /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
        /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
        /// lifetime of the channel.
        pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
        /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
        /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
        pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
        /// The node_id of our counterparty
        pub remote_network_id: PublicKey,
        /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
        pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
        /// The user_id passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
        pub user_id: u64,
}

impl ChannelManager {
        /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
        ///
        /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
        /// ChannelMessageHandler.
        ///
        /// fee_proportional_millionths is an optional fee to charge any payments routed through us.
        /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
        ///
        /// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= `MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS`!
        pub fn new(fee_proportional_millionths: u32, announce_channels_publicly: bool, network: Network, feeest: Arc<FeeEstimator>, monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>, chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>, tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>, logger: Arc<Logger>, keys_manager: Arc<KeysInterface>) -> Result<Arc<ChannelManager>, secp256k1::Error> {
                let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();

                let res = Arc::new(ChannelManager {
                        genesis_hash: genesis_block(network).header.bitcoin_hash(),
                        fee_estimator: feeest.clone(),
                        monitor: monitor.clone(),
                        chain_monitor,
                        tx_broadcaster,

                        announce_channels_publicly,
                        fee_proportional_millionths,
                        latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(0), //TODO: Get an init value (generally need to replay recent chain on chain_monitor registration)
                        secp_ctx,

                        channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
                                by_id: HashMap::new(),
                                short_to_id: HashMap::new(),
                                next_forward: Instant::now(),
                                forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
                                claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
                                pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
                        }),
                        our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(),

                        pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),

                        keys_manager,

                        logger,
                });
                let weak_res = Arc::downgrade(&res);
                res.chain_monitor.register_listener(weak_res);
                Ok(res)
        }

        /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
        ///
        /// user_id will be provided back as user_channel_id in FundingGenerationReady and
        /// FundingBroadcastSafe events to allow tracking of which events correspond with which
        /// create_channel call. Note that user_channel_id defaults to 0 for inbound channels, so you
        /// may wish to avoid using 0 for user_id here.
        ///
        /// If successful, will generate a SendOpenChannel message event, so you should probably poll
        /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
        ///
        /// Raises APIError::APIMisuseError when channel_value_satoshis > 2**24 or push_msat being greater than channel_value_satoshis * 1k
        pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
                let channel = Channel::new_outbound(&*self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, self.announce_channels_publicly, user_id, Arc::clone(&self.logger))?;
                let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone(), &*self.fee_estimator);
                let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
                match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
                        hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
                                if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
                                        return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG" });
                                } else {
                                        panic!("RNG is bad???");
                                }
                        },
                        hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
                }
                channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
                        node_id: their_network_key,
                        msg: res,
                });
                Ok(())
        }

        /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
        /// more information.
        pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
                let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
                let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.by_id.len());
                for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
                        res.push(ChannelDetails {
                                channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
                                short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
                                remote_network_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
                                channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
                                user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
                        });
                }
                res
        }

        /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
        /// Router::get_route to ensure non-announced channels are used.
        pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
                let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
                let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.by_id.len());
                for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
                        // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
                        // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
                        // really wanted anyway.
                        if channel.is_live() {
                                res.push(ChannelDetails {
                                        channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
                                        short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
                                        remote_network_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
                                        channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
                                        user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
                                });
                        }
                }
                res
        }

        /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
        /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
        /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
        ///
        /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
        pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
                let (mut failed_htlcs, chan_option) = {
                        let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
                        let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
                        match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
                                hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
                                        let (shutdown_msg, failed_htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown()?;
                                        channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
                                                node_id: chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id(),
                                                msg: shutdown_msg
                                        });
                                        if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
                                                if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
                                                        channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
                                                }
                                                (failed_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
                                        } else { (failed_htlcs, None) }
                                },
                                hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel"})
                        }
                };
                for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
                        // unknown_next_peer...I dunno who that is anymore....
                        self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() });
                }
                let chan_update = if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
                        if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
                                Some(update)
                        } else { None }
                } else { None };

                if let Some(update) = chan_update {
                        let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
                        channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
                                msg: update
                        });
                }

                Ok(())
        }

        #[inline]
        fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<(HTLCSource, [u8; 32])>)) {
                let (local_txn, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
                for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
                        // unknown_next_peer...I dunno who that is anymore....
                        self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() });
                }
                for tx in local_txn {
                        self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
                }
                //TODO: We need to have a way where outbound HTLC claims can result in us claiming the
                //now-on-chain HTLC output for ourselves (and, thereafter, passing the HTLC backwards).
                //TODO: We need to handle monitoring of pending offered HTLCs which just hit the chain and
                //may be claimed, resulting in us claiming the inbound HTLCs (and back-failing after
                //timeouts are hit and our claims confirm).
                //TODO: In any case, we need to make sure we remove any pending htlc tracking (via
                //fail_backwards or claim_funds) eventually for all HTLCs that were in the channel
        }

        /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to
        /// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel.
        pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) {
                let mut chan = {
                        let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
                        let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
                        if let Some(chan) = channel_state.by_id.remove(channel_id) {
                                if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
                                        channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
                                }
                                chan
                        } else {
                                return;
                        }
                };
                self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown());
                if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
                        let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
                        channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
                                msg: update
                        });
                }
        }

        /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
        /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
        pub fn force_close_all_channels(&self) {
                for chan in self.list_channels() {
                        self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
                }
        }

        fn handle_monitor_update_fail(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>, channel_id: &[u8; 32], err: ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, reason: RAACommitmentOrder) {
                match err {
                        ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
                                let mut chan = {
                                        let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
                                        let chan = channel_state.by_id.remove(channel_id).expect("monitor_update_failed must be called within the same lock as the channel get!");
                                        if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
                                                channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
                                        }
                                        chan
                                };
                                mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
                                self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown());
                                if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
                                        let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
                                        channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
                                                msg: update
                                        });
                                }
                        },
                        ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
                                let channel = channel_state_lock.by_id.get_mut(channel_id).expect("monitor_update_failed must be called within the same lock as the channel get!");
                                channel.monitor_update_failed(reason);
                        },
                }
        }

        #[inline]
        fn gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &[u8]) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
                assert_eq!(shared_secret.len(), 32);
                ({
                        let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x72, 0x68, 0x6f]); // rho
                        hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
                        let mut res = [0; 32];
                        hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
                        res
                },
                {
                        let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x6d, 0x75]); // mu
                        hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
                        let mut res = [0; 32];
                        hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
                        res
                })
        }

        #[inline]
        fn gen_um_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &[u8]) -> [u8; 32] {
                assert_eq!(shared_secret.len(), 32);
                let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x75, 0x6d]); // um
                hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
                let mut res = [0; 32];
                hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
                res
        }

        #[inline]
        fn gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(shared_secret: &[u8]) -> [u8; 32] {
                assert_eq!(shared_secret.len(), 32);
                let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &[0x61, 0x6d, 0x6d, 0x61, 0x67]); // ammag
                hmac.input(&shared_secret[..]);
                let mut res = [0; 32];
                hmac.raw_result(&mut res);
                res
        }

        // can only fail if an intermediary hop has an invalid public key or session_priv is invalid
        #[inline]
        fn construct_onion_keys_callback<T: secp256k1::Signing, FType: FnMut(SharedSecret, [u8; 32], PublicKey, &RouteHop)> (secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, route: &Route, session_priv: &SecretKey, mut callback: FType) -> Result<(), secp256k1::Error> {
                let mut blinded_priv = session_priv.clone();
                let mut blinded_pub = PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &blinded_priv);

                for hop in route.hops.iter() {
                        let shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(secp_ctx, &hop.pubkey, &blinded_priv);

                        let mut sha = Sha256::new();
                        sha.input(&blinded_pub.serialize()[..]);
                        sha.input(&shared_secret[..]);
                        let mut blinding_factor = [0u8; 32];
                        sha.result(&mut blinding_factor);

                        let ephemeral_pubkey = blinded_pub;

                        blinded_priv.mul_assign(secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(secp_ctx, &blinding_factor)?)?;
                        blinded_pub = PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &blinded_priv);

                        callback(shared_secret, blinding_factor, ephemeral_pubkey, hop);
                }

                Ok(())
        }

        // can only fail if an intermediary hop has an invalid public key or session_priv is invalid
        fn construct_onion_keys<T: secp256k1::Signing>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, route: &Route, session_priv: &SecretKey) -> Result<Vec<OnionKeys>, secp256k1::Error> {
                let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(route.hops.len());

                Self::construct_onion_keys_callback(secp_ctx, route, session_priv, |shared_secret, _blinding_factor, ephemeral_pubkey, _| {
                        let (rho, mu) = ChannelManager::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret[..]);

                        res.push(OnionKeys {
                                #[cfg(test)]
                                shared_secret,
                                #[cfg(test)]
                                blinding_factor: _blinding_factor,
                                ephemeral_pubkey,
                                rho,
                                mu,
                        });
                })?;

                Ok(res)
        }

        /// returns the hop data, as well as the first-hop value_msat and CLTV value we should send.
        fn build_onion_payloads(route: &Route, starting_htlc_offset: u32) -> Result<(Vec<msgs::OnionHopData>, u64, u32), APIError> {
                let mut cur_value_msat = 0u64;
                let mut cur_cltv = starting_htlc_offset;
                let mut last_short_channel_id = 0;
                let mut res: Vec<msgs::OnionHopData> = Vec::with_capacity(route.hops.len());
                internal_traits::test_no_dealloc::<msgs::OnionHopData>(None);
                unsafe { res.set_len(route.hops.len()); }

                for (idx, hop) in route.hops.iter().enumerate().rev() {
                        // First hop gets special values so that it can check, on receipt, that everything is
                        // exactly as it should be (and the next hop isn't trying to probe to find out if we're
                        // the intended recipient).
                        let value_msat = if cur_value_msat == 0 { hop.fee_msat } else { cur_value_msat };
                        let cltv = if cur_cltv == starting_htlc_offset { hop.cltv_expiry_delta + starting_htlc_offset } else { cur_cltv };
                        res[idx] = msgs::OnionHopData {
                                realm: 0,
                                data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
                                        short_channel_id: last_short_channel_id,
                                        amt_to_forward: value_msat,
                                        outgoing_cltv_value: cltv,
                                },
                                hmac: [0; 32],
                        };
                        cur_value_msat += hop.fee_msat;
                        if cur_value_msat >= 21000000 * 100000000 * 1000 {
                                return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Channel fees overflowed?!"});
                        }
                        cur_cltv += hop.cltv_expiry_delta as u32;
                        if cur_cltv >= 500000000 {
                                return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Channel CLTV overflowed?!"});
                        }
                        last_short_channel_id = hop.short_channel_id;
                }
                Ok((res, cur_value_msat, cur_cltv))
        }

        #[inline]
        fn shift_arr_right(arr: &mut [u8; 20*65]) {
                unsafe {
                        ptr::copy(arr[0..].as_ptr(), arr[65..].as_mut_ptr(), 19*65);
                }
                for i in 0..65 {
                        arr[i] = 0;
                }
        }

        #[inline]
        fn xor_bufs(dst: &mut[u8], src: &[u8]) {
                assert_eq!(dst.len(), src.len());

                for i in 0..dst.len() {
                        dst[i] ^= src[i];
                }
        }

        const ZERO:[u8; 21*65] = [0; 21*65];
        fn construct_onion_packet(mut payloads: Vec<msgs::OnionHopData>, onion_keys: Vec<OnionKeys>, associated_data: &[u8; 32]) -> msgs::OnionPacket {
                let mut buf = Vec::with_capacity(21*65);
                buf.resize(21*65, 0);

                let filler = {
                        let iters = payloads.len() - 1;
                        let end_len = iters * 65;
                        let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(end_len);
                        res.resize(end_len, 0);

                        for (i, keys) in onion_keys.iter().enumerate() {
                                if i == payloads.len() - 1 { continue; }
                                let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&keys.rho, &[0u8; 8]);
                                chacha.process(&ChannelManager::ZERO, &mut buf); // We don't have a seek function :(
                                ChannelManager::xor_bufs(&mut res[0..(i + 1)*65], &buf[(20 - i)*65..21*65]);
                        }
                        res
                };

                let mut packet_data = [0; 20*65];
                let mut hmac_res = [0; 32];

                for (i, (payload, keys)) in payloads.iter_mut().zip(onion_keys.iter()).rev().enumerate() {
                        ChannelManager::shift_arr_right(&mut packet_data);
                        payload.hmac = hmac_res;
                        packet_data[0..65].copy_from_slice(&payload.encode()[..]);

                        let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&keys.rho, &[0u8; 8]);
                        chacha.process(&packet_data, &mut buf[0..20*65]);
                        packet_data[..].copy_from_slice(&buf[0..20*65]);

                        if i == 0 {
                                packet_data[20*65 - filler.len()..20*65].copy_from_slice(&filler[..]);
                        }

                        let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &keys.mu);
                        hmac.input(&packet_data);
                        hmac.input(&associated_data[..]);
                        hmac.raw_result(&mut hmac_res);
                }

                msgs::OnionPacket{
                        version: 0,
                        public_key: Ok(onion_keys.first().unwrap().ephemeral_pubkey),
                        hop_data: packet_data,
                        hmac: hmac_res,
                }
        }

        /// Encrypts a failure packet. raw_packet can either be a
        /// msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket.encode() result or a msgs::OnionErrorPacket.data element.
        fn encrypt_failure_packet(shared_secret: &[u8], raw_packet: &[u8]) -> msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
                let ammag = ChannelManager::gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);

                let mut packet_crypted = Vec::with_capacity(raw_packet.len());
                packet_crypted.resize(raw_packet.len(), 0);
                let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&ammag, &[0u8; 8]);
                chacha.process(&raw_packet, &mut packet_crypted[..]);
                msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
                        data: packet_crypted,
                }
        }

        fn build_failure_packet(shared_secret: &[u8], failure_type: u16, failure_data: &[u8]) -> msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket {
                assert_eq!(shared_secret.len(), 32);
                assert!(failure_data.len() <= 256 - 2);

                let um = ChannelManager::gen_um_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);

                let failuremsg = {
                        let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(2 + failure_data.len());
                        res.push(((failure_type >> 8) & 0xff) as u8);
                        res.push(((failure_type >> 0) & 0xff) as u8);
                        res.extend_from_slice(&failure_data[..]);
                        res
                };
                let pad = {
                        let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(256 - 2 - failure_data.len());
                        res.resize(256 - 2 - failure_data.len(), 0);
                        res
                };
                let mut packet = msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket {
                        hmac: [0; 32],
                        failuremsg: failuremsg,
                        pad: pad,
                };

                let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &um);
                hmac.input(&packet.encode()[32..]);
                hmac.raw_result(&mut packet.hmac);

                packet
        }

        #[inline]
        fn build_first_hop_failure_packet(shared_secret: &[u8], failure_type: u16, failure_data: &[u8]) -> msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
                let failure_packet = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(shared_secret, failure_type, failure_data);
                ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(shared_secret, &failure_packet.encode()[..])
        }

        fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>) {
                macro_rules! get_onion_hash {
                        () => {
                                {
                                        let mut sha = Sha256::new();
                                        sha.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
                                        let mut onion_hash = [0; 32];
                                        sha.result(&mut onion_hash);
                                        onion_hash
                                }
                        }
                }

                if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
                        log_info!(self, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC with invalid ephemeral pubkey");
                        return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
                                channel_id: msg.channel_id,
                                htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
                                sha256_of_onion: get_onion_hash!(),
                                failure_code: 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6,
                        })), self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
                }

                let shared_secret = {
                        let mut arr = [0; 32];
                        arr.copy_from_slice(&SharedSecret::new(&self.secp_ctx, &msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key)[..]);
                        arr
                };
                let (rho, mu) = ChannelManager::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);

                let mut channel_state = None;
                macro_rules! return_err {
                        ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
                                {
                                        log_info!(self, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
                                        if channel_state.is_none() {
                                                channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
                                        }
                                        return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
                                                channel_id: msg.channel_id,
                                                htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
                                                reason: ChannelManager::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
                                        })), channel_state.unwrap());
                                }
                        }
                }

                if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
                        //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
                        //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
                        //the hash doesn't really serve any purpuse - in the case of hashing all data, the
                        //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
                        //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
                        //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
                        return_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4, &get_onion_hash!());
                }

                let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &mu);
                hmac.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
                hmac.input(&msg.payment_hash);
                if hmac.result() != MacResult::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac) {
                        return_err!("HMAC Check failed", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 5, &get_onion_hash!());
                }

                let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&rho, &[0u8; 8]);
                let next_hop_data = {
                        let mut decoded = [0; 65];
                        chacha.process(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[0..65], &mut decoded);
                        match msgs::OnionHopData::read(&mut Cursor::new(&decoded[..])) {
                                Err(err) => {
                                        let error_code = match err {
                                                msgs::DecodeError::UnknownVersion => 0x4000 | 1, // unknown realm byte
                                                _ => 0x2000 | 2, // Should never happen
                                        };
                                        return_err!("Unable to decode our hop data", error_code, &[0;0]);
                                },
                                Ok(msg) => msg
                        }
                };

                let pending_forward_info = if next_hop_data.hmac == [0; 32] {
                                // OUR PAYMENT!
                                // final_expiry_too_soon
                                if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + (CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS) as u64 {
                                        return_err!("The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle", 17, &[0;0]);
                                }
                                // final_incorrect_htlc_amount
                                if next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward > msg.amount_msat {
                                        return_err!("Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment", 19, &byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
                                }
                                // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
                                if next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value != msg.cltv_expiry {
                                        return_err!("Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value", 18, &byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
                                }

                                // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
                                // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
                                // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
                                // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!

                                PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
                                        onion_packet: None,
                                        payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
                                        short_channel_id: 0,
                                        incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
                                        amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward,
                                        outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value,
                                })
                        } else {
                                let mut new_packet_data = [0; 20*65];
                                chacha.process(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[65..], &mut new_packet_data[0..19*65]);
                                chacha.process(&ChannelManager::ZERO[0..65], &mut new_packet_data[19*65..]);

                                let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();

                                let blinding_factor = {
                                        let mut sha = Sha256::new();
                                        sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
                                        sha.input(&shared_secret);
                                        let mut res = [0u8; 32];
                                        sha.result(&mut res);
                                        match SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &res) {
                                                Err(_) => {
                                                        return_err!("Blinding factor is an invalid private key", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6, &get_onion_hash!());
                                                },
                                                Ok(key) => key
                                        }
                                };

                                if let Err(_) = new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor) {
                                        return_err!("New blinding factor is an invalid private key", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6, &get_onion_hash!());
                                }

                                let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
                                        version: 0,
                                        public_key: Ok(new_pubkey),
                                        hop_data: new_packet_data,
                                        hmac: next_hop_data.hmac.clone(),
                                };

                                PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
                                        onion_packet: Some(outgoing_packet),
                                        payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
                                        short_channel_id: next_hop_data.data.short_channel_id,
                                        incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
                                        amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward,
                                        outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value,
                                })
                        };

                channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
                if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo { ref onion_packet, ref short_channel_id, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
                        if onion_packet.is_some() { // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject them in the body here
                                let id_option = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
                                let forwarding_id = match id_option {
                                        None => { // unknown_next_peer
                                                return_err!("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, &[0;0]);
                                        },
                                        Some(id) => id.clone(),
                                };
                                if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
                                        let chan = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();

                                        // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
                                        // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
                                        // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
                                        // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
                                        // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
                                        if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
                                                break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
                                        }
                                        if *amt_to_forward < chan.get_their_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
                                                break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
                                        }
                                        let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(self.fee_proportional_millionths as u64).and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&*self.fee_estimator) as u64) });
                                        if fee.is_none() || msg.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() || (msg.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < *amt_to_forward { // fee_insufficient
                                                break Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
                                        }
                                        if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
                                                break Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
                                        }
                                        let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
                                        // We want to have at least HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS to fail prior to going on chain CLAIM_BUFFER blocks before expiration
                                        if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
                                                break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
                                        }
                                        if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
                                                break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
                                        }
                                        break None;
                                }
                                {
                                        let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
                                        if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
                                                res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
                                        }
                                        else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
                                                res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
                                        }
                                        if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
                                                res.extend_from_slice(&chan_update.encode_with_len()[..]);
                                        }
                                        return_err!(err, code, &res[..]);
                                }
                        }
                }

                (pending_forward_info, channel_state.unwrap())
        }

        /// only fails if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id
        /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
        fn get_channel_update(&self, chan: &Channel) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, HandleError> {
                let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() {
                        None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Channel not yet established", action: None}),
                        Some(id) => id,
                };

                let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_their_node_id().serialize()[..];

                let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
                        chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
                        short_channel_id: short_channel_id,
                        timestamp: chan.get_channel_update_count(),
                        flags: (!were_node_one) as u16 | ((!chan.is_live() as u16) << 1),
                        cltv_expiry_delta: CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA,
                        htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_our_htlc_minimum_msat(),
                        fee_base_msat: chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&*self.fee_estimator),
                        fee_proportional_millionths: self.fee_proportional_millionths,
                        excess_data: Vec::new(),
                };

                let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::from_data(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
                let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&Message::from_slice(&msg_hash[..]).unwrap(), &self.our_network_key);

                Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
                        signature: sig,
                        contents: unsigned
                })
        }

        /// Sends a payment along a given route.
        ///
        /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
        /// fields for more info.
        ///
        /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
        /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
        /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
        /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
        /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
        /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
        ///
        /// May generate a SendHTLCs message event on success, which should be relayed.
        ///
        /// Raises APIError::RoutError when invalid route or forward parameter
        /// (cltv_delta, fee, node public key) is specified
        pub fn send_payment(&self, route: Route, payment_hash: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
                if route.hops.len() < 1 || route.hops.len() > 20 {
                        return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"});
                }
                let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
                for (idx, hop) in route.hops.iter().enumerate() {
                        if idx != route.hops.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
                                return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"});
                        }
                }

                let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &{
                        let mut session_key = [0; 32];
                        rng::fill_bytes(&mut session_key);
                        session_key
                }).expect("RNG is bad!");

                let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;

                let onion_keys = secp_call!(ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv),
                                APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"});
                let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = ChannelManager::build_onion_payloads(&route, cur_height)?;
                let onion_packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, &payment_hash);

                let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();

                let id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&route.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
                        None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!"}),
                        Some(id) => id.clone(),
                };

                let res = {
                        let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&id).unwrap();
                        if chan.get_their_node_id() != route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey {
                                return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
                        }
                        if chan.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
                                return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
                        }
                        if !chan.is_live() {
                                return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected!"});
                        }
                        chan.send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
                                route: route.clone(),
                                session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
                                first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
                        }, onion_packet).map_err(|he| APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: he.err})?
                };
                match res {
                        Some((update_add, commitment_signed, chan_monitor)) => {
                                if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
                                        self.handle_monitor_update_fail(channel_state, &id, e, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
                                        return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
                                }

                                channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
                                        node_id: route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey,
                                        updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
                                                update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
                                                update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
                                                update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
                                                update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
                                                update_fee: None,
                                                commitment_signed,
                                        },
                                });
                        },
                        None => {},
                }

                Ok(())
        }

        /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
        ///
        /// Panics if a funding transaction has already been provided for this channel.
        ///
        /// May panic if the funding_txo is duplicative with some other channel (note that this should
        /// be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction keys per-channel).
        pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_txo: OutPoint) {
                let (chan, msg, chan_monitor) = {
                        let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
                        match channel_state.by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
                                Some(mut chan) => {
                                        match chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_txo) {
                                                Ok(funding_msg) => {
                                                        (chan, funding_msg.0, funding_msg.1)
                                                },
                                                Err(e) => {
                                                        log_error!(self, "Got bad signatures: {}!", e.err);
                                                        channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
                                                                node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
                                                                action: e.action,
                                                        });
                                                        return;
                                                },
                                        }
                                },
                                None => return
                        }
                };
                // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
                // lock before add_update_monitor
                if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
                        unimplemented!();
                }

                let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
                channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
                        node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
                        msg: msg,
                });
                match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
                        hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
                                panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
                        },
                        hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
                                e.insert(chan);
                        }
                }
        }

        fn get_announcement_sigs(&self, chan: &Channel) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures> {
                if !chan.should_announce() { return None }

                let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = match chan.get_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
                        Ok(res) => res,
                        Err(_) => return None, // Only in case of state precondition violations eg channel is closing
                };
                let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
                let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);

                Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
                        channel_id: chan.channel_id(),
                        short_channel_id: chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
                        node_signature: our_node_sig,
                        bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
                })
        }

        /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
        ///
        /// Should only really ever be called in response to an PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
        /// Will likely generate further events.
        pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
                let mut new_events = Vec::new();
                let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
                {
                        let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
                        let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();

                        if cfg!(not(feature = "fuzztarget")) && Instant::now() < *channel_state.next_forward {
                                return;
                        }

                        for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
                                if short_chan_id != 0 {
                                        let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) {
                                                Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
                                                None => {
                                                        failed_forwards.reserve(pending_forwards.len());
                                                        for HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
                                                                let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
                                                                        short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
                                                                        htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
                                                                        incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
                                                                });
                                                                failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash, 0x4000 | 10, None));
                                                        }
                                                        continue;
                                                }
                                        };
                                        let forward_chan = &mut channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&forward_chan_id).unwrap();

                                        let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
                                        for HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
                                                let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
                                                        short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
                                                        htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
                                                        incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
                                                });
                                                match forward_chan.send_htlc(forward_info.amt_to_forward, forward_info.payment_hash, forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), forward_info.onion_packet.unwrap()) {
                                                        Err(_e) => {
                                                                let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(forward_chan).unwrap();
                                                                failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash, 0x1000 | 7, Some(chan_update)));
                                                                continue;
                                                        },
                                                        Ok(update_add) => {
                                                                match update_add {
                                                                        Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
                                                                        None => {
                                                                                // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
                                                                                // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
                                                                                // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
                                                                                // commitment_signed messages when we can.
                                                                                // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
                                                                                // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
                                                                                // this channel currently :/.
                                                                        }
                                                                }
                                                        }
                                                }
                                        }

                                        if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
                                                let (commitment_msg, monitor) = match forward_chan.send_commitment() {
                                                        Ok(res) => res,
                                                        Err(e) => {
                                                                if let &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer{msg: Some(ref _err_msg)}) = &e.action {
                                                                } else if let &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{msg: ref _err_msg}) = &e.action {
                                                                } else {
                                                                        panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
                                                                }
                                                                //TODO: Handle...this is bad!
                                                                continue;
                                                        },
                                                };
                                                if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
                                                        unimplemented!();// but def dont push the event...
                                                }
                                                channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
                                                        node_id: forward_chan.get_their_node_id(),
                                                        updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
                                                                update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
                                                                update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
                                                                update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
                                                                update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
                                                                update_fee: None,
                                                                commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
                                                        },
                                                });
                                        }
                                } else {
                                        for HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
                                                let prev_hop_data = HTLCPreviousHopData {
                                                        short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
                                                        htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
                                                        incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
                                                };
                                                match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(forward_info.payment_hash) {
                                                        hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => entry.get_mut().push(prev_hop_data),
                                                        hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(vec![prev_hop_data]); },
                                                };
                                                new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
                                                        payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
                                                        amt: forward_info.amt_to_forward,
                                                });
                                        }
                                }
                        }
                }

                for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_code, update) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
                        match update {
                                None => self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: Vec::new() }),
                                Some(chan_update) => self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: chan_update.encode_with_len() }),
                        };
                }

                if new_events.is_empty() { return }
                let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
                events.append(&mut new_events);
        }

        /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect after a PaymentReceived event.
        pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &[u8; 32], reason: PaymentFailReason) -> bool {
                let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
                let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
                if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
                        for htlc_with_hash in sources.drain(..) {
                                if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
                                self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(), HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_with_hash), payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: if reason == PaymentFailReason::PreimageUnknown {0x4000 | 15} else {0x4000 | 16}, data: Vec::new() });
                        }
                        true
                } else { false }
        }

        /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
        /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here.
        /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes
        /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may
        /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to
        /// still-available channels.
        fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &[u8; 32], onion_error: HTLCFailReason) {
                match source {
                        HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
                                mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
                                if let &HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { ref err } = &onion_error {
                                        let (channel_update, payment_retryable) = self.process_onion_failure(&source, err.data.clone());
                                        if let Some(update) = channel_update {
                                                self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
                                                        events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate {
                                                                update,
                                                        }
                                                );
                                        }
                                        self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
                                                payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
                                                rejected_by_dest: !payment_retryable,
                                        });
                                } else {
                                        panic!("should have onion error packet here");
                                }
                        },
                        HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret }) => {
                                let err_packet = match onion_error {
                                        HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
                                                let packet = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
                                                ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
                                        },
                                        HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err } => {
                                                ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
                                        }
                                };

                                let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();

                                let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id) {
                                        Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
                                        None => return
                                };

                                let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&chan_id).unwrap();
                                match chan.get_update_fail_htlc_and_commit(htlc_id, err_packet) {
                                        Ok(Some((msg, commitment_msg, chan_monitor))) => {
                                                if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
                                                        unimplemented!();
                                                }
                                                channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
                                                        node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
                                                        updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
                                                                update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
                                                                update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
                                                                update_fail_htlcs: vec![msg],
                                                                update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
                                                                update_fee: None,
                                                                commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
                                                        },
                                                });
                                        },
                                        Ok(None) => {},
                                        Err(_e) => {
                                                //TODO: Do something with e?
                                                return;
                                        },
                                }
                        },
                }
        }

        /// Provides a payment preimage in response to a PaymentReceived event, returning true and
        /// generating message events for the net layer to claim the payment, if possible. Thus, you
        /// should probably kick the net layer to go send messages if this returns true!
        ///
        /// May panic if called except in response to a PaymentReceived event.
        pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) -> bool {
                let mut sha = Sha256::new();
                sha.input(&payment_preimage);
                let mut payment_hash = [0; 32];
                sha.result(&mut payment_hash);

                let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
                let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash);
                if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
                        for htlc_with_hash in sources.drain(..) {
                                if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
                                self.claim_funds_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(), HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_with_hash), payment_preimage);
                        }
                        true
                } else { false }
        }
        fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) {
                match source {
                        HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
                                mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
                                let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
                                pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentSent {
                                        payment_preimage
                                });
                        },
                        HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, .. }) => {
                                //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
                                let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();

                                let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id) {
                                        Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
                                        None => {
                                                // TODO: There is probably a channel manager somewhere that needs to
                                                // learn the preimage as the channel already hit the chain and that's
                                                // why its missing.
                                                return
                                        }
                                };

                                let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&chan_id).unwrap();
                                match chan.get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(htlc_id, payment_preimage) {
                                        Ok((msgs, monitor_option)) => {
                                                if let Some(chan_monitor) = monitor_option {
                                                        if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
                                                                unimplemented!();// but def dont push the event...
                                                        }
                                                }
                                                if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
                                                        channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
                                                                node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
                                                                updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
                                                                        update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
                                                                        update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
                                                                        update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
                                                                        update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
                                                                        update_fee: None,
                                                                        commitment_signed,
                                                                }
                                                        });
                                                }
                                        },
                                        Err(_e) => {
                                                // TODO: There is probably a channel manager somewhere that needs to
                                                // learn the preimage as the channel may be about to hit the chain.
                                                //TODO: Do something with e?
                                                return
                                        },
                                }
                        },
                }
        }

        /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
        pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
                PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key)
        }

        /// Used to restore channels to normal operation after a
        /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure was returned from a channel monitor update
        /// operation.
        pub fn test_restore_channel_monitor(&self) {
                let mut close_results = Vec::new();
                let mut htlc_forwards = Vec::new();
                let mut htlc_failures = Vec::new();

                {
                        let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
                        let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
                        let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
                        let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
                        channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
                                if channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
                                        let chan_monitor = channel.channel_monitor();
                                        if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
                                                match e {
                                                        ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
                                                                if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
                                                                        short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
                                                                }
                                                                close_results.push(channel.force_shutdown());
                                                                if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
                                                                        pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
                                                                                msg: update
                                                                        });
                                                                }
                                                                false
                                                        },
                                                        ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => true,
                                                }
                                        } else {
                                                let (raa, commitment_update, order, pending_forwards, mut pending_failures) = channel.monitor_updating_restored();
                                                if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
                                                        htlc_forwards.push((channel.get_short_channel_id().expect("We can't have pending forwards before funding confirmation"), pending_forwards));
                                                }
                                                htlc_failures.append(&mut pending_failures);

                                                macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
                                                        if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
                                                                pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
                                                                        node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
                                                                        updates: update,
                                                                });
                                                        }
                                                } }
                                                macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
                                                        if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
                                                                pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
                                                                        node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
                                                                        msg: revoke_and_ack,
                                                                });
                                                        }
                                                } }
                                                match order {
                                                        RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
                                                                handle_cs!();
                                                                handle_raa!();
                                                        },
                                                        RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
                                                                handle_raa!();
                                                                handle_cs!();
                                                        },
                                                }
                                                true
                                        }
                                } else { true }
                        });
                }

                for failure in htlc_failures.drain(..) {
                        self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
                }
                self.forward_htlcs(&mut htlc_forwards[..]);

                for res in close_results.drain(..) {
                        self.finish_force_close_channel(res);
                }
        }

        fn internal_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
                if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
                        return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash", msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
                }

                let channel = Channel::new_from_req(&*self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_node_id.clone(), msg, 0, false, self.announce_channels_publicly, Arc::clone(&self.logger))
                        .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id))?;
                let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
                let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
                match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
                        hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!", msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())),
                        hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
                                channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
                                        node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
                                        msg: channel.get_accept_channel(),
                                });
                                entry.insert(channel);
                        }
                }
                Ok(())
        }

        fn internal_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
                let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
                        let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
                        match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
                                Some(chan) => {
                                        if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
                                                //TODO: see issue #153, need a consistent behavior on obnoxious behavior from random node
                                                return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.temporary_channel_id));
                                        }
                                        chan.accept_channel(&msg)
                                                .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id))?;
                                        (chan.get_value_satoshis(), chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get_user_id())
                                },
                                //TODO: same as above
                                None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.temporary_channel_id))
                        }
                };
                let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
                pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
                        temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
                        channel_value_satoshis: value,
                        output_script: output_script,
                        user_channel_id: user_id,
                });
                Ok(())
        }

        fn internal_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
                let (chan, funding_msg, monitor_update) = {
                        let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
                        match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
                                hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
                                        if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
                                                //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
                                                return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.temporary_channel_id));
                                        }
                                        match chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg) {
                                                Ok((funding_msg, monitor_update)) => {
                                                        (chan.remove(), funding_msg, monitor_update)
                                                },
                                                Err(e) => {
                                                        return Err(e).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))
                                                }
                                        }
                                },
                                hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.temporary_channel_id))
                        }
                };
                // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
                // lock before add_update_monitor
                if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor_update.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
                        unimplemented!();
                }
                let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
                let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
                match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
                        hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
                                return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id", funding_msg.channel_id))
                        },
                        hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
                                channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
                                        node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
                                        msg: funding_msg,
                                });
                                e.insert(chan);
                        }
                }
                Ok(())
        }

        fn internal_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
                let (funding_txo, user_id) = {
                        let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
                        match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
                                Some(chan) => {
                                        if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
                                                //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
                                                return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
                                        }
                                        let chan_monitor = chan.funding_signed(&msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?;
                                        if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
                                                unimplemented!();
                                        }
                                        (chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan.get_user_id())
                                },
                                None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
                        }
                };
                let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
                pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingBroadcastSafe {
                        funding_txo: funding_txo,
                        user_channel_id: user_id,
                });
                Ok(())
        }

        fn internal_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
                let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
                let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
                match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
                        Some(chan) => {
                                if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
                                        //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
                                        return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
                                }
                                chan.funding_locked(&msg)
                                        .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))?;
                                if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(chan) {
                                        channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
                                                node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
                                                msg: announcement_sigs,
                                        });
                                }
                                Ok(())
                        },
                        None => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
                }
        }

        fn internal_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
                let (mut dropped_htlcs, chan_option) = {
                        let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
                        let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();

                        match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
                                hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
                                        if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
                                                //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
                                                return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
                                        }
                                        let (shutdown, closing_signed, dropped_htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?;
                                        if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
                                                channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
                                                        node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
                                                        msg,
                                                });
                                        }
                                        if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
                                                channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
                                                        node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
                                                        msg,
                                                });
                                        }
                                        if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
                                                if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
                                                        channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
                                                }
                                                (dropped_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
                                        } else { (dropped_htlcs, None) }
                                },
                                hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
                        }
                };
                for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
                        // unknown_next_peer...I dunno who that is anymore....
                        self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() });
                }
                if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
                        if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
                                let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
                                channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
                                        msg: update
                                });
                        }
                }
                Ok(())
        }

        fn internal_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
                let (tx, chan_option) = {
                        let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
                        let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
                        match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
                                hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
                                        if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
                                                //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
                                                return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
                                        }
                                        let (closing_signed, tx) = chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?;
                                        if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
                                                channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
                                                        node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
                                                        msg,
                                                });
                                        }
                                        if tx.is_some() {
                                                // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
                                                // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
                                                // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
                                                // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
                                                // watch for old state broadcasts)!
                                                if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
                                                        channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
                                                }
                                                (tx, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
                                        } else { (tx, None) }
                                },
                                hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
                        }
                };
                if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
                        self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
                }
                if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
                        if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
                                let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
                                channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
                                        msg: update
                                });
                        }
                }
                Ok(())
        }

        fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
                //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
                //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
                //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
                //
                //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
                //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
                //encrypted with the same key. Its not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
                //but we should prevent it anyway.

                let (pending_forward_info, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
                let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();

                match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
                        Some(chan) => {
                                if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
                                        //TODO: here MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
                                        return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
                                }
                                if !chan.is_usable() {
                                        return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(HandleError{err: "Channel not yet available for receiving HTLCs", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError)}));
                                }
                                chan.update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))
                        },
                        None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
                }
        }

        fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
                let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
                let htlc_source = match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
                        Some(chan) => {
                                if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
                                        //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
                                        return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
                                }
                                chan.update_fulfill_htlc(&msg)
                                        .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))?.clone()
                        },
                        None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
                };
                self.claim_funds_internal(channel_state, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone());
                Ok(())
        }

        // Process failure we got back from upstream on a payment we sent. Returns update and a boolean
        // indicating that the payment itself failed
        fn process_onion_failure(&self, htlc_source: &HTLCSource, mut packet_decrypted: Vec<u8>) -> (Option<msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate>, bool) {
                if let &HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref route, ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat } = htlc_source {
                        macro_rules! onion_failure_log {
                                ( $error_code_textual: expr, $error_code: expr, $reported_name: expr, $reported_value: expr ) => {
                                        log_trace!(self, "{}({:#x}) {}({})", $error_code_textual, $error_code, $reported_name, $reported_value);
                                };
                                ( $error_code_textual: expr, $error_code: expr ) => {
                                        log_trace!(self, "{}({})", $error_code_textual, $error_code);
                                };
                        }

                        const BADONION: u16 = 0x8000;
                        const PERM: u16 = 0x4000;
                        const UPDATE: u16 = 0x1000;

                        let mut res = None;
                        let mut htlc_msat = *first_hop_htlc_msat;

                        // Handle packed channel/node updates for passing back for the route handler
                        Self::construct_onion_keys_callback(&self.secp_ctx, route, session_priv, |shared_secret, _, _, route_hop| {
                                if res.is_some() { return; }

                                let incoming_htlc_msat = htlc_msat;
                                let amt_to_forward = htlc_msat - route_hop.fee_msat;
                                htlc_msat = amt_to_forward;

                                let ammag = ChannelManager::gen_ammag_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret[..]);

                                let mut decryption_tmp = Vec::with_capacity(packet_decrypted.len());
                                decryption_tmp.resize(packet_decrypted.len(), 0);
                                let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&ammag, &[0u8; 8]);
                                chacha.process(&packet_decrypted, &mut decryption_tmp[..]);
                                packet_decrypted = decryption_tmp;

                                let is_from_final_node = route.hops.last().unwrap().pubkey == route_hop.pubkey;

                                if let Ok(err_packet) = msgs::DecodedOnionErrorPacket::read(&mut Cursor::new(&packet_decrypted)) {
                                        let um = ChannelManager::gen_um_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret[..]);
                                        let mut hmac = Hmac::new(Sha256::new(), &um);
                                        hmac.input(&err_packet.encode()[32..]);
                                        let mut calc_tag = [0u8; 32];
                                        hmac.raw_result(&mut calc_tag);

                                        if crypto::util::fixed_time_eq(&calc_tag, &err_packet.hmac) {
                                                if err_packet.failuremsg.len() < 2 {
                                                        // Useless packet that we can't use but it passed HMAC, so it
                                                        // definitely came from the peer in question
                                                        res = Some((None, !is_from_final_node));
                                                } else {
                                                        let error_code = byte_utils::slice_to_be16(&err_packet.failuremsg[0..2]);

                                                        match error_code & 0xff {
                                                                1|2|3 => {
                                                                        // either from an intermediate or final node
                                                                        //   invalid_realm(PERM|1),
                                                                        //   temporary_node_failure(NODE|2)
                                                                        //   permanent_node_failure(PERM|NODE|2)
                                                                        //   required_node_feature_mssing(PERM|NODE|3)
                                                                        res = Some((Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure {
                                                                                node_id: route_hop.pubkey,
                                                                                is_permanent: error_code & PERM == PERM,
                                                                        }), !(error_code & PERM == PERM && is_from_final_node)));
                                                                        // node returning invalid_realm is removed from network_map,
                                                                        // although NODE flag is not set, TODO: or remove channel only?
                                                                        // retry payment when removed node is not a final node
                                                                        return;
                                                                },
                                                                _ => {}
                                                        }

                                                        if is_from_final_node {
                                                                let payment_retryable = match error_code {
                                                                        c if c == PERM|15 => false, // unknown_payment_hash
                                                                        c if c == PERM|16 => false, // incorrect_payment_amount
                                                                        17 => true, // final_expiry_too_soon
                                                                        18 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() == 6 => { // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
                                                                                let _reported_cltv_expiry = byte_utils::slice_to_be32(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..2+4]);
                                                                                true
                                                                        },
                                                                        19 if err_packet.failuremsg.len() == 10 => { // final_incorrect_htlc_amount
                                                                                let _reported_incoming_htlc_msat = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..2+8]);
                                                                                true
                                                                        },
                                                                        _ => {
                                                                                // A final node has sent us either an invalid code or an error_code that
                                                                                // MUST be sent from the processing node, or the formmat of failuremsg
                                                                                // does not coform to the spec.
                                                                                // Remove it from the network map and don't may retry payment
                                                                                res = Some((Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure {
                                                                                        node_id: route_hop.pubkey,
                                                                                        is_permanent: true,
                                                                                }), false));
                                                                                return;
                                                                        }
                                                                };
                                                                res = Some((None, payment_retryable));
                                                                return;
                                                        }

                                                        // now, error_code should be only from the intermediate nodes
                                                        match error_code {
                                                                _c if error_code & PERM == PERM => {
                                                                        res = Some((Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed {
                                                                                short_channel_id: route_hop.short_channel_id,
                                                                                is_permanent: true,
                                                                        }), false));
                                                                },
                                                                _c if error_code & UPDATE == UPDATE => {
                                                                        let offset = match error_code {
                                                                                c if c == UPDATE|7  => 0, // temporary_channel_failure
                                                                                c if c == UPDATE|11 => 8, // amount_below_minimum
                                                                                c if c == UPDATE|12 => 8, // fee_insufficient
                                                                                c if c == UPDATE|13 => 4, // incorrect_cltv_expiry
                                                                                c if c == UPDATE|14 => 0, // expiry_too_soon
                                                                                c if c == UPDATE|20 => 2, // channel_disabled
                                                                                _ =>  {
                                                                                        // node sending unknown code
                                                                                        res = Some((Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure {
                                                                                                node_id: route_hop.pubkey,
                                                                                                is_permanent: true,
                                                                                        }), false));
                                                                                        return;
                                                                                }
                                                                        };

                                                                        if err_packet.failuremsg.len() >= offset + 2 {
                                                                                let update_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be16(&err_packet.failuremsg[offset+2..offset+4]) as usize;
                                                                                if err_packet.failuremsg.len() >= offset + 4 + update_len {
                                                                                        if let Ok(chan_update) = msgs::ChannelUpdate::read(&mut Cursor::new(&err_packet.failuremsg[offset + 4..offset + 4 + update_len])) {
                                                                                                // if channel_update should NOT have caused the failure:
                                                                                                // MAY treat the channel_update as invalid.
                                                                                                let is_chan_update_invalid = match error_code {
                                                                                                        c if c == UPDATE|7 => { // temporary_channel_failure
                                                                                                                false
                                                                                                        },
                                                                                                        c if c == UPDATE|11 => { // amount_below_minimum
                                                                                                                let reported_htlc_msat = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..2+8]);
                                                                                                                onion_failure_log!("amount_below_minimum", UPDATE|11, "htlc_msat", reported_htlc_msat);
                                                                                                                incoming_htlc_msat > chan_update.contents.htlc_minimum_msat
                                                                                                        },
                                                                                                        c if c == UPDATE|12 => { // fee_insufficient
                                                                                                                let reported_htlc_msat = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..2+8]);
                                                                                                                let new_fee =  amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan_update.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64).and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(chan_update.contents.fee_base_msat as u64) });
                                                                                                                onion_failure_log!("fee_insufficient", UPDATE|12, "htlc_msat", reported_htlc_msat);
                                                                                                                new_fee.is_none() || incoming_htlc_msat >= new_fee.unwrap() && incoming_htlc_msat >= amt_to_forward + new_fee.unwrap()
                                                                                                        }
                                                                                                        c if c == UPDATE|13 => { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
                                                                                                                let reported_cltv_expiry = byte_utils::slice_to_be32(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..2+4]);
                                                                                                                onion_failure_log!("incorrect_cltv_expiry", UPDATE|13, "cltv_expiry", reported_cltv_expiry);
                                                                                                                route_hop.cltv_expiry_delta as u16 >= chan_update.contents.cltv_expiry_delta
                                                                                                        },
                                                                                                        c if c == UPDATE|20 => { // channel_disabled
                                                                                                                let reported_flags = byte_utils::slice_to_be16(&err_packet.failuremsg[2..2+2]);
                                                                                                                onion_failure_log!("channel_disabled", UPDATE|20, "flags", reported_flags);
                                                                                                                chan_update.contents.flags & 0x01 == 0x01
                                                                                                        },
                                                                                                        c if c == UPDATE|21 => true, // expiry_too_far
                                                                                                        _ => { unreachable!(); },
                                                                                                };

                                                                                                let msg = if is_chan_update_invalid { None } else {
                                                                                                        Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage {
                                                                                                                msg: chan_update,
                                                                                                        })
                                                                                                };
                                                                                                res = Some((msg, true));
                                                                                                return;
                                                                                        }
                                                                                }
                                                                        }
                                                                },
                                                                _c if error_code & BADONION == BADONION => {
                                                                        //TODO
                                                                },
                                                                14 => { // expiry_too_soon
                                                                        res = Some((None, true));
                                                                        return;
                                                                }
                                                                _ => {
                                                                        // node sending unknown code
                                                                        res = Some((Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure {
                                                                                node_id: route_hop.pubkey,
                                                                                is_permanent: true,
                                                                        }), false));
                                                                        return;
                                                                }
                                                        }
                                                }
                                        }
                                }
                        }).expect("Route that we sent via spontaneously grew invalid keys in the middle of it?");
                        res.unwrap_or((None, true))
                } else { ((None, true)) }
        }

        fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
                let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
                match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
                        Some(chan) => {
                                if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
                                        //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
                                        return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
                                }
                                chan.update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err: msg.reason.clone() })
                                        .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))
                        },
                        None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
                }?;
                Ok(())
        }

        fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
                let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
                match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
                        Some(chan) => {
                                if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
                                        //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
                                        return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
                                }
                                if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) != 0 {
                                        return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_close_chan("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION set", msg.channel_id));
                                }
                                chan.update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() })
                                        .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))?;
                                Ok(())
                        },
                        None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
                }
        }

        fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
                let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
                let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
                match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
                        Some(chan) => {
                                if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
                                        //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
                                        return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
                                }
                                let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, chan_monitor) = chan.commitment_signed(&msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?;
                                if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
                                        unimplemented!();
                                }
                                channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
                                        node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
                                        msg: revoke_and_ack,
                                });
                                if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
                                        channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
                                                node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
                                                updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
                                                        update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
                                                        update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
                                                        update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
                                                        update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
                                                        update_fee: None,
                                                        commitment_signed: msg,
                                                },
                                        });
                                }
                                Ok(())
                        },
                        None => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
                }
        }

        #[inline]
        fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, Vec<(PendingForwardHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
                for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
                        let mut forward_event = None;
                        if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
                                let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
                                if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
                                        forward_event = Some(Instant::now() + Duration::from_millis(((rng::rand_f32() * 4.0 + 1.0) * MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS as f32) as u64));
                                        channel_state.next_forward = forward_event.unwrap();
                                }
                                for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
                                        match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(forward_info.short_channel_id) {
                                                hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
                                                        entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info });
                                                },
                                                hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
                                                        entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info }));
                                                }
                                        }
                                }
                        }
                        match forward_event {
                                Some(time) => {
                                        let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
                                        pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
                                                time_forwardable: time
                                        });
                                }
                                None => {},
                        }
                }
        }

        fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
                let (pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, short_channel_id) = {
                        let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
                        let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
                        match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
                                Some(chan) => {
                                        if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
                                                //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
                                                return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
                                        }
                                        let (commitment_update, pending_forwards, pending_failures, chan_monitor) = chan.revoke_and_ack(&msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_maybe_close(e))?;
                                        if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
                                                unimplemented!();
                                        }
                                        if let Some(updates) = commitment_update {
                                                channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
                                                        node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
                                                        updates,
                                                });
                                        }
                                        (pending_forwards, pending_failures, chan.get_short_channel_id().expect("RAA should only work on a short-id-available channel"))
                                },
                                None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
                        }
                };
                for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
                        self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
                }
                self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, pending_forwards)]);

                Ok(())
        }

        fn internal_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
                let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
                match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
                        Some(chan) => {
                                if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
                                        //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
                                        return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
                                }
                                chan.update_fee(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg).map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))
                        },
                        None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
                }
        }

        fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
                let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
                let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();

                match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
                        Some(chan) => {
                                if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
                                        return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
                                }
                                if !chan.is_usable() {
                                        return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(HandleError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError)}));
                                }

                                let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
                                let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = chan.get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), self.genesis_hash.clone())
                                        .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))?;

                                let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_id;
                                let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
                                let bad_sig_action = MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_close_chan("Bad announcement_signatures node_signature", msg.channel_id);
                                secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.node_id_2 } else { &announcement.node_id_1 }), bad_sig_action);
                                secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.bitcoin_key_2 } else { &announcement.bitcoin_key_1 }), bad_sig_action);

                                let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);

                                channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
                                        msg: msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
                                                node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { msg.node_signature },
                                                node_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.node_signature } else { our_node_sig },
                                                bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { msg.bitcoin_signature },
                                                bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.bitcoin_signature } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
                                                contents: announcement,
                                        },
                                        update_msg: self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap(), // can only fail if we're not in a ready state
                                });
                        },
                        None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
                }
                Ok(())
        }

        fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
                let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
                let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();

                match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
                        Some(chan) => {
                                if chan.get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
                                        return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
                                }
                                let (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, channel_monitor, order) = chan.channel_reestablish(msg)
                                        .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_maybe_close(e, msg.channel_id))?;
                                if let Some(monitor) = channel_monitor {
                                        if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
                                                unimplemented!();
                                        }
                                }
                                if let Some(msg) = funding_locked {
                                        channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
                                                node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
                                                msg
                                        });
                                }
                                macro_rules! send_raa { () => {
                                        if let Some(msg) = revoke_and_ack {
                                                channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
                                                        node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
                                                        msg
                                                });
                                        }
                                } }
                                macro_rules! send_cu { () => {
                                        if let Some(updates) = commitment_update {
                                                channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
                                                        node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
                                                        updates
                                                });
                                        }
                                } }
                                match order {
                                        RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
                                                send_raa!();
                                                send_cu!();
                                        },
                                        RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
                                                send_cu!();
                                                send_raa!();
                                        },
                                }
                                Ok(())
                        },
                        None => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
                }
        }

        /// Begin Update fee process. Allowed only on an outbound channel.
        /// If successful, will generate a UpdateHTLCs event, so you should probably poll
        /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
        /// Note: This API is likely to change!
        #[doc(hidden)]
        pub fn update_fee(&self, channel_id: [u8;32], feerate_per_kw: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
                let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
                let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();

                match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
                        None => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel"}),
                        Some(chan) => {
                                if !chan.is_outbound() {
                                        return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "update_fee cannot be sent for an inbound channel"});
                                }
                                if chan.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
                                        return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
                                }
                                if !chan.is_live() {
                                        return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel is either not yet fully established or peer is currently disconnected"});
                                }
                                if let Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, chan_monitor)) = chan.send_update_fee_and_commit(feerate_per_kw).map_err(|e| APIError::APIMisuseError{err: e.err})? {
                                        if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
                                                unimplemented!();
                                        }
                                        channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
                                                node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
                                                updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
                                                        update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
                                                        update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
                                                        update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
                                                        update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
                                                        update_fee: Some(update_fee),
                                                        commitment_signed,
                                                },
                                        });
                                }
                        },
                }
                Ok(())
        }
}

impl events::MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager {
        fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<events::MessageSendEvent> {
                let mut ret = Vec::new();
                let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
                mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events);
                ret
        }
}

impl events::EventsProvider for ChannelManager {
        fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
                let mut ret = Vec::new();
                let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
                mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut *pending_events);
                ret
        }
}

impl ChainListener for ChannelManager {
        fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) {
                let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
                {
                        let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
                        let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
                        let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
                        let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
                        channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
                                let chan_res = channel.block_connected(header, height, txn_matched, indexes_of_txn_matched);
                                if let Ok(Some(funding_locked)) = chan_res {
                                        pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
                                                node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
                                                msg: funding_locked,
                                        });
                                        if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
                                                pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
                                                        node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
                                                        msg: announcement_sigs,
                                                });
                                        }
                                        short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
                                } else if let Err(e) = chan_res {
                                        pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
                                                node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
                                                action: e.action,
                                        });
                                        if channel.is_shutdown() {
                                                return false;
                                        }
                                }
                                if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
                                        for tx in txn_matched {
                                                for inp in tx.input.iter() {
                                                        if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
                                                                if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
                                                                        short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
                                                                }
                                                                // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain. We go ahead and
                                                                // broadcast our latest local state as well here, just in case its
                                                                // some kind of SPV attack, though we expect these to be dropped.
                                                                failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown());
                                                                if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
                                                                        pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
                                                                                msg: update
                                                                        });
                                                                }
                                                                return false;
                                                        }
                                                }
                                        }
                                }
                                if channel.is_funding_initiated() && channel.channel_monitor().would_broadcast_at_height(height) {
                                        if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
                                                short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
                                        }
                                        failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown());
                                        // If would_broadcast_at_height() is true, the channel_monitor will broadcast
                                        // the latest local tx for us, so we should skip that here (it doesn't really
                                        // hurt anything, but does make tests a bit simpler).
                                        failed_channels.last_mut().unwrap().0 = Vec::new();
                                        if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
                                                pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
                                                        msg: update
                                                });
                                        }
                                        return false;
                                }
                                true
                        });
                }
                for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
                        self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
                }
                self.latest_block_height.store(height as usize, Ordering::Release);
        }

        /// We force-close the channel without letting our counterparty participate in the shutdown
        fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader) {
                let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
                {
                        let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
                        let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
                        let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
                        let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
                        channel_state.by_id.retain(|_,  v| {
                                if v.block_disconnected(header) {
                                        if let Some(short_id) = v.get_short_channel_id() {
                                                short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
                                        }
                                        failed_channels.push(v.force_shutdown());
                                        if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&v) {
                                                pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
                                                        msg: update
                                                });
                                        }
                                        false
                                } else {
                                        true
                                }
                        });
                }
                for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
                        self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
                }
                self.latest_block_height.fetch_sub(1, Ordering::AcqRel);
        }
}

macro_rules! handle_error {
        ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $their_node_id: expr) => {
                match $internal {
                        Ok(msg) => Ok(msg),
                        Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, needs_channel_force_close }) => {
                                if needs_channel_force_close {
                                        match &err.action {
                                                &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg: Some(ref msg) }) => {
                                                        if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
                                                                $self.peer_disconnected(&$their_node_id, true);
                                                        } else {
                                                                $self.force_close_channel(&msg.channel_id);
                                                        }
                                                },
                                                &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg: None }) => {},
                                                &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) => {},
                                                &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }) => {
                                                        if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
                                                                $self.peer_disconnected(&$their_node_id, true);
                                                        } else {
                                                                $self.force_close_channel(&msg.channel_id);
                                                        }
                                                },
                                                &None => {},
                                        }
                                }
                                Err(err)
                        },
                }
        }
}

impl ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager {
        //TODO: Handle errors and close channel (or so)
        fn handle_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
                handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
        }

        fn handle_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
                handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
        }

        fn handle_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
                handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
        }

        fn handle_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
                handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
        }

        fn handle_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
                handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_locked(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
        }

        fn handle_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
                handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
        }

        fn handle_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
                handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
        }

        fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), msgs::HandleError> {
                handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
        }

        fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
                handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
        }

        fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
                handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
        }

        fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
                handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
        }

        fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
                handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
        }

        fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
                handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
        }

        fn handle_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
                handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
        }

        fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
                handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
        }

        fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
                handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
        }

        fn peer_disconnected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
                let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
                let mut failed_payments = Vec::new();
                {
                        let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
                        let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
                        let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
                        let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
                        if no_connection_possible {
                                channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
                                        if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
                                                if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
                                                        short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
                                                }
                                                failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown());
                                                if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
                                                        pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
                                                                msg: update
                                                        });
                                                }
                                                false
                                        } else {
                                                true
                                        }
                                });
                        } else {
                                channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
                                        if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
                                                //TODO: mark channel disabled (and maybe announce such after a timeout).
                                                let failed_adds = chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused();
                                                if !failed_adds.is_empty() {
                                                        let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(&chan).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe
                                                        failed_payments.push((chan_update, failed_adds));
                                                }
                                                if chan.is_shutdown() {
                                                        if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
                                                                short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
                                                        }
                                                        return false;
                                                }
                                        }
                                        true
                                })
                        }
                }
                for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
                        self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
                }
                for (chan_update, mut htlc_sources) in failed_payments {
                        for (htlc_source, payment_hash) in htlc_sources.drain(..) {
                                self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.clone() });
                        }
                }
        }

        fn peer_connected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey) {
                let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
                let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
                let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
                channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
                        if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
                                if !chan.have_received_message() {
                                        // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
                                        // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
                                        // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
                                        // drop it.
                                        false
                                } else {
                                        pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
                                                node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
                                                msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(),
                                        });
                                        true
                                }
                        } else { true }
                });
                //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
        }

        fn handle_error(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
                if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
                        for chan in self.list_channels() {
                                if chan.remote_network_id == *their_node_id {
                                        self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
                                }
                        }
                } else {
                        self.force_close_channel(&msg.channel_id);
                }
        }
}

#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
        use chain::chaininterface;
        use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
        use chain::chaininterface::ChainListener;
        use chain::keysinterface::KeysInterface;
        use chain::keysinterface;
        use ln::channelmanager::{ChannelManager,OnionKeys,PaymentFailReason,RAACommitmentOrder};
        use ln::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS};
        use ln::router::{Route, RouteHop, Router};
        use ln::msgs;
        use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler,RoutingMessageHandler};
        use util::test_utils;
        use util::events::{Event, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
        use util::errors::APIError;
        use util::logger::Logger;
        use util::ser::Writeable;

        use bitcoin::util::hash::Sha256dHash;
        use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
        use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
        use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
        use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
        use bitcoin::network::serialize::serialize;
        use bitcoin::network::serialize::BitcoinHash;

        use hex;

        use secp256k1::{Secp256k1, Message};
        use secp256k1::key::{PublicKey,SecretKey};

        use crypto::sha2::Sha256;
        use crypto::digest::Digest;

        use rand::{thread_rng,Rng};

        use std::cell::RefCell;
        use std::collections::{BTreeSet, HashMap};
        use std::default::Default;
        use std::rc::Rc;
        use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
        use std::sync::atomic::Ordering;
        use std::time::Instant;
        use std::mem;

        fn build_test_onion_keys() -> Vec<OnionKeys> {
                // Keys from BOLT 4, used in both test vector tests
                let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();

                let route = Route {
                        hops: vec!(
                                        RouteHop {
                                                pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("02eec7245d6b7d2ccb30380bfbe2a3648cd7a942653f5aa340edcea1f283686619").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
                                                short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
                                        },
                                        RouteHop {
                                                pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("0324653eac434488002cc06bbfb7f10fe18991e35f9fe4302dbea6d2353dc0ab1c").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
                                                short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
                                        },
                                        RouteHop {
                                                pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("027f31ebc5462c1fdce1b737ecff52d37d75dea43ce11c74d25aa297165faa2007").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
                                                short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
                                        },
                                        RouteHop {
                                                pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
                                                short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
                                        },
                                        RouteHop {
                                                pubkey: PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("02edabbd16b41c8371b92ef2f04c1185b4f03b6dcd52ba9b78d9d7c89c8f221145").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
                                                short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0 // Test vectors are garbage and not generateble from a RouteHop, we fill in payloads manually
                                        },
                        ),
                };

                let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("4141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();

                let onion_keys = ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
                assert_eq!(onion_keys.len(), route.hops.len());
                onion_keys
        }

        #[test]
        fn onion_vectors() {
                // Packet creation test vectors from BOLT 4
                let onion_keys = build_test_onion_keys();

                assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("53eb63ea8a3fec3b3cd433b85cd62a4b145e1dda09391b348c4e1cd36a03ea66").unwrap()[..]);
                assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("2ec2e5da605776054187180343287683aa6a51b4b1c04d6dd49c45d8cffb3c36").unwrap()[..]);
                assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("02eec7245d6b7d2ccb30380bfbe2a3648cd7a942653f5aa340edcea1f283686619").unwrap()[..]);
                assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].rho, hex::decode("ce496ec94def95aadd4bec15cdb41a740c9f2b62347c4917325fcc6fb0453986").unwrap()[..]);
                assert_eq!(onion_keys[0].mu, hex::decode("b57061dc6d0a2b9f261ac410c8b26d64ac5506cbba30267a649c28c179400eba").unwrap()[..]);

                assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("a6519e98832a0b179f62123b3567c106db99ee37bef036e783263602f3488fae").unwrap()[..]);
                assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("bf66c28bc22e598cfd574a1931a2bafbca09163df2261e6d0056b2610dab938f").unwrap()[..]);
                assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("028f9438bfbf7feac2e108d677e3a82da596be706cc1cf342b75c7b7e22bf4e6e2").unwrap()[..]);
                assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].rho, hex::decode("450ffcabc6449094918ebe13d4f03e433d20a3d28a768203337bc40b6e4b2c59").unwrap()[..]);
                assert_eq!(onion_keys[1].mu, hex::decode("05ed2b4a3fb023c2ff5dd6ed4b9b6ea7383f5cfe9d59c11d121ec2c81ca2eea9").unwrap()[..]);

                assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("3a6b412548762f0dbccce5c7ae7bb8147d1caf9b5471c34120b30bc9c04891cc").unwrap()[..]);
                assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("a1f2dadd184eb1627049673f18c6325814384facdee5bfd935d9cb031a1698a5").unwrap()[..]);
                assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("03bfd8225241ea71cd0843db7709f4c222f62ff2d4516fd38b39914ab6b83e0da0").unwrap()[..]);
                assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].rho, hex::decode("11bf5c4f960239cb37833936aa3d02cea82c0f39fd35f566109c41f9eac8deea").unwrap()[..]);
                assert_eq!(onion_keys[2].mu, hex::decode("caafe2820fa00eb2eeb78695ae452eba38f5a53ed6d53518c5c6edf76f3f5b78").unwrap()[..]);

                assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("21e13c2d7cfe7e18836df50872466117a295783ab8aab0e7ecc8c725503ad02d").unwrap()[..]);
                assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("7cfe0b699f35525029ae0fa437c69d0f20f7ed4e3916133f9cacbb13c82ff262").unwrap()[..]);
                assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("031dde6926381289671300239ea8e57ffaf9bebd05b9a5b95beaf07af05cd43595").unwrap()[..]);
                assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].rho, hex::decode("cbe784ab745c13ff5cffc2fbe3e84424aa0fd669b8ead4ee562901a4a4e89e9e").unwrap()[..]);
                assert_eq!(onion_keys[3].mu, hex::decode("5052aa1b3d9f0655a0932e50d42f0c9ba0705142c25d225515c45f47c0036ee9").unwrap()[..]);

                assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].shared_secret[..], hex::decode("b5756b9b542727dbafc6765a49488b023a725d631af688fc031217e90770c328").unwrap()[..]);
                assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].blinding_factor[..], hex::decode("c96e00dddaf57e7edcd4fb5954be5b65b09f17cb6d20651b4e90315be5779205").unwrap()[..]);
                assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].ephemeral_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("03a214ebd875aab6ddfd77f22c5e7311d7f77f17a169e599f157bbcdae8bf071f4").unwrap()[..]);
                assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].rho, hex::decode("034e18b8cc718e8af6339106e706c52d8df89e2b1f7e9142d996acf88df8799b").unwrap()[..]);
                assert_eq!(onion_keys[4].mu, hex::decode("8e45e5c61c2b24cb6382444db6698727afb063adecd72aada233d4bf273d975a").unwrap()[..]);

                // Test vectors below are flat-out wrong: they claim to set outgoing_cltv_value to non-0 :/
                let payloads = vec!(
                        msgs::OnionHopData {
                                realm: 0,
                                data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
                                        short_channel_id: 0,
                                        amt_to_forward: 0,
                                        outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
                                },
                                hmac: [0; 32],
                        },
                        msgs::OnionHopData {
                                realm: 0,
                                data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
                                        short_channel_id: 0x0101010101010101,
                                        amt_to_forward: 0x0100000001,
                                        outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
                                },
                                hmac: [0; 32],
                        },
                        msgs::OnionHopData {
                                realm: 0,
                                data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
                                        short_channel_id: 0x0202020202020202,
                                        amt_to_forward: 0x0200000002,
                                        outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
                                },
                                hmac: [0; 32],
                        },
                        msgs::OnionHopData {
                                realm: 0,
                                data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
                                        short_channel_id: 0x0303030303030303,
                                        amt_to_forward: 0x0300000003,
                                        outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
                                },
                                hmac: [0; 32],
                        },
                        msgs::OnionHopData {
                                realm: 0,
                                data: msgs::OnionRealm0HopData {
                                        short_channel_id: 0x0404040404040404,
                                        amt_to_forward: 0x0400000004,
                                        outgoing_cltv_value: 0,
                                },
                                hmac: [0; 32],
                        },
                );

                let packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(payloads, onion_keys, &[0x42; 32]);
                // Just check the final packet encoding, as it includes all the per-hop vectors in it
                // anyway...
                assert_eq!(packet.encode(), hex::decode("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").unwrap());
        }

        #[test]
        fn test_failure_packet_onion() {
                // Returning Errors test vectors from BOLT 4

                let onion_keys = build_test_onion_keys();
                let onion_error = ChannelManager::build_failure_packet(&onion_keys[4].shared_secret[..], 0x2002, &[0; 0]);
                assert_eq!(onion_error.encode(), hex::decode("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").unwrap());

                let onion_packet_1 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[4].shared_secret[..], &onion_error.encode()[..]);
                assert_eq!(onion_packet_1.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());

                let onion_packet_2 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[3].shared_secret[..], &onion_packet_1.data[..]);
                assert_eq!(onion_packet_2.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());

                let onion_packet_3 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[2].shared_secret[..], &onion_packet_2.data[..]);
                assert_eq!(onion_packet_3.data, hex::decode("a5d3e8634cfe78b2307d87c6d90be6fe7855b4f2cc9b1dfb19e92e4b79103f61ff9ac25f412ddfb7466e74f81b3e545563cdd8f5524dae873de61d7bdfccd496af2584930d2b566b4f8d3881f8c043df92224f38cf094cfc09d92655989531524593ec6d6caec1863bdfaa79229b5020acc034cd6deeea1021c50586947b9b8e6faa83b81fbfa6133c0af5d6b07c017f7158fa94f0d206baf12dda6b68f785b773b360fd0497e16cc402d779c8d48d0fa6315536ef0660f3f4e1865f5b38ea49c7da4fd959de4e83ff3ab686f059a45c65ba2af4a6a79166aa0f496bf04d06987b6d2ea205bdb0d347718b9aeff5b61dfff344993a275b79717cd815b6ad4c0beb568c4ac9c36ff1c315ec1119a1993c4b61e6eaa0375e0aaf738ac691abd3263bf937e3").unwrap());

                let onion_packet_4 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[1].shared_secret[..], &onion_packet_3.data[..]);
                assert_eq!(onion_packet_4.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());

                let onion_packet_5 = ChannelManager::encrypt_failure_packet(&onion_keys[0].shared_secret[..], &onion_packet_4.data[..]);
                assert_eq!(onion_packet_5.data, hex::decode("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").unwrap());
        }

        fn confirm_transaction(chain: &chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil, tx: &Transaction, chan_id: u32) {
                assert!(chain.does_match_tx(tx));
                let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
                chain.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[tx; 1], &[chan_id; 1]);
                for i in 2..100 {
                        header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
                        chain.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &[tx; 0], &[0; 0]);
                }
        }

        struct Node {
                chain_monitor: Arc<chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil>,
                tx_broadcaster: Arc<test_utils::TestBroadcaster>,
                chan_monitor: Arc<test_utils::TestChannelMonitor>,
                node: Arc<ChannelManager>,
                router: Router,
                network_payment_count: Rc<RefCell<u8>>,
                network_chan_count: Rc<RefCell<u32>>,
        }
        impl Drop for Node {
                fn drop(&mut self) {
                        if !::std::thread::panicking() {
                                // Check that we processed all pending events
                                assert_eq!(self.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().len(), 0);
                                assert_eq!(self.node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
                                assert_eq!(self.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
                        }
                }
        }

        fn create_chan_between_nodes(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node) -> (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
                create_chan_between_nodes_with_value(node_a, node_b, 100000, 10001)
        }

        fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, channel_value: u64, push_msat: u64) -> (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
                let (funding_locked, channel_id, tx) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(node_a, node_b, channel_value, push_msat);
                let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(node_a, node_b, &funding_locked);
                (announcement, as_update, bs_update, channel_id, tx)
        }

        macro_rules! get_revoke_commit_msgs {
                ($node: expr, $node_id: expr) => {
                        {
                                let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
                                assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
                                (match events[0] {
                                        MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
                                                assert_eq!(*node_id, $node_id);
                                                (*msg).clone()
                                        },
                                        _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
                                }, match events[1] {
                                        MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
                                                assert_eq!(*node_id, $node_id);
                                                assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
                                                assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
                                                assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
                                                assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
                                                assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
                                                updates.commitment_signed.clone()
                                        },
                                        _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
                                })
                        }
                }
        }

        macro_rules! get_event_msg {
                ($node: expr, $event_type: path, $node_id: expr) => {
                        {
                                let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
                                assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
                                match events[0] {
                                        $event_type { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
                                                assert_eq!(*node_id, $node_id);
                                                (*msg).clone()
                                        },
                                        _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
                                }
                        }
                }
        }

        macro_rules! get_htlc_update_msgs {
                ($node: expr, $node_id: expr) => {
                        {
                                let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
                                assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
                                match events[0] {
                                        MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
                                                assert_eq!(*node_id, $node_id);
                                                (*updates).clone()
                                        },
                                        _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
                                }
                        }
                }
        }

        fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, channel_value: u64, push_msat: u64) -> Transaction {
                node_a.node.create_channel(node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value, push_msat, 42).unwrap();
                node_b.node.handle_open_channel(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.node.get_our_node_id())).unwrap();
                node_a.node.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.node.get_our_node_id())).unwrap();

                let chan_id = *node_a.network_chan_count.borrow();
                let tx;
                let funding_output;

                let events_2 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
                assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
                match events_2[0] {
                        Event::FundingGenerationReady { ref temporary_channel_id, ref channel_value_satoshis, ref output_script, user_channel_id } => {
                                assert_eq!(*channel_value_satoshis, channel_value);
                                assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);

                                tx = Transaction { version: chan_id as u32, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
                                        value: *channel_value_satoshis, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
                                }]};
                                funding_output = OutPoint::new(Sha256dHash::from_data(&serialize(&tx).unwrap()[..]), 0);

                                node_a.node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, funding_output);
                                let mut added_monitors = node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
                                assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
                                assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
                                added_monitors.clear();
                        },
                        _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
                }

                node_b.node.handle_funding_created(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.node.get_our_node_id())).unwrap();
                {
                        let mut added_monitors = node_b.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
                        assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
                        assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
                        added_monitors.clear();
                }

                node_a.node.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.node.get_our_node_id())).unwrap();
                {
                        let mut added_monitors = node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
                        assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
                        assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
                        added_monitors.clear();
                }

                let events_4 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
                assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
                match events_4[0] {
                        Event::FundingBroadcastSafe { ref funding_txo, user_channel_id } => {
                                assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
                                assert_eq!(*funding_txo, funding_output);
                        },
                        _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
                };

                tx
        }

        fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, tx: &Transaction) -> ((msgs::FundingLocked, msgs::AnnouncementSignatures), [u8; 32]) {
                confirm_transaction(&node_b.chain_monitor, &tx, tx.version);
                node_a.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, node_a.node.get_our_node_id())).unwrap();

                let channel_id;

                confirm_transaction(&node_a.chain_monitor, &tx, tx.version);
                let events_6 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
                assert_eq!(events_6.len(), 2);
                ((match events_6[0] {
                        MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
                                channel_id = msg.channel_id.clone();
                                assert_eq!(*node_id, node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
                                msg.clone()
                        },
                        _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
                }, match events_6[1] {
                        MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
                                assert_eq!(*node_id, node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
                                msg.clone()
                        },
                        _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
                }), channel_id)
        }

        fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, channel_value: u64, push_msat: u64) -> ((msgs::FundingLocked, msgs::AnnouncementSignatures), [u8; 32], Transaction) {
                let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(node_a, node_b, channel_value, push_msat);
                let (msgs, chan_id) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(node_a, node_b, &tx);
                (msgs, chan_id, tx)
        }

        fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, as_funding_msgs: &(msgs::FundingLocked, msgs::AnnouncementSignatures)) -> (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
                node_b.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_funding_msgs.0).unwrap();
                let bs_announcement_sigs = get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures, node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
                node_b.node.handle_announcement_signatures(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_funding_msgs.1).unwrap();

                let events_7 = node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
                assert_eq!(events_7.len(), 1);
                let (announcement, bs_update) = match events_7[0] {
                        MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
                                (msg, update_msg)
                        },
                        _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
                };

                node_a.node.handle_announcement_signatures(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_announcement_sigs).unwrap();
                let events_8 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
                assert_eq!(events_8.len(), 1);
                let as_update = match events_8[0] {
                        MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
                                assert!(*announcement == *msg);
                                update_msg
                        },
                        _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
                };

                *node_a.network_chan_count.borrow_mut() += 1;

                ((*announcement).clone(), (*as_update).clone(), (*bs_update).clone())
        }

        fn create_announced_chan_between_nodes(nodes: &Vec<Node>, a: usize, b: usize) -> (msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
                create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(nodes, a, b, 100000, 10001)
        }

        fn create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(nodes: &Vec<Node>, a: usize, b: usize, channel_value: u64, push_msat: u64) -> (msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) {
                let chan_announcement = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes[a], &nodes[b], channel_value, push_msat);
                for node in nodes {
                        assert!(node.router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement.0).unwrap());
                        node.router.handle_channel_update(&chan_announcement.1).unwrap();
                        node.router.handle_channel_update(&chan_announcement.2).unwrap();
                }
                (chan_announcement.1, chan_announcement.2, chan_announcement.3, chan_announcement.4)
        }

        macro_rules! check_spends {
                ($tx: expr, $spends_tx: expr) => {
                        {
                                let mut funding_tx_map = HashMap::new();
                                let spends_tx = $spends_tx;
                                funding_tx_map.insert(spends_tx.txid(), spends_tx);
                                $tx.verify(&funding_tx_map).unwrap();
                        }
                }
        }

        fn close_channel(outbound_node: &Node, inbound_node: &Node, channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_tx: Transaction, close_inbound_first: bool) -> (msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
                let (node_a, broadcaster_a, struct_a) = if close_inbound_first { (&inbound_node.node, &inbound_node.tx_broadcaster, inbound_node) } else { (&outbound_node.node, &outbound_node.tx_broadcaster, outbound_node) };
                let (node_b, broadcaster_b) = if close_inbound_first { (&outbound_node.node, &outbound_node.tx_broadcaster) } else { (&inbound_node.node, &inbound_node.tx_broadcaster) };
                let (tx_a, tx_b);

                node_a.close_channel(channel_id).unwrap();
                node_b.handle_shutdown(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(struct_a, MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, node_b.get_our_node_id())).unwrap();

                let events_1 = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
                assert!(events_1.len() >= 1);
                let shutdown_b = match events_1[0] {
                        MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
                                assert_eq!(node_id, &node_a.get_our_node_id());
                                msg.clone()
                        },
                        _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
                };

                let closing_signed_b = if !close_inbound_first {
                        assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
                        None
                } else {
                        Some(match events_1[1] {
                                MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
                                        assert_eq!(node_id, &node_a.get_our_node_id());
                                        msg.clone()
                                },
                                _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
                        })
                };

                macro_rules! get_closing_signed_broadcast {
                        ($node: expr, $dest_pubkey: expr) => {
                                {
                                        let events = $node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
                                        assert!(events.len() == 1 || events.len() == 2);
                                        (match events[events.len() - 1] {
                                                MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
                                                        msg.clone()
                                                },
                                                _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
                                        }, if events.len() == 2 {
                                                match events[0] {
                                                        MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
                                                                assert_eq!(*node_id, $dest_pubkey);
                                                                Some(msg.clone())
                                                        },
                                                        _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
                                                }
                                        } else { None })
                                }
                        }
                }

                node_a.handle_shutdown(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &shutdown_b).unwrap();
                let (as_update, bs_update) = if close_inbound_first {
                        assert!(node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
                        node_a.handle_closing_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_b.unwrap()).unwrap();
                        assert_eq!(broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
                        tx_a = broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
                        let (as_update, closing_signed_a) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(node_a, node_b.get_our_node_id());

                        node_b.handle_closing_signed(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_a.unwrap()).unwrap();
                        let (bs_update, none_b) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(node_b, node_a.get_our_node_id());
                        assert!(none_b.is_none());
                        assert_eq!(broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
                        tx_b = broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
                        (as_update, bs_update)
                } else {
                        let closing_signed_a = get_event_msg!(struct_a, MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, node_b.get_our_node_id());

                        node_b.handle_closing_signed(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_a).unwrap();
                        assert_eq!(broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
                        tx_b = broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
                        let (bs_update, closing_signed_b) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(node_b, node_a.get_our_node_id());

                        node_a.handle_closing_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_b.unwrap()).unwrap();
                        let (as_update, none_a) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(node_a, node_b.get_our_node_id());
                        assert!(none_a.is_none());
                        assert_eq!(broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
                        tx_a = broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0);
                        (as_update, bs_update)
                };
                assert_eq!(tx_a, tx_b);
                check_spends!(tx_a, funding_tx);

                (as_update, bs_update)
        }

        struct SendEvent {
                node_id: PublicKey,
                msgs: Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>,
                commitment_msg: msgs::CommitmentSigned,
        }
        impl SendEvent {
                fn from_commitment_update(node_id: PublicKey, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate) -> SendEvent {
                        assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
                        assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
                        assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
                        assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
                        SendEvent { node_id: node_id, msgs: updates.update_add_htlcs, commitment_msg: updates.commitment_signed }
                }

                fn from_event(event: MessageSendEvent) -> SendEvent {
                        match event {
                                MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => SendEvent::from_commitment_update(node_id, updates),
                                _ => panic!("Unexpected event type!"),
                        }
                }
        }

        macro_rules! check_added_monitors {
                ($node: expr, $count: expr) => {
                        {
                                let mut added_monitors = $node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
                                assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), $count);
                                added_monitors.clear();
                        }
                }
        }

        macro_rules! commitment_signed_dance {
                ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr, $commitment_signed: expr, $fail_backwards: expr) => {
                        {
                                check_added_monitors!($node_a, 0);
                                assert!($node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
                                $node_a.node.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &$commitment_signed).unwrap();
                                let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!($node_a, $node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
                                check_added_monitors!($node_a, 1);
                                check_added_monitors!($node_b, 0);
                                assert!($node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
                                $node_b.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
                                assert!($node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
                                check_added_monitors!($node_b, 1);
                                $node_b.node.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed).unwrap();
                                let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!($node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
                                check_added_monitors!($node_b, 1);
                                if $fail_backwards {
                                        assert!($node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
                                        assert!($node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
                                }
                                $node_a.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
                                if $fail_backwards {
                                        let channel_state = $node_a.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
                                        assert_eq!(channel_state.pending_msg_events.len(), 1);
                                        if let MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } = channel_state.pending_msg_events[0] {
                                                assert_ne!(*node_id, $node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
                                        } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
                                } else {
                                        assert!($node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
                                }
                                {
                                        let mut added_monitors = $node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
                                        if $fail_backwards {
                                                assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 2);
                                                assert!(added_monitors[0].0 != added_monitors[1].0);
                                        } else {
                                                assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
                                        }
                                        added_monitors.clear();
                                }
                        }
                }
        }

        macro_rules! get_payment_preimage_hash {
                ($node: expr) => {
                        {
                                let payment_preimage = [*$node.network_payment_count.borrow(); 32];
                                *$node.network_payment_count.borrow_mut() += 1;
                                let mut payment_hash = [0; 32];
                                let mut sha = Sha256::new();
                                sha.input(&payment_preimage[..]);
                                sha.result(&mut payment_hash);
                                (payment_preimage, payment_hash)
                        }
                }
        }

        fn send_along_route(origin_node: &Node, route: Route, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
                let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(origin_node);

                let mut payment_event = {
                        origin_node.node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
                        check_added_monitors!(origin_node, 1);

                        let mut events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
                        assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
                        SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
                };
                let mut prev_node = origin_node;

                for (idx, &node) in expected_route.iter().enumerate() {
                        assert_eq!(node.node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);

                        node.node.handle_update_add_htlc(&prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
                        check_added_monitors!(node, 0);
                        commitment_signed_dance!(node, prev_node, payment_event.commitment_msg, false);

                        let events_1 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
                        assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
                        match events_1[0] {
                                Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
                                _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
                        };

                        node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
                        node.node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();

                        if idx == expected_route.len() - 1 {
                                let events_2 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
                                assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
                                match events_2[0] {
                                        Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
                                                assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash);
                                                assert_eq!(amt, recv_value);
                                        },
                                        _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
                                }
                        } else {
                                let mut events_2 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
                                assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
                                check_added_monitors!(node, 1);
                                payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
                                assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
                        }

                        prev_node = node;
                }

                (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash)
        }

        fn claim_payment_along_route(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], skip_last: bool, our_payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) {
                assert!(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage));
                check_added_monitors!(expected_route.last().unwrap(), 1);

                let mut next_msgs: Option<(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)> = None;
                let mut expected_next_node = expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id();
                macro_rules! get_next_msgs {
                        ($node: expr) => {
                                {
                                        let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
                                        assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
                                        match events[0] {
                                                MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
                                                        assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
                                                        assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
                                                        assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
                                                        assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
                                                        assert!(update_fee.is_none());
                                                        expected_next_node = node_id.clone();
                                                        Some((update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone()))
                                                },
                                                _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
                                        }
                                }
                        }
                }

                macro_rules! last_update_fulfill_dance {
                        ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr) => {
                                {
                                        $node.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().0).unwrap();
                                        check_added_monitors!($node, 0);
                                        assert!($node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
                                        commitment_signed_dance!($node, $prev_node, next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().1, false);
                                }
                        }
                }
                macro_rules! mid_update_fulfill_dance {
                        ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $new_msgs: expr) => {
                                {
                                        $node.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().0).unwrap();
                                        check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
                                        let new_next_msgs = if $new_msgs {
                                                get_next_msgs!($node)
                                        } else {
                                                assert!($node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
                                                None
                                        };
                                        commitment_signed_dance!($node, $prev_node, next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().1, false);
                                        next_msgs = new_next_msgs;
                                }
                        }
                }

                let mut prev_node = expected_route.last().unwrap();
                for (idx, node) in expected_route.iter().rev().enumerate() {
                        assert_eq!(expected_next_node, node.node.get_our_node_id());
                        let update_next_msgs = !skip_last || idx != expected_route.len() - 1;
                        if next_msgs.is_some() {
                                mid_update_fulfill_dance!(node, prev_node, update_next_msgs);
                        } else if update_next_msgs {
                                next_msgs = get_next_msgs!(node);
                        } else {
                                assert!(node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
                        }
                        if !skip_last && idx == expected_route.len() - 1 {
                                assert_eq!(expected_next_node, origin_node.node.get_our_node_id());
                        }

                        prev_node = node;
                }

                if !skip_last {
                        last_update_fulfill_dance!(origin_node, expected_route.first().unwrap());
                        let events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
                        assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
                        match events[0] {
                                Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage } => {
                                        assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage);
                                },
                                _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
                        }
                }
        }

        fn claim_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], our_payment_preimage: [u8; 32]) {
                claim_payment_along_route(origin_node, expected_route, false, our_payment_preimage);
        }

        const TEST_FINAL_CLTV: u32 = 32;

        fn route_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
                let route = origin_node.router.get_route(&expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), recv_value, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
                assert_eq!(route.hops.len(), expected_route.len());
                for (node, hop) in expected_route.iter().zip(route.hops.iter()) {
                        assert_eq!(hop.pubkey, node.node.get_our_node_id());
                }

                send_along_route(origin_node, route, expected_route, recv_value)
        }

        fn route_over_limit(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) {
                let route = origin_node.router.get_route(&expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), recv_value, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
                assert_eq!(route.hops.len(), expected_route.len());
                for (node, hop) in expected_route.iter().zip(route.hops.iter()) {
                        assert_eq!(hop.pubkey, node.node.get_our_node_id());
                }

                let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(origin_node);

                let err = origin_node.node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap();
                match err {
                        APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our max HTLC value in flight"),
                        _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
                };
        }

        fn send_payment(origin: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) {
                let our_payment_preimage = route_payment(&origin, expected_route, recv_value).0;
                claim_payment(&origin, expected_route, our_payment_preimage);
        }

        fn fail_payment_along_route(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], skip_last: bool, our_payment_hash: [u8; 32]) {
                assert!(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash, PaymentFailReason::PreimageUnknown));
                check_added_monitors!(expected_route.last().unwrap(), 1);

                let mut next_msgs: Option<(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)> = None;
                macro_rules! update_fail_dance {
                        ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $last_node: expr) => {
                                {
                                        $node.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().0).unwrap();
                                        commitment_signed_dance!($node, $prev_node, next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().1, !$last_node);
                                }
                        }
                }

                let mut expected_next_node = expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id();
                let mut prev_node = expected_route.last().unwrap();
                for (idx, node) in expected_route.iter().rev().enumerate() {
                        assert_eq!(expected_next_node, node.node.get_our_node_id());
                        if next_msgs.is_some() {
                                // We may be the "last node" for the purpose of the commitment dance if we're
                                // skipping the last node (implying it is disconnected) and we're the
                                // second-to-last node!
                                update_fail_dance!(node, prev_node, skip_last && idx == expected_route.len() - 1);
                        }

                        let events = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
                        if !skip_last || idx != expected_route.len() - 1 {
                                assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
                                match events[0] {
                                        MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
                                                assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
                                                assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
                                                assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
                                                assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
                                                assert!(update_fee.is_none());
                                                expected_next_node = node_id.clone();
                                                next_msgs = Some((update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone()));
                                        },
                                        _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
                                }
                        } else {
                                assert!(events.is_empty());
                        }
                        if !skip_last && idx == expected_route.len() - 1 {
                                assert_eq!(expected_next_node, origin_node.node.get_our_node_id());
                        }

                        prev_node = node;
                }

                if !skip_last {
                        update_fail_dance!(origin_node, expected_route.first().unwrap(), true);

                        let events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
                        assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
                        match events[0] {
                                Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, rejected_by_dest } => {
                                        assert_eq!(payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
                                        assert!(rejected_by_dest);
                                },
                                _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
                        }
                }
        }

        fn fail_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], our_payment_hash: [u8; 32]) {
                fail_payment_along_route(origin_node, expected_route, false, our_payment_hash);
        }

        fn create_network(node_count: usize) -> Vec<Node> {
                let mut nodes = Vec::new();
                let mut rng = thread_rng();
                let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
                let logger: Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());

                let chan_count = Rc::new(RefCell::new(0));
                let payment_count = Rc::new(RefCell::new(0));

                for _ in 0..node_count {
                        let feeest = Arc::new(test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 });
                        let chain_monitor = Arc::new(chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil::new(Network::Testnet, Arc::clone(&logger)));
                        let tx_broadcaster = Arc::new(test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new())});
                        let mut seed = [0; 32];
                        rng.fill_bytes(&mut seed);
                        let keys_manager = Arc::new(keysinterface::KeysManager::new(&seed, Network::Testnet, Arc::clone(&logger)));
                        let chan_monitor = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChannelMonitor::new(chain_monitor.clone(), tx_broadcaster.clone()));
                        let node = ChannelManager::new(0, true, Network::Testnet, feeest.clone(), chan_monitor.clone(), chain_monitor.clone(), tx_broadcaster.clone(), Arc::clone(&logger), keys_manager.clone()).unwrap();
                        let router = Router::new(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &keys_manager.get_node_secret()), chain_monitor.clone(), Arc::clone(&logger));
                        nodes.push(Node { chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, chan_monitor, node, router,
                                network_payment_count: payment_count.clone(),
                                network_chan_count: chan_count.clone(),
                        });
                }

                nodes
        }

        #[test]
        fn test_async_inbound_update_fee() {
                let mut nodes = create_network(2);
                let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
                let channel_id = chan.2;

                macro_rules! get_feerate {
                        ($node: expr) => {{
                                let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
                                let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
                                chan.get_feerate()
                        }}
                }

                // balancing
                send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);

                // A                                        B
                // update_fee                            ->
                // send (1) commitment_signed            -.
                //                                       <- update_add_htlc/commitment_signed
                // send (2) RAA (awaiting remote revoke) -.
                // (1) commitment_signed is delivered    ->
                //                                       .- send (3) RAA (awaiting remote revoke)
                // (2) RAA is delivered                  ->
                //                                       .- send (4) commitment_signed
                //                                       <- (3) RAA is delivered
                // send (5) commitment_signed            -.
                //                                       <- (4) commitment_signed is delivered
                // send (6) RAA                          -.
                // (5) commitment_signed is delivered    ->
                //                                       <- RAA
                // (6) RAA is delivered                  ->

                // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
                nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, get_feerate!(nodes[0]) + 20).unwrap();
                check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);

                let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
                assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
                let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
                        MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
                                (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
                        },
                        _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
                };

                nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();

                // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
                let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
                nodes[1].node.send_payment(nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 40000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap(), our_payment_hash).unwrap();
                check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);

                let payment_event = {
                        let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
                        assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
                        SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
                };
                assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
                assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);

                // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
                nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
                nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap(); // (2)
                let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
                // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
                check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);

                // deliver(1), generate (3):
                nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
                let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
                // nodes[1] is awaiting nodes[0] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
                check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);

                nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap(); // deliver (2)
                let bs_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
                assert!(bs_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
                assert!(bs_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
                assert!(bs_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
                assert!(bs_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
                assert!(bs_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (4)
                check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);

                nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap(); // deliver (3)
                let as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
                assert!(as_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
                assert!(as_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
                assert!(as_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
                assert!(as_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
                assert!(as_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (5)
                check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);

                nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update.commitment_signed).unwrap(); // deliver (4)
                let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
                // only (6) so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
                check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);

                nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update.commitment_signed).unwrap(); // deliver (5)
                let bs_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
                check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);

                nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke).unwrap();
                check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);

                let events_2 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
                assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
                match events_2[0] {
                        Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {..} => {}, // If we actually processed we'd receive the payment
                        _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
                }

                nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke).unwrap(); // deliver (6)
                check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
        }

        #[test]
        fn test_update_fee_unordered_raa() {
                // Just the intro to the previous test followed by an out-of-order RAA (which caused a
                // crash in an earlier version of the update_fee patch)
                let mut nodes = create_network(2);
                let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
                let channel_id = chan.2;

                macro_rules! get_feerate {
                        ($node: expr) => {{
                                let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
                                let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
                                chan.get_feerate()
                        }}
                }

                // balancing
                send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);

                // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
                nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, get_feerate!(nodes[0]) + 20).unwrap();
                check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);

                let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
                assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
                let update_msg = match events_0[0] { // (1)
                        MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, .. }, .. } => {
                                update_fee.as_ref()
                        },
                        _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
                };

                nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();

                // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
                let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
                nodes[1].node.send_payment(nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 40000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap(), our_payment_hash).unwrap();
                check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);

                let payment_event = {
                        let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
                        assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
                        SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
                };
                assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
                assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);

                // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
                nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
                nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap(); // (2)
                let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
                // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
                check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);

                nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg).unwrap(); // deliver (2)
                check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);

                // We can't continue, sadly, because our (1) now has a bogus signature
        }

        #[test]
        fn test_multi_flight_update_fee() {
                let nodes = create_network(2);
                let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
                let channel_id = chan.2;

                macro_rules! get_feerate {
                        ($node: expr) => {{
                                let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
                                let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
                                chan.get_feerate()
                        }}
                }

                // A                                        B
                // update_fee/commitment_signed          ->
                //                                       .- send (1) RAA and (2) commitment_signed
                // update_fee (never committed)          ->
                // (3) update_fee                        ->
                // We have to manually generate the above update_fee, it is allowed by the protocol but we
                // don't track which updates correspond to which revoke_and_ack responses so we're in
                // AwaitingRAA mode and will not generate the update_fee yet.
                //                                       <- (1) RAA delivered
                // (3) is generated and send (4) CS      -.
                // Note that A cannot generate (4) prior to (1) being delivered as it otherwise doesn't
                // know the per_commitment_point to use for it.
                //                                       <- (2) commitment_signed delivered
                // revoke_and_ack                        ->
                //                                          B should send no response here
                // (4) commitment_signed delivered       ->
                //                                       <- RAA/commitment_signed delivered
                // revoke_and_ack                        ->

                // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
                let initial_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0]);
                nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, initial_feerate + 20).unwrap();
                check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);

                let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
                assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
                let (update_msg_1, commitment_signed_1) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
                        MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
                                (update_fee.as_ref().unwrap(), commitment_signed)
                        },
                        _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
                };

                // Deliver first update_fee/commitment_signed pair, generating (1) and (2):
                nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg_1).unwrap();
                nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed_1).unwrap();
                let (bs_revoke_msg, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
                check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);

                // nodes[0] is awaiting a revoke from nodes[1] before it will create a new commitment
                // transaction:
                nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, initial_feerate + 40).unwrap();
                assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
                assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());

                // Create the (3) update_fee message that nodes[0] will generate before it does...
                let mut update_msg_2 = msgs::UpdateFee {
                        channel_id: update_msg_1.channel_id.clone(),
                        feerate_per_kw: (initial_feerate + 30) as u32,
                };

                nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2).unwrap();

                update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw = (initial_feerate + 40) as u32;
                // Deliver (3)
                nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2).unwrap();

                // Deliver (1), generating (3) and (4)
                nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_msg).unwrap();
                let as_second_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
                check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
                assert!(as_second_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
                assert!(as_second_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
                assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
                assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
                // Check that the update_fee newly generated matches what we delivered:
                assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().channel_id, update_msg_2.channel_id);
                assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().feerate_per_kw, update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw);

                // Deliver (2) commitment_signed
                nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed).unwrap();
                let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
                check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
                // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes

                nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg).unwrap();
                assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
                check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);

                // Delever (4)
                nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
                let (bs_second_revoke, bs_second_commitment) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
                check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);

                nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke).unwrap();
                assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
                check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);

                nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment).unwrap();
                let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
                // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
                check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);

                nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke).unwrap();
                assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
                check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
        }

        #[test]
        fn test_update_fee_vanilla() {
                let nodes = create_network(2);
                let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
                let channel_id = chan.2;

                macro_rules! get_feerate {
                        ($node: expr) => {{
                                let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
                                let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
                                chan.get_feerate()
                        }}
                }

                let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0]);
                nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+20).unwrap();
                check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);

                let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
                assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
                let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
                                MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
                                (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
                        },
                        _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
                };
                nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();

                nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
                let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
                check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);

                nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
                assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
                check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);

                nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap();
                let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
                // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
                check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);

                nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
                assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
                check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
        }

        #[test]
        fn test_update_fee_with_fundee_update_add_htlc() {
                let mut nodes = create_network(2);
                let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
                let channel_id = chan.2;

                macro_rules! get_feerate {
                        ($node: expr) => {{
                                let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
                                let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
                                chan.get_feerate()
                        }}
                }

                // balancing
                send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);

                let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0]);
                nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+20).unwrap();
                check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);

                let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
                assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
                let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
                                MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
                                (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
                        },
                        _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
                };
                nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
                nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
                let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
                check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);

                let route = nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 800000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();

                let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[1]);

                // nothing happens since node[1] is in AwaitingRemoteRevoke
                nodes[1].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
                {
                        let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
                        assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 0);
                        added_monitors.clear();
                }
                assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
                assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
                // node[1] has nothing to do

                nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
                assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
                check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);

                nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap();
                let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
                // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
                check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
                nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
                check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
                // AwaitingRemoteRevoke ends here

                let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
                assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
                assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
                assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 0);
                assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
                assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none(), true);

                nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.update_add_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
                nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
                check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
                let (revoke, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());

                nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke).unwrap();
                check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
                assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());

                nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap();
                check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
                let revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
                // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes

                nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke).unwrap();
                check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
                assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());

                let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
                assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
                match events[0] {
                        Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
                        _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
                };
                nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
                nodes[0].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();

                let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
                assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
                match events[0] {
                        Event::PaymentReceived { .. } => { },
                        _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
                };

                claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], our_payment_preimage);

                send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 800000);
                send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 800000);
                close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
        }

        #[test]
        fn test_update_fee() {
                let nodes = create_network(2);
                let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
                let channel_id = chan.2;

                macro_rules! get_feerate {
                        ($node: expr) => {{
                                let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
                                let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
                                chan.get_feerate()
                        }}
                }

                // A                                        B
                // (1) update_fee/commitment_signed      ->
                //                                       <- (2) revoke_and_ack
                //                                       .- send (3) commitment_signed
                // (4) update_fee/commitment_signed      ->
                //                                       .- send (5) revoke_and_ack (no CS as we're awaiting a revoke)
                //                                       <- (3) commitment_signed delivered
                // send (6) revoke_and_ack               -.
                //                                       <- (5) deliver revoke_and_ack
                // (6) deliver revoke_and_ack            ->
                //                                       .- send (7) commitment_signed in response to (4)
                //                                       <- (7) deliver commitment_signed
                // revoke_and_ack                        ->

                // Create and deliver (1)...
                let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0]);
                nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+20).unwrap();
                check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);

                let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
                assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
                let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
                                MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
                                (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
                        },
                        _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
                };
                nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();

                // Generate (2) and (3):
                nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
                let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed_0) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
                check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);

                // Deliver (2):
                nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
                assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
                check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);

                // Create and deliver (4)...
                nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+30).unwrap();
                check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
                let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
                assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
                let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
                                MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
                                (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
                        },
                        _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
                };

                nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap();
                nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
                check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
                // ... creating (5)
                let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
                // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes

                // Handle (3), creating (6):
                nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed_0).unwrap();
                check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
                let revoke_msg_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
                // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes

                // Deliver (5):
                nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
                assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
                check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);

                // Deliver (6), creating (7):
                nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg_0).unwrap();
                let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
                assert!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
                assert!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
                assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
                assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
                assert!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none());
                check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);

                // Deliver (7)
                nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
                check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
                let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
                // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes

                nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap();
                check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
                assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());

                assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[0]), feerate + 30);
                assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[1]), feerate + 30);
                close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
        }

        #[test]
        fn fake_network_test() {
                // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
                // tests that payments get routed and transactions broadcast in semi-reasonable ways.
                let nodes = create_network(4);

                // Create some initial channels
                let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
                let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
                let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);

                // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
                send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
                send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
                send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
                send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);

                // Send some more payments
                send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
                send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], &nodes[0])[..], 1000000);
                send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000);

                // Test failure packets
                let payment_hash_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000).1;
                fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], payment_hash_1);

                // Add a new channel that skips 3
                let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);

                send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
                send_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
                send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
                send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
                send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
                send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
                send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);

                // Do some rebalance loop payments, simultaneously
                let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
                hops.push(RouteHop {
                        pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
                        short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
                        fee_msat: 0,
                        cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.0.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
                });
                hops.push(RouteHop {
                        pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
                        short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
                        fee_msat: 0,
                        cltv_expiry_delta: chan_4.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
                });
                hops.push(RouteHop {
                        pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
                        short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
                        fee_msat: 1000000,
                        cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
                });
                hops[1].fee_msat = chan_4.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_4.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
                hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.0.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.0.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
                let payment_preimage_1 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { hops }, &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).0;

                let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
                hops.push(RouteHop {
                        pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
                        short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
                        fee_msat: 0,
                        cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
                });
                hops.push(RouteHop {
                        pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
                        short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
                        fee_msat: 0,
                        cltv_expiry_delta: chan_2.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
                });
                hops.push(RouteHop {
                        pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
                        short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
                        fee_msat: 1000000,
                        cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
                });
                hops[1].fee_msat = chan_2.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_2.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
                hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
                let payment_hash_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { hops }, &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).1;

                // Claim the rebalances...
                fail_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], payment_hash_2);
                claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);

                // Add a duplicate new channel from 2 to 4
                let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);

                // Send some payments across both channels
                let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
                let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
                let payment_preimage_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;

                route_over_limit(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000);

                //TODO: Test that routes work again here as we've been notified that the channel is full

                claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_3);
                claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_4);
                claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_5);

                // Close down the channels...
                close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan_1.2, chan_1.3, true);
                close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, false);
                close_channel(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &chan_3.2, chan_3.3, true);
                close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_4.2, chan_4.3, false);
                close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_5.2, chan_5.3, false);
        }

        #[test]
        fn duplicate_htlc_test() {
                // Test that we accept duplicate payment_hash HTLCs across the network and that
                // claiming/failing them are all separate and don't effect each other
                let mut nodes = create_network(6);

                // Create some initial channels to route via 3 to 4/5 from 0/1/2
                create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3);
                create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
                create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
                create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);
                create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5);

                let (payment_preimage, payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 1000000);

                *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
                assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);

                *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
                assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);

                claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], payment_preimage);
                fail_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], payment_hash);
                claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage);
        }

        #[derive(PartialEq)]
        enum HTLCType { NONE, TIMEOUT, SUCCESS }
        /// Tests that the given node has broadcast transactions for the given Channel
        ///
        /// First checks that the latest local commitment tx has been broadcast, unless an explicit
        /// commitment_tx is provided, which may be used to test that a remote commitment tx was
        /// broadcast and the revoked outputs were claimed.
        ///
        /// Next tests that there is (or is not) a transaction that spends the commitment transaction
        /// that appears to be the type of HTLC transaction specified in has_htlc_tx.
        ///
        /// All broadcast transactions must be accounted for in one of the above three types of we'll
        /// also fail.
        fn test_txn_broadcast(node: &Node, chan: &(msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction), commitment_tx: Option<Transaction>, has_htlc_tx: HTLCType) -> Vec<Transaction> {
                let mut node_txn = node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
                assert!(node_txn.len() >= if commitment_tx.is_some() { 0 } else { 1 } + if has_htlc_tx == HTLCType::NONE { 0 } else { 1 });

                let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(2);
                node_txn.retain(|tx| {
                        if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == chan.3.txid() {
                                check_spends!(tx, chan.3.clone());
                                if commitment_tx.is_none() {
                                        res.push(tx.clone());
                                }
                                false
                        } else { true }
                });
                if let Some(explicit_tx) = commitment_tx {
                        res.push(explicit_tx.clone());
                }

                assert_eq!(res.len(), 1);

                if has_htlc_tx != HTLCType::NONE {
                        node_txn.retain(|tx| {
                                if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == res[0].txid() {
                                        check_spends!(tx, res[0].clone());
                                        if has_htlc_tx == HTLCType::TIMEOUT {
                                                assert!(tx.lock_time != 0);
                                        } else {
                                                assert!(tx.lock_time == 0);
                                        }
                                        res.push(tx.clone());
                                        false
                                } else { true }
                        });
                        assert_eq!(res.len(), 2);
                }

                assert!(node_txn.is_empty());
                res
        }

        /// Tests that the given node has broadcast a claim transaction against the provided revoked
        /// HTLC transaction.
        fn test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(node: &Node, revoked_tx: Transaction) {
                let mut node_txn = node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
                assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
                node_txn.retain(|tx| {
                        if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_tx.txid() {
                                check_spends!(tx, revoked_tx.clone());
                                false
                        } else { true }
                });
                assert!(node_txn.is_empty());
        }

        fn check_preimage_claim(node: &Node, prev_txn: &Vec<Transaction>) -> Vec<Transaction> {
                let mut node_txn = node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();

                assert!(node_txn.len() >= 1);
                assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
                let mut found_prev = false;

                for tx in prev_txn {
                        if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == tx.txid() {
                                check_spends!(node_txn[0], tx.clone());
                                assert!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness[2].len() > 106); // must spend an htlc output
                                assert_eq!(tx.input.len(), 1); // must spend a commitment tx

                                found_prev = true;
                                break;
                        }
                }
                assert!(found_prev);

                let mut res = Vec::new();
                mem::swap(&mut *node_txn, &mut res);
                res
        }

        fn get_announce_close_broadcast_events(nodes: &Vec<Node>, a: usize, b: usize) {
                let events_1 = nodes[a].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
                assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
                let as_update = match events_1[0] {
                        MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
                                msg.clone()
                        },
                        _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
                };

                let events_2 = nodes[b].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
                assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
                let bs_update = match events_2[0] {
                        MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
                                msg.clone()
                        },
                        _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
                };

                for node in nodes {
                        node.router.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
                        node.router.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
                }
        }

        macro_rules! expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable {
                ($node: expr) => {{
                        let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
                        assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
                        match events[0] {
                                Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
                                _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
                        };
                        $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
                        $node.node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
                }}
        }

        #[test]
        fn channel_reserve_test() {
                use util::rng;
                use std::sync::atomic::Ordering;
                use ln::msgs::HandleError;

                macro_rules! get_channel_value_stat {
                        ($node: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {{
                                let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
                                let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&$channel_id).unwrap();
                                chan.get_value_stat()
                        }}
                }

                let mut nodes = create_network(3);
                let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1900, 1001);
                let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 1900, 1001);

                let mut stat01 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
                let mut stat11 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);

                let mut stat12 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2);
                let mut stat22 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);

                macro_rules! get_route_and_payment_hash {
                        ($recv_value: expr) => {{
                                let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), $recv_value, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
                                let (payment_preimage, payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
                                (route, payment_hash, payment_preimage)
                        }}
                };

                macro_rules! expect_forward {
                        ($node: expr) => {{
                                let mut events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
                                assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
                                check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
                                let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
                                payment_event
                        }}
                }

                macro_rules! expect_payment_received {
                        ($node: expr, $expected_payment_hash: expr, $expected_recv_value: expr) => {
                                let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
                                assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
                                match events[0] {
                                        Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
                                                assert_eq!($expected_payment_hash, *payment_hash);
                                                assert_eq!($expected_recv_value, amt);
                                        },
                                        _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
                                }
                        }
                };

                let feemsat = 239; // somehow we know?
                let total_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * 239;

                let recv_value_0 = stat01.their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - total_fee_msat;

                // attempt to send amt_msat > their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
                {
                        let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_0 + 1);
                        assert!(route.hops.iter().rev().skip(1).all(|h| h.fee_msat == feemsat));
                        let err = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap();
                        match err {
                                APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our max HTLC value in flight"),
                                _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
                        }
                }

                let mut htlc_id = 0;
                // channel reserve is bigger than their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat so loop to deplete
                // nodes[0]'s wealth
                loop {
                        let amt_msat = recv_value_0 + total_fee_msat;
                        if stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat < stat01.channel_reserve_msat {
                                break;
                        }
                        send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1], &nodes[2]][..], recv_value_0);
                        htlc_id += 1;

                        let (stat01_, stat11_, stat12_, stat22_) = (
                                get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2),
                                get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2),
                                get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2),
                                get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2),
                        );

                        assert_eq!(stat01_.value_to_self_msat, stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat);
                        assert_eq!(stat11_.value_to_self_msat, stat11.value_to_self_msat + amt_msat);
                        assert_eq!(stat12_.value_to_self_msat, stat12.value_to_self_msat - (amt_msat - feemsat));
                        assert_eq!(stat22_.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + (amt_msat - feemsat));
                        stat01 = stat01_; stat11 = stat11_; stat12 = stat12_; stat22 = stat22_;
                }

                {
                        let recv_value = stat01.value_to_self_msat - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat;
                        // attempt to get channel_reserve violation
                        let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value + 1);
                        let err = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), our_payment_hash).err().unwrap();
                        match err {
                                APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our reserve value"),
                                _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
                        }
                }

                // adding pending output
                let recv_value_1 = (stat01.value_to_self_msat - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat)/2;
                let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat;

                let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_preimage_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_1);
                let payment_event_1 = {
                        nodes[0].node.send_payment(route_1, our_payment_hash_1).unwrap();
                        check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);

                        let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
                        assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
                        SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
                };
                nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]).unwrap();

                // channel reserve test with htlc pending output > 0
                let recv_value_2 = stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat;
                {
                        let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_2 + 1);
                        match nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap() {
                                APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our reserve value"),
                                _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
                        }
                }

                {
                        // test channel_reserve test on nodes[1] side
                        let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_2 + 1);

                        // Need to manually create update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
                        let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
                        let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &{
                                let mut session_key = [0; 32];
                                rng::fill_bytes(&mut session_key);
                                session_key
                        }).expect("RNG is bad!");

                        let cur_height = nodes[0].node.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
                        let onion_keys = ChannelManager::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
                        let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = ChannelManager::build_onion_payloads(&route, cur_height).unwrap();
                        let onion_packet = ChannelManager::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, &our_payment_hash);
                        let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
                                channel_id: chan_1.2,
                                htlc_id,
                                amount_msat: htlc_msat,
                                payment_hash: our_payment_hash,
                                cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
                                onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
                        };

                        let err = nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg).err().unwrap();
                        match err {
                                HandleError{err, .. } => assert_eq!(err, "Remote HTLC add would put them over their reserve value"),
                        }
                }

                // split the rest to test holding cell
                let recv_value_21 = recv_value_2/2;
                let recv_value_22 = recv_value_2 - recv_value_21 - total_fee_msat;
                {
                        let stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
                        assert_eq!(stat.value_to_self_msat - (stat.pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat + total_fee_msat), stat.channel_reserve_msat);
                }

                // now see if they go through on both sides
                let (route_21, our_payment_hash_21, our_payment_preimage_21) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_21);
                // but this will stuck in the holding cell
                nodes[0].node.send_payment(route_21, our_payment_hash_21).unwrap();
                check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
                let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
                assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);

                // test with outbound holding cell amount > 0
                {
                        let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_22+1);
                        match nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap() {
                                APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our reserve value"),
                                _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
                        }
                }

                let (route_22, our_payment_hash_22, our_payment_preimage_22) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_22);
                // this will also stuck in the holding cell
                nodes[0].node.send_payment(route_22, our_payment_hash_22).unwrap();
                check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
                assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
                assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());

                // flush the pending htlc
                nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.commitment_msg).unwrap();
                let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
                check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);

                nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
                check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
                let commitment_update_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());

                nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed).unwrap();
                let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
                // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
                check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);

                nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
                assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
                check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);

                expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);

                let ref payment_event_11 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
                nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_11.msgs[0]).unwrap();
                commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event_11.commitment_msg, false);

                expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
                expect_payment_received!(nodes[2], our_payment_hash_1, recv_value_1);

                // flush the htlcs in the holding cell
                assert_eq!(commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs.len(), 2);
                nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
                nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[1]).unwrap();
                commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], &commitment_update_2.commitment_signed, false);
                expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);

                let ref payment_event_3 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
                assert_eq!(payment_event_3.msgs.len(), 2);
                nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[0]).unwrap();
                nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[1]).unwrap();

                commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], &payment_event_3.commitment_msg, false);
                expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);

                let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
                assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
                match events[0] {
                        Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
                                assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_21, *payment_hash);
                                assert_eq!(recv_value_21, amt);
                        },
                        _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
                }
                match events[1] {
                        Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
                                assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_22, *payment_hash);
                                assert_eq!(recv_value_22, amt);
                        },
                        _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
                }

                claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_1);
                claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_21);
                claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_22);

                let expected_value_to_self = stat01.value_to_self_msat - (recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_21 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat);
                let stat0 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
                assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, expected_value_to_self);
                assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, stat0.channel_reserve_msat);

                let stat2 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
                assert_eq!(stat2.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + recv_value_1 + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22);
        }

        #[test]
        fn channel_monitor_network_test() {
                // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
                // tests that ChannelMonitor is able to recover from various states.
                let nodes = create_network(5);

                // Create some initial channels
                let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
                let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
                let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
                let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);

                // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
                send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
                send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
                send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
                send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);

                // Simple case with no pending HTLCs:
                nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
                {
                        let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
                        let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
                        nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn.drain(..).next().unwrap()] }, 1);
                        test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
                }
                get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
                assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
                assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);

                // One pending HTLC is discarded by the force-close:
                let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;

                // Simple case of one pending HTLC to HTLC-Timeout
                nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
                {
                        let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
                        let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
                        nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn.drain(..).next().unwrap()] }, 1);
                        test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
                }
                get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 1, 2);
                assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
                assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 1);

                macro_rules! claim_funds {
                        ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $preimage: expr) => {
                                {
                                        assert!($node.node.claim_funds($preimage));
                                        check_added_monitors!($node, 1);

                                        let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
                                        assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
                                        match events[0] {
                                                MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, .. } } => {
                                                        assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
                                                        assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
                                                        assert_eq!(*node_id, $prev_node.node.get_our_node_id());
                                                },
                                                _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
                                        };
                                }
                        }
                }

                // nodes[3] gets the preimage, but nodes[2] already disconnected, resulting in a nodes[2]
                // HTLC-Timeout and a nodes[3] claim against it (+ its own announces)
                nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
                {
                        let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);

                        // Claim the payment on nodes[3], giving it knowledge of the preimage
                        claim_funds!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_preimage_1);

                        let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
                        nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);

                        check_preimage_claim(&nodes[3], &node_txn);
                }
                get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 2, 3);
                assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
                assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 1);

                { // Cheat and reset nodes[4]'s height to 1
                        let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
                        nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, 1);
                }

                assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire), 1);
                assert_eq!(nodes[4].node.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire), 1);
                // One pending HTLC to time out:
                let payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[4])[..], 3000000).0;
                // CLTV expires at TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1 (current height) + 1 (added in send_payment for
                // buffer space).

                {
                        let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
                        nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 2, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
                        for i in 3..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 2 + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS + 1 {
                                header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
                                nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
                        }

                        let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[3], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);

                        // Claim the payment on nodes[4], giving it knowledge of the preimage
                        claim_funds!(nodes[4], nodes[3], payment_preimage_2);

                        header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
                        nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 2, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
                        for i in 3..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 2 - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + 1 {
                                header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
                                nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
                        }

                        test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[4], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::SUCCESS);

                        header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
                        nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone()] }, TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 5);

                        check_preimage_claim(&nodes[4], &node_txn);
                }
                get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 3, 4);
                assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
                assert_eq!(nodes[4].node.list_channels().len(), 0);

                // Create some new channels:
                let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);

                // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
                let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
                // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[0]
                let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.iter().next().unwrap().1.last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
                assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // First commitment tx, then HTLC tx
                assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
                assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_5.3.txid());
                assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to 0 are present
                assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
                assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
                assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 133); // HTLC-Timeout
                // Revoke the old state
                claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);

                {
                        let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
                        nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
                        {
                                let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
                                assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
                                assert_eq!(node_txn.pop().unwrap(), node_txn[0]); // An outpoint registration will result in a 2nd block_connected
                                assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2); // We should claim the revoked output and the HTLC output

                                check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
                                node_txn.swap_remove(0);
                        }
                        test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_5, None, HTLCType::NONE);

                        nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
                        let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_5, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
                        header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
                        nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[1].clone()] }, 1);
                        test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], node_txn[1].clone());
                }
                get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
                assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
                assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
        }

        #[test]
        fn revoked_output_claim() {
                // Simple test to ensure a node will claim a revoked output when a stale remote commitment
                // transaction is broadcast by its counterparty
                let nodes = create_network(2);
                let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
                // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim the revoked output
                let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
                assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1);
                // Only output is the full channel value back to nodes[0]:
                assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
                // Send a payment through, updating everyone's latest commitment txn
                send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 5000000);

                // Inform nodes[1] that nodes[0] broadcast a stale tx
                let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
                nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
                let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
                assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); // nodes[1] will broadcast justice tx twice, and its own local state once

                assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[2]);

                check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
                check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3.clone());

                // Inform nodes[0] that a watchtower cheated on its behalf, so it will force-close the chan
                nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
                get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
        }

        #[test]
        fn claim_htlc_outputs_shared_tx() {
                // Node revoked old state, htlcs haven't time out yet, claim them in shared justice tx
                let nodes = create_network(2);

                // Create some new channel:
                let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);

                // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
                send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
                // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx
                let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
                let _payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000).0;

                // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
                let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
                assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // commitment tx + 1 HTLC-Timeout tx
                assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
                assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
                assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
                assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
                assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 133); // HTLC-Timeout
                check_spends!(revoked_local_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());

                //Revoke the old state
                claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);

                {
                        let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };

                        nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);

                        nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
                        let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
                        assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4);

                        assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Claim the revoked output + both revoked HTLC outputs
                        check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());

                        assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]); // justice tx is duplicated due to block re-scanning

                        let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
                        witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
                        witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len());
                        witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[2].witness.last().unwrap().len());
                        assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
                        assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
                        assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), 133); // revoked offered HTLC
                        assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), 138); // revoked received HTLC

                        // Next nodes[1] broadcasts its current local tx state:
                        assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
                        assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid()); //Spending funding tx unique txouput, tx broadcasted by ChannelManager

                        assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
                        let witness_script = node_txn[2].clone().input[0].witness.pop().unwrap();
                        assert_eq!(witness_script.len(), 133); //Spending an offered htlc output
                        assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[1].txid());
                        assert_ne!(node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid);
                        assert_ne!(node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output.txid);
                }
                get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
                assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
                assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
        }

        #[test]
        fn claim_htlc_outputs_single_tx() {
                // Node revoked old state, htlcs have timed out, claim each of them in separated justice tx
                let nodes = create_network(2);

                let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);

                // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
                send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
                // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx, but this
                // time as two different claim transactions as we're gonna to timeout htlc with given a high current height
                let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
                let _payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000).0;

                // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
                let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();

                //Revoke the old state
                claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);

                {
                        let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };

                        nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 200);

                        nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 200);
                        let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
                        assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 12); // ChannelManager : 2, ChannelMontitor: 8 (1 standard revoked output, 2 revocation htlc tx, 1 local commitment tx + 1 htlc timeout tx) * 2 (block-rescan)

                        assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[7]);
                        assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[8]);
                        assert_eq!(node_txn[2], node_txn[9]);
                        assert_eq!(node_txn[3], node_txn[10]);
                        assert_eq!(node_txn[4], node_txn[11]);
                        assert_eq!(node_txn[3], node_txn[5]); //local commitment tx + htlc timeout tx broadcated by ChannelManger
                        assert_eq!(node_txn[4], node_txn[6]);

                        assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
                        assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
                        assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);

                        let mut revoked_tx_map = HashMap::new();
                        revoked_tx_map.insert(revoked_local_txn[0].txid(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
                        node_txn[0].verify(&revoked_tx_map).unwrap();
                        node_txn[1].verify(&revoked_tx_map).unwrap();
                        node_txn[2].verify(&revoked_tx_map).unwrap();

                        let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
                        witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
                        witness_lens.insert(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
                        witness_lens.insert(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
                        assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
                        assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
                        assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), 133); // revoked offered HTLC
                        assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), 138); // revoked received HTLC

                        assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
                        check_spends!(node_txn[3], chan_1.3.clone());

                        assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input.len(), 1);
                        let witness_script = node_txn[4].input[0].witness.last().unwrap();
                        assert_eq!(witness_script.len(), 133); //Spending an offered htlc output
                        assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[3].txid());
                        assert_ne!(node_txn[4].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid);
                        assert_ne!(node_txn[4].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid);
                }
                get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
                assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
                assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
        }

        #[test]
        fn test_htlc_ignore_latest_remote_commitment() {
                // Test that HTLC transactions spending the latest remote commitment transaction are simply
                // ignored if we cannot claim them. This originally tickled an invalid unwrap().
                let nodes = create_network(2);
                create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);

                route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10000000);
                nodes[0].node.force_close_channel(&nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].channel_id);
                {
                        let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
                        assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
                        match events[0] {
                                MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
                                        assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
                                },
                                _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
                        }
                }

                let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
                assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);

                let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
                nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&node_txn[0], &node_txn[1]], &[1; 2]);

                {
                        let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
                        assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
                        match events[0] {
                                MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
                                        assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
                                },
                                _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
                        }
                }

                // Duplicate the block_connected call since this may happen due to other listeners
                // registering new transactions
                nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&node_txn[0], &node_txn[1]], &[1; 2]);
        }

        #[test]
        fn test_force_close_fail_back() {
                // Check which HTLCs are failed-backwards on channel force-closure
                let mut nodes = create_network(3);
                create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
                create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);

                let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, 42).unwrap();

                let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);

                let mut payment_event = {
                        nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
                        check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);

                        let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
                        assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
                        SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
                };

                nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
                commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);

                let events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
                assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
                match events_1[0] {
                        Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
                        _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
                };

                nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
                nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();

                let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
                assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
                payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
                assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);

                check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
                nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
                nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap();
                check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
                let (_, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());

                // nodes[2] now has the latest commitment transaction, but hasn't revoked its previous
                // state or updated nodes[1]' state. Now force-close and broadcast that commitment/HTLC
                // transaction and ensure nodes[1] doesn't fail-backwards (this was originally a bug!).

                nodes[2].node.force_close_channel(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id);
                let events_3 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
                assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
                match events_3[0] {
                        MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
                                assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
                        },
                        _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
                }

                let tx = {
                        let mut node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
                        // Note that we don't bother broadcasting the HTLC-Success transaction here as we don't
                        // have a use for it unless nodes[2] learns the preimage somehow, the funds will go
                        // back to nodes[1] upon timeout otherwise.
                        assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
                        node_txn.remove(0)
                };

                let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
                nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&tx], &[1]);

                let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
                // Note no UpdateHTLCs event here from nodes[1] to nodes[0]!
                assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
                match events_4[0] {
                        MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
                                assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
                        },
                        _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
                }

                // Now check that if we add the preimage to ChannelMonitor it broadcasts our HTLC-Success..
                {
                        let mut monitors = nodes[2].chan_monitor.simple_monitor.monitors.lock().unwrap();
                        monitors.get_mut(&OutPoint::new(Sha256dHash::from(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id[..]), 0)).unwrap()
                                .provide_payment_preimage(&our_payment_hash, &our_payment_preimage);
                }
                nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&tx], &[1]);
                let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
                assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
                assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
                assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, tx.txid());
                assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Must be an HTLC-Success
                assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.len(), 5); // Must be an HTLC-Success

                check_spends!(node_txn[0], tx);
        }

        #[test]
        fn test_unconf_chan() {
                // After creating a chan between nodes, we disconnect all blocks previously seen to force a channel close on nodes[0] side
                let nodes = create_network(2);
                create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);

                let channel_state = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
                assert_eq!(channel_state.by_id.len(), 1);
                assert_eq!(channel_state.short_to_id.len(), 1);
                mem::drop(channel_state);

                let mut headers = Vec::new();
                let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
                headers.push(header.clone());
                for _i in 2..100 {
                        header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
                        headers.push(header.clone());
                }
                while !headers.is_empty() {
                        nodes[0].node.block_disconnected(&headers.pop().unwrap());
                }
                {
                        let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
                        assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
                        match events[0] {
                                MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { flags, .. }, .. } } => {
                                        assert_eq!(flags & 0b10, 0b10);
                                },
                                _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
                        }
                }
                let channel_state = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
                assert_eq!(channel_state.by_id.len(), 0);
                assert_eq!(channel_state.short_to_id.len(), 0);
        }

        macro_rules! get_chan_reestablish_msgs {
                ($src_node: expr, $dst_node: expr) => {
                        {
                                let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(1);
                                for msg in $src_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events() {
                                        if let MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, ref msg } = msg {
                                                assert_eq!(*node_id, $dst_node.node.get_our_node_id());
                                                res.push(msg.clone());
                                        } else {
                                                panic!("Unexpected event")
                                        }
                                }
                                res
                        }
                }
        }

        macro_rules! handle_chan_reestablish_msgs {
                ($src_node: expr, $dst_node: expr) => {
                        {
                                let msg_events = $src_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
                                let mut idx = 0;
                                let funding_locked = if let Some(&MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg }) = msg_events.get(0) {
                                        idx += 1;
                                        assert_eq!(*node_id, $dst_node.node.get_our_node_id());
                                        Some(msg.clone())
                                } else {
                                        None
                                };

                                let mut revoke_and_ack = None;
                                let mut commitment_update = None;
                                let order = if let Some(ev) = msg_events.get(idx) {
                                        idx += 1;
                                        match ev {
                                                &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
                                                        assert_eq!(*node_id, $dst_node.node.get_our_node_id());
                                                        revoke_and_ack = Some(msg.clone());
                                                        RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst
                                                },
                                                &MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
                                                        assert_eq!(*node_id, $dst_node.node.get_our_node_id());
                                                        commitment_update = Some(updates.clone());
                                                        RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst
                                                },
                                                _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
                                        }
                                } else {
                                        RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst
                                };

                                if let Some(ev) = msg_events.get(idx) {
                                        match ev {
                                                &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
                                                        assert_eq!(*node_id, $dst_node.node.get_our_node_id());
                                                        assert!(revoke_and_ack.is_none());
                                                        revoke_and_ack = Some(msg.clone());
                                                },
                                                &MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
                                                        assert_eq!(*node_id, $dst_node.node.get_our_node_id());
                                                        assert!(commitment_update.is_none());
                                                        commitment_update = Some(updates.clone());
                                                },
                                                _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
                                        }
                                }

                                (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, order)
                        }
                }
        }

        /// pending_htlc_adds includes both the holding cell and in-flight update_add_htlcs, whereas
        /// for claims/fails they are separated out.
        fn reconnect_nodes(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, pre_all_htlcs: bool, pending_htlc_adds: (i64, i64), pending_htlc_claims: (usize, usize), pending_cell_htlc_claims: (usize, usize), pending_cell_htlc_fails: (usize, usize), pending_raa: (bool, bool)) {
                node_a.node.peer_connected(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
                let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(node_a, node_b);
                node_b.node.peer_connected(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
                let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(node_b, node_a);

                let mut resp_1 = Vec::new();
                for msg in reestablish_1 {
                        node_b.node.handle_channel_reestablish(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &msg).unwrap();
                        resp_1.push(handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(node_b, node_a));
                }
                if pending_cell_htlc_claims.0 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_fails.0 != 0 {
                        check_added_monitors!(node_b, 1);
                } else {
                        check_added_monitors!(node_b, 0);
                }

                let mut resp_2 = Vec::new();
                for msg in reestablish_2 {
                        node_a.node.handle_channel_reestablish(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &msg).unwrap();
                        resp_2.push(handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(node_a, node_b));
                }
                if pending_cell_htlc_claims.1 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_fails.1 != 0 {
                        check_added_monitors!(node_a, 1);
                } else {
                        check_added_monitors!(node_a, 0);
                }

                // We dont yet support both needing updates, as that would require a different commitment dance:
                assert!((pending_htlc_adds.0 == 0 && pending_htlc_claims.0 == 0 && pending_cell_htlc_claims.0 == 0 && pending_cell_htlc_fails.0 == 0) ||
                        (pending_htlc_adds.1 == 0 && pending_htlc_claims.1 == 0 && pending_cell_htlc_claims.1 == 0 && pending_cell_htlc_fails.1 == 0));

                for chan_msgs in resp_1.drain(..) {
                        if pre_all_htlcs {
                                node_a.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_msgs.0.unwrap()).unwrap();
                                let announcement_event = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
                                if !announcement_event.is_empty() {
                                        assert_eq!(announcement_event.len(), 1);
                                        if let MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } = announcement_event[0] {
                                                //TODO: Test announcement_sigs re-sending
                                        } else { panic!("Unexpected event!"); }
                                }
                        } else {
                                assert!(chan_msgs.0.is_none());
                        }
                        if pending_raa.0 {
                                assert!(chan_msgs.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst);
                                node_a.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_msgs.1.unwrap()).unwrap();
                                assert!(node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
                                check_added_monitors!(node_a, 1);
                        } else {
                                assert!(chan_msgs.1.is_none());
                        }
                        if pending_htlc_adds.0 != 0 || pending_htlc_claims.0 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_claims.0 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_fails.0 != 0 {
                                let commitment_update = chan_msgs.2.unwrap();
                                if pending_htlc_adds.0 != -1 { // We use -1 to denote a response commitment_signed
                                        assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_adds.0 as usize);
                                } else {
                                        assert!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
                                }
                                assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_claims.0 + pending_cell_htlc_claims.0);
                                assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), pending_cell_htlc_fails.0);
                                assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
                                for update_add in commitment_update.update_add_htlcs {
                                        node_a.node.handle_update_add_htlc(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add).unwrap();
                                }
                                for update_fulfill in commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs {
                                        node_a.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill).unwrap();
                                }
                                for update_fail in commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs {
                                        node_a.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail).unwrap();
                                }

                                if pending_htlc_adds.0 != -1 { // We use -1 to denote a response commitment_signed
                                        commitment_signed_dance!(node_a, node_b, commitment_update.commitment_signed, false);
                                } else {
                                        node_a.node.handle_commitment_signed(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
                                        check_added_monitors!(node_a, 1);
                                        let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(node_a, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, node_b.node.get_our_node_id());
                                        // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
                                        node_b.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
                                        assert!(node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
                                        check_added_monitors!(node_b, 1);
                                }
                        } else {
                                assert!(chan_msgs.2.is_none());
                        }
                }

                for chan_msgs in resp_2.drain(..) {
                        if pre_all_htlcs {
                                node_b.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_msgs.0.unwrap()).unwrap();
                                let announcement_event = node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
                                if !announcement_event.is_empty() {
                                        assert_eq!(announcement_event.len(), 1);
                                        if let MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } = announcement_event[0] {
                                                //TODO: Test announcement_sigs re-sending
                                        } else { panic!("Unexpected event!"); }
                                }
                        } else {
                                assert!(chan_msgs.0.is_none());
                        }
                        if pending_raa.1 {
                                assert!(chan_msgs.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst);
                                node_b.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_msgs.1.unwrap()).unwrap();
                                assert!(node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
                                check_added_monitors!(node_b, 1);
                        } else {
                                assert!(chan_msgs.1.is_none());
                        }
                        if pending_htlc_adds.1 != 0 || pending_htlc_claims.1 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_claims.1 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_fails.1 != 0 {
                                let commitment_update = chan_msgs.2.unwrap();
                                if pending_htlc_adds.1 != -1 { // We use -1 to denote a response commitment_signed
                                        assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_adds.1 as usize);
                                }
                                assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_claims.0 + pending_cell_htlc_claims.0);
                                assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), pending_cell_htlc_fails.0);
                                assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
                                for update_add in commitment_update.update_add_htlcs {
                                        node_b.node.handle_update_add_htlc(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add).unwrap();
                                }
                                for update_fulfill in commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs {
                                        node_b.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill).unwrap();
                                }
                                for update_fail in commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs {
                                        node_b.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail).unwrap();
                                }

                                if pending_htlc_adds.1 != -1 { // We use -1 to denote a response commitment_signed
                                        commitment_signed_dance!(node_b, node_a, commitment_update.commitment_signed, false);
                                } else {
                                        node_b.node.handle_commitment_signed(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
                                        check_added_monitors!(node_b, 1);
                                        let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
                                        // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
                                        node_a.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
                                        assert!(node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
                                        check_added_monitors!(node_a, 1);
                                }
                        } else {
                                assert!(chan_msgs.2.is_none());
                        }
                }
        }

        #[test]
        fn test_simple_peer_disconnect() {
                // Test that we can reconnect when there are no lost messages
                let nodes = create_network(3);
                create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
                create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);

                nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
                nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
                reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], true, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));

                let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
                let payment_hash_2 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
                fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_2);
                claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_1);

                nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
                nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
                reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));

                let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
                let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
                let payment_hash_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
                let payment_hash_6 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;

                nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
                nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);

                claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), true, payment_preimage_3);
                fail_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], true, payment_hash_5);

                reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (1, 0), (1, 0), (false, false));
                {
                        let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
                        assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
                        match events[0] {
                                Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage } => {
                                        assert_eq!(payment_preimage, payment_preimage_3);
                                },
                                _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
                        }
                        match events[1] {
                                Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, rejected_by_dest } => {
                                        assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_5);
                                        assert!(rejected_by_dest);
                                },
                                _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
                        }
                }

                claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_4);
                fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_6);
        }

        fn do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(messages_delivered: u8) {
                // Test that we can reconnect when in-flight HTLC updates get dropped
                let mut nodes = create_network(2);
                if messages_delivered == 0 {
                        create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001);
                        // nodes[1] doesn't receive the funding_locked message (it'll be re-sent on reconnect)
                } else {
                        create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
                }

                let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(&nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()), &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
                let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);

                let payment_event = {
                        nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), payment_hash_1).unwrap();
                        check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);

                        let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
                        assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
                        SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
                };
                assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);

                if messages_delivered < 2 {
                        // Drop the payment_event messages, and let them get re-generated in reconnect_nodes!
                } else {
                        nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
                        if messages_delivered >= 3 {
                                nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap();
                                check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
                                let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());

                                if messages_delivered >= 4 {
                                        nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
                                        assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
                                        check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);

                                        if messages_delivered >= 5 {
                                                nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed).unwrap();
                                                let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
                                                // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
                                                check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);

                                                if messages_delivered >= 6 {
                                                        nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
                                                        assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
                                                        check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
                                                }
                                        }
                                }
                        }
                }

                nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
                nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
                if messages_delivered < 3 {
                        // Even if the funding_locked messages get exchanged, as long as nothing further was
                        // received on either side, both sides will need to resend them.
                        reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], true, (0, 1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
                } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
                        // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
                        reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
                } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
                        // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
                        reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
                } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
                        // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
                        reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
                } else if messages_delivered == 6 {
                        // Everything was delivered...
                        reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
                }

                let events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
                assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
                match events_1[0] {
                        Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
                        _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
                };

                nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
                nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
                reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));

                nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
                nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();

                let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
                assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
                match events_2[0] {
                        Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
                                assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
                                assert_eq!(amt, 1000000);
                        },
                        _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
                }

                nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
                check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);

                let events_3 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
                assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
                let (update_fulfill_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events_3[0] {
                        MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
                                assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
                                assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
                                assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
                                assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
                                assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
                                assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
                                (updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
                        },
                        _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
                };

                if messages_delivered >= 1 {
                        nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlc).unwrap();

                        let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
                        assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
                        match events_4[0] {
                                Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
                                        assert_eq!(payment_preimage_1, *payment_preimage);
                                },
                                _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
                        }

                        if messages_delivered >= 2 {
                                nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap();
                                check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
                                let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());

                                if messages_delivered >= 3 {
                                        nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
                                        assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
                                        check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);

                                        if messages_delivered >= 4 {
                                                nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed).unwrap();
                                                let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
                                                // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
                                                check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);

                                                if messages_delivered >= 5 {
                                                        nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
                                                        assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
                                                        check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
                                                }
                                        }
                                }
                        }
                }

                nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
                nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
                if messages_delivered < 2 {
                        reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
                        //TODO: Deduplicate PaymentSent events, then enable this if:
                        //if messages_delivered < 1 {
                                let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
                                assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
                                match events_4[0] {
                                        Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
                                                assert_eq!(payment_preimage_1, *payment_preimage);
                                        },
                                        _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
                                }
                        //}
                } else if messages_delivered == 2 {
                        // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
                        reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
                } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
                        // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
                        reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
                } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
                        // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
                        reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
                } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
                        // Everything was delivered...
                        reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
                }

                nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
                nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
                reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));

                // Channel should still work fine...
                let payment_preimage_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
                claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
        }

        #[test]
        fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_a() {
                do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0);
                do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(1);
                do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(2);
                do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(3);
        }

        #[test]
        fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_b() {
                do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(4);
                do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(5);
                do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(6);
        }

        #[test]
        fn test_funding_peer_disconnect() {
                // Test that we can lock in our funding tx while disconnected
                let nodes = create_network(2);
                let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001);

                nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
                nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);

                confirm_transaction(&nodes[0].chain_monitor, &tx, tx.version);
                let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
                assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
                match events_1[0] {
                        MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, msg: _ } => {
                                assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
                        },
                        _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
                }

                confirm_transaction(&nodes[1].chain_monitor, &tx, tx.version);
                let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
                assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
                match events_2[0] {
                        MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, msg: _ } => {
                                assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
                        },
                        _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
                }

                reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], true, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
                nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
                nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
                reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], true, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));

                // TODO: We shouldn't need to manually pass list_usable_chanels here once we support
                // rebroadcasting announcement_signatures upon reconnect.

                let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(&nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()), &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
                let (payment_preimage, _) = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
                claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage);
        }

        #[test]
        fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_dual_htlc() {
                // Test that we can handle reconnecting when both sides of a channel have pending
                // commitment_updates when we disconnect.
                let mut nodes = create_network(2);
                create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);

                let (payment_preimage_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);

                // Now try to send a second payment which will fail to send
                let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
                let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);

                nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), payment_hash_2).unwrap();
                check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);

                let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
                assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
                match events_1[0] {
                        MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
                        _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
                }

                assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1));
                check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);

                let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
                assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
                match events_2[0] {
                        MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
                                assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
                                assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
                                assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
                                assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
                                assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
                                assert!(update_fee.is_none());

                                nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
                                let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
                                assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
                                match events_3[0] {
                                        Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
                                                assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
                                        },
                                        _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
                                }

                                nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
                                let _ = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
                                // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
                                check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
                        },
                        _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
                }

                nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
                nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);

                nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
                let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
                assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
                nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
                let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
                assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);

                nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]).unwrap();
                let as_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
                nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]).unwrap();
                let bs_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);

                assert!(as_resp.0.is_none());
                assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none());

                assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
                assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());

                assert!(as_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);

                assert_eq!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
                assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
                assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
                assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
                assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none());
                nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
                nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed).unwrap();
                let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
                // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
                check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);

                nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), as_resp.1.as_ref().unwrap()).unwrap();
                let bs_second_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
                assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
                assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
                assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
                assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
                assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
                check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);

                nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
                let as_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
                assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
                assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
                assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
                assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
                assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
                check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);

                nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment_signed.commitment_signed).unwrap();
                let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
                // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
                check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);

                nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed.commitment_signed).unwrap();
                let bs_second_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
                // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
                check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);

                nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
                assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
                check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);

                let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
                assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
                match events_4[0] {
                        Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
                        _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
                };

                nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
                nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();

                let events_5 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
                assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
                match events_5[0] {
                        Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt: _ } => {
                                assert_eq!(payment_hash_2, *payment_hash);
                        },
                        _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
                }

                nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
                assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
                check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);

                claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
        }

        #[test]
        fn test_simple_monitor_permanent_update_fail() {
                // Test that we handle a simple permanent monitor update failure
                let mut nodes = create_network(2);
                create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);

                let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
                let (_, payment_hash_1) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);

                *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure);
                if let Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, payment_hash_1) {} else { panic!(); }
                check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);

                let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
                assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
                match events_1[0] {
                        MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
                        _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
                };

                // TODO: Once we hit the chain with the failure transaction we should check that we get a
                // PaymentFailed event

                assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
        }

        fn do_test_simple_monitor_temporary_update_fail(disconnect: bool) {
                // Test that we can recover from a simple temporary monitor update failure optionally with
                // a disconnect in between
                let mut nodes = create_network(2);
                create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);

                let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
                let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);

                *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
                if let Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), payment_hash_1) {} else { panic!(); }
                check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);

                assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
                assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
                assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);

                if disconnect {
                        nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
                        nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
                        reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], true, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
                }

                *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(());
                nodes[0].node.test_restore_channel_monitor();
                check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);

                let mut events_2 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
                assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
                let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.pop().unwrap());
                assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
                nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
                commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);

                expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);

                let events_3 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
                assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
                match events_3[0] {
                        Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
                                assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
                                assert_eq!(amt, 1000000);
                        },
                        _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
                }

                claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_1);

                // Now set it to failed again...
                let (_, payment_hash_2) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
                *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
                if let Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, payment_hash_2) {} else { panic!(); }
                check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);

                assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
                assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
                assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);

                if disconnect {
                        nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
                        nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
                        reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
                }

                // ...and make sure we can force-close a TemporaryFailure channel with a PermanentFailure
                *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure);
                nodes[0].node.test_restore_channel_monitor();
                check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);

                let events_5 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
                assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
                match events_5[0] {
                        MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
                        _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
                }

                // TODO: Once we hit the chain with the failure transaction we should check that we get a
                // PaymentFailed event

                assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
        }

        #[test]
        fn test_simple_monitor_temporary_update_fail() {
                do_test_simple_monitor_temporary_update_fail(false);
                do_test_simple_monitor_temporary_update_fail(true);
        }

        fn do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(disconnect_count: usize) {
                let disconnect_flags = 8 | 16;

                // Test that we can recover from a temporary monitor update failure with some in-flight
                // HTLCs going on at the same time potentially with some disconnection thrown in.
                // * First we route a payment, then get a temporary monitor update failure when trying to
                //   route a second payment. We then claim the first payment.
                // * If disconnect_count is set, we will disconnect at this point (which is likely as
                //   TemporaryFailure likely indicates net disconnect which resulted in failing to update
                //   the ChannelMonitor on a watchtower).
                // * If !(disconnect_count & 16) we deliver a update_fulfill_htlc/CS for the first payment
                //   immediately, otherwise we wait sconnect and deliver them via the reconnect
                //   channel_reestablish processing (ie disconnect_count & 16 makes no sense if
                //   disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags is 0).
                // * We then update the channel monitor, reconnecting if disconnect_count is set and walk
                //   through message sending, potentially disconnect/reconnecting multiple times based on
                //   disconnect_count, to get the update_fulfill_htlc through.
                // * We then walk through more message exchanges to get the original update_add_htlc
                //   through, swapping message ordering based on disconnect_count & 8 and optionally
                //   disconnect/reconnecting based on disconnect_count.
                let mut nodes = create_network(2);
                create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);

                let (payment_preimage_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);

                // Now try to send a second payment which will fail to send
                let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
                let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);

                *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure);
                if let Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), payment_hash_2) {} else { panic!(); }
                check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);

                assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
                assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
                assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);

                // Claim the previous payment, which will result in a update_fulfill_htlc/CS from nodes[1]
                // but nodes[0] won't respond since it is frozen.
                assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1));
                check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
                let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
                assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
                let (bs_initial_fulfill, bs_initial_commitment_signed) = match events_2[0] {
                        MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
                                assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
                                assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
                                assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
                                assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
                                assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
                                assert!(update_fee.is_none());

                                if (disconnect_count & 16) == 0 {
                                        nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
                                        let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
                                        assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
                                        match events_3[0] {
                                                Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
                                                        assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
                                                },
                                                _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
                                        }

                                        if let Err(msgs::HandleError{err, action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) }) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed) {
                                                assert_eq!(err, "Previous monitor update failure prevented generation of RAA");
                                        } else { panic!(); }
                                }

                                (update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone())
                        },
                        _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
                };

                if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 0 {
                        nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
                        nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
                }

                // Now fix monitor updating...
                *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(());
                nodes[0].node.test_restore_channel_monitor();
                check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);

                macro_rules! disconnect_reconnect_peers { () => { {
                        nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
                        nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);

                        nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
                        let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
                        assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
                        nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
                        let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
                        assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);

                        nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]).unwrap();
                        let as_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
                        nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]).unwrap();
                        let bs_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);

                        assert!(as_resp.0.is_none());
                        assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none());

                        (reestablish_1, reestablish_2, as_resp, bs_resp)
                } } }

                let (payment_event, initial_revoke_and_ack) = if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 0 {
                        assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
                        assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());

                        nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
                        let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
                        assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
                        nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
                        let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
                        assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);

                        nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]).unwrap();
                        check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
                        let mut as_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
                        nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]).unwrap();
                        check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
                        let mut bs_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);

                        assert!(as_resp.0.is_none());
                        assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none());

                        assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
                        if (disconnect_count & 16) == 0 {
                                assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());

                                assert!(as_resp.1.is_some());
                                assert!(as_resp.2.is_some());
                                assert!(as_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
                        } else {
                                assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
                                assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
                                assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
                                assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none());
                                assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs == vec![bs_initial_fulfill]);
                                assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed == bs_initial_commitment_signed);

                                assert!(as_resp.1.is_none());

                                nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
                                let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
                                assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
                                match events_3[0] {
                                        Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => {
                                                assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
                                        },
                                        _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
                                }

                                nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed).unwrap();
                                let as_resp_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
                                // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
                                check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);

                                as_resp.1 = Some(as_resp_raa);
                                bs_resp.2 = None;
                        }

                        if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 1 {
                                let (second_reestablish_1, second_reestablish_2, second_as_resp, second_bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();

                                if (disconnect_count & 16) == 0 {
                                        assert!(reestablish_1 == second_reestablish_1);
                                        assert!(reestablish_2 == second_reestablish_2);
                                }
                                assert!(as_resp == second_as_resp);
                                assert!(bs_resp == second_bs_resp);
                        }

                        (SendEvent::from_commitment_update(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), as_resp.2.unwrap()), as_resp.1.unwrap())
                } else {
                        let mut events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
                        assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 2);
                        (SendEvent::from_event(events_4.remove(0)), match events_4[0] {
                                MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
                                        assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
                                        msg.clone()
                                },
                                _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
                        })
                };

                assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());

                nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap();
                nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap();
                let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
                // nodes[1] is awaiting an RAA from nodes[0] still so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
                check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);

                if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 2 {
                        let (_, _, as_resp, bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();

                        assert!(as_resp.1.unwrap() == initial_revoke_and_ack);
                        assert!(bs_resp.1.unwrap() == bs_revoke_and_ack);

                        assert!(as_resp.2.is_none());
                        assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
                }

                let as_commitment_update;
                let bs_second_commitment_update;

                macro_rules! handle_bs_raa { () => {
                        nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
                        as_commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
                        assert!(as_commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
                        assert!(as_commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
                        assert!(as_commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
                        assert!(as_commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
                        assert!(as_commitment_update.update_fee.is_none());
                        check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
                } }

                macro_rules! handle_initial_raa { () => {
                        nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
                        bs_second_commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
                        assert!(bs_second_commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
                        assert!(bs_second_commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
                        assert!(bs_second_commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
                        assert!(bs_second_commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
                        assert!(bs_second_commitment_update.update_fee.is_none());
                        check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
                } }

                if (disconnect_count & 8) == 0 {
                        handle_bs_raa!();

                        if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 3 {
                                let (_, _, as_resp, bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();

                                assert!(as_resp.1.unwrap() == initial_revoke_and_ack);
                                assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());

                                assert!(as_resp.2.unwrap() == as_commitment_update);
                                assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());

                                assert!(as_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst);
                        }

                        handle_initial_raa!();

                        if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 4 {
                                let (_, _, as_resp, bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();

                                assert!(as_resp.1.is_none());
                                assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());

                                assert!(as_resp.2.unwrap() == as_commitment_update);
                                assert!(bs_resp.2.unwrap() == bs_second_commitment_update);
                        }
                } else {
                        handle_initial_raa!();

                        if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 3 {
                                let (_, _, as_resp, bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();

                                assert!(as_resp.1.is_none());
                                assert!(bs_resp.1.unwrap() == bs_revoke_and_ack);

                                assert!(as_resp.2.is_none());
                                assert!(bs_resp.2.unwrap() == bs_second_commitment_update);

                                assert!(bs_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst);
                        }

                        handle_bs_raa!();

                        if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 4 {
                                let (_, _, as_resp, bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!();

                                assert!(as_resp.1.is_none());
                                assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());

                                assert!(as_resp.2.unwrap() == as_commitment_update);
                                assert!(bs_resp.2.unwrap() == bs_second_commitment_update);
                        }
                }

                nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
                let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
                // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
                check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);

                nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap();
                let bs_second_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
                // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
                check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);

                nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
                assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
                check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);

                nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
                assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
                check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);

                expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);

                let events_5 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
                assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
                match events_5[0] {
                        Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => {
                                assert_eq!(payment_hash_2, *payment_hash);
                                assert_eq!(amt, 1000000);
                        },
                        _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
                }

                claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
        }

        #[test]
        fn test_monitor_temporary_update_fail_a() {
                do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(0);
                do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(1);
                do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(2);
                do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(3);
                do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(4);
                do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(5);
        }

        #[test]
        fn test_monitor_temporary_update_fail_b() {
                do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(2 | 8);
                do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(3 | 8);
                do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(4 | 8);
                do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(5 | 8);
        }

        #[test]
        fn test_monitor_temporary_update_fail_c() {
                do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(1 | 16);
                do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(2 | 16);
                do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(3 | 16);
                do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(2 | 8 | 16);
                do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(3 | 8 | 16);
        }

        #[test]
        fn test_invalid_channel_announcement() {
                //Test BOLT 7 channel_announcement msg requirement for final node, gather data to build customed channel_announcement msgs
                let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
                let nodes = create_network(2);

                let chan_announcement = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);

                let a_channel_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
                let b_channel_lock = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
                let as_chan = a_channel_lock.by_id.get(&chan_announcement.3).unwrap();
                let bs_chan = b_channel_lock.by_id.get(&chan_announcement.3).unwrap();

                let _ = nodes[0].router.handle_htlc_fail_channel_update(&msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { short_channel_id : as_chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), is_permanent: false } );

                let as_bitcoin_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &as_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
                let bs_bitcoin_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &bs_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);

                let as_network_key = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
                let bs_network_key = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();

                let were_node_one = as_bitcoin_key.serialize()[..] < bs_bitcoin_key.serialize()[..];

                let mut chan_announcement;

                macro_rules! dummy_unsigned_msg {
                        () => {
                                msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
                                        features: msgs::GlobalFeatures::new(),
                                        chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.bitcoin_hash(),
                                        short_channel_id: as_chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
                                        node_id_1: if were_node_one { as_network_key } else { bs_network_key },
                                        node_id_2: if were_node_one { bs_network_key } else { as_network_key },
                                        bitcoin_key_1: if were_node_one { as_bitcoin_key } else { bs_bitcoin_key },
                                        bitcoin_key_2: if were_node_one { bs_bitcoin_key } else { as_bitcoin_key },
                                        excess_data: Vec::new(),
                                };
                        }
                }

                macro_rules! sign_msg {
                        ($unsigned_msg: expr) => {
                                let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&$unsigned_msg.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
                                let as_bitcoin_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &as_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
                                let bs_bitcoin_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &bs_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
                                let as_node_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &nodes[0].node.our_network_key);
                                let bs_node_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &nodes[1].node.our_network_key);
                                chan_announcement = msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
                                        node_signature_1 : if were_node_one { as_node_sig } else { bs_node_sig},
                                        node_signature_2 : if were_node_one { bs_node_sig } else { as_node_sig},
                                        bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { as_bitcoin_sig } else { bs_bitcoin_sig },
                                        bitcoin_signature_2 : if were_node_one { bs_bitcoin_sig } else { as_bitcoin_sig },
                                        contents: $unsigned_msg
                                }
                        }
                }

                let unsigned_msg = dummy_unsigned_msg!();
                sign_msg!(unsigned_msg);
                assert_eq!(nodes[0].router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).unwrap(), true);
                let _ = nodes[0].router.handle_htlc_fail_channel_update(&msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { short_channel_id : as_chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), is_permanent: false } );

                // Configured with Network::Testnet
                let mut unsigned_msg = dummy_unsigned_msg!();
                unsigned_msg.chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin).header.bitcoin_hash();
                sign_msg!(unsigned_msg);
                assert!(nodes[0].router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).is_err());

                let mut unsigned_msg = dummy_unsigned_msg!();
                unsigned_msg.chain_hash = Sha256dHash::from_data(&[1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9]);
                sign_msg!(unsigned_msg);
                assert!(nodes[0].router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).is_err());
        }
}