1 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
3 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
4 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
5 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
7 //! It does not manage routing logic (see ln::router for that) nor does it manage constructing
8 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
9 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
12 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
13 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
14 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
15 use bitcoin::util::hash::BitcoinHash;
17 use bitcoin_hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
18 use bitcoin_hashes::hmac::{Hmac, HmacEngine};
19 use bitcoin_hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
20 use bitcoin_hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
21 use bitcoin_hashes::cmp::fixed_time_eq;
23 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
24 use secp256k1::Secp256k1;
25 use secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
28 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface,ChainListener,ChainWatchInterface,FeeEstimator};
29 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
30 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError};
31 use ln::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, ManyChannelMonitor, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY};
32 use ln::router::Route;
34 use ln::msgs::LocalFeatures;
36 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, HandleError};
37 use chain::keysinterface::KeysInterface;
38 use util::config::UserConfig;
39 use util::{byte_utils, events};
40 use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer};
41 use util::chacha20::ChaCha20;
42 use util::logger::Logger;
43 use util::errors::APIError;
46 use std::collections::{HashMap, hash_map, HashSet};
48 use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock};
49 use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
50 use std::time::Duration;
52 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
54 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
55 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
56 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
58 // When a Channel forwards an HTLC to its peer, it will give us back the PendingForwardHTLCInfo
59 // which we will use to construct an outbound HTLC, with a relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData
60 // filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use to either fail-backwards or fulfill
61 // the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
62 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
63 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
64 /// Stores the info we will need to send when we want to forward an HTLC onwards
65 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
66 pub(super) struct PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
67 onion_packet: Option<msgs::OnionPacket>,
68 incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
69 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
70 short_channel_id: u64,
71 pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
72 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
75 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
76 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
77 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
78 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
81 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
82 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
83 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
84 Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo),
88 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
89 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
90 pub(super) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
91 short_channel_id: u64,
93 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
96 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
97 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
98 pub(super) enum HTLCSource {
99 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
102 session_priv: SecretKey,
103 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
104 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
105 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
110 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
111 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
112 route: Route { hops: Vec::new() },
113 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
114 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
119 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
120 pub(super) enum HTLCFailReason {
122 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
130 /// payment_hash type, use to cross-lock hop
131 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
132 pub struct PaymentHash(pub [u8;32]);
133 /// payment_preimage type, use to route payment between hop
134 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
135 pub struct PaymentPreimage(pub [u8;32]);
137 type ShutdownResult = (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>);
139 /// Error type returned across the channel_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
140 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
141 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
142 /// channel_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
143 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
145 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
146 err: msgs::HandleError,
147 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
149 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
151 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: &'static str, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
155 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
156 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
158 data: err.to_string()
162 shutdown_finish: None,
166 fn ignore_no_close(err: &'static str) -> Self {
170 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError),
172 shutdown_finish: None,
176 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::HandleError) -> Self {
177 Self { err, shutdown_finish: None }
180 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: &'static str, channel_id: [u8; 32], shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
184 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
185 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
187 data: err.to_string()
191 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
195 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
198 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => HandleError {
200 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError),
202 ChannelError::Close(msg) => HandleError {
204 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
205 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
207 data: msg.to_string()
212 shutdown_finish: None,
217 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
218 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
219 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
220 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
221 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
223 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
225 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
227 forward_info: PendingForwardHTLCInfo,
231 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
235 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
236 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
237 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
238 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
239 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
240 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
241 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
243 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
247 // Note this is only exposed in cfg(test):
248 pub(super) struct ChannelHolder {
249 pub(super) by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel>,
250 pub(super) short_to_id: HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
251 /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
252 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
253 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the short id here, nor the short
254 /// ids in the PendingForwardHTLCInfo!
255 pub(super) forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
256 /// payment_hash -> Vec<(amount_received, htlc_source)> for tracking things that were to us and
257 /// can be failed/claimed by the user
258 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
259 /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
261 pub(super) claimable_htlcs: HashMap<PaymentHash, Vec<(u64, HTLCPreviousHopData)>>,
262 /// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
263 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
264 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>,
266 pub(super) struct MutChannelHolder<'a> {
267 pub(super) by_id: &'a mut HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel>,
268 pub(super) short_to_id: &'a mut HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
269 pub(super) forward_htlcs: &'a mut HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
270 pub(super) claimable_htlcs: &'a mut HashMap<PaymentHash, Vec<(u64, HTLCPreviousHopData)>>,
271 pub(super) pending_msg_events: &'a mut Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>,
274 pub(super) fn borrow_parts(&mut self) -> MutChannelHolder {
276 by_id: &mut self.by_id,
277 short_to_id: &mut self.short_to_id,
278 forward_htlcs: &mut self.forward_htlcs,
279 claimable_htlcs: &mut self.claimable_htlcs,
280 pending_msg_events: &mut self.pending_msg_events,
285 #[cfg(not(any(target_pointer_width = "32", target_pointer_width = "64")))]
286 const ERR: () = "You need at least 32 bit pointers (well, usize, but we'll assume they're the same) for ChannelManager::latest_block_height";
288 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
289 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
291 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
292 /// to individual Channels.
294 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
295 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
296 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
297 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
299 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
300 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
301 /// returning from ManyChannelMonitor::add_update_monitor, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
302 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
303 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
304 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
305 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
307 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (Sha256dHash, ChannelManager), which
308 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
309 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
310 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
312 pub struct ChannelManager {
313 default_configuration: UserConfig,
314 genesis_hash: Sha256dHash,
315 fee_estimator: Arc<FeeEstimator>,
316 monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>,
317 chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>,
318 tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>,
321 pub(super) latest_block_height: AtomicUsize,
323 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize,
324 last_block_hash: Mutex<Sha256dHash>,
325 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
328 pub(super) channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder>,
330 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder>,
331 our_network_key: SecretKey,
333 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
334 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
335 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
336 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
337 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
339 keys_manager: Arc<KeysInterface>,
344 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
345 /// HTLC's CLTV. This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
346 /// ie the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
347 /// the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
348 /// CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
349 const CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6 * 12; //TODO?
350 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 6 * 24 * 7; //TODO?
352 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
353 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
354 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
355 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
356 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
357 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
360 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
362 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying inbound claim. See
363 // ChannelMontior::would_broadcast_at_height for a description of why this is needed.
366 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
368 macro_rules! secp_call {
369 ( $res: expr, $err: expr ) => {
372 Err(_) => return Err($err),
377 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
378 pub struct ChannelDetails {
379 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
380 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
381 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
382 /// lifetime of the channel.
383 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
384 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
385 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
386 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
387 /// The node_id of our counterparty
388 pub remote_network_id: PublicKey,
389 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
390 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
391 /// The user_id passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
393 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
394 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, who's balance is not
395 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
396 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
397 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
398 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
399 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, who's balance is not
400 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
401 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
402 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
403 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
404 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and funding_locked messages have been exchanged, (b)
405 /// the peer is connected, and (c) no monitor update failure is pending resolution.
409 macro_rules! handle_error {
410 ($self: ident, $internal: expr) => {
413 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, shutdown_finish }) => {
414 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
415 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
416 if let Some(update) = update_option {
417 let mut channel_state = $self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
418 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
429 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
430 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
433 Err(ChannelError::Ignore(msg)) => {
434 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $entry.key().clone()))
436 Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => {
437 log_trace!($self, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg);
438 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
439 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
440 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
442 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
448 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
449 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
452 Err(ChannelError::Ignore(msg)) => {
453 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $entry.key().clone()))
455 Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => {
456 log_trace!($self, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg);
457 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
458 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
459 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
461 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
467 macro_rules! handle_monitor_err {
468 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
469 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, Vec::new(), Vec::new())
471 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
473 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
474 log_error!($self, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update PermanentFailure", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]));
475 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
476 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
477 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
479 // TODO: $failed_fails is dropped here, which will cause other channels to hit the
480 // chain in a confused state! We need to move them into the ChannelMonitor which
481 // will be responsible for failing backwards once things confirm on-chain.
482 // It's ok that we drop $failed_forwards here - at this point we'd rather they
483 // broadcast HTLC-Timeout and pay the associated fees to get their funds back than
484 // us bother trying to claim it just to forward on to another peer. If we're
485 // splitting hairs we'd prefer to claim payments that were to us, but we haven't
486 // given up the preimage yet, so might as well just wait until the payment is
487 // retried, avoiding the on-chain fees.
488 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure", channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()));
491 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
492 log_info!($self, "Disabling channel {} due to monitor update TemporaryFailure. On restore will send {} and process {} forwards and {} fails",
493 log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]),
494 if $resend_commitment && $resend_raa {
496 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => { "commitment then RAA" },
497 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => { "RAA then commitment" },
499 } else if $resend_commitment { "commitment" }
500 else if $resend_raa { "RAA" }
502 (&$failed_forwards as &Vec<(PendingForwardHTLCInfo, u64)>).len(),
503 (&$failed_fails as &Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>).len());
504 if !$resend_commitment {
505 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst || !$resend_raa);
508 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst || !$resend_commitment);
510 $entry.get_mut().monitor_update_failed($resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
511 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to update ChannelMonitor"), *$entry.key()))
517 macro_rules! return_monitor_err {
518 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
519 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment);
521 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
522 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
526 // Does not break in case of TemporaryFailure!
527 macro_rules! maybe_break_monitor_err {
528 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
529 match (handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment), $err) {
530 (e, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure) => {
533 (_, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure) => { },
538 impl ChannelManager {
539 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
541 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
542 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
544 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
546 /// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= `MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS`!
547 pub fn new(network: Network, feeest: Arc<FeeEstimator>, monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>, chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>, tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>, logger: Arc<Logger>,keys_manager: Arc<KeysInterface>, config: UserConfig) -> Result<Arc<ChannelManager>, secp256k1::Error> {
548 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
550 let res = Arc::new(ChannelManager {
551 default_configuration: config.clone(),
552 genesis_hash: genesis_block(network).header.bitcoin_hash(),
553 fee_estimator: feeest.clone(),
554 monitor: monitor.clone(),
558 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(0), //TODO: Get an init value
559 last_block_hash: Mutex::new(Default::default()),
562 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
563 by_id: HashMap::new(),
564 short_to_id: HashMap::new(),
565 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
566 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
567 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
569 our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
571 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
572 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
578 let weak_res = Arc::downgrade(&res);
579 res.chain_monitor.register_listener(weak_res);
583 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
585 /// user_id will be provided back as user_channel_id in FundingGenerationReady and
586 /// FundingBroadcastSafe events to allow tracking of which events correspond with which
587 /// create_channel call. Note that user_channel_id defaults to 0 for inbound channels, so you
588 /// may wish to avoid using 0 for user_id here.
590 /// If successful, will generate a SendOpenChannel message event, so you should probably poll
591 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
593 /// Raises APIError::APIMisuseError when channel_value_satoshis > 2**24 or push_msat is
594 /// greater than channel_value_satoshis * 1k or channel_value_satoshis is < 1000.
595 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
596 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
597 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "channel_value must be at least 1000 satoshis" });
600 let channel = Channel::new_outbound(&*self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_id, Arc::clone(&self.logger), &self.default_configuration)?;
601 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone(), &*self.fee_estimator);
603 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
604 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
605 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
606 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
607 if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
608 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG" });
610 panic!("RNG is bad???");
613 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
615 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
616 node_id: their_network_key,
622 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
623 /// more information.
624 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
625 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
626 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.by_id.len());
627 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
628 let (inbound_capacity_msat, outbound_capacity_msat) = channel.get_inbound_outbound_available_balance_msat();
629 res.push(ChannelDetails {
630 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
631 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
632 remote_network_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
633 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
634 inbound_capacity_msat,
635 outbound_capacity_msat,
636 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
637 is_live: channel.is_live(),
643 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
644 /// Router::get_route to ensure non-announced channels are used.
646 /// These are guaranteed to have their is_live value set to true, see the documentation for
647 /// ChannelDetails::is_live for more info on exactly what the criteria are.
648 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
649 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
650 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.by_id.len());
651 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
652 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
653 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
654 // really wanted anyway.
655 if channel.is_live() {
656 let (inbound_capacity_msat, outbound_capacity_msat) = channel.get_inbound_outbound_available_balance_msat();
657 res.push(ChannelDetails {
658 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
659 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
660 remote_network_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
661 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
662 inbound_capacity_msat,
663 outbound_capacity_msat,
664 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
672 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
673 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
674 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
676 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
677 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
678 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
680 let (mut failed_htlcs, chan_option) = {
681 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
682 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
683 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
684 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
685 let (shutdown_msg, failed_htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown()?;
686 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
687 node_id: chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id(),
690 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
691 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
692 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
694 (failed_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
695 } else { (failed_htlcs, None) }
697 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel"})
700 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
701 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
703 let chan_update = if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
704 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
709 if let Some(update) = chan_update {
710 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
711 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
720 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
721 let (local_txn, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
722 log_trace!(self, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} transactions to broadcast and {} HTLCs to fail", local_txn.len(), failed_htlcs.len());
723 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
724 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
726 for tx in local_txn {
727 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
731 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to
732 /// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel.
733 pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) {
734 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
737 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
738 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
739 if let Some(chan) = channel_state.by_id.remove(channel_id) {
740 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
741 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
748 log_trace!(self, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
749 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown());
750 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
751 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
752 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
758 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
759 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
760 pub fn force_close_all_channels(&self) {
761 for chan in self.list_channels() {
762 self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
766 const ZERO:[u8; 65] = [0; 65];
767 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>) {
768 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
769 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
771 log_info!(self, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
772 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
773 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
774 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
775 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
776 failure_code: $err_code,
777 })), self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
782 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
783 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
786 let shared_secret = {
787 let mut arr = [0; 32];
788 arr.copy_from_slice(&SharedSecret::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key)[..]);
791 let (rho, mu) = onion_utils::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
793 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
794 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
795 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
796 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
797 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
798 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
799 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
800 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
803 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&mu);
804 hmac.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
805 hmac.input(&msg.payment_hash.0[..]);
806 if !fixed_time_eq(&Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner(), &msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac) {
807 return_malformed_err!("HMAC Check failed", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 5);
810 let mut channel_state = None;
811 macro_rules! return_err {
812 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
814 log_info!(self, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
815 if channel_state.is_none() {
816 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
818 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
819 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
820 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
821 reason: onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
822 })), channel_state.unwrap());
827 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&rho, &[0u8; 8]);
828 let next_hop_data = {
829 let mut decoded = [0; 65];
830 chacha.process(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[0..65], &mut decoded);
831 match msgs::OnionHopData::read(&mut Cursor::new(&decoded[..])) {
833 let error_code = match err {
834 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownVersion => 0x4000 | 1, // unknown realm byte
835 _ => 0x2000 | 2, // Should never happen
837 return_err!("Unable to decode our hop data", error_code, &[0;0]);
843 let pending_forward_info = if next_hop_data.hmac == [0; 32] {
845 // final_expiry_too_soon
846 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + (CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
847 return_err!("The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle", 17, &[0;0]);
849 // final_incorrect_htlc_amount
850 if next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward > msg.amount_msat {
851 return_err!("Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment", 19, &byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
853 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
854 if next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value != msg.cltv_expiry {
855 return_err!("Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value", 18, &byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
858 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
859 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
860 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
861 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
863 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
865 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
867 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
868 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward,
869 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value,
872 let mut new_packet_data = [0; 20*65];
873 chacha.process(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[65..], &mut new_packet_data[0..19*65]);
874 chacha.process(&ChannelManager::ZERO[..], &mut new_packet_data[19*65..]);
876 let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
878 let blinding_factor = {
879 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
880 sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
881 sha.input(&shared_secret);
882 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
885 let public_key = if let Err(e) = new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor[..]) {
887 } else { Ok(new_pubkey) };
889 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
892 hop_data: new_packet_data,
893 hmac: next_hop_data.hmac.clone(),
896 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
897 onion_packet: Some(outgoing_packet),
898 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
899 short_channel_id: next_hop_data.data.short_channel_id,
900 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
901 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward,
902 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value,
906 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
907 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo { ref onion_packet, ref short_channel_id, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
908 if onion_packet.is_some() { // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject them in the body here
909 let id_option = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
910 let forwarding_id = match id_option {
911 None => { // unknown_next_peer
912 return_err!("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, &[0;0]);
914 Some(id) => id.clone(),
916 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
917 let chan = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
919 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
920 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
921 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
922 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
923 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
924 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
925 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
927 if *amt_to_forward < chan.get_their_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
928 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
930 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths() as u64).and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&*self.fee_estimator) as u64) });
931 if fee.is_none() || msg.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() || (msg.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < *amt_to_forward { // fee_insufficient
932 break Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
934 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
935 break Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
937 let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
938 // We want to have at least LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS to fail prior to going on chain CLAIM_BUFFER blocks before expiration
939 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
940 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
942 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
943 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
948 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
949 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
950 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
951 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
953 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
954 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
956 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
957 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(chan_update.contents.flags));
959 res.extend_from_slice(&chan_update.encode_with_len()[..]);
961 return_err!(err, code, &res[..]);
966 (pending_forward_info, channel_state.unwrap())
969 /// only fails if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id
970 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
971 fn get_channel_update(&self, chan: &Channel) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, HandleError> {
972 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() {
973 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Channel not yet established", action: None}),
977 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_their_node_id().serialize()[..];
979 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
980 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
981 short_channel_id: short_channel_id,
982 timestamp: chan.get_channel_update_count(),
983 flags: (!were_node_one) as u16 | ((!chan.is_live() as u16) << 1),
984 cltv_expiry_delta: CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA,
985 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_our_htlc_minimum_msat(),
986 fee_base_msat: chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&*self.fee_estimator),
987 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
988 excess_data: Vec::new(),
991 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
992 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&hash_to_message!(&msg_hash[..]), &self.our_network_key);
994 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
1000 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
1002 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
1003 /// fields for more info.
1005 /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
1006 /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
1007 /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
1008 /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
1009 /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
1010 /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
1012 /// May generate a SendHTLCs message event on success, which should be relayed.
1014 /// Raises APIError::RoutError when invalid route or forward parameter
1015 /// (cltv_delta, fee, node public key) is specified.
1016 /// Raises APIError::ChannelUnavailable if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
1017 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update failure).
1018 /// Raised APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
1019 /// relevant updates.
1021 /// In case of APIError::RouteError/APIError::ChannelUnavailable, the payment send has failed
1022 /// and you may wish to retry via a different route immediately.
1023 /// In case of APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed, the commitment update has been irrevocably
1024 /// committed on our end and we're just waiting for a monitor update to send it. Do NOT retry
1025 /// the payment via a different route unless you intend to pay twice!
1026 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1027 if route.hops.len() < 1 || route.hops.len() > 20 {
1028 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"});
1030 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
1031 for (idx, hop) in route.hops.iter().enumerate() {
1032 if idx != route.hops.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
1033 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"});
1037 let session_priv = self.keys_manager.get_session_key();
1039 let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
1041 let onion_keys = secp_call!(onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv),
1042 APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"});
1043 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route, cur_height)?;
1044 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, &payment_hash);
1046 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1048 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
1049 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1051 let id = match channel_lock.short_to_id.get(&route.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
1052 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!"}),
1053 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1056 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1057 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(id) {
1059 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey {
1060 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
1062 if !chan.get().is_live() {
1063 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!"});
1065 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
1066 route: route.clone(),
1067 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
1068 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
1069 }, onion_packet), channel_state, chan)
1071 Some((update_add, commitment_signed, chan_monitor)) => {
1072 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1073 maybe_break_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true);
1074 // Note that MonitorUpdateFailed here indicates (per function docs)
1075 // that we will resent the commitment update once we unfree monitor
1076 // updating, so we have to take special care that we don't return
1077 // something else in case we will resend later!
1078 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
1081 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1082 node_id: route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey,
1083 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1084 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
1085 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1086 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1087 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1095 } else { unreachable!(); }
1099 match handle_error!(self, err) {
1100 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
1102 if let Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) = e.action {
1104 log_error!(self, "Got bad keys: {}!", e.err);
1105 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1106 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1107 node_id: route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey,
1111 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
1116 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
1118 /// Note that ALL inputs in the transaction pointed to by funding_txo MUST spend SegWit outputs
1119 /// or your counterparty can steal your funds!
1121 /// Panics if a funding transaction has already been provided for this channel.
1123 /// May panic if the funding_txo is duplicative with some other channel (note that this should
1124 /// be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction keys per-channel).
1125 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_txo: OutPoint) {
1126 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1128 let (chan, msg, chan_monitor) = {
1130 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1131 match channel_state.by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
1133 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_txo)
1134 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
1135 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.force_shutdown(), None)
1136 } else { unreachable!(); })
1142 match handle_error!(self, res) {
1143 Ok(funding_msg) => {
1144 (chan, funding_msg.0, funding_msg.1)
1147 log_error!(self, "Got bad signatures: {}!", e.err);
1148 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1149 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1150 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1157 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
1158 // lock before add_update_monitor
1159 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1163 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1164 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
1165 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1168 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
1169 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1170 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
1172 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1178 fn get_announcement_sigs(&self, chan: &Channel) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures> {
1179 if !chan.should_announce() { return None }
1181 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = match chan.get_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
1183 Err(_) => return None, // Only in case of state precondition violations eg channel is closing
1185 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1186 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
1188 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
1189 channel_id: chan.channel_id(),
1190 short_channel_id: chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
1191 node_signature: our_node_sig,
1192 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
1196 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
1198 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
1199 /// Will likely generate further events.
1200 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
1201 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1203 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
1204 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
1205 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
1207 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1208 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1210 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
1211 if short_chan_id != 0 {
1212 let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) {
1213 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1215 failed_forwards.reserve(pending_forwards.len());
1216 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1217 match forward_info {
1218 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } => {
1219 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1220 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1221 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1222 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1224 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash, 0x4000 | 10, None));
1226 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
1227 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
1228 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
1229 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
1230 // problem, not ours.
1237 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
1238 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
1239 let mut fail_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
1240 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1241 match forward_info {
1242 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } => {
1243 log_trace!(self, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", log_bytes!(forward_info.payment_hash.0), prev_short_channel_id, short_chan_id);
1244 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1245 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1246 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1247 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1249 match chan.get_mut().send_htlc(forward_info.amt_to_forward, forward_info.payment_hash, forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), forward_info.onion_packet.unwrap()) {
1251 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
1252 log_trace!(self, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(forward_info.payment_hash.0), msg);
1254 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
1256 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(chan.get()).unwrap();
1257 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash, 0x1000 | 7, Some(chan_update)));
1262 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
1264 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
1265 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
1266 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
1267 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
1268 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
1269 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
1270 // this channel currently :/.
1276 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
1277 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} after delay", short_chan_id);
1278 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet) {
1280 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
1281 log_trace!(self, "Failed to fail backwards to short_id {}: {}", short_chan_id, msg);
1283 panic!("Stated return value requirements in get_update_fail_htlc() were not met");
1285 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
1286 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
1287 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
1290 Ok(Some(msg)) => { fail_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
1292 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
1293 // revoke_and_ack before we can update the commitment
1294 // transaction. The Channel will automatically handle
1295 // building the update_fail_htlc and commitment_signed
1296 // messages when we can.
1297 // We don't need any kind of timer here as they should fail
1298 // the channel onto the chain if they can't get our
1299 // update_fail_htlc in time, it's not our problem.
1306 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() || !fail_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
1307 let (commitment_msg, monitor) = match chan.get_mut().send_commitment() {
1310 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {
1311 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
1313 //TODO: Handle...this is bad!
1317 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
1318 handle_errors.push((chan.get().get_their_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true)));
1321 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1322 node_id: chan.get().get_their_node_id(),
1323 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1324 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
1325 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1326 update_fail_htlcs: fail_htlc_msgs,
1327 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1329 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
1337 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1338 match forward_info {
1339 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } => {
1340 let prev_hop_data = HTLCPreviousHopData {
1341 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1342 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1343 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1345 match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(forward_info.payment_hash) {
1346 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => entry.get_mut().push((forward_info.amt_to_forward, prev_hop_data)),
1347 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(vec![(forward_info.amt_to_forward, prev_hop_data)]); },
1349 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
1350 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
1351 amt: forward_info.amt_to_forward,
1354 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
1355 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
1363 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_code, update) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
1365 None => self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: Vec::new() }),
1366 Some(chan_update) => self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: chan_update.encode_with_len() }),
1370 for (their_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
1371 match handle_error!(self, err) {
1374 if let Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) = e.action {
1376 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1377 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1378 node_id: their_node_id,
1386 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
1387 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1388 events.append(&mut new_events);
1391 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
1392 /// after a PaymentReceived event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
1393 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
1394 /// Returns false if no payment was found to fail backwards, true if the process of failing the
1395 /// HTLC backwards has been started.
1396 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) -> bool {
1397 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1399 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1400 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
1401 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
1402 for (recvd_value, htlc_with_hash) in sources.drain(..) {
1403 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
1404 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
1405 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_with_hash), payment_hash,
1406 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: byte_utils::be64_to_array(recvd_value).to_vec() });
1412 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
1413 /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here.
1414 /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes
1415 /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may
1416 /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to
1417 /// still-available channels.
1418 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: HTLCFailReason) {
1419 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
1420 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
1421 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
1424 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref route, .. } => {
1425 log_trace!(self, "Failing outbound payment HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
1426 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
1427 match &onion_error {
1428 &HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { ref err } => {
1430 let (channel_update, payment_retryable, onion_error_code) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
1432 let (channel_update, payment_retryable, _) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
1433 // TODO: If we decided to blame ourselves (or one of our channels) in
1434 // process_onion_failure we should close that channel as it implies our
1435 // next-hop is needlessly blaming us!
1436 if let Some(update) = channel_update {
1437 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
1438 events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate {
1443 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
1444 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
1445 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
1446 rejected_by_dest: !payment_retryable,
1448 error_code: onion_error_code
1452 &HTLCFailReason::Reason {
1456 // we get a fail_malformed_htlc from the first hop
1457 // TODO: We'd like to generate a PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate for temporary
1458 // failures here, but that would be insufficient as Router::get_route
1459 // generally ignores its view of our own channels as we provide them via
1461 // TODO: For non-temporary failures, we really should be closing the
1462 // channel here as we apparently can't relay through them anyway.
1463 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
1464 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
1465 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
1466 rejected_by_dest: route.hops.len() == 1,
1468 error_code: Some(*failure_code),
1474 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret }) => {
1475 let err_packet = match onion_error {
1476 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
1477 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with code {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), failure_code);
1478 let packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
1479 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
1481 HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err } => {
1482 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards with pre-built ErrorPacket", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
1483 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
1487 let mut forward_event = None;
1488 if channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
1489 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS));
1491 match channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.entry(short_channel_id) {
1492 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
1493 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet });
1495 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1496 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet }));
1499 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
1500 if let Some(time) = forward_event {
1501 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1502 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
1503 time_forwardable: time
1510 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to a PaymentReceived event, returning true and
1511 /// generating message events for the net layer to claim the payment, if possible. Thus, you
1512 /// should probably kick the net layer to go send messages if this returns true!
1514 /// May panic if called except in response to a PaymentReceived event.
1515 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> bool {
1516 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
1518 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1520 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1521 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash);
1522 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
1523 // TODO: We should require the user specify the expected amount so that we can claim
1524 // only payments for the correct amount, and reject payments for incorrect amounts
1525 // (which are probably middle nodes probing to break our privacy).
1526 for (_, htlc_with_hash) in sources.drain(..) {
1527 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
1528 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(), HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_with_hash), payment_preimage);
1533 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
1534 let (their_node_id, err) = loop {
1536 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
1537 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
1538 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1539 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentSent {
1543 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, .. }) => {
1544 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
1545 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1547 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id) {
1548 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1550 // TODO: There is probably a channel manager somewhere that needs to
1551 // learn the preimage as the channel already hit the chain and that's
1552 // why it's missing.
1557 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
1558 let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
1559 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(htlc_id, payment_preimage) {
1560 Ok((msgs, monitor_option)) => {
1561 if let Some(chan_monitor) = monitor_option {
1562 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1563 if was_frozen_for_monitor {
1564 assert!(msgs.is_none());
1566 break (chan.get().get_their_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, msgs.is_some()));
1570 if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
1571 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1572 node_id: chan.get().get_their_node_id(),
1573 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1574 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1575 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
1576 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1577 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1585 // TODO: There is probably a channel manager somewhere that needs to
1586 // learn the preimage as the channel may be about to hit the chain.
1587 //TODO: Do something with e?
1591 } else { unreachable!(); }
1597 match handle_error!(self, err) {
1600 if let Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) = e.action {
1602 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1603 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1604 node_id: their_node_id,
1612 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
1613 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
1614 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key)
1617 /// Used to restore channels to normal operation after a
1618 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure was returned from a channel monitor update
1620 pub fn test_restore_channel_monitor(&self) {
1621 let mut close_results = Vec::new();
1622 let mut htlc_forwards = Vec::new();
1623 let mut htlc_failures = Vec::new();
1624 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1627 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1628 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1629 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
1630 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
1631 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
1632 if channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
1633 let chan_monitor = channel.channel_monitor();
1634 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1636 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
1637 // TODO: There may be some pending HTLCs that we intended to fail
1638 // backwards when a monitor update failed. We should make sure
1639 // knowledge of those gets moved into the appropriate in-memory
1640 // ChannelMonitor and they get failed backwards once we get
1641 // on-chain confirmations.
1642 // Note I think #198 addresses this, so once it's merged a test
1643 // should be written.
1644 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1645 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1647 close_results.push(channel.force_shutdown());
1648 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
1649 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1655 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => true,
1658 let (raa, commitment_update, order, pending_forwards, mut pending_failures) = channel.monitor_updating_restored();
1659 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
1660 htlc_forwards.push((channel.get_short_channel_id().expect("We can't have pending forwards before funding confirmation"), pending_forwards));
1662 htlc_failures.append(&mut pending_failures);
1664 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
1665 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
1666 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1667 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
1672 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
1673 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
1674 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
1675 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
1676 msg: revoke_and_ack,
1681 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
1685 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
1696 for failure in htlc_failures.drain(..) {
1697 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
1699 self.forward_htlcs(&mut htlc_forwards[..]);
1701 for res in close_results.drain(..) {
1702 self.finish_force_close_channel(res);
1706 fn internal_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, their_local_features: LocalFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1707 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
1708 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash", msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
1711 let channel = Channel::new_from_req(&*self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_node_id.clone(), their_local_features, msg, 0, Arc::clone(&self.logger), &self.default_configuration)
1712 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id))?;
1713 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1714 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1715 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
1716 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!", msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())),
1717 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1718 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
1719 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1720 msg: channel.get_accept_channel(),
1722 entry.insert(channel);
1728 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, their_local_features: LocalFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1729 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
1730 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1731 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1732 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
1733 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1734 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1735 //TODO: see issue #153, need a consistent behavior on obnoxious behavior from random node
1736 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.temporary_channel_id));
1738 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration, their_local_features), channel_state, chan);
1739 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
1741 //TODO: same as above
1742 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.temporary_channel_id))
1745 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1746 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
1747 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
1748 channel_value_satoshis: value,
1749 output_script: output_script,
1750 user_channel_id: user_id,
1755 fn internal_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1756 let ((funding_msg, monitor_update), chan) = {
1757 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1758 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1759 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
1760 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1761 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1762 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1763 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.temporary_channel_id));
1765 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg), channel_state, chan), chan.remove())
1767 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.temporary_channel_id))
1770 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
1771 // lock before add_update_monitor
1772 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor_update.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1775 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1776 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1777 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
1778 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1779 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id", funding_msg.channel_id))
1781 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1782 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
1783 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1792 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1793 let (funding_txo, user_id) = {
1794 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1795 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1796 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
1797 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1798 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1799 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1800 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1802 let chan_monitor = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg), channel_state, chan);
1803 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1806 (chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan.get().get_user_id())
1808 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1811 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1812 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingBroadcastSafe {
1813 funding_txo: funding_txo,
1814 user_channel_id: user_id,
1819 fn internal_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1820 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1821 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1822 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
1823 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1824 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1825 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1826 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1828 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_locked(&msg), channel_state, chan);
1829 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(chan.get()) {
1830 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
1831 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1832 msg: announcement_sigs,
1837 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1841 fn internal_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1842 let (mut dropped_htlcs, chan_option) = {
1843 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1844 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1846 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
1847 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1848 if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1849 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1850 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1852 let (shutdown, closing_signed, dropped_htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
1853 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
1854 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
1855 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1859 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
1860 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
1861 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1865 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1866 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1867 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1869 (dropped_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
1870 } else { (dropped_htlcs, None) }
1872 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1875 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
1876 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
1878 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
1879 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1880 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1881 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1889 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1890 let (tx, chan_option) = {
1891 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1892 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1893 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
1894 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1895 if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1896 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1897 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1899 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
1900 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
1901 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
1902 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1907 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
1908 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
1909 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
1910 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
1911 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
1912 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1913 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1915 (tx, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
1916 } else { (tx, None) }
1918 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1921 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
1922 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
1924 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
1925 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1926 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1927 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1935 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1936 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
1937 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
1938 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
1940 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
1941 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
1942 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
1943 //but we should prevent it anyway.
1945 let (mut pending_forward_info, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
1946 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1948 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
1949 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1950 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1951 //TODO: here MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1952 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1954 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
1955 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
1956 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
1957 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
1958 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo { incoming_shared_secret, .. }) = pending_forward_info {
1959 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(chan.get());
1960 pending_forward_info = PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
1961 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
1962 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
1963 reason: if let Ok(update) = chan_update {
1964 // TODO: Note that |20 is defined as "channel FROM the processing
1965 // node has been disabled" (emphasis mine), which seems to imply
1966 // that we can't return |20 for an inbound channel being disabled.
1967 // This probably needs a spec update but should definitely be
1969 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&incoming_shared_secret, 0x1000|20, &{
1970 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
1971 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(update.contents.flags));
1972 res.extend_from_slice(&update.encode_with_len()[..]);
1976 // This can only happen if the channel isn't in the fully-funded
1977 // state yet, implying our counterparty is trying to route payments
1978 // over the channel back to themselves (cause no one else should
1979 // know the short_id is a lightning channel yet). We should have no
1980 // problem just calling this unknown_next_peer
1981 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&incoming_shared_secret, 0x4000|10, &[])
1986 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info), channel_state, chan);
1988 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1993 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1994 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1996 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1997 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
1998 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1999 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2000 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2001 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2003 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), channel_state, chan)
2005 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2008 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_lock, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone());
2012 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2013 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2014 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2015 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2016 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2017 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2018 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2019 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2021 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err: msg.reason.clone() }), channel_state, chan);
2023 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2028 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2029 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2030 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2031 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2032 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2033 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2034 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2035 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2037 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
2038 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set")), channel_state, chan);
2040 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() }), channel_state, chan);
2043 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2047 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2048 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2049 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2050 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2051 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2052 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2053 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2054 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2056 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, closing_signed, chan_monitor) =
2057 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &*self.fee_estimator), channel_state, chan);
2058 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
2059 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, true, commitment_signed.is_some());
2060 //TODO: Rebroadcast closing_signed if present on monitor update restoration
2062 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
2063 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2064 msg: revoke_and_ack,
2066 if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
2067 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2068 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2069 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2070 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2071 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2072 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2073 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2075 commitment_signed: msg,
2079 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2080 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2081 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2087 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2092 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, Vec<(PendingForwardHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
2093 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
2094 let mut forward_event = None;
2095 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
2096 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2097 if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
2098 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS))
2100 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2101 match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(forward_info.short_channel_id) {
2102 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
2103 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info });
2105 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2106 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info }));
2111 match forward_event {
2113 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2114 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
2115 time_forwardable: time
2123 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2124 let (pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, short_channel_id) = {
2125 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2126 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2127 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2128 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2129 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2130 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2131 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2133 let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
2134 let (commitment_update, pending_forwards, pending_failures, closing_signed, chan_monitor) =
2135 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &*self.fee_estimator), channel_state, chan);
2136 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
2137 if was_frozen_for_monitor {
2138 assert!(commitment_update.is_none() && closing_signed.is_none() && pending_forwards.is_empty() && pending_failures.is_empty());
2139 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::ignore_no_close("Previous monitor update failure prevented responses to RAA"));
2141 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, commitment_update.is_some(), pending_forwards, pending_failures);
2144 if let Some(updates) = commitment_update {
2145 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2146 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2150 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2151 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2152 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2156 (pending_forwards, pending_failures, chan.get().get_short_channel_id().expect("RAA should only work on a short-id-available channel"))
2158 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2161 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
2162 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
2164 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, pending_forwards)]);
2169 fn internal_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2170 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2171 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2172 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2173 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2174 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2175 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2176 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2178 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan);
2180 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2185 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2186 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2187 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2189 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2190 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2191 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2192 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2194 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
2195 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(HandleError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError)}));
2198 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
2199 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) =
2200 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), self.genesis_hash.clone()), channel_state, chan);
2202 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_id;
2203 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
2204 if self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.node_id_2 } else { &announcement.node_id_1 }).is_err() ||
2205 self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.bitcoin_key_2 } else { &announcement.bitcoin_key_1 }).is_err() {
2206 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close("Bad announcement_signatures node_signature")), channel_state, chan);
2209 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
2211 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
2212 msg: msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
2213 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { msg.node_signature },
2214 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.node_signature } else { our_node_sig },
2215 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { msg.bitcoin_signature },
2216 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.bitcoin_signature } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
2217 contents: announcement,
2219 update_msg: self.get_channel_update(chan.get()).unwrap(), // can only fail if we're not in a ready state
2222 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2227 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2228 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2229 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2231 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2232 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2233 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2234 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2236 let (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, channel_monitor, mut order, shutdown) =
2237 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(msg), channel_state, chan);
2238 if let Some(monitor) = channel_monitor {
2239 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
2240 // channel_reestablish doesn't guarantee the order it returns is sensical
2241 // for the messages it returns, but if we're setting what messages to
2242 // re-transmit on monitor update success, we need to make sure it is sane.
2243 if revoke_and_ack.is_none() {
2244 order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
2246 if commitment_update.is_none() {
2247 order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
2249 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, order, revoke_and_ack.is_some(), commitment_update.is_some());
2250 //TODO: Resend the funding_locked if needed once we get the monitor running again
2253 if let Some(msg) = funding_locked {
2254 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
2255 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2259 macro_rules! send_raa { () => {
2260 if let Some(msg) = revoke_and_ack {
2261 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
2262 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2267 macro_rules! send_cu { () => {
2268 if let Some(updates) = commitment_update {
2269 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2270 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2276 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
2280 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
2285 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
2286 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2287 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2293 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2297 /// Begin Update fee process. Allowed only on an outbound channel.
2298 /// If successful, will generate a UpdateHTLCs event, so you should probably poll
2299 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
2300 /// Note: This API is likely to change!
2302 pub fn update_fee(&self, channel_id: [u8;32], feerate_per_kw: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2303 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2305 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
2306 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2307 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2309 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id) {
2310 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel"}),
2311 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2312 if !chan.get().is_outbound() {
2313 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "update_fee cannot be sent for an inbound channel"});
2315 if chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
2316 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
2318 if !chan.get().is_live() {
2319 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel is either not yet fully established or peer is currently disconnected"});
2321 their_node_id = chan.get().get_their_node_id();
2322 if let Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, chan_monitor)) =
2323 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_update_fee_and_commit(feerate_per_kw), channel_state, chan)
2325 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
2328 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2329 node_id: chan.get().get_their_node_id(),
2330 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2331 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2332 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2333 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2334 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2335 update_fee: Some(update_fee),
2345 match handle_error!(self, err) {
2346 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
2348 if let Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) = e.action {
2350 log_error!(self, "Got bad keys: {}!", e.err);
2351 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2352 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2353 node_id: their_node_id,
2357 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: e.err })
2363 impl events::MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager {
2364 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<events::MessageSendEvent> {
2365 // TODO: Event release to users and serialization is currently race-y: it's very easy for a
2366 // user to serialize a ChannelManager with pending events in it and lose those events on
2367 // restart. This is doubly true for the fail/fulfill-backs from monitor events!
2369 //TODO: This behavior should be documented.
2370 for htlc_update in self.monitor.fetch_pending_htlc_updated() {
2371 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
2372 log_trace!(self, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
2373 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage);
2375 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
2376 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
2381 let mut ret = Vec::new();
2382 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2383 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events);
2388 impl events::EventsProvider for ChannelManager {
2389 fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
2390 // TODO: Event release to users and serialization is currently race-y: it's very easy for a
2391 // user to serialize a ChannelManager with pending events in it and lose those events on
2392 // restart. This is doubly true for the fail/fulfill-backs from monitor events!
2394 //TODO: This behavior should be documented.
2395 for htlc_update in self.monitor.fetch_pending_htlc_updated() {
2396 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
2397 log_trace!(self, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
2398 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage);
2400 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
2401 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
2406 let mut ret = Vec::new();
2407 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2408 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut *pending_events);
2413 impl ChainListener for ChannelManager {
2414 fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) {
2415 let header_hash = header.bitcoin_hash();
2416 log_trace!(self, "Block {} at height {} connected with {} txn matched", header_hash, height, txn_matched.len());
2417 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2418 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2420 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2421 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2422 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
2423 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2424 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
2425 let chan_res = channel.block_connected(header, height, txn_matched, indexes_of_txn_matched);
2426 if let Ok(Some(funding_locked)) = chan_res {
2427 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
2428 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2429 msg: funding_locked,
2431 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
2432 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
2433 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2434 msg: announcement_sigs,
2437 short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
2438 } else if let Err(e) = chan_res {
2439 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2440 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2441 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: e }),
2445 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
2446 for tx in txn_matched {
2447 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
2448 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
2449 log_trace!(self, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
2450 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
2451 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2453 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain. We go ahead and
2454 // broadcast our latest local state as well here, just in case its
2455 // some kind of SPV attack, though we expect these to be dropped.
2456 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown());
2457 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
2458 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2467 if channel.is_funding_initiated() && channel.channel_monitor().would_broadcast_at_height(height) {
2468 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
2469 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2471 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown());
2472 // If would_broadcast_at_height() is true, the channel_monitor will broadcast
2473 // the latest local tx for us, so we should skip that here (it doesn't really
2474 // hurt anything, but does make tests a bit simpler).
2475 failed_channels.last_mut().unwrap().0 = Vec::new();
2476 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
2477 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2486 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2487 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2489 self.latest_block_height.store(height as usize, Ordering::Release);
2490 *self.last_block_hash.try_lock().expect("block_(dis)connected must not be called in parallel") = header_hash;
2493 /// We force-close the channel without letting our counterparty participate in the shutdown
2494 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, _: u32) {
2495 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2496 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2498 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2499 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2500 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
2501 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2502 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, v| {
2503 if v.block_disconnected(header) {
2504 if let Some(short_id) = v.get_short_channel_id() {
2505 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2507 failed_channels.push(v.force_shutdown());
2508 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&v) {
2509 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2519 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2520 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2522 self.latest_block_height.fetch_sub(1, Ordering::AcqRel);
2523 *self.last_block_hash.try_lock().expect("block_(dis)connected must not be called in parallel") = header.bitcoin_hash();
2527 impl ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager {
2528 //TODO: Handle errors and close channel (or so)
2529 fn handle_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, their_local_features: LocalFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2530 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2531 handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(their_node_id, their_local_features, msg))
2534 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, their_local_features: LocalFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2535 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2536 handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(their_node_id, their_local_features, msg))
2539 fn handle_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2540 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2541 handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(their_node_id, msg))
2544 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2545 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2546 handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(their_node_id, msg))
2549 fn handle_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2550 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2551 handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_locked(their_node_id, msg))
2554 fn handle_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2555 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2556 handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(their_node_id, msg))
2559 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2560 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2561 handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(their_node_id, msg))
2564 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), msgs::HandleError> {
2565 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2566 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(their_node_id, msg))
2569 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2570 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2571 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(their_node_id, msg))
2574 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2575 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2576 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(their_node_id, msg))
2579 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2580 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2581 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(their_node_id, msg))
2584 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2585 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2586 handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(their_node_id, msg))
2589 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2590 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2591 handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(their_node_id, msg))
2594 fn handle_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2595 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2596 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(their_node_id, msg))
2599 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2600 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2601 handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(their_node_id, msg))
2604 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2605 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2606 handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(their_node_id, msg))
2609 fn peer_disconnected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
2610 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2611 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2612 let mut failed_payments = Vec::new();
2614 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2615 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2616 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
2617 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2618 if no_connection_possible {
2619 log_debug!(self, "Failing all channels with {} due to no_connection_possible", log_pubkey!(their_node_id));
2620 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2621 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2622 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
2623 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2625 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown());
2626 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2627 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2637 log_debug!(self, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates", log_pubkey!(their_node_id));
2638 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2639 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2640 //TODO: mark channel disabled (and maybe announce such after a timeout).
2641 let failed_adds = chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused();
2642 if !failed_adds.is_empty() {
2643 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(&chan).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe
2644 failed_payments.push((chan_update, failed_adds));
2646 if chan.is_shutdown() {
2647 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
2648 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2656 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
2658 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2659 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2660 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2661 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2662 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2663 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2664 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2665 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2666 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2667 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2668 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2669 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
2670 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
2671 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2672 &events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate { .. } => true,
2676 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2677 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2679 for (chan_update, mut htlc_sources) in failed_payments {
2680 for (htlc_source, payment_hash) in htlc_sources.drain(..) {
2681 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.clone() });
2686 fn peer_connected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey) {
2687 log_debug!(self, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(their_node_id));
2689 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2690 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2691 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2692 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2693 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2694 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2695 if !chan.have_received_message() {
2696 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
2697 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
2698 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
2702 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
2703 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
2704 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(),
2710 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
2713 fn handle_error(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
2714 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2716 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
2717 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2718 if chan.remote_network_id == *their_node_id {
2719 self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
2723 self.force_close_channel(&msg.channel_id);
2728 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
2729 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
2731 impl Writeable for PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
2732 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
2733 self.onion_packet.write(writer)?;
2734 self.incoming_shared_secret.write(writer)?;
2735 self.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
2736 self.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
2737 self.amt_to_forward.write(writer)?;
2738 self.outgoing_cltv_value.write(writer)?;
2743 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
2744 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<PendingForwardHTLCInfo, DecodeError> {
2745 Ok(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
2746 onion_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
2747 incoming_shared_secret: Readable::read(reader)?,
2748 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
2749 short_channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
2750 amt_to_forward: Readable::read(reader)?,
2751 outgoing_cltv_value: Readable::read(reader)?,
2756 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
2757 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
2759 &HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(ref fail_msg) => {
2761 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
2763 &HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(ref fail_msg) => {
2765 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
2772 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for HTLCFailureMsg {
2773 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCFailureMsg, DecodeError> {
2774 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2775 0 => Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(Readable::read(reader)?)),
2776 1 => Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(Readable::read(reader)?)),
2777 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2782 impl Writeable for PendingHTLCStatus {
2783 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
2785 &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(ref forward_info) => {
2787 forward_info.write(writer)?;
2789 &PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(ref fail_msg) => {
2791 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
2798 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for PendingHTLCStatus {
2799 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<PendingHTLCStatus, DecodeError> {
2800 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2801 0 => Ok(PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(Readable::read(reader)?)),
2802 1 => Ok(PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(Readable::read(reader)?)),
2803 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2808 impl_writeable!(HTLCPreviousHopData, 0, {
2811 incoming_packet_shared_secret
2814 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
2815 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
2817 &HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref hop_data) => {
2819 hop_data.write(writer)?;
2821 &HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref route, ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
2823 route.write(writer)?;
2824 session_priv.write(writer)?;
2825 first_hop_htlc_msat.write(writer)?;
2832 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for HTLCSource {
2833 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCSource, DecodeError> {
2834 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2835 0 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
2836 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
2837 route: Readable::read(reader)?,
2838 session_priv: Readable::read(reader)?,
2839 first_hop_htlc_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
2841 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2846 impl Writeable for HTLCFailReason {
2847 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
2849 &HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { ref err } => {
2853 &HTLCFailReason::Reason { ref failure_code, ref data } => {
2855 failure_code.write(writer)?;
2856 data.write(writer)?;
2863 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for HTLCFailReason {
2864 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCFailReason, DecodeError> {
2865 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2866 0 => Ok(HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err: Readable::read(reader)? }),
2867 1 => Ok(HTLCFailReason::Reason {
2868 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
2869 data: Readable::read(reader)?,
2871 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2876 impl Writeable for HTLCForwardInfo {
2877 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
2879 &HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { ref prev_short_channel_id, ref prev_htlc_id, ref forward_info } => {
2881 prev_short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
2882 prev_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
2883 forward_info.write(writer)?;
2885 &HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
2887 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
2888 err_packet.write(writer)?;
2895 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for HTLCForwardInfo {
2896 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCForwardInfo, DecodeError> {
2897 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2898 0 => Ok(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC {
2899 prev_short_channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
2900 prev_htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
2901 forward_info: Readable::read(reader)?,
2903 1 => Ok(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC {
2904 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
2905 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
2907 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2912 impl Writeable for ChannelManager {
2913 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
2914 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
2916 writer.write_all(&[SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
2917 writer.write_all(&[MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
2919 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
2920 (self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
2921 self.last_block_hash.lock().unwrap().write(writer)?;
2923 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2924 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
2925 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
2926 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
2927 unfunded_channels += 1;
2930 ((channel_state.by_id.len() - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
2931 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
2932 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
2933 channel.write(writer)?;
2937 (channel_state.forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
2938 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.iter() {
2939 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
2940 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
2941 for forward in pending_forwards {
2942 forward.write(writer)?;
2946 (channel_state.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
2947 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in channel_state.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
2948 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
2949 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
2950 for &(recvd_amt, ref previous_hop) in previous_hops.iter() {
2951 recvd_amt.write(writer)?;
2952 previous_hop.write(writer)?;
2960 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
2962 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
2964 /// 1) Deserialize all stored ChannelMonitors.
2965 /// 2) Deserialize the ChannelManager by filling in this struct and calling <(Sha256dHash,
2966 /// ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args).
2967 /// This may result in closing some Channels if the ChannelMonitor is newer than the stored
2968 /// ChannelManager state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
2969 /// 3) Register all relevant ChannelMonitor outpoints with your chain watch mechanism using
2970 /// ChannelMonitor::get_monitored_outpoints and ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo().
2971 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your ChannelMonitors.
2972 /// 5) Move the ChannelMonitors into your local ManyChannelMonitor.
2973 /// 6) Disconnect/connect blocks on the ChannelManager.
2974 /// 7) Register the new ChannelManager with your ChainWatchInterface (this does not happen
2975 /// automatically as it does in ChannelManager::new()).
2976 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a> {
2977 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
2978 /// deserialization.
2979 pub keys_manager: Arc<KeysInterface>,
2981 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
2983 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
2984 pub fee_estimator: Arc<FeeEstimator>,
2985 /// The ManyChannelMonitor for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
2987 /// No calls to the ManyChannelMonitor will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
2988 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
2989 /// ManyChannelMonitor after deserializing this ChannelManager.
2990 pub monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>,
2991 /// The ChainWatchInterface for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
2993 /// No calls to the ChainWatchInterface will be made during deserialization.
2994 pub chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>,
2995 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
2996 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
2997 /// force-closed during deserialization.
2998 pub tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>,
2999 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
3000 /// deserialization.
3001 pub logger: Arc<Logger>,
3002 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
3003 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
3004 pub default_config: UserConfig,
3006 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
3007 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
3009 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
3010 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
3011 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
3012 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
3014 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
3016 pub channel_monitors: &'a HashMap<OutPoint, &'a ChannelMonitor>,
3019 impl<'a, R : ::std::io::Read> ReadableArgs<R, ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a>> for (Sha256dHash, ChannelManager) {
3020 fn read(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
3021 let _ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3022 let min_ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3023 if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION {
3024 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion);
3027 let genesis_hash: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3028 let latest_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3029 let last_block_hash: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3031 let mut closed_channels = Vec::new();
3033 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3034 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
3035 let mut by_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
3036 let mut short_to_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
3037 for _ in 0..channel_count {
3038 let mut channel: Channel = ReadableArgs::read(reader, args.logger.clone())?;
3039 if channel.last_block_connected != last_block_hash {
3040 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3043 let funding_txo = channel.channel_monitor().get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
3044 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
3045 if let Some(monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo) {
3046 if channel.get_cur_local_commitment_transaction_number() != monitor.get_cur_local_commitment_number() ||
3047 channel.get_revoked_remote_commitment_transaction_number() != monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
3048 channel.get_cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number() != monitor.get_cur_remote_commitment_number() {
3049 let mut force_close_res = channel.force_shutdown();
3050 force_close_res.0 = monitor.get_latest_local_commitment_txn();
3051 closed_channels.push(force_close_res);
3053 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
3054 short_to_id.insert(short_channel_id, channel.channel_id());
3056 by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
3059 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3063 for (ref funding_txo, ref monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
3064 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
3065 closed_channels.push((monitor.get_latest_local_commitment_txn(), Vec::new()));
3069 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3070 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
3071 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
3072 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
3073 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3074 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, 128));
3075 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
3076 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
3078 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
3081 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3082 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
3083 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
3084 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3085 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3086 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, 2));
3087 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
3088 previous_hops.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
3090 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, previous_hops);
3093 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
3095 fee_estimator: args.fee_estimator,
3096 monitor: args.monitor,
3097 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
3098 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
3100 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(latest_block_height as usize),
3101 last_block_hash: Mutex::new(last_block_hash),
3102 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
3104 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder {
3109 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
3111 our_network_key: args.keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
3113 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
3114 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
3115 keys_manager: args.keys_manager,
3116 logger: args.logger,
3117 default_configuration: args.default_config,
3120 for close_res in closed_channels.drain(..) {
3121 channel_manager.finish_force_close_channel(close_res);
3122 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
3123 //connection or two.
3126 Ok((last_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))