1 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
3 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
4 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
5 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
7 //! It does not manage routing logic (see ln::router for that) nor does it manage constructing
8 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
9 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
12 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
13 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
14 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
15 use bitcoin::util::hash::{BitcoinHash, Sha256dHash};
17 use bitcoin_hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
18 use bitcoin_hashes::hmac::{Hmac, HmacEngine};
19 use bitcoin_hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
20 use bitcoin_hashes::cmp::fixed_time_eq;
22 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
23 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Message};
24 use secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
27 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface,ChainListener,ChainWatchInterface,FeeEstimator};
28 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
29 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError};
30 use ln::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, ManyChannelMonitor, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS, HTLC_FAIL_ANTI_REORG_DELAY};
31 use ln::router::Route;
34 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, HandleError};
35 use chain::keysinterface::KeysInterface;
36 use util::config::UserConfig;
37 use util::{byte_utils, events, rng};
38 use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer};
39 use util::chacha20::ChaCha20;
40 use util::logger::Logger;
41 use util::errors::APIError;
44 use std::collections::{HashMap, hash_map, HashSet};
46 use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock};
47 use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
48 use std::time::{Instant,Duration};
50 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
52 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
53 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
54 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
56 // When a Channel forwards an HTLC to its peer, it will give us back the PendingForwardHTLCInfo
57 // which we will use to construct an outbound HTLC, with a relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData
58 // filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use to either fail-backwards or fulfill
59 // the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
60 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
61 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
62 /// Stores the info we will need to send when we want to forward an HTLC onwards
63 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
64 pub(super) struct PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
65 onion_packet: Option<msgs::OnionPacket>,
66 incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
67 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
68 short_channel_id: u64,
69 pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
70 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
73 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
74 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
75 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
76 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
79 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
80 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
81 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
82 Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo),
86 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
87 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
88 pub(super) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
89 short_channel_id: u64,
91 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
94 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
95 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
96 pub(super) enum HTLCSource {
97 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
100 session_priv: SecretKey,
101 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
102 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
103 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
108 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
109 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
110 route: Route { hops: Vec::new() },
111 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&::secp256k1::Secp256k1::without_caps(), &[1; 32]).unwrap(),
112 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
117 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
118 pub(super) enum HTLCFailReason {
120 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
128 /// payment_hash type, use to cross-lock hop
129 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
130 pub struct PaymentHash(pub [u8;32]);
131 /// payment_preimage type, use to route payment between hop
132 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
133 pub struct PaymentPreimage(pub [u8;32]);
135 type ShutdownResult = (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>);
137 /// Error type returned across the channel_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
138 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
139 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
140 /// channel_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
141 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
143 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
144 err: msgs::HandleError,
145 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
147 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
149 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: &'static str, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
153 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
154 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
156 data: err.to_string()
160 shutdown_finish: None,
164 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::HandleError) -> Self {
165 Self { err, shutdown_finish: None }
168 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: &'static str, channel_id: [u8; 32], shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
172 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
173 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
175 data: err.to_string()
179 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
183 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
186 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => HandleError {
188 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError),
190 ChannelError::Close(msg) => HandleError {
192 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
193 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
195 data: msg.to_string()
200 shutdown_finish: None,
205 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval in the range (this, 5*this). This
206 /// provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like 1 second
207 /// to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly. We could
208 /// probably increase this significantly.
209 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u32 = 50;
211 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
213 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
215 forward_info: PendingForwardHTLCInfo,
219 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
220 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
221 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
222 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
223 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
224 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
225 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
227 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
231 // Note this is only exposed in cfg(test):
232 pub(super) struct ChannelHolder {
233 pub(super) by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel>,
234 pub(super) short_to_id: HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
235 pub(super) next_forward: Instant,
236 /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
237 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
238 /// guarantees are made about there existing a channel with the short id here, nor the short
239 /// ids in the PendingForwardHTLCInfo!
240 pub(super) forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
241 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
242 /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
244 pub(super) claimable_htlcs: HashMap<PaymentHash, Vec<HTLCPreviousHopData>>,
245 /// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
246 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
247 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>,
249 pub(super) struct MutChannelHolder<'a> {
250 pub(super) by_id: &'a mut HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel>,
251 pub(super) short_to_id: &'a mut HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
252 pub(super) next_forward: &'a mut Instant,
253 pub(super) forward_htlcs: &'a mut HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
254 pub(super) claimable_htlcs: &'a mut HashMap<PaymentHash, Vec<HTLCPreviousHopData>>,
255 pub(super) pending_msg_events: &'a mut Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>,
258 pub(super) fn borrow_parts(&mut self) -> MutChannelHolder {
260 by_id: &mut self.by_id,
261 short_to_id: &mut self.short_to_id,
262 next_forward: &mut self.next_forward,
263 forward_htlcs: &mut self.forward_htlcs,
264 claimable_htlcs: &mut self.claimable_htlcs,
265 pending_msg_events: &mut self.pending_msg_events,
270 #[cfg(not(any(target_pointer_width = "32", target_pointer_width = "64")))]
271 const ERR: () = "You need at least 32 bit pointers (well, usize, but we'll assume they're the same) for ChannelManager::latest_block_height";
273 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
274 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
276 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
277 /// to individual Channels.
279 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
280 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
281 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
282 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
284 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
285 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
286 /// returning from ManyChannelMonitor::add_update_monitor, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
287 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
288 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
289 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
290 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
292 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (Sha256dHash, ChannelManager), which
293 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
294 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
295 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
297 pub struct ChannelManager {
298 default_configuration: UserConfig,
299 genesis_hash: Sha256dHash,
300 fee_estimator: Arc<FeeEstimator>,
301 monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>,
302 chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>,
303 tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>,
306 pub(super) latest_block_height: AtomicUsize,
308 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize,
309 last_block_hash: Mutex<Sha256dHash>,
310 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
313 pub(super) channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder>,
315 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder>,
316 our_network_key: SecretKey,
318 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
319 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
320 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
321 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
322 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
324 keys_manager: Arc<KeysInterface>,
329 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
330 /// HTLC's CLTV. This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
331 /// ie the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
332 /// the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
333 /// CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that its at least 3 blocks more).
334 const CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6 * 12; //TODO?
335 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 6 * 24 * 7; //TODO?
337 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + 2*HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS +
338 // HTLC_FAIL_ANTI_REORG_DELAY, ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
339 // HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS then we'll still have HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS left to fail it
340 // backwards ourselves before hitting the CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point and failing the channel
341 // on-chain to time out the HTLC.
344 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 2*HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - HTLC_FAIL_ANTI_REORG_DELAY;
346 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying inbound claim. See
347 // ChannelMontior::would_broadcast_at_height for a description of why this is needed.
350 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
352 macro_rules! secp_call {
353 ( $res: expr, $err: expr ) => {
356 Err(_) => return Err($err),
361 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
362 pub struct ChannelDetails {
363 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
364 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
365 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
366 /// lifetime of the channel.
367 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
368 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
369 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
370 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
371 /// The node_id of our counterparty
372 pub remote_network_id: PublicKey,
373 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
374 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
375 /// The user_id passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
379 macro_rules! handle_error {
380 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $their_node_id: expr) => {
383 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, shutdown_finish }) => {
384 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
385 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
386 if let Some(update) = update_option {
387 let mut channel_state = $self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
388 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
399 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
400 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
403 Err(ChannelError::Ignore(msg)) => {
404 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $entry.key().clone()))
406 Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => {
407 log_trace!($self, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg);
408 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
409 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
410 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
412 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
418 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
419 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
422 Err(ChannelError::Ignore(msg)) => {
423 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $entry.key().clone()))
425 Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => {
426 log_trace!($self, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg);
427 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
428 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
429 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
431 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
437 macro_rules! return_monitor_err {
438 ($self: expr, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path) => {
439 return_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, Vec::new(), Vec::new())
441 ($self: expr, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $raa_first_dropped_cs: expr) => {
442 if $action_type != RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst { panic!("Bad return_monitor_err call!"); }
443 return_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), $raa_first_dropped_cs)
445 ($self: expr, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
446 return_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, false)
448 ($self: expr, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $raa_first_dropped_cs: expr) => {
450 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
451 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
452 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
453 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
455 // TODO: $failed_fails is dropped here, which will cause other channels to hit the
456 // chain in a confused state! We need to move them into the ChannelMonitor which
457 // will be responsible for failing backwards once things confirm on-chain.
458 // It's ok that we drop $failed_forwards here - at this point we'd rather they
459 // broadcast HTLC-Timeout and pay the associated fees to get their funds back than
460 // us bother trying to claim it just to forward on to another peer. If we're
461 // splitting hairs we'd prefer to claim payments that were to us, but we haven't
462 // given up the preimage yet, so might as well just wait until the payment is
463 // retried, avoiding the on-chain fees.
464 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure", channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
466 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
467 $entry.get_mut().monitor_update_failed($action_type, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $raa_first_dropped_cs);
468 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to update ChannelMonitor"), *$entry.key()));
474 // Does not break in case of TemporaryFailure!
475 macro_rules! maybe_break_monitor_err {
476 ($self: expr, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path) => {
478 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
479 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
480 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
481 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
483 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure", channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
485 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
486 $entry.get_mut().monitor_update_failed($action_type, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), false);
492 impl ChannelManager {
493 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
495 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
496 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
498 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
500 /// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= `MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS`!
501 pub fn new(network: Network, feeest: Arc<FeeEstimator>, monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>, chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>, tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>, logger: Arc<Logger>,keys_manager: Arc<KeysInterface>, config: UserConfig) -> Result<Arc<ChannelManager>, secp256k1::Error> {
502 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
504 let res = Arc::new(ChannelManager {
505 default_configuration: config.clone(),
506 genesis_hash: genesis_block(network).header.bitcoin_hash(),
507 fee_estimator: feeest.clone(),
508 monitor: monitor.clone(),
512 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(0), //TODO: Get an init value
513 last_block_hash: Mutex::new(Default::default()),
516 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
517 by_id: HashMap::new(),
518 short_to_id: HashMap::new(),
519 next_forward: Instant::now(),
520 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
521 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
522 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
524 our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
526 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
527 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
533 let weak_res = Arc::downgrade(&res);
534 res.chain_monitor.register_listener(weak_res);
538 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
540 /// user_id will be provided back as user_channel_id in FundingGenerationReady and
541 /// FundingBroadcastSafe events to allow tracking of which events correspond with which
542 /// create_channel call. Note that user_channel_id defaults to 0 for inbound channels, so you
543 /// may wish to avoid using 0 for user_id here.
545 /// If successful, will generate a SendOpenChannel message event, so you should probably poll
546 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
548 /// Raises APIError::APIMisuseError when channel_value_satoshis > 2**24 or push_msat is
549 /// greater than channel_value_satoshis * 1k or channel_value_satoshis is < 1000.
550 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
551 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
552 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "channel_value must be at least 1000 satoshis" });
555 let channel = Channel::new_outbound(&*self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_id, Arc::clone(&self.logger), &self.default_configuration)?;
556 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone(), &*self.fee_estimator);
558 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
559 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
560 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
561 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
562 if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
563 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG" });
565 panic!("RNG is bad???");
568 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
570 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
571 node_id: their_network_key,
577 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
578 /// more information.
579 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
580 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
581 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.by_id.len());
582 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
583 res.push(ChannelDetails {
584 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
585 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
586 remote_network_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
587 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
588 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
594 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
595 /// Router::get_route to ensure non-announced channels are used.
596 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
597 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
598 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.by_id.len());
599 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
600 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
601 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
602 // really wanted anyway.
603 if channel.is_live() {
604 res.push(ChannelDetails {
605 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
606 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
607 remote_network_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
608 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
609 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
616 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
617 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
618 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
620 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
621 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
622 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
624 let (mut failed_htlcs, chan_option) = {
625 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
626 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
627 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
628 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
629 let (shutdown_msg, failed_htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown()?;
630 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
631 node_id: chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id(),
634 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
635 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
636 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
638 (failed_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
639 } else { (failed_htlcs, None) }
641 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel"})
644 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
645 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
647 let chan_update = if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
648 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
653 if let Some(update) = chan_update {
654 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
655 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
664 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
665 let (local_txn, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
666 log_trace!(self, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} transactions to broadcast and {} HTLCs to fail", local_txn.len(), failed_htlcs.len());
667 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
668 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
670 for tx in local_txn {
671 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
675 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to
676 /// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel.
677 pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) {
678 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
681 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
682 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
683 if let Some(chan) = channel_state.by_id.remove(channel_id) {
684 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
685 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
692 log_trace!(self, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
693 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown());
694 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
695 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
696 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
702 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
703 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
704 pub fn force_close_all_channels(&self) {
705 for chan in self.list_channels() {
706 self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
710 const ZERO:[u8; 65] = [0; 65];
711 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>) {
712 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
713 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
715 log_info!(self, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
716 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
717 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
718 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
719 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
720 failure_code: $err_code,
721 })), self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
726 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
727 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
730 let shared_secret = {
731 let mut arr = [0; 32];
732 arr.copy_from_slice(&SharedSecret::new(&self.secp_ctx, &msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key)[..]);
735 let (rho, mu) = onion_utils::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
737 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
738 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
739 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
740 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpuse - in the case of hashing all data, the
741 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
742 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
743 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
744 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
747 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&mu);
748 hmac.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
749 hmac.input(&msg.payment_hash.0[..]);
750 if !fixed_time_eq(&Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner(), &msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac) {
751 return_malformed_err!("HMAC Check failed", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 5);
754 let mut channel_state = None;
755 macro_rules! return_err {
756 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
758 log_info!(self, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
759 if channel_state.is_none() {
760 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
762 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
763 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
764 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
765 reason: onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
766 })), channel_state.unwrap());
771 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&rho, &[0u8; 8]);
772 let next_hop_data = {
773 let mut decoded = [0; 65];
774 chacha.process(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[0..65], &mut decoded);
775 match msgs::OnionHopData::read(&mut Cursor::new(&decoded[..])) {
777 let error_code = match err {
778 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownVersion => 0x4000 | 1, // unknown realm byte
779 _ => 0x2000 | 2, // Should never happen
781 return_err!("Unable to decode our hop data", error_code, &[0;0]);
787 let pending_forward_info = if next_hop_data.hmac == [0; 32] {
789 // final_expiry_too_soon
790 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + (CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS) as u64 {
791 return_err!("The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle", 17, &[0;0]);
793 // final_incorrect_htlc_amount
794 if next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward > msg.amount_msat {
795 return_err!("Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment", 19, &byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
797 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
798 if next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value != msg.cltv_expiry {
799 return_err!("Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value", 18, &byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
802 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
803 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
804 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
805 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
807 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
809 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
811 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
812 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward,
813 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value,
816 let mut new_packet_data = [0; 20*65];
817 chacha.process(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[65..], &mut new_packet_data[0..19*65]);
818 chacha.process(&ChannelManager::ZERO[..], &mut new_packet_data[19*65..]);
820 let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
822 let blinding_factor = {
823 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
824 sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
825 sha.input(&shared_secret);
826 SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()).expect("SHA-256 is broken?")
829 let public_key = if let Err(e) = new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor) {
831 } else { Ok(new_pubkey) };
833 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
836 hop_data: new_packet_data,
837 hmac: next_hop_data.hmac.clone(),
840 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
841 onion_packet: Some(outgoing_packet),
842 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
843 short_channel_id: next_hop_data.data.short_channel_id,
844 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
845 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward,
846 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value,
850 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
851 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo { ref onion_packet, ref short_channel_id, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
852 if onion_packet.is_some() { // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject them in the body here
853 let id_option = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
854 let forwarding_id = match id_option {
855 None => { // unknown_next_peer
856 return_err!("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, &[0;0]);
858 Some(id) => id.clone(),
860 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
861 let chan = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
863 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
864 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
865 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
866 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
867 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
868 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
869 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
871 if *amt_to_forward < chan.get_their_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
872 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
874 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths() as u64).and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&*self.fee_estimator) as u64) });
875 if fee.is_none() || msg.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() || (msg.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < *amt_to_forward { // fee_insufficient
876 break Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
878 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
879 break Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
881 let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
882 // We want to have at least HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS to fail prior to going on chain CLAIM_BUFFER blocks before expiration
883 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
884 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
886 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
887 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
892 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
893 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
894 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
895 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
897 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
898 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
900 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
901 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(chan_update.contents.flags));
903 res.extend_from_slice(&chan_update.encode_with_len()[..]);
905 return_err!(err, code, &res[..]);
910 (pending_forward_info, channel_state.unwrap())
913 /// only fails if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id
914 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
915 fn get_channel_update(&self, chan: &Channel) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, HandleError> {
916 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() {
917 None => return Err(HandleError{err: "Channel not yet established", action: None}),
921 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_their_node_id().serialize()[..];
923 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
924 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
925 short_channel_id: short_channel_id,
926 timestamp: chan.get_channel_update_count(),
927 flags: (!were_node_one) as u16 | ((!chan.is_live() as u16) << 1),
928 cltv_expiry_delta: CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA,
929 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_our_htlc_minimum_msat(),
930 fee_base_msat: chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&*self.fee_estimator),
931 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
932 excess_data: Vec::new(),
935 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::from_data(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
936 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&Message::from_slice(&msg_hash[..]).unwrap(), &self.our_network_key);
938 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
944 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
946 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
947 /// fields for more info.
949 /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
950 /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
951 /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
952 /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
953 /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
954 /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
956 /// May generate a SendHTLCs message event on success, which should be relayed.
958 /// Raises APIError::RoutError when invalid route or forward parameter
959 /// (cltv_delta, fee, node public key) is specified.
960 /// Raises APIError::ChannelUnavailable if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
961 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update failure).
962 /// Raised APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
963 /// relevant updates.
965 /// In case of APIError::RouteError/APIError::ChannelUnavailable, the payment send has failed
966 /// and you may wish to retry via a different route immediately.
967 /// In case of APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed, the commitment update has been irrevocably
968 /// committed on our end and we're just waiting for a monitor update to send it. Do NOT retry
969 /// the payment via a different route unless you intend to pay twice!
970 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash) -> Result<(), APIError> {
971 if route.hops.len() < 1 || route.hops.len() > 20 {
972 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"});
974 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
975 for (idx, hop) in route.hops.iter().enumerate() {
976 if idx != route.hops.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
977 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"});
981 let session_priv = self.keys_manager.get_session_key();
983 let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
985 let onion_keys = secp_call!(onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv),
986 APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"});
987 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route, cur_height)?;
988 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, &payment_hash);
990 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
992 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
993 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
995 let id = match channel_lock.short_to_id.get(&route.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
996 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!"}),
997 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1000 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1001 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(id) {
1003 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey {
1004 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
1006 if !chan.get().is_live() {
1007 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!"});
1009 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
1010 route: route.clone(),
1011 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
1012 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
1013 }, onion_packet), channel_state, chan)
1015 Some((update_add, commitment_signed, chan_monitor)) => {
1016 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1017 maybe_break_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
1018 // Note that MonitorUpdateFailed here indicates (per function docs)
1019 // that we will resent the commitment update once we unfree monitor
1020 // updating, so we have to take special care that we don't return
1021 // something else in case we will resend later!
1022 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
1025 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1026 node_id: route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey,
1027 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1028 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
1029 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1030 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1031 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1039 } else { unreachable!(); }
1043 match handle_error!(self, err, route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
1044 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
1046 if let Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) = e.action {
1048 log_error!(self, "Got bad keys: {}!", e.err);
1049 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1050 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1051 node_id: route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey,
1055 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
1060 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
1062 /// Note that ALL inputs in the transaction pointed to by funding_txo MUST spend SegWit outputs
1063 /// or your counterparty can steal your funds!
1065 /// Panics if a funding transaction has already been provided for this channel.
1067 /// May panic if the funding_txo is duplicative with some other channel (note that this should
1068 /// be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction keys per-channel).
1069 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_txo: OutPoint) {
1070 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1072 let (chan, msg, chan_monitor) = {
1074 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1075 match channel_state.by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
1077 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_txo)
1078 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
1079 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.force_shutdown(), None)
1080 } else { unreachable!(); })
1086 match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_their_node_id()) {
1087 Ok(funding_msg) => {
1088 (chan, funding_msg.0, funding_msg.1)
1091 log_error!(self, "Got bad signatures: {}!", e.err);
1092 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1093 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1094 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1101 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
1102 // lock before add_update_monitor
1103 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1107 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1108 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
1109 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1112 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
1113 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1114 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
1116 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1122 fn get_announcement_sigs(&self, chan: &Channel) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures> {
1123 if !chan.should_announce() { return None }
1125 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = match chan.get_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
1127 Err(_) => return None, // Only in case of state precondition violations eg channel is closing
1129 let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
1130 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
1132 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
1133 channel_id: chan.channel_id(),
1134 short_channel_id: chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
1135 node_signature: our_node_sig,
1136 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
1140 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
1142 /// Should only really ever be called in response to an PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
1143 /// Will likely generate further events.
1144 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
1145 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1147 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
1148 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
1150 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1151 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1153 if cfg!(not(feature = "fuzztarget")) && Instant::now() < *channel_state.next_forward {
1157 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
1158 if short_chan_id != 0 {
1159 let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) {
1160 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1162 failed_forwards.reserve(pending_forwards.len());
1163 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1164 match forward_info {
1165 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } => {
1166 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1167 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1168 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1169 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1171 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash, 0x4000 | 10, None));
1178 let forward_chan = &mut channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&forward_chan_id).unwrap();
1180 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
1181 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1182 match forward_info {
1183 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } => {
1184 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1185 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1186 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1187 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1189 match forward_chan.send_htlc(forward_info.amt_to_forward, forward_info.payment_hash, forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), forward_info.onion_packet.unwrap()) {
1191 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(forward_chan).unwrap();
1192 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash, 0x1000 | 7, Some(chan_update)));
1197 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
1199 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
1200 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
1201 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
1202 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
1203 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
1204 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
1205 // this channel currently :/.
1214 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
1215 let (commitment_msg, monitor) = match forward_chan.send_commitment() {
1218 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {
1219 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
1221 //TODO: Handle...this is bad!
1225 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
1228 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1229 node_id: forward_chan.get_their_node_id(),
1230 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1231 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
1232 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1233 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1234 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1236 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
1241 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1242 match forward_info {
1243 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } => {
1244 let prev_hop_data = HTLCPreviousHopData {
1245 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1246 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1247 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1249 match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(forward_info.payment_hash) {
1250 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => entry.get_mut().push(prev_hop_data),
1251 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(vec![prev_hop_data]); },
1253 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
1254 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
1255 amt: forward_info.amt_to_forward,
1264 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_code, update) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
1266 None => self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: Vec::new() }),
1267 Some(chan_update) => self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: chan_update.encode_with_len() }),
1271 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
1272 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1273 events.append(&mut new_events);
1276 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
1277 /// after a PaymentReceived event.
1278 /// expected_value is the value you expected the payment to be for (not the amount it actually
1279 /// was for from the PaymentReceived event).
1280 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, expected_value: u64) -> bool {
1281 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1283 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1284 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
1285 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
1286 for htlc_with_hash in sources.drain(..) {
1287 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
1288 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
1289 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_with_hash), payment_hash,
1290 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: byte_utils::be64_to_array(expected_value).to_vec() });
1296 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
1297 /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here.
1298 /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes
1299 /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may
1300 /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to
1301 /// still-available channels.
1302 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: HTLCFailReason) {
1304 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref route, .. } => {
1305 log_trace!(self, "Failing outbound payment HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
1306 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
1307 match &onion_error {
1308 &HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { ref err } => {
1310 let (channel_update, payment_retryable, onion_error_code) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
1312 let (channel_update, payment_retryable, _) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
1313 // TODO: If we decided to blame ourselves (or one of our channels) in
1314 // process_onion_failure we should close that channel as it implies our
1315 // next-hop is needlessly blaming us!
1316 if let Some(update) = channel_update {
1317 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
1318 events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate {
1323 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
1324 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
1325 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
1326 rejected_by_dest: !payment_retryable,
1328 error_code: onion_error_code
1332 &HTLCFailReason::Reason {
1336 // we get a fail_malformed_htlc from the first hop
1337 // TODO: We'd like to generate a PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate for temporary
1338 // failures here, but that would be insufficient as Router::get_route
1339 // generally ignores its view of our own channels as we provide them via
1341 // TODO: For non-temporary failures, we really should be closing the
1342 // channel here as we apparently can't relay through them anyway.
1343 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
1344 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
1345 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
1346 rejected_by_dest: route.hops.len() == 1,
1348 error_code: Some(*failure_code),
1354 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret }) => {
1355 let err_packet = match onion_error {
1356 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
1357 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with code {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), failure_code);
1358 let packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
1359 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
1361 HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err } => {
1362 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards with pre-built ErrorPacket", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
1363 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
1367 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1369 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id) {
1370 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1374 let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&chan_id).unwrap();
1375 match chan.get_update_fail_htlc_and_commit(htlc_id, err_packet) {
1376 Ok(Some((msg, commitment_msg, chan_monitor))) => {
1377 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1380 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1381 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1382 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1383 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1384 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1385 update_fail_htlcs: vec![msg],
1386 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1388 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
1394 //TODO: Do something with e?
1402 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to a PaymentReceived event, returning true and
1403 /// generating message events for the net layer to claim the payment, if possible. Thus, you
1404 /// should probably kick the net layer to go send messages if this returns true!
1406 /// May panic if called except in response to a PaymentReceived event.
1407 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> bool {
1408 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
1410 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1412 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1413 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash);
1414 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
1415 for htlc_with_hash in sources.drain(..) {
1416 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
1417 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(), HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_with_hash), payment_preimage);
1422 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
1424 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
1425 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
1426 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1427 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentSent {
1431 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, .. }) => {
1432 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
1433 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1435 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id) {
1436 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1438 // TODO: There is probably a channel manager somewhere that needs to
1439 // learn the preimage as the channel already hit the chain and that's
1445 let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&chan_id).unwrap();
1446 match chan.get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(htlc_id, payment_preimage) {
1447 Ok((msgs, monitor_option)) => {
1448 if let Some(chan_monitor) = monitor_option {
1449 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1450 unimplemented!();// but def dont push the event...
1453 if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
1454 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1455 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1456 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1457 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1458 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
1459 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1460 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1468 // TODO: There is probably a channel manager somewhere that needs to
1469 // learn the preimage as the channel may be about to hit the chain.
1470 //TODO: Do something with e?
1478 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
1479 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
1480 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key)
1483 /// Used to restore channels to normal operation after a
1484 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure was returned from a channel monitor update
1486 pub fn test_restore_channel_monitor(&self) {
1487 let mut close_results = Vec::new();
1488 let mut htlc_forwards = Vec::new();
1489 let mut htlc_failures = Vec::new();
1490 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1493 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1494 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1495 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
1496 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
1497 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
1498 if channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
1499 let chan_monitor = channel.channel_monitor();
1500 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1502 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
1503 // TODO: There may be some pending HTLCs that we intended to fail
1504 // backwards when a monitor update failed. We should make sure
1505 // knowledge of those gets moved into the appropriate in-memory
1506 // ChannelMonitor and they get failed backwards once we get
1507 // on-chain confirmations.
1508 // Note I think #198 addresses this, so once its merged a test
1509 // should be written.
1510 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1511 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1513 close_results.push(channel.force_shutdown());
1514 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
1515 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1521 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => true,
1524 let (raa, commitment_update, order, pending_forwards, mut pending_failures) = channel.monitor_updating_restored();
1525 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
1526 htlc_forwards.push((channel.get_short_channel_id().expect("We can't have pending forwards before funding confirmation"), pending_forwards));
1528 htlc_failures.append(&mut pending_failures);
1530 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
1531 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
1532 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1533 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
1538 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
1539 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
1540 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
1541 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
1542 msg: revoke_and_ack,
1547 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
1551 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
1562 for failure in htlc_failures.drain(..) {
1563 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
1565 self.forward_htlcs(&mut htlc_forwards[..]);
1567 for res in close_results.drain(..) {
1568 self.finish_force_close_channel(res);
1572 fn internal_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1573 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
1574 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash", msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
1577 let channel = Channel::new_from_req(&*self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_node_id.clone(), msg, 0, Arc::clone(&self.logger), &self.default_configuration)
1578 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id))?;
1579 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1580 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1581 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
1582 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!", msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())),
1583 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1584 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
1585 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1586 msg: channel.get_accept_channel(),
1588 entry.insert(channel);
1594 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1595 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
1596 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1597 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1598 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
1599 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1600 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1601 //TODO: see issue #153, need a consistent behavior on obnoxious behavior from random node
1602 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.temporary_channel_id));
1604 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration), channel_state, chan);
1605 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
1607 //TODO: same as above
1608 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.temporary_channel_id))
1611 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1612 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
1613 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
1614 channel_value_satoshis: value,
1615 output_script: output_script,
1616 user_channel_id: user_id,
1621 fn internal_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1622 let ((funding_msg, monitor_update), chan) = {
1623 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1624 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1625 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
1626 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1627 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1628 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1629 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.temporary_channel_id));
1631 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg), channel_state, chan), chan.remove())
1633 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.temporary_channel_id))
1636 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
1637 // lock before add_update_monitor
1638 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor_update.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1641 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1642 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1643 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
1644 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1645 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id", funding_msg.channel_id))
1647 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1648 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
1649 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1658 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1659 let (funding_txo, user_id) = {
1660 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1661 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1662 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
1663 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1664 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1665 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1666 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1668 let chan_monitor = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg), channel_state, chan);
1669 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1672 (chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan.get().get_user_id())
1674 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1677 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1678 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingBroadcastSafe {
1679 funding_txo: funding_txo,
1680 user_channel_id: user_id,
1685 fn internal_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1686 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1687 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1688 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
1689 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1690 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1691 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1692 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1694 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_locked(&msg), channel_state, chan);
1695 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(chan.get()) {
1696 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
1697 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1698 msg: announcement_sigs,
1703 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1707 fn internal_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1708 let (mut dropped_htlcs, chan_option) = {
1709 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1710 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1712 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
1713 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1714 if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1715 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1716 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1718 let (shutdown, closing_signed, dropped_htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
1719 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
1720 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
1721 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1725 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
1726 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
1727 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1731 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1732 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1733 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1735 (dropped_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
1736 } else { (dropped_htlcs, None) }
1738 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1741 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
1742 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
1744 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
1745 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1746 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1747 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1755 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1756 let (tx, chan_option) = {
1757 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1758 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1759 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
1760 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1761 if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1762 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1763 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1765 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
1766 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
1767 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
1768 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1773 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
1774 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
1775 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
1776 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
1777 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
1778 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1779 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1781 (tx, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
1782 } else { (tx, None) }
1784 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1787 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
1788 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
1790 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
1791 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1792 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1793 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1801 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1802 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
1803 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
1804 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
1806 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
1807 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
1808 //encrypted with the same key. Its not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
1809 //but we should prevent it anyway.
1811 let (mut pending_forward_info, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
1812 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1814 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
1815 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1816 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1817 //TODO: here MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1818 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1820 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
1821 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
1822 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
1823 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
1824 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo { incoming_shared_secret, .. }) = pending_forward_info {
1825 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(chan.get());
1826 pending_forward_info = PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
1827 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
1828 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
1829 reason: if let Ok(update) = chan_update {
1830 // TODO: Note that |20 is defined as "channel FROM the processing
1831 // node has been disabled" (emphasis mine), which seems to imply
1832 // that we can't return |20 for an inbound channel being disabled.
1833 // This probably needs a spec update but should definitely be
1835 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&incoming_shared_secret, 0x1000|20, &{
1836 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
1837 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(update.contents.flags));
1838 res.extend_from_slice(&update.encode_with_len()[..]);
1842 // This can only happen if the channel isn't in the fully-funded
1843 // state yet, implying our counterparty is trying to route payments
1844 // over the channel back to themselves (cause no one else should
1845 // know the short_id is a lightning channel yet). We should have no
1846 // problem just calling this unknown_next_peer
1847 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&incoming_shared_secret, 0x4000|10, &[])
1852 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info), channel_state, chan);
1854 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1859 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1860 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1862 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1863 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
1864 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1865 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1866 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1867 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1869 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), channel_state, chan)
1871 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1874 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_lock, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone());
1878 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1879 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1880 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1881 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
1882 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1883 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1884 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1885 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1887 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err: msg.reason.clone() }), channel_state, chan);
1889 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1894 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1895 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1896 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1897 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
1898 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1899 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1900 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1901 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1903 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
1904 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set")), channel_state, chan);
1906 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() }), channel_state, chan);
1909 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1913 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1914 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1915 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1916 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
1917 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1918 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1919 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1920 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1922 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, closing_signed, chan_monitor) =
1923 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &*self.fee_estimator), channel_state, chan);
1924 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1925 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, commitment_signed.is_some());
1926 //TODO: Rebroadcast closing_signed if present on monitor update restoration
1928 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
1929 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1930 msg: revoke_and_ack,
1932 if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
1933 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1934 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1935 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1936 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1937 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1938 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1939 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1941 commitment_signed: msg,
1945 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
1946 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
1947 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1953 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1958 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, Vec<(PendingForwardHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
1959 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
1960 let mut forward_event = None;
1961 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
1962 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1963 if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
1964 forward_event = Some(Instant::now() + Duration::from_millis(((rng::rand_f32() * 4.0 + 1.0) * MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS as f32) as u64));
1965 channel_state.next_forward = forward_event.unwrap();
1967 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1968 match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(forward_info.short_channel_id) {
1969 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
1970 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info });
1972 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1973 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info }));
1978 match forward_event {
1980 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1981 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
1982 time_forwardable: time
1990 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1991 let (pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, short_channel_id) = {
1992 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1993 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1994 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
1995 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1996 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1997 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1998 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2000 let (commitment_update, pending_forwards, pending_failures, closing_signed, chan_monitor) =
2001 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &*self.fee_estimator), channel_state, chan);
2002 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
2003 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, pending_forwards, pending_failures);
2005 if let Some(updates) = commitment_update {
2006 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2007 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2011 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2012 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2013 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2017 (pending_forwards, pending_failures, chan.get().get_short_channel_id().expect("RAA should only work on a short-id-available channel"))
2019 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2022 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
2023 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
2025 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, pending_forwards)]);
2030 fn internal_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2031 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2032 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2033 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2034 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2035 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2036 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2037 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2039 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan);
2041 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2046 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2047 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2048 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2050 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2051 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2052 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2053 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2055 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
2056 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(HandleError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it", action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError)}));
2059 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
2060 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) =
2061 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), self.genesis_hash.clone()), channel_state, chan);
2063 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_id;
2064 let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
2065 if self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.node_id_2 } else { &announcement.node_id_1 }).is_err() ||
2066 self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.bitcoin_key_2 } else { &announcement.bitcoin_key_1 }).is_err() {
2067 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close("Bad announcement_signatures node_signature")), channel_state, chan);
2070 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
2072 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
2073 msg: msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
2074 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { msg.node_signature },
2075 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.node_signature } else { our_node_sig },
2076 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { msg.bitcoin_signature },
2077 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.bitcoin_signature } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
2078 contents: announcement,
2080 update_msg: self.get_channel_update(chan.get()).unwrap(), // can only fail if we're not in a ready state
2083 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2088 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2089 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2090 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2092 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2093 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2094 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2095 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2097 let (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, channel_monitor, mut order, shutdown) =
2098 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(msg), channel_state, chan);
2099 if let Some(monitor) = channel_monitor {
2100 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
2101 // channel_reestablish doesn't guarantee the order it returns is sensical
2102 // for the messages it returns, but if we're setting what messages to
2103 // re-transmit on monitor update success, we need to make sure it is sane.
2104 if revoke_and_ack.is_none() {
2105 order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
2107 if commitment_update.is_none() {
2108 order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
2110 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, order);
2111 //TODO: Resend the funding_locked if needed once we get the monitor running again
2114 if let Some(msg) = funding_locked {
2115 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
2116 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2120 macro_rules! send_raa { () => {
2121 if let Some(msg) = revoke_and_ack {
2122 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
2123 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2128 macro_rules! send_cu { () => {
2129 if let Some(updates) = commitment_update {
2130 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2131 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2137 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
2141 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
2146 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
2147 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2148 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2154 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2158 /// Begin Update fee process. Allowed only on an outbound channel.
2159 /// If successful, will generate a UpdateHTLCs event, so you should probably poll
2160 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
2161 /// Note: This API is likely to change!
2163 pub fn update_fee(&self, channel_id: [u8;32], feerate_per_kw: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2164 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2166 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
2167 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2168 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2170 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id) {
2171 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel"}),
2172 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2173 if !chan.get().is_outbound() {
2174 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "update_fee cannot be sent for an inbound channel"});
2176 if chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
2177 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
2179 if !chan.get().is_live() {
2180 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel is either not yet fully established or peer is currently disconnected"});
2182 their_node_id = chan.get().get_their_node_id();
2183 if let Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, chan_monitor)) =
2184 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_update_fee_and_commit(feerate_per_kw), channel_state, chan)
2186 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
2189 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2190 node_id: chan.get().get_their_node_id(),
2191 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2192 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2193 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2194 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2195 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2196 update_fee: Some(update_fee),
2206 match handle_error!(self, err, their_node_id) {
2207 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
2209 if let Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) = e.action {
2211 log_error!(self, "Got bad keys: {}!", e.err);
2212 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2213 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2214 node_id: their_node_id,
2218 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: e.err })
2224 impl events::MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager {
2225 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<events::MessageSendEvent> {
2226 // TODO: Event release to users and serialization is currently race-y: its very easy for a
2227 // user to serialize a ChannelManager with pending events in it and lose those events on
2228 // restart. This is doubly true for the fail/fulfill-backs from monitor events!
2230 //TODO: This behavior should be documented.
2231 for htlc_update in self.monitor.fetch_pending_htlc_updated() {
2232 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
2233 log_trace!(self, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
2234 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage);
2236 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
2237 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
2242 let mut ret = Vec::new();
2243 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2244 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events);
2249 impl events::EventsProvider for ChannelManager {
2250 fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
2251 // TODO: Event release to users and serialization is currently race-y: its very easy for a
2252 // user to serialize a ChannelManager with pending events in it and lose those events on
2253 // restart. This is doubly true for the fail/fulfill-backs from monitor events!
2255 //TODO: This behavior should be documented.
2256 for htlc_update in self.monitor.fetch_pending_htlc_updated() {
2257 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
2258 log_trace!(self, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
2259 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage);
2261 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
2262 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
2267 let mut ret = Vec::new();
2268 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2269 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut *pending_events);
2274 impl ChainListener for ChannelManager {
2275 fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) {
2276 let header_hash = header.bitcoin_hash();
2277 log_trace!(self, "Block {} at height {} connected with {} txn matched", header_hash, height, txn_matched.len());
2278 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2279 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2281 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2282 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2283 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
2284 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2285 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
2286 let chan_res = channel.block_connected(header, height, txn_matched, indexes_of_txn_matched);
2287 if let Ok(Some(funding_locked)) = chan_res {
2288 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
2289 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2290 msg: funding_locked,
2292 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
2293 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
2294 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2295 msg: announcement_sigs,
2298 short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
2299 } else if let Err(e) = chan_res {
2300 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2301 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2302 action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: e }),
2306 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
2307 for tx in txn_matched {
2308 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
2309 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
2310 log_trace!(self, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
2311 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
2312 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2314 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain. We go ahead and
2315 // broadcast our latest local state as well here, just in case its
2316 // some kind of SPV attack, though we expect these to be dropped.
2317 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown());
2318 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
2319 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2328 if channel.is_funding_initiated() && channel.channel_monitor().would_broadcast_at_height(height) {
2329 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
2330 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2332 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown());
2333 // If would_broadcast_at_height() is true, the channel_monitor will broadcast
2334 // the latest local tx for us, so we should skip that here (it doesn't really
2335 // hurt anything, but does make tests a bit simpler).
2336 failed_channels.last_mut().unwrap().0 = Vec::new();
2337 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
2338 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2347 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2348 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2350 self.latest_block_height.store(height as usize, Ordering::Release);
2351 *self.last_block_hash.try_lock().expect("block_(dis)connected must not be called in parallel") = header_hash;
2354 /// We force-close the channel without letting our counterparty participate in the shutdown
2355 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader) {
2356 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2357 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2359 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2360 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2361 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
2362 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2363 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, v| {
2364 if v.block_disconnected(header) {
2365 if let Some(short_id) = v.get_short_channel_id() {
2366 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2368 failed_channels.push(v.force_shutdown());
2369 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&v) {
2370 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2380 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2381 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2383 self.latest_block_height.fetch_sub(1, Ordering::AcqRel);
2384 *self.last_block_hash.try_lock().expect("block_(dis)connected must not be called in parallel") = header.bitcoin_hash();
2388 impl ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager {
2389 //TODO: Handle errors and close channel (or so)
2390 fn handle_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2391 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2392 handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2395 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2396 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2397 handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2400 fn handle_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2401 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2402 handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2405 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2406 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2407 handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2410 fn handle_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2411 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2412 handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_locked(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2415 fn handle_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2416 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2417 handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2420 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2421 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2422 handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2425 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), msgs::HandleError> {
2426 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2427 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2430 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2431 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2432 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2435 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2436 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2437 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2440 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2441 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2442 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2445 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2446 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2447 handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2450 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2451 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2452 handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2455 fn handle_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2456 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2457 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2460 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2461 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2462 handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2465 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
2466 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2467 handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(their_node_id, msg), their_node_id)
2470 fn peer_disconnected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
2471 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2472 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2473 let mut failed_payments = Vec::new();
2475 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2476 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2477 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
2478 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2479 if no_connection_possible {
2480 log_debug!(self, "Failing all channels with {} due to no_connection_possible", log_pubkey!(their_node_id));
2481 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2482 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2483 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
2484 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2486 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown());
2487 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2488 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2498 log_debug!(self, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates", log_pubkey!(their_node_id));
2499 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2500 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2501 //TODO: mark channel disabled (and maybe announce such after a timeout).
2502 let failed_adds = chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused();
2503 if !failed_adds.is_empty() {
2504 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(&chan).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe
2505 failed_payments.push((chan_update, failed_adds));
2507 if chan.is_shutdown() {
2508 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
2509 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2518 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2519 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2521 for (chan_update, mut htlc_sources) in failed_payments {
2522 for (htlc_source, payment_hash) in htlc_sources.drain(..) {
2523 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.clone() });
2528 fn peer_connected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey) {
2529 log_debug!(self, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(their_node_id));
2531 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2532 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2533 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2534 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2535 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2536 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2537 if !chan.have_received_message() {
2538 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
2539 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
2540 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
2544 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
2545 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
2546 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(),
2552 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
2555 fn handle_error(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
2556 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2558 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
2559 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2560 if chan.remote_network_id == *their_node_id {
2561 self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
2565 self.force_close_channel(&msg.channel_id);
2570 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
2571 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
2573 impl Writeable for PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
2574 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
2575 if let &Some(ref onion) = &self.onion_packet {
2577 onion.write(writer)?;
2581 self.incoming_shared_secret.write(writer)?;
2582 self.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
2583 self.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
2584 self.amt_to_forward.write(writer)?;
2585 self.outgoing_cltv_value.write(writer)?;
2590 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
2591 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<PendingForwardHTLCInfo, DecodeError> {
2592 let onion_packet = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2594 1 => Some(msgs::OnionPacket::read(reader)?),
2595 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2597 Ok(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
2599 incoming_shared_secret: Readable::read(reader)?,
2600 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
2601 short_channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
2602 amt_to_forward: Readable::read(reader)?,
2603 outgoing_cltv_value: Readable::read(reader)?,
2608 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
2609 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
2611 &HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(ref fail_msg) => {
2613 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
2615 &HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(ref fail_msg) => {
2617 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
2624 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for HTLCFailureMsg {
2625 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCFailureMsg, DecodeError> {
2626 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2627 0 => Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(Readable::read(reader)?)),
2628 1 => Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(Readable::read(reader)?)),
2629 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2634 impl Writeable for PendingHTLCStatus {
2635 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
2637 &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(ref forward_info) => {
2639 forward_info.write(writer)?;
2641 &PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(ref fail_msg) => {
2643 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
2650 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for PendingHTLCStatus {
2651 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<PendingHTLCStatus, DecodeError> {
2652 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2653 0 => Ok(PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(Readable::read(reader)?)),
2654 1 => Ok(PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(Readable::read(reader)?)),
2655 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2660 impl_writeable!(HTLCPreviousHopData, 0, {
2663 incoming_packet_shared_secret
2666 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
2667 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
2669 &HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref hop_data) => {
2671 hop_data.write(writer)?;
2673 &HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref route, ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
2675 route.write(writer)?;
2676 session_priv.write(writer)?;
2677 first_hop_htlc_msat.write(writer)?;
2684 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for HTLCSource {
2685 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCSource, DecodeError> {
2686 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2687 0 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
2688 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
2689 route: Readable::read(reader)?,
2690 session_priv: Readable::read(reader)?,
2691 first_hop_htlc_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
2693 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2698 impl Writeable for HTLCFailReason {
2699 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
2701 &HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { ref err } => {
2705 &HTLCFailReason::Reason { ref failure_code, ref data } => {
2707 failure_code.write(writer)?;
2708 data.write(writer)?;
2715 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for HTLCFailReason {
2716 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCFailReason, DecodeError> {
2717 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2718 0 => Ok(HTLCFailReason::ErrorPacket { err: Readable::read(reader)? }),
2719 1 => Ok(HTLCFailReason::Reason {
2720 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
2721 data: Readable::read(reader)?,
2723 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2728 impl Writeable for HTLCForwardInfo {
2729 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
2731 &HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { ref prev_short_channel_id, ref prev_htlc_id, ref forward_info } => {
2733 prev_short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
2734 prev_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
2735 forward_info.write(writer)?;
2742 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for HTLCForwardInfo {
2743 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCForwardInfo, DecodeError> {
2744 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2745 0 => Ok(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC {
2746 prev_short_channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
2747 prev_htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
2748 forward_info: Readable::read(reader)?,
2750 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2755 impl Writeable for ChannelManager {
2756 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
2757 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
2759 writer.write_all(&[SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
2760 writer.write_all(&[MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
2762 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
2763 (self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
2764 self.last_block_hash.lock().unwrap().write(writer)?;
2766 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2767 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
2768 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
2769 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
2770 unfunded_channels += 1;
2773 ((channel_state.by_id.len() - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
2774 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
2775 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
2776 channel.write(writer)?;
2780 (channel_state.forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
2781 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.iter() {
2782 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
2783 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
2784 for forward in pending_forwards {
2785 forward.write(writer)?;
2789 (channel_state.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
2790 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in channel_state.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
2791 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
2792 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
2793 for previous_hop in previous_hops {
2794 previous_hop.write(writer)?;
2802 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
2804 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
2806 /// 1) Deserialize all stored ChannelMonitors.
2807 /// 2) Deserialize the ChannelManager by filling in this struct and calling <(Sha256dHash,
2808 /// ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args).
2809 /// This may result in closing some Channels if the ChannelMonitor is newer than the stored
2810 /// ChannelManager state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
2811 /// 3) Register all relevant ChannelMonitor outpoints with your chain watch mechanism using
2812 /// ChannelMonitor::get_monitored_outpoints and ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo().
2813 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your ChannelMonitors.
2814 /// 5) Move the ChannelMonitors into your local ManyChannelMonitor.
2815 /// 6) Disconnect/connect blocks on the ChannelManager.
2816 /// 7) Register the new ChannelManager with your ChainWatchInterface (this does not happen
2817 /// automatically as it does in ChannelManager::new()).
2818 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a> {
2819 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
2820 /// deserialization.
2821 pub keys_manager: Arc<KeysInterface>,
2823 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
2825 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
2826 pub fee_estimator: Arc<FeeEstimator>,
2827 /// The ManyChannelMonitor for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
2829 /// No calls to the ManyChannelMonitor will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
2830 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
2831 /// ManyChannelMonitor after deserializing this ChannelManager.
2832 pub monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>,
2833 /// The ChainWatchInterface for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
2835 /// No calls to the ChainWatchInterface will be made during deserialization.
2836 pub chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>,
2837 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
2838 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
2839 /// force-closed during deserialization.
2840 pub tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>,
2841 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
2842 /// deserialization.
2843 pub logger: Arc<Logger>,
2844 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
2845 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
2846 pub default_config: UserConfig,
2848 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
2849 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
2851 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
2852 /// be force-closed using the data in the channelmonitor and the Channel will be dropped. This
2853 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
2854 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
2856 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
2858 pub channel_monitors: &'a HashMap<OutPoint, &'a ChannelMonitor>,
2861 impl<'a, R : ::std::io::Read> ReadableArgs<R, ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a>> for (Sha256dHash, ChannelManager) {
2862 fn read(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
2863 let _ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2864 let min_ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2865 if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION {
2866 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion);
2869 let genesis_hash: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
2870 let latest_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2871 let last_block_hash: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
2873 let mut closed_channels = Vec::new();
2875 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2876 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
2877 let mut by_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
2878 let mut short_to_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
2879 for _ in 0..channel_count {
2880 let mut channel: Channel = ReadableArgs::read(reader, args.logger.clone())?;
2881 if channel.last_block_connected != last_block_hash {
2882 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
2885 let funding_txo = channel.channel_monitor().get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
2886 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
2887 if let Some(monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo) {
2888 if channel.get_cur_local_commitment_transaction_number() != monitor.get_cur_local_commitment_number() ||
2889 channel.get_revoked_remote_commitment_transaction_number() != monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
2890 channel.get_cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number() != monitor.get_cur_remote_commitment_number() {
2891 let mut force_close_res = channel.force_shutdown();
2892 force_close_res.0 = monitor.get_latest_local_commitment_txn();
2893 closed_channels.push(force_close_res);
2895 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
2896 short_to_id.insert(short_channel_id, channel.channel_id());
2898 by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
2901 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
2905 for (ref funding_txo, ref monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
2906 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
2907 closed_channels.push((monitor.get_latest_local_commitment_txn(), Vec::new()));
2911 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2912 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
2913 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
2914 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
2915 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2916 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, 128));
2917 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
2918 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
2920 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
2923 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2924 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
2925 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
2926 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
2927 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2928 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, 2));
2929 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
2930 previous_hops.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
2932 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, previous_hops);
2935 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
2937 fee_estimator: args.fee_estimator,
2938 monitor: args.monitor,
2939 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
2940 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
2942 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(latest_block_height as usize),
2943 last_block_hash: Mutex::new(last_block_hash),
2944 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
2946 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder {
2949 next_forward: Instant::now(),
2952 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
2954 our_network_key: args.keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
2956 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
2957 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
2958 keys_manager: args.keys_manager,
2959 logger: args.logger,
2960 default_configuration: args.default_config,
2963 for close_res in closed_channels.drain(..) {
2964 channel_manager.finish_force_close_channel(close_res);
2965 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
2966 //connection or two.
2969 Ok((last_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))