1 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
2 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxIn,TxOut,SigHashType,Transaction};
3 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
4 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Script;
5 use bitcoin::network::serialize;
6 use bitcoin::util::hash::Sha256dHash;
7 use bitcoin::util::bip143;
9 use crypto::digest::Digest;
11 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Message,Signature};
12 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
15 use ln::msgs::HandleError;
17 use ln::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment;
18 use chain::chaininterface::{ChainListener, ChainWatchInterface, BroadcasterInterface};
19 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
20 use util::sha2::Sha256;
23 use std::collections::HashMap;
24 use std::sync::{Arc,Mutex};
27 pub enum ChannelMonitorUpdateErr {
28 /// Used to indicate a temporary failure (eg connection to a watchtower failed, but is expected
29 /// to succeed at some point in the future).
30 /// Such a failure will "freeze" a channel, preventing us from revoking old states or
31 /// submitting new commitment transactions to the remote party.
32 /// ChannelManager::test_restore_channel_monitor can be used to retry the update(s) and restore
33 /// the channel to an operational state.
35 /// Used to indicate no further channel monitor updates will be allowed (eg we've moved on to a
36 /// different watchtower and cannot update with all watchtowers that were previously informed
37 /// of this channel). This will force-close the channel in question.
41 /// Simple trait indicating ability to track a set of ChannelMonitors and multiplex events between
42 /// them. Generally should be implemented by keeping a local SimpleManyChannelMonitor and passing
43 /// events to it, while also taking any add_update_monitor events and passing them to some remote
45 /// Note that any updates to a channel's monitor *must* be applied to each instance of the
46 /// channel's monitor everywhere (including remote watchtowers) *before* this function returns. If
47 /// an update occurs and a remote watchtower is left with old state, it may broadcast transactions
48 /// which we have revoked, allowing our counterparty to claim all funds in the channel!
49 pub trait ManyChannelMonitor: Send + Sync {
50 /// Adds or updates a monitor for the given `funding_txo`.
51 /// Implementor must also ensure that the funding_txo outpoint is registered with any relevant
52 /// ChainWatchInterfaces such that the provided monitor receives block_connected callbacks with
54 fn add_update_monitor(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr>;
57 /// A simple implementation of a ManyChannelMonitor and ChainListener. Can be used to create a
58 /// watchtower or watch our own channels.
59 /// Note that you must provide your own key by which to refer to channels.
60 /// If you're accepting remote monitors (ie are implementing a watchtower), you must verify that
61 /// users cannot overwrite a given channel by providing a duplicate key. ie you should probably
62 /// index by a PublicKey which is required to sign any updates.
63 /// If you're using this for local monitoring of your own channels, you probably want to use
64 /// `OutPoint` as the key, which will give you a ManyChannelMonitor implementation.
65 pub struct SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
66 monitors: Mutex<HashMap<Key, ChannelMonitor>>,
67 chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>,
68 broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>
71 impl<Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash> ChainListener for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
72 fn block_connected(&self, _header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], _indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) {
73 let monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
74 for monitor in monitors.values() {
75 let txn_outputs = monitor.block_connected(txn_matched, height, &*self.broadcaster);
76 for (ref txid, ref outputs) in txn_outputs {
77 for (idx, output) in outputs.iter().enumerate() {
78 self.chain_monitor.install_watch_outpoint((txid.clone(), idx as u32), &output.script_pubkey);
84 fn block_disconnected(&self, _: &BlockHeader) { }
87 impl<Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash + 'static> SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
88 pub fn new(chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>, broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>) -> Arc<SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key>> {
89 let res = Arc::new(SimpleManyChannelMonitor {
90 monitors: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
94 let weak_res = Arc::downgrade(&res);
95 res.chain_monitor.register_listener(weak_res);
99 pub fn add_update_monitor_by_key(&self, key: Key, monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
100 let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
101 match monitors.get_mut(&key) {
102 Some(orig_monitor) => return orig_monitor.insert_combine(monitor),
105 match &monitor.funding_txo {
106 &None => self.chain_monitor.watch_all_txn(),
107 &Some((ref outpoint, ref script)) => {
108 self.chain_monitor.install_watch_tx(&outpoint.txid, script);
109 self.chain_monitor.install_watch_outpoint((outpoint.txid, outpoint.index as u32), script);
112 monitors.insert(key, monitor);
117 impl ManyChannelMonitor for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<OutPoint> {
118 fn add_update_monitor(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr> {
119 match self.add_update_monitor_by_key(funding_txo, monitor) {
121 Err(_) => Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure),
126 /// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, don't try to claim it in a shared transaction,
127 /// instead claiming it in its own individual transaction.
128 const CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 12;
129 /// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, force-close the channel to broadcast the
130 /// HTLC-Success transaction.
131 const CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 6;
133 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
136 revocation_base_key: SecretKey,
137 htlc_base_key: SecretKey,
140 revocation_base_key: PublicKey,
141 htlc_base_key: PublicKey,
142 sigs: HashMap<Sha256dHash, Signature>,
146 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
147 struct LocalSignedTx {
148 /// txid of the transaction in tx, just used to make comparison faster
151 revocation_key: PublicKey,
152 a_htlc_key: PublicKey,
153 b_htlc_key: PublicKey,
154 delayed_payment_key: PublicKey,
156 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Signature, Signature)>,
159 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
160 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
162 pub struct ChannelMonitor {
163 funding_txo: Option<(OutPoint, Script)>,
164 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64,
166 key_storage: KeyStorage,
167 delayed_payment_base_key: PublicKey,
168 their_htlc_base_key: Option<PublicKey>,
169 // first is the idx of the first of the two revocation points
170 their_cur_revocation_points: Option<(u64, PublicKey, Option<PublicKey>)>,
172 our_to_self_delay: u16,
173 their_to_self_delay: Option<u16>,
175 old_secrets: [([u8; 32], u64); 49],
176 remote_claimable_outpoints: HashMap<Sha256dHash, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>>,
177 /// We cannot identify HTLC-Success or HTLC-Timeout transactions by themselves on the chain.
178 /// Nor can we figure out their commitment numbers without the commitment transaction they are
179 /// spending. Thus, in order to claim them via revocation key, we track all the remote
180 /// commitment transactions which we find on-chain, mapping them to the commitment number which
181 /// can be used to derive the revocation key and claim the transactions.
182 remote_commitment_txn_on_chain: Mutex<HashMap<Sha256dHash, u64>>,
183 /// Cache used to make pruning of payment_preimages faster.
184 /// Maps payment_hash values to commitment numbers for remote transactions for non-revoked
185 /// remote transactions (ie should remain pretty small).
186 /// Serialized to disk but should generally not be sent to Watchtowers.
187 remote_hash_commitment_number: HashMap<[u8; 32], u64>,
189 // We store two local commitment transactions to avoid any race conditions where we may update
190 // some monitors (potentially on watchtowers) but then fail to update others, resulting in the
191 // various monitors for one channel being out of sync, and us broadcasting a local
192 // transaction for which we have deleted claim information on some watchtowers.
193 prev_local_signed_commitment_tx: Option<LocalSignedTx>,
194 current_local_signed_commitment_tx: Option<LocalSignedTx>,
196 payment_preimages: HashMap<[u8; 32], [u8; 32]>,
198 destination_script: Script,
199 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>, //TODO: dedup this a bit...
201 impl Clone for ChannelMonitor {
202 fn clone(&self) -> Self {
204 funding_txo: self.funding_txo.clone(),
205 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor.clone(),
207 key_storage: self.key_storage.clone(),
208 delayed_payment_base_key: self.delayed_payment_base_key.clone(),
209 their_htlc_base_key: self.their_htlc_base_key.clone(),
210 their_cur_revocation_points: self.their_cur_revocation_points.clone(),
212 our_to_self_delay: self.our_to_self_delay,
213 their_to_self_delay: self.their_to_self_delay,
215 old_secrets: self.old_secrets.clone(),
216 remote_claimable_outpoints: self.remote_claimable_outpoints.clone(),
217 remote_commitment_txn_on_chain: Mutex::new((*self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.lock().unwrap()).clone()),
218 remote_hash_commitment_number: self.remote_hash_commitment_number.clone(),
220 prev_local_signed_commitment_tx: self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.clone(),
221 current_local_signed_commitment_tx: self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx.clone(),
223 payment_preimages: self.payment_preimages.clone(),
225 destination_script: self.destination_script.clone(),
226 secp_ctx: self.secp_ctx.clone(),
231 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
232 /// Used only in testing and fuzztarget to check serialization roundtrips don't change the
233 /// underlying object
234 impl PartialEq for ChannelMonitor {
235 fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
236 if self.funding_txo != other.funding_txo ||
237 self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor != other.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor ||
238 self.key_storage != other.key_storage ||
239 self.delayed_payment_base_key != other.delayed_payment_base_key ||
240 self.their_htlc_base_key != other.their_htlc_base_key ||
241 self.their_cur_revocation_points != other.their_cur_revocation_points ||
242 self.our_to_self_delay != other.our_to_self_delay ||
243 self.their_to_self_delay != other.their_to_self_delay ||
244 self.remote_claimable_outpoints != other.remote_claimable_outpoints ||
245 self.remote_hash_commitment_number != other.remote_hash_commitment_number ||
246 self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx != other.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx ||
247 self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx != other.current_local_signed_commitment_tx ||
248 self.payment_preimages != other.payment_preimages ||
249 self.destination_script != other.destination_script
253 for (&(ref secret, ref idx), &(ref o_secret, ref o_idx)) in self.old_secrets.iter().zip(other.old_secrets.iter()) {
254 if secret != o_secret || idx != o_idx {
258 let us = self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.lock().unwrap();
259 let them = other.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.lock().unwrap();
265 impl ChannelMonitor {
266 pub fn new(revocation_base_key: &SecretKey, delayed_payment_base_key: &PublicKey, htlc_base_key: &SecretKey, our_to_self_delay: u16, destination_script: Script) -> ChannelMonitor {
269 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: 0,
271 key_storage: KeyStorage::PrivMode {
272 revocation_base_key: revocation_base_key.clone(),
273 htlc_base_key: htlc_base_key.clone(),
275 delayed_payment_base_key: delayed_payment_base_key.clone(),
276 their_htlc_base_key: None,
277 their_cur_revocation_points: None,
279 our_to_self_delay: our_to_self_delay,
280 their_to_self_delay: None,
282 old_secrets: [([0; 32], 1 << 48); 49],
283 remote_claimable_outpoints: HashMap::new(),
284 remote_commitment_txn_on_chain: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
285 remote_hash_commitment_number: HashMap::new(),
287 prev_local_signed_commitment_tx: None,
288 current_local_signed_commitment_tx: None,
290 payment_preimages: HashMap::new(),
292 destination_script: destination_script,
293 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
298 fn place_secret(idx: u64) -> u8 {
300 if idx & (1 << i) == (1 << i) {
308 fn derive_secret(secret: [u8; 32], bits: u8, idx: u64) -> [u8; 32] {
309 let mut res: [u8; 32] = secret;
311 let bitpos = bits - 1 - i;
312 if idx & (1 << bitpos) == (1 << bitpos) {
313 res[(bitpos / 8) as usize] ^= 1 << (bitpos & 7);
314 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
316 sha.result(&mut res);
322 /// Inserts a revocation secret into this channel monitor. Also optionally tracks the next
323 /// revocation point which may be required to claim HTLC outputs which we know the preimage of
324 /// in case the remote end force-closes using their latest state. Prunes old preimages if neither
325 /// needed by local commitment transactions HTCLs nor by remote ones. Unless we haven't already seen remote
326 /// commitment transaction's secret, they are de facto pruned (we can use revocation key).
327 pub(super) fn provide_secret(&mut self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32], their_next_revocation_point: Option<(u64, PublicKey)>) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
328 let pos = ChannelMonitor::place_secret(idx);
330 let (old_secret, old_idx) = self.old_secrets[i as usize];
331 if ChannelMonitor::derive_secret(secret, pos, old_idx) != old_secret {
332 return Err(HandleError{err: "Previous secret did not match new one", action: None})
335 self.old_secrets[pos as usize] = (secret, idx);
337 if let Some(new_revocation_point) = their_next_revocation_point {
338 match self.their_cur_revocation_points {
339 Some(old_points) => {
340 if old_points.0 == new_revocation_point.0 + 1 {
341 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0, old_points.1, Some(new_revocation_point.1)));
342 } else if old_points.0 == new_revocation_point.0 + 2 {
343 if let Some(old_second_point) = old_points.2 {
344 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0 - 1, old_second_point, Some(new_revocation_point.1)));
346 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((new_revocation_point.0, new_revocation_point.1, None));
349 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((new_revocation_point.0, new_revocation_point.1, None));
353 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((new_revocation_point.0, new_revocation_point.1, None));
358 if !self.payment_preimages.is_empty() {
359 let local_signed_commitment_tx = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx.as_ref().expect("Channel needs at least an initial commitment tx !");
360 let prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.as_ref();
361 let min_idx = self.get_min_seen_secret();
362 let remote_hash_commitment_number = &mut self.remote_hash_commitment_number;
364 self.payment_preimages.retain(|&k, _| {
365 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in &local_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs {
366 if k == htlc.payment_hash {
370 if let Some(prev_local_commitment_tx) = prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
371 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in prev_local_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
372 if k == htlc.payment_hash {
377 let contains = if let Some(cn) = remote_hash_commitment_number.get(&k) {
384 remote_hash_commitment_number.remove(&k);
393 /// Informs this monitor of the latest remote (ie non-broadcastable) commitment transaction.
394 /// The monitor watches for it to be broadcasted and then uses the HTLC information (and
395 /// possibly future revocation/preimage information) to claim outputs where possible.
396 /// We cache also the mapping hash:commitment number to lighten pruning of old preimages by watchtowers.
397 pub(super) fn provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, unsigned_commitment_tx: &Transaction, htlc_outputs: Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>, commitment_number: u64) {
398 // TODO: Encrypt the htlc_outputs data with the single-hash of the commitment transaction
399 // so that a remote monitor doesn't learn anything unless there is a malicious close.
400 // (only maybe, sadly we cant do the same for local info, as we need to be aware of
402 for htlc in &htlc_outputs {
403 self.remote_hash_commitment_number.insert(htlc.payment_hash, commitment_number);
405 self.remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(unsigned_commitment_tx.txid(), htlc_outputs);
408 /// Informs this monitor of the latest local (ie broadcastable) commitment transaction. The
409 /// monitor watches for timeouts and may broadcast it if we approach such a timeout. Thus, it
410 /// is important that any clones of this channel monitor (including remote clones) by kept
411 /// up-to-date as our local commitment transaction is updated.
412 /// Panics if set_their_to_self_delay has never been called.
413 pub(super) fn provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, signed_commitment_tx: Transaction, local_keys: chan_utils::TxCreationKeys, feerate_per_kw: u64, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Signature, Signature)>) {
414 assert!(self.their_to_self_delay.is_some());
415 self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx.take();
416 self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(LocalSignedTx {
417 txid: signed_commitment_tx.txid(),
418 tx: signed_commitment_tx,
419 revocation_key: local_keys.revocation_key,
420 a_htlc_key: local_keys.a_htlc_key,
421 b_htlc_key: local_keys.b_htlc_key,
422 delayed_payment_key: local_keys.a_delayed_payment_key,
428 /// Provides a payment_hash->payment_preimage mapping. Will be automatically pruned when all
429 /// commitment_tx_infos which contain the payment hash have been revoked.
430 pub(super) fn provide_payment_preimage(&mut self, payment_hash: &[u8; 32], payment_preimage: &[u8; 32]) {
431 self.payment_preimages.insert(payment_hash.clone(), payment_preimage.clone());
434 pub fn insert_combine(&mut self, mut other: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
435 if self.funding_txo.is_some() {
436 // We should be able to compare the entire funding_txo, but in fuzztarget its trivially
437 // easy to collide the funding_txo hash and have a different scriptPubKey.
438 if other.funding_txo.is_some() && other.funding_txo.as_ref().unwrap().0 != self.funding_txo.as_ref().unwrap().0 {
439 return Err(HandleError{err: "Funding transaction outputs are not identical!", action: None});
442 self.funding_txo = other.funding_txo.take();
444 let other_min_secret = other.get_min_seen_secret();
445 let our_min_secret = self.get_min_seen_secret();
446 if our_min_secret > other_min_secret {
447 self.provide_secret(other_min_secret, other.get_secret(other_min_secret).unwrap(), None)?;
449 if our_min_secret >= other_min_secret {
450 self.their_cur_revocation_points = other.their_cur_revocation_points;
451 for (txid, htlcs) in other.remote_claimable_outpoints.drain() {
452 self.remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, htlcs);
454 if let Some(local_tx) = other.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
455 self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(local_tx);
457 if let Some(local_tx) = other.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
458 self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(local_tx);
460 self.payment_preimages = other.payment_preimages;
465 /// Panics if commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor doesn't fit in 48 bits
466 pub(super) fn set_commitment_obscure_factor(&mut self, commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64) {
467 assert!(commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor < (1 << 48));
468 self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor = commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor;
471 /// Allows this monitor to scan only for transactions which are applicable. Note that this is
472 /// optional, without it this monitor cannot be used in an SPV client, but you may wish to
473 /// avoid this (or call unset_funding_info) on a monitor you wish to send to a watchtower as it
474 /// provides slightly better privacy.
475 /// It's the responsibility of the caller to register outpoint and script with passing the former
476 /// value as key to add_update_monitor.
477 pub(super) fn set_funding_info(&mut self, funding_info: (OutPoint, Script)) {
478 self.funding_txo = Some(funding_info);
481 pub(super) fn set_their_htlc_base_key(&mut self, their_htlc_base_key: &PublicKey) {
482 self.their_htlc_base_key = Some(their_htlc_base_key.clone());
485 pub(super) fn set_their_to_self_delay(&mut self, their_to_self_delay: u16) {
486 self.their_to_self_delay = Some(their_to_self_delay);
489 pub(super) fn unset_funding_info(&mut self) {
490 self.funding_txo = None;
493 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
494 match self.funding_txo {
495 Some((outpoint, _)) => Some(outpoint),
500 /// Serializes into a vec, with various modes for the exposed pub fns
501 fn serialize(&self, for_local_storage: bool) -> Vec<u8> {
502 let mut res = Vec::new();
503 res.push(SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
504 res.push(MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
506 match &self.funding_txo {
507 &Some((ref outpoint, ref script)) => {
508 res.extend_from_slice(&outpoint.txid[..]);
509 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(outpoint.index));
510 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(script.len() as u64));
511 res.extend_from_slice(&script[..]);
514 // We haven't even been initialized...not sure why anyone is serializing us, but
515 // not much to give them.
520 // Set in initial Channel-object creation, so should always be set by now:
521 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor));
523 match self.key_storage {
524 KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key } => {
526 res.extend_from_slice(&revocation_base_key[..]);
527 res.extend_from_slice(&htlc_base_key[..]);
529 KeyStorage::SigsMode { .. } => unimplemented!(),
532 res.extend_from_slice(&self.delayed_payment_base_key.serialize());
533 res.extend_from_slice(&self.their_htlc_base_key.as_ref().unwrap().serialize());
535 match self.their_cur_revocation_points {
536 Some((idx, pubkey, second_option)) => {
537 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(idx));
538 res.extend_from_slice(&pubkey.serialize());
539 match second_option {
540 Some(second_pubkey) => {
541 res.extend_from_slice(&second_pubkey.serialize());
544 res.extend_from_slice(&[0; 33]);
549 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(0));
553 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.our_to_self_delay));
554 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap()));
556 for &(ref secret, ref idx) in self.old_secrets.iter() {
557 res.extend_from_slice(secret);
558 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*idx));
561 macro_rules! serialize_htlc_in_commitment {
562 ($htlc_output: expr) => {
563 res.push($htlc_output.offered as u8);
564 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc_output.amount_msat));
565 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array($htlc_output.cltv_expiry));
566 res.extend_from_slice(&$htlc_output.payment_hash);
567 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array($htlc_output.transaction_output_index));
571 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_claimable_outpoints.len() as u64));
572 for (txid, htlc_outputs) in self.remote_claimable_outpoints.iter() {
573 res.extend_from_slice(&txid[..]);
574 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc_outputs.len() as u64));
575 for htlc_output in htlc_outputs.iter() {
576 serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output);
581 let remote_commitment_txn_on_chain = self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.lock().unwrap();
582 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.len() as u64));
583 for (txid, commitment_number) in remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
584 res.extend_from_slice(&txid[..]);
585 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(*commitment_number));
589 if for_local_storage {
590 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_hash_commitment_number.len() as u64));
591 for (payment_hash, commitment_number) in self.remote_hash_commitment_number.iter() {
592 res.extend_from_slice(payment_hash);
593 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(*commitment_number));
596 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(0));
599 macro_rules! serialize_local_tx {
600 ($local_tx: expr) => {
601 let tx_ser = serialize::serialize(&$local_tx.tx).unwrap();
602 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(tx_ser.len() as u64));
603 res.extend_from_slice(&tx_ser);
605 res.extend_from_slice(&$local_tx.revocation_key.serialize());
606 res.extend_from_slice(&$local_tx.a_htlc_key.serialize());
607 res.extend_from_slice(&$local_tx.b_htlc_key.serialize());
608 res.extend_from_slice(&$local_tx.delayed_payment_key.serialize());
610 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($local_tx.feerate_per_kw));
611 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($local_tx.htlc_outputs.len() as u64));
612 for &(ref htlc_output, ref their_sig, ref our_sig) in $local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
613 serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output);
614 res.extend_from_slice(&their_sig.serialize_compact(&self.secp_ctx));
615 res.extend_from_slice(&our_sig.serialize_compact(&self.secp_ctx));
620 if let Some(ref prev_local_tx) = self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
622 serialize_local_tx!(prev_local_tx);
627 if let Some(ref cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
629 serialize_local_tx!(cur_local_tx);
634 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.payment_preimages.len() as u64));
635 for payment_preimage in self.payment_preimages.values() {
636 res.extend_from_slice(payment_preimage);
639 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.destination_script.len() as u64));
640 res.extend_from_slice(&self.destination_script[..]);
645 /// Encodes this monitor into a byte array, suitable for writing to disk.
646 pub fn serialize_for_disk(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
650 /// Encodes this monitor into a byte array, suitable for sending to a remote watchtower
651 pub fn serialize_for_watchtower(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
652 self.serialize(false)
655 /// Attempts to decode a serialized monitor
656 pub fn deserialize(data: &[u8]) -> Option<Self> {
657 let mut read_pos = 0;
658 macro_rules! read_bytes {
659 ($byte_count: expr) => {
661 if ($byte_count as usize) > data.len() - read_pos {
664 read_pos += $byte_count as usize;
665 &data[read_pos - $byte_count as usize..read_pos]
670 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
671 macro_rules! unwrap_obj {
675 Err(_) => return None,
680 let _ver = read_bytes!(1)[0];
681 let min_ver = read_bytes!(1)[0];
682 if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION {
686 // Technically this can fail and serialize fail a round-trip, but only for serialization of
687 // barely-init'd ChannelMonitors that we can't do anything with.
688 let outpoint = OutPoint {
689 txid: Sha256dHash::from(read_bytes!(32)),
690 index: byte_utils::slice_to_be16(read_bytes!(2)),
692 let script_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8));
693 let funding_txo = Some((outpoint, Script::from(read_bytes!(script_len).to_vec())));
694 let commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor = byte_utils::slice_to_be48(read_bytes!(6));
696 let key_storage = match read_bytes!(1)[0] {
698 KeyStorage::PrivMode {
699 revocation_base_key: unwrap_obj!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(32))),
700 htlc_base_key: unwrap_obj!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(32))),
706 let delayed_payment_base_key = unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(33)));
707 let their_htlc_base_key = Some(unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(33))));
709 let their_cur_revocation_points = {
710 let first_idx = byte_utils::slice_to_be48(read_bytes!(6));
714 let first_point = unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(33)));
715 let second_point_slice = read_bytes!(33);
716 if second_point_slice[0..32] == [0; 32] && second_point_slice[32] == 0 {
717 Some((first_idx, first_point, None))
719 Some((first_idx, first_point, Some(unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, second_point_slice)))))
724 let our_to_self_delay = byte_utils::slice_to_be16(read_bytes!(2));
725 let their_to_self_delay = Some(byte_utils::slice_to_be16(read_bytes!(2)));
727 let mut old_secrets = [([0; 32], 1 << 48); 49];
728 for &mut (ref mut secret, ref mut idx) in old_secrets.iter_mut() {
729 secret.copy_from_slice(read_bytes!(32));
730 *idx = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8));
733 macro_rules! read_htlc_in_commitment {
736 let offered = match read_bytes!(1)[0] {
737 0 => false, 1 => true,
740 let amount_msat = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8));
741 let cltv_expiry = byte_utils::slice_to_be32(read_bytes!(4));
742 let mut payment_hash = [0; 32];
743 payment_hash[..].copy_from_slice(read_bytes!(32));
744 let transaction_output_index = byte_utils::slice_to_be32(read_bytes!(4));
746 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
747 offered, amount_msat, cltv_expiry, payment_hash, transaction_output_index
753 let remote_claimable_outpoints_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8));
754 if remote_claimable_outpoints_len > data.len() as u64 / 64 { return None; }
755 let mut remote_claimable_outpoints = HashMap::with_capacity(remote_claimable_outpoints_len as usize);
756 for _ in 0..remote_claimable_outpoints_len {
757 let txid = Sha256dHash::from(read_bytes!(32));
758 let outputs_count = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8));
759 if outputs_count > data.len() as u64 / 32 { return None; }
760 let mut outputs = Vec::with_capacity(outputs_count as usize);
761 for _ in 0..outputs_count {
762 outputs.push(read_htlc_in_commitment!());
764 if let Some(_) = remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, outputs) {
769 let remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8));
770 if remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len > data.len() as u64 / 32 { return None; }
771 let mut remote_commitment_txn_on_chain = HashMap::with_capacity(remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len as usize);
772 for _ in 0..remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len {
773 let txid = Sha256dHash::from(read_bytes!(32));
774 let commitment_number = byte_utils::slice_to_be48(read_bytes!(6));
775 if let Some(_) = remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(txid, commitment_number) {
780 let remote_hash_commitment_number_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8));
781 if remote_hash_commitment_number_len > data.len() as u64 / 32 { return None; }
782 let mut remote_hash_commitment_number = HashMap::with_capacity(remote_hash_commitment_number_len as usize);
783 for _ in 0..remote_hash_commitment_number_len {
784 let mut txid = [0; 32];
785 txid[..].copy_from_slice(read_bytes!(32));
786 let commitment_number = byte_utils::slice_to_be48(read_bytes!(6));
787 if let Some(_) = remote_hash_commitment_number.insert(txid, commitment_number) {
792 macro_rules! read_local_tx {
795 let tx_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8));
796 let tx_ser = read_bytes!(tx_len);
797 let tx: Transaction = unwrap_obj!(serialize::deserialize(tx_ser));
798 if serialize::serialize(&tx).unwrap() != tx_ser {
799 // We check that the tx re-serializes to the same form to ensure there is
800 // no extra data, and as rust-bitcoin doesn't handle the 0-input ambiguity
805 let revocation_key = unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(33)));
806 let a_htlc_key = unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(33)));
807 let b_htlc_key = unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(33)));
808 let delayed_payment_key = unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(33)));
809 let feerate_per_kw = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8));
811 let htlc_outputs_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8));
812 if htlc_outputs_len > data.len() as u64 / 128 { return None; }
813 let mut htlc_outputs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_outputs_len as usize);
814 for _ in 0..htlc_outputs_len {
815 htlc_outputs.push((read_htlc_in_commitment!(),
816 unwrap_obj!(Signature::from_compact(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(64))),
817 unwrap_obj!(Signature::from_compact(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(64)))));
822 tx, revocation_key, a_htlc_key, b_htlc_key, delayed_payment_key, feerate_per_kw, htlc_outputs
828 let prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = match read_bytes!(1)[0] {
831 Some(read_local_tx!())
836 let current_local_signed_commitment_tx = match read_bytes!(1)[0] {
839 Some(read_local_tx!())
844 let payment_preimages_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8));
845 if payment_preimages_len > data.len() as u64 / 32 { return None; }
846 let mut payment_preimages = HashMap::with_capacity(payment_preimages_len as usize);
847 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
848 for _ in 0..payment_preimages_len {
849 let mut preimage = [0; 32];
850 preimage[..].copy_from_slice(read_bytes!(32));
852 sha.input(&preimage);
853 let mut hash = [0; 32];
854 sha.result(&mut hash);
855 if let Some(_) = payment_preimages.insert(hash, preimage) {
860 let destination_script_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8));
861 let destination_script = Script::from(read_bytes!(destination_script_len).to_vec());
863 Some(ChannelMonitor {
865 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor,
868 delayed_payment_base_key,
870 their_cur_revocation_points,
876 remote_claimable_outpoints,
877 remote_commitment_txn_on_chain: Mutex::new(remote_commitment_txn_on_chain),
878 remote_hash_commitment_number,
880 prev_local_signed_commitment_tx,
881 current_local_signed_commitment_tx,
890 //TODO: Functions to serialize/deserialize (with different forms depending on which information
891 //we want to leave out (eg funding_txo, etc).
893 /// Can only fail if idx is < get_min_seen_secret
894 pub fn get_secret(&self, idx: u64) -> Result<[u8; 32], HandleError> {
895 for i in 0..self.old_secrets.len() {
896 if (idx & (!((1 << i) - 1))) == self.old_secrets[i].1 {
897 return Ok(ChannelMonitor::derive_secret(self.old_secrets[i].0, i as u8, idx))
900 assert!(idx < self.get_min_seen_secret());
901 Err(HandleError{err: "idx too low", action: None})
904 pub fn get_min_seen_secret(&self) -> u64 {
905 //TODO This can be optimized?
906 let mut min = 1 << 48;
907 for &(_, idx) in self.old_secrets.iter() {
915 /// Attempts to claim a remote commitment transaction's outputs using the revocation key and
916 /// data in remote_claimable_outpoints. Will directly claim any HTLC outputs which expire at a
917 /// height > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER. In any case, will install monitoring for
918 /// HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions, and claim them using the revocation key (if
919 /// applicable) as well.
920 fn check_spend_remote_transaction(&self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32) -> (Vec<Transaction>, (Sha256dHash, Vec<TxOut>)) {
921 // Most secp and related errors trying to create keys means we have no hope of constructing
922 // a spend transaction...so we return no transactions to broadcast
923 let mut txn_to_broadcast = Vec::new();
924 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
926 let commitment_txid = tx.txid(); //TODO: This is gonna be a performance bottleneck for watchtowers!
927 let per_commitment_option = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(&commitment_txid);
929 macro_rules! ignore_error {
930 ( $thing : expr ) => {
933 Err(_) => return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs))
938 let commitment_number = 0xffffffffffff - ((((tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor);
939 if commitment_number >= self.get_min_seen_secret() {
940 let secret = self.get_secret(commitment_number).unwrap();
941 let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &secret));
942 let (revocation_pubkey, b_htlc_key) = match self.key_storage {
943 KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key } => {
944 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
945 (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_base_key))),
946 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &htlc_base_key))))
948 KeyStorage::SigsMode { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
949 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
950 (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &revocation_base_key)),
951 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &htlc_base_key)))
954 let delayed_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key), &self.delayed_payment_base_key));
955 let a_htlc_key = match self.their_htlc_base_key {
956 None => return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs)),
957 Some(their_htlc_base_key) => ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key), &their_htlc_base_key)),
960 let revokeable_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey, self.our_to_self_delay, &delayed_key);
961 let revokeable_p2wsh = revokeable_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
963 let mut total_value = 0;
964 let mut values = Vec::new();
965 let mut inputs = Vec::new();
966 let mut htlc_idxs = Vec::new();
968 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
969 if outp.script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh {
971 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
972 txid: commitment_txid,
975 script_sig: Script::new(),
976 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
979 htlc_idxs.push(None);
980 values.push(outp.value);
981 total_value += outp.value;
982 break; // There can only be one of these
986 macro_rules! sign_input {
987 ($sighash_parts: expr, $input: expr, $htlc_idx: expr, $amount: expr) => {
989 let (sig, redeemscript) = match self.key_storage {
990 KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
991 let redeemscript = if $htlc_idx.is_none() { revokeable_redeemscript.clone() } else {
992 let htlc = &per_commitment_option.unwrap()[$htlc_idx.unwrap()];
993 chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey)
995 let sighash = ignore_error!(Message::from_slice(&$sighash_parts.sighash_all(&$input, &redeemscript, $amount)[..]));
996 let revocation_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key, &revocation_base_key));
997 (self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &revocation_key), redeemscript)
999 KeyStorage::SigsMode { .. } => {
1003 $input.witness.push(sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
1004 $input.witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1005 if $htlc_idx.is_none() {
1006 $input.witness.push(vec!(1));
1008 $input.witness.push(revocation_pubkey.serialize().to_vec());
1010 $input.witness.push(redeemscript.into_bytes());
1015 if let Some(per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
1016 inputs.reserve_exact(per_commitment_data.len());
1018 for (idx, htlc) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() {
1019 let expected_script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey);
1020 if htlc.transaction_output_index as usize >= tx.output.len() ||
1021 tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 ||
1022 tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].script_pubkey != expected_script.to_v0_p2wsh() {
1023 return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs)); // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user
1026 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
1027 txid: commitment_txid,
1028 vout: htlc.transaction_output_index,
1030 script_sig: Script::new(),
1031 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
1032 witness: Vec::new(),
1034 if htlc.cltv_expiry > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER {
1036 htlc_idxs.push(Some(idx));
1037 values.push(tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].value);
1038 total_value += htlc.amount_msat / 1000;
1040 let mut single_htlc_tx = Transaction {
1044 output: vec!(TxOut {
1045 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1046 value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000, //TODO: - fee
1049 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&single_htlc_tx);
1050 sign_input!(sighash_parts, single_htlc_tx.input[0], Some(idx), htlc.amount_msat / 1000);
1051 txn_to_broadcast.push(single_htlc_tx); // TODO: This is not yet tested in ChannelManager!
1056 if !inputs.is_empty() || !txn_to_broadcast.is_empty() { // ie we're confident this is actually ours
1057 // We're definitely a remote commitment transaction!
1058 watch_outputs.append(&mut tx.output.clone());
1059 self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.lock().unwrap().insert(commitment_txid, commitment_number);
1061 if inputs.is_empty() { return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs)); } // Nothing to be done...probably a false positive/local tx
1063 let outputs = vec!(TxOut {
1064 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1065 value: total_value, //TODO: - fee
1067 let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
1074 let mut values_drain = values.drain(..);
1075 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx);
1077 for (input, htlc_idx) in spend_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(htlc_idxs.iter()) {
1078 let value = values_drain.next().unwrap();
1079 sign_input!(sighash_parts, input, htlc_idx, value);
1082 txn_to_broadcast.push(spend_tx);
1083 } else if let Some(per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
1084 // While this isn't useful yet, there is a potential race where if a counterparty
1085 // revokes a state at the same time as the commitment transaction for that state is
1086 // confirmed, and the watchtower receives the block before the user, the user could
1087 // upload a new ChannelMonitor with the revocation secret but the watchtower has
1088 // already processed the block, resulting in the remote_commitment_txn_on_chain entry
1089 // not being generated by the above conditional. Thus, to be safe, we go ahead and
1091 watch_outputs.append(&mut tx.output.clone());
1092 self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.lock().unwrap().insert(commitment_txid, commitment_number);
1094 if let Some(revocation_points) = self.their_cur_revocation_points {
1095 let revocation_point_option =
1096 if revocation_points.0 == commitment_number { Some(&revocation_points.1) }
1097 else if let Some(point) = revocation_points.2.as_ref() {
1098 if revocation_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 { Some(point) } else { None }
1100 if let Some(revocation_point) = revocation_point_option {
1101 let (revocation_pubkey, b_htlc_key) = match self.key_storage {
1102 KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key } => {
1103 (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_base_key))),
1104 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &htlc_base_key))))
1106 KeyStorage::SigsMode { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
1107 (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &revocation_base_key)),
1108 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &htlc_base_key)))
1111 let a_htlc_key = match self.their_htlc_base_key {
1112 None => return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs)),
1113 Some(their_htlc_base_key) => ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &their_htlc_base_key)),
1116 let mut total_value = 0;
1117 let mut values = Vec::new();
1118 let mut inputs = Vec::new();
1120 macro_rules! sign_input {
1121 ($sighash_parts: expr, $input: expr, $amount: expr, $preimage: expr) => {
1123 let (sig, redeemscript) = match self.key_storage {
1124 KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
1125 let htlc = &per_commitment_option.unwrap()[$input.sequence as usize];
1126 let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey);
1127 let sighash = ignore_error!(Message::from_slice(&$sighash_parts.sighash_all(&$input, &redeemscript, $amount)[..]));
1128 let htlc_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &htlc_base_key));
1129 (self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &htlc_key), redeemscript)
1131 KeyStorage::SigsMode { .. } => {
1135 $input.witness.push(sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
1136 $input.witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1137 $input.witness.push($preimage);
1138 $input.witness.push(redeemscript.into_bytes());
1143 for (idx, htlc) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() {
1144 if let Some(payment_preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
1146 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
1147 txid: commitment_txid,
1148 vout: htlc.transaction_output_index,
1150 script_sig: Script::new(),
1151 sequence: idx as u32, // reset to 0xfffffffd in sign_input
1152 witness: Vec::new(),
1154 if htlc.cltv_expiry > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER {
1156 values.push((tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].value, payment_preimage));
1157 total_value += htlc.amount_msat / 1000;
1159 let mut single_htlc_tx = Transaction {
1163 output: vec!(TxOut {
1164 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1165 value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000, //TODO: - fee
1168 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&single_htlc_tx);
1169 sign_input!(sighash_parts, single_htlc_tx.input[0], htlc.amount_msat / 1000, payment_preimage.to_vec());
1170 txn_to_broadcast.push(single_htlc_tx);
1175 if inputs.is_empty() { return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs)); } // Nothing to be done...probably a false positive/local tx
1177 let outputs = vec!(TxOut {
1178 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1179 value: total_value, //TODO: - fee
1181 let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
1188 let mut values_drain = values.drain(..);
1189 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx);
1191 for input in spend_tx.input.iter_mut() {
1192 let value = values_drain.next().unwrap();
1193 sign_input!(sighash_parts, input, value.0, value.1.to_vec());
1196 txn_to_broadcast.push(spend_tx);
1200 //TODO: For each input check if its in our remote_commitment_txn_on_chain map!
1203 (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs))
1206 fn broadcast_by_local_state(&self, local_tx: &LocalSignedTx) -> Vec<Transaction> {
1207 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
1209 for &(ref htlc, ref their_sig, ref our_sig) in local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1211 let mut htlc_timeout_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&local_tx.txid, local_tx.feerate_per_kw, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), htlc, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key, &local_tx.revocation_key);
1213 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
1215 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(their_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
1216 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1217 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
1218 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1220 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new());
1221 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &local_tx.a_htlc_key, &local_tx.b_htlc_key, &local_tx.revocation_key).into_bytes());
1223 res.push(htlc_timeout_tx);
1225 if let Some(payment_preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
1226 let mut htlc_success_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&local_tx.txid, local_tx.feerate_per_kw, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), htlc, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key, &local_tx.revocation_key);
1228 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
1230 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(their_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
1231 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1232 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
1233 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1235 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(payment_preimage.to_vec());
1236 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &local_tx.a_htlc_key, &local_tx.b_htlc_key, &local_tx.revocation_key).into_bytes());
1238 res.push(htlc_success_tx);
1246 /// Attempts to claim any claimable HTLCs in a commitment transaction which was not (yet)
1247 /// revoked using data in local_claimable_outpoints.
1248 /// Should not be used if check_spend_revoked_transaction succeeds.
1249 fn check_spend_local_transaction(&self, tx: &Transaction, _height: u32) -> Vec<Transaction> {
1250 let commitment_txid = tx.txid();
1251 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1252 if local_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
1253 return self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx);
1256 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1257 if local_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
1258 return self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx);
1264 fn block_connected(&self, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], height: u32, broadcaster: &BroadcasterInterface)-> Vec<(Sha256dHash, Vec<TxOut>)> {
1265 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
1266 for tx in txn_matched {
1267 for txin in tx.input.iter() {
1268 if self.funding_txo.is_none() || (txin.previous_output.txid == self.funding_txo.as_ref().unwrap().0.txid && txin.previous_output.vout == self.funding_txo.as_ref().unwrap().0.index as u32) {
1269 let (mut txn, new_outputs) = self.check_spend_remote_transaction(tx, height);
1270 if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() {
1271 watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
1274 txn = self.check_spend_local_transaction(tx, height);
1276 for tx in txn.iter() {
1277 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(tx);
1282 if let Some(ref cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1283 let mut needs_broadcast = false;
1284 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in cur_local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1285 if htlc.cltv_expiry <= height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER {
1286 if htlc.offered || self.payment_preimages.contains_key(&htlc.payment_hash) {
1287 needs_broadcast = true;
1292 if needs_broadcast {
1293 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&cur_local_tx.tx);
1294 for tx in self.broadcast_by_local_state(&cur_local_tx) {
1295 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
1302 pub fn would_broadcast_at_height(&self, height: u32) -> bool {
1303 if let Some(ref cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1304 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in cur_local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1305 if htlc.cltv_expiry <= height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER {
1306 if htlc.offered || self.payment_preimages.contains_key(&htlc.payment_hash) {
1318 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Script;
1319 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
1320 use crypto::digest::Digest;
1322 use ln::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor;
1323 use ln::chan_utils::{HTLCOutputInCommitment, TxCreationKeys};
1324 use util::sha2::Sha256;
1325 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
1326 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1, Signature};
1327 use rand::{thread_rng,Rng};
1330 fn test_per_commitment_storage() {
1331 // Test vectors from BOLT 3:
1332 let mut secrets: Vec<[u8; 32]> = Vec::new();
1333 let mut monitor: ChannelMonitor;
1334 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1336 macro_rules! test_secrets {
1338 let mut idx = 281474976710655;
1339 for secret in secrets.iter() {
1340 assert_eq!(monitor.get_secret(idx).unwrap(), *secret);
1343 assert_eq!(monitor.get_min_seen_secret(), idx + 1);
1344 assert!(monitor.get_secret(idx).is_err());
1348 let delayed_payment_base_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap());
1351 // insert_secret correct sequence
1352 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &delayed_payment_base_key, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
1355 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1356 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1357 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1360 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1361 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1362 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1365 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1366 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1367 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1370 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1371 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1372 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1375 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1376 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
1377 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1380 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1381 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
1382 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1385 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1386 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
1387 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1390 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1391 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
1392 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1397 // insert_secret #1 incorrect
1398 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &delayed_payment_base_key, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
1401 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1402 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
1403 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1406 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1407 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1408 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err,
1409 "Previous secret did not match new one");
1413 // insert_secret #2 incorrect (#1 derived from incorrect)
1414 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &delayed_payment_base_key, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
1417 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1418 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
1419 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1422 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1423 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("dddc3a8d14fddf2b68fa8c7fbad2748274937479dd0f8930d5ebb4ab6bd866a3").unwrap());
1424 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1427 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1428 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1429 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1432 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1433 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1434 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err,
1435 "Previous secret did not match new one");
1439 // insert_secret #3 incorrect
1440 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &delayed_payment_base_key, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
1443 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1444 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1445 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1448 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1449 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1450 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1453 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1454 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c51a18b13e8527e579ec56365482c62f180b7d5760b46e9477dae59e87ed423a").unwrap());
1455 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1458 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1459 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1460 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err,
1461 "Previous secret did not match new one");
1465 // insert_secret #4 incorrect (1,2,3 derived from incorrect)
1466 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &delayed_payment_base_key, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
1469 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1470 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
1471 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1474 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1475 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("dddc3a8d14fddf2b68fa8c7fbad2748274937479dd0f8930d5ebb4ab6bd866a3").unwrap());
1476 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1479 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1480 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c51a18b13e8527e579ec56365482c62f180b7d5760b46e9477dae59e87ed423a").unwrap());
1481 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1484 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1485 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("ba65d7b0ef55a3ba300d4e87af29868f394f8f138d78a7011669c79b37b936f4").unwrap());
1486 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1489 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1490 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
1491 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1494 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1495 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
1496 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1499 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1500 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
1501 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1504 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1505 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
1506 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err,
1507 "Previous secret did not match new one");
1511 // insert_secret #5 incorrect
1512 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &delayed_payment_base_key, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
1515 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1516 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1517 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1520 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1521 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1522 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1525 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1526 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1527 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1530 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1531 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1532 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1535 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1536 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("631373ad5f9ef654bb3dade742d09504c567edd24320d2fcd68e3cc47e2ff6a6").unwrap());
1537 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1540 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1541 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
1542 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err,
1543 "Previous secret did not match new one");
1547 // insert_secret #6 incorrect (5 derived from incorrect)
1548 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &delayed_payment_base_key, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
1551 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1552 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1553 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1556 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1557 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1558 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1561 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1562 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1563 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1566 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1567 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1568 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1571 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1572 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("631373ad5f9ef654bb3dade742d09504c567edd24320d2fcd68e3cc47e2ff6a6").unwrap());
1573 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1576 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1577 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("b7e76a83668bde38b373970155c868a653304308f9896692f904a23731224bb1").unwrap());
1578 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1581 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1582 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
1583 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1586 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1587 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
1588 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err,
1589 "Previous secret did not match new one");
1593 // insert_secret #7 incorrect
1594 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &delayed_payment_base_key, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
1597 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1598 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1599 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1602 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1603 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1604 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1607 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1608 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1609 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1612 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1613 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1614 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1617 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1618 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
1619 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1622 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1623 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
1624 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1627 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1628 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("e7971de736e01da8ed58b94c2fc216cb1dca9e326f3a96e7194fe8ea8af6c0a3").unwrap());
1629 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1632 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1633 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
1634 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err,
1635 "Previous secret did not match new one");
1639 // insert_secret #8 incorrect
1640 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &delayed_payment_base_key, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
1643 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1644 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1645 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1648 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1649 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1650 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1653 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1654 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1655 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1658 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1659 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1660 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1663 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1664 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
1665 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1668 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1669 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
1670 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1673 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1674 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
1675 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1678 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1679 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a7efbc61aac46d34f77778bac22c8a20c6a46ca460addc49009bda875ec88fa4").unwrap());
1680 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err,
1681 "Previous secret did not match new one");
1686 fn test_prune_preimages() {
1687 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1688 let dummy_sig = Signature::from_der(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("3045022100fa86fa9a36a8cd6a7bb8f06a541787d51371d067951a9461d5404de6b928782e02201c8b7c334c10aed8976a3a465be9a28abff4cb23acbf00022295b378ce1fa3cd").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
1690 macro_rules! dummy_keys {
1693 let dummy_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap());
1695 per_commitment_point: dummy_key.clone(),
1696 revocation_key: dummy_key.clone(),
1697 a_htlc_key: dummy_key.clone(),
1698 b_htlc_key: dummy_key.clone(),
1699 a_delayed_payment_key: dummy_key.clone(),
1700 b_payment_key: dummy_key.clone(),
1705 let dummy_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
1707 let mut preimages = Vec::new();
1709 let mut rng = thread_rng();
1711 let mut preimage = [0; 32];
1712 rng.fill_bytes(&mut preimage);
1713 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
1714 sha.input(&preimage);
1715 let mut hash = [0; 32];
1716 sha.result(&mut hash);
1717 preimages.push((preimage, hash));
1721 macro_rules! preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs {
1722 ($preimages_slice: expr) => {
1724 let mut res = Vec::new();
1725 for (idx, preimage) in $preimages_slice.iter().enumerate() {
1726 res.push(HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1730 payment_hash: preimage.1.clone(),
1731 transaction_output_index: idx as u32,
1738 macro_rules! preimages_to_local_htlcs {
1739 ($preimages_slice: expr) => {
1741 let mut inp = preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!($preimages_slice);
1742 let res: Vec<_> = inp.drain(..).map(|e| { (e, dummy_sig.clone(), dummy_sig.clone()) }).collect();
1748 macro_rules! test_preimages_exist {
1749 ($preimages_slice: expr, $monitor: expr) => {
1750 for preimage in $preimages_slice {
1751 assert!($monitor.payment_preimages.contains_key(&preimage.1));
1756 // Prune with one old state and a local commitment tx holding a few overlaps with the
1758 let delayed_payment_base_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap());
1759 let mut monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &delayed_payment_base_key, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
1760 monitor.set_their_to_self_delay(10);
1762 monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(dummy_tx.clone(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..10]));
1763 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[5..15]), 281474976710655);
1764 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[15..20]), 281474976710654);
1765 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[17..20]), 281474976710653);
1766 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[18..20]), 281474976710652);
1767 for &(ref preimage, ref hash) in preimages.iter() {
1768 monitor.provide_payment_preimage(hash, preimage);
1771 // Now provide a secret, pruning preimages 10-15
1772 let mut secret = [0; 32];
1773 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1774 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secret.clone(), None).unwrap();
1775 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 15);
1776 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
1777 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[15..20], monitor);
1779 // Now provide a further secret, pruning preimages 15-17
1780 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1781 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secret.clone(), None).unwrap();
1782 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 13);
1783 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
1784 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[17..20], monitor);
1786 // Now update local commitment tx info, pruning only element 18 as we still care about the
1787 // previous commitment tx's preimages too
1788 monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(dummy_tx.clone(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..5]));
1789 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1790 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secret.clone(), None).unwrap();
1791 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 12);
1792 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
1793 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[18..20], monitor);
1795 // But if we do it again, we'll prune 5-10
1796 monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(dummy_tx.clone(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..3]));
1797 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1798 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secret.clone(), None).unwrap();
1799 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 5);
1800 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..5], monitor);
1803 // Further testing is done in the ChannelManager integration tests.