_ Git - rust-lightning/blob - src/ln/channelmonitor.rs

   1 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
   2 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxIn,TxOut,SigHashType,Transaction};
   3 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
   4 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Script;
   5 use bitcoin::network::serialize;
   6 use bitcoin::util::hash::Sha256dHash;
   7 use bitcoin::util::bip143;
   8
   9 use crypto::digest::Digest;
  10
  11 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Message,Signature};
  12 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
  13 use secp256k1;
  14
  15 use ln::msgs::HandleError;
  16 use ln::chan_utils;
  17 use ln::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment;
  18 use chain::chaininterface::{ChainListener, ChainWatchInterface, BroadcasterInterface};
  19 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
  20 use util::sha2::Sha256;
  21 use util::byte_utils;
  22
  23 use std::collections::HashMap;
  24 use std::sync::{Arc,Mutex};
  25 use std::{hash,cmp};
  26
  27 pub enum ChannelMonitorUpdateErr {
  28         /// Used to indicate a temporary failure (eg connection to a watchtower failed, but is expected
  29         /// to succeed at some point in the future).
  30         /// Such a failure will "freeze" a channel, preventing us from revoking old states or
  31         /// submitting new commitment transactions to the remote party.
  32         /// ChannelManager::test_restore_channel_monitor can be used to retry the update(s) and restore
  33         /// the channel to an operational state.
  34         TemporaryFailure,
  35         /// Used to indicate no further channel monitor updates will be allowed (eg we've moved on to a
  36         /// different watchtower and cannot update with all watchtowers that were previously informed
  37         /// of this channel). This will force-close the channel in question.
  38         PermanentFailure,
  39 }
  40
  41 /// Simple trait indicating ability to track a set of ChannelMonitors and multiplex events between
  42 /// them. Generally should be implemented by keeping a local SimpleManyChannelMonitor and passing
  43 /// events to it, while also taking any add_update_monitor events and passing them to some remote
  44 /// server(s).
  45 /// Note that any updates to a channel's monitor *must* be applied to each instance of the
  46 /// channel's monitor everywhere (including remote watchtowers) *before* this function returns. If
  47 /// an update occurs and a remote watchtower is left with old state, it may broadcast transactions
  48 /// which we have revoked, allowing our counterparty to claim all funds in the channel!
  49 pub trait ManyChannelMonitor: Send + Sync {
  50         /// Adds or updates a monitor for the given `funding_txo`.
  51         /// Implementor must also ensure that the funding_txo outpoint is registered with any relevant
  52         /// ChainWatchInterfaces such that the provided monitor receives block_connected callbacks with
  53         /// any spends of it.
  54         fn add_update_monitor(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr>;
  55 }
  56
  57 /// A simple implementation of a ManyChannelMonitor and ChainListener. Can be used to create a
  58 /// watchtower or watch our own channels.
  59 /// Note that you must provide your own key by which to refer to channels.
  60 /// If you're accepting remote monitors (ie are implementing a watchtower), you must verify that
  61 /// users cannot overwrite a given channel by providing a duplicate key. ie you should probably
  62 /// index by a PublicKey which is required to sign any updates.
  63 /// If you're using this for local monitoring of your own channels, you probably want to use
  64 /// `OutPoint` as the key, which will give you a ManyChannelMonitor implementation.
  65 pub struct SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
  66         monitors: Mutex<HashMap<Key, ChannelMonitor>>,
  67         chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>,
  68         broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>
  69 }
  70
  71 impl<Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash> ChainListener for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
  72         fn block_connected(&self, _header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], _indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) {
  73                 let monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
  74                 for monitor in monitors.values() {
  75                         let txn_outputs = monitor.block_connected(txn_matched, height, &*self.broadcaster);
  76                         for (ref txid, ref outputs) in txn_outputs {
  77                                 for (idx, output) in outputs.iter().enumerate() {
  78                                         self.chain_monitor.install_watch_outpoint((txid.clone(), idx as u32), &output.script_pubkey);
  79                                 }
  80                         }
  81                 }
  82         }
  83
  84         fn block_disconnected(&self, _: &BlockHeader) { }
  85 }
  86
  87 impl<Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash + 'static> SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
  88         pub fn new(chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>, broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>) -> Arc<SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key>> {
  89                 let res = Arc::new(SimpleManyChannelMonitor {
  90                         monitors: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
  91                         chain_monitor,
  92                         broadcaster
  93                 });
  94                 let weak_res = Arc::downgrade(&res);
  95                 res.chain_monitor.register_listener(weak_res);
  96                 res
  97         }
  98
  99         pub fn add_update_monitor_by_key(&self, key: Key, monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
 100                 let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
 101                 match monitors.get_mut(&key) {
 102                         Some(orig_monitor) => return orig_monitor.insert_combine(monitor),
 103                         None => {}
 104                 };
 105                 match &monitor.funding_txo {
 106                         &None => self.chain_monitor.watch_all_txn(),
 107                         &Some((ref outpoint, ref script)) => {
 108                                 self.chain_monitor.install_watch_tx(&outpoint.txid, script);
 109                                 self.chain_monitor.install_watch_outpoint((outpoint.txid, outpoint.index as u32), script);
 110                         },
 111                 }
 112                 monitors.insert(key, monitor);
 113                 Ok(())
 114         }
 115 }
 116
 117 impl ManyChannelMonitor for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<OutPoint> {
 118         fn add_update_monitor(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr> {
 119                 match self.add_update_monitor_by_key(funding_txo, monitor) {
 120                         Ok(_) => Ok(()),
 121                         Err(_) => Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure),
 122                 }
 123         }
 124 }
 125
 126 /// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, don't try to claim it in a shared transaction,
 127 /// instead claiming it in its own individual transaction.
 128 const CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 12;
 129 /// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, force-close the channel to broadcast the
 130 /// HTLC-Success transaction.
 131 const CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 6;
 132
 133 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
 134 enum KeyStorage {
 135         PrivMode {
 136                 revocation_base_key: SecretKey,
 137                 htlc_base_key: SecretKey,
 138         },
 139         SigsMode {
 140                 revocation_base_key: PublicKey,
 141                 htlc_base_key: PublicKey,
 142                 sigs: HashMap<Sha256dHash, Signature>,
 143         }
 144 }
 145
 146 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
 147 struct LocalSignedTx {
 148         /// txid of the transaction in tx, just used to make comparison faster
 149         txid: Sha256dHash,
 150         tx: Transaction,
 151         revocation_key: PublicKey,
 152         a_htlc_key: PublicKey,
 153         b_htlc_key: PublicKey,
 154         delayed_payment_key: PublicKey,
 155         feerate_per_kw: u64,
 156         htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Signature, Signature)>,
 157 }
 158
 159 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
 160 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
 161
 162 pub struct ChannelMonitor {
 163         funding_txo: Option<(OutPoint, Script)>,
 164         commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64,
 165
 166         key_storage: KeyStorage,
 167         delayed_payment_base_key: PublicKey,
 168         their_htlc_base_key: Option<PublicKey>,
 169         // first is the idx of the first of the two revocation points
 170         their_cur_revocation_points: Option<(u64, PublicKey, Option<PublicKey>)>,
 171
 172         our_to_self_delay: u16,
 173         their_to_self_delay: Option<u16>,
 174
 175         old_secrets: [([u8; 32], u64); 49],
 176         remote_claimable_outpoints: HashMap<Sha256dHash, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>>,
 177         /// We cannot identify HTLC-Success or HTLC-Timeout transactions by themselves on the chain.
 178         /// Nor can we figure out their commitment numbers without the commitment transaction they are
 179         /// spending. Thus, in order to claim them via revocation key, we track all the remote
 180         /// commitment transactions which we find on-chain, mapping them to the commitment number which
 181         /// can be used to derive the revocation key and claim the transactions.
 182         remote_commitment_txn_on_chain: Mutex<HashMap<Sha256dHash, u64>>,
 183         /// Cache used to make pruning of payment_preimages faster.
 184         /// Maps payment_hash values to commitment numbers for remote transactions for non-revoked
 185         /// remote transactions (ie should remain pretty small).
 186         /// Serialized to disk but should generally not be sent to Watchtowers.
 187         remote_hash_commitment_number: HashMap<[u8; 32], u64>,
 188
 189         // We store two local commitment transactions to avoid any race conditions where we may update
 190         // some monitors (potentially on watchtowers) but then fail to update others, resulting in the
 191         // various monitors for one channel being out of sync, and us broadcasting a local
 192         // transaction for which we have deleted claim information on some watchtowers.
 193         prev_local_signed_commitment_tx: Option<LocalSignedTx>,
 194         current_local_signed_commitment_tx: Option<LocalSignedTx>,
 195
 196         payment_preimages: HashMap<[u8; 32], [u8; 32]>,
 197
 198         destination_script: Script,
 199         secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>, //TODO: dedup this a bit...
 200 }
 201 impl Clone for ChannelMonitor {
 202         fn clone(&self) -> Self {
 203                 ChannelMonitor {
 204                         funding_txo: self.funding_txo.clone(),
 205                         commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor.clone(),
 206
 207                         key_storage: self.key_storage.clone(),
 208                         delayed_payment_base_key: self.delayed_payment_base_key.clone(),
 209                         their_htlc_base_key: self.their_htlc_base_key.clone(),
 210                         their_cur_revocation_points: self.their_cur_revocation_points.clone(),
 211
 212                         our_to_self_delay: self.our_to_self_delay,
 213                         their_to_self_delay: self.their_to_self_delay,
 214
 215                         old_secrets: self.old_secrets.clone(),
 216                         remote_claimable_outpoints: self.remote_claimable_outpoints.clone(),
 217                         remote_commitment_txn_on_chain: Mutex::new((*self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.lock().unwrap()).clone()),
 218                         remote_hash_commitment_number: self.remote_hash_commitment_number.clone(),
 219
 220                         prev_local_signed_commitment_tx: self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.clone(),
 221                         current_local_signed_commitment_tx: self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx.clone(),
 222
 223                         payment_preimages: self.payment_preimages.clone(),
 224
 225                         destination_script: self.destination_script.clone(),
 226                         secp_ctx: self.secp_ctx.clone(),
 227                 }
 228         }
 229 }
 230
 231 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
 232 /// Used only in testing and fuzztarget to check serialization roundtrips don't change the
 233 /// underlying object
 234 impl PartialEq for ChannelMonitor {
 235         fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
 236                 if self.funding_txo != other.funding_txo ||
 237                         self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor != other.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor ||
 238                         self.key_storage != other.key_storage ||
 239                         self.delayed_payment_base_key != other.delayed_payment_base_key ||
 240                         self.their_htlc_base_key != other.their_htlc_base_key ||
 241                         self.their_cur_revocation_points != other.their_cur_revocation_points ||
 242                         self.our_to_self_delay != other.our_to_self_delay ||
 243                         self.their_to_self_delay != other.their_to_self_delay ||
 244                         self.remote_claimable_outpoints != other.remote_claimable_outpoints ||
 245                         self.remote_hash_commitment_number != other.remote_hash_commitment_number ||
 246                         self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx != other.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx ||
 247                         self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx != other.current_local_signed_commitment_tx ||
 248                         self.payment_preimages != other.payment_preimages ||
 249                         self.destination_script != other.destination_script
 250                 {
 251                         false
 252                 } else {
 253                         for (&(ref secret, ref idx), &(ref o_secret, ref o_idx)) in self.old_secrets.iter().zip(other.old_secrets.iter()) {
 254                                 if secret != o_secret || idx != o_idx {
 255                                         return false
 256                                 }
 257                         }
 258                         let us = self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.lock().unwrap();
 259                         let them = other.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.lock().unwrap();
 260                         *us == *them
 261                 }
 262         }
 263 }
 264
 265 impl ChannelMonitor {
 266         pub fn new(revocation_base_key: &SecretKey, delayed_payment_base_key: &PublicKey, htlc_base_key: &SecretKey, our_to_self_delay: u16, destination_script: Script) -> ChannelMonitor {
 267                 ChannelMonitor {
 268                         funding_txo: None,
 269                         commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: 0,
 270
 271                         key_storage: KeyStorage::PrivMode {
 272                                 revocation_base_key: revocation_base_key.clone(),
 273                                 htlc_base_key: htlc_base_key.clone(),
 274                         },
 275                         delayed_payment_base_key: delayed_payment_base_key.clone(),
 276                         their_htlc_base_key: None,
 277                         their_cur_revocation_points: None,
 278
 279                         our_to_self_delay: our_to_self_delay,
 280                         their_to_self_delay: None,
 281
 282                         old_secrets: [([0; 32], 1 << 48); 49],
 283                         remote_claimable_outpoints: HashMap::new(),
 284                         remote_commitment_txn_on_chain: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
 285                         remote_hash_commitment_number: HashMap::new(),
 286
 287                         prev_local_signed_commitment_tx: None,
 288                         current_local_signed_commitment_tx: None,
 289
 290                         payment_preimages: HashMap::new(),
 291
 292                         destination_script: destination_script,
 293                         secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
 294                 }
 295         }
 296
 297         #[inline]
 298         fn place_secret(idx: u64) -> u8 {
 299                 for i in 0..48 {
 300                         if idx & (1 << i) == (1 << i) {
 301                                 return i
 302                         }
 303                 }
 304                 48
 305         }
 306
 307         #[inline]
 308         fn derive_secret(secret: [u8; 32], bits: u8, idx: u64) -> [u8; 32] {
 309                 let mut res: [u8; 32] = secret;
 310                 for i in 0..bits {
 311                         let bitpos = bits - 1 - i;
 312                         if idx & (1 << bitpos) == (1 << bitpos) {
 313                                 res[(bitpos / 8) as usize] ^= 1 << (bitpos & 7);
 314                                 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
 315                                 sha.input(&res);
 316                                 sha.result(&mut res);
 317                         }
 318                 }
 319                 res
 320         }
 321
 322         /// Inserts a revocation secret into this channel monitor. Also optionally tracks the next
 323         /// revocation point which may be required to claim HTLC outputs which we know the preimage of
 324         /// in case the remote end force-closes using their latest state. Prunes old preimages if neither
 325         /// needed by local commitment transactions HTCLs nor by remote ones. Unless we haven't already seen remote
 326         /// commitment transaction's secret, they are de facto pruned (we can use revocation key).
 327         pub(super) fn provide_secret(&mut self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32], their_next_revocation_point: Option<(u64, PublicKey)>) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
 328                 let pos = ChannelMonitor::place_secret(idx);
 329                 for i in 0..pos {
 330                         let (old_secret, old_idx) = self.old_secrets[i as usize];
 331                         if ChannelMonitor::derive_secret(secret, pos, old_idx) != old_secret {
 332                                 return Err(HandleError{err: "Previous secret did not match new one", action: None})
 333                         }
 334                 }
 335                 self.old_secrets[pos as usize] = (secret, idx);
 336
 337                 if let Some(new_revocation_point) = their_next_revocation_point {
 338                         match self.their_cur_revocation_points {
 339                                 Some(old_points) => {
 340                                         if old_points.0 == new_revocation_point.0 + 1 {
 341                                                 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0, old_points.1, Some(new_revocation_point.1)));
 342                                         } else if old_points.0 == new_revocation_point.0 + 2 {
 343                                                 if let Some(old_second_point) = old_points.2 {
 344                                                         self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0 - 1, old_second_point, Some(new_revocation_point.1)));
 345                                                 } else {
 346                                                         self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((new_revocation_point.0, new_revocation_point.1, None));
 347                                                 }
 348                                         } else {
 349                                                 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((new_revocation_point.0, new_revocation_point.1, None));
 350                                         }
 351                                 },
 352                                 None => {
 353                                         self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((new_revocation_point.0, new_revocation_point.1, None));
 354                                 }
 355                         }
 356                 }
 357
 358                 if !self.payment_preimages.is_empty() {
 359                         let local_signed_commitment_tx = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx.as_ref().expect("Channel needs at least an initial commitment tx !");
 360                         let prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.as_ref();
 361                         let min_idx = self.get_min_seen_secret();
 362                         let remote_hash_commitment_number = &mut self.remote_hash_commitment_number;
 363
 364                         self.payment_preimages.retain(|&k, _| {
 365                                 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in &local_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs {
 366                                         if k == htlc.payment_hash {
 367                                                 return true
 368                                         }
 369                                 }
 370                                 if let Some(prev_local_commitment_tx) = prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
 371                                         for &(ref htlc, _, _) in prev_local_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
 372                                                 if k == htlc.payment_hash {
 373                                                         return true
 374                                                 }
 375                                         }
 376                                 }
 377                                 let contains = if let Some(cn) = remote_hash_commitment_number.get(&k) {
 378                                         if *cn < min_idx {
 379                                                 return true
 380                                         }
 381                                         true
 382                                 } else { false };
 383                                 if contains {
 384                                         remote_hash_commitment_number.remove(&k);
 385                                 }
 386                                 false
 387                         });
 388                 }
 389
 390                 Ok(())
 391         }
 392
 393         /// Informs this monitor of the latest remote (ie non-broadcastable) commitment transaction.
 394         /// The monitor watches for it to be broadcasted and then uses the HTLC information (and
 395         /// possibly future revocation/preimage information) to claim outputs where possible.
 396         /// We cache also the mapping hash:commitment number to lighten pruning of old preimages by watchtowers.
 397         pub(super) fn provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, unsigned_commitment_tx: &Transaction, htlc_outputs: Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>, commitment_number: u64) {
 398                 // TODO: Encrypt the htlc_outputs data with the single-hash of the commitment transaction
 399                 // so that a remote monitor doesn't learn anything unless there is a malicious close.
 400                 // (only maybe, sadly we cant do the same for local info, as we need to be aware of
 401                 // timeouts)
 402                 for htlc in &htlc_outputs {
 403                         self.remote_hash_commitment_number.insert(htlc.payment_hash, commitment_number);
 404                 }
 405                 self.remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(unsigned_commitment_tx.txid(), htlc_outputs);
 406         }
 407
 408         /// Informs this monitor of the latest local (ie broadcastable) commitment transaction. The
 409         /// monitor watches for timeouts and may broadcast it if we approach such a timeout. Thus, it
 410         /// is important that any clones of this channel monitor (including remote clones) by kept
 411         /// up-to-date as our local commitment transaction is updated.
 412         /// Panics if set_their_to_self_delay has never been called.
 413         pub(super) fn provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, signed_commitment_tx: Transaction, local_keys: chan_utils::TxCreationKeys, feerate_per_kw: u64, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Signature, Signature)>) {
 414                 assert!(self.their_to_self_delay.is_some());
 415                 self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx.take();
 416                 self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(LocalSignedTx {
 417                         txid: signed_commitment_tx.txid(),
 418                         tx: signed_commitment_tx,
 419                         revocation_key: local_keys.revocation_key,
 420                         a_htlc_key: local_keys.a_htlc_key,
 421                         b_htlc_key: local_keys.b_htlc_key,
 422                         delayed_payment_key: local_keys.a_delayed_payment_key,
 423                         feerate_per_kw,
 424                         htlc_outputs,
 425                 });
 426         }
 427
 428         /// Provides a payment_hash->payment_preimage mapping. Will be automatically pruned when all
 429         /// commitment_tx_infos which contain the payment hash have been revoked.
 430         pub(super) fn provide_payment_preimage(&mut self, payment_hash: &[u8; 32], payment_preimage: &[u8; 32]) {
 431                 self.payment_preimages.insert(payment_hash.clone(), payment_preimage.clone());
 432         }
 433
 434         pub fn insert_combine(&mut self, mut other: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
 435                 if self.funding_txo.is_some() {
 436                         // We should be able to compare the entire funding_txo, but in fuzztarget its trivially
 437                         // easy to collide the funding_txo hash and have a different scriptPubKey.
 438                         if other.funding_txo.is_some() && other.funding_txo.as_ref().unwrap().0 != self.funding_txo.as_ref().unwrap().0 {
 439                                 return Err(HandleError{err: "Funding transaction outputs are not identical!", action: None});
 440                         }
 441                 } else {
 442                         self.funding_txo = other.funding_txo.take();
 443                 }
 444                 let other_min_secret = other.get_min_seen_secret();
 445                 let our_min_secret = self.get_min_seen_secret();
 446                 if our_min_secret > other_min_secret {
 447                         self.provide_secret(other_min_secret, other.get_secret(other_min_secret).unwrap(), None)?;
 448                 }
 449                 if our_min_secret >= other_min_secret {
 450                         self.their_cur_revocation_points = other.their_cur_revocation_points;
 451                         for (txid, htlcs) in other.remote_claimable_outpoints.drain() {
 452                                 self.remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, htlcs);
 453                         }
 454                         if let Some(local_tx) = other.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
 455                                 self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(local_tx);
 456                         }
 457                         if let Some(local_tx) = other.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
 458                                 self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(local_tx);
 459                         }
 460                         self.payment_preimages = other.payment_preimages;
 461                 }
 462                 Ok(())
 463         }
 464
 465         /// Panics if commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor doesn't fit in 48 bits
 466         pub(super) fn set_commitment_obscure_factor(&mut self, commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64) {
 467                 assert!(commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor < (1 << 48));
 468                 self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor = commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor;
 469         }
 470
 471         /// Allows this monitor to scan only for transactions which are applicable. Note that this is
 472         /// optional, without it this monitor cannot be used in an SPV client, but you may wish to
 473         /// avoid this (or call unset_funding_info) on a monitor you wish to send to a watchtower as it
 474         /// provides slightly better privacy.
 475         /// It's the responsibility of the caller to register outpoint and script with passing the former
 476         /// value as key to add_update_monitor.
 477         pub(super) fn set_funding_info(&mut self, funding_info: (OutPoint, Script)) {
 478                 self.funding_txo = Some(funding_info);
 479         }
 480
 481         pub(super) fn set_their_htlc_base_key(&mut self, their_htlc_base_key: &PublicKey) {
 482                 self.their_htlc_base_key = Some(their_htlc_base_key.clone());
 483         }
 484
 485         pub(super) fn set_their_to_self_delay(&mut self, their_to_self_delay: u16) {
 486                 self.their_to_self_delay = Some(their_to_self_delay);
 487         }
 488
 489         pub(super) fn unset_funding_info(&mut self) {
 490                 self.funding_txo = None;
 491         }
 492
 493         pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
 494                 match self.funding_txo {
 495                         Some((outpoint, _)) => Some(outpoint),
 496                         None => None
 497                 }
 498         }
 499
 500         /// Serializes into a vec, with various modes for the exposed pub fns
 501         fn serialize(&self, for_local_storage: bool) -> Vec<u8> {
 502                 let mut res = Vec::new();
 503                 res.push(SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
 504                 res.push(MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
 505
 506                 match &self.funding_txo {
 507                         &Some((ref outpoint, ref script)) => {
 508                                 res.extend_from_slice(&outpoint.txid[..]);
 509                                 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(outpoint.index));
 510                                 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(script.len() as u64));
 511                                 res.extend_from_slice(&script[..]);
 512                         },
 513                         &None => {
 514                                 // We haven't even been initialized...not sure why anyone is serializing us, but
 515                                 // not much to give them.
 516                                 return res;
 517                         },
 518                 }
 519
 520                 // Set in initial Channel-object creation, so should always be set by now:
 521                 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor));
 522
 523                 match self.key_storage {
 524                         KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key } => {
 525                                 res.push(0);
 526                                 res.extend_from_slice(&revocation_base_key[..]);
 527                                 res.extend_from_slice(&htlc_base_key[..]);
 528                         },
 529                         KeyStorage::SigsMode { .. } => unimplemented!(),
 530                 }
 531
 532                 res.extend_from_slice(&self.delayed_payment_base_key.serialize());
 533                 res.extend_from_slice(&self.their_htlc_base_key.as_ref().unwrap().serialize());
 534
 535                 match self.their_cur_revocation_points {
 536                         Some((idx, pubkey, second_option)) => {
 537                                 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(idx));
 538                                 res.extend_from_slice(&pubkey.serialize());
 539                                 match second_option {
 540                                         Some(second_pubkey) => {
 541                                                 res.extend_from_slice(&second_pubkey.serialize());
 542                                         },
 543                                         None => {
 544                                                 res.extend_from_slice(&[0; 33]);
 545                                         },
 546                                 }
 547                         },
 548                         None => {
 549                                 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(0));
 550                         },
 551                 }
 552
 553                 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.our_to_self_delay));
 554                 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap()));
 555
 556                 for &(ref secret, ref idx) in self.old_secrets.iter() {
 557                         res.extend_from_slice(secret);
 558                         res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*idx));
 559                 }
 560
 561                 macro_rules! serialize_htlc_in_commitment {
 562                         ($htlc_output: expr) => {
 563                                 res.push($htlc_output.offered as u8);
 564                                 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc_output.amount_msat));
 565                                 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array($htlc_output.cltv_expiry));
 566                                 res.extend_from_slice(&$htlc_output.payment_hash);
 567                                 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array($htlc_output.transaction_output_index));
 568                         }
 569                 }
 570
 571                 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_claimable_outpoints.len() as u64));
 572                 for (txid, htlc_outputs) in self.remote_claimable_outpoints.iter() {
 573                         res.extend_from_slice(&txid[..]);
 574                         res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc_outputs.len() as u64));
 575                         for htlc_output in htlc_outputs.iter() {
 576                                 serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output);
 577                         }
 578                 }
 579
 580                 {
 581                         let remote_commitment_txn_on_chain = self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.lock().unwrap();
 582                         res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.len() as u64));
 583                         for (txid, commitment_number) in remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
 584                                 res.extend_from_slice(&txid[..]);
 585                                 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(*commitment_number));
 586                         }
 587                 }
 588
 589                 if for_local_storage {
 590                         res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_hash_commitment_number.len() as u64));
 591                         for (payment_hash, commitment_number) in self.remote_hash_commitment_number.iter() {
 592                                 res.extend_from_slice(payment_hash);
 593                                 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(*commitment_number));
 594                         }
 595                 } else {
 596                         res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(0));
 597                 }
 598
 599                 macro_rules! serialize_local_tx {
 600                         ($local_tx: expr) => {
 601                                 let tx_ser = serialize::serialize(&$local_tx.tx).unwrap();
 602                                 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(tx_ser.len() as u64));
 603                                 res.extend_from_slice(&tx_ser);
 604
 605                                 res.extend_from_slice(&$local_tx.revocation_key.serialize());
 606                                 res.extend_from_slice(&$local_tx.a_htlc_key.serialize());
 607                                 res.extend_from_slice(&$local_tx.b_htlc_key.serialize());
 608                                 res.extend_from_slice(&$local_tx.delayed_payment_key.serialize());
 609
 610                                 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($local_tx.feerate_per_kw));
 611                                 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($local_tx.htlc_outputs.len() as u64));
 612                                 for &(ref htlc_output, ref their_sig, ref our_sig) in $local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
 613                                         serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output);
 614                                         res.extend_from_slice(&their_sig.serialize_compact(&self.secp_ctx));
 615                                         res.extend_from_slice(&our_sig.serialize_compact(&self.secp_ctx));
 616                                 }
 617                         }
 618                 }
 619
 620                 if let Some(ref prev_local_tx) = self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
 621                         res.push(1);
 622                         serialize_local_tx!(prev_local_tx);
 623                 } else {
 624                         res.push(0);
 625                 }
 626
 627                 if let Some(ref cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
 628                         res.push(1);
 629                         serialize_local_tx!(cur_local_tx);
 630                 } else {
 631                         res.push(0);
 632                 }
 633
 634                 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.payment_preimages.len() as u64));
 635                 for payment_preimage in self.payment_preimages.values() {
 636                         res.extend_from_slice(payment_preimage);
 637                 }
 638
 639                 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.destination_script.len() as u64));
 640                 res.extend_from_slice(&self.destination_script[..]);
 641
 642                 res
 643         }
 644
 645         /// Encodes this monitor into a byte array, suitable for writing to disk.
 646         pub fn serialize_for_disk(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
 647                 self.serialize(true)
 648         }
 649
 650         /// Encodes this monitor into a byte array, suitable for sending to a remote watchtower
 651         pub fn serialize_for_watchtower(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
 652                 self.serialize(false)
 653         }
 654
 655         /// Attempts to decode a serialized monitor
 656         pub fn deserialize(data: &[u8]) -> Option<Self> {
 657                 let mut read_pos = 0;
 658                 macro_rules! read_bytes {
 659                         ($byte_count: expr) => {
 660                                 {
 661                                         if ($byte_count as usize) > data.len() - read_pos {
 662                                                 return None;
 663                                         }
 664                                         read_pos += $byte_count as usize;
 665                                         &data[read_pos - $byte_count as usize..read_pos]
 666                                 }
 667                         }
 668                 }
 669
 670                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
 671                 macro_rules! unwrap_obj {
 672                         ($key: expr) => {
 673                                 match $key {
 674                                         Ok(res) => res,
 675                                         Err(_) => return None,
 676                                 }
 677                         }
 678                 }
 679
 680                 let _ver = read_bytes!(1)[0];
 681                 let min_ver = read_bytes!(1)[0];
 682                 if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION {
 683                         return None;
 684                 }
 685
 686                 // Technically this can fail and serialize fail a round-trip, but only for serialization of
 687                 // barely-init'd ChannelMonitors that we can't do anything with.
 688                 let outpoint = OutPoint {
 689                         txid: Sha256dHash::from(read_bytes!(32)),
 690                         index: byte_utils::slice_to_be16(read_bytes!(2)),
 691                 };
 692                 let script_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8));
 693                 let funding_txo = Some((outpoint, Script::from(read_bytes!(script_len).to_vec())));
 694                 let commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor = byte_utils::slice_to_be48(read_bytes!(6));
 695
 696                 let key_storage = match read_bytes!(1)[0] {
 697                         0 => {
 698                                 KeyStorage::PrivMode {
 699                                         revocation_base_key: unwrap_obj!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(32))),
 700                                         htlc_base_key: unwrap_obj!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(32))),
 701                                 }
 702                         },
 703                         _ => return None,
 704                 };
 705
 706                 let delayed_payment_base_key = unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(33)));
 707                 let their_htlc_base_key = Some(unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(33))));
 708
 709                 let their_cur_revocation_points = {
 710                         let first_idx = byte_utils::slice_to_be48(read_bytes!(6));
 711                         if first_idx == 0 {
 712                                 None
 713                         } else {
 714                                 let first_point = unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(33)));
 715                                 let second_point_slice = read_bytes!(33);
 716                                 if second_point_slice[0..32] == [0; 32] && second_point_slice[32] == 0 {
 717                                         Some((first_idx, first_point, None))
 718                                 } else {
 719                                         Some((first_idx, first_point, Some(unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, second_point_slice)))))
 720                                 }
 721                         }
 722                 };
 723
 724                 let our_to_self_delay = byte_utils::slice_to_be16(read_bytes!(2));
 725                 let their_to_self_delay = Some(byte_utils::slice_to_be16(read_bytes!(2)));
 726
 727                 let mut old_secrets = [([0; 32], 1 << 48); 49];
 728                 for &mut (ref mut secret, ref mut idx) in old_secrets.iter_mut() {
 729                         secret.copy_from_slice(read_bytes!(32));
 730                         *idx = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8));
 731                 }
 732
 733                 macro_rules! read_htlc_in_commitment {
 734                         () => {
 735                                 {
 736                                         let offered = match read_bytes!(1)[0] {
 737                                                 0 => false, 1 => true,
 738                                                 _ => return None,
 739                                         };
 740                                         let amount_msat = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8));
 741                                         let cltv_expiry = byte_utils::slice_to_be32(read_bytes!(4));
 742                                         let mut payment_hash = [0; 32];
 743                                         payment_hash[..].copy_from_slice(read_bytes!(32));
 744                                         let transaction_output_index = byte_utils::slice_to_be32(read_bytes!(4));
 745
 746                                         HTLCOutputInCommitment {
 747                                                 offered, amount_msat, cltv_expiry, payment_hash, transaction_output_index
 748                                         }
 749                                 }
 750                         }
 751                 }
 752
 753                 let remote_claimable_outpoints_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8));
 754                 if remote_claimable_outpoints_len > data.len() as u64 / 64 { return None; }
 755                 let mut remote_claimable_outpoints = HashMap::with_capacity(remote_claimable_outpoints_len as usize);
 756                 for _ in 0..remote_claimable_outpoints_len {
 757                         let txid = Sha256dHash::from(read_bytes!(32));
 758                         let outputs_count = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8));
 759                         if outputs_count > data.len() as u64 / 32 { return None; }
 760                         let mut outputs = Vec::with_capacity(outputs_count as usize);
 761                         for _ in 0..outputs_count {
 762                                 outputs.push(read_htlc_in_commitment!());
 763                         }
 764                         if let Some(_) = remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, outputs) {
 765                                 return None;
 766                         }
 767                 }
 768
 769                 let remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8));
 770                 if remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len > data.len() as u64 / 32 { return None; }
 771                 let mut remote_commitment_txn_on_chain = HashMap::with_capacity(remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len as usize);
 772                 for _ in 0..remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len {
 773                         let txid = Sha256dHash::from(read_bytes!(32));
 774                         let commitment_number = byte_utils::slice_to_be48(read_bytes!(6));
 775                         if let Some(_) = remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(txid, commitment_number) {
 776                                 return None;
 777                         }
 778                 }
 779
 780                 let remote_hash_commitment_number_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8));
 781                 if remote_hash_commitment_number_len > data.len() as u64 / 32 { return None; }
 782                 let mut remote_hash_commitment_number = HashMap::with_capacity(remote_hash_commitment_number_len as usize);
 783                 for _ in 0..remote_hash_commitment_number_len {
 784                         let mut txid = [0; 32];
 785                         txid[..].copy_from_slice(read_bytes!(32));
 786                         let commitment_number = byte_utils::slice_to_be48(read_bytes!(6));
 787                         if let Some(_) = remote_hash_commitment_number.insert(txid, commitment_number) {
 788                                 return None;
 789                         }
 790                 }
 791
 792                 macro_rules! read_local_tx {
 793                         () => {
 794                                 {
 795                                         let tx_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8));
 796                                         let tx_ser = read_bytes!(tx_len);
 797                                         let tx: Transaction = unwrap_obj!(serialize::deserialize(tx_ser));
 798                                         if serialize::serialize(&tx).unwrap() != tx_ser {
 799                                                 // We check that the tx re-serializes to the same form to ensure there is
 800                                                 // no extra data, and as rust-bitcoin doesn't handle the 0-input ambiguity
 801                                                 // all that well.
 802                                                 return None;
 803                                         }
 804
 805                                         let revocation_key = unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(33)));
 806                                         let a_htlc_key = unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(33)));
 807                                         let b_htlc_key = unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(33)));
 808                                         let delayed_payment_key = unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(33)));
 809                                         let feerate_per_kw = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8));
 810
 811                                         let htlc_outputs_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8));
 812                                         if htlc_outputs_len > data.len() as u64 / 128 { return None; }
 813                                         let mut htlc_outputs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_outputs_len as usize);
 814                                         for _ in 0..htlc_outputs_len {
 815                                                 htlc_outputs.push((read_htlc_in_commitment!(),
 816                                                                 unwrap_obj!(Signature::from_compact(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(64))),
 817                                                                 unwrap_obj!(Signature::from_compact(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(64)))));
 818                                         }
 819
 820                                         LocalSignedTx {
 821                                                 txid: tx.txid(),
 822                                                 tx, revocation_key, a_htlc_key, b_htlc_key, delayed_payment_key, feerate_per_kw, htlc_outputs
 823                                         }
 824                                 }
 825                         }
 826                 }
 827
 828                 let prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = match read_bytes!(1)[0] {
 829                         0 => None,
 830                         1 => {
 831                                 Some(read_local_tx!())
 832                         },
 833                         _ => return None,
 834                 };
 835
 836                 let current_local_signed_commitment_tx = match read_bytes!(1)[0] {
 837                         0 => None,
 838                         1 => {
 839                                 Some(read_local_tx!())
 840                         },
 841                         _ => return None,
 842                 };
 843
 844                 let payment_preimages_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8));
 845                 if payment_preimages_len > data.len() as u64 / 32 { return None; }
 846                 let mut payment_preimages = HashMap::with_capacity(payment_preimages_len as usize);
 847                 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
 848                 for _ in 0..payment_preimages_len {
 849                         let mut preimage = [0; 32];
 850                         preimage[..].copy_from_slice(read_bytes!(32));
 851                         sha.reset();
 852                         sha.input(&preimage);
 853                         let mut hash = [0; 32];
 854                         sha.result(&mut hash);
 855                         if let Some(_) = payment_preimages.insert(hash, preimage) {
 856                                 return None;
 857                         }
 858                 }
 859
 860                 let destination_script_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8));
 861                 let destination_script = Script::from(read_bytes!(destination_script_len).to_vec());
 862
 863                 Some(ChannelMonitor {
 864                         funding_txo,
 865                         commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor,
 866
 867                         key_storage,
 868                         delayed_payment_base_key,
 869                         their_htlc_base_key,
 870                         their_cur_revocation_points,
 871
 872                         our_to_self_delay,
 873                         their_to_self_delay,
 874
 875                         old_secrets,
 876                         remote_claimable_outpoints,
 877                         remote_commitment_txn_on_chain: Mutex::new(remote_commitment_txn_on_chain),
 878                         remote_hash_commitment_number,
 879
 880                         prev_local_signed_commitment_tx,
 881                         current_local_signed_commitment_tx,
 882
 883                         payment_preimages,
 884
 885                         destination_script,
 886                         secp_ctx,
 887                 })
 888         }
 889
 890         //TODO: Functions to serialize/deserialize (with different forms depending on which information
 891         //we want to leave out (eg funding_txo, etc).
 892
 893         /// Can only fail if idx is < get_min_seen_secret
 894         pub fn get_secret(&self, idx: u64) -> Result<[u8; 32], HandleError> {
 895                 for i in 0..self.old_secrets.len() {
 896                         if (idx & (!((1 << i) - 1))) == self.old_secrets[i].1 {
 897                                 return Ok(ChannelMonitor::derive_secret(self.old_secrets[i].0, i as u8, idx))
 898                         }
 899                 }
 900                 assert!(idx < self.get_min_seen_secret());
 901                 Err(HandleError{err: "idx too low", action: None})
 902         }
 903
 904         pub fn get_min_seen_secret(&self) -> u64 {
 905                 //TODO This can be optimized?
 906                 let mut min = 1 << 48;
 907                 for &(_, idx) in self.old_secrets.iter() {
 908                         if idx < min {
 909                                 min = idx;
 910                         }
 911                 }
 912                 min
 913         }
 914
 915         /// Attempts to claim a remote commitment transaction's outputs using the revocation key and
 916         /// data in remote_claimable_outpoints. Will directly claim any HTLC outputs which expire at a
 917         /// height > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER. In any case, will install monitoring for
 918         /// HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions, and claim them using the revocation key (if
 919         /// applicable) as well.
 920         fn check_spend_remote_transaction(&self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32) -> (Vec<Transaction>, (Sha256dHash, Vec<TxOut>)) {
 921                 // Most secp and related errors trying to create keys means we have no hope of constructing
 922                 // a spend transaction...so we return no transactions to broadcast
 923                 let mut txn_to_broadcast = Vec::new();
 924                 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
 925
 926                 let commitment_txid = tx.txid(); //TODO: This is gonna be a performance bottleneck for watchtowers!
 927                 let per_commitment_option = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(&commitment_txid);
 928
 929                 macro_rules! ignore_error {
 930                         ( $thing : expr ) => {
 931                                 match $thing {
 932                                         Ok(a) => a,
 933                                         Err(_) => return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs))
 934                                 }
 935                         };
 936                 }
 937
 938                 let commitment_number = 0xffffffffffff - ((((tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor);
 939                 if commitment_number >= self.get_min_seen_secret() {
 940                         let secret = self.get_secret(commitment_number).unwrap();
 941                         let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &secret));
 942                         let (revocation_pubkey, b_htlc_key) = match self.key_storage {
 943                                 KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key } => {
 944                                         let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
 945                                         (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_base_key))),
 946                                         ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &htlc_base_key))))
 947                                 },
 948                                 KeyStorage::SigsMode { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
 949                                         let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
 950                                         (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &revocation_base_key)),
 951                                         ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &htlc_base_key)))
 952                                 },
 953                         };
 954                         let delayed_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key), &self.delayed_payment_base_key));
 955                         let a_htlc_key = match self.their_htlc_base_key {
 956                                 None => return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs)),
 957                                 Some(their_htlc_base_key) => ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key), &their_htlc_base_key)),
 958                         };
 959
 960                         let revokeable_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey, self.our_to_self_delay, &delayed_key);
 961                         let revokeable_p2wsh = revokeable_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
 962
 963                         let mut total_value = 0;
 964                         let mut values = Vec::new();
 965                         let mut inputs = Vec::new();
 966                         let mut htlc_idxs = Vec::new();
 967
 968                         for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
 969                                 if outp.script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh {
 970                                         inputs.push(TxIn {
 971                                                 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
 972                                                         txid: commitment_txid,
 973                                                         vout: idx as u32,
 974                                                 },
 975                                                 script_sig: Script::new(),
 976                                                 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
 977                                                 witness: Vec::new(),
 978                                         });
 979                                         htlc_idxs.push(None);
 980                                         values.push(outp.value);
 981                                         total_value += outp.value;
 982                                         break; // There can only be one of these
 983                                 }
 984                         }
 985
 986                         macro_rules! sign_input {
 987                                 ($sighash_parts: expr, $input: expr, $htlc_idx: expr, $amount: expr) => {
 988                                         {
 989                                                 let (sig, redeemscript) = match self.key_storage {
 990                                                         KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
 991                                                                 let redeemscript = if $htlc_idx.is_none() { revokeable_redeemscript.clone() } else {
 992                                                                         let htlc = &per_commitment_option.unwrap()[$htlc_idx.unwrap()];
 993                                                                         chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey)
 994                                                                 };
 995                                                                 let sighash = ignore_error!(Message::from_slice(&$sighash_parts.sighash_all(&$input, &redeemscript, $amount)[..]));
 996                                                                 let revocation_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key, &revocation_base_key));
 997                                                                 (self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &revocation_key), redeemscript)
 998                                                         },
 999                                                         KeyStorage::SigsMode { .. } => {
1000                                                                 unimplemented!();
1001                                                         }
1002                                                 };
1003                                                 $input.witness.push(sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
1004                                                 $input.witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1005                                                 if $htlc_idx.is_none() {
1006                                                         $input.witness.push(vec!(1));
1007                                                 } else {
1008                                                         $input.witness.push(revocation_pubkey.serialize().to_vec());
1009                                                 }
1010                                                 $input.witness.push(redeemscript.into_bytes());
1011                                         }
1012                                 }
1013                         }
1014
1015                         if let Some(per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
1016                                 inputs.reserve_exact(per_commitment_data.len());
1017
1018                                 for (idx, htlc) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() {
1019                                         let expected_script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey);
1020                                         if htlc.transaction_output_index as usize >= tx.output.len() ||
1021                                                         tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 ||
1022                                                         tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].script_pubkey != expected_script.to_v0_p2wsh() {
1023                                                 return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs)); // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user
1024                                         }
1025                                         let input = TxIn {
1026                                                 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
1027                                                         txid: commitment_txid,
1028                                                         vout: htlc.transaction_output_index,
1029                                                 },
1030                                                 script_sig: Script::new(),
1031                                                 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
1032                                                 witness: Vec::new(),
1033                                         };
1034                                         if htlc.cltv_expiry > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER {
1035                                                 inputs.push(input);
1036                                                 htlc_idxs.push(Some(idx));
1037                                                 values.push(tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].value);
1038                                                 total_value += htlc.amount_msat / 1000;
1039                                         } else {
1040                                                 let mut single_htlc_tx = Transaction {
1041                                                         version: 2,
1042                                                         lock_time: 0,
1043                                                         input: vec![input],
1044                                                         output: vec!(TxOut {
1045                                                                 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1046                                                                 value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000, //TODO: - fee
1047                                                         }),
1048                                                 };
1049                                                 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&single_htlc_tx);
1050                                                 sign_input!(sighash_parts, single_htlc_tx.input[0], Some(idx), htlc.amount_msat / 1000);
1051                                                 txn_to_broadcast.push(single_htlc_tx); // TODO: This is not yet tested in ChannelManager!
1052                                         }
1053                                 }
1054                         }
1055
1056                         if !inputs.is_empty() || !txn_to_broadcast.is_empty() { // ie we're confident this is actually ours
1057                                 // We're definitely a remote commitment transaction!
1058                                 watch_outputs.append(&mut tx.output.clone());
1059                                 self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.lock().unwrap().insert(commitment_txid, commitment_number);
1060                         }
1061                         if inputs.is_empty() { return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs)); } // Nothing to be done...probably a false positive/local tx
1062
1063                         let outputs = vec!(TxOut {
1064                                 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1065                                 value: total_value, //TODO: - fee
1066                         });
1067                         let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
1068                                 version: 2,
1069                                 lock_time: 0,
1070                                 input: inputs,
1071                                 output: outputs,
1072                         };
1073
1074                         let mut values_drain = values.drain(..);
1075                         let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx);
1076
1077                         for (input, htlc_idx) in spend_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(htlc_idxs.iter()) {
1078                                 let value = values_drain.next().unwrap();
1079                                 sign_input!(sighash_parts, input, htlc_idx, value);
1080                         }
1081
1082                         txn_to_broadcast.push(spend_tx);
1083                 } else if let Some(per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
1084                         // While this isn't useful yet, there is a potential race where if a counterparty
1085                         // revokes a state at the same time as the commitment transaction for that state is
1086                         // confirmed, and the watchtower receives the block before the user, the user could
1087                         // upload a new ChannelMonitor with the revocation secret but the watchtower has
1088                         // already processed the block, resulting in the remote_commitment_txn_on_chain entry
1089                         // not being generated by the above conditional. Thus, to be safe, we go ahead and
1090                         // insert it here.
1091                         watch_outputs.append(&mut tx.output.clone());
1092                         self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.lock().unwrap().insert(commitment_txid, commitment_number);
1093
1094                         if let Some(revocation_points) = self.their_cur_revocation_points {
1095                                 let revocation_point_option =
1096                                         if revocation_points.0 == commitment_number { Some(&revocation_points.1) }
1097                                         else if let Some(point) = revocation_points.2.as_ref() {
1098                                                 if revocation_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 { Some(point) } else { None }
1099                                         } else { None };
1100                                 if let Some(revocation_point) = revocation_point_option {
1101                                         let (revocation_pubkey, b_htlc_key) = match self.key_storage {
1102                                                 KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key } => {
1103                                                         (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_base_key))),
1104                                                         ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &htlc_base_key))))
1105                                                 },
1106                                                 KeyStorage::SigsMode { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
1107                                                         (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &revocation_base_key)),
1108                                                         ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &htlc_base_key)))
1109                                                 },
1110                                         };
1111                                         let a_htlc_key = match self.their_htlc_base_key {
1112                                                 None => return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs)),
1113                                                 Some(their_htlc_base_key) => ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &their_htlc_base_key)),
1114                                         };
1115
1116                                         let mut total_value = 0;
1117                                         let mut values = Vec::new();
1118                                         let mut inputs = Vec::new();
1119
1120                                         macro_rules! sign_input {
1121                                                 ($sighash_parts: expr, $input: expr, $amount: expr, $preimage: expr) => {
1122                                                         {
1123                                                                 let (sig, redeemscript) = match self.key_storage {
1124                                                                         KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
1125                                                                                 let htlc = &per_commitment_option.unwrap()[$input.sequence as usize];
1126                                                                                 let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey);
1127                                                                                 let sighash = ignore_error!(Message::from_slice(&$sighash_parts.sighash_all(&$input, &redeemscript, $amount)[..]));
1128                                                                                 let htlc_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &htlc_base_key));
1129                                                                                 (self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &htlc_key), redeemscript)
1130                                                                         },
1131                                                                         KeyStorage::SigsMode { .. } => {
1132                                                                                 unimplemented!();
1133                                                                         }
1134                                                                 };
1135                                                                 $input.witness.push(sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
1136                                                                 $input.witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1137                                                                 $input.witness.push($preimage);
1138                                                                 $input.witness.push(redeemscript.into_bytes());
1139                                                         }
1140                                                 }
1141                                         }
1142
1143                                         for (idx, htlc) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() {
1144                                                 if let Some(payment_preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
1145                                                         let input = TxIn {
1146                                                                 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
1147                                                                         txid: commitment_txid,
1148                                                                         vout: htlc.transaction_output_index,
1149                                                                 },
1150                                                                 script_sig: Script::new(),
1151                                                                 sequence: idx as u32, // reset to 0xfffffffd in sign_input
1152                                                                 witness: Vec::new(),
1153                                                         };
1154                                                         if htlc.cltv_expiry > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER {
1155                                                                 inputs.push(input);
1156                                                                 values.push((tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].value, payment_preimage));
1157                                                                 total_value += htlc.amount_msat / 1000;
1158                                                         } else {
1159                                                                 let mut single_htlc_tx = Transaction {
1160                                                                         version: 2,
1161                                                                         lock_time: 0,
1162                                                                         input: vec![input],
1163                                                                         output: vec!(TxOut {
1164                                                                                 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1165                                                                                 value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000, //TODO: - fee
1166                                                                         }),
1167                                                                 };
1168                                                                 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&single_htlc_tx);
1169                                                                 sign_input!(sighash_parts, single_htlc_tx.input[0], htlc.amount_msat / 1000, payment_preimage.to_vec());
1170                                                                 txn_to_broadcast.push(single_htlc_tx);
1171                                                         }
1172                                                 }
1173                                         }
1174
1175                                         if inputs.is_empty() { return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs)); } // Nothing to be done...probably a false positive/local tx
1176
1177                                         let outputs = vec!(TxOut {
1178                                                 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1179                                                 value: total_value, //TODO: - fee
1180                                         });
1181                                         let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
1182                                                 version: 2,
1183                                                 lock_time: 0,
1184                                                 input: inputs,
1185                                                 output: outputs,
1186                                         };
1187
1188                                         let mut values_drain = values.drain(..);
1189                                         let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx);
1190
1191                                         for input in spend_tx.input.iter_mut() {
1192                                                 let value = values_drain.next().unwrap();
1193                                                 sign_input!(sighash_parts, input, value.0, value.1.to_vec());
1194                                         }
1195
1196                                         txn_to_broadcast.push(spend_tx);
1197                                 }
1198                         }
1199                 } else {
1200                         //TODO: For each input check if its in our remote_commitment_txn_on_chain map!
1201                 }
1202
1203                 (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs))
1204         }
1205
1206         fn broadcast_by_local_state(&self, local_tx: &LocalSignedTx) -> Vec<Transaction> {
1207                 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
1208
1209                 for &(ref htlc, ref their_sig, ref our_sig) in local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1210                         if htlc.offered {
1211                                 let mut htlc_timeout_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&local_tx.txid, local_tx.feerate_per_kw, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), htlc, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key, &local_tx.revocation_key);
1212
1213                                 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
1214
1215                                 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(their_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
1216                                 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1217                                 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
1218                                 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1219
1220                                 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new());
1221                                 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &local_tx.a_htlc_key, &local_tx.b_htlc_key, &local_tx.revocation_key).into_bytes());
1222
1223                                 res.push(htlc_timeout_tx);
1224                         } else {
1225                                 if let Some(payment_preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
1226                                         let mut htlc_success_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&local_tx.txid, local_tx.feerate_per_kw, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), htlc, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key, &local_tx.revocation_key);
1227
1228                                         htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
1229
1230                                         htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(their_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
1231                                         htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1232                                         htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
1233                                         htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1234
1235                                         htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(payment_preimage.to_vec());
1236                                         htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &local_tx.a_htlc_key, &local_tx.b_htlc_key, &local_tx.revocation_key).into_bytes());
1237
1238                                         res.push(htlc_success_tx);
1239                                 }
1240                         }
1241                 }
1242
1243                 res
1244         }
1245
1246         /// Attempts to claim any claimable HTLCs in a commitment transaction which was not (yet)
1247         /// revoked using data in local_claimable_outpoints.
1248         /// Should not be used if check_spend_revoked_transaction succeeds.
1249         fn check_spend_local_transaction(&self, tx: &Transaction, _height: u32) -> Vec<Transaction> {
1250                 let commitment_txid = tx.txid();
1251                 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1252                         if local_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
1253                                 return self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx);
1254                         }
1255                 }
1256                 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1257                         if local_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
1258                                 return self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx);
1259                         }
1260                 }
1261                 Vec::new()
1262         }
1263
1264         fn block_connected(&self, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], height: u32, broadcaster: &BroadcasterInterface)-> Vec<(Sha256dHash, Vec<TxOut>)> {
1265                 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
1266                 for tx in txn_matched {
1267                         for txin in tx.input.iter() {
1268                                 if self.funding_txo.is_none() || (txin.previous_output.txid == self.funding_txo.as_ref().unwrap().0.txid && txin.previous_output.vout == self.funding_txo.as_ref().unwrap().0.index as u32) {
1269                                         let (mut txn, new_outputs) = self.check_spend_remote_transaction(tx, height);
1270                                         if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() {
1271                                                 watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
1272                                         }
1273                                         if txn.is_empty() {
1274                                                 txn = self.check_spend_local_transaction(tx, height);
1275                                         }
1276                                         for tx in txn.iter() {
1277                                                 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(tx);
1278                                         }
1279                                 }
1280                         }
1281                 }
1282                 if let Some(ref cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1283                         let mut needs_broadcast = false;
1284                         for &(ref htlc, _, _) in cur_local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1285                                 if htlc.cltv_expiry <= height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER {
1286                                         if htlc.offered || self.payment_preimages.contains_key(&htlc.payment_hash) {
1287                                                 needs_broadcast = true;
1288                                         }
1289                                 }
1290                         }
1291
1292                         if needs_broadcast {
1293                                 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&cur_local_tx.tx);
1294                                 for tx in self.broadcast_by_local_state(&cur_local_tx) {
1295                                         broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
1296                                 }
1297                         }
1298                 }
1299                 watch_outputs
1300         }
1301
1302         pub fn would_broadcast_at_height(&self, height: u32) -> bool {
1303                 if let Some(ref cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1304                         for &(ref htlc, _, _) in cur_local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1305                                 if htlc.cltv_expiry <= height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER {
1306                                         if htlc.offered || self.payment_preimages.contains_key(&htlc.payment_hash) {
1307                                                 return true;
1308                                         }
1309                                 }
1310                         }
1311                 }
1312                 false
1313         }
1314 }
1315
1316 #[cfg(test)]
1317 mod tests {
1318         use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Script;
1319         use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
1320         use crypto::digest::Digest;
1321         use hex;
1322         use ln::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor;
1323         use ln::chan_utils::{HTLCOutputInCommitment, TxCreationKeys};
1324         use util::sha2::Sha256;
1325         use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
1326         use secp256k1::{Secp256k1, Signature};
1327         use rand::{thread_rng,Rng};
1328
1329         #[test]
1330         fn test_per_commitment_storage() {
1331                 // Test vectors from BOLT 3:
1332                 let mut secrets: Vec<[u8; 32]> = Vec::new();
1333                 let mut monitor: ChannelMonitor;
1334                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1335
1336                 macro_rules! test_secrets {
1337                         () => {
1338                                 let mut idx = 281474976710655;
1339                                 for secret in secrets.iter() {
1340                                         assert_eq!(monitor.get_secret(idx).unwrap(), *secret);
1341                                         idx -= 1;
1342                                 }
1343                                 assert_eq!(monitor.get_min_seen_secret(), idx + 1);
1344                                 assert!(monitor.get_secret(idx).is_err());
1345                         };
1346                 }
1347
1348                 let delayed_payment_base_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap());
1349
1350                 {
1351                         // insert_secret correct sequence
1352                         monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &delayed_payment_base_key, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
1353                         secrets.clear();
1354
1355                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1356                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1357                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1358                         test_secrets!();
1359
1360                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1361                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1362                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1363                         test_secrets!();
1364
1365                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1366                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1367                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1368                         test_secrets!();
1369
1370                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1371                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1372                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1373                         test_secrets!();
1374
1375                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1376                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
1377                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1378                         test_secrets!();
1379
1380                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1381                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
1382                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1383                         test_secrets!();
1384
1385                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1386                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
1387                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1388                         test_secrets!();
1389
1390                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1391                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
1392                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1393                         test_secrets!();
1394                 }
1395
1396                 {
1397                         // insert_secret #1 incorrect
1398                         monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &delayed_payment_base_key, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
1399                         secrets.clear();
1400
1401                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1402                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
1403                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1404                         test_secrets!();
1405
1406                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1407                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1408                         assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err,
1409                                         "Previous secret did not match new one");
1410                 }
1411
1412                 {
1413                         // insert_secret #2 incorrect (#1 derived from incorrect)
1414                         monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &delayed_payment_base_key, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
1415                         secrets.clear();
1416
1417                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1418                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
1419                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1420                         test_secrets!();
1421
1422                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1423                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("dddc3a8d14fddf2b68fa8c7fbad2748274937479dd0f8930d5ebb4ab6bd866a3").unwrap());
1424                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1425                         test_secrets!();
1426
1427                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1428                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1429                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1430                         test_secrets!();
1431
1432                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1433                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1434                         assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err,
1435                                         "Previous secret did not match new one");
1436                 }
1437
1438                 {
1439                         // insert_secret #3 incorrect
1440                         monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &delayed_payment_base_key, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
1441                         secrets.clear();
1442
1443                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1444                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1445                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1446                         test_secrets!();
1447
1448                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1449                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1450                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1451                         test_secrets!();
1452
1453                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1454                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c51a18b13e8527e579ec56365482c62f180b7d5760b46e9477dae59e87ed423a").unwrap());
1455                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1456                         test_secrets!();
1457
1458                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1459                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1460                         assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err,
1461                                         "Previous secret did not match new one");
1462                 }
1463
1464                 {
1465                         // insert_secret #4 incorrect (1,2,3 derived from incorrect)
1466                         monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &delayed_payment_base_key, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
1467                         secrets.clear();
1468
1469                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1470                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
1471                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1472                         test_secrets!();
1473
1474                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1475                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("dddc3a8d14fddf2b68fa8c7fbad2748274937479dd0f8930d5ebb4ab6bd866a3").unwrap());
1476                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1477                         test_secrets!();
1478
1479                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1480                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c51a18b13e8527e579ec56365482c62f180b7d5760b46e9477dae59e87ed423a").unwrap());
1481                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1482                         test_secrets!();
1483
1484                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1485                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("ba65d7b0ef55a3ba300d4e87af29868f394f8f138d78a7011669c79b37b936f4").unwrap());
1486                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1487                         test_secrets!();
1488
1489                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1490                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
1491                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1492                         test_secrets!();
1493
1494                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1495                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
1496                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1497                         test_secrets!();
1498
1499                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1500                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
1501                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1502                         test_secrets!();
1503
1504                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1505                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
1506                         assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err,
1507                                         "Previous secret did not match new one");
1508                 }
1509
1510                 {
1511                         // insert_secret #5 incorrect
1512                         monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &delayed_payment_base_key, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
1513                         secrets.clear();
1514
1515                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1516                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1517                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1518                         test_secrets!();
1519
1520                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1521                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1522                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1523                         test_secrets!();
1524
1525                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1526                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1527                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1528                         test_secrets!();
1529
1530                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1531                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1532                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1533                         test_secrets!();
1534
1535                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1536                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("631373ad5f9ef654bb3dade742d09504c567edd24320d2fcd68e3cc47e2ff6a6").unwrap());
1537                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1538                         test_secrets!();
1539
1540                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1541                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
1542                         assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err,
1543                                         "Previous secret did not match new one");
1544                 }
1545
1546                 {
1547                         // insert_secret #6 incorrect (5 derived from incorrect)
1548                         monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &delayed_payment_base_key, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
1549                         secrets.clear();
1550
1551                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1552                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1553                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1554                         test_secrets!();
1555
1556                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1557                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1558                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1559                         test_secrets!();
1560
1561                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1562                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1563                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1564                         test_secrets!();
1565
1566                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1567                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1568                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1569                         test_secrets!();
1570
1571                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1572                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("631373ad5f9ef654bb3dade742d09504c567edd24320d2fcd68e3cc47e2ff6a6").unwrap());
1573                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1574                         test_secrets!();
1575
1576                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1577                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("b7e76a83668bde38b373970155c868a653304308f9896692f904a23731224bb1").unwrap());
1578                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1579                         test_secrets!();
1580
1581                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1582                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
1583                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1584                         test_secrets!();
1585
1586                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1587                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
1588                         assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err,
1589                                         "Previous secret did not match new one");
1590                 }
1591
1592                 {
1593                         // insert_secret #7 incorrect
1594                         monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &delayed_payment_base_key, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
1595                         secrets.clear();
1596
1597                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1598                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1599                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1600                         test_secrets!();
1601
1602                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1603                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1604                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1605                         test_secrets!();
1606
1607                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1608                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1609                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1610                         test_secrets!();
1611
1612                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1613                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1614                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1615                         test_secrets!();
1616
1617                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1618                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
1619                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1620                         test_secrets!();
1621
1622                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1623                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
1624                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1625                         test_secrets!();
1626
1627                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1628                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("e7971de736e01da8ed58b94c2fc216cb1dca9e326f3a96e7194fe8ea8af6c0a3").unwrap());
1629                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1630                         test_secrets!();
1631
1632                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1633                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
1634                         assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err,
1635                                         "Previous secret did not match new one");
1636                 }
1637
1638                 {
1639                         // insert_secret #8 incorrect
1640                         monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &delayed_payment_base_key, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
1641                         secrets.clear();
1642
1643                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1644                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1645                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1646                         test_secrets!();
1647
1648                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1649                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1650                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1651                         test_secrets!();
1652
1653                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1654                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1655                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1656                         test_secrets!();
1657
1658                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1659                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1660                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1661                         test_secrets!();
1662
1663                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1664                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
1665                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1666                         test_secrets!();
1667
1668                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1669                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
1670                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1671                         test_secrets!();
1672
1673                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1674                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
1675                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1676                         test_secrets!();
1677
1678                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1679                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a7efbc61aac46d34f77778bac22c8a20c6a46ca460addc49009bda875ec88fa4").unwrap());
1680                         assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err,
1681                                         "Previous secret did not match new one");
1682                 }
1683         }
1684
1685         #[test]
1686         fn test_prune_preimages() {
1687                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1688                 let dummy_sig = Signature::from_der(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("3045022100fa86fa9a36a8cd6a7bb8f06a541787d51371d067951a9461d5404de6b928782e02201c8b7c334c10aed8976a3a465be9a28abff4cb23acbf00022295b378ce1fa3cd").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
1689
1690                 macro_rules! dummy_keys {
1691                         () => {
1692                                 {
1693                                         let dummy_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap());
1694                                         TxCreationKeys {
1695                                                 per_commitment_point: dummy_key.clone(),
1696                                                 revocation_key: dummy_key.clone(),
1697                                                 a_htlc_key: dummy_key.clone(),
1698                                                 b_htlc_key: dummy_key.clone(),
1699                                                 a_delayed_payment_key: dummy_key.clone(),
1700                                                 b_payment_key: dummy_key.clone(),
1701                                         }
1702                                 }
1703                         }
1704                 }
1705                 let dummy_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
1706
1707                 let mut preimages = Vec::new();
1708                 {
1709                         let mut rng  = thread_rng();
1710                         for _ in 0..20 {
1711                                 let mut preimage = [0; 32];
1712                                 rng.fill_bytes(&mut preimage);
1713                                 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
1714                                 sha.input(&preimage);
1715                                 let mut hash = [0; 32];
1716                                 sha.result(&mut hash);
1717                                 preimages.push((preimage, hash));
1718                         }
1719                 }
1720
1721                 macro_rules! preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs {
1722                         ($preimages_slice: expr) => {
1723                                 {
1724                                         let mut res = Vec::new();
1725                                         for (idx, preimage) in $preimages_slice.iter().enumerate() {
1726                                                 res.push(HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1727                                                         offered: true,
1728                                                         amount_msat: 0,
1729                                                         cltv_expiry: 0,
1730                                                         payment_hash: preimage.1.clone(),
1731                                                         transaction_output_index: idx as u32,
1732                                                 });
1733                                         }
1734                                         res
1735                                 }
1736                         }
1737                 }
1738                 macro_rules! preimages_to_local_htlcs {
1739                         ($preimages_slice: expr) => {
1740                                 {
1741                                         let mut inp = preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!($preimages_slice);
1742                                         let res: Vec<_> = inp.drain(..).map(|e| { (e, dummy_sig.clone(), dummy_sig.clone()) }).collect();
1743                                         res
1744                                 }
1745                         }
1746                 }
1747
1748                 macro_rules! test_preimages_exist {
1749                         ($preimages_slice: expr, $monitor: expr) => {
1750                                 for preimage in $preimages_slice {
1751                                         assert!($monitor.payment_preimages.contains_key(&preimage.1));
1752                                 }
1753                         }
1754                 }
1755
1756                 // Prune with one old state and a local commitment tx holding a few overlaps with the
1757                 // old state.
1758                 let delayed_payment_base_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap());
1759                 let mut monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &delayed_payment_base_key, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
1760                 monitor.set_their_to_self_delay(10);
1761
1762                 monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(dummy_tx.clone(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..10]));
1763                 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[5..15]), 281474976710655);
1764                 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[15..20]), 281474976710654);
1765                 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[17..20]), 281474976710653);
1766                 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[18..20]), 281474976710652);
1767                 for &(ref preimage, ref hash) in preimages.iter() {
1768                         monitor.provide_payment_preimage(hash, preimage);
1769                 }
1770
1771                 // Now provide a secret, pruning preimages 10-15
1772                 let mut secret = [0; 32];
1773                 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1774                 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secret.clone(), None).unwrap();
1775                 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 15);
1776                 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
1777                 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[15..20], monitor);
1778
1779                 // Now provide a further secret, pruning preimages 15-17
1780                 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1781                 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secret.clone(), None).unwrap();
1782                 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 13);
1783                 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
1784                 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[17..20], monitor);
1785
1786                 // Now update local commitment tx info, pruning only element 18 as we still care about the
1787                 // previous commitment tx's preimages too
1788                 monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(dummy_tx.clone(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..5]));
1789                 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1790                 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secret.clone(), None).unwrap();
1791                 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 12);
1792                 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
1793                 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[18..20], monitor);
1794
1795                 // But if we do it again, we'll prune 5-10
1796                 monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(dummy_tx.clone(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..3]));
1797                 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1798                 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secret.clone(), None).unwrap();
1799                 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 5);
1800                 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..5], monitor);
1801         }
1802
1803         // Further testing is done in the ChannelManager integration tests.
1804 }