1 //! The logic to monitor for on-chain transactions and create the relevant claim responses lives
4 //! ChannelMonitor objects are generated by ChannelManager in response to relevant
5 //! messages/actions, and MUST be persisted to disk (and, preferably, remotely) before progress can
6 //! be made in responding to certain messages, see ManyChannelMonitor for more.
8 //! Note that ChannelMonitors are an important part of the lightning trust model and a copy of the
9 //! latest ChannelMonitor must always be actively monitoring for chain updates (and no out-of-date
10 //! ChannelMonitors should do so). Thus, if you're building rust-lightning into an HSM or other
11 //! security-domain-separated system design, you should consider having multiple paths for
12 //! ChannelMonitors to get out of the HSM and onto monitoring devices.
14 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
15 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxIn,TxOut,SigHashType,Transaction};
16 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
17 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Script;
18 use bitcoin::network::serialize;
19 use bitcoin::network::encodable::{ConsensusDecodable, ConsensusEncodable};
20 use bitcoin::util::hash::Sha256dHash;
21 use bitcoin::util::bip143;
23 use crypto::digest::Digest;
25 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Message,Signature};
26 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
29 use ln::msgs::{DecodeError, HandleError};
31 use ln::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment;
32 use chain::chaininterface::{ChainListener, ChainWatchInterface, BroadcasterInterface};
33 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
34 use chain::keysinterface::SpendableOutputDescriptor;
35 use util::logger::Logger;
36 use util::ser::{ReadableArgs, Readable, Writer, Writeable, WriterWriteAdaptor, U48};
37 use util::sha2::Sha256;
38 use util::{byte_utils, events};
40 use std::collections::HashMap;
41 use std::sync::{Arc,Mutex};
42 use std::{hash,cmp, mem};
44 /// An error enum representing a failure to persist a channel monitor update.
46 pub enum ChannelMonitorUpdateErr {
47 /// Used to indicate a temporary failure (eg connection to a watchtower failed, but is expected
48 /// to succeed at some point in the future).
50 /// Such a failure will "freeze" a channel, preventing us from revoking old states or
51 /// submitting new commitment transactions to the remote party.
52 /// ChannelManager::test_restore_channel_monitor can be used to retry the update(s) and restore
53 /// the channel to an operational state.
55 /// Note that continuing to operate when no copy of the updated ChannelMonitor could be
56 /// persisted is unsafe - if you failed to store the update on your own local disk you should
57 /// instead return PermanentFailure to force closure of the channel ASAP.
59 /// Even when a channel has been "frozen" updates to the ChannelMonitor can continue to occur
60 /// (eg if an inbound HTLC which we forwarded was claimed upstream resulting in us attempting
61 /// to claim it on this channel) and those updates must be applied wherever they can be. At
62 /// least one such updated ChannelMonitor must be persisted otherwise PermanentFailure should
63 /// be returned to get things on-chain ASAP using only the in-memory copy. Obviously updates to
64 /// the channel which would invalidate previous ChannelMonitors are not made when a channel has
67 /// Note that even if updates made after TemporaryFailure succeed you must still call
68 /// test_restore_channel_monitor to ensure you have the latest monitor and re-enable normal
69 /// channel operation.
71 /// Used to indicate no further channel monitor updates will be allowed (eg we've moved on to a
72 /// different watchtower and cannot update with all watchtowers that were previously informed
73 /// of this channel). This will force-close the channel in question.
77 /// Simple trait indicating ability to track a set of ChannelMonitors and multiplex events between
78 /// them. Generally should be implemented by keeping a local SimpleManyChannelMonitor and passing
79 /// events to it, while also taking any add_update_monitor events and passing them to some remote
82 /// Note that any updates to a channel's monitor *must* be applied to each instance of the
83 /// channel's monitor everywhere (including remote watchtowers) *before* this function returns. If
84 /// an update occurs and a remote watchtower is left with old state, it may broadcast transactions
85 /// which we have revoked, allowing our counterparty to claim all funds in the channel!
86 pub trait ManyChannelMonitor: Send + Sync {
87 /// Adds or updates a monitor for the given `funding_txo`.
89 /// Implementor must also ensure that the funding_txo outpoint is registered with any relevant
90 /// ChainWatchInterfaces such that the provided monitor receives block_connected callbacks with
92 fn add_update_monitor(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr>;
95 /// A simple implementation of a ManyChannelMonitor and ChainListener. Can be used to create a
96 /// watchtower or watch our own channels.
98 /// Note that you must provide your own key by which to refer to channels.
100 /// If you're accepting remote monitors (ie are implementing a watchtower), you must verify that
101 /// users cannot overwrite a given channel by providing a duplicate key. ie you should probably
102 /// index by a PublicKey which is required to sign any updates.
104 /// If you're using this for local monitoring of your own channels, you probably want to use
105 /// `OutPoint` as the key, which will give you a ManyChannelMonitor implementation.
106 pub struct SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
107 #[cfg(test)] // Used in ChannelManager tests to manipulate channels directly
108 pub monitors: Mutex<HashMap<Key, ChannelMonitor>>,
110 monitors: Mutex<HashMap<Key, ChannelMonitor>>,
111 chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>,
112 broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>,
113 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
116 impl<Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash> ChainListener for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
117 fn block_connected(&self, _header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], _indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) {
118 let mut new_events: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(0);
120 let monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
121 for monitor in monitors.values() {
122 let (txn_outputs, spendable_outputs) = monitor.block_connected(txn_matched, height, &*self.broadcaster);
123 if spendable_outputs.len() > 0 {
124 new_events.push(events::Event::SpendableOutputs {
125 outputs: spendable_outputs,
128 for (ref txid, ref outputs) in txn_outputs {
129 for (idx, output) in outputs.iter().enumerate() {
130 self.chain_monitor.install_watch_outpoint((txid.clone(), idx as u32), &output.script_pubkey);
135 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
136 pending_events.append(&mut new_events);
139 fn block_disconnected(&self, _: &BlockHeader) { }
142 impl<Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash + 'static> SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
143 /// Creates a new object which can be used to monitor several channels given the chain
144 /// interface with which to register to receive notifications.
145 pub fn new(chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>, broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>) -> Arc<SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key>> {
146 let res = Arc::new(SimpleManyChannelMonitor {
147 monitors: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
150 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
152 let weak_res = Arc::downgrade(&res);
153 res.chain_monitor.register_listener(weak_res);
157 /// Adds or udpates the monitor which monitors the channel referred to by the given key.
158 pub fn add_update_monitor_by_key(&self, key: Key, monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
159 let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
160 match monitors.get_mut(&key) {
161 Some(orig_monitor) => return orig_monitor.insert_combine(monitor),
164 match &monitor.funding_txo {
165 &None => self.chain_monitor.watch_all_txn(),
166 &Some((ref outpoint, ref script)) => {
167 self.chain_monitor.install_watch_tx(&outpoint.txid, script);
168 self.chain_monitor.install_watch_outpoint((outpoint.txid, outpoint.index as u32), script);
171 monitors.insert(key, monitor);
176 impl ManyChannelMonitor for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<OutPoint> {
177 fn add_update_monitor(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr> {
178 match self.add_update_monitor_by_key(funding_txo, monitor) {
180 Err(_) => Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure),
185 impl<Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash> events::EventsProvider for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
186 fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
187 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
188 let mut ret = Vec::new();
189 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut *pending_events);
194 /// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, don't try to claim it in a shared transaction,
195 /// instead claiming it in its own individual transaction.
196 const CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 12;
197 /// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, force-close the channel to broadcast the
198 /// HTLC-Success transaction.
199 /// In other words, this is an upper bound on how many blocks we think it can take us to get a
200 /// transaction confirmed (and we use it in a few more, equivalent, places).
201 pub(crate) const CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 6;
202 /// Number of blocks by which point we expect our counterparty to have seen new blocks on the
203 /// network and done a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance (+ we've updated all our
204 /// copies of ChannelMonitors, including watchtowers).
205 pub(crate) const HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS: u32 = 3;
207 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
210 revocation_base_key: SecretKey,
211 htlc_base_key: SecretKey,
212 delayed_payment_base_key: SecretKey,
213 prev_latest_per_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
214 latest_per_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
217 revocation_base_key: PublicKey,
218 htlc_base_key: PublicKey,
219 sigs: HashMap<Sha256dHash, Signature>,
223 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
224 struct LocalSignedTx {
225 /// txid of the transaction in tx, just used to make comparison faster
228 revocation_key: PublicKey,
229 a_htlc_key: PublicKey,
230 b_htlc_key: PublicKey,
231 delayed_payment_key: PublicKey,
233 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Signature, Signature)>,
236 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
237 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
239 /// A ChannelMonitor handles chain events (blocks connected and disconnected) and generates
240 /// on-chain transactions to ensure no loss of funds occurs.
242 /// You MUST ensure that no ChannelMonitors for a given channel anywhere contain out-of-date
243 /// information and are actively monitoring the chain.
244 pub struct ChannelMonitor {
245 funding_txo: Option<(OutPoint, Script)>,
246 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64,
248 key_storage: KeyStorage,
249 their_htlc_base_key: Option<PublicKey>,
250 their_delayed_payment_base_key: Option<PublicKey>,
251 // first is the idx of the first of the two revocation points
252 their_cur_revocation_points: Option<(u64, PublicKey, Option<PublicKey>)>,
254 our_to_self_delay: u16,
255 their_to_self_delay: Option<u16>,
257 old_secrets: [([u8; 32], u64); 49],
258 remote_claimable_outpoints: HashMap<Sha256dHash, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>>,
259 /// We cannot identify HTLC-Success or HTLC-Timeout transactions by themselves on the chain.
260 /// Nor can we figure out their commitment numbers without the commitment transaction they are
261 /// spending. Thus, in order to claim them via revocation key, we track all the remote
262 /// commitment transactions which we find on-chain, mapping them to the commitment number which
263 /// can be used to derive the revocation key and claim the transactions.
264 remote_commitment_txn_on_chain: Mutex<HashMap<Sha256dHash, u64>>,
265 /// Cache used to make pruning of payment_preimages faster.
266 /// Maps payment_hash values to commitment numbers for remote transactions for non-revoked
267 /// remote transactions (ie should remain pretty small).
268 /// Serialized to disk but should generally not be sent to Watchtowers.
269 remote_hash_commitment_number: HashMap<[u8; 32], u64>,
271 // We store two local commitment transactions to avoid any race conditions where we may update
272 // some monitors (potentially on watchtowers) but then fail to update others, resulting in the
273 // various monitors for one channel being out of sync, and us broadcasting a local
274 // transaction for which we have deleted claim information on some watchtowers.
275 prev_local_signed_commitment_tx: Option<LocalSignedTx>,
276 current_local_signed_commitment_tx: Option<LocalSignedTx>,
278 payment_preimages: HashMap<[u8; 32], [u8; 32]>,
280 destination_script: Script,
282 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>, //TODO: dedup this a bit...
285 impl Clone for ChannelMonitor {
286 fn clone(&self) -> Self {
288 funding_txo: self.funding_txo.clone(),
289 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor.clone(),
291 key_storage: self.key_storage.clone(),
292 their_htlc_base_key: self.their_htlc_base_key.clone(),
293 their_delayed_payment_base_key: self.their_delayed_payment_base_key.clone(),
294 their_cur_revocation_points: self.their_cur_revocation_points.clone(),
296 our_to_self_delay: self.our_to_self_delay,
297 their_to_self_delay: self.their_to_self_delay,
299 old_secrets: self.old_secrets.clone(),
300 remote_claimable_outpoints: self.remote_claimable_outpoints.clone(),
301 remote_commitment_txn_on_chain: Mutex::new((*self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.lock().unwrap()).clone()),
302 remote_hash_commitment_number: self.remote_hash_commitment_number.clone(),
304 prev_local_signed_commitment_tx: self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.clone(),
305 current_local_signed_commitment_tx: self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx.clone(),
307 payment_preimages: self.payment_preimages.clone(),
309 destination_script: self.destination_script.clone(),
310 secp_ctx: self.secp_ctx.clone(),
311 logger: self.logger.clone(),
316 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
317 /// Used only in testing and fuzztarget to check serialization roundtrips don't change the
318 /// underlying object
319 impl PartialEq for ChannelMonitor {
320 fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
321 if self.funding_txo != other.funding_txo ||
322 self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor != other.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor ||
323 self.key_storage != other.key_storage ||
324 self.their_htlc_base_key != other.their_htlc_base_key ||
325 self.their_delayed_payment_base_key != other.their_delayed_payment_base_key ||
326 self.their_cur_revocation_points != other.their_cur_revocation_points ||
327 self.our_to_self_delay != other.our_to_self_delay ||
328 self.their_to_self_delay != other.their_to_self_delay ||
329 self.remote_claimable_outpoints != other.remote_claimable_outpoints ||
330 self.remote_hash_commitment_number != other.remote_hash_commitment_number ||
331 self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx != other.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx ||
332 self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx != other.current_local_signed_commitment_tx ||
333 self.payment_preimages != other.payment_preimages ||
334 self.destination_script != other.destination_script
338 for (&(ref secret, ref idx), &(ref o_secret, ref o_idx)) in self.old_secrets.iter().zip(other.old_secrets.iter()) {
339 if secret != o_secret || idx != o_idx {
343 let us = self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.lock().unwrap();
344 let them = other.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.lock().unwrap();
350 impl ChannelMonitor {
351 pub(super) fn new(revocation_base_key: &SecretKey, delayed_payment_base_key: &SecretKey, htlc_base_key: &SecretKey, our_to_self_delay: u16, destination_script: Script, logger: Arc<Logger>) -> ChannelMonitor {
354 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: 0,
356 key_storage: KeyStorage::PrivMode {
357 revocation_base_key: revocation_base_key.clone(),
358 htlc_base_key: htlc_base_key.clone(),
359 delayed_payment_base_key: delayed_payment_base_key.clone(),
360 prev_latest_per_commitment_point: None,
361 latest_per_commitment_point: None,
363 their_htlc_base_key: None,
364 their_delayed_payment_base_key: None,
365 their_cur_revocation_points: None,
367 our_to_self_delay: our_to_self_delay,
368 their_to_self_delay: None,
370 old_secrets: [([0; 32], 1 << 48); 49],
371 remote_claimable_outpoints: HashMap::new(),
372 remote_commitment_txn_on_chain: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
373 remote_hash_commitment_number: HashMap::new(),
375 prev_local_signed_commitment_tx: None,
376 current_local_signed_commitment_tx: None,
378 payment_preimages: HashMap::new(),
379 destination_script: destination_script,
381 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
387 fn place_secret(idx: u64) -> u8 {
389 if idx & (1 << i) == (1 << i) {
397 fn derive_secret(secret: [u8; 32], bits: u8, idx: u64) -> [u8; 32] {
398 let mut res: [u8; 32] = secret;
400 let bitpos = bits - 1 - i;
401 if idx & (1 << bitpos) == (1 << bitpos) {
402 res[(bitpos / 8) as usize] ^= 1 << (bitpos & 7);
403 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
405 sha.result(&mut res);
411 /// Inserts a revocation secret into this channel monitor. Also optionally tracks the next
412 /// revocation point which may be required to claim HTLC outputs which we know the preimage of
413 /// in case the remote end force-closes using their latest state. Prunes old preimages if neither
414 /// needed by local commitment transactions HTCLs nor by remote ones. Unless we haven't already seen remote
415 /// commitment transaction's secret, they are de facto pruned (we can use revocation key).
416 pub(super) fn provide_secret(&mut self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32], their_next_revocation_point: Option<(u64, PublicKey)>) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
417 let pos = ChannelMonitor::place_secret(idx);
419 let (old_secret, old_idx) = self.old_secrets[i as usize];
420 if ChannelMonitor::derive_secret(secret, pos, old_idx) != old_secret {
421 return Err(HandleError{err: "Previous secret did not match new one", action: None})
424 self.old_secrets[pos as usize] = (secret, idx);
426 if let Some(new_revocation_point) = their_next_revocation_point {
427 match self.their_cur_revocation_points {
428 Some(old_points) => {
429 if old_points.0 == new_revocation_point.0 + 1 {
430 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0, old_points.1, Some(new_revocation_point.1)));
431 } else if old_points.0 == new_revocation_point.0 + 2 {
432 if let Some(old_second_point) = old_points.2 {
433 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0 - 1, old_second_point, Some(new_revocation_point.1)));
435 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((new_revocation_point.0, new_revocation_point.1, None));
438 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((new_revocation_point.0, new_revocation_point.1, None));
442 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((new_revocation_point.0, new_revocation_point.1, None));
447 if !self.payment_preimages.is_empty() {
448 let local_signed_commitment_tx = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx.as_ref().expect("Channel needs at least an initial commitment tx !");
449 let prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.as_ref();
450 let min_idx = self.get_min_seen_secret();
451 let remote_hash_commitment_number = &mut self.remote_hash_commitment_number;
453 self.payment_preimages.retain(|&k, _| {
454 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in &local_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs {
455 if k == htlc.payment_hash {
459 if let Some(prev_local_commitment_tx) = prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
460 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in prev_local_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
461 if k == htlc.payment_hash {
466 let contains = if let Some(cn) = remote_hash_commitment_number.get(&k) {
473 remote_hash_commitment_number.remove(&k);
482 /// Informs this monitor of the latest remote (ie non-broadcastable) commitment transaction.
483 /// The monitor watches for it to be broadcasted and then uses the HTLC information (and
484 /// possibly future revocation/preimage information) to claim outputs where possible.
485 /// We cache also the mapping hash:commitment number to lighten pruning of old preimages by watchtowers.
486 pub(super) fn provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, unsigned_commitment_tx: &Transaction, htlc_outputs: Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>, commitment_number: u64) {
487 // TODO: Encrypt the htlc_outputs data with the single-hash of the commitment transaction
488 // so that a remote monitor doesn't learn anything unless there is a malicious close.
489 // (only maybe, sadly we cant do the same for local info, as we need to be aware of
491 for htlc in &htlc_outputs {
492 self.remote_hash_commitment_number.insert(htlc.payment_hash, commitment_number);
494 self.remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(unsigned_commitment_tx.txid(), htlc_outputs);
497 /// Informs this monitor of the latest local (ie broadcastable) commitment transaction. The
498 /// monitor watches for timeouts and may broadcast it if we approach such a timeout. Thus, it
499 /// is important that any clones of this channel monitor (including remote clones) by kept
500 /// up-to-date as our local commitment transaction is updated.
501 /// Panics if set_their_to_self_delay has never been called.
502 /// Also update KeyStorage with latest local per_commitment_point to derive local_delayedkey in
503 /// case of onchain HTLC tx
504 pub(super) fn provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, signed_commitment_tx: Transaction, local_keys: chan_utils::TxCreationKeys, feerate_per_kw: u64, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Signature, Signature)>) {
505 assert!(self.their_to_self_delay.is_some());
506 self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx.take();
507 self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(LocalSignedTx {
508 txid: signed_commitment_tx.txid(),
509 tx: signed_commitment_tx,
510 revocation_key: local_keys.revocation_key,
511 a_htlc_key: local_keys.a_htlc_key,
512 b_htlc_key: local_keys.b_htlc_key,
513 delayed_payment_key: local_keys.a_delayed_payment_key,
517 self.key_storage = if let KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, ref delayed_payment_base_key, prev_latest_per_commitment_point: _, ref latest_per_commitment_point } = self.key_storage {
518 KeyStorage::PrivMode {
519 revocation_base_key: *revocation_base_key,
520 htlc_base_key: *htlc_base_key,
521 delayed_payment_base_key: *delayed_payment_base_key,
522 prev_latest_per_commitment_point: *latest_per_commitment_point,
523 latest_per_commitment_point: Some(local_keys.per_commitment_point),
525 } else { unimplemented!(); };
528 /// Provides a payment_hash->payment_preimage mapping. Will be automatically pruned when all
529 /// commitment_tx_infos which contain the payment hash have been revoked.
530 pub(super) fn provide_payment_preimage(&mut self, payment_hash: &[u8; 32], payment_preimage: &[u8; 32]) {
531 self.payment_preimages.insert(payment_hash.clone(), payment_preimage.clone());
534 /// Combines this ChannelMonitor with the information contained in the other ChannelMonitor.
535 /// After a successful call this ChannelMonitor is up-to-date and is safe to use to monitor the
536 /// chain for new blocks/transactions.
537 pub fn insert_combine(&mut self, mut other: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
538 if self.funding_txo.is_some() {
539 // We should be able to compare the entire funding_txo, but in fuzztarget its trivially
540 // easy to collide the funding_txo hash and have a different scriptPubKey.
541 if other.funding_txo.is_some() && other.funding_txo.as_ref().unwrap().0 != self.funding_txo.as_ref().unwrap().0 {
542 return Err(HandleError{err: "Funding transaction outputs are not identical!", action: None});
545 self.funding_txo = other.funding_txo.take();
547 let other_min_secret = other.get_min_seen_secret();
548 let our_min_secret = self.get_min_seen_secret();
549 if our_min_secret > other_min_secret {
550 self.provide_secret(other_min_secret, other.get_secret(other_min_secret).unwrap(), None)?;
552 if our_min_secret >= other_min_secret {
553 self.their_cur_revocation_points = other.their_cur_revocation_points;
554 for (txid, htlcs) in other.remote_claimable_outpoints.drain() {
555 self.remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, htlcs);
557 if let Some(local_tx) = other.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
558 self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(local_tx);
560 if let Some(local_tx) = other.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
561 self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(local_tx);
563 self.payment_preimages = other.payment_preimages;
568 /// Panics if commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor doesn't fit in 48 bits
569 pub(super) fn set_commitment_obscure_factor(&mut self, commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64) {
570 assert!(commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor < (1 << 48));
571 self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor = commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor;
574 /// Allows this monitor to scan only for transactions which are applicable. Note that this is
575 /// optional, without it this monitor cannot be used in an SPV client, but you may wish to
576 /// avoid this (or call unset_funding_info) on a monitor you wish to send to a watchtower as it
577 /// provides slightly better privacy.
578 /// It's the responsibility of the caller to register outpoint and script with passing the former
579 /// value as key to add_update_monitor.
580 pub(super) fn set_funding_info(&mut self, funding_info: (OutPoint, Script)) {
581 self.funding_txo = Some(funding_info);
584 /// We log these base keys at channel opening to being able to rebuild redeemscript in case of leaked revoked commit tx
585 pub(super) fn set_their_base_keys(&mut self, their_htlc_base_key: &PublicKey, their_delayed_payment_base_key: &PublicKey) {
586 self.their_htlc_base_key = Some(their_htlc_base_key.clone());
587 self.their_delayed_payment_base_key = Some(their_delayed_payment_base_key.clone());
590 pub(super) fn set_their_to_self_delay(&mut self, their_to_self_delay: u16) {
591 self.their_to_self_delay = Some(their_to_self_delay);
594 pub(super) fn unset_funding_info(&mut self) {
595 self.funding_txo = None;
598 /// Gets the funding transaction outpoint of the channel this ChannelMonitor is monitoring for.
599 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
600 match self.funding_txo {
601 Some((outpoint, _)) => Some(outpoint),
606 /// Serializes into a vec, with various modes for the exposed pub fns
607 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W, for_local_storage: bool) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
608 //TODO: We still write out all the serialization here manually instead of using the fancy
609 //serialization framework we have, we should migrate things over to it.
610 writer.write_all(&[SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
611 writer.write_all(&[MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
613 match &self.funding_txo {
614 &Some((ref outpoint, ref script)) => {
615 writer.write_all(&outpoint.txid[..])?;
616 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(outpoint.index))?;
617 script.write(writer)?;
620 // We haven't even been initialized...not sure why anyone is serializing us, but
621 // not much to give them.
626 // Set in initial Channel-object creation, so should always be set by now:
627 U48(self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor).write(writer)?;
629 match self.key_storage {
630 KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref prev_latest_per_commitment_point, ref latest_per_commitment_point } => {
631 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
632 writer.write_all(&revocation_base_key[..])?;
633 writer.write_all(&htlc_base_key[..])?;
634 writer.write_all(&delayed_payment_base_key[..])?;
635 if let Some(ref prev_latest_per_commitment_point) = *prev_latest_per_commitment_point {
636 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
637 writer.write_all(&prev_latest_per_commitment_point.serialize())?;
639 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
641 if let Some(ref latest_per_commitment_point) = *latest_per_commitment_point {
642 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
643 writer.write_all(&latest_per_commitment_point.serialize())?;
645 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
649 KeyStorage::SigsMode { .. } => unimplemented!(),
652 writer.write_all(&self.their_htlc_base_key.as_ref().unwrap().serialize())?;
653 writer.write_all(&self.their_delayed_payment_base_key.as_ref().unwrap().serialize())?;
655 match self.their_cur_revocation_points {
656 Some((idx, pubkey, second_option)) => {
657 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(idx))?;
658 writer.write_all(&pubkey.serialize())?;
659 match second_option {
660 Some(second_pubkey) => {
661 writer.write_all(&second_pubkey.serialize())?;
664 writer.write_all(&[0; 33])?;
669 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(0))?;
673 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.our_to_self_delay))?;
674 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap()))?;
676 for &(ref secret, ref idx) in self.old_secrets.iter() {
677 writer.write_all(secret)?;
678 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*idx))?;
681 macro_rules! serialize_htlc_in_commitment {
682 ($htlc_output: expr) => {
683 writer.write_all(&[$htlc_output.offered as u8; 1])?;
684 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc_output.amount_msat))?;
685 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array($htlc_output.cltv_expiry))?;
686 writer.write_all(&$htlc_output.payment_hash)?;
687 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array($htlc_output.transaction_output_index))?;
691 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_claimable_outpoints.len() as u64))?;
692 for (txid, htlc_outputs) in self.remote_claimable_outpoints.iter() {
693 writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
694 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc_outputs.len() as u64))?;
695 for htlc_output in htlc_outputs.iter() {
696 serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output);
701 let remote_commitment_txn_on_chain = self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.lock().unwrap();
702 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.len() as u64))?;
703 for (txid, commitment_number) in remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
704 writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
705 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(*commitment_number))?;
709 if for_local_storage {
710 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_hash_commitment_number.len() as u64))?;
711 for (payment_hash, commitment_number) in self.remote_hash_commitment_number.iter() {
712 writer.write_all(payment_hash)?;
713 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(*commitment_number))?;
716 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(0))?;
719 macro_rules! serialize_local_tx {
720 ($local_tx: expr) => {
721 if let Err(e) = $local_tx.tx.consensus_encode(&mut serialize::RawEncoder::new(WriterWriteAdaptor(writer))) {
723 serialize::Error::Io(e) => return Err(e),
724 _ => panic!("local tx must have been well-formed!"),
728 writer.write_all(&$local_tx.revocation_key.serialize())?;
729 writer.write_all(&$local_tx.a_htlc_key.serialize())?;
730 writer.write_all(&$local_tx.b_htlc_key.serialize())?;
731 writer.write_all(&$local_tx.delayed_payment_key.serialize())?;
733 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($local_tx.feerate_per_kw))?;
734 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($local_tx.htlc_outputs.len() as u64))?;
735 for &(ref htlc_output, ref their_sig, ref our_sig) in $local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
736 serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output);
737 writer.write_all(&their_sig.serialize_compact(&self.secp_ctx))?;
738 writer.write_all(&our_sig.serialize_compact(&self.secp_ctx))?;
743 if let Some(ref prev_local_tx) = self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
744 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
745 serialize_local_tx!(prev_local_tx);
747 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
750 if let Some(ref cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
751 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
752 serialize_local_tx!(cur_local_tx);
754 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
757 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.payment_preimages.len() as u64))?;
758 for payment_preimage in self.payment_preimages.values() {
759 writer.write_all(payment_preimage)?;
762 self.destination_script.write(writer)?;
767 /// Writes this monitor into the given writer, suitable for writing to disk.
768 pub fn write_for_disk<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
769 self.write(writer, true)
772 /// Encodes this monitor into the given writer, suitable for sending to a remote watchtower
773 pub fn write_for_watchtower<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
774 self.write(writer, false)
777 //TODO: Functions to serialize/deserialize (with different forms depending on which information
778 //we want to leave out (eg funding_txo, etc).
780 /// Can only fail if idx is < get_min_seen_secret
781 pub(super) fn get_secret(&self, idx: u64) -> Result<[u8; 32], HandleError> {
782 for i in 0..self.old_secrets.len() {
783 if (idx & (!((1 << i) - 1))) == self.old_secrets[i].1 {
784 return Ok(ChannelMonitor::derive_secret(self.old_secrets[i].0, i as u8, idx))
787 assert!(idx < self.get_min_seen_secret());
788 Err(HandleError{err: "idx too low", action: None})
791 pub(super) fn get_min_seen_secret(&self) -> u64 {
792 //TODO This can be optimized?
793 let mut min = 1 << 48;
794 for &(_, idx) in self.old_secrets.iter() {
802 /// Attempts to claim a remote commitment transaction's outputs using the revocation key and
803 /// data in remote_claimable_outpoints. Will directly claim any HTLC outputs which expire at a
804 /// height > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER. In any case, will install monitoring for
805 /// HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions.
806 fn check_spend_remote_transaction(&self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32) -> (Vec<Transaction>, (Sha256dHash, Vec<TxOut>), Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>) {
807 // Most secp and related errors trying to create keys means we have no hope of constructing
808 // a spend transaction...so we return no transactions to broadcast
809 let mut txn_to_broadcast = Vec::new();
810 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
811 let mut spendable_outputs = Vec::new();
813 let commitment_txid = tx.txid(); //TODO: This is gonna be a performance bottleneck for watchtowers!
814 let per_commitment_option = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(&commitment_txid);
816 macro_rules! ignore_error {
817 ( $thing : expr ) => {
820 Err(_) => return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs)
825 let commitment_number = 0xffffffffffff - ((((tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor);
826 if commitment_number >= self.get_min_seen_secret() {
827 let secret = self.get_secret(commitment_number).unwrap();
828 let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &secret));
829 let (revocation_pubkey, b_htlc_key) = match self.key_storage {
830 KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
831 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
832 (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_base_key))),
833 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &htlc_base_key))))
835 KeyStorage::SigsMode { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
836 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
837 (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &revocation_base_key)),
838 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &htlc_base_key)))
841 let delayed_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key), &self.their_delayed_payment_base_key.unwrap()));
842 let a_htlc_key = match self.their_htlc_base_key {
843 None => return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs),
844 Some(their_htlc_base_key) => ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key), &their_htlc_base_key)),
847 let revokeable_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey, self.our_to_self_delay, &delayed_key);
848 let revokeable_p2wsh = revokeable_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
850 let mut total_value = 0;
851 let mut values = Vec::new();
852 let mut inputs = Vec::new();
853 let mut htlc_idxs = Vec::new();
855 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
856 if outp.script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh {
858 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
859 txid: commitment_txid,
862 script_sig: Script::new(),
863 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
866 htlc_idxs.push(None);
867 values.push(outp.value);
868 total_value += outp.value;
869 break; // There can only be one of these
873 macro_rules! sign_input {
874 ($sighash_parts: expr, $input: expr, $htlc_idx: expr, $amount: expr) => {
876 let (sig, redeemscript) = match self.key_storage {
877 KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
878 let redeemscript = if $htlc_idx.is_none() { revokeable_redeemscript.clone() } else {
879 let htlc = &per_commitment_option.unwrap()[$htlc_idx.unwrap()];
880 chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey)
882 let sighash = ignore_error!(Message::from_slice(&$sighash_parts.sighash_all(&$input, &redeemscript, $amount)[..]));
883 let revocation_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key, &revocation_base_key));
884 (self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &revocation_key), redeemscript)
886 KeyStorage::SigsMode { .. } => {
890 $input.witness.push(sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
891 $input.witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
892 if $htlc_idx.is_none() {
893 $input.witness.push(vec!(1));
895 $input.witness.push(revocation_pubkey.serialize().to_vec());
897 $input.witness.push(redeemscript.into_bytes());
902 if let Some(per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
903 inputs.reserve_exact(per_commitment_data.len());
905 for (idx, htlc) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() {
906 let expected_script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey);
907 if htlc.transaction_output_index as usize >= tx.output.len() ||
908 tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 ||
909 tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].script_pubkey != expected_script.to_v0_p2wsh() {
910 return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs); // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user
913 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
914 txid: commitment_txid,
915 vout: htlc.transaction_output_index,
917 script_sig: Script::new(),
918 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
921 if htlc.cltv_expiry > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER {
923 htlc_idxs.push(Some(idx));
924 values.push(tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].value);
925 total_value += htlc.amount_msat / 1000;
927 let mut single_htlc_tx = Transaction {
932 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
933 value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000, //TODO: - fee
936 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&single_htlc_tx);
937 sign_input!(sighash_parts, single_htlc_tx.input[0], Some(idx), htlc.amount_msat / 1000);
938 txn_to_broadcast.push(single_htlc_tx);
943 if !inputs.is_empty() || !txn_to_broadcast.is_empty() { // ie we're confident this is actually ours
944 // We're definitely a remote commitment transaction!
945 watch_outputs.append(&mut tx.output.clone());
946 self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.lock().unwrap().insert(commitment_txid, commitment_number);
948 if inputs.is_empty() { return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs); } // Nothing to be done...probably a false positive/local tx
950 let outputs = vec!(TxOut {
951 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
952 value: total_value, //TODO: - fee
954 let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
961 let mut values_drain = values.drain(..);
962 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx);
964 for (input, htlc_idx) in spend_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(htlc_idxs.iter()) {
965 let value = values_drain.next().unwrap();
966 sign_input!(sighash_parts, input, htlc_idx, value);
969 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
970 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: spend_tx.txid(), vout: 0 },
971 output: spend_tx.output[0].clone(),
973 txn_to_broadcast.push(spend_tx);
974 } else if let Some(per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
975 // While this isn't useful yet, there is a potential race where if a counterparty
976 // revokes a state at the same time as the commitment transaction for that state is
977 // confirmed, and the watchtower receives the block before the user, the user could
978 // upload a new ChannelMonitor with the revocation secret but the watchtower has
979 // already processed the block, resulting in the remote_commitment_txn_on_chain entry
980 // not being generated by the above conditional. Thus, to be safe, we go ahead and
982 watch_outputs.append(&mut tx.output.clone());
983 self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.lock().unwrap().insert(commitment_txid, commitment_number);
985 if let Some(revocation_points) = self.their_cur_revocation_points {
986 let revocation_point_option =
987 if revocation_points.0 == commitment_number { Some(&revocation_points.1) }
988 else if let Some(point) = revocation_points.2.as_ref() {
989 if revocation_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 { Some(point) } else { None }
991 if let Some(revocation_point) = revocation_point_option {
992 let (revocation_pubkey, b_htlc_key) = match self.key_storage {
993 KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
994 (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_base_key))),
995 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &htlc_base_key))))
997 KeyStorage::SigsMode { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
998 (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &revocation_base_key)),
999 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &htlc_base_key)))
1002 let a_htlc_key = match self.their_htlc_base_key {
1003 None => return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs),
1004 Some(their_htlc_base_key) => ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &their_htlc_base_key)),
1007 let mut total_value = 0;
1008 let mut values = Vec::new();
1009 let mut inputs = Vec::new();
1011 macro_rules! sign_input {
1012 ($sighash_parts: expr, $input: expr, $amount: expr, $preimage: expr) => {
1014 let (sig, redeemscript) = match self.key_storage {
1015 KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
1016 let htlc = &per_commitment_option.unwrap()[$input.sequence as usize];
1017 let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey);
1018 let sighash = ignore_error!(Message::from_slice(&$sighash_parts.sighash_all(&$input, &redeemscript, $amount)[..]));
1019 let htlc_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &htlc_base_key));
1020 (self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &htlc_key), redeemscript)
1022 KeyStorage::SigsMode { .. } => {
1026 $input.witness.push(sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
1027 $input.witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1028 $input.witness.push($preimage);
1029 $input.witness.push(redeemscript.into_bytes());
1034 for (idx, htlc) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() {
1035 if let Some(payment_preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
1037 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
1038 txid: commitment_txid,
1039 vout: htlc.transaction_output_index,
1041 script_sig: Script::new(),
1042 sequence: idx as u32, // reset to 0xfffffffd in sign_input
1043 witness: Vec::new(),
1045 if htlc.cltv_expiry > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER {
1047 values.push((tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].value, payment_preimage));
1048 total_value += htlc.amount_msat / 1000;
1050 let mut single_htlc_tx = Transaction {
1054 output: vec!(TxOut {
1055 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1056 value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000, //TODO: - fee
1059 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&single_htlc_tx);
1060 sign_input!(sighash_parts, single_htlc_tx.input[0], htlc.amount_msat / 1000, payment_preimage.to_vec());
1061 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
1062 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: single_htlc_tx.txid(), vout: 0 },
1063 output: single_htlc_tx.output[0].clone(),
1065 txn_to_broadcast.push(single_htlc_tx);
1070 if inputs.is_empty() { return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs); } // Nothing to be done...probably a false positive/local tx
1072 let outputs = vec!(TxOut {
1073 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1074 value: total_value, //TODO: - fee
1076 let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
1083 let mut values_drain = values.drain(..);
1084 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx);
1086 for input in spend_tx.input.iter_mut() {
1087 let value = values_drain.next().unwrap();
1088 sign_input!(sighash_parts, input, value.0, value.1.to_vec());
1091 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
1092 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: spend_tx.txid(), vout: 0 },
1093 output: spend_tx.output[0].clone(),
1095 txn_to_broadcast.push(spend_tx);
1100 (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs)
1103 /// Attempst to claim a remote HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout s outputs using the revocation key
1104 fn check_spend_remote_htlc(&self, tx: &Transaction, commitment_number: u64) -> (Option<Transaction>, Option<SpendableOutputDescriptor>) {
1105 if tx.input.len() != 1 || tx.output.len() != 1 {
1109 macro_rules! ignore_error {
1110 ( $thing : expr ) => {
1113 Err(_) => return (None, None)
1118 let secret = ignore_error!(self.get_secret(commitment_number));
1119 let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &secret));
1120 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
1121 let revocation_pubkey = match self.key_storage {
1122 KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
1123 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_base_key)))
1125 KeyStorage::SigsMode { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
1126 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &revocation_base_key))
1129 let delayed_key = match self.their_delayed_payment_base_key {
1130 None => return (None, None),
1131 Some(their_delayed_payment_base_key) => ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &their_delayed_payment_base_key)),
1133 let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), &delayed_key);
1134 let revokeable_p2wsh = redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
1135 let htlc_txid = tx.txid(); //TODO: This is gonna be a performance bottleneck for watchtowers!
1137 let mut inputs = Vec::new();
1140 if tx.output[0].script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh { //HTLC transactions have one txin, one txout
1142 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
1146 script_sig: Script::new(),
1147 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
1148 witness: Vec::new(),
1150 amount = tx.output[0].value;
1153 if !inputs.is_empty() {
1154 let outputs = vec!(TxOut {
1155 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1156 value: amount, //TODO: - fee
1159 let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
1166 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx);
1168 let sig = match self.key_storage {
1169 KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
1170 let sighash = ignore_error!(Message::from_slice(&sighash_parts.sighash_all(&spend_tx.input[0], &redeemscript, amount)[..]));
1171 let revocation_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key, &revocation_base_key));
1172 self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &revocation_key)
1174 KeyStorage::SigsMode { .. } => {
1178 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
1179 spend_tx.input[0].witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1180 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(vec!(1));
1181 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(redeemscript.into_bytes());
1183 let outpoint = BitcoinOutPoint { txid: spend_tx.txid(), vout: 0 };
1184 let output = spend_tx.output[0].clone();
1185 (Some(spend_tx), Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput { outpoint, output }))
1186 } else { (None, None) }
1189 fn broadcast_by_local_state(&self, local_tx: &LocalSignedTx, per_commitment_point: &Option<PublicKey>, delayed_payment_base_key: &Option<SecretKey>) -> (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>) {
1190 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
1191 let mut spendable_outputs = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
1193 for &(ref htlc, ref their_sig, ref our_sig) in local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1195 let mut htlc_timeout_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&local_tx.txid, local_tx.feerate_per_kw, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), htlc, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key, &local_tx.revocation_key);
1197 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
1199 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(their_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
1200 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1201 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
1202 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1204 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new());
1205 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &local_tx.a_htlc_key, &local_tx.b_htlc_key, &local_tx.revocation_key).into_bytes());
1207 if let Some(ref per_commitment_point) = *per_commitment_point {
1208 if let Some(ref delayed_payment_base_key) = *delayed_payment_base_key {
1209 if let Ok(local_delayedkey) = chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base_key) {
1210 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutput {
1211 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: htlc_timeout_tx.txid(), vout: 0 },
1213 witness_script: chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&local_tx.revocation_key, self.our_to_self_delay, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key),
1214 to_self_delay: self.our_to_self_delay
1219 res.push(htlc_timeout_tx);
1221 if let Some(payment_preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
1222 let mut htlc_success_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&local_tx.txid, local_tx.feerate_per_kw, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), htlc, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key, &local_tx.revocation_key);
1224 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
1226 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(their_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
1227 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1228 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
1229 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1231 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(payment_preimage.to_vec());
1232 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &local_tx.a_htlc_key, &local_tx.b_htlc_key, &local_tx.revocation_key).into_bytes());
1234 if let Some(ref per_commitment_point) = *per_commitment_point {
1235 if let Some(ref delayed_payment_base_key) = *delayed_payment_base_key {
1236 if let Ok(local_delayedkey) = chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base_key) {
1237 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutput {
1238 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: htlc_success_tx.txid(), vout: 0 },
1240 witness_script: chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&local_tx.revocation_key, self.our_to_self_delay, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key),
1241 to_self_delay: self.our_to_self_delay
1246 res.push(htlc_success_tx);
1251 (res, spendable_outputs)
1254 /// Attempts to claim any claimable HTLCs in a commitment transaction which was not (yet)
1255 /// revoked using data in local_claimable_outpoints.
1256 /// Should not be used if check_spend_revoked_transaction succeeds.
1257 fn check_spend_local_transaction(&self, tx: &Transaction, _height: u32) -> (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>) {
1258 let commitment_txid = tx.txid();
1259 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1260 if local_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
1261 match self.key_storage {
1262 KeyStorage::PrivMode { revocation_base_key: _, htlc_base_key: _, ref delayed_payment_base_key, prev_latest_per_commitment_point: _, ref latest_per_commitment_point } => {
1263 return self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, latest_per_commitment_point, &Some(*delayed_payment_base_key));
1265 KeyStorage::SigsMode { .. } => {
1266 return self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, &None, &None);
1271 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1272 if local_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
1273 match self.key_storage {
1274 KeyStorage::PrivMode { revocation_base_key: _, htlc_base_key: _, ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref prev_latest_per_commitment_point, .. } => {
1275 return self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, prev_latest_per_commitment_point, &Some(*delayed_payment_base_key));
1277 KeyStorage::SigsMode { .. } => {
1278 return self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, &None, &None);
1283 (Vec::new(), Vec::new())
1286 fn block_connected(&self, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], height: u32, broadcaster: &BroadcasterInterface)-> (Vec<(Sha256dHash, Vec<TxOut>)>, Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>) {
1287 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
1288 let mut spendable_outputs = Vec::new();
1289 for tx in txn_matched {
1290 if tx.input.len() == 1 {
1291 // Assuming our keys were not leaked (in which case we're screwed no matter what),
1292 // commitment transactions and HTLC transactions will all only ever have one input,
1293 // which is an easy way to filter out any potential non-matching txn for lazy
1295 let prevout = &tx.input[0].previous_output;
1296 let mut txn: Vec<Transaction> = Vec::new();
1297 if self.funding_txo.is_none() || (prevout.txid == self.funding_txo.as_ref().unwrap().0.txid && prevout.vout == self.funding_txo.as_ref().unwrap().0.index as u32) {
1298 let (remote_txn, new_outputs, mut spendable_output) = self.check_spend_remote_transaction(tx, height);
1300 spendable_outputs.append(&mut spendable_output);
1301 if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() {
1302 watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
1305 let (remote_txn, mut outputs) = self.check_spend_local_transaction(tx, height);
1306 spendable_outputs.append(&mut outputs);
1310 let remote_commitment_txn_on_chain = self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.lock().unwrap();
1311 if let Some(commitment_number) = remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.get(&prevout.txid) {
1312 let (tx, spendable_output) = self.check_spend_remote_htlc(tx, *commitment_number);
1313 if let Some(tx) = tx {
1316 if let Some(spendable_output) = spendable_output {
1317 spendable_outputs.push(spendable_output);
1321 for tx in txn.iter() {
1322 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(tx);
1326 if let Some(ref cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1327 if self.would_broadcast_at_height(height) {
1328 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&cur_local_tx.tx);
1329 match self.key_storage {
1330 KeyStorage::PrivMode { revocation_base_key: _, htlc_base_key: _, ref delayed_payment_base_key, prev_latest_per_commitment_point: _, ref latest_per_commitment_point } => {
1331 let (txs, mut outputs) = self.broadcast_by_local_state(&cur_local_tx, latest_per_commitment_point, &Some(*delayed_payment_base_key));
1332 spendable_outputs.append(&mut outputs);
1334 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
1337 KeyStorage::SigsMode { .. } => {
1338 let (txs, mut outputs) = self.broadcast_by_local_state(&cur_local_tx, &None, &None);
1339 spendable_outputs.append(&mut outputs);
1341 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
1347 (watch_outputs, spendable_outputs)
1350 pub(super) fn would_broadcast_at_height(&self, height: u32) -> bool {
1351 if let Some(ref cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1352 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in cur_local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1353 // For inbound HTLCs which we know the preimage for, we have to ensure we hit the
1354 // chain with enough room to claim the HTLC without our counterparty being able to
1355 // time out the HTLC first.
1356 // For outbound HTLCs which our counterparty hasn't failed/claimed, our primary
1357 // concern is being able to claim the corresponding inbound HTLC (on another
1358 // channel) before it expires. In fact, we don't even really care if our
1359 // counterparty here claims such an outbound HTLC after it expired as long as we
1360 // can still claim the corresponding HTLC. Thus, to avoid needlessly hitting the
1361 // chain when our counterparty is waiting for expiration to off-chain fail an HTLC
1362 // we give ourselves a few blocks of headroom after expiration before going
1363 // on-chain for an expired HTLC.
1364 // Note that, to avoid a potential attack whereby a node delays claiming an HTLC
1365 // from us until we've reached the point where we go on-chain with the
1366 // corresponding inbound HTLC, we must ensure that outbound HTLCs go on chain at
1367 // least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER blocks prior to the inbound HTLC.
1368 // aka outbound_cltv + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS == height - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
1369 // inbound_cltv == height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
1370 // outbound_cltv + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFER <= inbound_cltv - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
1371 // HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS + 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFER <= inbound_cltv - outbound_cltv
1372 // HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS + 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFER <= CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA
1373 if ( htlc.offered && htlc.cltv_expiry + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS <= height) ||
1374 (!htlc.offered && htlc.cltv_expiry <= height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER && self.payment_preimages.contains_key(&htlc.payment_hash)) {
1383 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
1385 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> ReadableArgs<R, Arc<Logger>> for ChannelMonitor {
1386 fn read(reader: &mut R, logger: Arc<Logger>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1387 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1388 macro_rules! unwrap_obj {
1392 Err(_) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
1397 let _ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1398 let min_ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1399 if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION {
1400 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion);
1403 // Technically this can fail and serialize fail a round-trip, but only for serialization of
1404 // barely-init'd ChannelMonitors that we can't do anything with.
1405 let outpoint = OutPoint {
1406 txid: Readable::read(reader)?,
1407 index: Readable::read(reader)?,
1409 let funding_txo = Some((outpoint, Readable::read(reader)?));
1410 let commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor = <U48 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.0;
1412 let key_storage = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
1414 let revocation_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
1415 let htlc_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
1416 let delayed_payment_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
1417 let prev_latest_per_commitment_point = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
1419 1 => Some(Readable::read(reader)?),
1420 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
1422 let latest_per_commitment_point = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
1424 1 => Some(Readable::read(reader)?),
1425 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
1427 KeyStorage::PrivMode {
1428 revocation_base_key,
1430 delayed_payment_base_key,
1431 prev_latest_per_commitment_point,
1432 latest_per_commitment_point,
1435 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
1438 let their_htlc_base_key = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
1439 let their_delayed_payment_base_key = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
1441 let their_cur_revocation_points = {
1442 let first_idx = <U48 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.0;
1446 let first_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
1447 let second_point_slice: [u8; 33] = Readable::read(reader)?;
1448 if second_point_slice[0..32] == [0; 32] && second_point_slice[32] == 0 {
1449 Some((first_idx, first_point, None))
1451 Some((first_idx, first_point, Some(unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &second_point_slice)))))
1456 let our_to_self_delay: u16 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1457 let their_to_self_delay: Option<u16> = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
1459 let mut old_secrets = [([0; 32], 1 << 48); 49];
1460 for &mut (ref mut secret, ref mut idx) in old_secrets.iter_mut() {
1461 *secret = Readable::read(reader)?;
1462 *idx = Readable::read(reader)?;
1465 macro_rules! read_htlc_in_commitment {
1468 let offered: bool = Readable::read(reader)?;
1469 let amount_msat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1470 let cltv_expiry: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1471 let payment_hash: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(reader)?;
1472 let transaction_output_index: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1474 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1475 offered, amount_msat, cltv_expiry, payment_hash, transaction_output_index
1481 let remote_claimable_outpoints_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1482 let mut remote_claimable_outpoints = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(remote_claimable_outpoints_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 64));
1483 for _ in 0..remote_claimable_outpoints_len {
1484 let txid: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
1485 let outputs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1486 let mut outputs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
1487 for _ in 0..outputs_count {
1488 outputs.push(read_htlc_in_commitment!());
1490 if let Some(_) = remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, outputs) {
1491 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
1495 let remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1496 let mut remote_commitment_txn_on_chain = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
1497 for _ in 0..remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len {
1498 let txid: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
1499 let commitment_number = <U48 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.0;
1500 if let Some(_) = remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(txid, commitment_number) {
1501 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
1505 let remote_hash_commitment_number_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1506 let mut remote_hash_commitment_number = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(remote_hash_commitment_number_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
1507 for _ in 0..remote_hash_commitment_number_len {
1508 let txid: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(reader)?;
1509 let commitment_number = <U48 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.0;
1510 if let Some(_) = remote_hash_commitment_number.insert(txid, commitment_number) {
1511 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
1515 macro_rules! read_local_tx {
1518 let tx = match Transaction::consensus_decode(&mut serialize::RawDecoder::new(reader.by_ref())) {
1521 serialize::Error::Io(ioe) => return Err(DecodeError::Io(ioe)),
1522 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
1526 if tx.input.is_empty() {
1527 // Ensure tx didn't hit the 0-input ambiguity case.
1528 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
1531 let revocation_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
1532 let a_htlc_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
1533 let b_htlc_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
1534 let delayed_payment_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
1535 let feerate_per_kw: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1537 let htlc_outputs_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1538 let mut htlc_outputs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlc_outputs_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
1539 for _ in 0..htlc_outputs_len {
1540 htlc_outputs.push((read_htlc_in_commitment!(), Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
1545 tx, revocation_key, a_htlc_key, b_htlc_key, delayed_payment_key, feerate_per_kw, htlc_outputs
1551 let prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
1554 Some(read_local_tx!())
1556 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
1559 let current_local_signed_commitment_tx = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
1562 Some(read_local_tx!())
1564 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
1567 let payment_preimages_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1568 let mut payment_preimages = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(payment_preimages_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
1569 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
1570 for _ in 0..payment_preimages_len {
1571 let preimage: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(reader)?;
1573 sha.input(&preimage);
1574 let mut hash = [0; 32];
1575 sha.result(&mut hash);
1576 if let Some(_) = payment_preimages.insert(hash, preimage) {
1577 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
1581 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
1585 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor,
1588 their_htlc_base_key,
1589 their_delayed_payment_base_key,
1590 their_cur_revocation_points,
1593 their_to_self_delay,
1596 remote_claimable_outpoints,
1597 remote_commitment_txn_on_chain: Mutex::new(remote_commitment_txn_on_chain),
1598 remote_hash_commitment_number,
1600 prev_local_signed_commitment_tx,
1601 current_local_signed_commitment_tx,
1615 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Script;
1616 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
1617 use crypto::digest::Digest;
1619 use ln::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor;
1620 use ln::chan_utils::{HTLCOutputInCommitment, TxCreationKeys};
1621 use util::sha2::Sha256;
1622 use util::test_utils::TestLogger;
1623 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
1624 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1, Signature};
1625 use rand::{thread_rng,Rng};
1629 fn test_per_commitment_storage() {
1630 // Test vectors from BOLT 3:
1631 let mut secrets: Vec<[u8; 32]> = Vec::new();
1632 let mut monitor: ChannelMonitor;
1633 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1634 let logger = Arc::new(TestLogger::new());
1636 macro_rules! test_secrets {
1638 let mut idx = 281474976710655;
1639 for secret in secrets.iter() {
1640 assert_eq!(monitor.get_secret(idx).unwrap(), *secret);
1643 assert_eq!(monitor.get_min_seen_secret(), idx + 1);
1644 assert!(monitor.get_secret(idx).is_err());
1649 // insert_secret correct sequence
1650 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
1653 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1654 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1655 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1658 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1659 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1660 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1663 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1664 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1665 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1668 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1669 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1670 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1673 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1674 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
1675 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1678 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1679 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
1680 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1683 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1684 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
1685 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1688 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1689 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
1690 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1695 // insert_secret #1 incorrect
1696 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
1699 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1700 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
1701 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1704 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1705 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1706 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err,
1707 "Previous secret did not match new one");
1711 // insert_secret #2 incorrect (#1 derived from incorrect)
1712 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
1715 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1716 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
1717 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1720 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1721 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("dddc3a8d14fddf2b68fa8c7fbad2748274937479dd0f8930d5ebb4ab6bd866a3").unwrap());
1722 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1725 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1726 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1727 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1730 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1731 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1732 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err,
1733 "Previous secret did not match new one");
1737 // insert_secret #3 incorrect
1738 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
1741 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1742 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1743 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1746 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1747 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1748 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1751 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1752 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c51a18b13e8527e579ec56365482c62f180b7d5760b46e9477dae59e87ed423a").unwrap());
1753 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1756 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1757 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1758 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err,
1759 "Previous secret did not match new one");
1763 // insert_secret #4 incorrect (1,2,3 derived from incorrect)
1764 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
1767 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1768 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
1769 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1772 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1773 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("dddc3a8d14fddf2b68fa8c7fbad2748274937479dd0f8930d5ebb4ab6bd866a3").unwrap());
1774 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1777 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1778 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c51a18b13e8527e579ec56365482c62f180b7d5760b46e9477dae59e87ed423a").unwrap());
1779 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1782 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1783 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("ba65d7b0ef55a3ba300d4e87af29868f394f8f138d78a7011669c79b37b936f4").unwrap());
1784 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1787 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1788 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
1789 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1792 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1793 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
1794 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1797 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1798 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
1799 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1802 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1803 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
1804 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err,
1805 "Previous secret did not match new one");
1809 // insert_secret #5 incorrect
1810 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
1813 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1814 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1815 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1818 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1819 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1820 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1823 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1824 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1825 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1828 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1829 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1830 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1833 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1834 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("631373ad5f9ef654bb3dade742d09504c567edd24320d2fcd68e3cc47e2ff6a6").unwrap());
1835 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1838 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1839 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
1840 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err,
1841 "Previous secret did not match new one");
1845 // insert_secret #6 incorrect (5 derived from incorrect)
1846 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
1849 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1850 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1851 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1854 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1855 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1856 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1859 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1860 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1861 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1864 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1865 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1866 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1869 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1870 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("631373ad5f9ef654bb3dade742d09504c567edd24320d2fcd68e3cc47e2ff6a6").unwrap());
1871 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1874 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1875 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("b7e76a83668bde38b373970155c868a653304308f9896692f904a23731224bb1").unwrap());
1876 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1879 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1880 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
1881 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1884 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1885 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
1886 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err,
1887 "Previous secret did not match new one");
1891 // insert_secret #7 incorrect
1892 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
1895 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1896 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1897 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1900 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1901 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1902 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1905 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1906 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1907 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1910 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1911 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1912 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1915 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1916 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
1917 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1920 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1921 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
1922 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1925 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1926 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("e7971de736e01da8ed58b94c2fc216cb1dca9e326f3a96e7194fe8ea8af6c0a3").unwrap());
1927 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1930 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1931 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
1932 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err,
1933 "Previous secret did not match new one");
1937 // insert_secret #8 incorrect
1938 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
1941 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1942 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1943 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1946 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1947 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1948 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1951 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1952 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1953 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1956 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1957 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1958 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1961 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1962 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
1963 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1966 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1967 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
1968 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1971 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1972 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
1973 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1976 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1977 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a7efbc61aac46d34f77778bac22c8a20c6a46ca460addc49009bda875ec88fa4").unwrap());
1978 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err,
1979 "Previous secret did not match new one");
1984 fn test_prune_preimages() {
1985 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1986 let logger = Arc::new(TestLogger::new());
1987 let dummy_sig = Signature::from_der(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("3045022100fa86fa9a36a8cd6a7bb8f06a541787d51371d067951a9461d5404de6b928782e02201c8b7c334c10aed8976a3a465be9a28abff4cb23acbf00022295b378ce1fa3cd").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
1989 macro_rules! dummy_keys {
1992 let dummy_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap());
1994 per_commitment_point: dummy_key.clone(),
1995 revocation_key: dummy_key.clone(),
1996 a_htlc_key: dummy_key.clone(),
1997 b_htlc_key: dummy_key.clone(),
1998 a_delayed_payment_key: dummy_key.clone(),
1999 b_payment_key: dummy_key.clone(),
2004 let dummy_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
2006 let mut preimages = Vec::new();
2008 let mut rng = thread_rng();
2010 let mut preimage = [0; 32];
2011 rng.fill_bytes(&mut preimage);
2012 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
2013 sha.input(&preimage);
2014 let mut hash = [0; 32];
2015 sha.result(&mut hash);
2016 preimages.push((preimage, hash));
2020 macro_rules! preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs {
2021 ($preimages_slice: expr) => {
2023 let mut res = Vec::new();
2024 for (idx, preimage) in $preimages_slice.iter().enumerate() {
2025 res.push(HTLCOutputInCommitment {
2029 payment_hash: preimage.1.clone(),
2030 transaction_output_index: idx as u32,
2037 macro_rules! preimages_to_local_htlcs {
2038 ($preimages_slice: expr) => {
2040 let mut inp = preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!($preimages_slice);
2041 let res: Vec<_> = inp.drain(..).map(|e| { (e, dummy_sig.clone(), dummy_sig.clone()) }).collect();
2047 macro_rules! test_preimages_exist {
2048 ($preimages_slice: expr, $monitor: expr) => {
2049 for preimage in $preimages_slice {
2050 assert!($monitor.payment_preimages.contains_key(&preimage.1));
2055 // Prune with one old state and a local commitment tx holding a few overlaps with the
2057 let mut monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
2058 monitor.set_their_to_self_delay(10);
2060 monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(dummy_tx.clone(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..10]));
2061 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[5..15]), 281474976710655);
2062 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[15..20]), 281474976710654);
2063 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[17..20]), 281474976710653);
2064 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[18..20]), 281474976710652);
2065 for &(ref preimage, ref hash) in preimages.iter() {
2066 monitor.provide_payment_preimage(hash, preimage);
2069 // Now provide a secret, pruning preimages 10-15
2070 let mut secret = [0; 32];
2071 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
2072 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secret.clone(), None).unwrap();
2073 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 15);
2074 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
2075 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[15..20], monitor);
2077 // Now provide a further secret, pruning preimages 15-17
2078 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
2079 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secret.clone(), None).unwrap();
2080 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 13);
2081 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
2082 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[17..20], monitor);
2084 // Now update local commitment tx info, pruning only element 18 as we still care about the
2085 // previous commitment tx's preimages too
2086 monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(dummy_tx.clone(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..5]));
2087 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
2088 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secret.clone(), None).unwrap();
2089 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 12);
2090 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
2091 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[18..20], monitor);
2093 // But if we do it again, we'll prune 5-10
2094 monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(dummy_tx.clone(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..3]));
2095 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
2096 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secret.clone(), None).unwrap();
2097 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 5);
2098 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..5], monitor);
2101 // Further testing is done in the ChannelManager integration tests.