1 //! The logic to monitor for on-chain transactions and create the relevant claim responses lives
4 //! ChannelMonitor objects are generated by ChannelManager in response to relevant
5 //! messages/actions, and MUST be persisted to disk (and, preferably, remotely) before progress can
6 //! be made in responding to certain messages, see ManyChannelMonitor for more.
8 //! Note that ChannelMonitors are an important part of the lightning trust model and a copy of the
9 //! latest ChannelMonitor must always be actively monitoring for chain updates (and no out-of-date
10 //! ChannelMonitors should do so). Thus, if you're building rust-lightning into an HSM or other
11 //! security-domain-separated system design, you should consider having multiple paths for
12 //! ChannelMonitors to get out of the HSM and onto monitoring devices.
14 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
15 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxIn,TxOut,SigHashType,Transaction};
16 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
17 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Script;
18 use bitcoin::network::serialize;
19 use bitcoin::network::serialize::BitcoinHash;
20 use bitcoin::network::encodable::{ConsensusDecodable, ConsensusEncodable};
21 use bitcoin::util::hash::Sha256dHash;
22 use bitcoin::util::bip143;
24 use crypto::digest::Digest;
26 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Message,Signature};
27 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
30 use ln::msgs::{DecodeError, HandleError};
32 use ln::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment;
33 use chain::chaininterface::{ChainListener, ChainWatchInterface, BroadcasterInterface};
34 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
35 use chain::keysinterface::SpendableOutputDescriptor;
36 use util::logger::Logger;
37 use util::ser::{ReadableArgs, Readable, Writer, Writeable, WriterWriteAdaptor, U48};
38 use util::sha2::Sha256;
39 use util::{byte_utils, events};
41 use std::collections::HashMap;
42 use std::sync::{Arc,Mutex};
43 use std::{hash,cmp, mem};
45 /// An error enum representing a failure to persist a channel monitor update.
47 pub enum ChannelMonitorUpdateErr {
48 /// Used to indicate a temporary failure (eg connection to a watchtower failed, but is expected
49 /// to succeed at some point in the future).
51 /// Such a failure will "freeze" a channel, preventing us from revoking old states or
52 /// submitting new commitment transactions to the remote party.
53 /// ChannelManager::test_restore_channel_monitor can be used to retry the update(s) and restore
54 /// the channel to an operational state.
56 /// Note that continuing to operate when no copy of the updated ChannelMonitor could be
57 /// persisted is unsafe - if you failed to store the update on your own local disk you should
58 /// instead return PermanentFailure to force closure of the channel ASAP.
60 /// Even when a channel has been "frozen" updates to the ChannelMonitor can continue to occur
61 /// (eg if an inbound HTLC which we forwarded was claimed upstream resulting in us attempting
62 /// to claim it on this channel) and those updates must be applied wherever they can be. At
63 /// least one such updated ChannelMonitor must be persisted otherwise PermanentFailure should
64 /// be returned to get things on-chain ASAP using only the in-memory copy. Obviously updates to
65 /// the channel which would invalidate previous ChannelMonitors are not made when a channel has
68 /// Note that even if updates made after TemporaryFailure succeed you must still call
69 /// test_restore_channel_monitor to ensure you have the latest monitor and re-enable normal
70 /// channel operation.
72 /// Used to indicate no further channel monitor updates will be allowed (eg we've moved on to a
73 /// different watchtower and cannot update with all watchtowers that were previously informed
74 /// of this channel). This will force-close the channel in question.
78 /// Simple trait indicating ability to track a set of ChannelMonitors and multiplex events between
79 /// them. Generally should be implemented by keeping a local SimpleManyChannelMonitor and passing
80 /// events to it, while also taking any add_update_monitor events and passing them to some remote
83 /// Note that any updates to a channel's monitor *must* be applied to each instance of the
84 /// channel's monitor everywhere (including remote watchtowers) *before* this function returns. If
85 /// an update occurs and a remote watchtower is left with old state, it may broadcast transactions
86 /// which we have revoked, allowing our counterparty to claim all funds in the channel!
87 pub trait ManyChannelMonitor: Send + Sync {
88 /// Adds or updates a monitor for the given `funding_txo`.
90 /// Implementor must also ensure that the funding_txo outpoint is registered with any relevant
91 /// ChainWatchInterfaces such that the provided monitor receives block_connected callbacks with
93 fn add_update_monitor(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr>;
96 /// A simple implementation of a ManyChannelMonitor and ChainListener. Can be used to create a
97 /// watchtower or watch our own channels.
99 /// Note that you must provide your own key by which to refer to channels.
101 /// If you're accepting remote monitors (ie are implementing a watchtower), you must verify that
102 /// users cannot overwrite a given channel by providing a duplicate key. ie you should probably
103 /// index by a PublicKey which is required to sign any updates.
105 /// If you're using this for local monitoring of your own channels, you probably want to use
106 /// `OutPoint` as the key, which will give you a ManyChannelMonitor implementation.
107 pub struct SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
108 #[cfg(test)] // Used in ChannelManager tests to manipulate channels directly
109 pub monitors: Mutex<HashMap<Key, ChannelMonitor>>,
111 monitors: Mutex<HashMap<Key, ChannelMonitor>>,
112 chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>,
113 broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>,
114 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
117 impl<Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash> ChainListener for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
118 fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], _indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) {
119 let block_hash = header.bitcoin_hash();
120 let mut new_events: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(0);
122 let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
123 for monitor in monitors.values_mut() {
124 let (txn_outputs, spendable_outputs) = monitor.block_connected(txn_matched, height, &block_hash, &*self.broadcaster);
125 if spendable_outputs.len() > 0 {
126 new_events.push(events::Event::SpendableOutputs {
127 outputs: spendable_outputs,
130 for (ref txid, ref outputs) in txn_outputs {
131 for (idx, output) in outputs.iter().enumerate() {
132 self.chain_monitor.install_watch_outpoint((txid.clone(), idx as u32), &output.script_pubkey);
137 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
138 pending_events.append(&mut new_events);
141 fn block_disconnected(&self, _: &BlockHeader) { }
144 impl<Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash + 'static> SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
145 /// Creates a new object which can be used to monitor several channels given the chain
146 /// interface with which to register to receive notifications.
147 pub fn new(chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>, broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>) -> Arc<SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key>> {
148 let res = Arc::new(SimpleManyChannelMonitor {
149 monitors: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
152 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
154 let weak_res = Arc::downgrade(&res);
155 res.chain_monitor.register_listener(weak_res);
159 /// Adds or udpates the monitor which monitors the channel referred to by the given key.
160 pub fn add_update_monitor_by_key(&self, key: Key, monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
161 let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
162 match monitors.get_mut(&key) {
163 Some(orig_monitor) => return orig_monitor.insert_combine(monitor),
166 match &monitor.funding_txo {
167 &None => self.chain_monitor.watch_all_txn(),
168 &Some((ref outpoint, ref script)) => {
169 self.chain_monitor.install_watch_tx(&outpoint.txid, script);
170 self.chain_monitor.install_watch_outpoint((outpoint.txid, outpoint.index as u32), script);
173 monitors.insert(key, monitor);
178 impl ManyChannelMonitor for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<OutPoint> {
179 fn add_update_monitor(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr> {
180 match self.add_update_monitor_by_key(funding_txo, monitor) {
182 Err(_) => Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure),
187 impl<Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash> events::EventsProvider for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
188 fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
189 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
190 let mut ret = Vec::new();
191 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut *pending_events);
196 /// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, don't try to claim it in a shared transaction,
197 /// instead claiming it in its own individual transaction.
198 const CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 12;
199 /// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, force-close the channel to broadcast the
200 /// HTLC-Success transaction.
201 /// In other words, this is an upper bound on how many blocks we think it can take us to get a
202 /// transaction confirmed (and we use it in a few more, equivalent, places).
203 pub(crate) const CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 6;
204 /// Number of blocks by which point we expect our counterparty to have seen new blocks on the
205 /// network and done a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance (+ we've updated all our
206 /// copies of ChannelMonitors, including watchtowers).
207 pub(crate) const HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS: u32 = 3;
209 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
212 revocation_base_key: SecretKey,
213 htlc_base_key: SecretKey,
214 delayed_payment_base_key: SecretKey,
215 prev_latest_per_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
216 latest_per_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
219 revocation_base_key: PublicKey,
220 htlc_base_key: PublicKey,
221 sigs: HashMap<Sha256dHash, Signature>,
225 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
226 struct LocalSignedTx {
227 /// txid of the transaction in tx, just used to make comparison faster
230 revocation_key: PublicKey,
231 a_htlc_key: PublicKey,
232 b_htlc_key: PublicKey,
233 delayed_payment_key: PublicKey,
235 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Signature, Signature)>,
238 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
239 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
241 /// A ChannelMonitor handles chain events (blocks connected and disconnected) and generates
242 /// on-chain transactions to ensure no loss of funds occurs.
244 /// You MUST ensure that no ChannelMonitors for a given channel anywhere contain out-of-date
245 /// information and are actively monitoring the chain.
247 pub struct ChannelMonitor {
248 funding_txo: Option<(OutPoint, Script)>,
249 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64,
251 key_storage: KeyStorage,
252 their_htlc_base_key: Option<PublicKey>,
253 their_delayed_payment_base_key: Option<PublicKey>,
254 // first is the idx of the first of the two revocation points
255 their_cur_revocation_points: Option<(u64, PublicKey, Option<PublicKey>)>,
257 our_to_self_delay: u16,
258 their_to_self_delay: Option<u16>,
260 old_secrets: [([u8; 32], u64); 49],
261 remote_claimable_outpoints: HashMap<Sha256dHash, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>>,
262 /// We cannot identify HTLC-Success or HTLC-Timeout transactions by themselves on the chain.
263 /// Nor can we figure out their commitment numbers without the commitment transaction they are
264 /// spending. Thus, in order to claim them via revocation key, we track all the remote
265 /// commitment transactions which we find on-chain, mapping them to the commitment number which
266 /// can be used to derive the revocation key and claim the transactions.
267 remote_commitment_txn_on_chain: HashMap<Sha256dHash, (u64, Vec<Script>)>,
268 /// Cache used to make pruning of payment_preimages faster.
269 /// Maps payment_hash values to commitment numbers for remote transactions for non-revoked
270 /// remote transactions (ie should remain pretty small).
271 /// Serialized to disk but should generally not be sent to Watchtowers.
272 remote_hash_commitment_number: HashMap<[u8; 32], u64>,
274 // We store two local commitment transactions to avoid any race conditions where we may update
275 // some monitors (potentially on watchtowers) but then fail to update others, resulting in the
276 // various monitors for one channel being out of sync, and us broadcasting a local
277 // transaction for which we have deleted claim information on some watchtowers.
278 prev_local_signed_commitment_tx: Option<LocalSignedTx>,
279 current_local_signed_commitment_tx: Option<LocalSignedTx>,
281 // Used just for ChannelManager to make sure it has the latest channel data during
283 current_remote_commitment_number: u64,
285 payment_preimages: HashMap<[u8; 32], [u8; 32]>,
287 destination_script: Script,
289 // We simply modify last_block_hash in Channel's block_connected so that serialization is
290 // consistent but hopefully the users' copy handles block_connected in a consistent way.
291 // (we do *not*, however, update them in insert_combine to ensure any local user copies keep
292 // their last_block_hash from its state and not based on updated copies that didn't run through
293 // the full block_connected).
294 pub(crate) last_block_hash: Sha256dHash,
295 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>, //TODO: dedup this a bit...
299 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
300 /// Used only in testing and fuzztarget to check serialization roundtrips don't change the
301 /// underlying object
302 impl PartialEq for ChannelMonitor {
303 fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
304 if self.funding_txo != other.funding_txo ||
305 self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor != other.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor ||
306 self.key_storage != other.key_storage ||
307 self.their_htlc_base_key != other.their_htlc_base_key ||
308 self.their_delayed_payment_base_key != other.their_delayed_payment_base_key ||
309 self.their_cur_revocation_points != other.their_cur_revocation_points ||
310 self.our_to_self_delay != other.our_to_self_delay ||
311 self.their_to_self_delay != other.their_to_self_delay ||
312 self.remote_claimable_outpoints != other.remote_claimable_outpoints ||
313 self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain != other.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain ||
314 self.remote_hash_commitment_number != other.remote_hash_commitment_number ||
315 self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx != other.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx ||
316 self.current_remote_commitment_number != other.current_remote_commitment_number ||
317 self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx != other.current_local_signed_commitment_tx ||
318 self.payment_preimages != other.payment_preimages ||
319 self.destination_script != other.destination_script
323 for (&(ref secret, ref idx), &(ref o_secret, ref o_idx)) in self.old_secrets.iter().zip(other.old_secrets.iter()) {
324 if secret != o_secret || idx != o_idx {
333 impl ChannelMonitor {
334 pub(super) fn new(revocation_base_key: &SecretKey, delayed_payment_base_key: &SecretKey, htlc_base_key: &SecretKey, our_to_self_delay: u16, destination_script: Script, logger: Arc<Logger>) -> ChannelMonitor {
337 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: 0,
339 key_storage: KeyStorage::PrivMode {
340 revocation_base_key: revocation_base_key.clone(),
341 htlc_base_key: htlc_base_key.clone(),
342 delayed_payment_base_key: delayed_payment_base_key.clone(),
343 prev_latest_per_commitment_point: None,
344 latest_per_commitment_point: None,
346 their_htlc_base_key: None,
347 their_delayed_payment_base_key: None,
348 their_cur_revocation_points: None,
350 our_to_self_delay: our_to_self_delay,
351 their_to_self_delay: None,
353 old_secrets: [([0; 32], 1 << 48); 49],
354 remote_claimable_outpoints: HashMap::new(),
355 remote_commitment_txn_on_chain: HashMap::new(),
356 remote_hash_commitment_number: HashMap::new(),
358 prev_local_signed_commitment_tx: None,
359 current_local_signed_commitment_tx: None,
360 current_remote_commitment_number: 1 << 48,
362 payment_preimages: HashMap::new(),
363 destination_script: destination_script,
365 last_block_hash: Default::default(),
366 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
372 fn place_secret(idx: u64) -> u8 {
374 if idx & (1 << i) == (1 << i) {
382 fn derive_secret(secret: [u8; 32], bits: u8, idx: u64) -> [u8; 32] {
383 let mut res: [u8; 32] = secret;
385 let bitpos = bits - 1 - i;
386 if idx & (1 << bitpos) == (1 << bitpos) {
387 res[(bitpos / 8) as usize] ^= 1 << (bitpos & 7);
388 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
390 sha.result(&mut res);
396 /// Inserts a revocation secret into this channel monitor. Also optionally tracks the next
397 /// revocation point which may be required to claim HTLC outputs which we know the preimage of
398 /// in case the remote end force-closes using their latest state. Prunes old preimages if neither
399 /// needed by local commitment transactions HTCLs nor by remote ones. Unless we haven't already seen remote
400 /// commitment transaction's secret, they are de facto pruned (we can use revocation key).
401 pub(super) fn provide_secret(&mut self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32], their_next_revocation_point: Option<(u64, PublicKey)>) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
402 let pos = ChannelMonitor::place_secret(idx);
404 let (old_secret, old_idx) = self.old_secrets[i as usize];
405 if ChannelMonitor::derive_secret(secret, pos, old_idx) != old_secret {
406 return Err(HandleError{err: "Previous secret did not match new one", action: None})
409 self.old_secrets[pos as usize] = (secret, idx);
411 if let Some(new_revocation_point) = their_next_revocation_point {
412 match self.their_cur_revocation_points {
413 Some(old_points) => {
414 if old_points.0 == new_revocation_point.0 + 1 {
415 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0, old_points.1, Some(new_revocation_point.1)));
416 } else if old_points.0 == new_revocation_point.0 + 2 {
417 if let Some(old_second_point) = old_points.2 {
418 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0 - 1, old_second_point, Some(new_revocation_point.1)));
420 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((new_revocation_point.0, new_revocation_point.1, None));
423 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((new_revocation_point.0, new_revocation_point.1, None));
427 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((new_revocation_point.0, new_revocation_point.1, None));
432 if !self.payment_preimages.is_empty() {
433 let local_signed_commitment_tx = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx.as_ref().expect("Channel needs at least an initial commitment tx !");
434 let prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.as_ref();
435 let min_idx = self.get_min_seen_secret();
436 let remote_hash_commitment_number = &mut self.remote_hash_commitment_number;
438 self.payment_preimages.retain(|&k, _| {
439 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in &local_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs {
440 if k == htlc.payment_hash {
444 if let Some(prev_local_commitment_tx) = prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
445 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in prev_local_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
446 if k == htlc.payment_hash {
451 let contains = if let Some(cn) = remote_hash_commitment_number.get(&k) {
458 remote_hash_commitment_number.remove(&k);
467 /// Informs this monitor of the latest remote (ie non-broadcastable) commitment transaction.
468 /// The monitor watches for it to be broadcasted and then uses the HTLC information (and
469 /// possibly future revocation/preimage information) to claim outputs where possible.
470 /// We cache also the mapping hash:commitment number to lighten pruning of old preimages by watchtowers.
471 pub(super) fn provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, unsigned_commitment_tx: &Transaction, htlc_outputs: Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>, commitment_number: u64) {
472 // TODO: Encrypt the htlc_outputs data with the single-hash of the commitment transaction
473 // so that a remote monitor doesn't learn anything unless there is a malicious close.
474 // (only maybe, sadly we cant do the same for local info, as we need to be aware of
476 for htlc in &htlc_outputs {
477 self.remote_hash_commitment_number.insert(htlc.payment_hash, commitment_number);
479 self.remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(unsigned_commitment_tx.txid(), htlc_outputs);
480 self.current_remote_commitment_number = commitment_number;
483 /// Informs this monitor of the latest local (ie broadcastable) commitment transaction. The
484 /// monitor watches for timeouts and may broadcast it if we approach such a timeout. Thus, it
485 /// is important that any clones of this channel monitor (including remote clones) by kept
486 /// up-to-date as our local commitment transaction is updated.
487 /// Panics if set_their_to_self_delay has never been called.
488 /// Also update KeyStorage with latest local per_commitment_point to derive local_delayedkey in
489 /// case of onchain HTLC tx
490 pub(super) fn provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, signed_commitment_tx: Transaction, local_keys: chan_utils::TxCreationKeys, feerate_per_kw: u64, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Signature, Signature)>) {
491 assert!(self.their_to_self_delay.is_some());
492 self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx.take();
493 self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(LocalSignedTx {
494 txid: signed_commitment_tx.txid(),
495 tx: signed_commitment_tx,
496 revocation_key: local_keys.revocation_key,
497 a_htlc_key: local_keys.a_htlc_key,
498 b_htlc_key: local_keys.b_htlc_key,
499 delayed_payment_key: local_keys.a_delayed_payment_key,
503 self.key_storage = if let KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, ref delayed_payment_base_key, prev_latest_per_commitment_point: _, ref latest_per_commitment_point } = self.key_storage {
504 KeyStorage::PrivMode {
505 revocation_base_key: *revocation_base_key,
506 htlc_base_key: *htlc_base_key,
507 delayed_payment_base_key: *delayed_payment_base_key,
508 prev_latest_per_commitment_point: *latest_per_commitment_point,
509 latest_per_commitment_point: Some(local_keys.per_commitment_point),
511 } else { unimplemented!(); };
514 /// Provides a payment_hash->payment_preimage mapping. Will be automatically pruned when all
515 /// commitment_tx_infos which contain the payment hash have been revoked.
516 pub(super) fn provide_payment_preimage(&mut self, payment_hash: &[u8; 32], payment_preimage: &[u8; 32]) {
517 self.payment_preimages.insert(payment_hash.clone(), payment_preimage.clone());
520 /// Combines this ChannelMonitor with the information contained in the other ChannelMonitor.
521 /// After a successful call this ChannelMonitor is up-to-date and is safe to use to monitor the
522 /// chain for new blocks/transactions.
523 pub fn insert_combine(&mut self, mut other: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
524 if self.funding_txo.is_some() {
525 // We should be able to compare the entire funding_txo, but in fuzztarget its trivially
526 // easy to collide the funding_txo hash and have a different scriptPubKey.
527 if other.funding_txo.is_some() && other.funding_txo.as_ref().unwrap().0 != self.funding_txo.as_ref().unwrap().0 {
528 return Err(HandleError{err: "Funding transaction outputs are not identical!", action: None});
531 self.funding_txo = other.funding_txo.take();
533 let other_min_secret = other.get_min_seen_secret();
534 let our_min_secret = self.get_min_seen_secret();
535 if our_min_secret > other_min_secret {
536 self.provide_secret(other_min_secret, other.get_secret(other_min_secret).unwrap(), None)?;
538 // TODO: We should use current_remote_commitment_number and the commitment number out of
539 // local transactions to decide how to merge
540 if our_min_secret >= other_min_secret {
541 self.their_cur_revocation_points = other.their_cur_revocation_points;
542 for (txid, htlcs) in other.remote_claimable_outpoints.drain() {
543 self.remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, htlcs);
545 if let Some(local_tx) = other.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
546 self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(local_tx);
548 if let Some(local_tx) = other.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
549 self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(local_tx);
551 self.payment_preimages = other.payment_preimages;
553 self.current_remote_commitment_number = cmp::min(self.current_remote_commitment_number, other.current_remote_commitment_number);
557 /// Panics if commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor doesn't fit in 48 bits
558 pub(super) fn set_commitment_obscure_factor(&mut self, commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64) {
559 assert!(commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor < (1 << 48));
560 self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor = commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor;
563 /// Allows this monitor to scan only for transactions which are applicable. Note that this is
564 /// optional, without it this monitor cannot be used in an SPV client, but you may wish to
565 /// avoid this (or call unset_funding_info) on a monitor you wish to send to a watchtower as it
566 /// provides slightly better privacy.
567 /// It's the responsibility of the caller to register outpoint and script with passing the former
568 /// value as key to add_update_monitor.
569 pub(super) fn set_funding_info(&mut self, funding_info: (OutPoint, Script)) {
570 self.funding_txo = Some(funding_info);
573 /// We log these base keys at channel opening to being able to rebuild redeemscript in case of leaked revoked commit tx
574 pub(super) fn set_their_base_keys(&mut self, their_htlc_base_key: &PublicKey, their_delayed_payment_base_key: &PublicKey) {
575 self.their_htlc_base_key = Some(their_htlc_base_key.clone());
576 self.their_delayed_payment_base_key = Some(their_delayed_payment_base_key.clone());
579 pub(super) fn set_their_to_self_delay(&mut self, their_to_self_delay: u16) {
580 self.their_to_self_delay = Some(their_to_self_delay);
583 pub(super) fn unset_funding_info(&mut self) {
584 self.funding_txo = None;
587 /// Gets the funding transaction outpoint of the channel this ChannelMonitor is monitoring for.
588 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
589 match self.funding_txo {
590 Some((outpoint, _)) => Some(outpoint),
595 /// Gets the sets of all outpoints which this ChannelMonitor expects to hear about spends of.
596 /// Generally useful when deserializing as during normal operation the return values of
597 /// block_connected are sufficient to ensure all relevant outpoints are being monitored (note
598 /// that the get_funding_txo outpoint and transaction must also be monitored for!).
599 pub fn get_monitored_outpoints(&self) -> Vec<(Sha256dHash, u32, &Script)> {
600 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.len() * 2);
601 for (ref txid, &(_, ref outputs)) in self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
602 for (idx, output) in outputs.iter().enumerate() {
603 res.push(((*txid).clone(), idx as u32, output));
609 /// Serializes into a vec, with various modes for the exposed pub fns
610 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W, for_local_storage: bool) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
611 //TODO: We still write out all the serialization here manually instead of using the fancy
612 //serialization framework we have, we should migrate things over to it.
613 writer.write_all(&[SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
614 writer.write_all(&[MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
616 match &self.funding_txo {
617 &Some((ref outpoint, ref script)) => {
618 writer.write_all(&outpoint.txid[..])?;
619 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(outpoint.index))?;
620 script.write(writer)?;
623 // We haven't even been initialized...not sure why anyone is serializing us, but
624 // not much to give them.
629 // Set in initial Channel-object creation, so should always be set by now:
630 U48(self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor).write(writer)?;
632 match self.key_storage {
633 KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref prev_latest_per_commitment_point, ref latest_per_commitment_point } => {
634 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
635 writer.write_all(&revocation_base_key[..])?;
636 writer.write_all(&htlc_base_key[..])?;
637 writer.write_all(&delayed_payment_base_key[..])?;
638 if let Some(ref prev_latest_per_commitment_point) = *prev_latest_per_commitment_point {
639 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
640 writer.write_all(&prev_latest_per_commitment_point.serialize())?;
642 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
644 if let Some(ref latest_per_commitment_point) = *latest_per_commitment_point {
645 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
646 writer.write_all(&latest_per_commitment_point.serialize())?;
648 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
652 KeyStorage::SigsMode { .. } => unimplemented!(),
655 writer.write_all(&self.their_htlc_base_key.as_ref().unwrap().serialize())?;
656 writer.write_all(&self.their_delayed_payment_base_key.as_ref().unwrap().serialize())?;
658 match self.their_cur_revocation_points {
659 Some((idx, pubkey, second_option)) => {
660 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(idx))?;
661 writer.write_all(&pubkey.serialize())?;
662 match second_option {
663 Some(second_pubkey) => {
664 writer.write_all(&second_pubkey.serialize())?;
667 writer.write_all(&[0; 33])?;
672 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(0))?;
676 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.our_to_self_delay))?;
677 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap()))?;
679 for &(ref secret, ref idx) in self.old_secrets.iter() {
680 writer.write_all(secret)?;
681 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*idx))?;
684 macro_rules! serialize_htlc_in_commitment {
685 ($htlc_output: expr) => {
686 writer.write_all(&[$htlc_output.offered as u8; 1])?;
687 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc_output.amount_msat))?;
688 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array($htlc_output.cltv_expiry))?;
689 writer.write_all(&$htlc_output.payment_hash)?;
690 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array($htlc_output.transaction_output_index))?;
694 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_claimable_outpoints.len() as u64))?;
695 for (ref txid, ref htlc_outputs) in self.remote_claimable_outpoints.iter() {
696 writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
697 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc_outputs.len() as u64))?;
698 for htlc_output in htlc_outputs.iter() {
699 serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output);
703 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.len() as u64))?;
704 for (ref txid, &(commitment_number, ref txouts)) in self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
705 writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
706 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(commitment_number))?;
707 (txouts.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
708 for script in txouts.iter() {
709 script.write(writer)?;
713 if for_local_storage {
714 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_hash_commitment_number.len() as u64))?;
715 for (ref payment_hash, commitment_number) in self.remote_hash_commitment_number.iter() {
716 writer.write_all(*payment_hash)?;
717 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(*commitment_number))?;
720 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(0))?;
723 macro_rules! serialize_local_tx {
724 ($local_tx: expr) => {
725 if let Err(e) = $local_tx.tx.consensus_encode(&mut serialize::RawEncoder::new(WriterWriteAdaptor(writer))) {
727 serialize::Error::Io(e) => return Err(e),
728 _ => panic!("local tx must have been well-formed!"),
732 writer.write_all(&$local_tx.revocation_key.serialize())?;
733 writer.write_all(&$local_tx.a_htlc_key.serialize())?;
734 writer.write_all(&$local_tx.b_htlc_key.serialize())?;
735 writer.write_all(&$local_tx.delayed_payment_key.serialize())?;
737 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($local_tx.feerate_per_kw))?;
738 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($local_tx.htlc_outputs.len() as u64))?;
739 for &(ref htlc_output, ref their_sig, ref our_sig) in $local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
740 serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output);
741 writer.write_all(&their_sig.serialize_compact(&self.secp_ctx))?;
742 writer.write_all(&our_sig.serialize_compact(&self.secp_ctx))?;
747 if let Some(ref prev_local_tx) = self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
748 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
749 serialize_local_tx!(prev_local_tx);
751 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
754 if let Some(ref cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
755 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
756 serialize_local_tx!(cur_local_tx);
758 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
761 if for_local_storage {
762 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(self.current_remote_commitment_number))?;
764 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(0))?;
767 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.payment_preimages.len() as u64))?;
768 for payment_preimage in self.payment_preimages.values() {
769 writer.write_all(payment_preimage)?;
772 self.last_block_hash.write(writer)?;
773 self.destination_script.write(writer)?;
778 /// Writes this monitor into the given writer, suitable for writing to disk.
780 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor), which
781 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
782 /// the "reorg path" (ie not just starting at the same height but starting at the highest
783 /// common block that appears on your best chain as well as on the chain which contains the
784 /// last block hash returned) upon deserializing the object!
785 pub fn write_for_disk<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
786 self.write(writer, true)
789 /// Encodes this monitor into the given writer, suitable for sending to a remote watchtower
791 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor), which
792 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
793 /// the "reorg path" (ie not just starting at the same height but starting at the highest
794 /// common block that appears on your best chain as well as on the chain which contains the
795 /// last block hash returned) upon deserializing the object!
796 pub fn write_for_watchtower<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
797 self.write(writer, false)
800 //TODO: Functions to serialize/deserialize (with different forms depending on which information
801 //we want to leave out (eg funding_txo, etc).
803 /// Can only fail if idx is < get_min_seen_secret
804 pub(super) fn get_secret(&self, idx: u64) -> Result<[u8; 32], HandleError> {
805 for i in 0..self.old_secrets.len() {
806 if (idx & (!((1 << i) - 1))) == self.old_secrets[i].1 {
807 return Ok(ChannelMonitor::derive_secret(self.old_secrets[i].0, i as u8, idx))
810 assert!(idx < self.get_min_seen_secret());
811 Err(HandleError{err: "idx too low", action: None})
814 pub(super) fn get_min_seen_secret(&self) -> u64 {
815 //TODO This can be optimized?
816 let mut min = 1 << 48;
817 for &(_, idx) in self.old_secrets.iter() {
825 pub(super) fn get_cur_remote_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
826 self.current_remote_commitment_number
829 pub(super) fn get_cur_local_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
830 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
831 0xffff_ffff_ffff - ((((local_tx.tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (local_tx.tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor)
832 } else { 0xffff_ffff_ffff }
835 /// Attempts to claim a remote commitment transaction's outputs using the revocation key and
836 /// data in remote_claimable_outpoints. Will directly claim any HTLC outputs which expire at a
837 /// height > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER. In any case, will install monitoring for
838 /// HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions.
839 fn check_spend_remote_transaction(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32) -> (Vec<Transaction>, (Sha256dHash, Vec<TxOut>), Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>) {
840 // Most secp and related errors trying to create keys means we have no hope of constructing
841 // a spend transaction...so we return no transactions to broadcast
842 let mut txn_to_broadcast = Vec::new();
843 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
844 let mut spendable_outputs = Vec::new();
846 let commitment_txid = tx.txid(); //TODO: This is gonna be a performance bottleneck for watchtowers!
847 let per_commitment_option = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(&commitment_txid);
849 macro_rules! ignore_error {
850 ( $thing : expr ) => {
853 Err(_) => return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs)
858 let commitment_number = 0xffffffffffff - ((((tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor);
859 if commitment_number >= self.get_min_seen_secret() {
860 let secret = self.get_secret(commitment_number).unwrap();
861 let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &secret));
862 let (revocation_pubkey, b_htlc_key) = match self.key_storage {
863 KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
864 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
865 (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_base_key))),
866 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &htlc_base_key))))
868 KeyStorage::SigsMode { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
869 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
870 (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &revocation_base_key)),
871 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &htlc_base_key)))
874 let delayed_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key), &self.their_delayed_payment_base_key.unwrap()));
875 let a_htlc_key = match self.their_htlc_base_key {
876 None => return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs),
877 Some(their_htlc_base_key) => ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key), &their_htlc_base_key)),
880 let revokeable_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey, self.our_to_self_delay, &delayed_key);
881 let revokeable_p2wsh = revokeable_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
883 let mut total_value = 0;
884 let mut values = Vec::new();
885 let mut inputs = Vec::new();
886 let mut htlc_idxs = Vec::new();
888 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
889 if outp.script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh {
891 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
892 txid: commitment_txid,
895 script_sig: Script::new(),
896 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
899 htlc_idxs.push(None);
900 values.push(outp.value);
901 total_value += outp.value;
902 break; // There can only be one of these
906 macro_rules! sign_input {
907 ($sighash_parts: expr, $input: expr, $htlc_idx: expr, $amount: expr) => {
909 let (sig, redeemscript) = match self.key_storage {
910 KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
911 let redeemscript = if $htlc_idx.is_none() { revokeable_redeemscript.clone() } else {
912 let htlc = &per_commitment_option.unwrap()[$htlc_idx.unwrap()];
913 chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey)
915 let sighash = ignore_error!(Message::from_slice(&$sighash_parts.sighash_all(&$input, &redeemscript, $amount)[..]));
916 let revocation_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key, &revocation_base_key));
917 (self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &revocation_key), redeemscript)
919 KeyStorage::SigsMode { .. } => {
923 $input.witness.push(sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
924 $input.witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
925 if $htlc_idx.is_none() {
926 $input.witness.push(vec!(1));
928 $input.witness.push(revocation_pubkey.serialize().to_vec());
930 $input.witness.push(redeemscript.into_bytes());
935 if let Some(per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
936 inputs.reserve_exact(per_commitment_data.len());
938 for (idx, htlc) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() {
939 let expected_script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey);
940 if htlc.transaction_output_index as usize >= tx.output.len() ||
941 tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 ||
942 tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].script_pubkey != expected_script.to_v0_p2wsh() {
943 return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs); // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user
946 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
947 txid: commitment_txid,
948 vout: htlc.transaction_output_index,
950 script_sig: Script::new(),
951 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
954 if htlc.cltv_expiry > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER {
956 htlc_idxs.push(Some(idx));
957 values.push(tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].value);
958 total_value += htlc.amount_msat / 1000;
960 let mut single_htlc_tx = Transaction {
965 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
966 value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000, //TODO: - fee
969 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&single_htlc_tx);
970 sign_input!(sighash_parts, single_htlc_tx.input[0], Some(idx), htlc.amount_msat / 1000);
971 txn_to_broadcast.push(single_htlc_tx);
976 if !inputs.is_empty() || !txn_to_broadcast.is_empty() { // ie we're confident this is actually ours
977 // We're definitely a remote commitment transaction!
978 watch_outputs.append(&mut tx.output.clone());
979 self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, (commitment_number, tx.output.iter().map(|output| { output.script_pubkey.clone() }).collect()));
981 if inputs.is_empty() { return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs); } // Nothing to be done...probably a false positive/local tx
983 let outputs = vec!(TxOut {
984 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
985 value: total_value, //TODO: - fee
987 let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
994 let mut values_drain = values.drain(..);
995 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx);
997 for (input, htlc_idx) in spend_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(htlc_idxs.iter()) {
998 let value = values_drain.next().unwrap();
999 sign_input!(sighash_parts, input, htlc_idx, value);
1002 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
1003 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: spend_tx.txid(), vout: 0 },
1004 output: spend_tx.output[0].clone(),
1006 txn_to_broadcast.push(spend_tx);
1007 } else if let Some(per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
1008 // While this isn't useful yet, there is a potential race where if a counterparty
1009 // revokes a state at the same time as the commitment transaction for that state is
1010 // confirmed, and the watchtower receives the block before the user, the user could
1011 // upload a new ChannelMonitor with the revocation secret but the watchtower has
1012 // already processed the block, resulting in the remote_commitment_txn_on_chain entry
1013 // not being generated by the above conditional. Thus, to be safe, we go ahead and
1015 watch_outputs.append(&mut tx.output.clone());
1016 self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, (commitment_number, tx.output.iter().map(|output| { output.script_pubkey.clone() }).collect()));
1018 if let Some(revocation_points) = self.their_cur_revocation_points {
1019 let revocation_point_option =
1020 if revocation_points.0 == commitment_number { Some(&revocation_points.1) }
1021 else if let Some(point) = revocation_points.2.as_ref() {
1022 if revocation_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 { Some(point) } else { None }
1024 if let Some(revocation_point) = revocation_point_option {
1025 let (revocation_pubkey, b_htlc_key) = match self.key_storage {
1026 KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
1027 (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_base_key))),
1028 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &htlc_base_key))))
1030 KeyStorage::SigsMode { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
1031 (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &revocation_base_key)),
1032 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &htlc_base_key)))
1035 let a_htlc_key = match self.their_htlc_base_key {
1036 None => return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs),
1037 Some(their_htlc_base_key) => ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &their_htlc_base_key)),
1040 let mut total_value = 0;
1041 let mut values = Vec::new();
1042 let mut inputs = Vec::new();
1044 macro_rules! sign_input {
1045 ($sighash_parts: expr, $input: expr, $amount: expr, $preimage: expr) => {
1047 let (sig, redeemscript) = match self.key_storage {
1048 KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
1049 let htlc = &per_commitment_option.unwrap()[$input.sequence as usize];
1050 let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey);
1051 let sighash = ignore_error!(Message::from_slice(&$sighash_parts.sighash_all(&$input, &redeemscript, $amount)[..]));
1052 let htlc_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &htlc_base_key));
1053 (self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &htlc_key), redeemscript)
1055 KeyStorage::SigsMode { .. } => {
1059 $input.witness.push(sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
1060 $input.witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1061 $input.witness.push($preimage);
1062 $input.witness.push(redeemscript.into_bytes());
1067 for (idx, htlc) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() {
1068 if let Some(payment_preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
1070 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
1071 txid: commitment_txid,
1072 vout: htlc.transaction_output_index,
1074 script_sig: Script::new(),
1075 sequence: idx as u32, // reset to 0xfffffffd in sign_input
1076 witness: Vec::new(),
1078 if htlc.cltv_expiry > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER {
1080 values.push((tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].value, payment_preimage));
1081 total_value += htlc.amount_msat / 1000;
1083 let mut single_htlc_tx = Transaction {
1087 output: vec!(TxOut {
1088 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1089 value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000, //TODO: - fee
1092 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&single_htlc_tx);
1093 sign_input!(sighash_parts, single_htlc_tx.input[0], htlc.amount_msat / 1000, payment_preimage.to_vec());
1094 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
1095 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: single_htlc_tx.txid(), vout: 0 },
1096 output: single_htlc_tx.output[0].clone(),
1098 txn_to_broadcast.push(single_htlc_tx);
1103 if inputs.is_empty() { return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs); } // Nothing to be done...probably a false positive/local tx
1105 let outputs = vec!(TxOut {
1106 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1107 value: total_value, //TODO: - fee
1109 let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
1116 let mut values_drain = values.drain(..);
1117 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx);
1119 for input in spend_tx.input.iter_mut() {
1120 let value = values_drain.next().unwrap();
1121 sign_input!(sighash_parts, input, value.0, value.1.to_vec());
1124 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
1125 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: spend_tx.txid(), vout: 0 },
1126 output: spend_tx.output[0].clone(),
1128 txn_to_broadcast.push(spend_tx);
1133 (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs)
1136 /// Attempst to claim a remote HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout s outputs using the revocation key
1137 fn check_spend_remote_htlc(&self, tx: &Transaction, commitment_number: u64) -> (Option<Transaction>, Option<SpendableOutputDescriptor>) {
1138 if tx.input.len() != 1 || tx.output.len() != 1 {
1142 macro_rules! ignore_error {
1143 ( $thing : expr ) => {
1146 Err(_) => return (None, None)
1151 let secret = ignore_error!(self.get_secret(commitment_number));
1152 let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &secret));
1153 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
1154 let revocation_pubkey = match self.key_storage {
1155 KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
1156 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_base_key)))
1158 KeyStorage::SigsMode { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
1159 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &revocation_base_key))
1162 let delayed_key = match self.their_delayed_payment_base_key {
1163 None => return (None, None),
1164 Some(their_delayed_payment_base_key) => ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &their_delayed_payment_base_key)),
1166 let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), &delayed_key);
1167 let revokeable_p2wsh = redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
1168 let htlc_txid = tx.txid(); //TODO: This is gonna be a performance bottleneck for watchtowers!
1170 let mut inputs = Vec::new();
1173 if tx.output[0].script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh { //HTLC transactions have one txin, one txout
1175 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
1179 script_sig: Script::new(),
1180 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
1181 witness: Vec::new(),
1183 amount = tx.output[0].value;
1186 if !inputs.is_empty() {
1187 let outputs = vec!(TxOut {
1188 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1189 value: amount, //TODO: - fee
1192 let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
1199 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx);
1201 let sig = match self.key_storage {
1202 KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
1203 let sighash = ignore_error!(Message::from_slice(&sighash_parts.sighash_all(&spend_tx.input[0], &redeemscript, amount)[..]));
1204 let revocation_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key, &revocation_base_key));
1205 self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &revocation_key)
1207 KeyStorage::SigsMode { .. } => {
1211 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
1212 spend_tx.input[0].witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1213 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(vec!(1));
1214 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(redeemscript.into_bytes());
1216 let outpoint = BitcoinOutPoint { txid: spend_tx.txid(), vout: 0 };
1217 let output = spend_tx.output[0].clone();
1218 (Some(spend_tx), Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput { outpoint, output }))
1219 } else { (None, None) }
1222 fn broadcast_by_local_state(&self, local_tx: &LocalSignedTx, per_commitment_point: &Option<PublicKey>, delayed_payment_base_key: &Option<SecretKey>) -> (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>) {
1223 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
1224 let mut spendable_outputs = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
1226 for &(ref htlc, ref their_sig, ref our_sig) in local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1228 let mut htlc_timeout_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&local_tx.txid, local_tx.feerate_per_kw, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), htlc, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key, &local_tx.revocation_key);
1230 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
1232 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(their_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
1233 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1234 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
1235 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1237 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new());
1238 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &local_tx.a_htlc_key, &local_tx.b_htlc_key, &local_tx.revocation_key).into_bytes());
1240 if let Some(ref per_commitment_point) = *per_commitment_point {
1241 if let Some(ref delayed_payment_base_key) = *delayed_payment_base_key {
1242 if let Ok(local_delayedkey) = chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base_key) {
1243 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutput {
1244 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: htlc_timeout_tx.txid(), vout: 0 },
1246 witness_script: chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&local_tx.revocation_key, self.our_to_self_delay, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key),
1247 to_self_delay: self.our_to_self_delay
1252 res.push(htlc_timeout_tx);
1254 if let Some(payment_preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
1255 let mut htlc_success_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&local_tx.txid, local_tx.feerate_per_kw, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), htlc, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key, &local_tx.revocation_key);
1257 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
1259 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(their_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
1260 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1261 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
1262 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1264 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(payment_preimage.to_vec());
1265 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &local_tx.a_htlc_key, &local_tx.b_htlc_key, &local_tx.revocation_key).into_bytes());
1267 if let Some(ref per_commitment_point) = *per_commitment_point {
1268 if let Some(ref delayed_payment_base_key) = *delayed_payment_base_key {
1269 if let Ok(local_delayedkey) = chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base_key) {
1270 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutput {
1271 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: htlc_success_tx.txid(), vout: 0 },
1273 witness_script: chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&local_tx.revocation_key, self.our_to_self_delay, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key),
1274 to_self_delay: self.our_to_self_delay
1279 res.push(htlc_success_tx);
1284 (res, spendable_outputs)
1287 /// Attempts to claim any claimable HTLCs in a commitment transaction which was not (yet)
1288 /// revoked using data in local_claimable_outpoints.
1289 /// Should not be used if check_spend_revoked_transaction succeeds.
1290 fn check_spend_local_transaction(&self, tx: &Transaction, _height: u32) -> (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>) {
1291 let commitment_txid = tx.txid();
1292 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1293 if local_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
1294 match self.key_storage {
1295 KeyStorage::PrivMode { revocation_base_key: _, htlc_base_key: _, ref delayed_payment_base_key, prev_latest_per_commitment_point: _, ref latest_per_commitment_point } => {
1296 return self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, latest_per_commitment_point, &Some(*delayed_payment_base_key));
1298 KeyStorage::SigsMode { .. } => {
1299 return self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, &None, &None);
1304 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1305 if local_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
1306 match self.key_storage {
1307 KeyStorage::PrivMode { revocation_base_key: _, htlc_base_key: _, ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref prev_latest_per_commitment_point, .. } => {
1308 return self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, prev_latest_per_commitment_point, &Some(*delayed_payment_base_key));
1310 KeyStorage::SigsMode { .. } => {
1311 return self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, &None, &None);
1316 (Vec::new(), Vec::new())
1319 /// Used by ChannelManager deserialization to broadcast the latest local state if it's copy of
1320 /// the Channel was out-of-date.
1321 pub(super) fn get_latest_local_commitment_txn(&self) -> Vec<Transaction> {
1322 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1323 let mut res = vec![local_tx.tx.clone()];
1324 match self.key_storage {
1325 KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref prev_latest_per_commitment_point, .. } => {
1326 res.append(&mut self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, prev_latest_per_commitment_point, &Some(*delayed_payment_base_key)).0);
1328 _ => panic!("Can only broadcast by local channelmonitor"),
1336 fn block_connected(&mut self, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], height: u32, block_hash: &Sha256dHash, broadcaster: &BroadcasterInterface)-> (Vec<(Sha256dHash, Vec<TxOut>)>, Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>) {
1337 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
1338 let mut spendable_outputs = Vec::new();
1339 for tx in txn_matched {
1340 if tx.input.len() == 1 {
1341 // Assuming our keys were not leaked (in which case we're screwed no matter what),
1342 // commitment transactions and HTLC transactions will all only ever have one input,
1343 // which is an easy way to filter out any potential non-matching txn for lazy
1345 let prevout = &tx.input[0].previous_output;
1346 let mut txn: Vec<Transaction> = Vec::new();
1347 if self.funding_txo.is_none() || (prevout.txid == self.funding_txo.as_ref().unwrap().0.txid && prevout.vout == self.funding_txo.as_ref().unwrap().0.index as u32) {
1348 let (remote_txn, new_outputs, mut spendable_output) = self.check_spend_remote_transaction(tx, height);
1350 spendable_outputs.append(&mut spendable_output);
1351 if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() {
1352 watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
1355 let (remote_txn, mut outputs) = self.check_spend_local_transaction(tx, height);
1356 spendable_outputs.append(&mut outputs);
1360 if let Some(&(commitment_number, _)) = self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.get(&prevout.txid) {
1361 let (tx, spendable_output) = self.check_spend_remote_htlc(tx, commitment_number);
1362 if let Some(tx) = tx {
1365 if let Some(spendable_output) = spendable_output {
1366 spendable_outputs.push(spendable_output);
1370 for tx in txn.iter() {
1371 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(tx);
1375 if let Some(ref cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1376 if self.would_broadcast_at_height(height) {
1377 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&cur_local_tx.tx);
1378 match self.key_storage {
1379 KeyStorage::PrivMode { revocation_base_key: _, htlc_base_key: _, ref delayed_payment_base_key, prev_latest_per_commitment_point: _, ref latest_per_commitment_point } => {
1380 let (txs, mut outputs) = self.broadcast_by_local_state(&cur_local_tx, latest_per_commitment_point, &Some(*delayed_payment_base_key));
1381 spendable_outputs.append(&mut outputs);
1383 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
1386 KeyStorage::SigsMode { .. } => {
1387 let (txs, mut outputs) = self.broadcast_by_local_state(&cur_local_tx, &None, &None);
1388 spendable_outputs.append(&mut outputs);
1390 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
1396 self.last_block_hash = block_hash.clone();
1397 (watch_outputs, spendable_outputs)
1400 pub(super) fn would_broadcast_at_height(&self, height: u32) -> bool {
1401 if let Some(ref cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1402 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in cur_local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1403 // For inbound HTLCs which we know the preimage for, we have to ensure we hit the
1404 // chain with enough room to claim the HTLC without our counterparty being able to
1405 // time out the HTLC first.
1406 // For outbound HTLCs which our counterparty hasn't failed/claimed, our primary
1407 // concern is being able to claim the corresponding inbound HTLC (on another
1408 // channel) before it expires. In fact, we don't even really care if our
1409 // counterparty here claims such an outbound HTLC after it expired as long as we
1410 // can still claim the corresponding HTLC. Thus, to avoid needlessly hitting the
1411 // chain when our counterparty is waiting for expiration to off-chain fail an HTLC
1412 // we give ourselves a few blocks of headroom after expiration before going
1413 // on-chain for an expired HTLC.
1414 // Note that, to avoid a potential attack whereby a node delays claiming an HTLC
1415 // from us until we've reached the point where we go on-chain with the
1416 // corresponding inbound HTLC, we must ensure that outbound HTLCs go on chain at
1417 // least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER blocks prior to the inbound HTLC.
1418 // aka outbound_cltv + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS == height - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
1419 // inbound_cltv == height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
1420 // outbound_cltv + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFER <= inbound_cltv - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
1421 // HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS + 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFER <= inbound_cltv - outbound_cltv
1422 // HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS + 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFER <= CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA
1423 if ( htlc.offered && htlc.cltv_expiry + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS <= height) ||
1424 (!htlc.offered && htlc.cltv_expiry <= height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER && self.payment_preimages.contains_key(&htlc.payment_hash)) {
1433 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
1435 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> ReadableArgs<R, Arc<Logger>> for (Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor) {
1436 fn read(reader: &mut R, logger: Arc<Logger>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1437 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1438 macro_rules! unwrap_obj {
1442 Err(_) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
1447 let _ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1448 let min_ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1449 if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION {
1450 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion);
1453 // Technically this can fail and serialize fail a round-trip, but only for serialization of
1454 // barely-init'd ChannelMonitors that we can't do anything with.
1455 let outpoint = OutPoint {
1456 txid: Readable::read(reader)?,
1457 index: Readable::read(reader)?,
1459 let funding_txo = Some((outpoint, Readable::read(reader)?));
1460 let commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor = <U48 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.0;
1462 let key_storage = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
1464 let revocation_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
1465 let htlc_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
1466 let delayed_payment_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
1467 let prev_latest_per_commitment_point = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
1469 1 => Some(Readable::read(reader)?),
1470 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
1472 let latest_per_commitment_point = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
1474 1 => Some(Readable::read(reader)?),
1475 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
1477 KeyStorage::PrivMode {
1478 revocation_base_key,
1480 delayed_payment_base_key,
1481 prev_latest_per_commitment_point,
1482 latest_per_commitment_point,
1485 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
1488 let their_htlc_base_key = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
1489 let their_delayed_payment_base_key = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
1491 let their_cur_revocation_points = {
1492 let first_idx = <U48 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.0;
1496 let first_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
1497 let second_point_slice: [u8; 33] = Readable::read(reader)?;
1498 if second_point_slice[0..32] == [0; 32] && second_point_slice[32] == 0 {
1499 Some((first_idx, first_point, None))
1501 Some((first_idx, first_point, Some(unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &second_point_slice)))))
1506 let our_to_self_delay: u16 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1507 let their_to_self_delay: Option<u16> = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
1509 let mut old_secrets = [([0; 32], 1 << 48); 49];
1510 for &mut (ref mut secret, ref mut idx) in old_secrets.iter_mut() {
1511 *secret = Readable::read(reader)?;
1512 *idx = Readable::read(reader)?;
1515 macro_rules! read_htlc_in_commitment {
1518 let offered: bool = Readable::read(reader)?;
1519 let amount_msat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1520 let cltv_expiry: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1521 let payment_hash: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(reader)?;
1522 let transaction_output_index: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1524 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1525 offered, amount_msat, cltv_expiry, payment_hash, transaction_output_index
1531 let remote_claimable_outpoints_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1532 let mut remote_claimable_outpoints = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(remote_claimable_outpoints_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 64));
1533 for _ in 0..remote_claimable_outpoints_len {
1534 let txid: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
1535 let outputs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1536 let mut outputs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
1537 for _ in 0..outputs_count {
1538 outputs.push(read_htlc_in_commitment!());
1540 if let Some(_) = remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, outputs) {
1541 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
1545 let remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1546 let mut remote_commitment_txn_on_chain = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
1547 for _ in 0..remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len {
1548 let txid: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
1549 let commitment_number = <U48 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.0;
1550 let outputs_count = <u64 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?;
1551 let mut outputs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 8));
1552 for _ in 0..outputs_count {
1553 outputs.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
1555 if let Some(_) = remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(txid, (commitment_number, outputs)) {
1556 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
1560 let remote_hash_commitment_number_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1561 let mut remote_hash_commitment_number = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(remote_hash_commitment_number_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
1562 for _ in 0..remote_hash_commitment_number_len {
1563 let txid: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(reader)?;
1564 let commitment_number = <U48 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.0;
1565 if let Some(_) = remote_hash_commitment_number.insert(txid, commitment_number) {
1566 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
1570 macro_rules! read_local_tx {
1573 let tx = match Transaction::consensus_decode(&mut serialize::RawDecoder::new(reader.by_ref())) {
1576 serialize::Error::Io(ioe) => return Err(DecodeError::Io(ioe)),
1577 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
1581 if tx.input.is_empty() {
1582 // Ensure tx didn't hit the 0-input ambiguity case.
1583 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
1586 let revocation_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
1587 let a_htlc_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
1588 let b_htlc_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
1589 let delayed_payment_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
1590 let feerate_per_kw: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1592 let htlc_outputs_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1593 let mut htlc_outputs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlc_outputs_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
1594 for _ in 0..htlc_outputs_len {
1595 htlc_outputs.push((read_htlc_in_commitment!(), Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
1600 tx, revocation_key, a_htlc_key, b_htlc_key, delayed_payment_key, feerate_per_kw, htlc_outputs
1606 let prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
1609 Some(read_local_tx!())
1611 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
1614 let current_local_signed_commitment_tx = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
1617 Some(read_local_tx!())
1619 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
1622 let current_remote_commitment_number = <U48 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.0;
1624 let payment_preimages_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1625 let mut payment_preimages = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(payment_preimages_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
1626 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
1627 for _ in 0..payment_preimages_len {
1628 let preimage: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(reader)?;
1630 sha.input(&preimage);
1631 let mut hash = [0; 32];
1632 sha.result(&mut hash);
1633 if let Some(_) = payment_preimages.insert(hash, preimage) {
1634 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
1638 let last_block_hash: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
1639 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
1641 Ok((last_block_hash.clone(), ChannelMonitor {
1643 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor,
1646 their_htlc_base_key,
1647 their_delayed_payment_base_key,
1648 their_cur_revocation_points,
1651 their_to_self_delay,
1654 remote_claimable_outpoints,
1655 remote_commitment_txn_on_chain,
1656 remote_hash_commitment_number,
1658 prev_local_signed_commitment_tx,
1659 current_local_signed_commitment_tx,
1660 current_remote_commitment_number,
1675 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Script;
1676 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
1677 use crypto::digest::Digest;
1679 use ln::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor;
1680 use ln::chan_utils::{HTLCOutputInCommitment, TxCreationKeys};
1681 use util::sha2::Sha256;
1682 use util::test_utils::TestLogger;
1683 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
1684 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1, Signature};
1685 use rand::{thread_rng,Rng};
1689 fn test_per_commitment_storage() {
1690 // Test vectors from BOLT 3:
1691 let mut secrets: Vec<[u8; 32]> = Vec::new();
1692 let mut monitor: ChannelMonitor;
1693 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1694 let logger = Arc::new(TestLogger::new());
1696 macro_rules! test_secrets {
1698 let mut idx = 281474976710655;
1699 for secret in secrets.iter() {
1700 assert_eq!(monitor.get_secret(idx).unwrap(), *secret);
1703 assert_eq!(monitor.get_min_seen_secret(), idx + 1);
1704 assert!(monitor.get_secret(idx).is_err());
1709 // insert_secret correct sequence
1710 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
1713 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1714 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1715 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1718 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1719 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1720 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1723 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1724 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1725 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1728 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1729 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1730 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1733 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1734 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
1735 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1738 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1739 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
1740 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1743 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1744 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
1745 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1748 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1749 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
1750 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1755 // insert_secret #1 incorrect
1756 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
1759 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1760 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
1761 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1764 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1765 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1766 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err,
1767 "Previous secret did not match new one");
1771 // insert_secret #2 incorrect (#1 derived from incorrect)
1772 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
1775 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1776 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
1777 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1780 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1781 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("dddc3a8d14fddf2b68fa8c7fbad2748274937479dd0f8930d5ebb4ab6bd866a3").unwrap());
1782 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1785 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1786 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1787 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1790 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1791 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1792 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err,
1793 "Previous secret did not match new one");
1797 // insert_secret #3 incorrect
1798 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
1801 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1802 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1803 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1806 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1807 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1808 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1811 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1812 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c51a18b13e8527e579ec56365482c62f180b7d5760b46e9477dae59e87ed423a").unwrap());
1813 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1816 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1817 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1818 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err,
1819 "Previous secret did not match new one");
1823 // insert_secret #4 incorrect (1,2,3 derived from incorrect)
1824 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
1827 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1828 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
1829 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1832 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1833 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("dddc3a8d14fddf2b68fa8c7fbad2748274937479dd0f8930d5ebb4ab6bd866a3").unwrap());
1834 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1837 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1838 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c51a18b13e8527e579ec56365482c62f180b7d5760b46e9477dae59e87ed423a").unwrap());
1839 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1842 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1843 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("ba65d7b0ef55a3ba300d4e87af29868f394f8f138d78a7011669c79b37b936f4").unwrap());
1844 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1847 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1848 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
1849 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1852 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1853 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
1854 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1857 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1858 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
1859 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1862 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1863 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
1864 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err,
1865 "Previous secret did not match new one");
1869 // insert_secret #5 incorrect
1870 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
1873 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1874 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1875 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1878 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1879 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1880 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1883 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1884 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1885 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1888 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1889 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1890 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1893 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1894 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("631373ad5f9ef654bb3dade742d09504c567edd24320d2fcd68e3cc47e2ff6a6").unwrap());
1895 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1898 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1899 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
1900 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err,
1901 "Previous secret did not match new one");
1905 // insert_secret #6 incorrect (5 derived from incorrect)
1906 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
1909 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1910 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1911 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1914 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1915 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1916 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1919 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1920 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1921 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1924 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1925 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1926 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1929 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1930 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("631373ad5f9ef654bb3dade742d09504c567edd24320d2fcd68e3cc47e2ff6a6").unwrap());
1931 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1934 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1935 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("b7e76a83668bde38b373970155c868a653304308f9896692f904a23731224bb1").unwrap());
1936 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1939 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1940 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
1941 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1944 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1945 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
1946 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err,
1947 "Previous secret did not match new one");
1951 // insert_secret #7 incorrect
1952 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
1955 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1956 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1957 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1960 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1961 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1962 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1965 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1966 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1967 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1970 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1971 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1972 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1975 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1976 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
1977 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1980 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1981 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
1982 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1985 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1986 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("e7971de736e01da8ed58b94c2fc216cb1dca9e326f3a96e7194fe8ea8af6c0a3").unwrap());
1987 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1990 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1991 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
1992 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err,
1993 "Previous secret did not match new one");
1997 // insert_secret #8 incorrect
1998 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
2001 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2002 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
2003 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
2006 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2007 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
2008 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
2011 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2012 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
2013 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
2016 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2017 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
2018 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
2021 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2022 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
2023 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
2026 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2027 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
2028 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
2031 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2032 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
2033 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
2036 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2037 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a7efbc61aac46d34f77778bac22c8a20c6a46ca460addc49009bda875ec88fa4").unwrap());
2038 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err,
2039 "Previous secret did not match new one");
2044 fn test_prune_preimages() {
2045 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2046 let logger = Arc::new(TestLogger::new());
2047 let dummy_sig = Signature::from_der(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("3045022100fa86fa9a36a8cd6a7bb8f06a541787d51371d067951a9461d5404de6b928782e02201c8b7c334c10aed8976a3a465be9a28abff4cb23acbf00022295b378ce1fa3cd").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
2049 macro_rules! dummy_keys {
2052 let dummy_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap());
2054 per_commitment_point: dummy_key.clone(),
2055 revocation_key: dummy_key.clone(),
2056 a_htlc_key: dummy_key.clone(),
2057 b_htlc_key: dummy_key.clone(),
2058 a_delayed_payment_key: dummy_key.clone(),
2059 b_payment_key: dummy_key.clone(),
2064 let dummy_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
2066 let mut preimages = Vec::new();
2068 let mut rng = thread_rng();
2070 let mut preimage = [0; 32];
2071 rng.fill_bytes(&mut preimage);
2072 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
2073 sha.input(&preimage);
2074 let mut hash = [0; 32];
2075 sha.result(&mut hash);
2076 preimages.push((preimage, hash));
2080 macro_rules! preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs {
2081 ($preimages_slice: expr) => {
2083 let mut res = Vec::new();
2084 for (idx, preimage) in $preimages_slice.iter().enumerate() {
2085 res.push(HTLCOutputInCommitment {
2089 payment_hash: preimage.1.clone(),
2090 transaction_output_index: idx as u32,
2097 macro_rules! preimages_to_local_htlcs {
2098 ($preimages_slice: expr) => {
2100 let mut inp = preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!($preimages_slice);
2101 let res: Vec<_> = inp.drain(..).map(|e| { (e, dummy_sig.clone(), dummy_sig.clone()) }).collect();
2107 macro_rules! test_preimages_exist {
2108 ($preimages_slice: expr, $monitor: expr) => {
2109 for preimage in $preimages_slice {
2110 assert!($monitor.payment_preimages.contains_key(&preimage.1));
2115 // Prune with one old state and a local commitment tx holding a few overlaps with the
2117 let mut monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
2118 monitor.set_their_to_self_delay(10);
2120 monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(dummy_tx.clone(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..10]));
2121 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[5..15]), 281474976710655);
2122 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[15..20]), 281474976710654);
2123 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[17..20]), 281474976710653);
2124 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[18..20]), 281474976710652);
2125 for &(ref preimage, ref hash) in preimages.iter() {
2126 monitor.provide_payment_preimage(hash, preimage);
2129 // Now provide a secret, pruning preimages 10-15
2130 let mut secret = [0; 32];
2131 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
2132 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secret.clone(), None).unwrap();
2133 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 15);
2134 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
2135 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[15..20], monitor);
2137 // Now provide a further secret, pruning preimages 15-17
2138 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
2139 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secret.clone(), None).unwrap();
2140 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 13);
2141 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
2142 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[17..20], monitor);
2144 // Now update local commitment tx info, pruning only element 18 as we still care about the
2145 // previous commitment tx's preimages too
2146 monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(dummy_tx.clone(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..5]));
2147 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
2148 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secret.clone(), None).unwrap();
2149 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 12);
2150 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
2151 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[18..20], monitor);
2153 // But if we do it again, we'll prune 5-10
2154 monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(dummy_tx.clone(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..3]));
2155 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
2156 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secret.clone(), None).unwrap();
2157 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 5);
2158 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..5], monitor);
2161 // Further testing is done in the ChannelManager integration tests.