1 //! The logic to monitor for on-chain transactions and create the relevant claim responses lives
4 //! ChannelMonitor objects are generated by ChannelManager in response to relevant
5 //! messages/actions, and MUST be persisted to disk (and, preferably, remotely) before progress can
6 //! be made in responding to certain messages, see ManyChannelMonitor for more.
8 //! Note that ChannelMonitors are an important part of the lightning trust model and a copy of the
9 //! latest ChannelMonitor must always be actively monitoring for chain updates (and no out-of-date
10 //! ChannelMonitors should do so). Thus, if you're building rust-lightning into an HSM or other
11 //! security-domain-separated system design, you should consider having multiple paths for
12 //! ChannelMonitors to get out of the HSM and onto monitoring devices.
14 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
15 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxIn,TxOut,SigHashType,Transaction};
16 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
17 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
18 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
19 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::{self, Decodable, Encodable};
20 use bitcoin::util::hash::{Hash160, BitcoinHash,Sha256dHash};
21 use bitcoin::util::bip143;
23 use crypto::digest::Digest;
25 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Message,Signature};
26 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
29 use ln::msgs::DecodeError;
31 use ln::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment;
32 use chain::chaininterface::{ChainListener, ChainWatchInterface, BroadcasterInterface};
33 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
34 use chain::keysinterface::SpendableOutputDescriptor;
35 use util::logger::Logger;
36 use util::ser::{ReadableArgs, Readable, Writer, Writeable, WriterWriteAdaptor, U48};
37 use util::sha2::Sha256;
38 use util::{byte_utils, events};
40 use std::collections::HashMap;
41 use std::sync::{Arc,Mutex};
42 use std::{hash,cmp, mem};
44 /// An error enum representing a failure to persist a channel monitor update.
46 pub enum ChannelMonitorUpdateErr {
47 /// Used to indicate a temporary failure (eg connection to a watchtower failed, but is expected
48 /// to succeed at some point in the future).
50 /// Such a failure will "freeze" a channel, preventing us from revoking old states or
51 /// submitting new commitment transactions to the remote party.
52 /// ChannelManager::test_restore_channel_monitor can be used to retry the update(s) and restore
53 /// the channel to an operational state.
55 /// Note that continuing to operate when no copy of the updated ChannelMonitor could be
56 /// persisted is unsafe - if you failed to store the update on your own local disk you should
57 /// instead return PermanentFailure to force closure of the channel ASAP.
59 /// Even when a channel has been "frozen" updates to the ChannelMonitor can continue to occur
60 /// (eg if an inbound HTLC which we forwarded was claimed upstream resulting in us attempting
61 /// to claim it on this channel) and those updates must be applied wherever they can be. At
62 /// least one such updated ChannelMonitor must be persisted otherwise PermanentFailure should
63 /// be returned to get things on-chain ASAP using only the in-memory copy. Obviously updates to
64 /// the channel which would invalidate previous ChannelMonitors are not made when a channel has
67 /// Note that even if updates made after TemporaryFailure succeed you must still call
68 /// test_restore_channel_monitor to ensure you have the latest monitor and re-enable normal
69 /// channel operation.
71 /// Used to indicate no further channel monitor updates will be allowed (eg we've moved on to a
72 /// different watchtower and cannot update with all watchtowers that were previously informed
73 /// of this channel). This will force-close the channel in question.
77 /// General Err type for ChannelMonitor actions. Generally, this implies that the data provided is
78 /// inconsistent with the ChannelMonitor being called. eg for ChannelMonitor::insert_combine this
79 /// means you tried to merge two monitors for different channels or for a channel which was
80 /// restored from a backup and then generated new commitment updates.
81 /// Contains a human-readable error message.
83 pub struct MonitorUpdateError(pub &'static str);
85 /// Simple trait indicating ability to track a set of ChannelMonitors and multiplex events between
86 /// them. Generally should be implemented by keeping a local SimpleManyChannelMonitor and passing
87 /// events to it, while also taking any add_update_monitor events and passing them to some remote
90 /// Note that any updates to a channel's monitor *must* be applied to each instance of the
91 /// channel's monitor everywhere (including remote watchtowers) *before* this function returns. If
92 /// an update occurs and a remote watchtower is left with old state, it may broadcast transactions
93 /// which we have revoked, allowing our counterparty to claim all funds in the channel!
94 pub trait ManyChannelMonitor: Send + Sync {
95 /// Adds or updates a monitor for the given `funding_txo`.
97 /// Implementor must also ensure that the funding_txo outpoint is registered with any relevant
98 /// ChainWatchInterfaces such that the provided monitor receives block_connected callbacks with
100 fn add_update_monitor(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr>;
103 /// A simple implementation of a ManyChannelMonitor and ChainListener. Can be used to create a
104 /// watchtower or watch our own channels.
106 /// Note that you must provide your own key by which to refer to channels.
108 /// If you're accepting remote monitors (ie are implementing a watchtower), you must verify that
109 /// users cannot overwrite a given channel by providing a duplicate key. ie you should probably
110 /// index by a PublicKey which is required to sign any updates.
112 /// If you're using this for local monitoring of your own channels, you probably want to use
113 /// `OutPoint` as the key, which will give you a ManyChannelMonitor implementation.
114 pub struct SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
115 #[cfg(test)] // Used in ChannelManager tests to manipulate channels directly
116 pub monitors: Mutex<HashMap<Key, ChannelMonitor>>,
118 monitors: Mutex<HashMap<Key, ChannelMonitor>>,
119 chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>,
120 broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>,
121 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
125 impl<Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash> ChainListener for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
126 fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], _indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) {
127 let block_hash = header.bitcoin_hash();
128 let mut new_events: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(0);
130 let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
131 for monitor in monitors.values_mut() {
132 let (txn_outputs, spendable_outputs) = monitor.block_connected(txn_matched, height, &block_hash, &*self.broadcaster);
133 if spendable_outputs.len() > 0 {
134 new_events.push(events::Event::SpendableOutputs {
135 outputs: spendable_outputs,
138 for (ref txid, ref outputs) in txn_outputs {
139 for (idx, output) in outputs.iter().enumerate() {
140 self.chain_monitor.install_watch_outpoint((txid.clone(), idx as u32), &output.script_pubkey);
145 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
146 pending_events.append(&mut new_events);
149 fn block_disconnected(&self, _: &BlockHeader) { }
152 impl<Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash + 'static> SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
153 /// Creates a new object which can be used to monitor several channels given the chain
154 /// interface with which to register to receive notifications.
155 pub fn new(chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>, broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>, logger: Arc<Logger>) -> Arc<SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key>> {
156 let res = Arc::new(SimpleManyChannelMonitor {
157 monitors: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
160 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
163 let weak_res = Arc::downgrade(&res);
164 res.chain_monitor.register_listener(weak_res);
168 /// Adds or udpates the monitor which monitors the channel referred to by the given key.
169 pub fn add_update_monitor_by_key(&self, key: Key, monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
170 let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
171 match monitors.get_mut(&key) {
172 Some(orig_monitor) => {
173 log_trace!(self, "Updating Channel Monitor for channel {}", log_funding_info!(monitor.key_storage));
174 return orig_monitor.insert_combine(monitor);
178 match monitor.key_storage {
179 Storage::Local { ref funding_info, .. } => {
182 return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Try to update a useless monitor without funding_txo !"));
184 &Some((ref outpoint, ref script)) => {
185 log_trace!(self, "Got new Channel Monitor for channel {}", log_bytes!(outpoint.to_channel_id()[..]));
186 self.chain_monitor.install_watch_tx(&outpoint.txid, script);
187 self.chain_monitor.install_watch_outpoint((outpoint.txid, outpoint.index as u32), script);
191 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
192 self.chain_monitor.watch_all_txn();
195 monitors.insert(key, monitor);
200 impl ManyChannelMonitor for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<OutPoint> {
201 fn add_update_monitor(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr> {
202 match self.add_update_monitor_by_key(funding_txo, monitor) {
204 Err(_) => Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure),
209 impl<Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash> events::EventsProvider for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
210 fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
211 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
212 let mut ret = Vec::new();
213 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut *pending_events);
218 /// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, don't try to claim it in a shared transaction,
219 /// instead claiming it in its own individual transaction.
220 const CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 12;
221 /// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, force-close the channel to broadcast the
222 /// HTLC-Success transaction.
223 /// In other words, this is an upper bound on how many blocks we think it can take us to get a
224 /// transaction confirmed (and we use it in a few more, equivalent, places).
225 pub(crate) const CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 6;
226 /// Number of blocks by which point we expect our counterparty to have seen new blocks on the
227 /// network and done a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance (+ we've updated all our
228 /// copies of ChannelMonitors, including watchtowers).
229 pub(crate) const HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS: u32 = 3;
231 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
234 revocation_base_key: SecretKey,
235 htlc_base_key: SecretKey,
236 delayed_payment_base_key: SecretKey,
237 payment_base_key: SecretKey,
238 shutdown_pubkey: PublicKey,
239 prev_latest_per_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
240 latest_per_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
241 funding_info: Option<(OutPoint, Script)>,
242 short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
245 revocation_base_key: PublicKey,
246 htlc_base_key: PublicKey,
247 sigs: HashMap<Sha256dHash, Signature>,
251 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
252 struct LocalSignedTx {
253 /// txid of the transaction in tx, just used to make comparison faster
256 revocation_key: PublicKey,
257 a_htlc_key: PublicKey,
258 b_htlc_key: PublicKey,
259 delayed_payment_key: PublicKey,
261 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Signature, Signature)>,
264 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
265 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
267 /// A ChannelMonitor handles chain events (blocks connected and disconnected) and generates
268 /// on-chain transactions to ensure no loss of funds occurs.
270 /// You MUST ensure that no ChannelMonitors for a given channel anywhere contain out-of-date
271 /// information and are actively monitoring the chain.
273 pub struct ChannelMonitor {
274 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64,
276 key_storage: Storage,
277 their_htlc_base_key: Option<PublicKey>,
278 their_delayed_payment_base_key: Option<PublicKey>,
279 // first is the idx of the first of the two revocation points
280 their_cur_revocation_points: Option<(u64, PublicKey, Option<PublicKey>)>,
282 our_to_self_delay: u16,
283 their_to_self_delay: Option<u16>,
285 old_secrets: [([u8; 32], u64); 49],
286 remote_claimable_outpoints: HashMap<Sha256dHash, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>>,
287 /// We cannot identify HTLC-Success or HTLC-Timeout transactions by themselves on the chain.
288 /// Nor can we figure out their commitment numbers without the commitment transaction they are
289 /// spending. Thus, in order to claim them via revocation key, we track all the remote
290 /// commitment transactions which we find on-chain, mapping them to the commitment number which
291 /// can be used to derive the revocation key and claim the transactions.
292 remote_commitment_txn_on_chain: HashMap<Sha256dHash, (u64, Vec<Script>)>,
293 /// Cache used to make pruning of payment_preimages faster.
294 /// Maps payment_hash values to commitment numbers for remote transactions for non-revoked
295 /// remote transactions (ie should remain pretty small).
296 /// Serialized to disk but should generally not be sent to Watchtowers.
297 remote_hash_commitment_number: HashMap<[u8; 32], u64>,
299 // We store two local commitment transactions to avoid any race conditions where we may update
300 // some monitors (potentially on watchtowers) but then fail to update others, resulting in the
301 // various monitors for one channel being out of sync, and us broadcasting a local
302 // transaction for which we have deleted claim information on some watchtowers.
303 prev_local_signed_commitment_tx: Option<LocalSignedTx>,
304 current_local_signed_commitment_tx: Option<LocalSignedTx>,
306 // Used just for ChannelManager to make sure it has the latest channel data during
308 current_remote_commitment_number: u64,
310 payment_preimages: HashMap<[u8; 32], [u8; 32]>,
312 destination_script: Script,
314 // We simply modify last_block_hash in Channel's block_connected so that serialization is
315 // consistent but hopefully the users' copy handles block_connected in a consistent way.
316 // (we do *not*, however, update them in insert_combine to ensure any local user copies keep
317 // their last_block_hash from its state and not based on updated copies that didn't run through
318 // the full block_connected).
319 pub(crate) last_block_hash: Sha256dHash,
320 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>, //TODO: dedup this a bit...
324 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
325 /// Used only in testing and fuzztarget to check serialization roundtrips don't change the
326 /// underlying object
327 impl PartialEq for ChannelMonitor {
328 fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
329 if self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor != other.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor ||
330 self.key_storage != other.key_storage ||
331 self.their_htlc_base_key != other.their_htlc_base_key ||
332 self.their_delayed_payment_base_key != other.their_delayed_payment_base_key ||
333 self.their_cur_revocation_points != other.their_cur_revocation_points ||
334 self.our_to_self_delay != other.our_to_self_delay ||
335 self.their_to_self_delay != other.their_to_self_delay ||
336 self.remote_claimable_outpoints != other.remote_claimable_outpoints ||
337 self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain != other.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain ||
338 self.remote_hash_commitment_number != other.remote_hash_commitment_number ||
339 self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx != other.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx ||
340 self.current_remote_commitment_number != other.current_remote_commitment_number ||
341 self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx != other.current_local_signed_commitment_tx ||
342 self.payment_preimages != other.payment_preimages ||
343 self.destination_script != other.destination_script
347 for (&(ref secret, ref idx), &(ref o_secret, ref o_idx)) in self.old_secrets.iter().zip(other.old_secrets.iter()) {
348 if secret != o_secret || idx != o_idx {
357 impl ChannelMonitor {
358 pub(super) fn new(revocation_base_key: &SecretKey, delayed_payment_base_key: &SecretKey, htlc_base_key: &SecretKey, payment_base_key: &SecretKey, shutdown_pubkey: &PublicKey, our_to_self_delay: u16, destination_script: Script, logger: Arc<Logger>) -> ChannelMonitor {
360 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: 0,
362 key_storage: Storage::Local {
363 revocation_base_key: revocation_base_key.clone(),
364 htlc_base_key: htlc_base_key.clone(),
365 delayed_payment_base_key: delayed_payment_base_key.clone(),
366 payment_base_key: payment_base_key.clone(),
367 shutdown_pubkey: shutdown_pubkey.clone(),
368 prev_latest_per_commitment_point: None,
369 latest_per_commitment_point: None,
371 short_channel_id: None,
373 their_htlc_base_key: None,
374 their_delayed_payment_base_key: None,
375 their_cur_revocation_points: None,
377 our_to_self_delay: our_to_self_delay,
378 their_to_self_delay: None,
380 old_secrets: [([0; 32], 1 << 48); 49],
381 remote_claimable_outpoints: HashMap::new(),
382 remote_commitment_txn_on_chain: HashMap::new(),
383 remote_hash_commitment_number: HashMap::new(),
385 prev_local_signed_commitment_tx: None,
386 current_local_signed_commitment_tx: None,
387 current_remote_commitment_number: 1 << 48,
389 payment_preimages: HashMap::new(),
390 destination_script: destination_script,
392 last_block_hash: Default::default(),
393 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
399 fn place_secret(idx: u64) -> u8 {
401 if idx & (1 << i) == (1 << i) {
409 fn derive_secret(secret: [u8; 32], bits: u8, idx: u64) -> [u8; 32] {
410 let mut res: [u8; 32] = secret;
412 let bitpos = bits - 1 - i;
413 if idx & (1 << bitpos) == (1 << bitpos) {
414 res[(bitpos / 8) as usize] ^= 1 << (bitpos & 7);
415 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
417 sha.result(&mut res);
423 /// Inserts a revocation secret into this channel monitor. Prunes old preimages if neither
424 /// needed by local commitment transactions HTCLs nor by remote ones. Unless we haven't already seen remote
425 /// commitment transaction's secret, they are de facto pruned (we can use revocation key).
426 pub(super) fn provide_secret(&mut self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
427 let pos = ChannelMonitor::place_secret(idx);
429 let (old_secret, old_idx) = self.old_secrets[i as usize];
430 if ChannelMonitor::derive_secret(secret, pos, old_idx) != old_secret {
431 return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Previous secret did not match new one"));
434 self.old_secrets[pos as usize] = (secret, idx);
436 if !self.payment_preimages.is_empty() {
437 let local_signed_commitment_tx = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx.as_ref().expect("Channel needs at least an initial commitment tx !");
438 let prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.as_ref();
439 let min_idx = self.get_min_seen_secret();
440 let remote_hash_commitment_number = &mut self.remote_hash_commitment_number;
442 self.payment_preimages.retain(|&k, _| {
443 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in &local_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs {
444 if k == htlc.payment_hash {
448 if let Some(prev_local_commitment_tx) = prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
449 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in prev_local_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
450 if k == htlc.payment_hash {
455 let contains = if let Some(cn) = remote_hash_commitment_number.get(&k) {
462 remote_hash_commitment_number.remove(&k);
471 /// Informs this monitor of the latest remote (ie non-broadcastable) commitment transaction.
472 /// The monitor watches for it to be broadcasted and then uses the HTLC information (and
473 /// possibly future revocation/preimage information) to claim outputs where possible.
474 /// We cache also the mapping hash:commitment number to lighten pruning of old preimages by watchtowers.
475 pub(super) fn provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, unsigned_commitment_tx: &Transaction, htlc_outputs: Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>, commitment_number: u64, their_revocation_point: PublicKey) {
476 // TODO: Encrypt the htlc_outputs data with the single-hash of the commitment transaction
477 // so that a remote monitor doesn't learn anything unless there is a malicious close.
478 // (only maybe, sadly we cant do the same for local info, as we need to be aware of
480 for htlc in &htlc_outputs {
481 self.remote_hash_commitment_number.insert(htlc.payment_hash, commitment_number);
483 self.remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(unsigned_commitment_tx.txid(), htlc_outputs);
484 self.current_remote_commitment_number = commitment_number;
485 //TODO: Merge this into the other per-remote-transaction output storage stuff
486 match self.their_cur_revocation_points {
487 Some(old_points) => {
488 if old_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 {
489 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0, old_points.1, Some(their_revocation_point)));
490 } else if old_points.0 == commitment_number + 2 {
491 if let Some(old_second_point) = old_points.2 {
492 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0 - 1, old_second_point, Some(their_revocation_point)));
494 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None));
497 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None));
501 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None));
506 /// Informs this monitor of the latest local (ie broadcastable) commitment transaction. The
507 /// monitor watches for timeouts and may broadcast it if we approach such a timeout. Thus, it
508 /// is important that any clones of this channel monitor (including remote clones) by kept
509 /// up-to-date as our local commitment transaction is updated.
510 /// Panics if set_their_to_self_delay has never been called.
511 /// Also update Storage with latest local per_commitment_point to derive local_delayedkey in
512 /// case of onchain HTLC tx
513 pub(super) fn provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, signed_commitment_tx: Transaction, local_keys: chan_utils::TxCreationKeys, feerate_per_kw: u64, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Signature, Signature)>) {
514 assert!(self.their_to_self_delay.is_some());
515 self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx.take();
516 self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(LocalSignedTx {
517 txid: signed_commitment_tx.txid(),
518 tx: signed_commitment_tx,
519 revocation_key: local_keys.revocation_key,
520 a_htlc_key: local_keys.a_htlc_key,
521 b_htlc_key: local_keys.b_htlc_key,
522 delayed_payment_key: local_keys.a_delayed_payment_key,
526 self.key_storage = if let Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref payment_base_key, ref shutdown_pubkey, ref latest_per_commitment_point, ref mut funding_info, ref short_channel_id, .. } = self.key_storage {
528 revocation_base_key: *revocation_base_key,
529 htlc_base_key: *htlc_base_key,
530 delayed_payment_base_key: *delayed_payment_base_key,
531 payment_base_key: *payment_base_key,
532 shutdown_pubkey: *shutdown_pubkey,
533 prev_latest_per_commitment_point: *latest_per_commitment_point,
534 latest_per_commitment_point: Some(local_keys.per_commitment_point),
535 funding_info: funding_info.take(),
536 short_channel_id: *short_channel_id,
538 } else { unimplemented!(); };
541 /// Provides a payment_hash->payment_preimage mapping. Will be automatically pruned when all
542 /// commitment_tx_infos which contain the payment hash have been revoked.
543 pub(super) fn provide_payment_preimage(&mut self, payment_hash: &[u8; 32], payment_preimage: &[u8; 32]) {
544 self.payment_preimages.insert(payment_hash.clone(), payment_preimage.clone());
547 /// Combines this ChannelMonitor with the information contained in the other ChannelMonitor.
548 /// After a successful call this ChannelMonitor is up-to-date and is safe to use to monitor the
549 /// chain for new blocks/transactions.
550 pub fn insert_combine(&mut self, mut other: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
552 self.key_storage = match self.key_storage {
553 Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref payment_base_key, ref shutdown_pubkey, ref prev_latest_per_commitment_point, ref latest_per_commitment_point, ref mut funding_info, ref mut short_channel_id, .. } => {
555 macro_rules! new_storage_local {
556 ($funding_info: expr, $short_channel_id: expr) => {
558 revocation_base_key: *revocation_base_key,
559 htlc_base_key: *htlc_base_key,
560 delayed_payment_base_key: *delayed_payment_base_key,
561 payment_base_key: *payment_base_key,
562 shutdown_pubkey: *shutdown_pubkey,
563 prev_latest_per_commitment_point: *prev_latest_per_commitment_point,
564 latest_per_commitment_point: *latest_per_commitment_point,
565 funding_info: $funding_info,
566 short_channel_id: $short_channel_id,
571 let our_funding_info = funding_info;
572 let our_short_channel_id = short_channel_id;
573 if let Storage::Local { ref mut funding_info, ref mut short_channel_id, .. } = other.key_storage {
574 if our_funding_info.is_some() {
575 // We should be able to compare the entire funding_txo, but in fuzztarget its trivially
576 // easy to collide the funding_txo hash and have a different scriptPubKey.
577 if funding_info.is_some() && our_funding_info.is_some() && funding_info.as_ref().unwrap().0 != our_funding_info.as_ref().unwrap().0 {
578 return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Funding transaction outputs are not identical!"));
580 new_storage_local!(our_funding_info.take(), our_short_channel_id.take())
583 new_storage_local!(funding_info.take(), short_channel_id.take())
586 return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Try to combine a Local monitor with a Watchtower one !"));
589 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
590 if let Storage::Watchtower { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, ref mut sigs } = other.key_storage {
591 Storage::Watchtower {
592 revocation_base_key: *revocation_base_key,
593 htlc_base_key: *htlc_base_key,
594 sigs: sigs.drain().collect(),
597 return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Try to combine a Watchtower monitor with a Local one !"));
601 let other_min_secret = other.get_min_seen_secret();
602 let our_min_secret = self.get_min_seen_secret();
603 if our_min_secret > other_min_secret {
604 self.provide_secret(other_min_secret, other.get_secret(other_min_secret).unwrap())?;
606 if let Some(ref local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
607 if let Some(ref other_local_tx) = other.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
608 let our_commitment_number = 0xffffffffffff - ((((local_tx.tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (local_tx.tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor);
609 let other_commitment_number = 0xffffffffffff - ((((other_local_tx.tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (other_local_tx.tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ other.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor);
610 if our_commitment_number >= other_commitment_number {
611 self.key_storage = other.key_storage;
615 // TODO: We should use current_remote_commitment_number and the commitment number out of
616 // local transactions to decide how to merge
617 if our_min_secret >= other_min_secret {
618 self.their_cur_revocation_points = other.their_cur_revocation_points;
619 for (txid, htlcs) in other.remote_claimable_outpoints.drain() {
620 self.remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, htlcs);
622 if let Some(local_tx) = other.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
623 self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(local_tx);
625 if let Some(local_tx) = other.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
626 self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(local_tx);
628 self.payment_preimages = other.payment_preimages;
631 self.current_remote_commitment_number = cmp::min(self.current_remote_commitment_number, other.current_remote_commitment_number);
635 /// Panics if commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor doesn't fit in 48 bits
636 pub(super) fn set_commitment_obscure_factor(&mut self, commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64) {
637 assert!(commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor < (1 << 48));
638 self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor = commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor;
641 /// Allows this monitor to scan only for transactions which are applicable. Note that this is
642 /// optional, without it this monitor cannot be used in an SPV client, but you may wish to
643 /// avoid this (or call unset_funding_info) on a monitor you wish to send to a watchtower as it
644 /// provides slightly better privacy.
645 /// It's the responsibility of the caller to register outpoint and script with passing the former
646 /// value as key to add_update_monitor.
647 pub(super) fn set_funding_info(&mut self, funding_info: (OutPoint, Script)) {
648 self.key_storage = match self.key_storage {
649 Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref payment_base_key, ref shutdown_pubkey, ref prev_latest_per_commitment_point, ref latest_per_commitment_point, short_channel_id, .. } => {
651 revocation_base_key: *revocation_base_key,
652 htlc_base_key: *htlc_base_key,
653 delayed_payment_base_key: *delayed_payment_base_key,
654 payment_base_key: *payment_base_key,
655 shutdown_pubkey: *shutdown_pubkey,
656 prev_latest_per_commitment_point: *prev_latest_per_commitment_point,
657 latest_per_commitment_point: *latest_per_commitment_point,
658 funding_info: Some(funding_info.clone()),
659 short_channel_id: short_channel_id,
662 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
668 /// Allows this monitor to get preimages from upstream ChannelMonitor (linked by ManyChannelMonitor)
669 /// in cas of onchain remote commitment tx resolved by a HTLC-Succes one but you may wish to
670 /// avoid this (or call unset_funding_info) on a monitor you wish to send to a watchtower as it
671 /// provides slightly better privacy.
672 pub(super) fn set_short_channel_id(&mut self, short_channel_id: u64) {
673 self.key_storage = match self.key_storage {
674 Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref payment_base_key, ref shutdown_pubkey, ref prev_latest_per_commitment_point, ref latest_per_commitment_point, ref mut funding_info, .. } => {
676 revocation_base_key: *revocation_base_key,
677 htlc_base_key: *htlc_base_key,
678 delayed_payment_base_key: *delayed_payment_base_key,
679 payment_base_key: *payment_base_key,
680 shutdown_pubkey: *shutdown_pubkey,
681 prev_latest_per_commitment_point: *prev_latest_per_commitment_point,
682 latest_per_commitment_point: *latest_per_commitment_point,
683 funding_info: funding_info.take(),
684 short_channel_id: Some(short_channel_id),
687 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
693 /// We log these base keys at channel opening to being able to rebuild redeemscript in case of leaked revoked commit tx
694 pub(super) fn set_their_base_keys(&mut self, their_htlc_base_key: &PublicKey, their_delayed_payment_base_key: &PublicKey) {
695 self.their_htlc_base_key = Some(their_htlc_base_key.clone());
696 self.their_delayed_payment_base_key = Some(their_delayed_payment_base_key.clone());
699 pub(super) fn set_their_to_self_delay(&mut self, their_to_self_delay: u16) {
700 self.their_to_self_delay = Some(their_to_self_delay);
703 pub(super) fn unset_funding_info(&mut self) {
704 self.key_storage = match self.key_storage {
705 Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref payment_base_key, ref shutdown_pubkey, ref prev_latest_per_commitment_point, ref latest_per_commitment_point, short_channel_id, .. } => {
707 revocation_base_key: *revocation_base_key,
708 htlc_base_key: *htlc_base_key,
709 delayed_payment_base_key: *delayed_payment_base_key,
710 payment_base_key: *payment_base_key,
711 shutdown_pubkey: *shutdown_pubkey,
712 prev_latest_per_commitment_point: *prev_latest_per_commitment_point,
713 latest_per_commitment_point: *latest_per_commitment_point,
715 short_channel_id: short_channel_id,
718 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
724 /// Gets the funding transaction outpoint of the channel this ChannelMonitor is monitoring for.
725 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
726 match self.key_storage {
727 Storage::Local { ref funding_info, .. } => {
729 &Some((outpoint, _)) => Some(outpoint),
733 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
739 /// Gets the sets of all outpoints which this ChannelMonitor expects to hear about spends of.
740 /// Generally useful when deserializing as during normal operation the return values of
741 /// block_connected are sufficient to ensure all relevant outpoints are being monitored (note
742 /// that the get_funding_txo outpoint and transaction must also be monitored for!).
743 pub fn get_monitored_outpoints(&self) -> Vec<(Sha256dHash, u32, &Script)> {
744 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.len() * 2);
745 for (ref txid, &(_, ref outputs)) in self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
746 for (idx, output) in outputs.iter().enumerate() {
747 res.push(((*txid).clone(), idx as u32, output));
753 /// Serializes into a vec, with various modes for the exposed pub fns
754 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W, for_local_storage: bool) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
755 //TODO: We still write out all the serialization here manually instead of using the fancy
756 //serialization framework we have, we should migrate things over to it.
757 writer.write_all(&[SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
758 writer.write_all(&[MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
760 // Set in initial Channel-object creation, so should always be set by now:
761 U48(self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor).write(writer)?;
763 match self.key_storage {
764 Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref payment_base_key, ref shutdown_pubkey, ref prev_latest_per_commitment_point, ref latest_per_commitment_point, ref funding_info, ref short_channel_id } => {
765 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
766 writer.write_all(&revocation_base_key[..])?;
767 writer.write_all(&htlc_base_key[..])?;
768 writer.write_all(&delayed_payment_base_key[..])?;
769 writer.write_all(&payment_base_key[..])?;
770 writer.write_all(&shutdown_pubkey.serialize())?;
771 if let Some(ref prev_latest_per_commitment_point) = *prev_latest_per_commitment_point {
772 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
773 writer.write_all(&prev_latest_per_commitment_point.serialize())?;
775 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
777 if let Some(ref latest_per_commitment_point) = *latest_per_commitment_point {
778 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
779 writer.write_all(&latest_per_commitment_point.serialize())?;
781 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
784 &Some((ref outpoint, ref script)) => {
785 writer.write_all(&outpoint.txid[..])?;
786 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(outpoint.index))?;
787 script.write(writer)?;
790 debug_assert!(false, "Try to serialize a useless Local monitor !");
793 match short_channel_id {
794 &Some(short_channel_id) => {
795 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
796 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(short_channel_id))?;
799 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
803 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => unimplemented!(),
806 writer.write_all(&self.their_htlc_base_key.as_ref().unwrap().serialize())?;
807 writer.write_all(&self.their_delayed_payment_base_key.as_ref().unwrap().serialize())?;
809 match self.their_cur_revocation_points {
810 Some((idx, pubkey, second_option)) => {
811 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(idx))?;
812 writer.write_all(&pubkey.serialize())?;
813 match second_option {
814 Some(second_pubkey) => {
815 writer.write_all(&second_pubkey.serialize())?;
818 writer.write_all(&[0; 33])?;
823 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(0))?;
827 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.our_to_self_delay))?;
828 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap()))?;
830 for &(ref secret, ref idx) in self.old_secrets.iter() {
831 writer.write_all(secret)?;
832 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*idx))?;
835 macro_rules! serialize_htlc_in_commitment {
836 ($htlc_output: expr) => {
837 writer.write_all(&[$htlc_output.offered as u8; 1])?;
838 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc_output.amount_msat))?;
839 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array($htlc_output.cltv_expiry))?;
840 writer.write_all(&$htlc_output.payment_hash)?;
841 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array($htlc_output.transaction_output_index))?;
845 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_claimable_outpoints.len() as u64))?;
846 for (ref txid, ref htlc_outputs) in self.remote_claimable_outpoints.iter() {
847 writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
848 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc_outputs.len() as u64))?;
849 for htlc_output in htlc_outputs.iter() {
850 serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output);
854 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.len() as u64))?;
855 for (ref txid, &(commitment_number, ref txouts)) in self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
856 writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
857 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(commitment_number))?;
858 (txouts.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
859 for script in txouts.iter() {
860 script.write(writer)?;
864 if for_local_storage {
865 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_hash_commitment_number.len() as u64))?;
866 for (ref payment_hash, commitment_number) in self.remote_hash_commitment_number.iter() {
867 writer.write_all(*payment_hash)?;
868 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(*commitment_number))?;
871 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(0))?;
874 macro_rules! serialize_local_tx {
875 ($local_tx: expr) => {
876 if let Err(e) = $local_tx.tx.consensus_encode(&mut WriterWriteAdaptor(writer)) {
878 encode::Error::Io(e) => return Err(e),
879 _ => panic!("local tx must have been well-formed!"),
883 writer.write_all(&$local_tx.revocation_key.serialize())?;
884 writer.write_all(&$local_tx.a_htlc_key.serialize())?;
885 writer.write_all(&$local_tx.b_htlc_key.serialize())?;
886 writer.write_all(&$local_tx.delayed_payment_key.serialize())?;
888 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($local_tx.feerate_per_kw))?;
889 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($local_tx.htlc_outputs.len() as u64))?;
890 for &(ref htlc_output, ref their_sig, ref our_sig) in $local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
891 serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output);
892 writer.write_all(&their_sig.serialize_compact(&self.secp_ctx))?;
893 writer.write_all(&our_sig.serialize_compact(&self.secp_ctx))?;
898 if let Some(ref prev_local_tx) = self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
899 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
900 serialize_local_tx!(prev_local_tx);
902 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
905 if let Some(ref cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
906 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
907 serialize_local_tx!(cur_local_tx);
909 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
912 if for_local_storage {
913 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(self.current_remote_commitment_number))?;
915 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(0))?;
918 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.payment_preimages.len() as u64))?;
919 for payment_preimage in self.payment_preimages.values() {
920 writer.write_all(payment_preimage)?;
923 self.last_block_hash.write(writer)?;
924 self.destination_script.write(writer)?;
929 /// Writes this monitor into the given writer, suitable for writing to disk.
931 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor), which
932 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
933 /// the "reorg path" (ie not just starting at the same height but starting at the highest
934 /// common block that appears on your best chain as well as on the chain which contains the
935 /// last block hash returned) upon deserializing the object!
936 pub fn write_for_disk<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
937 self.write(writer, true)
940 /// Encodes this monitor into the given writer, suitable for sending to a remote watchtower
942 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor), which
943 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
944 /// the "reorg path" (ie not just starting at the same height but starting at the highest
945 /// common block that appears on your best chain as well as on the chain which contains the
946 /// last block hash returned) upon deserializing the object!
947 pub fn write_for_watchtower<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
948 self.write(writer, false)
951 //TODO: Functions to serialize/deserialize (with different forms depending on which information
952 //we want to leave out (eg funding_txo, etc).
954 /// Can only fail if idx is < get_min_seen_secret
955 pub(super) fn get_secret(&self, idx: u64) -> Option<[u8; 32]> {
956 for i in 0..self.old_secrets.len() {
957 if (idx & (!((1 << i) - 1))) == self.old_secrets[i].1 {
958 return Some(ChannelMonitor::derive_secret(self.old_secrets[i].0, i as u8, idx))
961 assert!(idx < self.get_min_seen_secret());
965 pub(super) fn get_min_seen_secret(&self) -> u64 {
966 //TODO This can be optimized?
967 let mut min = 1 << 48;
968 for &(_, idx) in self.old_secrets.iter() {
976 pub(super) fn get_cur_remote_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
977 self.current_remote_commitment_number
980 pub(super) fn get_cur_local_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
981 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
982 0xffff_ffff_ffff - ((((local_tx.tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (local_tx.tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor)
983 } else { 0xffff_ffff_ffff }
986 /// Attempts to claim a remote commitment transaction's outputs using the revocation key and
987 /// data in remote_claimable_outpoints. Will directly claim any HTLC outputs which expire at a
988 /// height > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER. In any case, will install monitoring for
989 /// HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions.
990 fn check_spend_remote_transaction(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32) -> (Vec<Transaction>, (Sha256dHash, Vec<TxOut>), Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>) {
991 // Most secp and related errors trying to create keys means we have no hope of constructing
992 // a spend transaction...so we return no transactions to broadcast
993 let mut txn_to_broadcast = Vec::new();
994 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
995 let mut spendable_outputs = Vec::new();
997 let commitment_txid = tx.txid(); //TODO: This is gonna be a performance bottleneck for watchtowers!
998 let per_commitment_option = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(&commitment_txid);
1000 macro_rules! ignore_error {
1001 ( $thing : expr ) => {
1004 Err(_) => return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs)
1009 let commitment_number = 0xffffffffffff - ((((tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor);
1010 if commitment_number >= self.get_min_seen_secret() {
1011 let secret = self.get_secret(commitment_number).unwrap();
1012 let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &secret));
1013 let (revocation_pubkey, b_htlc_key, local_payment_key) = match self.key_storage {
1014 Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, ref payment_base_key, .. } => {
1015 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
1016 (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_base_key))),
1017 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &htlc_base_key))),
1018 Some(ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &payment_base_key))))
1020 Storage::Watchtower { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
1021 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
1022 (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &revocation_base_key)),
1023 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &htlc_base_key)),
1027 let delayed_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key), &self.their_delayed_payment_base_key.unwrap()));
1028 let a_htlc_key = match self.their_htlc_base_key {
1029 None => return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs),
1030 Some(their_htlc_base_key) => ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key), &their_htlc_base_key)),
1033 let revokeable_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey, self.our_to_self_delay, &delayed_key);
1034 let revokeable_p2wsh = revokeable_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
1036 let local_payment_p2wpkh = if let Some(payment_key) = local_payment_key {
1037 // Note that the Network here is ignored as we immediately drop the address for the
1038 // script_pubkey version.
1039 let payment_hash160 = Hash160::from_data(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &payment_key).serialize());
1040 Some(Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::All::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&payment_hash160[..]).into_script())
1043 let mut total_value = 0;
1044 let mut values = Vec::new();
1045 let mut inputs = Vec::new();
1046 let mut htlc_idxs = Vec::new();
1048 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
1049 if outp.script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh {
1051 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
1052 txid: commitment_txid,
1055 script_sig: Script::new(),
1056 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
1057 witness: Vec::new(),
1059 htlc_idxs.push(None);
1060 values.push(outp.value);
1061 total_value += outp.value;
1062 } else if Some(&outp.script_pubkey) == local_payment_p2wpkh.as_ref() {
1063 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WPKH {
1064 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: commitment_txid, vout: idx as u32 },
1065 key: local_payment_key.unwrap(),
1066 output: outp.clone(),
1071 macro_rules! sign_input {
1072 ($sighash_parts: expr, $input: expr, $htlc_idx: expr, $amount: expr) => {
1074 let (sig, redeemscript) = match self.key_storage {
1075 Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
1076 let redeemscript = if $htlc_idx.is_none() { revokeable_redeemscript.clone() } else {
1077 let htlc = &per_commitment_option.unwrap()[$htlc_idx.unwrap()];
1078 chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey)
1080 let sighash = ignore_error!(Message::from_slice(&$sighash_parts.sighash_all(&$input, &redeemscript, $amount)[..]));
1081 let revocation_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key, &revocation_base_key));
1082 (self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &revocation_key), redeemscript)
1084 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
1088 $input.witness.push(sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
1089 $input.witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1090 if $htlc_idx.is_none() {
1091 $input.witness.push(vec!(1));
1093 $input.witness.push(revocation_pubkey.serialize().to_vec());
1095 $input.witness.push(redeemscript.into_bytes());
1100 if let Some(per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
1101 inputs.reserve_exact(per_commitment_data.len());
1103 for (idx, htlc) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() {
1104 let expected_script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey);
1105 if htlc.transaction_output_index as usize >= tx.output.len() ||
1106 tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 ||
1107 tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].script_pubkey != expected_script.to_v0_p2wsh() {
1108 return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs); // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user
1111 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
1112 txid: commitment_txid,
1113 vout: htlc.transaction_output_index,
1115 script_sig: Script::new(),
1116 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
1117 witness: Vec::new(),
1119 if htlc.cltv_expiry > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER {
1121 htlc_idxs.push(Some(idx));
1122 values.push(tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].value);
1123 total_value += htlc.amount_msat / 1000;
1125 let mut single_htlc_tx = Transaction {
1129 output: vec!(TxOut {
1130 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1131 value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000, //TODO: - fee
1134 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&single_htlc_tx);
1135 sign_input!(sighash_parts, single_htlc_tx.input[0], Some(idx), htlc.amount_msat / 1000);
1136 txn_to_broadcast.push(single_htlc_tx);
1141 if !inputs.is_empty() || !txn_to_broadcast.is_empty() { // ie we're confident this is actually ours
1142 // We're definitely a remote commitment transaction!
1143 watch_outputs.append(&mut tx.output.clone());
1144 self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, (commitment_number, tx.output.iter().map(|output| { output.script_pubkey.clone() }).collect()));
1146 if inputs.is_empty() { return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs); } // Nothing to be done...probably a false positive/local tx
1148 let outputs = vec!(TxOut {
1149 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1150 value: total_value, //TODO: - fee
1152 let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
1159 let mut values_drain = values.drain(..);
1160 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx);
1162 for (input, htlc_idx) in spend_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(htlc_idxs.iter()) {
1163 let value = values_drain.next().unwrap();
1164 sign_input!(sighash_parts, input, htlc_idx, value);
1167 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
1168 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: spend_tx.txid(), vout: 0 },
1169 output: spend_tx.output[0].clone(),
1171 txn_to_broadcast.push(spend_tx);
1172 } else if let Some(per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
1173 // While this isn't useful yet, there is a potential race where if a counterparty
1174 // revokes a state at the same time as the commitment transaction for that state is
1175 // confirmed, and the watchtower receives the block before the user, the user could
1176 // upload a new ChannelMonitor with the revocation secret but the watchtower has
1177 // already processed the block, resulting in the remote_commitment_txn_on_chain entry
1178 // not being generated by the above conditional. Thus, to be safe, we go ahead and
1180 watch_outputs.append(&mut tx.output.clone());
1181 self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, (commitment_number, tx.output.iter().map(|output| { output.script_pubkey.clone() }).collect()));
1183 if let Some(revocation_points) = self.their_cur_revocation_points {
1184 let revocation_point_option =
1185 if revocation_points.0 == commitment_number { Some(&revocation_points.1) }
1186 else if let Some(point) = revocation_points.2.as_ref() {
1187 if revocation_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 { Some(point) } else { None }
1189 if let Some(revocation_point) = revocation_point_option {
1190 let (revocation_pubkey, b_htlc_key) = match self.key_storage {
1191 Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
1192 (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_base_key))),
1193 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &htlc_base_key))))
1195 Storage::Watchtower { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
1196 (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &revocation_base_key)),
1197 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &htlc_base_key)))
1200 let a_htlc_key = match self.their_htlc_base_key {
1201 None => return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs),
1202 Some(their_htlc_base_key) => ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &their_htlc_base_key)),
1205 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
1206 if outp.script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh() {
1207 match self.key_storage {
1208 Storage::Local { ref payment_base_key, .. } => {
1209 if let Ok(local_key) = chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_point, &payment_base_key) {
1210 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WPKH {
1211 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: commitment_txid, vout: idx as u32 },
1213 output: outp.clone(),
1217 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {}
1219 break; // Only to_remote ouput is claimable
1223 let mut total_value = 0;
1224 let mut values = Vec::new();
1225 let mut inputs = Vec::new();
1227 macro_rules! sign_input {
1228 ($sighash_parts: expr, $input: expr, $amount: expr, $preimage: expr) => {
1230 let (sig, redeemscript) = match self.key_storage {
1231 Storage::Local { ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
1232 let htlc = &per_commitment_option.unwrap()[$input.sequence as usize];
1233 let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey);
1234 let sighash = ignore_error!(Message::from_slice(&$sighash_parts.sighash_all(&$input, &redeemscript, $amount)[..]));
1235 let htlc_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &htlc_base_key));
1236 (self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &htlc_key), redeemscript)
1238 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
1242 $input.witness.push(sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
1243 $input.witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1244 $input.witness.push($preimage);
1245 $input.witness.push(redeemscript.into_bytes());
1250 for (idx, htlc) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() {
1251 if let Some(payment_preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
1253 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
1254 txid: commitment_txid,
1255 vout: htlc.transaction_output_index,
1257 script_sig: Script::new(),
1258 sequence: idx as u32, // reset to 0xfffffffd in sign_input
1259 witness: Vec::new(),
1261 if htlc.cltv_expiry > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER {
1263 values.push((tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].value, payment_preimage));
1264 total_value += htlc.amount_msat / 1000;
1266 let mut single_htlc_tx = Transaction {
1270 output: vec!(TxOut {
1271 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1272 value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000, //TODO: - fee
1275 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&single_htlc_tx);
1276 sign_input!(sighash_parts, single_htlc_tx.input[0], htlc.amount_msat / 1000, payment_preimage.to_vec());
1277 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
1278 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: single_htlc_tx.txid(), vout: 0 },
1279 output: single_htlc_tx.output[0].clone(),
1281 txn_to_broadcast.push(single_htlc_tx);
1286 if inputs.is_empty() { return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs); } // Nothing to be done...probably a false positive/local tx
1288 let outputs = vec!(TxOut {
1289 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1290 value: total_value, //TODO: - fee
1292 let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
1299 let mut values_drain = values.drain(..);
1300 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx);
1302 for input in spend_tx.input.iter_mut() {
1303 let value = values_drain.next().unwrap();
1304 sign_input!(sighash_parts, input, value.0, value.1.to_vec());
1307 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
1308 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: spend_tx.txid(), vout: 0 },
1309 output: spend_tx.output[0].clone(),
1311 txn_to_broadcast.push(spend_tx);
1316 (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs)
1319 /// Attempst to claim a remote HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout s outputs using the revocation key
1320 fn check_spend_remote_htlc(&self, tx: &Transaction, commitment_number: u64) -> (Option<Transaction>, Option<SpendableOutputDescriptor>) {
1321 if tx.input.len() != 1 || tx.output.len() != 1 {
1325 macro_rules! ignore_error {
1326 ( $thing : expr ) => {
1329 Err(_) => return (None, None)
1334 let secret = if let Some(secret) = self.get_secret(commitment_number) { secret } else { return (None, None); };
1335 let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &secret));
1336 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
1337 let revocation_pubkey = match self.key_storage {
1338 Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
1339 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_base_key)))
1341 Storage::Watchtower { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
1342 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &revocation_base_key))
1345 let delayed_key = match self.their_delayed_payment_base_key {
1346 None => return (None, None),
1347 Some(their_delayed_payment_base_key) => ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &their_delayed_payment_base_key)),
1349 let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), &delayed_key);
1350 let revokeable_p2wsh = redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
1351 let htlc_txid = tx.txid(); //TODO: This is gonna be a performance bottleneck for watchtowers!
1353 let mut inputs = Vec::new();
1356 if tx.output[0].script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh { //HTLC transactions have one txin, one txout
1358 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
1362 script_sig: Script::new(),
1363 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
1364 witness: Vec::new(),
1366 amount = tx.output[0].value;
1369 if !inputs.is_empty() {
1370 let outputs = vec!(TxOut {
1371 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1372 value: amount, //TODO: - fee
1375 let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
1382 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx);
1384 let sig = match self.key_storage {
1385 Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
1386 let sighash = ignore_error!(Message::from_slice(&sighash_parts.sighash_all(&spend_tx.input[0], &redeemscript, amount)[..]));
1387 let revocation_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key, &revocation_base_key));
1388 self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &revocation_key)
1390 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
1394 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
1395 spend_tx.input[0].witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1396 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(vec!(1));
1397 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(redeemscript.into_bytes());
1399 let outpoint = BitcoinOutPoint { txid: spend_tx.txid(), vout: 0 };
1400 let output = spend_tx.output[0].clone();
1401 (Some(spend_tx), Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput { outpoint, output }))
1402 } else { (None, None) }
1405 fn broadcast_by_local_state(&self, local_tx: &LocalSignedTx, per_commitment_point: &Option<PublicKey>, delayed_payment_base_key: &Option<SecretKey>) -> (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>) {
1406 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
1407 let mut spendable_outputs = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
1409 macro_rules! add_dynamic_output {
1410 ($father_tx: expr, $vout: expr) => {
1411 if let Some(ref per_commitment_point) = *per_commitment_point {
1412 if let Some(ref delayed_payment_base_key) = *delayed_payment_base_key {
1413 if let Ok(local_delayedkey) = chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base_key) {
1414 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WSH {
1415 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: $father_tx.txid(), vout: $vout },
1416 key: local_delayedkey,
1417 witness_script: chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&local_tx.revocation_key, self.our_to_self_delay, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key),
1418 to_self_delay: self.our_to_self_delay,
1419 output: $father_tx.output[$vout as usize].clone(),
1428 let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&local_tx.revocation_key, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), &local_tx.delayed_payment_key);
1429 let revokeable_p2wsh = redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
1430 for (idx, output) in local_tx.tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
1431 if output.script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh {
1432 add_dynamic_output!(local_tx.tx, idx as u32);
1437 for &(ref htlc, ref their_sig, ref our_sig) in local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1439 let mut htlc_timeout_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&local_tx.txid, local_tx.feerate_per_kw, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), htlc, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key, &local_tx.revocation_key);
1441 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
1443 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(their_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
1444 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1445 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
1446 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1448 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new());
1449 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &local_tx.a_htlc_key, &local_tx.b_htlc_key, &local_tx.revocation_key).into_bytes());
1451 add_dynamic_output!(htlc_timeout_tx, 0);
1452 res.push(htlc_timeout_tx);
1454 if let Some(payment_preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
1455 let mut htlc_success_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&local_tx.txid, local_tx.feerate_per_kw, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), htlc, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key, &local_tx.revocation_key);
1457 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
1459 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(their_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
1460 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1461 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
1462 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1464 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(payment_preimage.to_vec());
1465 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &local_tx.a_htlc_key, &local_tx.b_htlc_key, &local_tx.revocation_key).into_bytes());
1467 add_dynamic_output!(htlc_success_tx, 0);
1468 res.push(htlc_success_tx);
1473 (res, spendable_outputs)
1476 /// Attempts to claim any claimable HTLCs in a commitment transaction which was not (yet)
1477 /// revoked using data in local_claimable_outpoints.
1478 /// Should not be used if check_spend_revoked_transaction succeeds.
1479 fn check_spend_local_transaction(&self, tx: &Transaction, _height: u32) -> (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>) {
1480 let commitment_txid = tx.txid();
1481 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1482 if local_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
1483 match self.key_storage {
1484 Storage::Local { ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref latest_per_commitment_point, .. } => {
1485 return self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, latest_per_commitment_point, &Some(*delayed_payment_base_key));
1487 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
1488 return self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, &None, &None);
1493 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1494 if local_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
1495 match self.key_storage {
1496 Storage::Local { ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref prev_latest_per_commitment_point, .. } => {
1497 return self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, prev_latest_per_commitment_point, &Some(*delayed_payment_base_key));
1499 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
1500 return self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, &None, &None);
1505 (Vec::new(), Vec::new())
1508 /// Generate a spendable output event when closing_transaction get registered onchain.
1509 fn check_spend_closing_transaction(&self, tx: &Transaction) -> Option<SpendableOutputDescriptor> {
1510 if tx.input[0].sequence == 0xFFFFFFFF && tx.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len() == 71 {
1511 match self.key_storage {
1512 Storage::Local { ref shutdown_pubkey, .. } => {
1513 let our_channel_close_key_hash = Hash160::from_data(&shutdown_pubkey.serialize());
1514 let shutdown_script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::All::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&our_channel_close_key_hash[..]).into_script();
1515 for (idx, output) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
1516 if shutdown_script == output.script_pubkey {
1517 return Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
1518 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), vout: idx as u32 },
1519 output: output.clone(),
1524 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
1525 //TODO: we need to ensure an offline client will generate the event when it
1526 // cames back online after only the watchtower saw the transaction
1533 /// Used by ChannelManager deserialization to broadcast the latest local state if it's copy of
1534 /// the Channel was out-of-date.
1535 pub(super) fn get_latest_local_commitment_txn(&self) -> Vec<Transaction> {
1536 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1537 let mut res = vec![local_tx.tx.clone()];
1538 match self.key_storage {
1539 Storage::Local { ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref prev_latest_per_commitment_point, .. } => {
1540 res.append(&mut self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, prev_latest_per_commitment_point, &Some(*delayed_payment_base_key)).0);
1542 _ => panic!("Can only broadcast by local channelmonitor"),
1550 fn block_connected(&mut self, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], height: u32, block_hash: &Sha256dHash, broadcaster: &BroadcasterInterface)-> (Vec<(Sha256dHash, Vec<TxOut>)>, Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>) {
1551 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
1552 let mut spendable_outputs = Vec::new();
1553 for tx in txn_matched {
1554 if tx.input.len() == 1 {
1555 // Assuming our keys were not leaked (in which case we're screwed no matter what),
1556 // commitment transactions and HTLC transactions will all only ever have one input,
1557 // which is an easy way to filter out any potential non-matching txn for lazy
1559 let prevout = &tx.input[0].previous_output;
1560 let mut txn: Vec<Transaction> = Vec::new();
1561 let funding_txo = match self.key_storage {
1562 Storage::Local { ref funding_info, .. } => {
1563 funding_info.clone()
1565 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
1569 if funding_txo.is_none() || (prevout.txid == funding_txo.as_ref().unwrap().0.txid && prevout.vout == funding_txo.as_ref().unwrap().0.index as u32) {
1570 let (remote_txn, new_outputs, mut spendable_output) = self.check_spend_remote_transaction(tx, height);
1572 spendable_outputs.append(&mut spendable_output);
1573 if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() {
1574 watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
1577 let (remote_txn, mut outputs) = self.check_spend_local_transaction(tx, height);
1578 spendable_outputs.append(&mut outputs);
1581 if !funding_txo.is_none() && txn.is_empty() {
1582 if let Some(spendable_output) = self.check_spend_closing_transaction(tx) {
1583 spendable_outputs.push(spendable_output);
1587 if let Some(&(commitment_number, _)) = self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.get(&prevout.txid) {
1588 let (tx, spendable_output) = self.check_spend_remote_htlc(tx, commitment_number);
1589 if let Some(tx) = tx {
1592 if let Some(spendable_output) = spendable_output {
1593 spendable_outputs.push(spendable_output);
1597 for tx in txn.iter() {
1598 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(tx);
1602 if let Some(ref cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1603 if self.would_broadcast_at_height(height) {
1604 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&cur_local_tx.tx);
1605 match self.key_storage {
1606 Storage::Local { ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref latest_per_commitment_point, .. } => {
1607 let (txs, mut outputs) = self.broadcast_by_local_state(&cur_local_tx, latest_per_commitment_point, &Some(*delayed_payment_base_key));
1608 spendable_outputs.append(&mut outputs);
1610 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
1613 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
1614 let (txs, mut outputs) = self.broadcast_by_local_state(&cur_local_tx, &None, &None);
1615 spendable_outputs.append(&mut outputs);
1617 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
1623 self.last_block_hash = block_hash.clone();
1624 (watch_outputs, spendable_outputs)
1627 pub(super) fn would_broadcast_at_height(&self, height: u32) -> bool {
1628 if let Some(ref cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1629 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in cur_local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1630 // For inbound HTLCs which we know the preimage for, we have to ensure we hit the
1631 // chain with enough room to claim the HTLC without our counterparty being able to
1632 // time out the HTLC first.
1633 // For outbound HTLCs which our counterparty hasn't failed/claimed, our primary
1634 // concern is being able to claim the corresponding inbound HTLC (on another
1635 // channel) before it expires. In fact, we don't even really care if our
1636 // counterparty here claims such an outbound HTLC after it expired as long as we
1637 // can still claim the corresponding HTLC. Thus, to avoid needlessly hitting the
1638 // chain when our counterparty is waiting for expiration to off-chain fail an HTLC
1639 // we give ourselves a few blocks of headroom after expiration before going
1640 // on-chain for an expired HTLC.
1641 // Note that, to avoid a potential attack whereby a node delays claiming an HTLC
1642 // from us until we've reached the point where we go on-chain with the
1643 // corresponding inbound HTLC, we must ensure that outbound HTLCs go on chain at
1644 // least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER blocks prior to the inbound HTLC.
1645 // aka outbound_cltv + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS == height - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
1646 // inbound_cltv == height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
1647 // outbound_cltv + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFER <= inbound_cltv - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
1648 // HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS + 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFER <= inbound_cltv - outbound_cltv
1649 // HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS + 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFER <= CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA
1650 if ( htlc.offered && htlc.cltv_expiry + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS <= height) ||
1651 (!htlc.offered && htlc.cltv_expiry <= height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER && self.payment_preimages.contains_key(&htlc.payment_hash)) {
1660 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
1662 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> ReadableArgs<R, Arc<Logger>> for (Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor) {
1663 fn read(reader: &mut R, logger: Arc<Logger>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1664 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1665 macro_rules! unwrap_obj {
1669 Err(_) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
1674 let _ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1675 let min_ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1676 if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION {
1677 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion);
1680 let commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor = <U48 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.0;
1682 let key_storage = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
1684 let revocation_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
1685 let htlc_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
1686 let delayed_payment_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
1687 let payment_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
1688 let shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
1689 let prev_latest_per_commitment_point = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
1691 1 => Some(Readable::read(reader)?),
1692 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
1694 let latest_per_commitment_point = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
1696 1 => Some(Readable::read(reader)?),
1697 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
1699 // Technically this can fail and serialize fail a round-trip, but only for serialization of
1700 // barely-init'd ChannelMonitors that we can't do anything with.
1701 let outpoint = OutPoint {
1702 txid: Readable::read(reader)?,
1703 index: Readable::read(reader)?,
1705 let funding_info = Some((outpoint, Readable::read(reader)?));
1706 let short_channel_id = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
1708 1 => Some(Readable::read(reader)?),
1709 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
1712 revocation_base_key,
1714 delayed_payment_base_key,
1717 prev_latest_per_commitment_point,
1718 latest_per_commitment_point,
1723 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
1726 let their_htlc_base_key = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
1727 let their_delayed_payment_base_key = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
1729 let their_cur_revocation_points = {
1730 let first_idx = <U48 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.0;
1734 let first_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
1735 let second_point_slice: [u8; 33] = Readable::read(reader)?;
1736 if second_point_slice[0..32] == [0; 32] && second_point_slice[32] == 0 {
1737 Some((first_idx, first_point, None))
1739 Some((first_idx, first_point, Some(unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &second_point_slice)))))
1744 let our_to_self_delay: u16 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1745 let their_to_self_delay: Option<u16> = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
1747 let mut old_secrets = [([0; 32], 1 << 48); 49];
1748 for &mut (ref mut secret, ref mut idx) in old_secrets.iter_mut() {
1749 *secret = Readable::read(reader)?;
1750 *idx = Readable::read(reader)?;
1753 macro_rules! read_htlc_in_commitment {
1756 let offered: bool = Readable::read(reader)?;
1757 let amount_msat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1758 let cltv_expiry: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1759 let payment_hash: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(reader)?;
1760 let transaction_output_index: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1762 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1763 offered, amount_msat, cltv_expiry, payment_hash, transaction_output_index
1769 let remote_claimable_outpoints_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1770 let mut remote_claimable_outpoints = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(remote_claimable_outpoints_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 64));
1771 for _ in 0..remote_claimable_outpoints_len {
1772 let txid: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
1773 let outputs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1774 let mut outputs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
1775 for _ in 0..outputs_count {
1776 outputs.push(read_htlc_in_commitment!());
1778 if let Some(_) = remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, outputs) {
1779 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
1783 let remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1784 let mut remote_commitment_txn_on_chain = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
1785 for _ in 0..remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len {
1786 let txid: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
1787 let commitment_number = <U48 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.0;
1788 let outputs_count = <u64 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?;
1789 let mut outputs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 8));
1790 for _ in 0..outputs_count {
1791 outputs.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
1793 if let Some(_) = remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(txid, (commitment_number, outputs)) {
1794 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
1798 let remote_hash_commitment_number_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1799 let mut remote_hash_commitment_number = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(remote_hash_commitment_number_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
1800 for _ in 0..remote_hash_commitment_number_len {
1801 let txid: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(reader)?;
1802 let commitment_number = <U48 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.0;
1803 if let Some(_) = remote_hash_commitment_number.insert(txid, commitment_number) {
1804 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
1808 macro_rules! read_local_tx {
1811 let tx = match Transaction::consensus_decode(reader.by_ref()) {
1814 encode::Error::Io(ioe) => return Err(DecodeError::Io(ioe)),
1815 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
1819 if tx.input.is_empty() {
1820 // Ensure tx didn't hit the 0-input ambiguity case.
1821 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
1824 let revocation_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
1825 let a_htlc_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
1826 let b_htlc_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
1827 let delayed_payment_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
1828 let feerate_per_kw: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1830 let htlc_outputs_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1831 let mut htlc_outputs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlc_outputs_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
1832 for _ in 0..htlc_outputs_len {
1833 htlc_outputs.push((read_htlc_in_commitment!(), Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
1838 tx, revocation_key, a_htlc_key, b_htlc_key, delayed_payment_key, feerate_per_kw, htlc_outputs
1844 let prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
1847 Some(read_local_tx!())
1849 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
1852 let current_local_signed_commitment_tx = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
1855 Some(read_local_tx!())
1857 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
1860 let current_remote_commitment_number = <U48 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.0;
1862 let payment_preimages_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1863 let mut payment_preimages = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(payment_preimages_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
1864 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
1865 for _ in 0..payment_preimages_len {
1866 let preimage: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(reader)?;
1868 sha.input(&preimage);
1869 let mut hash = [0; 32];
1870 sha.result(&mut hash);
1871 if let Some(_) = payment_preimages.insert(hash, preimage) {
1872 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
1876 let last_block_hash: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
1877 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
1879 Ok((last_block_hash.clone(), ChannelMonitor {
1880 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor,
1883 their_htlc_base_key,
1884 their_delayed_payment_base_key,
1885 their_cur_revocation_points,
1888 their_to_self_delay,
1891 remote_claimable_outpoints,
1892 remote_commitment_txn_on_chain,
1893 remote_hash_commitment_number,
1895 prev_local_signed_commitment_tx,
1896 current_local_signed_commitment_tx,
1897 current_remote_commitment_number,
1912 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Script;
1913 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
1914 use crypto::digest::Digest;
1916 use ln::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor;
1917 use ln::chan_utils::{HTLCOutputInCommitment, TxCreationKeys};
1918 use util::sha2::Sha256;
1919 use util::test_utils::TestLogger;
1920 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
1921 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1, Signature};
1922 use rand::{thread_rng,Rng};
1926 fn test_per_commitment_storage() {
1927 // Test vectors from BOLT 3:
1928 let mut secrets: Vec<[u8; 32]> = Vec::new();
1929 let mut monitor: ChannelMonitor;
1930 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1931 let logger = Arc::new(TestLogger::new());
1933 macro_rules! test_secrets {
1935 let mut idx = 281474976710655;
1936 for secret in secrets.iter() {
1937 assert_eq!(monitor.get_secret(idx).unwrap(), *secret);
1940 assert_eq!(monitor.get_min_seen_secret(), idx + 1);
1941 assert!(monitor.get_secret(idx).is_none());
1946 // insert_secret correct sequence
1947 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
1950 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1951 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1952 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1955 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1956 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1957 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1960 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1961 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1962 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1965 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1966 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1967 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1970 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1971 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
1972 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1975 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1976 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
1977 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1980 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1981 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
1982 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1985 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1986 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
1987 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1992 // insert_secret #1 incorrect
1993 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
1996 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1997 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
1998 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2001 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2002 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
2003 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
2004 "Previous secret did not match new one");
2008 // insert_secret #2 incorrect (#1 derived from incorrect)
2009 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
2012 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2013 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
2014 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2017 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2018 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("dddc3a8d14fddf2b68fa8c7fbad2748274937479dd0f8930d5ebb4ab6bd866a3").unwrap());
2019 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2022 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2023 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
2024 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2027 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2028 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
2029 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
2030 "Previous secret did not match new one");
2034 // insert_secret #3 incorrect
2035 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
2038 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2039 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
2040 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2043 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2044 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
2045 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2048 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2049 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c51a18b13e8527e579ec56365482c62f180b7d5760b46e9477dae59e87ed423a").unwrap());
2050 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2053 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2054 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
2055 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
2056 "Previous secret did not match new one");
2060 // insert_secret #4 incorrect (1,2,3 derived from incorrect)
2061 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
2064 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2065 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
2066 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2069 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2070 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("dddc3a8d14fddf2b68fa8c7fbad2748274937479dd0f8930d5ebb4ab6bd866a3").unwrap());
2071 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2074 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2075 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c51a18b13e8527e579ec56365482c62f180b7d5760b46e9477dae59e87ed423a").unwrap());
2076 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2079 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2080 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("ba65d7b0ef55a3ba300d4e87af29868f394f8f138d78a7011669c79b37b936f4").unwrap());
2081 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2084 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2085 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
2086 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2089 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2090 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
2091 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2094 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2095 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
2096 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2099 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2100 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
2101 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
2102 "Previous secret did not match new one");
2106 // insert_secret #5 incorrect
2107 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
2110 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2111 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
2112 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2115 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2116 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
2117 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2120 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2121 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
2122 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2125 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2126 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
2127 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2130 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2131 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("631373ad5f9ef654bb3dade742d09504c567edd24320d2fcd68e3cc47e2ff6a6").unwrap());
2132 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2135 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2136 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
2137 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
2138 "Previous secret did not match new one");
2142 // insert_secret #6 incorrect (5 derived from incorrect)
2143 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
2146 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2147 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
2148 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2151 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2152 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
2153 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2156 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2157 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
2158 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2161 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2162 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
2163 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2166 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2167 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("631373ad5f9ef654bb3dade742d09504c567edd24320d2fcd68e3cc47e2ff6a6").unwrap());
2168 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2171 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2172 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("b7e76a83668bde38b373970155c868a653304308f9896692f904a23731224bb1").unwrap());
2173 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2176 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2177 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
2178 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2181 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2182 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
2183 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
2184 "Previous secret did not match new one");
2188 // insert_secret #7 incorrect
2189 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
2192 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2193 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
2194 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2197 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2198 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
2199 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2202 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2203 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
2204 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2207 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2208 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
2209 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2212 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2213 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
2214 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2217 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2218 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
2219 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2222 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2223 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("e7971de736e01da8ed58b94c2fc216cb1dca9e326f3a96e7194fe8ea8af6c0a3").unwrap());
2224 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2227 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2228 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
2229 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
2230 "Previous secret did not match new one");
2234 // insert_secret #8 incorrect
2235 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
2238 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2239 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
2240 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2243 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2244 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
2245 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2248 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2249 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
2250 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2253 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2254 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
2255 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2258 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2259 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
2260 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2263 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2264 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
2265 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2268 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2269 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
2270 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2273 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2274 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a7efbc61aac46d34f77778bac22c8a20c6a46ca460addc49009bda875ec88fa4").unwrap());
2275 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
2276 "Previous secret did not match new one");
2281 fn test_prune_preimages() {
2282 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2283 let logger = Arc::new(TestLogger::new());
2284 let dummy_sig = Signature::from_der(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("3045022100fa86fa9a36a8cd6a7bb8f06a541787d51371d067951a9461d5404de6b928782e02201c8b7c334c10aed8976a3a465be9a28abff4cb23acbf00022295b378ce1fa3cd").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
2286 let dummy_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap());
2287 macro_rules! dummy_keys {
2291 per_commitment_point: dummy_key.clone(),
2292 revocation_key: dummy_key.clone(),
2293 a_htlc_key: dummy_key.clone(),
2294 b_htlc_key: dummy_key.clone(),
2295 a_delayed_payment_key: dummy_key.clone(),
2296 b_payment_key: dummy_key.clone(),
2301 let dummy_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
2303 let mut preimages = Vec::new();
2305 let mut rng = thread_rng();
2307 let mut preimage = [0; 32];
2308 rng.fill_bytes(&mut preimage);
2309 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
2310 sha.input(&preimage);
2311 let mut hash = [0; 32];
2312 sha.result(&mut hash);
2313 preimages.push((preimage, hash));
2317 macro_rules! preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs {
2318 ($preimages_slice: expr) => {
2320 let mut res = Vec::new();
2321 for (idx, preimage) in $preimages_slice.iter().enumerate() {
2322 res.push(HTLCOutputInCommitment {
2326 payment_hash: preimage.1.clone(),
2327 transaction_output_index: idx as u32,
2334 macro_rules! preimages_to_local_htlcs {
2335 ($preimages_slice: expr) => {
2337 let mut inp = preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!($preimages_slice);
2338 let res: Vec<_> = inp.drain(..).map(|e| { (e, dummy_sig.clone(), dummy_sig.clone()) }).collect();
2344 macro_rules! test_preimages_exist {
2345 ($preimages_slice: expr, $monitor: expr) => {
2346 for preimage in $preimages_slice {
2347 assert!($monitor.payment_preimages.contains_key(&preimage.1));
2352 // Prune with one old state and a local commitment tx holding a few overlaps with the
2354 let mut monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
2355 monitor.set_their_to_self_delay(10);
2357 monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(dummy_tx.clone(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..10]));
2358 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[5..15]), 281474976710655, dummy_key);
2359 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[15..20]), 281474976710654, dummy_key);
2360 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[17..20]), 281474976710653, dummy_key);
2361 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[18..20]), 281474976710652, dummy_key);
2362 for &(ref preimage, ref hash) in preimages.iter() {
2363 monitor.provide_payment_preimage(hash, preimage);
2366 // Now provide a secret, pruning preimages 10-15
2367 let mut secret = [0; 32];
2368 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
2369 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secret.clone()).unwrap();
2370 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 15);
2371 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
2372 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[15..20], monitor);
2374 // Now provide a further secret, pruning preimages 15-17
2375 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
2376 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secret.clone()).unwrap();
2377 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 13);
2378 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
2379 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[17..20], monitor);
2381 // Now update local commitment tx info, pruning only element 18 as we still care about the
2382 // previous commitment tx's preimages too
2383 monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(dummy_tx.clone(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..5]));
2384 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
2385 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secret.clone()).unwrap();
2386 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 12);
2387 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
2388 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[18..20], monitor);
2390 // But if we do it again, we'll prune 5-10
2391 monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(dummy_tx.clone(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..3]));
2392 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
2393 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secret.clone()).unwrap();
2394 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 5);
2395 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..5], monitor);
2398 // Further testing is done in the ChannelManager integration tests.