1 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
2 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxIn,TxOut,SigHashType,Transaction};
3 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
4 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Script;
5 use bitcoin::network::serialize;
6 use bitcoin::util::hash::Sha256dHash;
7 use bitcoin::util::bip143;
9 use crypto::digest::Digest;
11 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Message,Signature};
12 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
15 use ln::msgs::HandleError;
17 use ln::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment;
18 use chain::chaininterface::{ChainListener, ChainWatchInterface, BroadcasterInterface};
19 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
20 use util::sha2::Sha256;
23 use std::collections::HashMap;
24 use std::sync::{Arc,Mutex};
27 pub enum ChannelMonitorUpdateErr {
28 /// Used to indicate a temporary failure (eg connection to a watchtower failed, but is expected
29 /// to succeed at some point in the future).
30 /// Such a failure will "freeze" a channel, preventing us from revoking old states or
31 /// submitting new commitment transactions to the remote party.
32 /// ChannelManager::test_restore_channel_monitor can be used to retry the update(s) and restore
33 /// the channel to an operational state.
35 /// Used to indicate no further channel monitor updates will be allowed (eg we've moved on to a
36 /// different watchtower and cannot update with all watchtowers that were previously informed
37 /// of this channel). This will force-close the channel in question.
41 /// Simple trait indicating ability to track a set of ChannelMonitors and multiplex events between
42 /// them. Generally should be implemented by keeping a local SimpleManyChannelMonitor and passing
43 /// events to it, while also taking any add_update_monitor events and passing them to some remote
45 /// Note that any updates to a channel's monitor *must* be applied to each instance of the
46 /// channel's monitor everywhere (including remote watchtowers) *before* this function returns. If
47 /// an update occurs and a remote watchtower is left with old state, it may broadcast transactions
48 /// which we have revoked, allowing our counterparty to claim all funds in the channel!
49 pub trait ManyChannelMonitor: Send + Sync {
50 /// Adds or updates a monitor for the given `funding_txo`.
51 fn add_update_monitor(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr>;
54 /// A simple implementation of a ManyChannelMonitor and ChainListener. Can be used to create a
55 /// watchtower or watch our own channels.
56 /// Note that you must provide your own key by which to refer to channels.
57 /// If you're accepting remote monitors (ie are implementing a watchtower), you must verify that
58 /// users cannot overwrite a given channel by providing a duplicate key. ie you should probably
59 /// index by a PublicKey which is required to sign any updates.
60 /// If you're using this for local monitoring of your own channels, you probably want to use
61 /// `OutPoint` as the key, which will give you a ManyChannelMonitor implementation.
62 pub struct SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
63 monitors: Mutex<HashMap<Key, ChannelMonitor>>,
64 chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>,
65 broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>
68 impl<Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash> ChainListener for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
69 fn block_connected(&self, _header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], _indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) {
70 let monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
71 for monitor in monitors.values() {
72 monitor.block_connected(txn_matched, height, &*self.broadcaster);
76 fn block_disconnected(&self, _: &BlockHeader) { }
79 impl<Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash + 'static> SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
80 pub fn new(chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>, broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>) -> Arc<SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key>> {
81 let res = Arc::new(SimpleManyChannelMonitor {
82 monitors: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
86 let weak_res = Arc::downgrade(&res);
87 res.chain_monitor.register_listener(weak_res);
91 pub fn add_update_monitor_by_key(&self, key: Key, monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
92 let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
93 match monitors.get_mut(&key) {
94 Some(orig_monitor) => return orig_monitor.insert_combine(monitor),
97 match &monitor.funding_txo {
98 &None => self.chain_monitor.watch_all_txn(),
99 &Some((ref outpoint, ref script)) => {
100 self.chain_monitor.install_watch_script(script);
101 self.chain_monitor.install_watch_outpoint((outpoint.txid, outpoint.index as u32), script);
104 monitors.insert(key, monitor);
109 impl ManyChannelMonitor for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<OutPoint> {
110 fn add_update_monitor(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr> {
111 match self.add_update_monitor_by_key(funding_txo, monitor) {
113 Err(_) => Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure),
118 /// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, don't try to claim it in a shared transaction,
119 /// instead claiming it in its own individual transaction.
120 const CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 12;
121 /// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, force-close the channel to broadcast the
122 /// HTLC-Success transaction.
123 const CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 6;
125 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
128 revocation_base_key: SecretKey,
129 htlc_base_key: SecretKey,
132 revocation_base_key: PublicKey,
133 htlc_base_key: PublicKey,
134 sigs: HashMap<Sha256dHash, Signature>,
138 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
139 struct LocalSignedTx {
140 /// txid of the transaction in tx, just used to make comparison faster
143 revocation_key: PublicKey,
144 a_htlc_key: PublicKey,
145 b_htlc_key: PublicKey,
146 delayed_payment_key: PublicKey,
148 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Signature, Signature)>,
151 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
152 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
154 pub struct ChannelMonitor {
155 funding_txo: Option<(OutPoint, Script)>,
156 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64,
158 key_storage: KeyStorage,
159 delayed_payment_base_key: PublicKey,
160 their_htlc_base_key: Option<PublicKey>,
161 // first is the idx of the first of the two revocation points
162 their_cur_revocation_points: Option<(u64, PublicKey, Option<PublicKey>)>,
164 our_to_self_delay: u16,
165 their_to_self_delay: Option<u16>,
167 old_secrets: [([u8; 32], u64); 49],
168 remote_claimable_outpoints: HashMap<Sha256dHash, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>>,
169 /// We cannot identify HTLC-Success or HTLC-Timeout transactions by themselves on the chain.
170 /// Nor can we figure out their commitment numbers without the commitment transaction they are
171 /// spending. Thus, in order to claim them via revocation key, we track all the remote
172 /// commitment transactions which we find on-chain, mapping them to the commitment number which
173 /// can be used to derive the revocation key and claim the transactions.
174 remote_commitment_txn_on_chain: Mutex<HashMap<Sha256dHash, u64>>,
175 /// Cache used to make pruning of payment_preimages faster.
176 /// Maps payment_hash values to commitment numbers for remote transactions for non-revoked
177 /// remote transactions (ie should remain pretty small).
178 /// Serialized to disk but should generally not be sent to Watchtowers.
179 remote_hash_commitment_number: HashMap<[u8; 32], u64>,
181 // We store two local commitment transactions to avoid any race conditions where we may update
182 // some monitors (potentially on watchtowers) but then fail to update others, resulting in the
183 // various monitors for one channel being out of sync, and us broadcasting a local
184 // transaction for which we have deleted claim information on some watchtowers.
185 prev_local_signed_commitment_tx: Option<LocalSignedTx>,
186 current_local_signed_commitment_tx: Option<LocalSignedTx>,
188 payment_preimages: HashMap<[u8; 32], [u8; 32]>,
190 destination_script: Script,
191 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>, //TODO: dedup this a bit...
193 impl Clone for ChannelMonitor {
194 fn clone(&self) -> Self {
196 funding_txo: self.funding_txo.clone(),
197 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor.clone(),
199 key_storage: self.key_storage.clone(),
200 delayed_payment_base_key: self.delayed_payment_base_key.clone(),
201 their_htlc_base_key: self.their_htlc_base_key.clone(),
202 their_cur_revocation_points: self.their_cur_revocation_points.clone(),
204 our_to_self_delay: self.our_to_self_delay,
205 their_to_self_delay: self.their_to_self_delay,
207 old_secrets: self.old_secrets.clone(),
208 remote_claimable_outpoints: self.remote_claimable_outpoints.clone(),
209 remote_commitment_txn_on_chain: Mutex::new((*self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.lock().unwrap()).clone()),
210 remote_hash_commitment_number: self.remote_hash_commitment_number.clone(),
212 prev_local_signed_commitment_tx: self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.clone(),
213 current_local_signed_commitment_tx: self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx.clone(),
215 payment_preimages: self.payment_preimages.clone(),
217 destination_script: self.destination_script.clone(),
218 secp_ctx: self.secp_ctx.clone(),
223 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
224 /// Used only in testing and fuzztarget to check serialization roundtrips don't change the
225 /// underlying object
226 impl PartialEq for ChannelMonitor {
227 fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
228 if self.funding_txo != other.funding_txo ||
229 self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor != other.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor ||
230 self.key_storage != other.key_storage ||
231 self.delayed_payment_base_key != other.delayed_payment_base_key ||
232 self.their_htlc_base_key != other.their_htlc_base_key ||
233 self.their_cur_revocation_points != other.their_cur_revocation_points ||
234 self.our_to_self_delay != other.our_to_self_delay ||
235 self.their_to_self_delay != other.their_to_self_delay ||
236 self.remote_claimable_outpoints != other.remote_claimable_outpoints ||
237 self.remote_hash_commitment_number != other.remote_hash_commitment_number ||
238 self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx != other.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx ||
239 self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx != other.current_local_signed_commitment_tx ||
240 self.payment_preimages != other.payment_preimages ||
241 self.destination_script != other.destination_script
245 for (&(ref secret, ref idx), &(ref o_secret, ref o_idx)) in self.old_secrets.iter().zip(other.old_secrets.iter()) {
246 if secret != o_secret || idx != o_idx {
250 let us = self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.lock().unwrap();
251 let them = other.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.lock().unwrap();
257 impl ChannelMonitor {
258 pub fn new(revocation_base_key: &SecretKey, delayed_payment_base_key: &PublicKey, htlc_base_key: &SecretKey, our_to_self_delay: u16, destination_script: Script) -> ChannelMonitor {
261 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: 0,
263 key_storage: KeyStorage::PrivMode {
264 revocation_base_key: revocation_base_key.clone(),
265 htlc_base_key: htlc_base_key.clone(),
267 delayed_payment_base_key: delayed_payment_base_key.clone(),
268 their_htlc_base_key: None,
269 their_cur_revocation_points: None,
271 our_to_self_delay: our_to_self_delay,
272 their_to_self_delay: None,
274 old_secrets: [([0; 32], 1 << 48); 49],
275 remote_claimable_outpoints: HashMap::new(),
276 remote_commitment_txn_on_chain: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
277 remote_hash_commitment_number: HashMap::new(),
279 prev_local_signed_commitment_tx: None,
280 current_local_signed_commitment_tx: None,
282 payment_preimages: HashMap::new(),
284 destination_script: destination_script,
285 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
290 fn place_secret(idx: u64) -> u8 {
292 if idx & (1 << i) == (1 << i) {
300 fn derive_secret(secret: [u8; 32], bits: u8, idx: u64) -> [u8; 32] {
301 let mut res: [u8; 32] = secret;
303 let bitpos = bits - 1 - i;
304 if idx & (1 << bitpos) == (1 << bitpos) {
305 res[(bitpos / 8) as usize] ^= 1 << (bitpos & 7);
306 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
308 sha.result(&mut res);
314 /// Inserts a revocation secret into this channel monitor. Also optionally tracks the next
315 /// revocation point which may be required to claim HTLC outputs which we know the preimage of
316 /// in case the remote end force-closes using their latest state. Prunes old preimages if neither
317 /// needed by local commitment transactions HTCLs nor by remote ones. Unless we haven't already seen remote
318 /// commitment transaction's secret, they are de facto pruned (we can use revocation key).
319 pub(super) fn provide_secret(&mut self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32], their_next_revocation_point: Option<(u64, PublicKey)>) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
320 let pos = ChannelMonitor::place_secret(idx);
322 let (old_secret, old_idx) = self.old_secrets[i as usize];
323 if ChannelMonitor::derive_secret(secret, pos, old_idx) != old_secret {
324 return Err(HandleError{err: "Previous secret did not match new one", action: None})
327 self.old_secrets[pos as usize] = (secret, idx);
329 if let Some(new_revocation_point) = their_next_revocation_point {
330 match self.their_cur_revocation_points {
331 Some(old_points) => {
332 if old_points.0 == new_revocation_point.0 + 1 {
333 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0, old_points.1, Some(new_revocation_point.1)));
334 } else if old_points.0 == new_revocation_point.0 + 2 {
335 if let Some(old_second_point) = old_points.2 {
336 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0 - 1, old_second_point, Some(new_revocation_point.1)));
338 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((new_revocation_point.0, new_revocation_point.1, None));
341 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((new_revocation_point.0, new_revocation_point.1, None));
345 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((new_revocation_point.0, new_revocation_point.1, None));
350 if !self.payment_preimages.is_empty() {
351 let local_signed_commitment_tx = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx.as_ref().expect("Channel needs at least an initial commitment tx !");
352 let prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.as_ref();
353 let min_idx = self.get_min_seen_secret();
354 let remote_hash_commitment_number = &mut self.remote_hash_commitment_number;
356 self.payment_preimages.retain(|&k, _| {
357 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in &local_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs {
358 if k == htlc.payment_hash {
362 if let Some(prev_local_commitment_tx) = prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
363 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in prev_local_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
364 if k == htlc.payment_hash {
369 let contains = if let Some(cn) = remote_hash_commitment_number.get(&k) {
376 remote_hash_commitment_number.remove(&k);
385 /// Informs this monitor of the latest remote (ie non-broadcastable) commitment transaction.
386 /// The monitor watches for it to be broadcasted and then uses the HTLC information (and
387 /// possibly future revocation/preimage information) to claim outputs where possible.
388 /// We cache also the mapping hash:commitment number to lighten pruning of old preimages by watchtowers.
389 pub(super) fn provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, unsigned_commitment_tx: &Transaction, htlc_outputs: Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>, commitment_number: u64) {
390 // TODO: Encrypt the htlc_outputs data with the single-hash of the commitment transaction
391 // so that a remote monitor doesn't learn anything unless there is a malicious close.
392 // (only maybe, sadly we cant do the same for local info, as we need to be aware of
394 for htlc in &htlc_outputs {
395 self.remote_hash_commitment_number.insert(htlc.payment_hash, commitment_number);
397 self.remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(unsigned_commitment_tx.txid(), htlc_outputs);
400 /// Informs this monitor of the latest local (ie broadcastable) commitment transaction. The
401 /// monitor watches for timeouts and may broadcast it if we approach such a timeout. Thus, it
402 /// is important that any clones of this channel monitor (including remote clones) by kept
403 /// up-to-date as our local commitment transaction is updated.
404 /// Panics if set_their_to_self_delay has never been called.
405 pub(super) fn provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, signed_commitment_tx: Transaction, local_keys: chan_utils::TxCreationKeys, feerate_per_kw: u64, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Signature, Signature)>) {
406 assert!(self.their_to_self_delay.is_some());
407 self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx.take();
408 self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(LocalSignedTx {
409 txid: signed_commitment_tx.txid(),
410 tx: signed_commitment_tx,
411 revocation_key: local_keys.revocation_key,
412 a_htlc_key: local_keys.a_htlc_key,
413 b_htlc_key: local_keys.b_htlc_key,
414 delayed_payment_key: local_keys.a_delayed_payment_key,
420 /// Provides a payment_hash->payment_preimage mapping. Will be automatically pruned when all
421 /// commitment_tx_infos which contain the payment hash have been revoked.
422 pub(super) fn provide_payment_preimage(&mut self, payment_hash: &[u8; 32], payment_preimage: &[u8; 32]) {
423 self.payment_preimages.insert(payment_hash.clone(), payment_preimage.clone());
426 pub fn insert_combine(&mut self, mut other: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
427 if self.funding_txo.is_some() {
428 // We should be able to compare the entire funding_txo, but in fuzztarget its trivially
429 // easy to collide the funding_txo hash and have a different scriptPubKey.
430 if other.funding_txo.is_some() && other.funding_txo.as_ref().unwrap().0 != self.funding_txo.as_ref().unwrap().0 {
431 return Err(HandleError{err: "Funding transaction outputs are not identical!", action: None});
434 self.funding_txo = other.funding_txo.take();
436 let other_min_secret = other.get_min_seen_secret();
437 let our_min_secret = self.get_min_seen_secret();
438 if our_min_secret > other_min_secret {
439 self.provide_secret(other_min_secret, other.get_secret(other_min_secret).unwrap(), None)?;
441 if our_min_secret >= other_min_secret {
442 self.their_cur_revocation_points = other.their_cur_revocation_points;
443 for (txid, htlcs) in other.remote_claimable_outpoints.drain() {
444 self.remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, htlcs);
446 if let Some(local_tx) = other.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
447 self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(local_tx);
449 if let Some(local_tx) = other.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
450 self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(local_tx);
452 self.payment_preimages = other.payment_preimages;
457 /// Panics if commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor doesn't fit in 48 bits
458 pub(super) fn set_commitment_obscure_factor(&mut self, commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64) {
459 assert!(commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor < (1 << 48));
460 self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor = commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor;
463 /// Allows this monitor to scan only for transactions which are applicable. Note that this is
464 /// optional, without it this monitor cannot be used in an SPV client, but you may wish to
465 /// avoid this (or call unset_funding_info) on a monitor you wish to send to a watchtower as it
466 /// provides slightly better privacy.
467 pub(super) fn set_funding_info(&mut self, funding_info: (OutPoint, Script)) {
468 //TODO: Need to register the given script here with a chain_monitor
469 self.funding_txo = Some(funding_info);
472 pub(super) fn set_their_htlc_base_key(&mut self, their_htlc_base_key: &PublicKey) {
473 self.their_htlc_base_key = Some(their_htlc_base_key.clone());
476 pub(super) fn set_their_to_self_delay(&mut self, their_to_self_delay: u16) {
477 self.their_to_self_delay = Some(their_to_self_delay);
480 pub(super) fn unset_funding_info(&mut self) {
481 self.funding_txo = None;
484 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
485 match self.funding_txo {
486 Some((outpoint, _)) => Some(outpoint),
491 /// Serializes into a vec, with various modes for the exposed pub fns
492 fn serialize(&self, for_local_storage: bool) -> Vec<u8> {
493 let mut res = Vec::new();
494 res.push(SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
495 res.push(MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
497 match &self.funding_txo {
498 &Some((ref outpoint, ref script)) => {
499 res.extend_from_slice(&outpoint.txid[..]);
500 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(outpoint.index));
501 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(script.len() as u64));
502 res.extend_from_slice(&script[..]);
505 // We haven't even been initialized...not sure why anyone is serializing us, but
506 // not much to give them.
511 // Set in initial Channel-object creation, so should always be set by now:
512 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor));
514 match self.key_storage {
515 KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key } => {
517 res.extend_from_slice(&revocation_base_key[..]);
518 res.extend_from_slice(&htlc_base_key[..]);
520 KeyStorage::SigsMode { .. } => unimplemented!(),
523 res.extend_from_slice(&self.delayed_payment_base_key.serialize());
524 res.extend_from_slice(&self.their_htlc_base_key.as_ref().unwrap().serialize());
526 match self.their_cur_revocation_points {
527 Some((idx, pubkey, second_option)) => {
528 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(idx));
529 res.extend_from_slice(&pubkey.serialize());
530 match second_option {
531 Some(second_pubkey) => {
532 res.extend_from_slice(&second_pubkey.serialize());
535 res.extend_from_slice(&[0; 33]);
540 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(0));
544 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.our_to_self_delay));
545 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap()));
547 for &(ref secret, ref idx) in self.old_secrets.iter() {
548 res.extend_from_slice(secret);
549 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*idx));
552 macro_rules! serialize_htlc_in_commitment {
553 ($htlc_output: expr) => {
554 res.push($htlc_output.offered as u8);
555 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc_output.amount_msat));
556 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array($htlc_output.cltv_expiry));
557 res.extend_from_slice(&$htlc_output.payment_hash);
558 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array($htlc_output.transaction_output_index));
562 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_claimable_outpoints.len() as u64));
563 for (txid, htlc_outputs) in self.remote_claimable_outpoints.iter() {
564 res.extend_from_slice(&txid[..]);
565 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc_outputs.len() as u64));
566 for htlc_output in htlc_outputs.iter() {
567 serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output);
572 let remote_commitment_txn_on_chain = self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.lock().unwrap();
573 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.len() as u64));
574 for (txid, commitment_number) in remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
575 res.extend_from_slice(&txid[..]);
576 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(*commitment_number));
580 if for_local_storage {
581 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_hash_commitment_number.len() as u64));
582 for (payment_hash, commitment_number) in self.remote_hash_commitment_number.iter() {
583 res.extend_from_slice(payment_hash);
584 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(*commitment_number));
587 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(0));
590 macro_rules! serialize_local_tx {
591 ($local_tx: expr) => {
592 let tx_ser = serialize::serialize(&$local_tx.tx).unwrap();
593 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(tx_ser.len() as u64));
594 res.extend_from_slice(&tx_ser);
596 res.extend_from_slice(&$local_tx.revocation_key.serialize());
597 res.extend_from_slice(&$local_tx.a_htlc_key.serialize());
598 res.extend_from_slice(&$local_tx.b_htlc_key.serialize());
599 res.extend_from_slice(&$local_tx.delayed_payment_key.serialize());
601 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($local_tx.feerate_per_kw));
602 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($local_tx.htlc_outputs.len() as u64));
603 for &(ref htlc_output, ref their_sig, ref our_sig) in $local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
604 serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output);
605 res.extend_from_slice(&their_sig.serialize_compact(&self.secp_ctx));
606 res.extend_from_slice(&our_sig.serialize_compact(&self.secp_ctx));
611 if let Some(ref prev_local_tx) = self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
613 serialize_local_tx!(prev_local_tx);
618 if let Some(ref cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
620 serialize_local_tx!(cur_local_tx);
625 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.payment_preimages.len() as u64));
626 for payment_preimage in self.payment_preimages.values() {
627 res.extend_from_slice(payment_preimage);
630 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.destination_script.len() as u64));
631 res.extend_from_slice(&self.destination_script[..]);
636 /// Encodes this monitor into a byte array, suitable for writing to disk.
637 pub fn serialize_for_disk(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
641 /// Encodes this monitor into a byte array, suitable for sending to a remote watchtower
642 pub fn serialize_for_watchtower(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
643 self.serialize(false)
646 /// Attempts to decode a serialized monitor
647 pub fn deserialize(data: &[u8]) -> Option<Self> {
648 let mut read_pos = 0;
649 macro_rules! read_bytes {
650 ($byte_count: expr) => {
652 if ($byte_count as usize) > data.len() - read_pos {
655 read_pos += $byte_count as usize;
656 &data[read_pos - $byte_count as usize..read_pos]
661 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
662 macro_rules! unwrap_obj {
666 Err(_) => return None,
671 let _ver = read_bytes!(1)[0];
672 let min_ver = read_bytes!(1)[0];
673 if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION {
677 // Technically this can fail and serialize fail a round-trip, but only for serialization of
678 // barely-init'd ChannelMonitors that we can't do anything with.
679 let outpoint = OutPoint {
680 txid: Sha256dHash::from(read_bytes!(32)),
681 index: byte_utils::slice_to_be16(read_bytes!(2)),
683 let script_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8));
684 let funding_txo = Some((outpoint, Script::from(read_bytes!(script_len).to_vec())));
685 let commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor = byte_utils::slice_to_be48(read_bytes!(6));
687 let key_storage = match read_bytes!(1)[0] {
689 KeyStorage::PrivMode {
690 revocation_base_key: unwrap_obj!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(32))),
691 htlc_base_key: unwrap_obj!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(32))),
697 let delayed_payment_base_key = unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(33)));
698 let their_htlc_base_key = Some(unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(33))));
700 let their_cur_revocation_points = {
701 let first_idx = byte_utils::slice_to_be48(read_bytes!(6));
705 let first_point = unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(33)));
706 let second_point_slice = read_bytes!(33);
707 if second_point_slice[0..32] == [0; 32] && second_point_slice[32] == 0 {
708 Some((first_idx, first_point, None))
710 Some((first_idx, first_point, Some(unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, second_point_slice)))))
715 let our_to_self_delay = byte_utils::slice_to_be16(read_bytes!(2));
716 let their_to_self_delay = Some(byte_utils::slice_to_be16(read_bytes!(2)));
718 let mut old_secrets = [([0; 32], 1 << 48); 49];
719 for &mut (ref mut secret, ref mut idx) in old_secrets.iter_mut() {
720 secret.copy_from_slice(read_bytes!(32));
721 *idx = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8));
724 macro_rules! read_htlc_in_commitment {
727 let offered = match read_bytes!(1)[0] {
728 0 => false, 1 => true,
731 let amount_msat = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8));
732 let cltv_expiry = byte_utils::slice_to_be32(read_bytes!(4));
733 let mut payment_hash = [0; 32];
734 payment_hash[..].copy_from_slice(read_bytes!(32));
735 let transaction_output_index = byte_utils::slice_to_be32(read_bytes!(4));
737 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
738 offered, amount_msat, cltv_expiry, payment_hash, transaction_output_index
744 let remote_claimable_outpoints_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8));
745 if remote_claimable_outpoints_len > data.len() as u64 / 64 { return None; }
746 let mut remote_claimable_outpoints = HashMap::with_capacity(remote_claimable_outpoints_len as usize);
747 for _ in 0..remote_claimable_outpoints_len {
748 let txid = Sha256dHash::from(read_bytes!(32));
749 let outputs_count = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8));
750 if outputs_count > data.len() as u64 / 32 { return None; }
751 let mut outputs = Vec::with_capacity(outputs_count as usize);
752 for _ in 0..outputs_count {
753 outputs.push(read_htlc_in_commitment!());
755 if let Some(_) = remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, outputs) {
760 let remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8));
761 if remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len > data.len() as u64 / 32 { return None; }
762 let mut remote_commitment_txn_on_chain = HashMap::with_capacity(remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len as usize);
763 for _ in 0..remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len {
764 let txid = Sha256dHash::from(read_bytes!(32));
765 let commitment_number = byte_utils::slice_to_be48(read_bytes!(6));
766 if let Some(_) = remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(txid, commitment_number) {
771 let remote_hash_commitment_number_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8));
772 if remote_hash_commitment_number_len > data.len() as u64 / 32 { return None; }
773 let mut remote_hash_commitment_number = HashMap::with_capacity(remote_hash_commitment_number_len as usize);
774 for _ in 0..remote_hash_commitment_number_len {
775 let mut txid = [0; 32];
776 txid[..].copy_from_slice(read_bytes!(32));
777 let commitment_number = byte_utils::slice_to_be48(read_bytes!(6));
778 if let Some(_) = remote_hash_commitment_number.insert(txid, commitment_number) {
783 macro_rules! read_local_tx {
786 let tx_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8));
787 let tx_ser = read_bytes!(tx_len);
788 let tx: Transaction = unwrap_obj!(serialize::deserialize(tx_ser));
789 if serialize::serialize(&tx).unwrap() != tx_ser {
790 // We check that the tx re-serializes to the same form to ensure there is
791 // no extra data, and as rust-bitcoin doesn't handle the 0-input ambiguity
796 let revocation_key = unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(33)));
797 let a_htlc_key = unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(33)));
798 let b_htlc_key = unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(33)));
799 let delayed_payment_key = unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(33)));
800 let feerate_per_kw = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8));
802 let htlc_outputs_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8));
803 if htlc_outputs_len > data.len() as u64 / 128 { return None; }
804 let mut htlc_outputs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_outputs_len as usize);
805 for _ in 0..htlc_outputs_len {
806 htlc_outputs.push((read_htlc_in_commitment!(),
807 unwrap_obj!(Signature::from_compact(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(64))),
808 unwrap_obj!(Signature::from_compact(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(64)))));
813 tx, revocation_key, a_htlc_key, b_htlc_key, delayed_payment_key, feerate_per_kw, htlc_outputs
819 let prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = match read_bytes!(1)[0] {
822 Some(read_local_tx!())
827 let current_local_signed_commitment_tx = match read_bytes!(1)[0] {
830 Some(read_local_tx!())
835 let payment_preimages_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8));
836 if payment_preimages_len > data.len() as u64 / 32 { return None; }
837 let mut payment_preimages = HashMap::with_capacity(payment_preimages_len as usize);
838 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
839 for _ in 0..payment_preimages_len {
840 let mut preimage = [0; 32];
841 preimage[..].copy_from_slice(read_bytes!(32));
843 sha.input(&preimage);
844 let mut hash = [0; 32];
845 sha.result(&mut hash);
846 if let Some(_) = payment_preimages.insert(hash, preimage) {
851 let destination_script_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8));
852 let destination_script = Script::from(read_bytes!(destination_script_len).to_vec());
854 Some(ChannelMonitor {
856 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor,
859 delayed_payment_base_key,
861 their_cur_revocation_points,
867 remote_claimable_outpoints,
868 remote_commitment_txn_on_chain: Mutex::new(remote_commitment_txn_on_chain),
869 remote_hash_commitment_number,
871 prev_local_signed_commitment_tx,
872 current_local_signed_commitment_tx,
881 //TODO: Functions to serialize/deserialize (with different forms depending on which information
882 //we want to leave out (eg funding_txo, etc).
884 /// Can only fail if idx is < get_min_seen_secret
885 pub fn get_secret(&self, idx: u64) -> Result<[u8; 32], HandleError> {
886 for i in 0..self.old_secrets.len() {
887 if (idx & (!((1 << i) - 1))) == self.old_secrets[i].1 {
888 return Ok(ChannelMonitor::derive_secret(self.old_secrets[i].0, i as u8, idx))
891 assert!(idx < self.get_min_seen_secret());
892 Err(HandleError{err: "idx too low", action: None})
895 pub fn get_min_seen_secret(&self) -> u64 {
896 //TODO This can be optimized?
897 let mut min = 1 << 48;
898 for &(_, idx) in self.old_secrets.iter() {
906 /// Attempts to claim a remote commitment transaction's outputs using the revocation key and
907 /// data in remote_claimable_outpoints. Will directly claim any HTLC outputs which expire at a
908 /// height > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER. In any case, will install monitoring for
909 /// HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions, and claim them using the revocation key (if
910 /// applicable) as well.
911 fn check_spend_remote_transaction(&self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32) -> Vec<Transaction> {
912 // Most secp and related errors trying to create keys means we have no hope of constructing
913 // a spend transaction...so we return no transactions to broadcast
914 let mut txn_to_broadcast = Vec::new();
915 macro_rules! ignore_error {
916 ( $thing : expr ) => {
919 Err(_) => return txn_to_broadcast
924 let commitment_txid = tx.txid(); //TODO: This is gonna be a performance bottleneck for watchtowers!
925 let per_commitment_option = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(&commitment_txid);
927 let commitment_number = 0xffffffffffff - ((((tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor);
928 if commitment_number >= self.get_min_seen_secret() {
929 let secret = self.get_secret(commitment_number).unwrap();
930 let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &secret));
931 let (revocation_pubkey, b_htlc_key) = match self.key_storage {
932 KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key } => {
933 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
934 (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_base_key))),
935 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &htlc_base_key))))
937 KeyStorage::SigsMode { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
938 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
939 (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &revocation_base_key)),
940 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &htlc_base_key)))
943 let delayed_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key), &self.delayed_payment_base_key));
944 let a_htlc_key = match self.their_htlc_base_key {
945 None => return txn_to_broadcast,
946 Some(their_htlc_base_key) => ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key), &their_htlc_base_key)),
949 let revokeable_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey, self.our_to_self_delay, &delayed_key);
950 let revokeable_p2wsh = revokeable_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
952 let mut total_value = 0;
953 let mut values = Vec::new();
954 let mut inputs = Vec::new();
955 let mut htlc_idxs = Vec::new();
957 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
958 if outp.script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh {
960 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
961 txid: commitment_txid,
964 script_sig: Script::new(),
965 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
968 htlc_idxs.push(None);
969 values.push(outp.value);
970 total_value += outp.value;
971 break; // There can only be one of these
975 macro_rules! sign_input {
976 ($sighash_parts: expr, $input: expr, $htlc_idx: expr, $amount: expr) => {
978 let (sig, redeemscript) = match self.key_storage {
979 KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
980 let redeemscript = if $htlc_idx.is_none() { revokeable_redeemscript.clone() } else {
981 let htlc = &per_commitment_option.unwrap()[$htlc_idx.unwrap()];
982 chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey)
984 let sighash = ignore_error!(Message::from_slice(&$sighash_parts.sighash_all(&$input, &redeemscript, $amount)[..]));
985 let revocation_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key, &revocation_base_key));
986 (self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &revocation_key), redeemscript)
988 KeyStorage::SigsMode { .. } => {
992 $input.witness.push(sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
993 $input.witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
994 if $htlc_idx.is_none() {
995 $input.witness.push(vec!(1));
997 $input.witness.push(revocation_pubkey.serialize().to_vec());
999 $input.witness.push(redeemscript.into_bytes());
1004 if let Some(per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
1005 inputs.reserve_exact(per_commitment_data.len());
1007 for (idx, htlc) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() {
1008 let expected_script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey);
1009 if htlc.transaction_output_index as usize >= tx.output.len() ||
1010 tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 ||
1011 tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].script_pubkey != expected_script.to_v0_p2wsh() {
1012 return txn_to_broadcast; // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user
1015 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
1016 txid: commitment_txid,
1017 vout: htlc.transaction_output_index,
1019 script_sig: Script::new(),
1020 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
1021 witness: Vec::new(),
1023 if htlc.cltv_expiry > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER {
1025 htlc_idxs.push(Some(idx));
1026 values.push(tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].value);
1027 total_value += htlc.amount_msat / 1000;
1029 let mut single_htlc_tx = Transaction {
1033 output: vec!(TxOut {
1034 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1035 value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000, //TODO: - fee
1038 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&single_htlc_tx);
1039 sign_input!(sighash_parts, single_htlc_tx.input[0], Some(idx), htlc.amount_msat / 1000);
1040 txn_to_broadcast.push(single_htlc_tx); // TODO: This is not yet tested in ChannelManager!
1045 if !inputs.is_empty() || !txn_to_broadcast.is_empty() { // ie we're confident this is actually ours
1046 // We're definitely a remote commitment transaction!
1047 // TODO: Register all outputs in commitment_tx with the ChainWatchInterface!
1048 self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.lock().unwrap().insert(commitment_txid, commitment_number);
1050 if inputs.is_empty() { return txn_to_broadcast; } // Nothing to be done...probably a false positive/local tx
1052 let outputs = vec!(TxOut {
1053 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1054 value: total_value, //TODO: - fee
1056 let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
1063 let mut values_drain = values.drain(..);
1064 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx);
1066 for (input, htlc_idx) in spend_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(htlc_idxs.iter()) {
1067 let value = values_drain.next().unwrap();
1068 sign_input!(sighash_parts, input, htlc_idx, value);
1071 txn_to_broadcast.push(spend_tx);
1072 } else if let Some(per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
1073 // While this isn't useful yet, there is a potential race where if a counterparty
1074 // revokes a state at the same time as the commitment transaction for that state is
1075 // confirmed, and the watchtower receives the block before the user, the user could
1076 // upload a new ChannelMonitor with the revocation secret but the watchtower has
1077 // already processed the block, resulting in the remote_commitment_txn_on_chain entry
1078 // not being generated by the above conditional. Thus, to be safe, we go ahead and
1080 // TODO: Register all outputs in commitment_tx with the ChainWatchInterface!
1081 self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.lock().unwrap().insert(commitment_txid, commitment_number);
1083 if let Some(revocation_points) = self.their_cur_revocation_points {
1084 let revocation_point_option =
1085 if revocation_points.0 == commitment_number { Some(&revocation_points.1) }
1086 else if let Some(point) = revocation_points.2.as_ref() {
1087 if revocation_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 { Some(point) } else { None }
1089 if let Some(revocation_point) = revocation_point_option {
1090 let (revocation_pubkey, b_htlc_key) = match self.key_storage {
1091 KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key } => {
1092 (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_base_key))),
1093 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &htlc_base_key))))
1095 KeyStorage::SigsMode { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
1096 (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &revocation_base_key)),
1097 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &htlc_base_key)))
1100 let a_htlc_key = match self.their_htlc_base_key {
1101 None => return txn_to_broadcast,
1102 Some(their_htlc_base_key) => ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &their_htlc_base_key)),
1105 let mut total_value = 0;
1106 let mut values = Vec::new();
1107 let mut inputs = Vec::new();
1109 macro_rules! sign_input {
1110 ($sighash_parts: expr, $input: expr, $amount: expr, $preimage: expr) => {
1112 let (sig, redeemscript) = match self.key_storage {
1113 KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
1114 let htlc = &per_commitment_option.unwrap()[$input.sequence as usize];
1115 let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey);
1116 let sighash = ignore_error!(Message::from_slice(&$sighash_parts.sighash_all(&$input, &redeemscript, $amount)[..]));
1117 let htlc_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &htlc_base_key));
1118 (self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &htlc_key), redeemscript)
1120 KeyStorage::SigsMode { .. } => {
1124 $input.witness.push(sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
1125 $input.witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1126 $input.witness.push($preimage);
1127 $input.witness.push(redeemscript.into_bytes());
1132 for (idx, htlc) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() {
1133 if let Some(payment_preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
1135 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
1136 txid: commitment_txid,
1137 vout: htlc.transaction_output_index,
1139 script_sig: Script::new(),
1140 sequence: idx as u32, // reset to 0xfffffffd in sign_input
1141 witness: Vec::new(),
1143 if htlc.cltv_expiry > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER {
1145 values.push((tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].value, payment_preimage));
1146 total_value += htlc.amount_msat / 1000;
1148 let mut single_htlc_tx = Transaction {
1152 output: vec!(TxOut {
1153 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1154 value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000, //TODO: - fee
1157 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&single_htlc_tx);
1158 sign_input!(sighash_parts, single_htlc_tx.input[0], htlc.amount_msat / 1000, payment_preimage.to_vec());
1159 txn_to_broadcast.push(single_htlc_tx);
1164 if inputs.is_empty() { return txn_to_broadcast; } // Nothing to be done...probably a false positive/local tx
1166 let outputs = vec!(TxOut {
1167 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1168 value: total_value, //TODO: - fee
1170 let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
1177 let mut values_drain = values.drain(..);
1178 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx);
1180 for input in spend_tx.input.iter_mut() {
1181 let value = values_drain.next().unwrap();
1182 sign_input!(sighash_parts, input, value.0, value.1.to_vec());
1185 txn_to_broadcast.push(spend_tx);
1189 //TODO: For each input check if its in our remote_commitment_txn_on_chain map!
1195 fn broadcast_by_local_state(&self, local_tx: &LocalSignedTx) -> Vec<Transaction> {
1196 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
1198 for &(ref htlc, ref their_sig, ref our_sig) in local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1200 let mut htlc_timeout_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&local_tx.txid, local_tx.feerate_per_kw, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), htlc, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key, &local_tx.revocation_key);
1202 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
1204 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(their_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
1205 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1206 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
1207 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1209 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new());
1210 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &local_tx.a_htlc_key, &local_tx.b_htlc_key, &local_tx.revocation_key).into_bytes());
1212 res.push(htlc_timeout_tx);
1214 if let Some(payment_preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
1215 let mut htlc_success_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&local_tx.txid, local_tx.feerate_per_kw, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), htlc, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key, &local_tx.revocation_key);
1217 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
1219 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(their_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
1220 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1221 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
1222 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1224 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(payment_preimage.to_vec());
1225 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &local_tx.a_htlc_key, &local_tx.b_htlc_key, &local_tx.revocation_key).into_bytes());
1227 res.push(htlc_success_tx);
1235 /// Attempts to claim any claimable HTLCs in a commitment transaction which was not (yet)
1236 /// revoked using data in local_claimable_outpoints.
1237 /// Should not be used if check_spend_revoked_transaction succeeds.
1238 fn check_spend_local_transaction(&self, tx: &Transaction, _height: u32) -> Vec<Transaction> {
1239 let commitment_txid = tx.txid();
1240 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1241 if local_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
1242 return self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx);
1245 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1246 if local_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
1247 return self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx);
1253 fn block_connected(&self, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], height: u32, broadcaster: &BroadcasterInterface) {
1254 for tx in txn_matched {
1255 for txin in tx.input.iter() {
1256 if self.funding_txo.is_none() || (txin.previous_output.txid == self.funding_txo.as_ref().unwrap().0.txid && txin.previous_output.vout == self.funding_txo.as_ref().unwrap().0.index as u32) {
1257 let mut txn = self.check_spend_remote_transaction(tx, height);
1259 txn = self.check_spend_local_transaction(tx, height);
1261 for tx in txn.iter() {
1262 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(tx);
1267 if let Some(ref cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1268 let mut needs_broadcast = false;
1269 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in cur_local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1270 if htlc.cltv_expiry <= height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER {
1271 if htlc.offered || self.payment_preimages.contains_key(&htlc.payment_hash) {
1272 needs_broadcast = true;
1277 if needs_broadcast {
1278 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&cur_local_tx.tx);
1279 for tx in self.broadcast_by_local_state(&cur_local_tx) {
1280 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
1286 pub fn would_broadcast_at_height(&self, height: u32) -> bool {
1287 if let Some(ref cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1288 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in cur_local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1289 if htlc.cltv_expiry <= height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER {
1290 if htlc.offered || self.payment_preimages.contains_key(&htlc.payment_hash) {
1302 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Script;
1303 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
1304 use crypto::digest::Digest;
1306 use ln::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor;
1307 use ln::chan_utils::{HTLCOutputInCommitment, TxCreationKeys};
1308 use util::sha2::Sha256;
1309 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
1310 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1, Signature};
1311 use rand::{thread_rng,Rng};
1314 fn test_per_commitment_storage() {
1315 // Test vectors from BOLT 3:
1316 let mut secrets: Vec<[u8; 32]> = Vec::new();
1317 let mut monitor: ChannelMonitor;
1318 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1320 macro_rules! test_secrets {
1322 let mut idx = 281474976710655;
1323 for secret in secrets.iter() {
1324 assert_eq!(monitor.get_secret(idx).unwrap(), *secret);
1327 assert_eq!(monitor.get_min_seen_secret(), idx + 1);
1328 assert!(monitor.get_secret(idx).is_err());
1332 let delayed_payment_base_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap());
1335 // insert_secret correct sequence
1336 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &delayed_payment_base_key, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
1339 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1340 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1341 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1344 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1345 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1346 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1349 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1350 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1351 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1354 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1355 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1356 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1359 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1360 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
1361 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1364 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1365 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
1366 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1369 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1370 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
1371 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1374 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1375 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
1376 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1381 // insert_secret #1 incorrect
1382 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &delayed_payment_base_key, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
1385 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1386 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
1387 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1390 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1391 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1392 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err,
1393 "Previous secret did not match new one");
1397 // insert_secret #2 incorrect (#1 derived from incorrect)
1398 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &delayed_payment_base_key, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
1401 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1402 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
1403 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1406 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1407 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("dddc3a8d14fddf2b68fa8c7fbad2748274937479dd0f8930d5ebb4ab6bd866a3").unwrap());
1408 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1411 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1412 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1413 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1416 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1417 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1418 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err,
1419 "Previous secret did not match new one");
1423 // insert_secret #3 incorrect
1424 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &delayed_payment_base_key, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
1427 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1428 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1429 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1432 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1433 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1434 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1437 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1438 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c51a18b13e8527e579ec56365482c62f180b7d5760b46e9477dae59e87ed423a").unwrap());
1439 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1442 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1443 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1444 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err,
1445 "Previous secret did not match new one");
1449 // insert_secret #4 incorrect (1,2,3 derived from incorrect)
1450 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &delayed_payment_base_key, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
1453 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1454 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
1455 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1458 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1459 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("dddc3a8d14fddf2b68fa8c7fbad2748274937479dd0f8930d5ebb4ab6bd866a3").unwrap());
1460 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1463 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1464 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c51a18b13e8527e579ec56365482c62f180b7d5760b46e9477dae59e87ed423a").unwrap());
1465 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1468 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1469 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("ba65d7b0ef55a3ba300d4e87af29868f394f8f138d78a7011669c79b37b936f4").unwrap());
1470 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1473 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1474 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
1475 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1478 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1479 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
1480 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1483 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1484 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
1485 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1488 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1489 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
1490 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err,
1491 "Previous secret did not match new one");
1495 // insert_secret #5 incorrect
1496 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &delayed_payment_base_key, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
1499 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1500 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1501 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1504 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1505 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1506 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1509 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1510 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1511 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1514 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1515 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1516 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1519 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1520 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("631373ad5f9ef654bb3dade742d09504c567edd24320d2fcd68e3cc47e2ff6a6").unwrap());
1521 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1524 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1525 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
1526 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err,
1527 "Previous secret did not match new one");
1531 // insert_secret #6 incorrect (5 derived from incorrect)
1532 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &delayed_payment_base_key, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
1535 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1536 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1537 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1540 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1541 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1542 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1545 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1546 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1547 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1550 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1551 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1552 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1555 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1556 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("631373ad5f9ef654bb3dade742d09504c567edd24320d2fcd68e3cc47e2ff6a6").unwrap());
1557 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1560 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1561 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("b7e76a83668bde38b373970155c868a653304308f9896692f904a23731224bb1").unwrap());
1562 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1565 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1566 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
1567 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1570 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1571 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
1572 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err,
1573 "Previous secret did not match new one");
1577 // insert_secret #7 incorrect
1578 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &delayed_payment_base_key, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
1581 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1582 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1583 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1586 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1587 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1588 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1591 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1592 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1593 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1596 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1597 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1598 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1601 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1602 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
1603 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1606 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1607 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
1608 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1611 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1612 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("e7971de736e01da8ed58b94c2fc216cb1dca9e326f3a96e7194fe8ea8af6c0a3").unwrap());
1613 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1616 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1617 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
1618 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err,
1619 "Previous secret did not match new one");
1623 // insert_secret #8 incorrect
1624 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &delayed_payment_base_key, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
1627 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1628 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1629 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1632 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1633 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1634 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1637 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1638 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1639 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1642 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1643 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1644 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1647 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1648 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
1649 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1652 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1653 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
1654 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1657 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1658 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
1659 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1662 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1663 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a7efbc61aac46d34f77778bac22c8a20c6a46ca460addc49009bda875ec88fa4").unwrap());
1664 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err,
1665 "Previous secret did not match new one");
1670 fn test_prune_preimages() {
1671 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1672 let dummy_sig = Signature::from_der(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("3045022100fa86fa9a36a8cd6a7bb8f06a541787d51371d067951a9461d5404de6b928782e02201c8b7c334c10aed8976a3a465be9a28abff4cb23acbf00022295b378ce1fa3cd").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
1674 macro_rules! dummy_keys {
1677 let dummy_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap());
1679 per_commitment_point: dummy_key.clone(),
1680 revocation_key: dummy_key.clone(),
1681 a_htlc_key: dummy_key.clone(),
1682 b_htlc_key: dummy_key.clone(),
1683 a_delayed_payment_key: dummy_key.clone(),
1684 b_payment_key: dummy_key.clone(),
1689 let dummy_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
1691 let mut preimages = Vec::new();
1693 let mut rng = thread_rng();
1695 let mut preimage = [0; 32];
1696 rng.fill_bytes(&mut preimage);
1697 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
1698 sha.input(&preimage);
1699 let mut hash = [0; 32];
1700 sha.result(&mut hash);
1701 preimages.push((preimage, hash));
1705 macro_rules! preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs {
1706 ($preimages_slice: expr) => {
1708 let mut res = Vec::new();
1709 for (idx, preimage) in $preimages_slice.iter().enumerate() {
1710 res.push(HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1714 payment_hash: preimage.1.clone(),
1715 transaction_output_index: idx as u32,
1722 macro_rules! preimages_to_local_htlcs {
1723 ($preimages_slice: expr) => {
1725 let mut inp = preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!($preimages_slice);
1726 let res: Vec<_> = inp.drain(..).map(|e| { (e, dummy_sig.clone(), dummy_sig.clone()) }).collect();
1732 macro_rules! test_preimages_exist {
1733 ($preimages_slice: expr, $monitor: expr) => {
1734 for preimage in $preimages_slice {
1735 assert!($monitor.payment_preimages.contains_key(&preimage.1));
1740 // Prune with one old state and a local commitment tx holding a few overlaps with the
1742 let delayed_payment_base_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap());
1743 let mut monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &delayed_payment_base_key, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
1744 monitor.set_their_to_self_delay(10);
1746 monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(dummy_tx.clone(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..10]));
1747 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[5..15]), 281474976710655);
1748 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[15..20]), 281474976710654);
1749 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[17..20]), 281474976710653);
1750 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[18..20]), 281474976710652);
1751 for &(ref preimage, ref hash) in preimages.iter() {
1752 monitor.provide_payment_preimage(hash, preimage);
1755 // Now provide a secret, pruning preimages 10-15
1756 let mut secret = [0; 32];
1757 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1758 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secret.clone(), None).unwrap();
1759 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 15);
1760 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
1761 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[15..20], monitor);
1763 // Now provide a further secret, pruning preimages 15-17
1764 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1765 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secret.clone(), None).unwrap();
1766 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 13);
1767 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
1768 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[17..20], monitor);
1770 // Now update local commitment tx info, pruning only element 18 as we still care about the
1771 // previous commitment tx's preimages too
1772 monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(dummy_tx.clone(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..5]));
1773 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1774 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secret.clone(), None).unwrap();
1775 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 12);
1776 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
1777 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[18..20], monitor);
1779 // But if we do it again, we'll prune 5-10
1780 monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(dummy_tx.clone(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..3]));
1781 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1782 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secret.clone(), None).unwrap();
1783 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 5);
1784 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..5], monitor);
1787 // Further testing is done in the ChannelManager integration tests.