1 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
2 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxIn,TxOut,SigHashType,Transaction};
3 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Script;
4 use bitcoin::util::hash::Sha256dHash;
5 use bitcoin::util::bip143;
7 use crypto::digest::Digest;
9 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Message,Signature};
10 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
12 use ln::msgs::HandleError;
14 use ln::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment;
15 use chain::chaininterface::{ChainListener, ChainWatchInterface, BroadcasterInterface};
16 use util::sha2::Sha256;
18 use std::collections::HashMap;
19 use std::sync::{Arc,Mutex};
22 /// Simple trait indicating ability to track a set of ChannelMonitors and multiplex events between
23 /// them. Generally should be implemented by keeping a local SimpleManyChannelMonitor and passing
24 /// events to it, while also taking any add_update_monitor events and passing them to some remote
26 pub trait ManyChannelMonitor: Send + Sync {
27 /// Adds or updates a monitor for the given funding_txid+funding_output_index.
28 fn add_update_monitor(&self, funding_txo: (Sha256dHash, u16), monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), HandleError>;
31 /// A simple implementation of a ManyChannelMonitor and ChainListener. Can be used to create a
32 /// watchtower or watch our own channels.
33 /// Note that you must provide your own key by which to refer to channels.
34 /// If you're accepting remote monitors (ie are implementing a watchtower), you must verify that
35 /// users cannot overwrite a given channel by providing a duplicate key. ie you should probably
36 /// index by a PublicKey which is required to sign any updates.
37 /// If you're using this for local monitoring of your own channels, you probably want to use
38 /// (Sha256dHash, u16) as the key, which will give you a ManyChannelMonitor implementation.
39 pub struct SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
40 monitors: Mutex<HashMap<Key, ChannelMonitor>>,
41 chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>,
42 broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>
45 impl<Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash> ChainListener for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
46 fn block_connected(&self, _header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], _indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) {
47 let monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
48 for monitor in monitors.values() {
49 monitor.block_connected(txn_matched, height, &*self.broadcaster);
53 fn block_disconnected(&self, _: &BlockHeader) { }
56 impl<Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash + 'static> SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
57 pub fn new(chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>, broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>) -> Arc<SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key>> {
58 let res = Arc::new(SimpleManyChannelMonitor {
59 monitors: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
63 let weak_res = Arc::downgrade(&res);
64 res.chain_monitor.register_listener(weak_res);
68 pub fn add_update_monitor_by_key(&self, key: Key, monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
69 let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
70 match monitors.get_mut(&key) {
71 Some(orig_monitor) => return orig_monitor.insert_combine(monitor),
74 match monitor.funding_txo {
75 None => self.chain_monitor.watch_all_txn(),
76 Some((funding_txid, funding_output_index)) => self.chain_monitor.install_watch_outpoint((funding_txid, funding_output_index as u32)),
78 monitors.insert(key, monitor);
83 impl ManyChannelMonitor for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<(Sha256dHash, u16)> {
84 fn add_update_monitor(&self, funding_txo: (Sha256dHash, u16), monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
85 self.add_update_monitor_by_key(funding_txo, monitor)
89 /// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, don't try to claim it directly, instead broadcast
90 /// the HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transaction and claim the revocation from that.
91 const CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 12;
94 enum RevocationStorage {
96 revocation_base_key: SecretKey,
99 revocation_base_key: PublicKey,
100 sigs: HashMap<Sha256dHash, Signature>,
105 struct PerCommitmentTransactionData {
106 revoked_output_index: u32,
107 htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Signature)>,
111 pub struct ChannelMonitor {
112 funding_txo: Option<(Sha256dHash, u16)>,
113 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64,
115 revocation_base_key: RevocationStorage,
116 delayed_payment_base_key: PublicKey,
117 htlc_base_key: PublicKey,
118 their_htlc_base_key: Option<PublicKey>,
121 old_secrets: [([u8; 32], u64); 49],
122 claimable_outpoints: HashMap<Sha256dHash, PerCommitmentTransactionData>,
123 payment_preimages: Vec<[u8; 32]>,
125 destination_script: Script,
126 secp_ctx: Secp256k1, //TODO: dedup this a bit...
129 impl ChannelMonitor {
130 pub fn new(revocation_base_key: &SecretKey, delayed_payment_base_key: &PublicKey, htlc_base_key: &PublicKey, to_self_delay: u16, destination_script: Script) -> ChannelMonitor {
133 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: 0,
135 revocation_base_key: RevocationStorage::PrivMode {
136 revocation_base_key: revocation_base_key.clone(),
138 delayed_payment_base_key: delayed_payment_base_key.clone(),
139 htlc_base_key: htlc_base_key.clone(),
140 their_htlc_base_key: None,
141 to_self_delay: to_self_delay,
143 old_secrets: [([0; 32], 1 << 48); 49],
144 claimable_outpoints: HashMap::new(),
145 payment_preimages: Vec::new(),
147 destination_script: destination_script,
148 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
153 fn place_secret(idx: u64) -> u8 {
155 if idx & (1 << i) == (1 << i) {
163 fn derive_secret(secret: [u8; 32], bits: u8, idx: u64) -> [u8; 32] {
164 let mut res: [u8; 32] = secret;
166 let bitpos = bits - 1 - i;
167 if idx & (1 << bitpos) == (1 << bitpos) {
168 res[(bitpos / 8) as usize] ^= 1 << (bitpos & 7);
169 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
171 sha.result(&mut res);
177 /// Inserts a revocation secret into this channel monitor. Requires the revocation_base_key of
178 /// the node which we are monitoring the channel on behalf of in order to generate signatures
179 /// over revocation-claim transactions.
180 pub fn provide_secret(&mut self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
181 let pos = ChannelMonitor::place_secret(idx);
183 let (old_secret, old_idx) = self.old_secrets[i as usize];
184 if ChannelMonitor::derive_secret(secret, pos, old_idx) != old_secret {
185 return Err(HandleError{err: "Previous secret did not match new one", msg: None})
188 self.old_secrets[pos as usize] = (secret, idx);
192 /// Informs this watcher of the set of HTLC outputs in a commitment transaction which our
193 /// counterparty may broadcast. This allows us to reconstruct the commitment transaction's
194 /// outputs fully, claiming revoked, unexpired HTLC outputs as well as revoked refund outputs.
195 /// TODO: Doc new params!
196 /// TODO: This seems to be wrong...we should be calling this from commitment_signed, but we
197 /// should be calling this about remote transactions, ie ones that they can revoke_and_ack...
198 pub fn provide_tx_info(&mut self, commitment_tx: &Transaction, revokeable_out_index: u32, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Signature)>) {
199 // TODO: Encrypt the htlc_outputs data with the single-hash of the commitment transaction
200 // so that a remote monitor doesn't learn anything unless there is a malicious close.
201 self.claimable_outpoints.insert(commitment_tx.txid(), PerCommitmentTransactionData{
202 revoked_output_index: revokeable_out_index,
207 pub fn insert_combine(&mut self, other: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
208 match self.funding_txo {
209 Some(txo) => if other.funding_txo.is_some() && other.funding_txo.unwrap() != txo {
210 return Err(HandleError{err: "Funding transaction outputs are not identical!", msg: None});
212 None => if other.funding_txo.is_some() {
213 self.funding_txo = other.funding_txo;
216 let other_max_secret = other.get_min_seen_secret();
217 if self.get_min_seen_secret() > other_max_secret {
218 self.provide_secret(other_max_secret, other.get_secret(other_max_secret).unwrap())
222 /// Panics if commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor doesn't fit in 48 bits
223 pub fn set_commitment_obscure_factor(&mut self, commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64) {
224 assert!(commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor < (1 << 48));
225 self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor = commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor;
228 /// Allows this monitor to scan only for transactions which are applicable. Note that this is
229 /// optional, without it this monitor cannot be used in an SPV client, but you may wish to
230 /// avoid this (or call unset_funding_info) on a monitor you wish to send to a watchtower as it
231 /// provides slightly better privacy.
232 pub fn set_funding_info(&mut self, funding_txid: Sha256dHash, funding_output_index: u16) {
233 self.funding_txo = Some((funding_txid, funding_output_index));
236 pub fn set_their_htlc_base_key(&mut self, their_htlc_base_key: &PublicKey) {
237 self.their_htlc_base_key = Some(their_htlc_base_key.clone());
240 pub fn unset_funding_info(&mut self) {
241 self.funding_txo = None;
244 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<(Sha256dHash, u16)> {
248 //TODO: Functions to serialize/deserialize (with different forms depending on which information
249 //we want to leave out (eg funding_txo, etc).
251 /// Can only fail if idx is < get_min_seen_secret
252 pub fn get_secret(&self, idx: u64) -> Result<[u8; 32], HandleError> {
253 for i in 0..self.old_secrets.len() {
254 if (idx & (!((1 << i) - 1))) == self.old_secrets[i].1 {
255 return Ok(ChannelMonitor::derive_secret(self.old_secrets[i].0, i as u8, idx))
258 assert!(idx < self.get_min_seen_secret());
259 Err(HandleError{err: "idx too low", msg: None})
262 pub fn get_min_seen_secret(&self) -> u64 {
263 //TODO This can be optimized?
264 let mut min = 1 << 48;
265 for &(_, idx) in self.old_secrets.iter() {
274 fn check_spend_transaction(&self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32) -> Vec<Transaction> {
275 // Most secp and related errors trying to create keys means we have no hope of constructing
276 // a spend transaction...so we return no transactions to broadcast
277 macro_rules! ignore_error {
278 ( $thing : expr ) => {
281 Err(_) => return Vec::new()
286 let mut txn_to_broadcast = Vec::new();
288 let commitment_number = (((tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor;
289 if commitment_number >= self.get_min_seen_secret() {
290 let secret = self.get_secret(commitment_number).unwrap();
291 let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &secret));
292 let revocation_pubkey = match self.revocation_base_key {
293 RevocationStorage::PrivMode { ref revocation_base_key } => {
294 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &ignore_error!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key)), &ignore_error!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_base_key))))
296 RevocationStorage::SigsMode { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
297 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &ignore_error!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key)), &revocation_base_key))
300 let delayed_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &ignore_error!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key)), &self.delayed_payment_base_key));
301 let a_htlc_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &ignore_error!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key)), &self.htlc_base_key));
302 let b_htlc_key = match self.their_htlc_base_key {
303 None => return Vec::new(),
304 Some(their_htlc_base_key) => ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &ignore_error!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key)), &their_htlc_base_key)),
307 let revokeable_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey, self.to_self_delay, &delayed_key);
309 let commitment_txid = tx.txid();
311 let mut total_value = 0;
312 let mut values = Vec::new();
313 let inputs = match self.claimable_outpoints.get(&commitment_txid) {
314 Some(per_commitment_data) => {
315 let mut inp = Vec::with_capacity(per_commitment_data.htlcs.len() + 1);
317 if per_commitment_data.revoked_output_index as usize >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[per_commitment_data.revoked_output_index as usize].script_pubkey != revokeable_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh() {
318 return Vec::new(); // Corrupted per_commitment_data, not much we can do
322 prev_hash: commitment_txid,
323 prev_index: per_commitment_data.revoked_output_index,
324 script_sig: Script::new(),
325 sequence: 0xffffffff,
328 values.push(tx.output[per_commitment_data.revoked_output_index as usize].value);
329 total_value += tx.output[per_commitment_data.revoked_output_index as usize].value;
331 for &(ref htlc, ref _next_tx_sig) in per_commitment_data.htlcs.iter() {
332 let expected_script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey, htlc.offered);
333 if htlc.transaction_output_index as usize >= tx.output.len() ||
334 tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 ||
335 tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].script_pubkey != expected_script.to_v0_p2wsh() {
336 return Vec::new(); // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user
338 if htlc.cltv_expiry > height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER {
340 prev_hash: commitment_txid,
341 prev_index: htlc.transaction_output_index,
342 script_sig: Script::new(),
343 sequence: 0xffffffff,
346 values.push(tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].value);
347 total_value += htlc.amount_msat / 1000;
349 //TODO: Mark as "bad"
350 //then broadcast using next_tx_sig
355 let mut inp = Vec::new(); // This is unlikely to succeed
356 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
357 if outp.script_pubkey == revokeable_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh() {
359 prev_hash: commitment_txid,
360 prev_index: idx as u32,
361 script_sig: Script::new(),
362 sequence: 0xffffffff,
365 values.push(outp.value);
366 total_value += outp.value;
367 break; // There can only be one of these
370 if inp.is_empty() { return Vec::new(); } // Nothing to be done...probably a false positive
375 let outputs = vec!(TxOut {
376 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
377 value: total_value, //TODO: - fee
379 let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
386 let mut values_drain = values.drain(..);
388 // First input is the generic revokeable_redeemscript
389 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx);
391 let sig = match self.revocation_base_key {
392 RevocationStorage::PrivMode { ref revocation_base_key } => {
393 let sighash = ignore_error!(Message::from_slice(&sighash_parts.sighash_all(&spend_tx.input[0], &revokeable_redeemscript, values_drain.next().unwrap())[..]));
394 let revocation_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key, &revocation_base_key));
395 ignore_error!(self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &revocation_key))
397 RevocationStorage::SigsMode { .. } => {
402 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
403 spend_tx.input[0].witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
404 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(vec!(1)); // First if branch is revocation_key
407 match self.claimable_outpoints.get(&commitment_txid) {
409 Some(per_commitment_data) => {
410 let mut htlc_idx = 0;
411 for (idx, input) in spend_tx.input.iter_mut().enumerate() {
412 if idx == 0 { continue; } // We already signed the first input
416 htlc = &per_commitment_data.htlcs[htlc_idx].0;
418 htlc.cltv_expiry > height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
421 let sig = match self.revocation_base_key {
422 RevocationStorage::PrivMode { ref revocation_base_key } => {
423 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey, htlc.offered);
424 let sighash = ignore_error!(Message::from_slice(&sighash_parts.sighash_all(&input, &htlc_redeemscript, values_drain.next().unwrap())[..]));
426 let revocation_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key, &revocation_base_key));
427 ignore_error!(self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &revocation_key))
429 RevocationStorage::SigsMode { .. } => {
434 input.witness.push(revocation_pubkey.serialize().to_vec()); // First if branch is revocation_key
435 input.witness.push(sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
436 input.witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
441 txn_to_broadcast.push(spend_tx);
447 fn block_connected(&self, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], height: u32, broadcaster: &BroadcasterInterface) {
448 for tx in txn_matched {
449 if tx.input.len() != 1 {
450 // We currently only ever sign something spending a commitment or HTLC
451 // transaction with 1 input, so we can skip most transactions trivially.
455 for txin in tx.input.iter() {
456 if self.funding_txo.is_none() || (txin.prev_hash == self.funding_txo.unwrap().0 && txin.prev_index == self.funding_txo.unwrap().1 as u32) {
457 for tx in self.check_spend_transaction(tx, height).iter() {
458 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(tx);
468 use bitcoin::util::misc::hex_bytes;
469 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Script;
470 use ln::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor;
471 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
472 use secp256k1::Secp256k1;
475 fn test_per_commitment_storage() {
476 // Test vectors from BOLT 3:
477 let mut secrets: Vec<[u8; 32]> = Vec::new();
478 let mut monitor: ChannelMonitor;
479 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
481 macro_rules! test_secrets {
483 let mut idx = 281474976710655;
484 for secret in secrets.iter() {
485 assert_eq!(monitor.get_secret(idx).unwrap(), *secret);
488 assert_eq!(monitor.get_min_seen_secret(), idx + 1);
489 assert!(monitor.get_secret(idx).is_err());
494 // insert_secret correct sequence
495 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::new(), &PublicKey::new(), 0, Script::new());
498 secrets.push([0; 32]);
499 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
500 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
503 secrets.push([0; 32]);
504 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
505 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
508 secrets.push([0; 32]);
509 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
510 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
513 secrets.push([0; 32]);
514 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
515 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
518 secrets.push([0; 32]);
519 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
520 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
523 secrets.push([0; 32]);
524 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
525 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
528 secrets.push([0; 32]);
529 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
530 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
533 secrets.push([0; 32]);
534 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
535 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
540 // insert_secret #1 incorrect
541 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::new(), &PublicKey::new(), 0, Script::new());
544 secrets.push([0; 32]);
545 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
546 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
549 secrets.push([0; 32]);
550 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
551 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().err,
552 "Previous secret did not match new one");
556 // insert_secret #2 incorrect (#1 derived from incorrect)
557 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::new(), &PublicKey::new(), 0, Script::new());
560 secrets.push([0; 32]);
561 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
562 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
565 secrets.push([0; 32]);
566 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("dddc3a8d14fddf2b68fa8c7fbad2748274937479dd0f8930d5ebb4ab6bd866a3").unwrap());
567 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
570 secrets.push([0; 32]);
571 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
572 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
575 secrets.push([0; 32]);
576 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
577 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().err,
578 "Previous secret did not match new one");
582 // insert_secret #3 incorrect
583 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::new(), &PublicKey::new(), 0, Script::new());
586 secrets.push([0; 32]);
587 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
588 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
591 secrets.push([0; 32]);
592 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
593 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
596 secrets.push([0; 32]);
597 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("c51a18b13e8527e579ec56365482c62f180b7d5760b46e9477dae59e87ed423a").unwrap());
598 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
601 secrets.push([0; 32]);
602 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
603 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().err,
604 "Previous secret did not match new one");
608 // insert_secret #4 incorrect (1,2,3 derived from incorrect)
609 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::new(), &PublicKey::new(), 0, Script::new());
612 secrets.push([0; 32]);
613 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
614 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
617 secrets.push([0; 32]);
618 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("dddc3a8d14fddf2b68fa8c7fbad2748274937479dd0f8930d5ebb4ab6bd866a3").unwrap());
619 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
622 secrets.push([0; 32]);
623 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("c51a18b13e8527e579ec56365482c62f180b7d5760b46e9477dae59e87ed423a").unwrap());
624 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
627 secrets.push([0; 32]);
628 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("ba65d7b0ef55a3ba300d4e87af29868f394f8f138d78a7011669c79b37b936f4").unwrap());
629 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
632 secrets.push([0; 32]);
633 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
634 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
637 secrets.push([0; 32]);
638 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
639 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
642 secrets.push([0; 32]);
643 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
644 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
647 secrets.push([0; 32]);
648 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
649 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().err,
650 "Previous secret did not match new one");
654 // insert_secret #5 incorrect
655 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::new(), &PublicKey::new(), 0, Script::new());
658 secrets.push([0; 32]);
659 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
660 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
663 secrets.push([0; 32]);
664 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
665 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
668 secrets.push([0; 32]);
669 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
670 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
673 secrets.push([0; 32]);
674 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
675 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
678 secrets.push([0; 32]);
679 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("631373ad5f9ef654bb3dade742d09504c567edd24320d2fcd68e3cc47e2ff6a6").unwrap());
680 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
683 secrets.push([0; 32]);
684 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
685 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().err,
686 "Previous secret did not match new one");
690 // insert_secret #6 incorrect (5 derived from incorrect)
691 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::new(), &PublicKey::new(), 0, Script::new());
694 secrets.push([0; 32]);
695 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
696 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
699 secrets.push([0; 32]);
700 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
701 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
704 secrets.push([0; 32]);
705 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
706 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
709 secrets.push([0; 32]);
710 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
711 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
714 secrets.push([0; 32]);
715 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("631373ad5f9ef654bb3dade742d09504c567edd24320d2fcd68e3cc47e2ff6a6").unwrap());
716 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
719 secrets.push([0; 32]);
720 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("b7e76a83668bde38b373970155c868a653304308f9896692f904a23731224bb1").unwrap());
721 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
724 secrets.push([0; 32]);
725 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
726 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
729 secrets.push([0; 32]);
730 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
731 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().err,
732 "Previous secret did not match new one");
736 // insert_secret #7 incorrect
737 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::new(), &PublicKey::new(), 0, Script::new());
740 secrets.push([0; 32]);
741 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
742 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
745 secrets.push([0; 32]);
746 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
747 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
750 secrets.push([0; 32]);
751 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
752 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
755 secrets.push([0; 32]);
756 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
757 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
760 secrets.push([0; 32]);
761 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
762 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
765 secrets.push([0; 32]);
766 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
767 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
770 secrets.push([0; 32]);
771 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("e7971de736e01da8ed58b94c2fc216cb1dca9e326f3a96e7194fe8ea8af6c0a3").unwrap());
772 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
775 secrets.push([0; 32]);
776 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
777 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().err,
778 "Previous secret did not match new one");
782 // insert_secret #8 incorrect
783 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::new(), &PublicKey::new(), 0, Script::new());
786 secrets.push([0; 32]);
787 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
788 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
791 secrets.push([0; 32]);
792 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
793 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
796 secrets.push([0; 32]);
797 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
798 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
801 secrets.push([0; 32]);
802 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
803 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
806 secrets.push([0; 32]);
807 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
808 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
811 secrets.push([0; 32]);
812 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
813 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
816 secrets.push([0; 32]);
817 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
818 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
821 secrets.push([0; 32]);
822 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("a7efbc61aac46d34f77778bac22c8a20c6a46ca460addc49009bda875ec88fa4").unwrap());
823 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().err,
824 "Previous secret did not match new one");