1 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
2 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxIn,TxOut,SigHashType,Transaction};
3 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
4 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Script;
5 use bitcoin::network::serialize;
6 use bitcoin::util::hash::Sha256dHash;
7 use bitcoin::util::bip143;
9 use crypto::digest::Digest;
11 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Message,Signature};
12 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
15 use ln::msgs::HandleError;
17 use ln::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment;
18 use chain::chaininterface::{ChainListener, ChainWatchInterface, BroadcasterInterface};
19 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
20 use util::sha2::Sha256;
23 use std::collections::HashMap;
24 use std::sync::{Arc,Mutex};
27 pub enum ChannelMonitorUpdateErr {
28 /// Used to indicate a temporary failure (eg connection to a watchtower failed, but is expected
29 /// to succeed at some point in the future).
30 /// Such a failure will "freeze" a channel, preventing us from revoking old states or
31 /// submitting new commitment transactions to the remote party.
32 /// ChannelManager::test_restore_channel_monitor can be used to retry the update(s) and restore
33 /// the channel to an operational state.
35 /// Used to indicate no further channel monitor updates will be allowed (eg we've moved on to a
36 /// different watchtower and cannot update with all watchtowers that were previously informed
37 /// of this channel). This will force-close the channel in question.
41 /// Simple trait indicating ability to track a set of ChannelMonitors and multiplex events between
42 /// them. Generally should be implemented by keeping a local SimpleManyChannelMonitor and passing
43 /// events to it, while also taking any add_update_monitor events and passing them to some remote
45 /// Note that any updates to a channel's monitor *must* be applied to each instance of the
46 /// channel's monitor everywhere (including remote watchtowers) *before* this function returns. If
47 /// an update occurs and a remote watchtower is left with old state, it may broadcast transactions
48 /// which we have revoked, allowing our counterparty to claim all funds in the channel!
49 pub trait ManyChannelMonitor: Send + Sync {
50 /// Adds or updates a monitor for the given `funding_txo`.
51 /// Implementor must also ensure that the funding_txo outpoint is registered with any relevant
52 /// ChainWatchInterfaces such that the provided monitor receives block_connected callbacks with
54 fn add_update_monitor(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr>;
57 /// A simple implementation of a ManyChannelMonitor and ChainListener. Can be used to create a
58 /// watchtower or watch our own channels.
59 /// Note that you must provide your own key by which to refer to channels.
60 /// If you're accepting remote monitors (ie are implementing a watchtower), you must verify that
61 /// users cannot overwrite a given channel by providing a duplicate key. ie you should probably
62 /// index by a PublicKey which is required to sign any updates.
63 /// If you're using this for local monitoring of your own channels, you probably want to use
64 /// `OutPoint` as the key, which will give you a ManyChannelMonitor implementation.
65 pub struct SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
66 monitors: Mutex<HashMap<Key, ChannelMonitor>>,
67 chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>,
68 broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>
71 impl<Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash> ChainListener for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
72 fn block_connected(&self, _header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], _indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) {
73 let monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
74 for monitor in monitors.values() {
75 let txn_outputs = monitor.block_connected(txn_matched, height, &*self.broadcaster);
76 for (ref txid, ref outputs) in txn_outputs {
77 for (idx, output) in outputs.iter().enumerate() {
78 self.chain_monitor.install_watch_outpoint((txid.clone(), idx as u32), &output.script_pubkey);
84 fn block_disconnected(&self, _: &BlockHeader) { }
87 impl<Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash + 'static> SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
88 pub fn new(chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>, broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>) -> Arc<SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key>> {
89 let res = Arc::new(SimpleManyChannelMonitor {
90 monitors: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
94 let weak_res = Arc::downgrade(&res);
95 res.chain_monitor.register_listener(weak_res);
99 pub fn add_update_monitor_by_key(&self, key: Key, monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
100 let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
101 match monitors.get_mut(&key) {
102 Some(orig_monitor) => return orig_monitor.insert_combine(monitor),
105 match &monitor.funding_txo {
106 &None => self.chain_monitor.watch_all_txn(),
107 &Some((ref outpoint, ref script)) => {
108 self.chain_monitor.install_watch_tx(&outpoint.txid, script);
109 self.chain_monitor.install_watch_outpoint((outpoint.txid, outpoint.index as u32), script);
112 monitors.insert(key, monitor);
117 impl ManyChannelMonitor for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<OutPoint> {
118 fn add_update_monitor(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr> {
119 match self.add_update_monitor_by_key(funding_txo, monitor) {
121 Err(_) => Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure),
126 /// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, don't try to claim it in a shared transaction,
127 /// instead claiming it in its own individual transaction.
128 const CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 12;
129 /// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, force-close the channel to broadcast the
130 /// HTLC-Success transaction.
131 const CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 6;
133 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
136 revocation_base_key: SecretKey,
137 htlc_base_key: SecretKey,
140 revocation_base_key: PublicKey,
141 htlc_base_key: PublicKey,
142 sigs: HashMap<Sha256dHash, Signature>,
146 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
147 struct LocalSignedTx {
148 /// txid of the transaction in tx, just used to make comparison faster
151 revocation_key: PublicKey,
152 a_htlc_key: PublicKey,
153 b_htlc_key: PublicKey,
154 delayed_payment_key: PublicKey,
156 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Signature, Signature)>,
159 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
160 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
162 pub struct ChannelMonitor {
163 funding_txo: Option<(OutPoint, Script)>,
164 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64,
166 key_storage: KeyStorage,
167 delayed_payment_base_key: PublicKey,
168 their_htlc_base_key: Option<PublicKey>,
169 their_delayed_payment_base_key: Option<PublicKey>,
170 // first is the idx of the first of the two revocation points
171 their_cur_revocation_points: Option<(u64, PublicKey, Option<PublicKey>)>,
173 our_to_self_delay: u16,
174 their_to_self_delay: Option<u16>,
176 old_secrets: [([u8; 32], u64); 49],
177 remote_claimable_outpoints: HashMap<Sha256dHash, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>>,
178 /// We cannot identify HTLC-Success or HTLC-Timeout transactions by themselves on the chain.
179 /// Nor can we figure out their commitment numbers without the commitment transaction they are
180 /// spending. Thus, in order to claim them via revocation key, we track all the remote
181 /// commitment transactions which we find on-chain, mapping them to the commitment number which
182 /// can be used to derive the revocation key and claim the transactions.
183 remote_commitment_txn_on_chain: Mutex<HashMap<Sha256dHash, u64>>,
184 /// Cache used to make pruning of payment_preimages faster.
185 /// Maps payment_hash values to commitment numbers for remote transactions for non-revoked
186 /// remote transactions (ie should remain pretty small).
187 /// Serialized to disk but should generally not be sent to Watchtowers.
188 remote_hash_commitment_number: HashMap<[u8; 32], u64>,
190 // We store two local commitment transactions to avoid any race conditions where we may update
191 // some monitors (potentially on watchtowers) but then fail to update others, resulting in the
192 // various monitors for one channel being out of sync, and us broadcasting a local
193 // transaction for which we have deleted claim information on some watchtowers.
194 prev_local_signed_commitment_tx: Option<LocalSignedTx>,
195 current_local_signed_commitment_tx: Option<LocalSignedTx>,
197 payment_preimages: HashMap<[u8; 32], [u8; 32]>,
199 destination_script: Script,
200 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>, //TODO: dedup this a bit...
202 impl Clone for ChannelMonitor {
203 fn clone(&self) -> Self {
205 funding_txo: self.funding_txo.clone(),
206 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor.clone(),
208 key_storage: self.key_storage.clone(),
209 delayed_payment_base_key: self.delayed_payment_base_key.clone(),
210 their_htlc_base_key: self.their_htlc_base_key.clone(),
211 their_delayed_payment_base_key: self.their_delayed_payment_base_key.clone(),
212 their_cur_revocation_points: self.their_cur_revocation_points.clone(),
214 our_to_self_delay: self.our_to_self_delay,
215 their_to_self_delay: self.their_to_self_delay,
217 old_secrets: self.old_secrets.clone(),
218 remote_claimable_outpoints: self.remote_claimable_outpoints.clone(),
219 remote_commitment_txn_on_chain: Mutex::new((*self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.lock().unwrap()).clone()),
220 remote_hash_commitment_number: self.remote_hash_commitment_number.clone(),
222 prev_local_signed_commitment_tx: self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.clone(),
223 current_local_signed_commitment_tx: self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx.clone(),
225 payment_preimages: self.payment_preimages.clone(),
227 destination_script: self.destination_script.clone(),
228 secp_ctx: self.secp_ctx.clone(),
233 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
234 /// Used only in testing and fuzztarget to check serialization roundtrips don't change the
235 /// underlying object
236 impl PartialEq for ChannelMonitor {
237 fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
238 if self.funding_txo != other.funding_txo ||
239 self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor != other.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor ||
240 self.key_storage != other.key_storage ||
241 self.delayed_payment_base_key != other.delayed_payment_base_key ||
242 self.their_htlc_base_key != other.their_htlc_base_key ||
243 self.their_delayed_payment_base_key != other.their_delayed_payment_base_key ||
244 self.their_cur_revocation_points != other.their_cur_revocation_points ||
245 self.our_to_self_delay != other.our_to_self_delay ||
246 self.their_to_self_delay != other.their_to_self_delay ||
247 self.remote_claimable_outpoints != other.remote_claimable_outpoints ||
248 self.remote_hash_commitment_number != other.remote_hash_commitment_number ||
249 self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx != other.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx ||
250 self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx != other.current_local_signed_commitment_tx ||
251 self.payment_preimages != other.payment_preimages ||
252 self.destination_script != other.destination_script
256 for (&(ref secret, ref idx), &(ref o_secret, ref o_idx)) in self.old_secrets.iter().zip(other.old_secrets.iter()) {
257 if secret != o_secret || idx != o_idx {
261 let us = self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.lock().unwrap();
262 let them = other.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.lock().unwrap();
268 impl ChannelMonitor {
269 pub fn new(revocation_base_key: &SecretKey, delayed_payment_base_key: &PublicKey, htlc_base_key: &SecretKey, our_to_self_delay: u16, destination_script: Script) -> ChannelMonitor {
272 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: 0,
274 key_storage: KeyStorage::PrivMode {
275 revocation_base_key: revocation_base_key.clone(),
276 htlc_base_key: htlc_base_key.clone(),
278 delayed_payment_base_key: delayed_payment_base_key.clone(),
279 their_htlc_base_key: None,
280 their_delayed_payment_base_key: None,
281 their_cur_revocation_points: None,
283 our_to_self_delay: our_to_self_delay,
284 their_to_self_delay: None,
286 old_secrets: [([0; 32], 1 << 48); 49],
287 remote_claimable_outpoints: HashMap::new(),
288 remote_commitment_txn_on_chain: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
289 remote_hash_commitment_number: HashMap::new(),
291 prev_local_signed_commitment_tx: None,
292 current_local_signed_commitment_tx: None,
294 payment_preimages: HashMap::new(),
296 destination_script: destination_script,
297 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
302 fn place_secret(idx: u64) -> u8 {
304 if idx & (1 << i) == (1 << i) {
312 fn derive_secret(secret: [u8; 32], bits: u8, idx: u64) -> [u8; 32] {
313 let mut res: [u8; 32] = secret;
315 let bitpos = bits - 1 - i;
316 if idx & (1 << bitpos) == (1 << bitpos) {
317 res[(bitpos / 8) as usize] ^= 1 << (bitpos & 7);
318 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
320 sha.result(&mut res);
326 /// Inserts a revocation secret into this channel monitor. Also optionally tracks the next
327 /// revocation point which may be required to claim HTLC outputs which we know the preimage of
328 /// in case the remote end force-closes using their latest state. Prunes old preimages if neither
329 /// needed by local commitment transactions HTCLs nor by remote ones. Unless we haven't already seen remote
330 /// commitment transaction's secret, they are de facto pruned (we can use revocation key).
331 pub(super) fn provide_secret(&mut self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32], their_next_revocation_point: Option<(u64, PublicKey)>) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
332 let pos = ChannelMonitor::place_secret(idx);
334 let (old_secret, old_idx) = self.old_secrets[i as usize];
335 if ChannelMonitor::derive_secret(secret, pos, old_idx) != old_secret {
336 return Err(HandleError{err: "Previous secret did not match new one", action: None})
339 self.old_secrets[pos as usize] = (secret, idx);
341 if let Some(new_revocation_point) = their_next_revocation_point {
342 match self.their_cur_revocation_points {
343 Some(old_points) => {
344 if old_points.0 == new_revocation_point.0 + 1 {
345 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0, old_points.1, Some(new_revocation_point.1)));
346 } else if old_points.0 == new_revocation_point.0 + 2 {
347 if let Some(old_second_point) = old_points.2 {
348 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0 - 1, old_second_point, Some(new_revocation_point.1)));
350 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((new_revocation_point.0, new_revocation_point.1, None));
353 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((new_revocation_point.0, new_revocation_point.1, None));
357 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((new_revocation_point.0, new_revocation_point.1, None));
362 if !self.payment_preimages.is_empty() {
363 let local_signed_commitment_tx = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx.as_ref().expect("Channel needs at least an initial commitment tx !");
364 let prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.as_ref();
365 let min_idx = self.get_min_seen_secret();
366 let remote_hash_commitment_number = &mut self.remote_hash_commitment_number;
368 self.payment_preimages.retain(|&k, _| {
369 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in &local_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs {
370 if k == htlc.payment_hash {
374 if let Some(prev_local_commitment_tx) = prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
375 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in prev_local_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
376 if k == htlc.payment_hash {
381 let contains = if let Some(cn) = remote_hash_commitment_number.get(&k) {
388 remote_hash_commitment_number.remove(&k);
397 /// Informs this monitor of the latest remote (ie non-broadcastable) commitment transaction.
398 /// The monitor watches for it to be broadcasted and then uses the HTLC information (and
399 /// possibly future revocation/preimage information) to claim outputs where possible.
400 /// We cache also the mapping hash:commitment number to lighten pruning of old preimages by watchtowers.
401 pub(super) fn provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, unsigned_commitment_tx: &Transaction, htlc_outputs: Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>, commitment_number: u64) {
402 // TODO: Encrypt the htlc_outputs data with the single-hash of the commitment transaction
403 // so that a remote monitor doesn't learn anything unless there is a malicious close.
404 // (only maybe, sadly we cant do the same for local info, as we need to be aware of
406 for htlc in &htlc_outputs {
407 self.remote_hash_commitment_number.insert(htlc.payment_hash, commitment_number);
409 self.remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(unsigned_commitment_tx.txid(), htlc_outputs);
412 /// Informs this monitor of the latest local (ie broadcastable) commitment transaction. The
413 /// monitor watches for timeouts and may broadcast it if we approach such a timeout. Thus, it
414 /// is important that any clones of this channel monitor (including remote clones) by kept
415 /// up-to-date as our local commitment transaction is updated.
416 /// Panics if set_their_to_self_delay has never been called.
417 pub(super) fn provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, signed_commitment_tx: Transaction, local_keys: chan_utils::TxCreationKeys, feerate_per_kw: u64, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Signature, Signature)>) {
418 assert!(self.their_to_self_delay.is_some());
419 self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx.take();
420 self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(LocalSignedTx {
421 txid: signed_commitment_tx.txid(),
422 tx: signed_commitment_tx,
423 revocation_key: local_keys.revocation_key,
424 a_htlc_key: local_keys.a_htlc_key,
425 b_htlc_key: local_keys.b_htlc_key,
426 delayed_payment_key: local_keys.a_delayed_payment_key,
432 /// Provides a payment_hash->payment_preimage mapping. Will be automatically pruned when all
433 /// commitment_tx_infos which contain the payment hash have been revoked.
434 pub(super) fn provide_payment_preimage(&mut self, payment_hash: &[u8; 32], payment_preimage: &[u8; 32]) {
435 self.payment_preimages.insert(payment_hash.clone(), payment_preimage.clone());
438 pub fn insert_combine(&mut self, mut other: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
439 if self.funding_txo.is_some() {
440 // We should be able to compare the entire funding_txo, but in fuzztarget its trivially
441 // easy to collide the funding_txo hash and have a different scriptPubKey.
442 if other.funding_txo.is_some() && other.funding_txo.as_ref().unwrap().0 != self.funding_txo.as_ref().unwrap().0 {
443 return Err(HandleError{err: "Funding transaction outputs are not identical!", action: None});
446 self.funding_txo = other.funding_txo.take();
448 let other_min_secret = other.get_min_seen_secret();
449 let our_min_secret = self.get_min_seen_secret();
450 if our_min_secret > other_min_secret {
451 self.provide_secret(other_min_secret, other.get_secret(other_min_secret).unwrap(), None)?;
453 if our_min_secret >= other_min_secret {
454 self.their_cur_revocation_points = other.their_cur_revocation_points;
455 for (txid, htlcs) in other.remote_claimable_outpoints.drain() {
456 self.remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, htlcs);
458 if let Some(local_tx) = other.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
459 self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(local_tx);
461 if let Some(local_tx) = other.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
462 self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(local_tx);
464 self.payment_preimages = other.payment_preimages;
469 /// Panics if commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor doesn't fit in 48 bits
470 pub(super) fn set_commitment_obscure_factor(&mut self, commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64) {
471 assert!(commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor < (1 << 48));
472 self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor = commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor;
475 /// Allows this monitor to scan only for transactions which are applicable. Note that this is
476 /// optional, without it this monitor cannot be used in an SPV client, but you may wish to
477 /// avoid this (or call unset_funding_info) on a monitor you wish to send to a watchtower as it
478 /// provides slightly better privacy.
479 /// It's the responsibility of the caller to register outpoint and script with passing the former
480 /// value as key to add_update_monitor.
481 pub(super) fn set_funding_info(&mut self, funding_info: (OutPoint, Script)) {
482 self.funding_txo = Some(funding_info);
485 /// We log these base keys at channel opening to being able to rebuild redeemscript in case of leaked revoked commit tx
486 pub(super) fn set_their_base_keys(&mut self, their_htlc_base_key: &PublicKey, their_delayed_payment_base_key: &PublicKey) {
487 self.their_htlc_base_key = Some(their_htlc_base_key.clone());
488 self.their_delayed_payment_base_key = Some(their_delayed_payment_base_key.clone());
491 pub(super) fn set_their_to_self_delay(&mut self, their_to_self_delay: u16) {
492 self.their_to_self_delay = Some(their_to_self_delay);
495 pub(super) fn unset_funding_info(&mut self) {
496 self.funding_txo = None;
499 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
500 match self.funding_txo {
501 Some((outpoint, _)) => Some(outpoint),
506 /// Serializes into a vec, with various modes for the exposed pub fns
507 fn serialize(&self, for_local_storage: bool) -> Vec<u8> {
508 let mut res = Vec::new();
509 res.push(SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
510 res.push(MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
512 match &self.funding_txo {
513 &Some((ref outpoint, ref script)) => {
514 res.extend_from_slice(&outpoint.txid[..]);
515 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(outpoint.index));
516 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(script.len() as u64));
517 res.extend_from_slice(&script[..]);
520 // We haven't even been initialized...not sure why anyone is serializing us, but
521 // not much to give them.
526 // Set in initial Channel-object creation, so should always be set by now:
527 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor));
529 match self.key_storage {
530 KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key } => {
532 res.extend_from_slice(&revocation_base_key[..]);
533 res.extend_from_slice(&htlc_base_key[..]);
535 KeyStorage::SigsMode { .. } => unimplemented!(),
538 res.extend_from_slice(&self.delayed_payment_base_key.serialize());
539 res.extend_from_slice(&self.their_htlc_base_key.as_ref().unwrap().serialize());
540 res.extend_from_slice(&self.their_delayed_payment_base_key.as_ref().unwrap().serialize());
542 match self.their_cur_revocation_points {
543 Some((idx, pubkey, second_option)) => {
544 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(idx));
545 res.extend_from_slice(&pubkey.serialize());
546 match second_option {
547 Some(second_pubkey) => {
548 res.extend_from_slice(&second_pubkey.serialize());
551 res.extend_from_slice(&[0; 33]);
556 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(0));
560 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.our_to_self_delay));
561 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap()));
563 for &(ref secret, ref idx) in self.old_secrets.iter() {
564 res.extend_from_slice(secret);
565 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*idx));
568 macro_rules! serialize_htlc_in_commitment {
569 ($htlc_output: expr) => {
570 res.push($htlc_output.offered as u8);
571 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc_output.amount_msat));
572 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array($htlc_output.cltv_expiry));
573 res.extend_from_slice(&$htlc_output.payment_hash);
574 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array($htlc_output.transaction_output_index));
578 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_claimable_outpoints.len() as u64));
579 for (txid, htlc_outputs) in self.remote_claimable_outpoints.iter() {
580 res.extend_from_slice(&txid[..]);
581 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc_outputs.len() as u64));
582 for htlc_output in htlc_outputs.iter() {
583 serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output);
588 let remote_commitment_txn_on_chain = self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.lock().unwrap();
589 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.len() as u64));
590 for (txid, commitment_number) in remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
591 res.extend_from_slice(&txid[..]);
592 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(*commitment_number));
596 if for_local_storage {
597 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_hash_commitment_number.len() as u64));
598 for (payment_hash, commitment_number) in self.remote_hash_commitment_number.iter() {
599 res.extend_from_slice(payment_hash);
600 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(*commitment_number));
603 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(0));
606 macro_rules! serialize_local_tx {
607 ($local_tx: expr) => {
608 let tx_ser = serialize::serialize(&$local_tx.tx).unwrap();
609 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(tx_ser.len() as u64));
610 res.extend_from_slice(&tx_ser);
612 res.extend_from_slice(&$local_tx.revocation_key.serialize());
613 res.extend_from_slice(&$local_tx.a_htlc_key.serialize());
614 res.extend_from_slice(&$local_tx.b_htlc_key.serialize());
615 res.extend_from_slice(&$local_tx.delayed_payment_key.serialize());
617 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($local_tx.feerate_per_kw));
618 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($local_tx.htlc_outputs.len() as u64));
619 for &(ref htlc_output, ref their_sig, ref our_sig) in $local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
620 serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output);
621 res.extend_from_slice(&their_sig.serialize_compact(&self.secp_ctx));
622 res.extend_from_slice(&our_sig.serialize_compact(&self.secp_ctx));
627 if let Some(ref prev_local_tx) = self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
629 serialize_local_tx!(prev_local_tx);
634 if let Some(ref cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
636 serialize_local_tx!(cur_local_tx);
641 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.payment_preimages.len() as u64));
642 for payment_preimage in self.payment_preimages.values() {
643 res.extend_from_slice(payment_preimage);
646 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.destination_script.len() as u64));
647 res.extend_from_slice(&self.destination_script[..]);
652 /// Encodes this monitor into a byte array, suitable for writing to disk.
653 pub fn serialize_for_disk(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
657 /// Encodes this monitor into a byte array, suitable for sending to a remote watchtower
658 pub fn serialize_for_watchtower(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
659 self.serialize(false)
662 /// Attempts to decode a serialized monitor
663 pub fn deserialize(data: &[u8]) -> Option<Self> {
664 let mut read_pos = 0;
665 macro_rules! read_bytes {
666 ($byte_count: expr) => {
668 if ($byte_count as usize) > data.len() - read_pos {
671 read_pos += $byte_count as usize;
672 &data[read_pos - $byte_count as usize..read_pos]
677 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
678 macro_rules! unwrap_obj {
682 Err(_) => return None,
687 let _ver = read_bytes!(1)[0];
688 let min_ver = read_bytes!(1)[0];
689 if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION {
693 // Technically this can fail and serialize fail a round-trip, but only for serialization of
694 // barely-init'd ChannelMonitors that we can't do anything with.
695 let outpoint = OutPoint {
696 txid: Sha256dHash::from(read_bytes!(32)),
697 index: byte_utils::slice_to_be16(read_bytes!(2)),
699 let script_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8));
700 let funding_txo = Some((outpoint, Script::from(read_bytes!(script_len).to_vec())));
701 let commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor = byte_utils::slice_to_be48(read_bytes!(6));
703 let key_storage = match read_bytes!(1)[0] {
705 KeyStorage::PrivMode {
706 revocation_base_key: unwrap_obj!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(32))),
707 htlc_base_key: unwrap_obj!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(32))),
713 let delayed_payment_base_key = unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(33)));
714 let their_htlc_base_key = Some(unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(33))));
715 let their_delayed_payment_base_key = Some(unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(33))));
717 let their_cur_revocation_points = {
718 let first_idx = byte_utils::slice_to_be48(read_bytes!(6));
722 let first_point = unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(33)));
723 let second_point_slice = read_bytes!(33);
724 if second_point_slice[0..32] == [0; 32] && second_point_slice[32] == 0 {
725 Some((first_idx, first_point, None))
727 Some((first_idx, first_point, Some(unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, second_point_slice)))))
732 let our_to_self_delay = byte_utils::slice_to_be16(read_bytes!(2));
733 let their_to_self_delay = Some(byte_utils::slice_to_be16(read_bytes!(2)));
735 let mut old_secrets = [([0; 32], 1 << 48); 49];
736 for &mut (ref mut secret, ref mut idx) in old_secrets.iter_mut() {
737 secret.copy_from_slice(read_bytes!(32));
738 *idx = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8));
741 macro_rules! read_htlc_in_commitment {
744 let offered = match read_bytes!(1)[0] {
745 0 => false, 1 => true,
748 let amount_msat = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8));
749 let cltv_expiry = byte_utils::slice_to_be32(read_bytes!(4));
750 let mut payment_hash = [0; 32];
751 payment_hash[..].copy_from_slice(read_bytes!(32));
752 let transaction_output_index = byte_utils::slice_to_be32(read_bytes!(4));
754 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
755 offered, amount_msat, cltv_expiry, payment_hash, transaction_output_index
761 let remote_claimable_outpoints_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8));
762 if remote_claimable_outpoints_len > data.len() as u64 / 64 { return None; }
763 let mut remote_claimable_outpoints = HashMap::with_capacity(remote_claimable_outpoints_len as usize);
764 for _ in 0..remote_claimable_outpoints_len {
765 let txid = Sha256dHash::from(read_bytes!(32));
766 let outputs_count = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8));
767 if outputs_count > data.len() as u64 / 32 { return None; }
768 let mut outputs = Vec::with_capacity(outputs_count as usize);
769 for _ in 0..outputs_count {
770 outputs.push(read_htlc_in_commitment!());
772 if let Some(_) = remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, outputs) {
777 let remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8));
778 if remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len > data.len() as u64 / 32 { return None; }
779 let mut remote_commitment_txn_on_chain = HashMap::with_capacity(remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len as usize);
780 for _ in 0..remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len {
781 let txid = Sha256dHash::from(read_bytes!(32));
782 let commitment_number = byte_utils::slice_to_be48(read_bytes!(6));
783 if let Some(_) = remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(txid, commitment_number) {
788 let remote_hash_commitment_number_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8));
789 if remote_hash_commitment_number_len > data.len() as u64 / 32 { return None; }
790 let mut remote_hash_commitment_number = HashMap::with_capacity(remote_hash_commitment_number_len as usize);
791 for _ in 0..remote_hash_commitment_number_len {
792 let mut txid = [0; 32];
793 txid[..].copy_from_slice(read_bytes!(32));
794 let commitment_number = byte_utils::slice_to_be48(read_bytes!(6));
795 if let Some(_) = remote_hash_commitment_number.insert(txid, commitment_number) {
800 macro_rules! read_local_tx {
803 let tx_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8));
804 let tx_ser = read_bytes!(tx_len);
805 let tx: Transaction = unwrap_obj!(serialize::deserialize(tx_ser));
806 if serialize::serialize(&tx).unwrap() != tx_ser {
807 // We check that the tx re-serializes to the same form to ensure there is
808 // no extra data, and as rust-bitcoin doesn't handle the 0-input ambiguity
813 let revocation_key = unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(33)));
814 let a_htlc_key = unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(33)));
815 let b_htlc_key = unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(33)));
816 let delayed_payment_key = unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(33)));
817 let feerate_per_kw = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8));
819 let htlc_outputs_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8));
820 if htlc_outputs_len > data.len() as u64 / 128 { return None; }
821 let mut htlc_outputs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_outputs_len as usize);
822 for _ in 0..htlc_outputs_len {
823 htlc_outputs.push((read_htlc_in_commitment!(),
824 unwrap_obj!(Signature::from_compact(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(64))),
825 unwrap_obj!(Signature::from_compact(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(64)))));
830 tx, revocation_key, a_htlc_key, b_htlc_key, delayed_payment_key, feerate_per_kw, htlc_outputs
836 let prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = match read_bytes!(1)[0] {
839 Some(read_local_tx!())
844 let current_local_signed_commitment_tx = match read_bytes!(1)[0] {
847 Some(read_local_tx!())
852 let payment_preimages_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8));
853 if payment_preimages_len > data.len() as u64 / 32 { return None; }
854 let mut payment_preimages = HashMap::with_capacity(payment_preimages_len as usize);
855 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
856 for _ in 0..payment_preimages_len {
857 let mut preimage = [0; 32];
858 preimage[..].copy_from_slice(read_bytes!(32));
860 sha.input(&preimage);
861 let mut hash = [0; 32];
862 sha.result(&mut hash);
863 if let Some(_) = payment_preimages.insert(hash, preimage) {
868 let destination_script_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8));
869 let destination_script = Script::from(read_bytes!(destination_script_len).to_vec());
871 Some(ChannelMonitor {
873 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor,
876 delayed_payment_base_key,
878 their_delayed_payment_base_key,
879 their_cur_revocation_points,
885 remote_claimable_outpoints,
886 remote_commitment_txn_on_chain: Mutex::new(remote_commitment_txn_on_chain),
887 remote_hash_commitment_number,
889 prev_local_signed_commitment_tx,
890 current_local_signed_commitment_tx,
899 //TODO: Functions to serialize/deserialize (with different forms depending on which information
900 //we want to leave out (eg funding_txo, etc).
902 /// Can only fail if idx is < get_min_seen_secret
903 pub fn get_secret(&self, idx: u64) -> Result<[u8; 32], HandleError> {
904 for i in 0..self.old_secrets.len() {
905 if (idx & (!((1 << i) - 1))) == self.old_secrets[i].1 {
906 return Ok(ChannelMonitor::derive_secret(self.old_secrets[i].0, i as u8, idx))
909 assert!(idx < self.get_min_seen_secret());
910 Err(HandleError{err: "idx too low", action: None})
913 pub fn get_min_seen_secret(&self) -> u64 {
914 //TODO This can be optimized?
915 let mut min = 1 << 48;
916 for &(_, idx) in self.old_secrets.iter() {
924 /// Attempts to claim a remote commitment transaction's outputs using the revocation key and
925 /// data in remote_claimable_outpoints. Will directly claim any HTLC outputs which expire at a
926 /// height > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER. In any case, will install monitoring for
927 /// HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions.
928 fn check_spend_remote_transaction(&self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32) -> (Vec<Transaction>, (Sha256dHash, Vec<TxOut>)) {
929 // Most secp and related errors trying to create keys means we have no hope of constructing
930 // a spend transaction...so we return no transactions to broadcast
931 let mut txn_to_broadcast = Vec::new();
932 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
934 let commitment_txid = tx.txid(); //TODO: This is gonna be a performance bottleneck for watchtowers!
935 let per_commitment_option = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(&commitment_txid);
937 macro_rules! ignore_error {
938 ( $thing : expr ) => {
941 Err(_) => return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs))
946 let commitment_number = 0xffffffffffff - ((((tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor);
947 if commitment_number >= self.get_min_seen_secret() {
948 let secret = self.get_secret(commitment_number).unwrap();
949 let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &secret));
950 let (revocation_pubkey, b_htlc_key) = match self.key_storage {
951 KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key } => {
952 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
953 (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_base_key))),
954 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &htlc_base_key))))
956 KeyStorage::SigsMode { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
957 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
958 (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &revocation_base_key)),
959 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &htlc_base_key)))
962 let delayed_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key), &self.delayed_payment_base_key));
963 let a_htlc_key = match self.their_htlc_base_key {
964 None => return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs)),
965 Some(their_htlc_base_key) => ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key), &their_htlc_base_key)),
968 let revokeable_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey, self.our_to_self_delay, &delayed_key);
969 let revokeable_p2wsh = revokeable_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
971 let mut total_value = 0;
972 let mut values = Vec::new();
973 let mut inputs = Vec::new();
974 let mut htlc_idxs = Vec::new();
976 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
977 if outp.script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh {
979 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
980 txid: commitment_txid,
983 script_sig: Script::new(),
984 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
987 htlc_idxs.push(None);
988 values.push(outp.value);
989 total_value += outp.value;
990 break; // There can only be one of these
994 macro_rules! sign_input {
995 ($sighash_parts: expr, $input: expr, $htlc_idx: expr, $amount: expr) => {
997 let (sig, redeemscript) = match self.key_storage {
998 KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
999 let redeemscript = if $htlc_idx.is_none() { revokeable_redeemscript.clone() } else {
1000 let htlc = &per_commitment_option.unwrap()[$htlc_idx.unwrap()];
1001 chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey)
1003 let sighash = ignore_error!(Message::from_slice(&$sighash_parts.sighash_all(&$input, &redeemscript, $amount)[..]));
1004 let revocation_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key, &revocation_base_key));
1005 (self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &revocation_key), redeemscript)
1007 KeyStorage::SigsMode { .. } => {
1011 $input.witness.push(sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
1012 $input.witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1013 if $htlc_idx.is_none() {
1014 $input.witness.push(vec!(1));
1016 $input.witness.push(revocation_pubkey.serialize().to_vec());
1018 $input.witness.push(redeemscript.into_bytes());
1023 if let Some(per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
1024 inputs.reserve_exact(per_commitment_data.len());
1026 for (idx, htlc) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() {
1027 let expected_script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey);
1028 if htlc.transaction_output_index as usize >= tx.output.len() ||
1029 tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 ||
1030 tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].script_pubkey != expected_script.to_v0_p2wsh() {
1031 return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs)); // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user
1034 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
1035 txid: commitment_txid,
1036 vout: htlc.transaction_output_index,
1038 script_sig: Script::new(),
1039 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
1040 witness: Vec::new(),
1042 if htlc.cltv_expiry > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER {
1044 htlc_idxs.push(Some(idx));
1045 values.push(tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].value);
1046 total_value += htlc.amount_msat / 1000;
1048 let mut single_htlc_tx = Transaction {
1052 output: vec!(TxOut {
1053 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1054 value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000, //TODO: - fee
1057 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&single_htlc_tx);
1058 sign_input!(sighash_parts, single_htlc_tx.input[0], Some(idx), htlc.amount_msat / 1000);
1059 txn_to_broadcast.push(single_htlc_tx); // TODO: This is not yet tested in ChannelManager!
1064 if !inputs.is_empty() || !txn_to_broadcast.is_empty() { // ie we're confident this is actually ours
1065 // We're definitely a remote commitment transaction!
1066 watch_outputs.append(&mut tx.output.clone());
1067 self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.lock().unwrap().insert(commitment_txid, commitment_number);
1069 if inputs.is_empty() { return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs)); } // Nothing to be done...probably a false positive/local tx
1071 let outputs = vec!(TxOut {
1072 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1073 value: total_value, //TODO: - fee
1075 let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
1082 let mut values_drain = values.drain(..);
1083 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx);
1085 for (input, htlc_idx) in spend_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(htlc_idxs.iter()) {
1086 let value = values_drain.next().unwrap();
1087 sign_input!(sighash_parts, input, htlc_idx, value);
1090 txn_to_broadcast.push(spend_tx);
1091 } else if let Some(per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
1092 // While this isn't useful yet, there is a potential race where if a counterparty
1093 // revokes a state at the same time as the commitment transaction for that state is
1094 // confirmed, and the watchtower receives the block before the user, the user could
1095 // upload a new ChannelMonitor with the revocation secret but the watchtower has
1096 // already processed the block, resulting in the remote_commitment_txn_on_chain entry
1097 // not being generated by the above conditional. Thus, to be safe, we go ahead and
1099 watch_outputs.append(&mut tx.output.clone());
1100 self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.lock().unwrap().insert(commitment_txid, commitment_number);
1102 if let Some(revocation_points) = self.their_cur_revocation_points {
1103 let revocation_point_option =
1104 if revocation_points.0 == commitment_number { Some(&revocation_points.1) }
1105 else if let Some(point) = revocation_points.2.as_ref() {
1106 if revocation_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 { Some(point) } else { None }
1108 if let Some(revocation_point) = revocation_point_option {
1109 let (revocation_pubkey, b_htlc_key) = match self.key_storage {
1110 KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key } => {
1111 (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_base_key))),
1112 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &htlc_base_key))))
1114 KeyStorage::SigsMode { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
1115 (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &revocation_base_key)),
1116 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &htlc_base_key)))
1119 let a_htlc_key = match self.their_htlc_base_key {
1120 None => return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs)),
1121 Some(their_htlc_base_key) => ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &their_htlc_base_key)),
1124 let mut total_value = 0;
1125 let mut values = Vec::new();
1126 let mut inputs = Vec::new();
1128 macro_rules! sign_input {
1129 ($sighash_parts: expr, $input: expr, $amount: expr, $preimage: expr) => {
1131 let (sig, redeemscript) = match self.key_storage {
1132 KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
1133 let htlc = &per_commitment_option.unwrap()[$input.sequence as usize];
1134 let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey);
1135 let sighash = ignore_error!(Message::from_slice(&$sighash_parts.sighash_all(&$input, &redeemscript, $amount)[..]));
1136 let htlc_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &htlc_base_key));
1137 (self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &htlc_key), redeemscript)
1139 KeyStorage::SigsMode { .. } => {
1143 $input.witness.push(sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
1144 $input.witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1145 $input.witness.push($preimage);
1146 $input.witness.push(redeemscript.into_bytes());
1151 for (idx, htlc) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() {
1152 if let Some(payment_preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
1154 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
1155 txid: commitment_txid,
1156 vout: htlc.transaction_output_index,
1158 script_sig: Script::new(),
1159 sequence: idx as u32, // reset to 0xfffffffd in sign_input
1160 witness: Vec::new(),
1162 if htlc.cltv_expiry > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER {
1164 values.push((tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].value, payment_preimage));
1165 total_value += htlc.amount_msat / 1000;
1167 let mut single_htlc_tx = Transaction {
1171 output: vec!(TxOut {
1172 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1173 value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000, //TODO: - fee
1176 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&single_htlc_tx);
1177 sign_input!(sighash_parts, single_htlc_tx.input[0], htlc.amount_msat / 1000, payment_preimage.to_vec());
1178 txn_to_broadcast.push(single_htlc_tx);
1183 if inputs.is_empty() { return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs)); } // Nothing to be done...probably a false positive/local tx
1185 let outputs = vec!(TxOut {
1186 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1187 value: total_value, //TODO: - fee
1189 let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
1196 let mut values_drain = values.drain(..);
1197 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx);
1199 for input in spend_tx.input.iter_mut() {
1200 let value = values_drain.next().unwrap();
1201 sign_input!(sighash_parts, input, value.0, value.1.to_vec());
1204 txn_to_broadcast.push(spend_tx);
1209 (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs))
1212 /// Attempst to claim a remote HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout s outputs using the revocation key
1213 fn check_spend_remote_htlc(&self, tx: &Transaction, commitment_number: u64) -> Option<Transaction> {
1214 let htlc_txid = tx.txid(); //TODO: This is gonna be a performance bottleneck for watchtowers!
1216 macro_rules! ignore_error {
1217 ( $thing : expr ) => {
1220 Err(_) => return None
1225 let secret = ignore_error!(self.get_secret(commitment_number));
1226 let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &secret));
1227 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
1228 let revocation_pubkey = match self.key_storage {
1229 KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
1230 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_base_key)))
1232 KeyStorage::SigsMode { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
1233 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &revocation_base_key))
1236 let delayed_key = match self.their_delayed_payment_base_key {
1237 None => return None,
1238 Some(their_delayed_payment_base_key) => ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &their_delayed_payment_base_key)),
1240 let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), &delayed_key);
1241 let revokeable_p2wsh = redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
1243 let mut inputs = Vec::new();
1246 if tx.output[0].script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh { //HTLC transactions have one txin, one txout
1248 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
1252 script_sig: Script::new(),
1253 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
1254 witness: Vec::new(),
1256 amount = tx.output[0].value;
1259 if !inputs.is_empty() {
1260 let outputs = vec!(TxOut {
1261 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1262 value: amount, //TODO: - fee
1265 let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
1272 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx);
1274 let sig = match self.key_storage {
1275 KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
1276 let sighash = ignore_error!(Message::from_slice(&sighash_parts.sighash_all(&spend_tx.input[0], &redeemscript, amount)[..]));
1277 let revocation_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key, &revocation_base_key));
1278 self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &revocation_key)
1280 KeyStorage::SigsMode { .. } => {
1284 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
1285 spend_tx.input[0].witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1286 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(vec!(1));
1287 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(redeemscript.into_bytes());
1293 fn broadcast_by_local_state(&self, local_tx: &LocalSignedTx) -> Vec<Transaction> {
1294 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
1296 for &(ref htlc, ref their_sig, ref our_sig) in local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1298 let mut htlc_timeout_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&local_tx.txid, local_tx.feerate_per_kw, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), htlc, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key, &local_tx.revocation_key);
1300 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
1302 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(their_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
1303 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1304 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
1305 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1307 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new());
1308 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &local_tx.a_htlc_key, &local_tx.b_htlc_key, &local_tx.revocation_key).into_bytes());
1310 res.push(htlc_timeout_tx);
1312 if let Some(payment_preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
1313 let mut htlc_success_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&local_tx.txid, local_tx.feerate_per_kw, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), htlc, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key, &local_tx.revocation_key);
1315 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
1317 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(their_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
1318 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1319 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
1320 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1322 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(payment_preimage.to_vec());
1323 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &local_tx.a_htlc_key, &local_tx.b_htlc_key, &local_tx.revocation_key).into_bytes());
1325 res.push(htlc_success_tx);
1333 /// Attempts to claim any claimable HTLCs in a commitment transaction which was not (yet)
1334 /// revoked using data in local_claimable_outpoints.
1335 /// Should not be used if check_spend_revoked_transaction succeeds.
1336 fn check_spend_local_transaction(&self, tx: &Transaction, _height: u32) -> Vec<Transaction> {
1337 let commitment_txid = tx.txid();
1338 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1339 if local_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
1340 return self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx);
1343 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1344 if local_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
1345 return self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx);
1351 fn block_connected(&self, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], height: u32, broadcaster: &BroadcasterInterface)-> Vec<(Sha256dHash, Vec<TxOut>)> {
1352 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
1353 for tx in txn_matched {
1354 if tx.input.len() == 1 {
1355 // Assuming our keys were not leaked (in which case we're screwed no matter what),
1356 // commitment transactions and HTLC transactions will all only ever have one input,
1357 // which is an easy way to filter out any potential non-matching txn for lazy
1359 let prevout = &tx.input[0].previous_output;
1360 let mut txn: Vec<Transaction> = Vec::new();
1361 if self.funding_txo.is_none() || (prevout.txid == self.funding_txo.as_ref().unwrap().0.txid && prevout.vout == self.funding_txo.as_ref().unwrap().0.index as u32) {
1362 let (remote_txn, new_outputs) = self.check_spend_remote_transaction(tx, height);
1364 if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() {
1365 watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
1368 txn = self.check_spend_local_transaction(tx, height);
1371 let remote_commitment_txn_on_chain = self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.lock().unwrap();
1372 if let Some(commitment_number) = remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.get(&prevout.txid) {
1373 if let Some(tx) = self.check_spend_remote_htlc(tx, *commitment_number) {
1378 for tx in txn.iter() {
1379 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(tx);
1383 if let Some(ref cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1384 let mut needs_broadcast = false;
1385 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in cur_local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1386 if htlc.cltv_expiry <= height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER {
1387 if htlc.offered || self.payment_preimages.contains_key(&htlc.payment_hash) {
1388 needs_broadcast = true;
1393 if needs_broadcast {
1394 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&cur_local_tx.tx);
1395 for tx in self.broadcast_by_local_state(&cur_local_tx) {
1396 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
1403 pub fn would_broadcast_at_height(&self, height: u32) -> bool {
1404 if let Some(ref cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1405 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in cur_local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1406 if htlc.cltv_expiry <= height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER {
1407 if htlc.offered || self.payment_preimages.contains_key(&htlc.payment_hash) {
1419 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Script;
1420 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
1421 use crypto::digest::Digest;
1423 use ln::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor;
1424 use ln::chan_utils::{HTLCOutputInCommitment, TxCreationKeys};
1425 use util::sha2::Sha256;
1426 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
1427 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1, Signature};
1428 use rand::{thread_rng,Rng};
1431 fn test_per_commitment_storage() {
1432 // Test vectors from BOLT 3:
1433 let mut secrets: Vec<[u8; 32]> = Vec::new();
1434 let mut monitor: ChannelMonitor;
1435 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1437 macro_rules! test_secrets {
1439 let mut idx = 281474976710655;
1440 for secret in secrets.iter() {
1441 assert_eq!(monitor.get_secret(idx).unwrap(), *secret);
1444 assert_eq!(monitor.get_min_seen_secret(), idx + 1);
1445 assert!(monitor.get_secret(idx).is_err());
1449 let delayed_payment_base_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap());
1452 // insert_secret correct sequence
1453 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &delayed_payment_base_key, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
1456 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1457 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1458 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1461 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1462 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1463 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1466 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1467 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1468 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1471 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1472 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1473 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1476 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1477 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
1478 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1481 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1482 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
1483 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1486 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1487 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
1488 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1491 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1492 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
1493 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1498 // insert_secret #1 incorrect
1499 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &delayed_payment_base_key, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
1502 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1503 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
1504 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1507 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1508 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1509 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err,
1510 "Previous secret did not match new one");
1514 // insert_secret #2 incorrect (#1 derived from incorrect)
1515 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &delayed_payment_base_key, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
1518 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1519 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
1520 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1523 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1524 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("dddc3a8d14fddf2b68fa8c7fbad2748274937479dd0f8930d5ebb4ab6bd866a3").unwrap());
1525 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1528 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1529 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1530 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1533 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1534 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1535 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err,
1536 "Previous secret did not match new one");
1540 // insert_secret #3 incorrect
1541 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &delayed_payment_base_key, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
1544 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1545 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1546 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1549 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1550 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1551 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1554 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1555 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c51a18b13e8527e579ec56365482c62f180b7d5760b46e9477dae59e87ed423a").unwrap());
1556 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1559 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1560 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1561 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err,
1562 "Previous secret did not match new one");
1566 // insert_secret #4 incorrect (1,2,3 derived from incorrect)
1567 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &delayed_payment_base_key, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
1570 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1571 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
1572 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1575 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1576 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("dddc3a8d14fddf2b68fa8c7fbad2748274937479dd0f8930d5ebb4ab6bd866a3").unwrap());
1577 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1580 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1581 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c51a18b13e8527e579ec56365482c62f180b7d5760b46e9477dae59e87ed423a").unwrap());
1582 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1585 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1586 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("ba65d7b0ef55a3ba300d4e87af29868f394f8f138d78a7011669c79b37b936f4").unwrap());
1587 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1590 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1591 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
1592 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1595 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1596 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
1597 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1600 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1601 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
1602 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1605 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1606 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
1607 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err,
1608 "Previous secret did not match new one");
1612 // insert_secret #5 incorrect
1613 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &delayed_payment_base_key, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
1616 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1617 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1618 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1621 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1622 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1623 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1626 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1627 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1628 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1631 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1632 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1633 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1636 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1637 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("631373ad5f9ef654bb3dade742d09504c567edd24320d2fcd68e3cc47e2ff6a6").unwrap());
1638 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1641 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1642 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
1643 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err,
1644 "Previous secret did not match new one");
1648 // insert_secret #6 incorrect (5 derived from incorrect)
1649 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &delayed_payment_base_key, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
1652 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1653 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1654 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1657 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1658 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1659 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1662 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1663 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1664 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1667 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1668 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1669 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1672 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1673 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("631373ad5f9ef654bb3dade742d09504c567edd24320d2fcd68e3cc47e2ff6a6").unwrap());
1674 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1677 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1678 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("b7e76a83668bde38b373970155c868a653304308f9896692f904a23731224bb1").unwrap());
1679 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1682 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1683 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
1684 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1687 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1688 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
1689 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err,
1690 "Previous secret did not match new one");
1694 // insert_secret #7 incorrect
1695 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &delayed_payment_base_key, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
1698 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1699 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1700 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1703 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1704 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1705 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1708 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1709 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1710 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1713 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1714 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1715 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1718 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1719 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
1720 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1723 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1724 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
1725 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1728 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1729 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("e7971de736e01da8ed58b94c2fc216cb1dca9e326f3a96e7194fe8ea8af6c0a3").unwrap());
1730 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1733 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1734 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
1735 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err,
1736 "Previous secret did not match new one");
1740 // insert_secret #8 incorrect
1741 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &delayed_payment_base_key, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
1744 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1745 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1746 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1749 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1750 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1751 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1754 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1755 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1756 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1759 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1760 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1761 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1764 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1765 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
1766 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1769 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1770 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
1771 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1774 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1775 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
1776 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1779 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1780 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a7efbc61aac46d34f77778bac22c8a20c6a46ca460addc49009bda875ec88fa4").unwrap());
1781 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err,
1782 "Previous secret did not match new one");
1787 fn test_prune_preimages() {
1788 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1789 let dummy_sig = Signature::from_der(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("3045022100fa86fa9a36a8cd6a7bb8f06a541787d51371d067951a9461d5404de6b928782e02201c8b7c334c10aed8976a3a465be9a28abff4cb23acbf00022295b378ce1fa3cd").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
1791 macro_rules! dummy_keys {
1794 let dummy_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap());
1796 per_commitment_point: dummy_key.clone(),
1797 revocation_key: dummy_key.clone(),
1798 a_htlc_key: dummy_key.clone(),
1799 b_htlc_key: dummy_key.clone(),
1800 a_delayed_payment_key: dummy_key.clone(),
1801 b_payment_key: dummy_key.clone(),
1806 let dummy_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
1808 let mut preimages = Vec::new();
1810 let mut rng = thread_rng();
1812 let mut preimage = [0; 32];
1813 rng.fill_bytes(&mut preimage);
1814 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
1815 sha.input(&preimage);
1816 let mut hash = [0; 32];
1817 sha.result(&mut hash);
1818 preimages.push((preimage, hash));
1822 macro_rules! preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs {
1823 ($preimages_slice: expr) => {
1825 let mut res = Vec::new();
1826 for (idx, preimage) in $preimages_slice.iter().enumerate() {
1827 res.push(HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1831 payment_hash: preimage.1.clone(),
1832 transaction_output_index: idx as u32,
1839 macro_rules! preimages_to_local_htlcs {
1840 ($preimages_slice: expr) => {
1842 let mut inp = preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!($preimages_slice);
1843 let res: Vec<_> = inp.drain(..).map(|e| { (e, dummy_sig.clone(), dummy_sig.clone()) }).collect();
1849 macro_rules! test_preimages_exist {
1850 ($preimages_slice: expr, $monitor: expr) => {
1851 for preimage in $preimages_slice {
1852 assert!($monitor.payment_preimages.contains_key(&preimage.1));
1857 // Prune with one old state and a local commitment tx holding a few overlaps with the
1859 let delayed_payment_base_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap());
1860 let mut monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &delayed_payment_base_key, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
1861 monitor.set_their_to_self_delay(10);
1863 monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(dummy_tx.clone(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..10]));
1864 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[5..15]), 281474976710655);
1865 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[15..20]), 281474976710654);
1866 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[17..20]), 281474976710653);
1867 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[18..20]), 281474976710652);
1868 for &(ref preimage, ref hash) in preimages.iter() {
1869 monitor.provide_payment_preimage(hash, preimage);
1872 // Now provide a secret, pruning preimages 10-15
1873 let mut secret = [0; 32];
1874 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1875 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secret.clone(), None).unwrap();
1876 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 15);
1877 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
1878 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[15..20], monitor);
1880 // Now provide a further secret, pruning preimages 15-17
1881 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1882 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secret.clone(), None).unwrap();
1883 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 13);
1884 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
1885 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[17..20], monitor);
1887 // Now update local commitment tx info, pruning only element 18 as we still care about the
1888 // previous commitment tx's preimages too
1889 monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(dummy_tx.clone(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..5]));
1890 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1891 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secret.clone(), None).unwrap();
1892 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 12);
1893 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
1894 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[18..20], monitor);
1896 // But if we do it again, we'll prune 5-10
1897 monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(dummy_tx.clone(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..3]));
1898 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1899 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secret.clone(), None).unwrap();
1900 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 5);
1901 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..5], monitor);
1904 // Further testing is done in the ChannelManager integration tests.