_ Git - rust-lightning/blob - src/ln/channelmonitor.rs

   1 //! The logic to monitor for on-chain transactions and create the relevant claim responses lives
   2 //! here.
   3 //!
   4 //! ChannelMonitor objects are generated by ChannelManager in response to relevant
   5 //! messages/actions, and MUST be persisted to disk (and, preferably, remotely) before progress can
   6 //! be made in responding to certain messages, see ManyChannelMonitor for more.
   7 //!
   8 //! Note that ChannelMonitors are an important part of the lightning trust model and a copy of the
   9 //! latest ChannelMonitor must always be actively monitoring for chain updates (and no out-of-date
  10 //! ChannelMonitors should do so). Thus, if you're building rust-lightning into an HSM or other
  11 //! security-domain-separated system design, you should consider having multiple paths for
  12 //! ChannelMonitors to get out of the HSM and onto monitoring devices.
  13
  14 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
  15 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxIn,TxOut,SigHashType,Transaction};
  16 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
  17 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
  18 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
  19 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::{self, Decodable, Encodable};
  20 use bitcoin::util::hash::BitcoinHash;
  21 use bitcoin::util::bip143;
  22
  23 use bitcoin_hashes::Hash;
  24 use bitcoin_hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
  25 use bitcoin_hashes::hash160::Hash as Hash160;
  26 use bitcoin_hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
  27
  28 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Signature};
  29 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
  30 use secp256k1;
  31
  32 use ln::msgs::DecodeError;
  33 use ln::chan_utils;
  34 use ln::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment;
  35 use ln::channelmanager::{HTLCSource, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
  36 use ln::channel::{ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT, OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT};
  37 use chain::chaininterface::{ChainListener, ChainWatchInterface, BroadcasterInterface, FeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget};
  38 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
  39 use chain::keysinterface::SpendableOutputDescriptor;
  40 use util::logger::Logger;
  41 use util::ser::{ReadableArgs, Readable, Writer, Writeable, WriterWriteAdaptor, U48};
  42 use util::{byte_utils, events};
  43
  44 use std::collections::{HashMap, hash_map};
  45 use std::sync::{Arc,Mutex};
  46 use std::{hash,cmp, mem};
  47
  48 /// An error enum representing a failure to persist a channel monitor update.
  49 #[derive(Clone)]
  50 pub enum ChannelMonitorUpdateErr {
  51         /// Used to indicate a temporary failure (eg connection to a watchtower or remote backup of
  52         /// our state failed, but is expected to succeed at some point in the future).
  53         ///
  54         /// Such a failure will "freeze" a channel, preventing us from revoking old states or
  55         /// submitting new commitment transactions to the remote party.
  56         /// ChannelManager::test_restore_channel_monitor can be used to retry the update(s) and restore
  57         /// the channel to an operational state.
  58         ///
  59         /// Note that continuing to operate when no copy of the updated ChannelMonitor could be
  60         /// persisted is unsafe - if you failed to store the update on your own local disk you should
  61         /// instead return PermanentFailure to force closure of the channel ASAP.
  62         ///
  63         /// Even when a channel has been "frozen" updates to the ChannelMonitor can continue to occur
  64         /// (eg if an inbound HTLC which we forwarded was claimed upstream resulting in us attempting
  65         /// to claim it on this channel) and those updates must be applied wherever they can be. At
  66         /// least one such updated ChannelMonitor must be persisted otherwise PermanentFailure should
  67         /// be returned to get things on-chain ASAP using only the in-memory copy. Obviously updates to
  68         /// the channel which would invalidate previous ChannelMonitors are not made when a channel has
  69         /// been "frozen".
  70         ///
  71         /// Note that even if updates made after TemporaryFailure succeed you must still call
  72         /// test_restore_channel_monitor to ensure you have the latest monitor and re-enable normal
  73         /// channel operation.
  74         ///
  75         /// For deployments where a copy of ChannelMonitors and other local state are backed up in a
  76         /// remote location (with local copies persisted immediately), it is anticipated that all
  77         /// updates will return TemporaryFailure until the remote copies could be updated.
  78         TemporaryFailure,
  79         /// Used to indicate no further channel monitor updates will be allowed (eg we've moved on to a
  80         /// different watchtower and cannot update with all watchtowers that were previously informed
  81         /// of this channel). This will force-close the channel in question.
  82         ///
  83         /// Should also be used to indicate a failure to update the local copy of the channel monitor.
  84         PermanentFailure,
  85 }
  86
  87 /// General Err type for ChannelMonitor actions. Generally, this implies that the data provided is
  88 /// inconsistent with the ChannelMonitor being called. eg for ChannelMonitor::insert_combine this
  89 /// means you tried to merge two monitors for different channels or for a channel which was
  90 /// restored from a backup and then generated new commitment updates.
  91 /// Contains a human-readable error message.
  92 #[derive(Debug)]
  93 pub struct MonitorUpdateError(pub &'static str);
  94
  95 /// Simple structure send back by ManyChannelMonitor in case of HTLC detected onchain from a
  96 /// forward channel and from which info are needed to update HTLC in a backward channel.
  97 pub struct HTLCUpdate {
  98         pub(super) payment_hash: PaymentHash,
  99         pub(super) payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
 100         pub(super) source: HTLCSource
 101 }
 102
 103 /// Simple trait indicating ability to track a set of ChannelMonitors and multiplex events between
 104 /// them. Generally should be implemented by keeping a local SimpleManyChannelMonitor and passing
 105 /// events to it, while also taking any add_update_monitor events and passing them to some remote
 106 /// server(s).
 107 ///
 108 /// Note that any updates to a channel's monitor *must* be applied to each instance of the
 109 /// channel's monitor everywhere (including remote watchtowers) *before* this function returns. If
 110 /// an update occurs and a remote watchtower is left with old state, it may broadcast transactions
 111 /// which we have revoked, allowing our counterparty to claim all funds in the channel!
 112 pub trait ManyChannelMonitor: Send + Sync {
 113         /// Adds or updates a monitor for the given `funding_txo`.
 114         ///
 115         /// Implementor must also ensure that the funding_txo outpoint is registered with any relevant
 116         /// ChainWatchInterfaces such that the provided monitor receives block_connected callbacks with
 117         /// any spends of it.
 118         fn add_update_monitor(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr>;
 119
 120         /// Used by ChannelManager to get list of HTLC resolved onchain and which needed to be updated
 121         /// with success or failure backward
 122         fn fetch_pending_htlc_updated(&self) -> Vec<HTLCUpdate>;
 123 }
 124
 125 /// A simple implementation of a ManyChannelMonitor and ChainListener. Can be used to create a
 126 /// watchtower or watch our own channels.
 127 ///
 128 /// Note that you must provide your own key by which to refer to channels.
 129 ///
 130 /// If you're accepting remote monitors (ie are implementing a watchtower), you must verify that
 131 /// users cannot overwrite a given channel by providing a duplicate key. ie you should probably
 132 /// index by a PublicKey which is required to sign any updates.
 133 ///
 134 /// If you're using this for local monitoring of your own channels, you probably want to use
 135 /// `OutPoint` as the key, which will give you a ManyChannelMonitor implementation.
 136 pub struct SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
 137         #[cfg(test)] // Used in ChannelManager tests to manipulate channels directly
 138         pub monitors: Mutex<HashMap<Key, ChannelMonitor>>,
 139         #[cfg(not(test))]
 140         monitors: Mutex<HashMap<Key, ChannelMonitor>>,
 141         chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>,
 142         broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>,
 143         pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
 144         pending_htlc_updated: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, Vec<(HTLCSource, Option<PaymentPreimage>)>>>,
 145         logger: Arc<Logger>,
 146         fee_estimator: Arc<FeeEstimator>
 147 }
 148
 149 impl<Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash> ChainListener for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
 150         fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], _indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) {
 151                 let block_hash = header.bitcoin_hash();
 152                 let mut new_events: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(0);
 153                 let mut htlc_updated_infos = Vec::new();
 154                 {
 155                         let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
 156                         for monitor in monitors.values_mut() {
 157                                 let (txn_outputs, spendable_outputs, mut htlc_updated) = monitor.block_connected(txn_matched, height, &block_hash, &*self.broadcaster, &*self.fee_estimator);
 158                                 if spendable_outputs.len() > 0 {
 159                                         new_events.push(events::Event::SpendableOutputs {
 160                                                 outputs: spendable_outputs,
 161                                         });
 162                                 }
 163
 164                                 for (ref txid, ref outputs) in txn_outputs {
 165                                         for (idx, output) in outputs.iter().enumerate() {
 166                                                 self.chain_monitor.install_watch_outpoint((txid.clone(), idx as u32), &output.script_pubkey);
 167                                         }
 168                                 }
 169                                 htlc_updated_infos.append(&mut htlc_updated);
 170                         }
 171                 }
 172                 {
 173                         // ChannelManager will just need to fetch pending_htlc_updated and pass state backward
 174                         let mut pending_htlc_updated = self.pending_htlc_updated.lock().unwrap();
 175                         for htlc in htlc_updated_infos.drain(..) {
 176                                 match pending_htlc_updated.entry(htlc.2) {
 177                                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut e) => {
 178                                                 // In case of reorg we may have htlc outputs solved in a different way so
 179                                                 // we prefer to keep claims but don't store duplicate updates for a given
 180                                                 // (payment_hash, HTLCSource) pair.
 181                                                 let mut existing_claim = false;
 182                                                 e.get_mut().retain(|htlc_data| {
 183                                                         if htlc.0 == htlc_data.0 {
 184                                                                 if htlc_data.1.is_some() {
 185                                                                         existing_claim = true;
 186                                                                         true
 187                                                                 } else { false }
 188                                                         } else { true }
 189                                                 });
 190                                                 if !existing_claim {
 191                                                         e.get_mut().push((htlc.0, htlc.1));
 192                                                 }
 193                                         }
 194                                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
 195                                                 e.insert(vec![(htlc.0, htlc.1)]);
 196                                         }
 197                                 }
 198                         }
 199                 }
 200                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
 201                 pending_events.append(&mut new_events);
 202         }
 203
 204         fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, disconnected_height: u32) {
 205                 let block_hash = header.bitcoin_hash();
 206                 let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
 207                 for monitor in monitors.values_mut() {
 208                         monitor.block_disconnected(disconnected_height, &block_hash);
 209                 }
 210         }
 211 }
 212
 213 impl<Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash + 'static> SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
 214         /// Creates a new object which can be used to monitor several channels given the chain
 215         /// interface with which to register to receive notifications.
 216         pub fn new(chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>, broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>, logger: Arc<Logger>, feeest: Arc<FeeEstimator>) -> Arc<SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key>> {
 217                 let res = Arc::new(SimpleManyChannelMonitor {
 218                         monitors: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
 219                         chain_monitor,
 220                         broadcaster,
 221                         pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
 222                         pending_htlc_updated: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
 223                         logger,
 224                         fee_estimator: feeest,
 225                 });
 226                 let weak_res = Arc::downgrade(&res);
 227                 res.chain_monitor.register_listener(weak_res);
 228                 res
 229         }
 230
 231         /// Adds or updates the monitor which monitors the channel referred to by the given key.
 232         pub fn add_update_monitor_by_key(&self, key: Key, monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
 233                 let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
 234                 match monitors.get_mut(&key) {
 235                         Some(orig_monitor) => {
 236                                 log_trace!(self, "Updating Channel Monitor for channel {}", log_funding_info!(monitor.key_storage));
 237                                 return orig_monitor.insert_combine(monitor);
 238                         },
 239                         None => {}
 240                 };
 241                 match monitor.key_storage {
 242                         Storage::Local { ref funding_info, .. } => {
 243                                 match funding_info {
 244                                         &None => {
 245                                                 return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Try to update a useless monitor without funding_txo !"));
 246                                         },
 247                                         &Some((ref outpoint, ref script)) => {
 248                                                 log_trace!(self, "Got new Channel Monitor for channel {}", log_bytes!(outpoint.to_channel_id()[..]));
 249                                                 self.chain_monitor.install_watch_tx(&outpoint.txid, script);
 250                                                 self.chain_monitor.install_watch_outpoint((outpoint.txid, outpoint.index as u32), script);
 251                                         },
 252                                 }
 253                         },
 254                         Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
 255                                 self.chain_monitor.watch_all_txn();
 256                         }
 257                 }
 258                 monitors.insert(key, monitor);
 259                 Ok(())
 260         }
 261 }
 262
 263 impl ManyChannelMonitor for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<OutPoint> {
 264         fn add_update_monitor(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr> {
 265                 match self.add_update_monitor_by_key(funding_txo, monitor) {
 266                         Ok(_) => Ok(()),
 267                         Err(_) => Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure),
 268                 }
 269         }
 270
 271         fn fetch_pending_htlc_updated(&self) -> Vec<HTLCUpdate> {
 272                 let mut updated = self.pending_htlc_updated.lock().unwrap();
 273                 let mut pending_htlcs_updated = Vec::with_capacity(updated.len());
 274                 for (k, v) in updated.drain() {
 275                         for htlc_data in v {
 276                                 pending_htlcs_updated.push(HTLCUpdate {
 277                                         payment_hash: k,
 278                                         payment_preimage: htlc_data.1,
 279                                         source: htlc_data.0,
 280                                 });
 281                         }
 282                 }
 283                 pending_htlcs_updated
 284         }
 285 }
 286
 287 impl<Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash> events::EventsProvider for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
 288         fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
 289                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
 290                 let mut ret = Vec::new();
 291                 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut *pending_events);
 292                 ret
 293         }
 294 }
 295
 296 /// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, don't try to claim it in a shared transaction,
 297 /// instead claiming it in its own individual transaction.
 298 const CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 12;
 299 /// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, force-close the channel to broadcast the
 300 /// HTLC-Success transaction.
 301 /// In other words, this is an upper bound on how many blocks we think it can take us to get a
 302 /// transaction confirmed (and we use it in a few more, equivalent, places).
 303 pub(crate) const CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 6;
 304 /// Number of blocks by which point we expect our counterparty to have seen new blocks on the
 305 /// network and done a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance (+ we've updated all our
 306 /// copies of ChannelMonitors, including watchtowers).
 307 pub(crate) const HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS: u32 = 3;
 308 /// Number of blocks we wait on seeing a confirmed HTLC-Timeout or previous revoked commitment
 309 /// transaction before we fail corresponding inbound HTLCs. This prevents us from failing backwards
 310 /// and then getting a reorg resulting in us losing money.
 311 pub(crate) const HTLC_FAIL_ANTI_REORG_DELAY: u32 = 6;
 312
 313 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
 314 enum Storage {
 315         Local {
 316                 revocation_base_key: SecretKey,
 317                 htlc_base_key: SecretKey,
 318                 delayed_payment_base_key: SecretKey,
 319                 payment_base_key: SecretKey,
 320                 shutdown_pubkey: PublicKey,
 321                 prev_latest_per_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
 322                 latest_per_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
 323                 funding_info: Option<(OutPoint, Script)>,
 324                 current_remote_commitment_txid: Option<Sha256dHash>,
 325                 prev_remote_commitment_txid: Option<Sha256dHash>,
 326         },
 327         Watchtower {
 328                 revocation_base_key: PublicKey,
 329                 htlc_base_key: PublicKey,
 330         }
 331 }
 332
 333 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
 334 struct LocalSignedTx {
 335         /// txid of the transaction in tx, just used to make comparison faster
 336         txid: Sha256dHash,
 337         tx: Transaction,
 338         revocation_key: PublicKey,
 339         a_htlc_key: PublicKey,
 340         b_htlc_key: PublicKey,
 341         delayed_payment_key: PublicKey,
 342         feerate_per_kw: u64,
 343         htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<(Signature, Signature)>, Option<HTLCSource>)>,
 344 }
 345
 346 #[derive(PartialEq)]
 347 enum InputDescriptors {
 348         RevokedOfferedHTLC,
 349         RevokedReceivedHTLC,
 350         OfferedHTLC,
 351         ReceivedHTLC,
 352         RevokedOutput, // either a revoked to_local output on commitment tx, a revoked HTLC-Timeout output or a revoked HTLC-Success output
 353 }
 354
 355 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
 356 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
 357
 358 /// A ChannelMonitor handles chain events (blocks connected and disconnected) and generates
 359 /// on-chain transactions to ensure no loss of funds occurs.
 360 ///
 361 /// You MUST ensure that no ChannelMonitors for a given channel anywhere contain out-of-date
 362 /// information and are actively monitoring the chain.
 363 #[derive(Clone)]
 364 pub struct ChannelMonitor {
 365         commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64,
 366
 367         key_storage: Storage,
 368         their_htlc_base_key: Option<PublicKey>,
 369         their_delayed_payment_base_key: Option<PublicKey>,
 370         // first is the idx of the first of the two revocation points
 371         their_cur_revocation_points: Option<(u64, PublicKey, Option<PublicKey>)>,
 372
 373         our_to_self_delay: u16,
 374         their_to_self_delay: Option<u16>,
 375
 376         old_secrets: [([u8; 32], u64); 49],
 377         remote_claimable_outpoints: HashMap<Sha256dHash, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>>,
 378         /// We cannot identify HTLC-Success or HTLC-Timeout transactions by themselves on the chain.
 379         /// Nor can we figure out their commitment numbers without the commitment transaction they are
 380         /// spending. Thus, in order to claim them via revocation key, we track all the remote
 381         /// commitment transactions which we find on-chain, mapping them to the commitment number which
 382         /// can be used to derive the revocation key and claim the transactions.
 383         remote_commitment_txn_on_chain: HashMap<Sha256dHash, (u64, Vec<Script>)>,
 384         /// Cache used to make pruning of payment_preimages faster.
 385         /// Maps payment_hash values to commitment numbers for remote transactions for non-revoked
 386         /// remote transactions (ie should remain pretty small).
 387         /// Serialized to disk but should generally not be sent to Watchtowers.
 388         remote_hash_commitment_number: HashMap<PaymentHash, u64>,
 389
 390         // We store two local commitment transactions to avoid any race conditions where we may update
 391         // some monitors (potentially on watchtowers) but then fail to update others, resulting in the
 392         // various monitors for one channel being out of sync, and us broadcasting a local
 393         // transaction for which we have deleted claim information on some watchtowers.
 394         prev_local_signed_commitment_tx: Option<LocalSignedTx>,
 395         current_local_signed_commitment_tx: Option<LocalSignedTx>,
 396
 397         // Used just for ChannelManager to make sure it has the latest channel data during
 398         // deserialization
 399         current_remote_commitment_number: u64,
 400
 401         payment_preimages: HashMap<PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage>,
 402
 403         destination_script: Script,
 404
 405         htlc_updated_waiting_threshold_conf: HashMap<u32, Vec<(HTLCSource, Option<PaymentPreimage>, PaymentHash)>>,
 406
 407         // We simply modify last_block_hash in Channel's block_connected so that serialization is
 408         // consistent but hopefully the users' copy handles block_connected in a consistent way.
 409         // (we do *not*, however, update them in insert_combine to ensure any local user copies keep
 410         // their last_block_hash from its state and not based on updated copies that didn't run through
 411         // the full block_connected).
 412         pub(crate) last_block_hash: Sha256dHash,
 413         secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>, //TODO: dedup this a bit...
 414         logger: Arc<Logger>,
 415 }
 416
 417 macro_rules! subtract_high_prio_fee {
 418         ($self: ident, $fee_estimator: expr, $value: expr, $predicted_weight: expr, $spent_txid: expr) => {
 419                 {
 420                         let mut fee = $fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority) * $predicted_weight / 1000;
 421                         if $value <= fee {
 422                                 fee = $fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal) * $predicted_weight / 1000;
 423                                 if $value <= fee {
 424                                         fee = $fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background) * $predicted_weight / 1000;
 425                                         if $value <= fee {
 426                                                 log_error!($self, "Failed to generate an on-chain punishment tx spending {} as even low priority fee ({} sat) was more than the entire claim balance ({} sat)",
 427                                                         $spent_txid, fee, $value);
 428                                                 false
 429                                         } else {
 430                                                 log_warn!($self, "Used low priority fee for on-chain punishment tx spending {} as high priority fee was more than the entire claim balance ({} sat)",
 431                                                         $spent_txid, $value);
 432                                                 $value -= fee;
 433                                                 true
 434                                         }
 435                                 } else {
 436                                         log_warn!($self, "Used medium priority fee for on-chain punishment tx spending {} as high priority fee was more than the entire claim balance ({} sat)",
 437                                                 $spent_txid, $value);
 438                                         $value -= fee;
 439                                         true
 440                                 }
 441                         } else {
 442                                 $value -= fee;
 443                                 true
 444                         }
 445                 }
 446         }
 447 }
 448
 449 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
 450 /// Used only in testing and fuzztarget to check serialization roundtrips don't change the
 451 /// underlying object
 452 impl PartialEq for ChannelMonitor {
 453         fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
 454                 if self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor != other.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor ||
 455                         self.key_storage != other.key_storage ||
 456                         self.their_htlc_base_key != other.their_htlc_base_key ||
 457                         self.their_delayed_payment_base_key != other.their_delayed_payment_base_key ||
 458                         self.their_cur_revocation_points != other.their_cur_revocation_points ||
 459                         self.our_to_self_delay != other.our_to_self_delay ||
 460                         self.their_to_self_delay != other.their_to_self_delay ||
 461                         self.remote_claimable_outpoints != other.remote_claimable_outpoints ||
 462                         self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain != other.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain ||
 463                         self.remote_hash_commitment_number != other.remote_hash_commitment_number ||
 464                         self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx != other.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx ||
 465                         self.current_remote_commitment_number != other.current_remote_commitment_number ||
 466                         self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx != other.current_local_signed_commitment_tx ||
 467                         self.payment_preimages != other.payment_preimages ||
 468                         self.destination_script != other.destination_script ||
 469                         self.htlc_updated_waiting_threshold_conf != other.htlc_updated_waiting_threshold_conf
 470                 {
 471                         false
 472                 } else {
 473                         for (&(ref secret, ref idx), &(ref o_secret, ref o_idx)) in self.old_secrets.iter().zip(other.old_secrets.iter()) {
 474                                 if secret != o_secret || idx != o_idx {
 475                                         return false
 476                                 }
 477                         }
 478                         true
 479                 }
 480         }
 481 }
 482
 483 impl ChannelMonitor {
 484         pub(super) fn new(revocation_base_key: &SecretKey, delayed_payment_base_key: &SecretKey, htlc_base_key: &SecretKey, payment_base_key: &SecretKey, shutdown_pubkey: &PublicKey, our_to_self_delay: u16, destination_script: Script, logger: Arc<Logger>) -> ChannelMonitor {
 485                 ChannelMonitor {
 486                         commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: 0,
 487
 488                         key_storage: Storage::Local {
 489                                 revocation_base_key: revocation_base_key.clone(),
 490                                 htlc_base_key: htlc_base_key.clone(),
 491                                 delayed_payment_base_key: delayed_payment_base_key.clone(),
 492                                 payment_base_key: payment_base_key.clone(),
 493                                 shutdown_pubkey: shutdown_pubkey.clone(),
 494                                 prev_latest_per_commitment_point: None,
 495                                 latest_per_commitment_point: None,
 496                                 funding_info: None,
 497                                 current_remote_commitment_txid: None,
 498                                 prev_remote_commitment_txid: None,
 499                         },
 500                         their_htlc_base_key: None,
 501                         their_delayed_payment_base_key: None,
 502                         their_cur_revocation_points: None,
 503
 504                         our_to_self_delay: our_to_self_delay,
 505                         their_to_self_delay: None,
 506
 507                         old_secrets: [([0; 32], 1 << 48); 49],
 508                         remote_claimable_outpoints: HashMap::new(),
 509                         remote_commitment_txn_on_chain: HashMap::new(),
 510                         remote_hash_commitment_number: HashMap::new(),
 511
 512                         prev_local_signed_commitment_tx: None,
 513                         current_local_signed_commitment_tx: None,
 514                         current_remote_commitment_number: 1 << 48,
 515
 516                         payment_preimages: HashMap::new(),
 517                         destination_script: destination_script,
 518
 519                         htlc_updated_waiting_threshold_conf: HashMap::new(),
 520
 521                         last_block_hash: Default::default(),
 522                         secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
 523                         logger,
 524                 }
 525         }
 526
 527         fn get_witnesses_weight(inputs: &[InputDescriptors]) -> u64 {
 528                 let mut tx_weight = 2; // count segwit flags
 529                 for inp in inputs {
 530                         // We use expected weight (and not actual) as signatures and time lock delays may vary
 531                         tx_weight +=  match inp {
 532                                 // number_of_witness_elements + sig_length + revocation_sig + pubkey_length + revocationpubkey + witness_script_length + witness_script
 533                                 &InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC => {
 534                                         1 + 1 + 73 + 1 + 33 + 1 + 133
 535                                 },
 536                                 // number_of_witness_elements + sig_length + revocation_sig + pubkey_length + revocationpubkey + witness_script_length + witness_script
 537                                 &InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC => {
 538                                         1 + 1 + 73 + 1 + 33 + 1 + 139
 539                                 },
 540                                 // number_of_witness_elements + sig_length + remotehtlc_sig  + preimage_length + preimage + witness_script_length + witness_script
 541                                 &InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC => {
 542                                         1 + 1 + 73 + 1 + 32 + 1 + 133
 543                                 },
 544                                 // number_of_witness_elements + sig_length + revocation_sig + pubkey_length + revocationpubkey + witness_script_length + witness_script
 545                                 &InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC => {
 546                                         1 + 1 + 73 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 139
 547                                 },
 548                                 // number_of_witness_elements + sig_length + revocation_sig + true_length + op_true + witness_script_length + witness_script
 549                                 &InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput => {
 550                                         1 + 1 + 73 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 77
 551                                 },
 552                         };
 553                 }
 554                 tx_weight
 555         }
 556
 557         #[inline]
 558         fn place_secret(idx: u64) -> u8 {
 559                 for i in 0..48 {
 560                         if idx & (1 << i) == (1 << i) {
 561                                 return i
 562                         }
 563                 }
 564                 48
 565         }
 566
 567         #[inline]
 568         fn derive_secret(secret: [u8; 32], bits: u8, idx: u64) -> [u8; 32] {
 569                 let mut res: [u8; 32] = secret;
 570                 for i in 0..bits {
 571                         let bitpos = bits - 1 - i;
 572                         if idx & (1 << bitpos) == (1 << bitpos) {
 573                                 res[(bitpos / 8) as usize] ^= 1 << (bitpos & 7);
 574                                 res = Sha256::hash(&res).into_inner();
 575                         }
 576                 }
 577                 res
 578         }
 579
 580         /// Inserts a revocation secret into this channel monitor. Prunes old preimages if neither
 581         /// needed by local commitment transactions HTCLs nor by remote ones. Unless we haven't already seen remote
 582         /// commitment transaction's secret, they are de facto pruned (we can use revocation key).
 583         pub(super) fn provide_secret(&mut self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
 584                 let pos = ChannelMonitor::place_secret(idx);
 585                 for i in 0..pos {
 586                         let (old_secret, old_idx) = self.old_secrets[i as usize];
 587                         if ChannelMonitor::derive_secret(secret, pos, old_idx) != old_secret {
 588                                 return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Previous secret did not match new one"));
 589                         }
 590                 }
 591                 if self.get_min_seen_secret() <= idx {
 592                         return Ok(());
 593                 }
 594                 self.old_secrets[pos as usize] = (secret, idx);
 595
 596                 // Prune HTLCs from the previous remote commitment tx so we don't generate failure/fulfill
 597                 // events for now-revoked/fulfilled HTLCs.
 598                 // TODO: We should probably consider whether we're really getting the next secret here.
 599                 if let Storage::Local { ref mut prev_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage {
 600                         if let Some(txid) = prev_remote_commitment_txid.take() {
 601                                 for &mut (_, ref mut source) in self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get_mut(&txid).unwrap() {
 602                                         *source = None;
 603                                 }
 604                         }
 605                 }
 606
 607                 if !self.payment_preimages.is_empty() {
 608                         let local_signed_commitment_tx = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx.as_ref().expect("Channel needs at least an initial commitment tx !");
 609                         let prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.as_ref();
 610                         let min_idx = self.get_min_seen_secret();
 611                         let remote_hash_commitment_number = &mut self.remote_hash_commitment_number;
 612
 613                         self.payment_preimages.retain(|&k, _| {
 614                                 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in &local_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs {
 615                                         if k == htlc.payment_hash {
 616                                                 return true
 617                                         }
 618                                 }
 619                                 if let Some(prev_local_commitment_tx) = prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
 620                                         for &(ref htlc, _, _) in prev_local_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
 621                                                 if k == htlc.payment_hash {
 622                                                         return true
 623                                                 }
 624                                         }
 625                                 }
 626                                 let contains = if let Some(cn) = remote_hash_commitment_number.get(&k) {
 627                                         if *cn < min_idx {
 628                                                 return true
 629                                         }
 630                                         true
 631                                 } else { false };
 632                                 if contains {
 633                                         remote_hash_commitment_number.remove(&k);
 634                                 }
 635                                 false
 636                         });
 637                 }
 638
 639                 Ok(())
 640         }
 641
 642         /// Informs this monitor of the latest remote (ie non-broadcastable) commitment transaction.
 643         /// The monitor watches for it to be broadcasted and then uses the HTLC information (and
 644         /// possibly future revocation/preimage information) to claim outputs where possible.
 645         /// We cache also the mapping hash:commitment number to lighten pruning of old preimages by watchtowers.
 646         pub(super) fn provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, unsigned_commitment_tx: &Transaction, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>, commitment_number: u64, their_revocation_point: PublicKey) {
 647                 // TODO: Encrypt the htlc_outputs data with the single-hash of the commitment transaction
 648                 // so that a remote monitor doesn't learn anything unless there is a malicious close.
 649                 // (only maybe, sadly we cant do the same for local info, as we need to be aware of
 650                 // timeouts)
 651                 for &(ref htlc, _) in &htlc_outputs {
 652                         self.remote_hash_commitment_number.insert(htlc.payment_hash, commitment_number);
 653                 }
 654
 655                 let new_txid = unsigned_commitment_tx.txid();
 656                 log_trace!(self, "Tracking new remote commitment transaction with txid {} at commitment number {} with {} HTLC outputs", new_txid, commitment_number, htlc_outputs.len());
 657                 log_trace!(self, "New potential remote commitment transaction: {}", encode::serialize_hex(unsigned_commitment_tx));
 658                 if let Storage::Local { ref mut current_remote_commitment_txid, ref mut prev_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage {
 659                         *prev_remote_commitment_txid = current_remote_commitment_txid.take();
 660                         *current_remote_commitment_txid = Some(new_txid);
 661                 }
 662                 self.remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(new_txid, htlc_outputs);
 663                 self.current_remote_commitment_number = commitment_number;
 664                 //TODO: Merge this into the other per-remote-transaction output storage stuff
 665                 match self.their_cur_revocation_points {
 666                         Some(old_points) => {
 667                                 if old_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 {
 668                                         self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0, old_points.1, Some(their_revocation_point)));
 669                                 } else if old_points.0 == commitment_number + 2 {
 670                                         if let Some(old_second_point) = old_points.2 {
 671                                                 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0 - 1, old_second_point, Some(their_revocation_point)));
 672                                         } else {
 673                                                 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None));
 674                                         }
 675                                 } else {
 676                                         self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None));
 677                                 }
 678                         },
 679                         None => {
 680                                 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None));
 681                         }
 682                 }
 683         }
 684
 685         /// Informs this monitor of the latest local (ie broadcastable) commitment transaction. The
 686         /// monitor watches for timeouts and may broadcast it if we approach such a timeout. Thus, it
 687         /// is important that any clones of this channel monitor (including remote clones) by kept
 688         /// up-to-date as our local commitment transaction is updated.
 689         /// Panics if set_their_to_self_delay has never been called.
 690         /// Also update Storage with latest local per_commitment_point to derive local_delayedkey in
 691         /// case of onchain HTLC tx
 692         pub(super) fn provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, signed_commitment_tx: Transaction, local_keys: chan_utils::TxCreationKeys, feerate_per_kw: u64, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<(Signature, Signature)>, Option<HTLCSource>)>) {
 693                 assert!(self.their_to_self_delay.is_some());
 694                 self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx.take();
 695                 self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(LocalSignedTx {
 696                         txid: signed_commitment_tx.txid(),
 697                         tx: signed_commitment_tx,
 698                         revocation_key: local_keys.revocation_key,
 699                         a_htlc_key: local_keys.a_htlc_key,
 700                         b_htlc_key: local_keys.b_htlc_key,
 701                         delayed_payment_key: local_keys.a_delayed_payment_key,
 702                         feerate_per_kw,
 703                         htlc_outputs,
 704                 });
 705
 706                 if let Storage::Local { ref mut latest_per_commitment_point, .. } = self.key_storage {
 707                         *latest_per_commitment_point = Some(local_keys.per_commitment_point);
 708                 } else {
 709                         panic!("Channel somehow ended up with its internal ChannelMonitor being in Watchtower mode?");
 710                 }
 711         }
 712
 713         /// Provides a payment_hash->payment_preimage mapping. Will be automatically pruned when all
 714         /// commitment_tx_infos which contain the payment hash have been revoked.
 715         pub(super) fn provide_payment_preimage(&mut self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_preimage: &PaymentPreimage) {
 716                 self.payment_preimages.insert(payment_hash.clone(), payment_preimage.clone());
 717         }
 718
 719         /// Combines this ChannelMonitor with the information contained in the other ChannelMonitor.
 720         /// After a successful call this ChannelMonitor is up-to-date and is safe to use to monitor the
 721         /// chain for new blocks/transactions.
 722         pub fn insert_combine(&mut self, mut other: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
 723                 match self.key_storage {
 724                         Storage::Local { ref funding_info, .. } => {
 725                                 if funding_info.is_none() { return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Try to combine a Local monitor without funding_info")); }
 726                                 let our_funding_info = funding_info;
 727                                 if let Storage::Local { ref funding_info, .. } = other.key_storage {
 728                                         if funding_info.is_none() { return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Try to combine a Local monitor without funding_info")); }
 729                                         // We should be able to compare the entire funding_txo, but in fuzztarget it's trivially
 730                                         // easy to collide the funding_txo hash and have a different scriptPubKey.
 731                                         if funding_info.as_ref().unwrap().0 != our_funding_info.as_ref().unwrap().0 {
 732                                                 return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Funding transaction outputs are not identical!"));
 733                                         }
 734                                 } else {
 735                                         return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Try to combine a Local monitor with a Watchtower one !"));
 736                                 }
 737                         },
 738                         Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
 739                                 if let Storage::Watchtower { .. } = other.key_storage {
 740                                         unimplemented!();
 741                                 } else {
 742                                         return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Try to combine a Watchtower monitor with a Local one !"));
 743                                 }
 744                         },
 745                 }
 746                 let other_min_secret = other.get_min_seen_secret();
 747                 let our_min_secret = self.get_min_seen_secret();
 748                 if our_min_secret > other_min_secret {
 749                         self.provide_secret(other_min_secret, other.get_secret(other_min_secret).unwrap())?;
 750                 }
 751                 if let Some(ref local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
 752                         if let Some(ref other_local_tx) = other.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
 753                                 let our_commitment_number = 0xffffffffffff - ((((local_tx.tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (local_tx.tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor);
 754                                 let other_commitment_number = 0xffffffffffff - ((((other_local_tx.tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (other_local_tx.tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ other.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor);
 755                                 if our_commitment_number >= other_commitment_number {
 756                                         self.key_storage = other.key_storage;
 757                                 }
 758                         }
 759                 }
 760                 // TODO: We should use current_remote_commitment_number and the commitment number out of
 761                 // local transactions to decide how to merge
 762                 if our_min_secret >= other_min_secret {
 763                         self.their_cur_revocation_points = other.their_cur_revocation_points;
 764                         for (txid, htlcs) in other.remote_claimable_outpoints.drain() {
 765                                 self.remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, htlcs);
 766                         }
 767                         if let Some(local_tx) = other.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
 768                                 self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(local_tx);
 769                         }
 770                         if let Some(local_tx) = other.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
 771                                 self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(local_tx);
 772                         }
 773                         self.payment_preimages = other.payment_preimages;
 774                 }
 775
 776                 self.current_remote_commitment_number = cmp::min(self.current_remote_commitment_number, other.current_remote_commitment_number);
 777                 Ok(())
 778         }
 779
 780         /// Panics if commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor doesn't fit in 48 bits
 781         pub(super) fn set_commitment_obscure_factor(&mut self, commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64) {
 782                 assert!(commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor < (1 << 48));
 783                 self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor = commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor;
 784         }
 785
 786         /// Allows this monitor to scan only for transactions which are applicable. Note that this is
 787         /// optional, without it this monitor cannot be used in an SPV client, but you may wish to
 788         /// avoid this (or call unset_funding_info) on a monitor you wish to send to a watchtower as it
 789         /// provides slightly better privacy.
 790         /// It's the responsibility of the caller to register outpoint and script with passing the former
 791         /// value as key to add_update_monitor.
 792         pub(super) fn set_funding_info(&mut self, new_funding_info: (OutPoint, Script)) {
 793                 match self.key_storage {
 794                         Storage::Local { ref mut funding_info, .. } => {
 795                                 *funding_info = Some(new_funding_info);
 796                         },
 797                         Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
 798                                 panic!("Channel somehow ended up with its internal ChannelMonitor being in Watchtower mode?");
 799                         }
 800                 }
 801         }
 802
 803         /// We log these base keys at channel opening to being able to rebuild redeemscript in case of leaked revoked commit tx
 804         pub(super) fn set_their_base_keys(&mut self, their_htlc_base_key: &PublicKey, their_delayed_payment_base_key: &PublicKey) {
 805                 self.their_htlc_base_key = Some(their_htlc_base_key.clone());
 806                 self.their_delayed_payment_base_key = Some(their_delayed_payment_base_key.clone());
 807         }
 808
 809         pub(super) fn set_their_to_self_delay(&mut self, their_to_self_delay: u16) {
 810                 self.their_to_self_delay = Some(their_to_self_delay);
 811         }
 812
 813         pub(super) fn unset_funding_info(&mut self) {
 814                 match self.key_storage {
 815                         Storage::Local { ref mut funding_info, .. } => {
 816                                 *funding_info = None;
 817                         },
 818                         Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
 819                                 panic!("Channel somehow ended up with its internal ChannelMonitor being in Watchtower mode?");
 820                         },
 821                 }
 822         }
 823
 824         /// Gets the funding transaction outpoint of the channel this ChannelMonitor is monitoring for.
 825         pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
 826                 match self.key_storage {
 827                         Storage::Local { ref funding_info, .. } => {
 828                                 match funding_info {
 829                                         &Some((outpoint, _)) => Some(outpoint),
 830                                         &None => None
 831                                 }
 832                         },
 833                         Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
 834                                 return None;
 835                         }
 836                 }
 837         }
 838
 839         /// Gets the sets of all outpoints which this ChannelMonitor expects to hear about spends of.
 840         /// Generally useful when deserializing as during normal operation the return values of
 841         /// block_connected are sufficient to ensure all relevant outpoints are being monitored (note
 842         /// that the get_funding_txo outpoint and transaction must also be monitored for!).
 843         pub fn get_monitored_outpoints(&self) -> Vec<(Sha256dHash, u32, &Script)> {
 844                 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.len() * 2);
 845                 for (ref txid, &(_, ref outputs)) in self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
 846                         for (idx, output) in outputs.iter().enumerate() {
 847                                 res.push(((*txid).clone(), idx as u32, output));
 848                         }
 849                 }
 850                 res
 851         }
 852
 853         /// Serializes into a vec, with various modes for the exposed pub fns
 854         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W, for_local_storage: bool) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
 855                 //TODO: We still write out all the serialization here manually instead of using the fancy
 856                 //serialization framework we have, we should migrate things over to it.
 857                 writer.write_all(&[SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
 858                 writer.write_all(&[MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
 859
 860                 // Set in initial Channel-object creation, so should always be set by now:
 861                 U48(self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor).write(writer)?;
 862
 863                 macro_rules! write_option {
 864                         ($thing: expr) => {
 865                                 match $thing {
 866                                         &Some(ref t) => {
 867                                                 1u8.write(writer)?;
 868                                                 t.write(writer)?;
 869                                         },
 870                                         &None => 0u8.write(writer)?,
 871                                 }
 872                         }
 873                 }
 874
 875                 match self.key_storage {
 876                         Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref payment_base_key, ref shutdown_pubkey, ref prev_latest_per_commitment_point, ref latest_per_commitment_point, ref funding_info, ref current_remote_commitment_txid, ref prev_remote_commitment_txid } => {
 877                                 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
 878                                 writer.write_all(&revocation_base_key[..])?;
 879                                 writer.write_all(&htlc_base_key[..])?;
 880                                 writer.write_all(&delayed_payment_base_key[..])?;
 881                                 writer.write_all(&payment_base_key[..])?;
 882                                 writer.write_all(&shutdown_pubkey.serialize())?;
 883                                 prev_latest_per_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
 884                                 latest_per_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
 885                                 match funding_info  {
 886                                         &Some((ref outpoint, ref script)) => {
 887                                                 writer.write_all(&outpoint.txid[..])?;
 888                                                 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(outpoint.index))?;
 889                                                 script.write(writer)?;
 890                                         },
 891                                         &None => {
 892                                                 debug_assert!(false, "Try to serialize a useless Local monitor !");
 893                                         },
 894                                 }
 895                                 current_remote_commitment_txid.write(writer)?;
 896                                 prev_remote_commitment_txid.write(writer)?;
 897                         },
 898                         Storage::Watchtower { .. } => unimplemented!(),
 899                 }
 900
 901                 writer.write_all(&self.their_htlc_base_key.as_ref().unwrap().serialize())?;
 902                 writer.write_all(&self.their_delayed_payment_base_key.as_ref().unwrap().serialize())?;
 903
 904                 match self.their_cur_revocation_points {
 905                         Some((idx, pubkey, second_option)) => {
 906                                 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(idx))?;
 907                                 writer.write_all(&pubkey.serialize())?;
 908                                 match second_option {
 909                                         Some(second_pubkey) => {
 910                                                 writer.write_all(&second_pubkey.serialize())?;
 911                                         },
 912                                         None => {
 913                                                 writer.write_all(&[0; 33])?;
 914                                         },
 915                                 }
 916                         },
 917                         None => {
 918                                 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(0))?;
 919                         },
 920                 }
 921
 922                 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.our_to_self_delay))?;
 923                 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap()))?;
 924
 925                 for &(ref secret, ref idx) in self.old_secrets.iter() {
 926                         writer.write_all(secret)?;
 927                         writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*idx))?;
 928                 }
 929
 930                 macro_rules! serialize_htlc_in_commitment {
 931                         ($htlc_output: expr) => {
 932                                 writer.write_all(&[$htlc_output.offered as u8; 1])?;
 933                                 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc_output.amount_msat))?;
 934                                 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array($htlc_output.cltv_expiry))?;
 935                                 writer.write_all(&$htlc_output.payment_hash.0[..])?;
 936                                 $htlc_output.transaction_output_index.write(writer)?;
 937                         }
 938                 }
 939
 940                 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_claimable_outpoints.len() as u64))?;
 941                 for (ref txid, ref htlc_infos) in self.remote_claimable_outpoints.iter() {
 942                         writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
 943                         writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc_infos.len() as u64))?;
 944                         for &(ref htlc_output, ref htlc_source) in htlc_infos.iter() {
 945                                 serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output);
 946                                 write_option!(htlc_source);
 947                         }
 948                 }
 949
 950                 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.len() as u64))?;
 951                 for (ref txid, &(commitment_number, ref txouts)) in self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
 952                         writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
 953                         writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(commitment_number))?;
 954                         (txouts.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
 955                         for script in txouts.iter() {
 956                                 script.write(writer)?;
 957                         }
 958                 }
 959
 960                 if for_local_storage {
 961                         writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_hash_commitment_number.len() as u64))?;
 962                         for (ref payment_hash, commitment_number) in self.remote_hash_commitment_number.iter() {
 963                                 writer.write_all(&payment_hash.0[..])?;
 964                                 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(*commitment_number))?;
 965                         }
 966                 } else {
 967                         writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(0))?;
 968                 }
 969
 970                 macro_rules! serialize_local_tx {
 971                         ($local_tx: expr) => {
 972                                 if let Err(e) = $local_tx.tx.consensus_encode(&mut WriterWriteAdaptor(writer)) {
 973                                         match e {
 974                                                 encode::Error::Io(e) => return Err(e),
 975                                                 _ => panic!("local tx must have been well-formed!"),
 976                                         }
 977                                 }
 978
 979                                 writer.write_all(&$local_tx.revocation_key.serialize())?;
 980                                 writer.write_all(&$local_tx.a_htlc_key.serialize())?;
 981                                 writer.write_all(&$local_tx.b_htlc_key.serialize())?;
 982                                 writer.write_all(&$local_tx.delayed_payment_key.serialize())?;
 983
 984                                 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($local_tx.feerate_per_kw))?;
 985                                 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($local_tx.htlc_outputs.len() as u64))?;
 986                                 for &(ref htlc_output, ref sigs, ref htlc_source) in $local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
 987                                         serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output);
 988                                         if let &Some((ref their_sig, ref our_sig)) = sigs {
 989                                                 1u8.write(writer)?;
 990                                                 writer.write_all(&their_sig.serialize_compact())?;
 991                                                 writer.write_all(&our_sig.serialize_compact())?;
 992                                         } else {
 993                                                 0u8.write(writer)?;
 994                                         }
 995                                         write_option!(htlc_source);
 996                                 }
 997                         }
 998                 }
 999
1000                 if let Some(ref prev_local_tx) = self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1001                         writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
1002                         serialize_local_tx!(prev_local_tx);
1003                 } else {
1004                         writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
1005                 }
1006
1007                 if let Some(ref cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1008                         writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
1009                         serialize_local_tx!(cur_local_tx);
1010                 } else {
1011                         writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
1012                 }
1013
1014                 if for_local_storage {
1015                         writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(self.current_remote_commitment_number))?;
1016                 } else {
1017                         writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(0))?;
1018                 }
1019
1020                 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.payment_preimages.len() as u64))?;
1021                 for payment_preimage in self.payment_preimages.values() {
1022                         writer.write_all(&payment_preimage.0[..])?;
1023                 }
1024
1025                 self.last_block_hash.write(writer)?;
1026                 self.destination_script.write(writer)?;
1027
1028                 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.htlc_updated_waiting_threshold_conf.len() as u64))?;
1029                 for (ref target, ref updates) in self.htlc_updated_waiting_threshold_conf.iter() {
1030                         writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(**target))?;
1031                         writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(updates.len() as u64))?;
1032                         for ref update in updates.iter() {
1033                                 update.0.write(writer)?;
1034                                 update.1.write(writer)?;
1035                                 update.2.write(writer)?;
1036                         }
1037                 }
1038
1039                 Ok(())
1040         }
1041
1042         /// Writes this monitor into the given writer, suitable for writing to disk.
1043         ///
1044         /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor), which
1045         /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
1046         /// the "reorg path" (ie not just starting at the same height but starting at the highest
1047         /// common block that appears on your best chain as well as on the chain which contains the
1048         /// last block hash returned) upon deserializing the object!
1049         pub fn write_for_disk<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
1050                 self.write(writer, true)
1051         }
1052
1053         /// Encodes this monitor into the given writer, suitable for sending to a remote watchtower
1054         ///
1055         /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor), which
1056         /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
1057         /// the "reorg path" (ie not just starting at the same height but starting at the highest
1058         /// common block that appears on your best chain as well as on the chain which contains the
1059         /// last block hash returned) upon deserializing the object!
1060         pub fn write_for_watchtower<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
1061                 self.write(writer, false)
1062         }
1063
1064         /// Can only fail if idx is < get_min_seen_secret
1065         pub(super) fn get_secret(&self, idx: u64) -> Option<[u8; 32]> {
1066                 for i in 0..self.old_secrets.len() {
1067                         if (idx & (!((1 << i) - 1))) == self.old_secrets[i].1 {
1068                                 return Some(ChannelMonitor::derive_secret(self.old_secrets[i].0, i as u8, idx))
1069                         }
1070                 }
1071                 assert!(idx < self.get_min_seen_secret());
1072                 None
1073         }
1074
1075         pub(super) fn get_min_seen_secret(&self) -> u64 {
1076                 //TODO This can be optimized?
1077                 let mut min = 1 << 48;
1078                 for &(_, idx) in self.old_secrets.iter() {
1079                         if idx < min {
1080                                 min = idx;
1081                         }
1082                 }
1083                 min
1084         }
1085
1086         pub(super) fn get_cur_remote_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
1087                 self.current_remote_commitment_number
1088         }
1089
1090         pub(super) fn get_cur_local_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
1091                 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1092                         0xffff_ffff_ffff - ((((local_tx.tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (local_tx.tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor)
1093                 } else { 0xffff_ffff_ffff }
1094         }
1095
1096         /// Attempts to claim a remote commitment transaction's outputs using the revocation key and
1097         /// data in remote_claimable_outpoints. Will directly claim any HTLC outputs which expire at a
1098         /// height > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER. In any case, will install monitoring for
1099         /// HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions.
1100         /// Return updates for HTLC pending in the channel and failed automatically by the broadcast of
1101         /// revoked remote commitment tx
1102         fn check_spend_remote_transaction(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator) -> (Vec<Transaction>, (Sha256dHash, Vec<TxOut>), Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>) {
1103                 // Most secp and related errors trying to create keys means we have no hope of constructing
1104                 // a spend transaction...so we return no transactions to broadcast
1105                 let mut txn_to_broadcast = Vec::new();
1106                 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
1107                 let mut spendable_outputs = Vec::new();
1108
1109                 let commitment_txid = tx.txid(); //TODO: This is gonna be a performance bottleneck for watchtowers!
1110                 let per_commitment_option = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(&commitment_txid);
1111
1112                 macro_rules! ignore_error {
1113                         ( $thing : expr ) => {
1114                                 match $thing {
1115                                         Ok(a) => a,
1116                                         Err(_) => return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs)
1117                                 }
1118                         };
1119                 }
1120
1121                 let commitment_number = 0xffffffffffff - ((((tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor);
1122                 if commitment_number >= self.get_min_seen_secret() {
1123                         let secret = self.get_secret(commitment_number).unwrap();
1124                         let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secret));
1125                         let (revocation_pubkey, b_htlc_key, local_payment_key) = match self.key_storage {
1126                                 Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, ref payment_base_key, .. } => {
1127                                         let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
1128                                         (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_base_key))),
1129                                         ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &htlc_base_key))),
1130                                         Some(ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &payment_base_key))))
1131                                 },
1132                                 Storage::Watchtower { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
1133                                         let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
1134                                         (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &revocation_base_key)),
1135                                         ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &htlc_base_key)),
1136                                         None)
1137                                 },
1138                         };
1139                         let delayed_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key), &self.their_delayed_payment_base_key.unwrap()));
1140                         let a_htlc_key = match self.their_htlc_base_key {
1141                                 None => return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs),
1142                                 Some(their_htlc_base_key) => ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key), &their_htlc_base_key)),
1143                         };
1144
1145                         let revokeable_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey, self.our_to_self_delay, &delayed_key);
1146                         let revokeable_p2wsh = revokeable_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
1147
1148                         let local_payment_p2wpkh = if let Some(payment_key) = local_payment_key {
1149                                 // Note that the Network here is ignored as we immediately drop the address for the
1150                                 // script_pubkey version.
1151                                 let payment_hash160 = Hash160::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &payment_key).serialize());
1152                                 Some(Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&payment_hash160[..]).into_script())
1153                         } else { None };
1154
1155                         let mut total_value = 0;
1156                         let mut values = Vec::new();
1157                         let mut inputs = Vec::new();
1158                         let mut htlc_idxs = Vec::new();
1159                         let mut input_descriptors = Vec::new();
1160
1161                         for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
1162                                 if outp.script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh {
1163                                         inputs.push(TxIn {
1164                                                 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
1165                                                         txid: commitment_txid,
1166                                                         vout: idx as u32,
1167                                                 },
1168                                                 script_sig: Script::new(),
1169                                                 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
1170                                                 witness: Vec::new(),
1171                                         });
1172                                         htlc_idxs.push(None);
1173                                         values.push(outp.value);
1174                                         total_value += outp.value;
1175                                         input_descriptors.push(InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput);
1176                                 } else if Some(&outp.script_pubkey) == local_payment_p2wpkh.as_ref() {
1177                                         spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WPKH {
1178                                                 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: commitment_txid, vout: idx as u32 },
1179                                                 key: local_payment_key.unwrap(),
1180                                                 output: outp.clone(),
1181                                         });
1182                                 }
1183                         }
1184
1185                         macro_rules! sign_input {
1186                                 ($sighash_parts: expr, $input: expr, $htlc_idx: expr, $amount: expr) => {
1187                                         {
1188                                                 let (sig, redeemscript) = match self.key_storage {
1189                                                         Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
1190                                                                 let redeemscript = if $htlc_idx.is_none() { revokeable_redeemscript.clone() } else {
1191                                                                         let htlc = &per_commitment_option.unwrap()[$htlc_idx.unwrap()].0;
1192                                                                         chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey)
1193                                                                 };
1194                                                                 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&$sighash_parts.sighash_all(&$input, &redeemscript, $amount)[..]);
1195                                                                 let revocation_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key, &revocation_base_key));
1196                                                                 (self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &revocation_key), redeemscript)
1197                                                         },
1198                                                         Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
1199                                                                 unimplemented!();
1200                                                         }
1201                                                 };
1202                                                 $input.witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
1203                                                 $input.witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1204                                                 if $htlc_idx.is_none() {
1205                                                         $input.witness.push(vec!(1));
1206                                                 } else {
1207                                                         $input.witness.push(revocation_pubkey.serialize().to_vec());
1208                                                 }
1209                                                 $input.witness.push(redeemscript.into_bytes());
1210                                         }
1211                                 }
1212                         }
1213
1214                         if let Some(ref per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
1215                                 inputs.reserve_exact(per_commitment_data.len());
1216
1217                                 for (idx, &(ref htlc, _)) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() {
1218                                         if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
1219                                                 let expected_script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey);
1220                                                 if transaction_output_index as usize >= tx.output.len() ||
1221                                                                 tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 ||
1222                                                                 tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].script_pubkey != expected_script.to_v0_p2wsh() {
1223                                                         return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs); // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user
1224                                                 }
1225                                                 let input = TxIn {
1226                                                         previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
1227                                                                 txid: commitment_txid,
1228                                                                 vout: transaction_output_index,
1229                                                         },
1230                                                         script_sig: Script::new(),
1231                                                         sequence: 0xfffffffd,
1232                                                         witness: Vec::new(),
1233                                                 };
1234                                                 if htlc.cltv_expiry > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER {
1235                                                         inputs.push(input);
1236                                                         htlc_idxs.push(Some(idx));
1237                                                         values.push(tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value);
1238                                                         total_value += htlc.amount_msat / 1000;
1239                                                         input_descriptors.push(if htlc.offered { InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC } else { InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC });
1240                                                 } else {
1241                                                         let mut single_htlc_tx = Transaction {
1242                                                                 version: 2,
1243                                                                 lock_time: 0,
1244                                                                 input: vec![input],
1245                                                                 output: vec!(TxOut {
1246                                                                         script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1247                                                                         value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1248                                                                 }),
1249                                                         };
1250                                                         let predicted_weight = single_htlc_tx.get_weight() + Self::get_witnesses_weight(&[if htlc.offered { InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC } else { InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC }]);
1251                                                         if subtract_high_prio_fee!(self, fee_estimator, single_htlc_tx.output[0].value, predicted_weight, tx.txid()) {
1252                                                                 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&single_htlc_tx);
1253                                                                 sign_input!(sighash_parts, single_htlc_tx.input[0], Some(idx), htlc.amount_msat / 1000);
1254                                                                 assert!(predicted_weight >= single_htlc_tx.get_weight());
1255                                                                 txn_to_broadcast.push(single_htlc_tx);
1256                                                         }
1257                                                 }
1258                                         }
1259                                 }
1260                         }
1261
1262                         if !inputs.is_empty() || !txn_to_broadcast.is_empty() || per_commitment_option.is_some() { // ie we're confident this is actually ours
1263                                 // We're definitely a remote commitment transaction!
1264                                 log_trace!(self, "Got broadcast of revoked remote commitment transaction, generating general spend tx with {} inputs and {} other txn to broadcast", inputs.len(), txn_to_broadcast.len());
1265                                 watch_outputs.append(&mut tx.output.clone());
1266                                 self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, (commitment_number, tx.output.iter().map(|output| { output.script_pubkey.clone() }).collect()));
1267
1268                                 macro_rules! check_htlc_fails {
1269                                         ($txid: expr, $commitment_tx: expr) => {
1270                                                 if let Some(ref outpoints) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get($txid) {
1271                                                         for &(ref htlc, ref source_option) in outpoints.iter() {
1272                                                                 if let &Some(ref source) = source_option {
1273                                                                         log_info!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} remote commitment tx due to broadcast of revoked remote commitment transaction, waiting for confirmation (at height {})", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx, height + HTLC_FAIL_ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
1274                                                                         match self.htlc_updated_waiting_threshold_conf.entry(height + HTLC_FAIL_ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
1275                                                                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
1276                                                                                         let e = entry.get_mut();
1277                                                                                         e.retain(|ref update| update.0 != **source);
1278                                                                                         e.push(((**source).clone(), None, htlc.payment_hash.clone()));
1279                                                                                 }
1280                                                                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1281                                                                                         entry.insert(vec![((**source).clone(), None, htlc.payment_hash.clone())]);
1282                                                                                 }
1283                                                                         }
1284                                                                 }
1285                                                         }
1286                                                 }
1287                                         }
1288                                 }
1289                                 if let Storage::Local { ref current_remote_commitment_txid, ref prev_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage {
1290                                         if let &Some(ref txid) = current_remote_commitment_txid {
1291                                                 check_htlc_fails!(txid, "current");
1292                                         }
1293                                         if let &Some(ref txid) = prev_remote_commitment_txid {
1294                                                 check_htlc_fails!(txid, "remote");
1295                                         }
1296                                 }
1297                                 // No need to check local commitment txn, symmetric HTLCSource must be present as per-htlc data on remote commitment tx
1298                         }
1299                         if inputs.is_empty() { return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs); } // Nothing to be done...probably a false positive/local tx
1300
1301                         let outputs = vec!(TxOut {
1302                                 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1303                                 value: total_value,
1304                         });
1305                         let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
1306                                 version: 2,
1307                                 lock_time: 0,
1308                                 input: inputs,
1309                                 output: outputs,
1310                         };
1311                         let predicted_weight = spend_tx.get_weight() + Self::get_witnesses_weight(&input_descriptors[..]);
1312
1313                         if !subtract_high_prio_fee!(self, fee_estimator, spend_tx.output[0].value, predicted_weight, tx.txid()) {
1314                                 return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs);
1315                         }
1316
1317                         let mut values_drain = values.drain(..);
1318                         let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx);
1319
1320                         for (input, htlc_idx) in spend_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(htlc_idxs.iter()) {
1321                                 let value = values_drain.next().unwrap();
1322                                 sign_input!(sighash_parts, input, htlc_idx, value);
1323                         }
1324                         assert!(predicted_weight >= spend_tx.get_weight());
1325
1326                         spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
1327                                 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: spend_tx.txid(), vout: 0 },
1328                                 output: spend_tx.output[0].clone(),
1329                         });
1330                         txn_to_broadcast.push(spend_tx);
1331                 } else if let Some(per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
1332                         // While this isn't useful yet, there is a potential race where if a counterparty
1333                         // revokes a state at the same time as the commitment transaction for that state is
1334                         // confirmed, and the watchtower receives the block before the user, the user could
1335                         // upload a new ChannelMonitor with the revocation secret but the watchtower has
1336                         // already processed the block, resulting in the remote_commitment_txn_on_chain entry
1337                         // not being generated by the above conditional. Thus, to be safe, we go ahead and
1338                         // insert it here.
1339                         watch_outputs.append(&mut tx.output.clone());
1340                         self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, (commitment_number, tx.output.iter().map(|output| { output.script_pubkey.clone() }).collect()));
1341
1342                         log_trace!(self, "Got broadcast of non-revoked remote commitment transaction {}", commitment_txid);
1343
1344                         macro_rules! check_htlc_fails {
1345                                 ($txid: expr, $commitment_tx: expr, $id: tt) => {
1346                                         if let Some(ref latest_outpoints) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get($txid) {
1347                                                 $id: for &(ref htlc, ref source_option) in latest_outpoints.iter() {
1348                                                         if let &Some(ref source) = source_option {
1349                                                                 // Check if the HTLC is present in the commitment transaction that was
1350                                                                 // broadcast, but not if it was below the dust limit, which we should
1351                                                                 // fail backwards immediately as there is no way for us to learn the
1352                                                                 // payment_preimage.
1353                                                                 // Note that if the dust limit were allowed to change between
1354                                                                 // commitment transactions we'd want to be check whether *any*
1355                                                                 // broadcastable commitment transaction has the HTLC in it, but it
1356                                                                 // cannot currently change after channel initialization, so we don't
1357                                                                 // need to here.
1358                                                                 for &(ref broadcast_htlc, ref broadcast_source) in per_commitment_data.iter() {
1359                                                                         if broadcast_htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() && Some(source) == broadcast_source.as_ref() {
1360                                                                                 continue $id;
1361                                                                         }
1362                                                                 }
1363                                                                 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} remote commitment tx due to broadcast of remote commitment transaction", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx);
1364                                                                 match self.htlc_updated_waiting_threshold_conf.entry(height + HTLC_FAIL_ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
1365                                                                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
1366                                                                                 let e = entry.get_mut();
1367                                                                                 e.retain(|ref update| update.0 != **source);
1368                                                                                 e.push(((**source).clone(), None, htlc.payment_hash.clone()));
1369                                                                         }
1370                                                                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1371                                                                                 entry.insert(vec![((**source).clone(), None, htlc.payment_hash.clone())]);
1372                                                                         }
1373                                                                 }
1374                                                         }
1375                                                 }
1376                                         }
1377                                 }
1378                         }
1379                         if let Storage::Local { ref current_remote_commitment_txid, ref prev_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage {
1380                                 if let &Some(ref txid) = current_remote_commitment_txid {
1381                                         check_htlc_fails!(txid, "current", 'current_loop);
1382                                 }
1383                                 if let &Some(ref txid) = prev_remote_commitment_txid {
1384                                         check_htlc_fails!(txid, "previous", 'prev_loop);
1385                                 }
1386                         }
1387
1388                         if let Some(revocation_points) = self.their_cur_revocation_points {
1389                                 let revocation_point_option =
1390                                         if revocation_points.0 == commitment_number { Some(&revocation_points.1) }
1391                                         else if let Some(point) = revocation_points.2.as_ref() {
1392                                                 if revocation_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 { Some(point) } else { None }
1393                                         } else { None };
1394                                 if let Some(revocation_point) = revocation_point_option {
1395                                         let (revocation_pubkey, b_htlc_key) = match self.key_storage {
1396                                                 Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
1397                                                         (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_base_key))),
1398                                                         ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &htlc_base_key))))
1399                                                 },
1400                                                 Storage::Watchtower { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
1401                                                         (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &revocation_base_key)),
1402                                                         ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &htlc_base_key)))
1403                                                 },
1404                                         };
1405                                         let a_htlc_key = match self.their_htlc_base_key {
1406                                                 None => return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs),
1407                                                 Some(their_htlc_base_key) => ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &their_htlc_base_key)),
1408                                         };
1409
1410                                         for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
1411                                                 if outp.script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh() {
1412                                                         match self.key_storage {
1413                                                                 Storage::Local { ref payment_base_key, .. } => {
1414                                                                         if let Ok(local_key) = chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_point, &payment_base_key) {
1415                                                                                 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WPKH {
1416                                                                                         outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: commitment_txid, vout: idx as u32 },
1417                                                                                         key: local_key,
1418                                                                                         output: outp.clone(),
1419                                                                                 });
1420                                                                         }
1421                                                                 },
1422                                                                 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {}
1423                                                         }
1424                                                         break; // Only to_remote ouput is claimable
1425                                                 }
1426                                         }
1427
1428                                         let mut total_value = 0;
1429                                         let mut values = Vec::new();
1430                                         let mut inputs = Vec::new();
1431                                         let mut input_descriptors = Vec::new();
1432
1433                                         macro_rules! sign_input {
1434                                                 ($sighash_parts: expr, $input: expr, $amount: expr, $preimage: expr) => {
1435                                                         {
1436                                                                 let (sig, redeemscript) = match self.key_storage {
1437                                                                         Storage::Local { ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
1438                                                                                 let htlc = &per_commitment_option.unwrap()[$input.sequence as usize].0;
1439                                                                                 let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey);
1440                                                                                 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&$sighash_parts.sighash_all(&$input, &redeemscript, $amount)[..]);
1441                                                                                 let htlc_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &htlc_base_key));
1442                                                                                 (self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &htlc_key), redeemscript)
1443                                                                         },
1444                                                                         Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
1445                                                                                 unimplemented!();
1446                                                                         }
1447                                                                 };
1448                                                                 $input.witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
1449                                                                 $input.witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1450                                                                 $input.witness.push($preimage);
1451                                                                 $input.witness.push(redeemscript.into_bytes());
1452                                                         }
1453                                                 }
1454                                         }
1455
1456                                         for (idx, &(ref htlc, _)) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() {
1457                                                 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
1458                                                         let expected_script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey);
1459                                                         if transaction_output_index as usize >= tx.output.len() ||
1460                                                                         tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 ||
1461                                                                         tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].script_pubkey != expected_script.to_v0_p2wsh() {
1462                                                                 return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs); // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user
1463                                                         }
1464                                                         if let Some(payment_preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
1465                                                                 let input = TxIn {
1466                                                                         previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
1467                                                                                 txid: commitment_txid,
1468                                                                                 vout: transaction_output_index,
1469                                                                         },
1470                                                                         script_sig: Script::new(),
1471                                                                         sequence: idx as u32, // reset to 0xfffffffd in sign_input
1472                                                                         witness: Vec::new(),
1473                                                                 };
1474                                                                 if htlc.cltv_expiry > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER {
1475                                                                         inputs.push(input);
1476                                                                         values.push((tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value, payment_preimage));
1477                                                                         total_value += htlc.amount_msat / 1000;
1478                                                                         input_descriptors.push(if htlc.offered { InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC } else { InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC });
1479                                                                 } else {
1480                                                                         let mut single_htlc_tx = Transaction {
1481                                                                                 version: 2,
1482                                                                                 lock_time: 0,
1483                                                                                 input: vec![input],
1484                                                                                 output: vec!(TxOut {
1485                                                                                         script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1486                                                                                         value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1487                                                                                 }),
1488                                                                         };
1489                                                                         let predicted_weight = single_htlc_tx.get_weight() + Self::get_witnesses_weight(&[if htlc.offered { InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC } else { InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC }]);
1490                                                                         if subtract_high_prio_fee!(self, fee_estimator, single_htlc_tx.output[0].value, predicted_weight, tx.txid()) {
1491                                                                                 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&single_htlc_tx);
1492                                                                                 sign_input!(sighash_parts, single_htlc_tx.input[0], htlc.amount_msat / 1000, payment_preimage.0.to_vec());
1493                                                                                 assert!(predicted_weight >= single_htlc_tx.get_weight());
1494                                                                                 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
1495                                                                                         outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: single_htlc_tx.txid(), vout: 0 },
1496                                                                                         output: single_htlc_tx.output[0].clone(),
1497                                                                                 });
1498                                                                                 txn_to_broadcast.push(single_htlc_tx);
1499                                                                         }
1500                                                                 }
1501                                                         }
1502                                                         if !htlc.offered {
1503                                                                 // TODO: If the HTLC has already expired, potentially merge it with the
1504                                                                 // rest of the claim transaction, as above.
1505                                                                 let input = TxIn {
1506                                                                         previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
1507                                                                                 txid: commitment_txid,
1508                                                                                 vout: transaction_output_index,
1509                                                                         },
1510                                                                         script_sig: Script::new(),
1511                                                                         sequence: idx as u32,
1512                                                                         witness: Vec::new(),
1513                                                                 };
1514                                                                 let mut timeout_tx = Transaction {
1515                                                                         version: 2,
1516                                                                         lock_time: htlc.cltv_expiry,
1517                                                                         input: vec![input],
1518                                                                         output: vec!(TxOut {
1519                                                                                 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1520                                                                                 value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1521                                                                         }),
1522                                                                 };
1523                                                                 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&timeout_tx);
1524                                                                 sign_input!(sighash_parts, timeout_tx.input[0], htlc.amount_msat / 1000, vec![0]);
1525                                                                 txn_to_broadcast.push(timeout_tx);
1526                                                         }
1527                                                 }
1528                                         }
1529
1530                                         if inputs.is_empty() { return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs); } // Nothing to be done...probably a false positive/local tx
1531
1532                                         let outputs = vec!(TxOut {
1533                                                 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1534                                                 value: total_value
1535                                         });
1536                                         let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
1537                                                 version: 2,
1538                                                 lock_time: 0,
1539                                                 input: inputs,
1540                                                 output: outputs,
1541                                         };
1542                                         let predicted_weight = spend_tx.get_weight() + Self::get_witnesses_weight(&input_descriptors[..]);
1543                                         if !subtract_high_prio_fee!(self, fee_estimator, spend_tx.output[0].value, predicted_weight, tx.txid()) {
1544                                                 return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs);
1545                                         }
1546
1547                                         let mut values_drain = values.drain(..);
1548                                         let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx);
1549
1550                                         for input in spend_tx.input.iter_mut() {
1551                                                 let value = values_drain.next().unwrap();
1552                                                 sign_input!(sighash_parts, input, value.0, (value.1).0.to_vec());
1553                                         }
1554
1555                                         assert!(predicted_weight >= spend_tx.get_weight());
1556                                         spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
1557                                                 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: spend_tx.txid(), vout: 0 },
1558                                                 output: spend_tx.output[0].clone(),
1559                                         });
1560                                         txn_to_broadcast.push(spend_tx);
1561                                 }
1562                         }
1563                 }
1564
1565                 (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs)
1566         }
1567
1568         /// Attempts to claim a remote HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout's outputs using the revocation key
1569         fn check_spend_remote_htlc(&self, tx: &Transaction, commitment_number: u64, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator) -> (Option<Transaction>, Option<SpendableOutputDescriptor>) {
1570                 if tx.input.len() != 1 || tx.output.len() != 1 {
1571                         return (None, None)
1572                 }
1573
1574                 macro_rules! ignore_error {
1575                         ( $thing : expr ) => {
1576                                 match $thing {
1577                                         Ok(a) => a,
1578                                         Err(_) => return (None, None)
1579                                 }
1580                         };
1581                 }
1582
1583                 let secret = if let Some(secret) = self.get_secret(commitment_number) { secret } else { return (None, None); };
1584                 let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secret));
1585                 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
1586                 let revocation_pubkey = match self.key_storage {
1587                         Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
1588                                 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_base_key)))
1589                         },
1590                         Storage::Watchtower { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
1591                                 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &revocation_base_key))
1592                         },
1593                 };
1594                 let delayed_key = match self.their_delayed_payment_base_key {
1595                         None => return (None, None),
1596                         Some(their_delayed_payment_base_key) => ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &their_delayed_payment_base_key)),
1597                 };
1598                 let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), &delayed_key);
1599                 let revokeable_p2wsh = redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
1600                 let htlc_txid = tx.txid(); //TODO: This is gonna be a performance bottleneck for watchtowers!
1601
1602                 let mut inputs = Vec::new();
1603                 let mut amount = 0;
1604
1605                 if tx.output[0].script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh { //HTLC transactions have one txin, one txout
1606                         inputs.push(TxIn {
1607                                 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
1608                                         txid: htlc_txid,
1609                                         vout: 0,
1610                                 },
1611                                 script_sig: Script::new(),
1612                                 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
1613                                 witness: Vec::new(),
1614                         });
1615                         amount = tx.output[0].value;
1616                 }
1617
1618                 if !inputs.is_empty() {
1619                         let outputs = vec!(TxOut {
1620                                 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1621                                 value: amount
1622                         });
1623
1624                         let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
1625                                 version: 2,
1626                                 lock_time: 0,
1627                                 input: inputs,
1628                                 output: outputs,
1629                         };
1630                         let predicted_weight = spend_tx.get_weight() + Self::get_witnesses_weight(&[InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput]);
1631                         if !subtract_high_prio_fee!(self, fee_estimator, spend_tx.output[0].value, predicted_weight, tx.txid()) {
1632                                 return (None, None);
1633                         }
1634
1635                         let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx);
1636
1637                         let sig = match self.key_storage {
1638                                 Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
1639                                         let sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash_parts.sighash_all(&spend_tx.input[0], &redeemscript, amount)[..]);
1640                                         let revocation_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key, &revocation_base_key));
1641                                         self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &revocation_key)
1642                                 }
1643                                 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
1644                                         unimplemented!();
1645                                 }
1646                         };
1647                         spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
1648                         spend_tx.input[0].witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1649                         spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(vec!(1));
1650                         spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(redeemscript.into_bytes());
1651
1652                         assert!(predicted_weight >= spend_tx.get_weight());
1653                         let outpoint = BitcoinOutPoint { txid: spend_tx.txid(), vout: 0 };
1654                         let output = spend_tx.output[0].clone();
1655                         (Some(spend_tx), Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput { outpoint, output }))
1656                 } else { (None, None) }
1657         }
1658
1659         fn broadcast_by_local_state(&self, local_tx: &LocalSignedTx, per_commitment_point: &Option<PublicKey>, delayed_payment_base_key: &Option<SecretKey>) -> (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>, Vec<TxOut>) {
1660                 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
1661                 let mut spendable_outputs = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
1662                 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
1663
1664                 macro_rules! add_dynamic_output {
1665                         ($father_tx: expr, $vout: expr) => {
1666                                 if let Some(ref per_commitment_point) = *per_commitment_point {
1667                                         if let Some(ref delayed_payment_base_key) = *delayed_payment_base_key {
1668                                                 if let Ok(local_delayedkey) = chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base_key) {
1669                                                         spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WSH {
1670                                                                 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: $father_tx.txid(), vout: $vout },
1671                                                                 key: local_delayedkey,
1672                                                                 witness_script: chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&local_tx.revocation_key, self.our_to_self_delay, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key),
1673                                                                 to_self_delay: self.our_to_self_delay,
1674                                                                 output: $father_tx.output[$vout as usize].clone(),
1675                                                         });
1676                                                 }
1677                                         }
1678                                 }
1679                         }
1680                 }
1681
1682
1683                 let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&local_tx.revocation_key, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), &local_tx.delayed_payment_key);
1684                 let revokeable_p2wsh = redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
1685                 for (idx, output) in local_tx.tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
1686                         if output.script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh {
1687                                 add_dynamic_output!(local_tx.tx, idx as u32);
1688                                 break;
1689                         }
1690                 }
1691
1692                 for &(ref htlc, ref sigs, _) in local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1693                         if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
1694                                 if let &Some((ref their_sig, ref our_sig)) = sigs {
1695                                         if htlc.offered {
1696                                                 log_trace!(self, "Broadcasting HTLC-Timeout transaction against local commitment transactions");
1697                                                 let mut htlc_timeout_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&local_tx.txid, local_tx.feerate_per_kw, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), htlc, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key, &local_tx.revocation_key);
1698
1699                                                 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
1700
1701                                                 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(their_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
1702                                                 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1703                                                 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
1704                                                 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1705
1706                                                 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new());
1707                                                 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &local_tx.a_htlc_key, &local_tx.b_htlc_key, &local_tx.revocation_key).into_bytes());
1708
1709                                                 add_dynamic_output!(htlc_timeout_tx, 0);
1710                                                 res.push(htlc_timeout_tx);
1711                                         } else {
1712                                                 if let Some(payment_preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
1713                                                         log_trace!(self, "Broadcasting HTLC-Success transaction against local commitment transactions");
1714                                                         let mut htlc_success_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&local_tx.txid, local_tx.feerate_per_kw, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), htlc, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key, &local_tx.revocation_key);
1715
1716                                                         htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
1717
1718                                                         htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(their_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
1719                                                         htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1720                                                         htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
1721                                                         htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1722
1723                                                         htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(payment_preimage.0.to_vec());
1724                                                         htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &local_tx.a_htlc_key, &local_tx.b_htlc_key, &local_tx.revocation_key).into_bytes());
1725
1726                                                         add_dynamic_output!(htlc_success_tx, 0);
1727                                                         res.push(htlc_success_tx);
1728                                                 }
1729                                         }
1730                                         watch_outputs.push(local_tx.tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].clone());
1731                                 } else { panic!("Should have sigs for non-dust local tx outputs!") }
1732                         }
1733                 }
1734
1735                 (res, spendable_outputs, watch_outputs)
1736         }
1737
1738         /// Attempts to claim any claimable HTLCs in a commitment transaction which was not (yet)
1739         /// revoked using data in local_claimable_outpoints.
1740         /// Should not be used if check_spend_revoked_transaction succeeds.
1741         fn check_spend_local_transaction(&self, tx: &Transaction, _height: u32) -> (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>, (Sha256dHash, Vec<TxOut>)) {
1742                 let commitment_txid = tx.txid();
1743                 // TODO: If we find a match here we need to fail back HTLCs that weren't included in the
1744                 // broadcast commitment transaction, either because they didn't meet dust or because they
1745                 // weren't yet included in our commitment transaction(s).
1746                 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1747                         if local_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
1748                                 log_trace!(self, "Got latest local commitment tx broadcast, searching for available HTLCs to claim");
1749                                 match self.key_storage {
1750                                         Storage::Local { ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref latest_per_commitment_point, .. } => {
1751                                                 let (local_txn, spendable_outputs, watch_outputs) = self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, latest_per_commitment_point, &Some(*delayed_payment_base_key));
1752                                                 return (local_txn, spendable_outputs, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs));
1753                                         },
1754                                         Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
1755                                                 let (local_txn, spendable_outputs, watch_outputs) = self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, &None, &None);
1756                                                 return (local_txn, spendable_outputs, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs));
1757                                         }
1758                                 }
1759                         }
1760                 }
1761                 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1762                         if local_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
1763                                 log_trace!(self, "Got previous local commitment tx broadcast, searching for available HTLCs to claim");
1764                                 match self.key_storage {
1765                                         Storage::Local { ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref prev_latest_per_commitment_point, .. } => {
1766                                                 let (local_txn, spendable_outputs, watch_outputs) = self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, prev_latest_per_commitment_point, &Some(*delayed_payment_base_key));
1767                                                 return (local_txn, spendable_outputs, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs));
1768                                         },
1769                                         Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
1770                                                 let (local_txn, spendable_outputs, watch_outputs) = self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, &None, &None);
1771                                                 return (local_txn, spendable_outputs, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs));
1772                                         }
1773                                 }
1774                         }
1775                 }
1776                 (Vec::new(), Vec::new(), (commitment_txid, Vec::new()))
1777         }
1778
1779         /// Generate a spendable output event when closing_transaction get registered onchain.
1780         fn check_spend_closing_transaction(&self, tx: &Transaction) -> Option<SpendableOutputDescriptor> {
1781                 if tx.input[0].sequence == 0xFFFFFFFF && !tx.input[0].witness.is_empty() && tx.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len() == 71 {
1782                         match self.key_storage {
1783                                 Storage::Local { ref shutdown_pubkey, .. } =>  {
1784                                         let our_channel_close_key_hash = Hash160::hash(&shutdown_pubkey.serialize());
1785                                         let shutdown_script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&our_channel_close_key_hash[..]).into_script();
1786                                         for (idx, output) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
1787                                                 if shutdown_script == output.script_pubkey {
1788                                                         return Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
1789                                                                 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), vout: idx as u32 },
1790                                                                 output: output.clone(),
1791                                                         });
1792                                                 }
1793                                         }
1794                                 }
1795                                 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
1796                                         //TODO: we need to ensure an offline client will generate the event when it
1797                                         // comes back online after only the watchtower saw the transaction
1798                                 }
1799                         }
1800                 }
1801                 None
1802         }
1803
1804         /// Used by ChannelManager deserialization to broadcast the latest local state if it's copy of
1805         /// the Channel was out-of-date.
1806         pub(super) fn get_latest_local_commitment_txn(&self) -> Vec<Transaction> {
1807                 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1808                         let mut res = vec![local_tx.tx.clone()];
1809                         match self.key_storage {
1810                                 Storage::Local { ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref prev_latest_per_commitment_point, .. } => {
1811                                         res.append(&mut self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, prev_latest_per_commitment_point, &Some(*delayed_payment_base_key)).0);
1812                                 },
1813                                 _ => panic!("Can only broadcast by local channelmonitor"),
1814                         };
1815                         res
1816                 } else {
1817                         Vec::new()
1818                 }
1819         }
1820
1821         fn block_connected(&mut self, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], height: u32, block_hash: &Sha256dHash, broadcaster: &BroadcasterInterface, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator)-> (Vec<(Sha256dHash, Vec<TxOut>)>, Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>, Vec<(HTLCSource, Option<PaymentPreimage>, PaymentHash)>) {
1822                 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
1823                 let mut spendable_outputs = Vec::new();
1824                 let mut htlc_updated = Vec::new();
1825                 for tx in txn_matched {
1826                         if tx.input.len() == 1 {
1827                                 // Assuming our keys were not leaked (in which case we're screwed no matter what),
1828                                 // commitment transactions and HTLC transactions will all only ever have one input,
1829                                 // which is an easy way to filter out any potential non-matching txn for lazy
1830                                 // filters.
1831                                 let prevout = &tx.input[0].previous_output;
1832                                 let mut txn: Vec<Transaction> = Vec::new();
1833                                 let funding_txo = match self.key_storage {
1834                                         Storage::Local { ref funding_info, .. } => {
1835                                                 funding_info.clone()
1836                                         }
1837                                         Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
1838                                                 unimplemented!();
1839                                         }
1840                                 };
1841                                 if funding_txo.is_none() || (prevout.txid == funding_txo.as_ref().unwrap().0.txid && prevout.vout == funding_txo.as_ref().unwrap().0.index as u32) {
1842                                         let (remote_txn, new_outputs, mut spendable_output) = self.check_spend_remote_transaction(tx, height, fee_estimator);
1843                                         txn = remote_txn;
1844                                         spendable_outputs.append(&mut spendable_output);
1845                                         if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() {
1846                                                 watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
1847                                         }
1848                                         if txn.is_empty() {
1849                                                 let (local_txn, mut spendable_output, new_outputs) = self.check_spend_local_transaction(tx, height);
1850                                                 spendable_outputs.append(&mut spendable_output);
1851                                                 txn = local_txn;
1852                                                 if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() {
1853                                                         watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
1854                                                 }
1855                                         }
1856                                         if !funding_txo.is_none() && txn.is_empty() {
1857                                                 if let Some(spendable_output) = self.check_spend_closing_transaction(tx) {
1858                                                         spendable_outputs.push(spendable_output);
1859                                                 }
1860                                         }
1861                                 } else {
1862                                         if let Some(&(commitment_number, _)) = self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.get(&prevout.txid) {
1863                                                 let (tx, spendable_output) = self.check_spend_remote_htlc(tx, commitment_number, fee_estimator);
1864                                                 if let Some(tx) = tx {
1865                                                         txn.push(tx);
1866                                                 }
1867                                                 if let Some(spendable_output) = spendable_output {
1868                                                         spendable_outputs.push(spendable_output);
1869                                                 }
1870                                         }
1871                                 }
1872                                 for tx in txn.iter() {
1873                                         broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(tx);
1874                                 }
1875                         }
1876                         // While all commitment/HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions have one input, HTLCs
1877                         // can also be resolved in a few other ways which can have more than one output. Thus,
1878                         // we call is_resolving_htlc_output here outside of the tx.input.len() == 1 check.
1879                         let mut updated = self.is_resolving_htlc_output(tx, height);
1880                         if updated.len() > 0 {
1881                                 htlc_updated.append(&mut updated);
1882                         }
1883                 }
1884                 if let Some(ref cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1885                         if self.would_broadcast_at_height(height) {
1886                                 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&cur_local_tx.tx);
1887                                 match self.key_storage {
1888                                         Storage::Local { ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref latest_per_commitment_point, .. } => {
1889                                                 let (txs, mut spendable_output, new_outputs) = self.broadcast_by_local_state(&cur_local_tx, latest_per_commitment_point, &Some(*delayed_payment_base_key));
1890                                                 spendable_outputs.append(&mut spendable_output);
1891                                                 if !new_outputs.is_empty() {
1892                                                         watch_outputs.push((cur_local_tx.txid.clone(), new_outputs));
1893                                                 }
1894                                                 for tx in txs {
1895                                                         broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
1896                                                 }
1897                                         },
1898                                         Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
1899                                                 let (txs, mut spendable_output, new_outputs) = self.broadcast_by_local_state(&cur_local_tx, &None, &None);
1900                                                 spendable_outputs.append(&mut spendable_output);
1901                                                 if !new_outputs.is_empty() {
1902                                                         watch_outputs.push((cur_local_tx.txid.clone(), new_outputs));
1903                                                 }
1904                                                 for tx in txs {
1905                                                         broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
1906                                                 }
1907                                         }
1908                                 }
1909                         }
1910                 }
1911                 if let Some(updates) = self.htlc_updated_waiting_threshold_conf.remove(&height) {
1912                         for update in updates {
1913                                 log_trace!(self, "HTLC {} failure update has get enough confirmation to be pass upstream", log_bytes!((update.2).0));
1914                                 htlc_updated.push(update);
1915                         }
1916                 }
1917                 self.last_block_hash = block_hash.clone();
1918                 (watch_outputs, spendable_outputs, htlc_updated)
1919         }
1920
1921         fn block_disconnected(&mut self, height: u32, block_hash: &Sha256dHash) {
1922                 if let Some(_) = self.htlc_updated_waiting_threshold_conf.remove(&(height + HTLC_FAIL_ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1)) {
1923                         //We discard htlc update there as failure-trigger tx (revoked commitment tx, non-revoked commitment tx, HTLC-timeout tx) has been disconnected
1924                 }
1925                 self.last_block_hash = block_hash.clone();
1926         }
1927
1928         pub(super) fn would_broadcast_at_height(&self, height: u32) -> bool {
1929                 // We need to consider all HTLCs which are:
1930                 //  * in any unrevoked remote commitment transaction, as they could broadcast said
1931                 //    transactions and we'd end up in a race, or
1932                 //  * are in our latest local commitment transaction, as this is the thing we will
1933                 //    broadcast if we go on-chain.
1934                 // Note that we consider HTLCs which were below dust threshold here - while they don't
1935                 // strictly imply that we need to fail the channel, we need to go ahead and fail them back
1936                 // to the source, and if we don't fail the channel we will have to ensure that the next
1937                 // updates that peer sends us are update_fails, failing the channel if not. It's probably
1938                 // easier to just fail the channel as this case should be rare enough anyway.
1939                 macro_rules! scan_commitment {
1940                         ($htlcs: expr, $local_tx: expr) => {
1941                                 for ref htlc in $htlcs {
1942                                         // For inbound HTLCs which we know the preimage for, we have to ensure we hit the
1943                                         // chain with enough room to claim the HTLC without our counterparty being able to
1944                                         // time out the HTLC first.
1945                                         // For outbound HTLCs which our counterparty hasn't failed/claimed, our primary
1946                                         // concern is being able to claim the corresponding inbound HTLC (on another
1947                                         // channel) before it expires. In fact, we don't even really care if our
1948                                         // counterparty here claims such an outbound HTLC after it expired as long as we
1949                                         // can still claim the corresponding HTLC. Thus, to avoid needlessly hitting the
1950                                         // chain when our counterparty is waiting for expiration to off-chain fail an HTLC
1951                                         // we give ourselves a few blocks of headroom after expiration before going
1952                                         // on-chain for an expired HTLC.
1953                                         // Note that, to avoid a potential attack whereby a node delays claiming an HTLC
1954                                         // from us until we've reached the point where we go on-chain with the
1955                                         // corresponding inbound HTLC, we must ensure that outbound HTLCs go on chain at
1956                                         // least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER blocks prior to the inbound HTLC.
1957                                         //  aka outbound_cltv + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS == height - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
1958                                         //      inbound_cltv == height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
1959                                         //      outbound_cltv + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= inbound_cltv - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
1960                                         //      HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS + 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= inbound_cltv - outbound_cltv
1961                                         //      CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA <= inbound_cltv - outbound_cltv (by check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion)
1962                                         //      HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS + 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA
1963                                         //  The final, above, condition is checked for statically in channelmanager
1964                                         //  with CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2.
1965                                         let htlc_outbound = $local_tx == htlc.offered;
1966                                         if ( htlc_outbound && htlc.cltv_expiry + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS <= height) ||
1967                                            (!htlc_outbound && htlc.cltv_expiry <= height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER && self.payment_preimages.contains_key(&htlc.payment_hash)) {
1968                                                 log_info!(self, "Force-closing channel due to {} HTLC timeout, HTLC expiry is {}", if htlc_outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound "}, htlc.cltv_expiry);
1969                                                 return true;
1970                                         }
1971                                 }
1972                         }
1973                 }
1974
1975                 if let Some(ref cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1976                         scan_commitment!(cur_local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, _)| a), true);
1977                 }
1978
1979                 if let Storage::Local { ref current_remote_commitment_txid, ref prev_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage {
1980                         if let &Some(ref txid) = current_remote_commitment_txid {
1981                                 if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(txid) {
1982                                         scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _)| a), false);
1983                                 }
1984                         }
1985                         if let &Some(ref txid) = prev_remote_commitment_txid {
1986                                 if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(txid) {
1987                                         scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _)| a), false);
1988                                 }
1989                         }
1990                 }
1991
1992                 false
1993         }
1994
1995         /// Check if any transaction broadcasted is resolving HTLC output by a success or timeout on a local
1996         /// or remote commitment tx, if so send back the source, preimage if found and payment_hash of resolved HTLC
1997         fn is_resolving_htlc_output(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32) -> Vec<(HTLCSource, Option<PaymentPreimage>, PaymentHash)> {
1998                 let mut htlc_updated = Vec::new();
1999
2000                 'outer_loop: for input in &tx.input {
2001                         let mut payment_data = None;
2002                         let revocation_sig_claim = (input.witness.len() == 3 && input.witness[2].len() == OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT && input.witness[1].len() == 33)
2003                                 || (input.witness.len() == 3 && input.witness[2].len() == ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT && input.witness[1].len() == 33);
2004                         let accepted_preimage_claim = input.witness.len() == 5 && input.witness[4].len() == ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT;
2005                         let offered_preimage_claim = input.witness.len() == 3 && input.witness[2].len() == OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT;
2006
2007                         macro_rules! log_claim {
2008                                 ($tx_info: expr, $local_tx: expr, $htlc: expr, $source_avail: expr) => {
2009                                         // We found the output in question, but aren't failing it backwards
2010                                         // as we have no corresponding source and no valid remote commitment txid
2011                                         // to try a weak source binding with same-hash, same-value still-valid offered HTLC.
2012                                         // This implies either it is an inbound HTLC or an outbound HTLC on a revoked transaction.
2013                                         let outbound_htlc = $local_tx == $htlc.offered;
2014                                         if ($local_tx && revocation_sig_claim) ||
2015                                                         (outbound_htlc && !$source_avail && (accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim)) {
2016                                                 log_error!(self, "Input spending {} ({}:{}) in {} resolves {} HTLC with payment hash {} with {}!",
2017                                                         $tx_info, input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, tx.txid(),
2018                                                         if outbound_htlc { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0),
2019                                                         if revocation_sig_claim { "revocation sig" } else { "preimage claim after we'd passed the HTLC resolution back" });
2020                                         } else {
2021                                                 log_info!(self, "Input spending {} ({}:{}) in {} resolves {} HTLC with payment hash {} with {}",
2022                                                         $tx_info, input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, tx.txid(),
2023                                                         if outbound_htlc { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0),
2024                                                         if revocation_sig_claim { "revocation sig" } else if accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim { "preimage" } else { "timeout" });
2025                                         }
2026                                 }
2027                         }
2028
2029                         macro_rules! check_htlc_valid_remote {
2030                                 ($remote_txid: expr, $htlc_output: expr) => {
2031                                         if let &Some(txid) = $remote_txid {
2032                                                 for &(ref pending_htlc, ref pending_source) in self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(&txid).unwrap() {
2033                                                         if pending_htlc.payment_hash == $htlc_output.payment_hash && pending_htlc.amount_msat == $htlc_output.amount_msat {
2034                                                                 if let &Some(ref source) = pending_source {
2035                                                                         log_claim!("revoked remote commitment tx", false, pending_htlc, true);
2036                                                                         payment_data = Some(((**source).clone(), $htlc_output.payment_hash));
2037                                                                         break;
2038                                                                 }
2039                                                         }
2040                                                 }
2041                                         }
2042                                 }
2043                         }
2044
2045                         macro_rules! scan_commitment {
2046                                 ($htlcs: expr, $tx_info: expr, $local_tx: expr) => {
2047                                         for (ref htlc_output, source_option) in $htlcs {
2048                                                 if Some(input.previous_output.vout) == htlc_output.transaction_output_index {
2049                                                         if let Some(ref source) = source_option {
2050                                                                 log_claim!($tx_info, $local_tx, htlc_output, true);
2051                                                                 // We have a resolution of an HTLC either from one of our latest
2052                                                                 // local commitment transactions or an unrevoked remote commitment
2053                                                                 // transaction. This implies we either learned a preimage, the HTLC
2054                                                                 // has timed out, or we screwed up. In any case, we should now
2055                                                                 // resolve the source HTLC with the original sender.
2056                                                                 payment_data = Some(((*source).clone(), htlc_output.payment_hash));
2057                                                         } else if !$local_tx {
2058                                                                 if let Storage::Local { ref current_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage {
2059                                                                         check_htlc_valid_remote!(current_remote_commitment_txid, htlc_output);
2060                                                                 }
2061                                                                 if payment_data.is_none() {
2062                                                                         if let Storage::Local { ref prev_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage {
2063                                                                                 check_htlc_valid_remote!(prev_remote_commitment_txid, htlc_output);
2064                                                                         }
2065                                                                 }
2066                                                         }
2067                                                         if payment_data.is_none() {
2068                                                                 log_claim!($tx_info, $local_tx, htlc_output, false);
2069                                                                 continue 'outer_loop;
2070                                                         }
2071                                                 }
2072                                         }
2073                                 }
2074                         }
2075
2076                         if let Some(ref current_local_signed_commitment_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
2077                                 if input.previous_output.txid == current_local_signed_commitment_tx.txid {
2078                                         scan_commitment!(current_local_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, ref b)| (a, b.as_ref())),
2079                                                 "our latest local commitment tx", true);
2080                                 }
2081                         }
2082                         if let Some(ref prev_local_signed_commitment_tx) = self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
2083                                 if input.previous_output.txid == prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.txid {
2084                                         scan_commitment!(prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, ref b)| (a, b.as_ref())),
2085                                                 "our previous local commitment tx", true);
2086                                 }
2087                         }
2088                         if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(&input.previous_output.txid) {
2089                                 scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, ref b)| (a, (b.as_ref().clone()).map(|boxed| &**boxed))),
2090                                         "remote commitment tx", false);
2091                         }
2092
2093                         // Check that scan_commitment, above, decided there is some source worth relaying an
2094                         // HTLC resolution backwards to and figure out whether we learned a preimage from it.
2095                         if let Some((source, payment_hash)) = payment_data {
2096                                 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
2097                                 if accepted_preimage_claim {
2098                                         payment_preimage.0.copy_from_slice(&input.witness[3]);
2099                                         htlc_updated.push((source, Some(payment_preimage), payment_hash));
2100                                 } else if offered_preimage_claim {
2101                                         payment_preimage.0.copy_from_slice(&input.witness[1]);
2102                                         htlc_updated.push((source, Some(payment_preimage), payment_hash));
2103                                 } else {
2104                                         log_info!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} timeout by a spend tx, waiting for confirmation (at height{})", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), height + HTLC_FAIL_ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2105                                         match self.htlc_updated_waiting_threshold_conf.entry(height + HTLC_FAIL_ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
2106                                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
2107                                                         let e = entry.get_mut();
2108                                                         e.retain(|ref update| update.0 != source);
2109                                                         e.push((source, None, payment_hash.clone()));
2110                                                 }
2111                                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2112                                                         entry.insert(vec![(source, None, payment_hash)]);
2113                                                 }
2114                                         }
2115                                 }
2116                         }
2117                 }
2118                 htlc_updated
2119         }
2120 }
2121
2122 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
2123
2124 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> ReadableArgs<R, Arc<Logger>> for (Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor) {
2125         fn read(reader: &mut R, logger: Arc<Logger>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
2126                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2127                 macro_rules! unwrap_obj {
2128                         ($key: expr) => {
2129                                 match $key {
2130                                         Ok(res) => res,
2131                                         Err(_) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2132                                 }
2133                         }
2134                 }
2135
2136                 let _ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2137                 let min_ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2138                 if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION {
2139                         return Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion);
2140                 }
2141
2142                 let commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor = <U48 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.0;
2143
2144                 let key_storage = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2145                         0 => {
2146                                 let revocation_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
2147                                 let htlc_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
2148                                 let delayed_payment_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
2149                                 let payment_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
2150                                 let shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
2151                                 let prev_latest_per_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
2152                                 let latest_per_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
2153                                 // Technically this can fail and serialize fail a round-trip, but only for serialization of
2154                                 // barely-init'd ChannelMonitors that we can't do anything with.
2155                                 let outpoint = OutPoint {
2156                                         txid: Readable::read(reader)?,
2157                                         index: Readable::read(reader)?,
2158                                 };
2159                                 let funding_info = Some((outpoint, Readable::read(reader)?));
2160                                 let current_remote_commitment_txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
2161                                 let prev_remote_commitment_txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
2162                                 Storage::Local {
2163                                         revocation_base_key,
2164                                         htlc_base_key,
2165                                         delayed_payment_base_key,
2166                                         payment_base_key,
2167                                         shutdown_pubkey,
2168                                         prev_latest_per_commitment_point,
2169                                         latest_per_commitment_point,
2170                                         funding_info,
2171                                         current_remote_commitment_txid,
2172                                         prev_remote_commitment_txid,
2173                                 }
2174                         },
2175                         _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2176                 };
2177
2178                 let their_htlc_base_key = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
2179                 let their_delayed_payment_base_key = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
2180
2181                 let their_cur_revocation_points = {
2182                         let first_idx = <U48 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.0;
2183                         if first_idx == 0 {
2184                                 None
2185                         } else {
2186                                 let first_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
2187                                 let second_point_slice: [u8; 33] = Readable::read(reader)?;
2188                                 if second_point_slice[0..32] == [0; 32] && second_point_slice[32] == 0 {
2189                                         Some((first_idx, first_point, None))
2190                                 } else {
2191                                         Some((first_idx, first_point, Some(unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&second_point_slice)))))
2192                                 }
2193                         }
2194                 };
2195
2196                 let our_to_self_delay: u16 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2197                 let their_to_self_delay: Option<u16> = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
2198
2199                 let mut old_secrets = [([0; 32], 1 << 48); 49];
2200                 for &mut (ref mut secret, ref mut idx) in old_secrets.iter_mut() {
2201                         *secret = Readable::read(reader)?;
2202                         *idx = Readable::read(reader)?;
2203                 }
2204
2205                 macro_rules! read_htlc_in_commitment {
2206                         () => {
2207                                 {
2208                                         let offered: bool = Readable::read(reader)?;
2209                                         let amount_msat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2210                                         let cltv_expiry: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2211                                         let payment_hash: PaymentHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
2212                                         let transaction_output_index: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
2213
2214                                         HTLCOutputInCommitment {
2215                                                 offered, amount_msat, cltv_expiry, payment_hash, transaction_output_index
2216                                         }
2217                                 }
2218                         }
2219                 }
2220
2221                 let remote_claimable_outpoints_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2222                 let mut remote_claimable_outpoints = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(remote_claimable_outpoints_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 64));
2223                 for _ in 0..remote_claimable_outpoints_len {
2224                         let txid: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
2225                         let htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2226                         let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlcs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
2227                         for _ in 0..htlcs_count {
2228                                 htlcs.push((read_htlc_in_commitment!(), <Option<HTLCSource> as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.map(|o: HTLCSource| Box::new(o))));
2229                         }
2230                         if let Some(_) = remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, htlcs) {
2231                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
2232                         }
2233                 }
2234
2235                 let remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2236                 let mut remote_commitment_txn_on_chain = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
2237                 for _ in 0..remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len {
2238                         let txid: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
2239                         let commitment_number = <U48 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.0;
2240                         let outputs_count = <u64 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?;
2241                         let mut outputs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 8));
2242                         for _ in 0..outputs_count {
2243                                 outputs.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
2244                         }
2245                         if let Some(_) = remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(txid, (commitment_number, outputs)) {
2246                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
2247                         }
2248                 }
2249
2250                 let remote_hash_commitment_number_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2251                 let mut remote_hash_commitment_number = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(remote_hash_commitment_number_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
2252                 for _ in 0..remote_hash_commitment_number_len {
2253                         let payment_hash: PaymentHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
2254                         let commitment_number = <U48 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.0;
2255                         if let Some(_) = remote_hash_commitment_number.insert(payment_hash, commitment_number) {
2256                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
2257                         }
2258                 }
2259
2260                 macro_rules! read_local_tx {
2261                         () => {
2262                                 {
2263                                         let tx = match Transaction::consensus_decode(reader.by_ref()) {
2264                                                 Ok(tx) => tx,
2265                                                 Err(e) => match e {
2266                                                         encode::Error::Io(ioe) => return Err(DecodeError::Io(ioe)),
2267                                                         _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2268                                                 },
2269                                         };
2270
2271                                         if tx.input.is_empty() {
2272                                                 // Ensure tx didn't hit the 0-input ambiguity case.
2273                                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
2274                                         }
2275
2276                                         let revocation_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
2277                                         let a_htlc_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
2278                                         let b_htlc_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
2279                                         let delayed_payment_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
2280                                         let feerate_per_kw: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2281
2282                                         let htlcs_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2283                                         let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlcs_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
2284                                         for _ in 0..htlcs_len {
2285                                                 let htlc = read_htlc_in_commitment!();
2286                                                 let sigs = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2287                                                         0 => None,
2288                                                         1 => Some((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?)),
2289                                                         _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2290                                                 };
2291                                                 htlcs.push((htlc, sigs, Readable::read(reader)?));
2292                                         }
2293
2294                                         LocalSignedTx {
2295                                                 txid: tx.txid(),
2296                                                 tx, revocation_key, a_htlc_key, b_htlc_key, delayed_payment_key, feerate_per_kw,
2297                                                 htlc_outputs: htlcs
2298                                         }
2299                                 }
2300                         }
2301                 }
2302
2303                 let prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2304                         0 => None,
2305                         1 => {
2306                                 Some(read_local_tx!())
2307                         },
2308                         _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2309                 };
2310
2311                 let current_local_signed_commitment_tx = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2312                         0 => None,
2313                         1 => {
2314                                 Some(read_local_tx!())
2315                         },
2316                         _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2317                 };
2318
2319                 let current_remote_commitment_number = <U48 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.0;
2320
2321                 let payment_preimages_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2322                 let mut payment_preimages = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(payment_preimages_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
2323                 for _ in 0..payment_preimages_len {
2324                         let preimage: PaymentPreimage = Readable::read(reader)?;
2325                         let hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
2326                         if let Some(_) = payment_preimages.insert(hash, preimage) {
2327                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
2328                         }
2329                 }
2330
2331                 let last_block_hash: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
2332                 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
2333
2334                 let waiting_threshold_conf_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2335                 let mut htlc_updated_waiting_threshold_conf = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(waiting_threshold_conf_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
2336                 for _ in 0..waiting_threshold_conf_len {
2337                         let height_target = Readable::read(reader)?;
2338                         let updates_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2339                         let mut updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(updates_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
2340                         for _ in 0..updates_len {
2341                                 let htlc_source = Readable::read(reader)?;
2342                                 let preimage = Readable::read(reader)?;
2343                                 let hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
2344                                 updates.push((htlc_source, preimage, hash));
2345                         }
2346                         htlc_updated_waiting_threshold_conf.insert(height_target, updates);
2347                 }
2348
2349                 Ok((last_block_hash.clone(), ChannelMonitor {
2350                         commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor,
2351
2352                         key_storage,
2353                         their_htlc_base_key,
2354                         their_delayed_payment_base_key,
2355                         their_cur_revocation_points,
2356
2357                         our_to_self_delay,
2358                         their_to_self_delay,
2359
2360                         old_secrets,
2361                         remote_claimable_outpoints,
2362                         remote_commitment_txn_on_chain,
2363                         remote_hash_commitment_number,
2364
2365                         prev_local_signed_commitment_tx,
2366                         current_local_signed_commitment_tx,
2367                         current_remote_commitment_number,
2368
2369                         payment_preimages,
2370
2371                         destination_script,
2372
2373                         htlc_updated_waiting_threshold_conf,
2374
2375                         last_block_hash,
2376                         secp_ctx,
2377                         logger,
2378                 }))
2379         }
2380
2381 }
2382
2383 #[cfg(test)]
2384 mod tests {
2385         use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
2386         use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
2387         use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxIn, TxOut, SigHashType};
2388         use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
2389         use bitcoin::util::bip143;
2390         use bitcoin_hashes::Hash;
2391         use bitcoin_hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
2392         use bitcoin_hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
2393         use bitcoin_hashes::hex::FromHex;
2394         use hex;
2395         use ln::channelmanager::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
2396         use ln::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, InputDescriptors};
2397         use ln::chan_utils;
2398         use ln::chan_utils::{HTLCOutputInCommitment, TxCreationKeys};
2399         use util::test_utils::TestLogger;
2400         use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
2401         use secp256k1::Secp256k1;
2402         use rand::{thread_rng,Rng};
2403         use std::sync::Arc;
2404
2405         #[test]
2406         fn test_per_commitment_storage() {
2407                 // Test vectors from BOLT 3:
2408                 let mut secrets: Vec<[u8; 32]> = Vec::new();
2409                 let mut monitor: ChannelMonitor;
2410                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2411                 let logger = Arc::new(TestLogger::new());
2412
2413                 macro_rules! test_secrets {
2414                         () => {
2415                                 let mut idx = 281474976710655;
2416                                 for secret in secrets.iter() {
2417                                         assert_eq!(monitor.get_secret(idx).unwrap(), *secret);
2418                                         idx -= 1;
2419                                 }
2420                                 assert_eq!(monitor.get_min_seen_secret(), idx + 1);
2421                                 assert!(monitor.get_secret(idx).is_none());
2422                         };
2423                 }
2424
2425                 {
2426                         // insert_secret correct sequence
2427                         monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
2428                         secrets.clear();
2429
2430                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
2431                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
2432                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2433                         test_secrets!();
2434
2435                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
2436                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
2437                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2438                         test_secrets!();
2439
2440                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
2441                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
2442                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2443                         test_secrets!();
2444
2445                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
2446                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
2447                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2448                         test_secrets!();
2449
2450                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
2451                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
2452                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2453                         test_secrets!();
2454
2455                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
2456                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
2457                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2458                         test_secrets!();
2459
2460                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
2461                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
2462                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2463                         test_secrets!();
2464
2465                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
2466                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
2467                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2468                         test_secrets!();
2469                 }
2470
2471                 {
2472                         // insert_secret #1 incorrect
2473                         monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
2474                         secrets.clear();
2475
2476                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
2477                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
2478                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2479                         test_secrets!();
2480
2481                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
2482                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
2483                         assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
2484                                         "Previous secret did not match new one");
2485                 }
2486
2487                 {
2488                         // insert_secret #2 incorrect (#1 derived from incorrect)
2489                         monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
2490                         secrets.clear();
2491
2492                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
2493                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
2494                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2495                         test_secrets!();
2496
2497                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
2498                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("dddc3a8d14fddf2b68fa8c7fbad2748274937479dd0f8930d5ebb4ab6bd866a3").unwrap());
2499                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2500                         test_secrets!();
2501
2502                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
2503                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
2504                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2505                         test_secrets!();
2506
2507                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
2508                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
2509                         assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
2510                                         "Previous secret did not match new one");
2511                 }
2512
2513                 {
2514                         // insert_secret #3 incorrect
2515                         monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
2516                         secrets.clear();
2517
2518                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
2519                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
2520                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2521                         test_secrets!();
2522
2523                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
2524                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
2525                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2526                         test_secrets!();
2527
2528                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
2529                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c51a18b13e8527e579ec56365482c62f180b7d5760b46e9477dae59e87ed423a").unwrap());
2530                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2531                         test_secrets!();
2532
2533                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
2534                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
2535                         assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
2536                                         "Previous secret did not match new one");
2537                 }
2538
2539                 {
2540                         // insert_secret #4 incorrect (1,2,3 derived from incorrect)
2541                         monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
2542                         secrets.clear();
2543
2544                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
2545                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
2546                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2547                         test_secrets!();
2548
2549                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
2550                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("dddc3a8d14fddf2b68fa8c7fbad2748274937479dd0f8930d5ebb4ab6bd866a3").unwrap());
2551                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2552                         test_secrets!();
2553
2554                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
2555                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c51a18b13e8527e579ec56365482c62f180b7d5760b46e9477dae59e87ed423a").unwrap());
2556                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2557                         test_secrets!();
2558
2559                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
2560                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("ba65d7b0ef55a3ba300d4e87af29868f394f8f138d78a7011669c79b37b936f4").unwrap());
2561                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2562                         test_secrets!();
2563
2564                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
2565                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
2566                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2567                         test_secrets!();
2568
2569                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
2570                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
2571                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2572                         test_secrets!();
2573
2574                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
2575                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
2576                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2577                         test_secrets!();
2578
2579                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
2580                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
2581                         assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
2582                                         "Previous secret did not match new one");
2583                 }
2584
2585                 {
2586                         // insert_secret #5 incorrect
2587                         monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
2588                         secrets.clear();
2589
2590                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
2591                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
2592                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2593                         test_secrets!();
2594
2595                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
2596                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
2597                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2598                         test_secrets!();
2599
2600                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
2601                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
2602                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2603                         test_secrets!();
2604
2605                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
2606                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
2607                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2608                         test_secrets!();
2609
2610                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
2611                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("631373ad5f9ef654bb3dade742d09504c567edd24320d2fcd68e3cc47e2ff6a6").unwrap());
2612                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2613                         test_secrets!();
2614
2615                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
2616                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
2617                         assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
2618                                         "Previous secret did not match new one");
2619                 }
2620
2621                 {
2622                         // insert_secret #6 incorrect (5 derived from incorrect)
2623                         monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
2624                         secrets.clear();
2625
2626                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
2627                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
2628                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2629                         test_secrets!();
2630
2631                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
2632                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
2633                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2634                         test_secrets!();
2635
2636                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
2637                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
2638                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2639                         test_secrets!();
2640
2641                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
2642                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
2643                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2644                         test_secrets!();
2645
2646                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
2647                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("631373ad5f9ef654bb3dade742d09504c567edd24320d2fcd68e3cc47e2ff6a6").unwrap());
2648                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2649                         test_secrets!();
2650
2651                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
2652                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("b7e76a83668bde38b373970155c868a653304308f9896692f904a23731224bb1").unwrap());
2653                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2654                         test_secrets!();
2655
2656                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
2657                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
2658                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2659                         test_secrets!();
2660
2661                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
2662                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
2663                         assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
2664                                         "Previous secret did not match new one");
2665                 }
2666
2667                 {
2668                         // insert_secret #7 incorrect
2669                         monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
2670                         secrets.clear();
2671
2672                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
2673                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
2674                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2675                         test_secrets!();
2676
2677                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
2678                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
2679                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2680                         test_secrets!();
2681
2682                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
2683                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
2684                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2685                         test_secrets!();
2686
2687                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
2688                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
2689                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2690                         test_secrets!();
2691
2692                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
2693                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
2694                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2695                         test_secrets!();
2696
2697                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
2698                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
2699                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2700                         test_secrets!();
2701
2702                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
2703                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("e7971de736e01da8ed58b94c2fc216cb1dca9e326f3a96e7194fe8ea8af6c0a3").unwrap());
2704                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2705                         test_secrets!();
2706
2707                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
2708                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
2709                         assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
2710                                         "Previous secret did not match new one");
2711                 }
2712
2713                 {
2714                         // insert_secret #8 incorrect
2715                         monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
2716                         secrets.clear();
2717
2718                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
2719                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
2720                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2721                         test_secrets!();
2722
2723                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
2724                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
2725                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2726                         test_secrets!();
2727
2728                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
2729                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
2730                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2731                         test_secrets!();
2732
2733                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
2734                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
2735                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2736                         test_secrets!();
2737
2738                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
2739                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
2740                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2741                         test_secrets!();
2742
2743                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
2744                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
2745                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2746                         test_secrets!();
2747
2748                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
2749                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
2750                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2751                         test_secrets!();
2752
2753                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
2754                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a7efbc61aac46d34f77778bac22c8a20c6a46ca460addc49009bda875ec88fa4").unwrap());
2755                         assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
2756                                         "Previous secret did not match new one");
2757                 }
2758         }
2759
2760         #[test]
2761         fn test_prune_preimages() {
2762                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2763                 let logger = Arc::new(TestLogger::new());
2764
2765                 let dummy_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
2766                 macro_rules! dummy_keys {
2767                         () => {
2768                                 {
2769                                         TxCreationKeys {
2770                                                 per_commitment_point: dummy_key.clone(),
2771                                                 revocation_key: dummy_key.clone(),
2772                                                 a_htlc_key: dummy_key.clone(),
2773                                                 b_htlc_key: dummy_key.clone(),
2774                                                 a_delayed_payment_key: dummy_key.clone(),
2775                                                 b_payment_key: dummy_key.clone(),
2776                                         }
2777                                 }
2778                         }
2779                 }
2780                 let dummy_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
2781
2782                 let mut preimages = Vec::new();
2783                 {
2784                         let mut rng  = thread_rng();
2785                         for _ in 0..20 {
2786                                 let mut preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
2787                                 rng.fill_bytes(&mut preimage.0[..]);
2788                                 let hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
2789                                 preimages.push((preimage, hash));
2790                         }
2791                 }
2792
2793                 macro_rules! preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs {
2794                         ($preimages_slice: expr) => {
2795                                 {
2796                                         let mut res = Vec::new();
2797                                         for (idx, preimage) in $preimages_slice.iter().enumerate() {
2798                                                 res.push((HTLCOutputInCommitment {
2799                                                         offered: true,
2800                                                         amount_msat: 0,
2801                                                         cltv_expiry: 0,
2802                                                         payment_hash: preimage.1.clone(),
2803                                                         transaction_output_index: Some(idx as u32),
2804                                                 }, None));
2805                                         }
2806                                         res
2807                                 }
2808                         }
2809                 }
2810                 macro_rules! preimages_to_local_htlcs {
2811                         ($preimages_slice: expr) => {
2812                                 {
2813                                         let mut inp = preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!($preimages_slice);
2814                                         let res: Vec<_> = inp.drain(..).map(|e| { (e.0, None, e.1) }).collect();
2815                                         res
2816                                 }
2817                         }
2818                 }
2819
2820                 macro_rules! test_preimages_exist {
2821                         ($preimages_slice: expr, $monitor: expr) => {
2822                                 for preimage in $preimages_slice {
2823                                         assert!($monitor.payment_preimages.contains_key(&preimage.1));
2824                                 }
2825                         }
2826                 }
2827
2828                 // Prune with one old state and a local commitment tx holding a few overlaps with the
2829                 // old state.
2830                 let mut monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
2831                 monitor.set_their_to_self_delay(10);
2832
2833                 monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(dummy_tx.clone(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..10]));
2834                 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[5..15]), 281474976710655, dummy_key);
2835                 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[15..20]), 281474976710654, dummy_key);
2836                 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[17..20]), 281474976710653, dummy_key);
2837                 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[18..20]), 281474976710652, dummy_key);
2838                 for &(ref preimage, ref hash) in preimages.iter() {
2839                         monitor.provide_payment_preimage(hash, preimage);
2840                 }
2841
2842                 // Now provide a secret, pruning preimages 10-15
2843                 let mut secret = [0; 32];
2844                 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
2845                 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secret.clone()).unwrap();
2846                 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 15);
2847                 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
2848                 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[15..20], monitor);
2849
2850                 // Now provide a further secret, pruning preimages 15-17
2851                 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
2852                 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secret.clone()).unwrap();
2853                 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 13);
2854                 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
2855                 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[17..20], monitor);
2856
2857                 // Now update local commitment tx info, pruning only element 18 as we still care about the
2858                 // previous commitment tx's preimages too
2859                 monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(dummy_tx.clone(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..5]));
2860                 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
2861                 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secret.clone()).unwrap();
2862                 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 12);
2863                 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
2864                 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[18..20], monitor);
2865
2866                 // But if we do it again, we'll prune 5-10
2867                 monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(dummy_tx.clone(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..3]));
2868                 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
2869                 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secret.clone()).unwrap();
2870                 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 5);
2871                 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..5], monitor);
2872         }
2873
2874         #[test]
2875         fn test_claim_txn_weight_computation() {
2876                 // We test Claim txn weight, knowing that we want expected weigth and
2877                 // not actual case to avoid sigs and time-lock delays hell variances.
2878
2879                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2880                 let privkey = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
2881                 let pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &privkey);
2882                 let mut sum_actual_sigs: u64 = 0;
2883
2884                 macro_rules! sign_input {
2885                         ($sighash_parts: expr, $input: expr, $idx: expr, $amount: expr, $input_type: expr, $sum_actual_sigs: expr) => {
2886                                 let htlc = HTLCOutputInCommitment {
2887                                         offered: if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC || *$input_type == InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC { true } else { false },
2888                                         amount_msat: 0,
2889                                         cltv_expiry: 2 << 16,
2890                                         payment_hash: PaymentHash([1; 32]),
2891                                         transaction_output_index: Some($idx),
2892                                 };
2893                                 let redeem_script = if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput { chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&pubkey, 256, &pubkey) } else { chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, &pubkey, &pubkey, &pubkey) };
2894                                 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&$sighash_parts.sighash_all(&$input, &redeem_script, $amount)[..]);
2895                                 let sig = secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &privkey);
2896                                 $input.witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
2897                                 $input.witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
2898                                 sum_actual_sigs += $input.witness[0].len() as u64;
2899                                 if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput {
2900                                         $input.witness.push(vec!(1));
2901                                 } else if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC || *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC {
2902                                         $input.witness.push(pubkey.clone().serialize().to_vec());
2903                                 } else if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC {
2904                                         $input.witness.push(vec![0]);
2905                                 } else {
2906                                         $input.witness.push(PaymentPreimage([1; 32]).0.to_vec());
2907                                 }
2908                                 $input.witness.push(redeem_script.into_bytes());
2909                                 println!("witness[0] {}", $input.witness[0].len());
2910                                 println!("witness[1] {}", $input.witness[1].len());
2911                                 println!("witness[2] {}", $input.witness[2].len());
2912                         }
2913                 }
2914
2915                 let script_pubkey = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script();
2916                 let txid = Sha256dHash::from_hex("56944c5d3f98413ef45cf54545538103cc9f298e0575820ad3591376e2e0f65d").unwrap();
2917
2918                 // Justice tx with 1 to_local, 2 revoked offered HTLCs, 1 revoked received HTLCs
2919                 let mut claim_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
2920                 for i in 0..4 {
2921                         claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
2922                                 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
2923                                         txid,
2924                                         vout: i,
2925                                 },
2926                                 script_sig: Script::new(),
2927                                 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
2928                                 witness: Vec::new(),
2929                         });
2930                 }
2931                 claim_tx.output.push(TxOut {
2932                         script_pubkey: script_pubkey.clone(),
2933                         value: 0,
2934                 });
2935                 let base_weight = claim_tx.get_weight();
2936                 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&claim_tx);
2937                 let inputs_des = vec![InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput, InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC, InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC, InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC];
2938                 for (idx, inp) in claim_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(inputs_des.iter()).enumerate() {
2939                         sign_input!(sighash_parts, inp.0, idx as u32, 0, inp.1, sum_actual_sigs);
2940                 }
2941                 assert_eq!(base_weight + ChannelMonitor::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_des[..]),  claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_sig */ (73 * inputs_des.len() as u64 - sum_actual_sigs));
2942
2943                 // Claim tx with 1 offered HTLCs, 3 received HTLCs
2944                 claim_tx.input.clear();
2945                 sum_actual_sigs = 0;
2946                 for i in 0..4 {
2947                         claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
2948                                 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
2949                                         txid,
2950                                         vout: i,
2951                                 },
2952                                 script_sig: Script::new(),
2953                                 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
2954                                 witness: Vec::new(),
2955                         });
2956                 }
2957                 let base_weight = claim_tx.get_weight();
2958                 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&claim_tx);
2959                 let inputs_des = vec![InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC, InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC, InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC, InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC];
2960                 for (idx, inp) in claim_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(inputs_des.iter()).enumerate() {
2961                         sign_input!(sighash_parts, inp.0, idx as u32, 0, inp.1, sum_actual_sigs);
2962                 }
2963                 assert_eq!(base_weight + ChannelMonitor::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_des[..]),  claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_sig */ (73 * inputs_des.len() as u64 - sum_actual_sigs));
2964
2965                 // Justice tx with 1 revoked HTLC-Success tx output
2966                 claim_tx.input.clear();
2967                 sum_actual_sigs = 0;
2968                 claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
2969                         previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
2970                                 txid,
2971                                 vout: 0,
2972                         },
2973                         script_sig: Script::new(),
2974                         sequence: 0xfffffffd,
2975                         witness: Vec::new(),
2976                 });
2977                 let base_weight = claim_tx.get_weight();
2978                 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&claim_tx);
2979                 let inputs_des = vec![InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput];
2980                 for (idx, inp) in claim_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(inputs_des.iter()).enumerate() {
2981                         sign_input!(sighash_parts, inp.0, idx as u32, 0, inp.1, sum_actual_sigs);
2982                 }
2983                 assert_eq!(base_weight + ChannelMonitor::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_des[..]), claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_isg */ (73 * inputs_des.len() as u64 - sum_actual_sigs));
2984         }
2985
2986         // Further testing is done in the ChannelManager integration tests.
2987 }