1 //! The logic to monitor for on-chain transactions and create the relevant claim responses lives
4 //! ChannelMonitor objects are generated by ChannelManager in response to relevant
5 //! messages/actions, and MUST be persisted to disk (and, preferably, remotely) before progress can
6 //! be made in responding to certain messages, see ManyChannelMonitor for more.
8 //! Note that ChannelMonitors are an important part of the lightning trust model and a copy of the
9 //! latest ChannelMonitor must always be actively monitoring for chain updates (and no out-of-date
10 //! ChannelMonitors should do so). Thus, if you're building rust-lightning into an HSM or other
11 //! security-domain-separated system design, you should consider having multiple paths for
12 //! ChannelMonitors to get out of the HSM and onto monitoring devices.
14 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
15 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxIn,TxOut,SigHashType,Transaction};
16 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
17 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
18 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
19 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::{self, Decodable, Encodable};
20 use bitcoin::util::hash::{Hash160, BitcoinHash,Sha256dHash};
21 use bitcoin::util::bip143;
23 use crypto::digest::Digest;
25 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Message,Signature};
26 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
29 use ln::msgs::DecodeError;
31 use ln::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment;
32 use chain::chaininterface::{ChainListener, ChainWatchInterface, BroadcasterInterface};
33 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
34 use chain::keysinterface::SpendableOutputDescriptor;
35 use util::logger::Logger;
36 use util::ser::{ReadableArgs, Readable, Writer, Writeable, WriterWriteAdaptor, U48};
37 use util::sha2::Sha256;
38 use util::{byte_utils, events};
40 use std::collections::HashMap;
41 use std::sync::{Arc,Mutex};
42 use std::{hash,cmp, mem};
44 /// An error enum representing a failure to persist a channel monitor update.
46 pub enum ChannelMonitorUpdateErr {
47 /// Used to indicate a temporary failure (eg connection to a watchtower failed, but is expected
48 /// to succeed at some point in the future).
50 /// Such a failure will "freeze" a channel, preventing us from revoking old states or
51 /// submitting new commitment transactions to the remote party.
52 /// ChannelManager::test_restore_channel_monitor can be used to retry the update(s) and restore
53 /// the channel to an operational state.
55 /// Note that continuing to operate when no copy of the updated ChannelMonitor could be
56 /// persisted is unsafe - if you failed to store the update on your own local disk you should
57 /// instead return PermanentFailure to force closure of the channel ASAP.
59 /// Even when a channel has been "frozen" updates to the ChannelMonitor can continue to occur
60 /// (eg if an inbound HTLC which we forwarded was claimed upstream resulting in us attempting
61 /// to claim it on this channel) and those updates must be applied wherever they can be. At
62 /// least one such updated ChannelMonitor must be persisted otherwise PermanentFailure should
63 /// be returned to get things on-chain ASAP using only the in-memory copy. Obviously updates to
64 /// the channel which would invalidate previous ChannelMonitors are not made when a channel has
67 /// Note that even if updates made after TemporaryFailure succeed you must still call
68 /// test_restore_channel_monitor to ensure you have the latest monitor and re-enable normal
69 /// channel operation.
71 /// Used to indicate no further channel monitor updates will be allowed (eg we've moved on to a
72 /// different watchtower and cannot update with all watchtowers that were previously informed
73 /// of this channel). This will force-close the channel in question.
77 /// General Err type for ChannelMonitor actions. Generally, this implies that the data provided is
78 /// inconsistent with the ChannelMonitor being called. eg for ChannelMonitor::insert_combine this
79 /// means you tried to merge two monitors for different channels or for a channel which was
80 /// restored from a backup and then generated new commitment updates.
81 /// Contains a human-readable error message.
83 pub struct MonitorUpdateError(pub &'static str);
85 /// Simple trait indicating ability to track a set of ChannelMonitors and multiplex events between
86 /// them. Generally should be implemented by keeping a local SimpleManyChannelMonitor and passing
87 /// events to it, while also taking any add_update_monitor events and passing them to some remote
90 /// Note that any updates to a channel's monitor *must* be applied to each instance of the
91 /// channel's monitor everywhere (including remote watchtowers) *before* this function returns. If
92 /// an update occurs and a remote watchtower is left with old state, it may broadcast transactions
93 /// which we have revoked, allowing our counterparty to claim all funds in the channel!
94 pub trait ManyChannelMonitor: Send + Sync {
95 /// Adds or updates a monitor for the given `funding_txo`.
97 /// Implementor must also ensure that the funding_txo outpoint is registered with any relevant
98 /// ChainWatchInterfaces such that the provided monitor receives block_connected callbacks with
100 fn add_update_monitor(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr>;
103 /// A simple implementation of a ManyChannelMonitor and ChainListener. Can be used to create a
104 /// watchtower or watch our own channels.
106 /// Note that you must provide your own key by which to refer to channels.
108 /// If you're accepting remote monitors (ie are implementing a watchtower), you must verify that
109 /// users cannot overwrite a given channel by providing a duplicate key. ie you should probably
110 /// index by a PublicKey which is required to sign any updates.
112 /// If you're using this for local monitoring of your own channels, you probably want to use
113 /// `OutPoint` as the key, which will give you a ManyChannelMonitor implementation.
114 pub struct SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
115 #[cfg(test)] // Used in ChannelManager tests to manipulate channels directly
116 pub monitors: Mutex<HashMap<Key, ChannelMonitor>>,
118 monitors: Mutex<HashMap<Key, ChannelMonitor>>,
119 chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>,
120 broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>,
121 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
125 impl<Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash> ChainListener for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
126 fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], _indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) {
127 let block_hash = header.bitcoin_hash();
128 let mut new_events: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(0);
130 let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
131 for monitor in monitors.values_mut() {
132 let (txn_outputs, spendable_outputs) = monitor.block_connected(txn_matched, height, &block_hash, &*self.broadcaster);
133 if spendable_outputs.len() > 0 {
134 new_events.push(events::Event::SpendableOutputs {
135 outputs: spendable_outputs,
138 for (ref txid, ref outputs) in txn_outputs {
139 for (idx, output) in outputs.iter().enumerate() {
140 self.chain_monitor.install_watch_outpoint((txid.clone(), idx as u32), &output.script_pubkey);
145 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
146 pending_events.append(&mut new_events);
149 fn block_disconnected(&self, _: &BlockHeader) { }
152 impl<Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash + 'static> SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
153 /// Creates a new object which can be used to monitor several channels given the chain
154 /// interface with which to register to receive notifications.
155 pub fn new(chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>, broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>, logger: Arc<Logger>) -> Arc<SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key>> {
156 let res = Arc::new(SimpleManyChannelMonitor {
157 monitors: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
160 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
163 let weak_res = Arc::downgrade(&res);
164 res.chain_monitor.register_listener(weak_res);
168 /// Adds or udpates the monitor which monitors the channel referred to by the given key.
169 pub fn add_update_monitor_by_key(&self, key: Key, monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
170 let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
171 match monitors.get_mut(&key) {
172 Some(orig_monitor) => {
173 log_trace!(self, "Updating Channel Monitor for channel {}", log_funding_info!(monitor.key_storage));
174 return orig_monitor.insert_combine(monitor);
178 match monitor.key_storage {
179 Storage::Local { ref funding_info, .. } => {
182 return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Try to update a useless monitor without funding_txo !"));
184 &Some((ref outpoint, ref script)) => {
185 log_trace!(self, "Got new Channel Monitor for channel {}", log_bytes!(outpoint.to_channel_id()[..]));
186 self.chain_monitor.install_watch_tx(&outpoint.txid, script);
187 self.chain_monitor.install_watch_outpoint((outpoint.txid, outpoint.index as u32), script);
191 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
192 self.chain_monitor.watch_all_txn();
195 monitors.insert(key, monitor);
200 impl ManyChannelMonitor for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<OutPoint> {
201 fn add_update_monitor(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr> {
202 match self.add_update_monitor_by_key(funding_txo, monitor) {
204 Err(_) => Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure),
209 impl<Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash> events::EventsProvider for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
210 fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
211 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
212 let mut ret = Vec::new();
213 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut *pending_events);
218 /// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, don't try to claim it in a shared transaction,
219 /// instead claiming it in its own individual transaction.
220 const CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 12;
221 /// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, force-close the channel to broadcast the
222 /// HTLC-Success transaction.
223 /// In other words, this is an upper bound on how many blocks we think it can take us to get a
224 /// transaction confirmed (and we use it in a few more, equivalent, places).
225 pub(crate) const CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 6;
226 /// Number of blocks by which point we expect our counterparty to have seen new blocks on the
227 /// network and done a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance (+ we've updated all our
228 /// copies of ChannelMonitors, including watchtowers).
229 pub(crate) const HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS: u32 = 3;
231 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
234 revocation_base_key: SecretKey,
235 htlc_base_key: SecretKey,
236 delayed_payment_base_key: SecretKey,
237 payment_base_key: SecretKey,
238 shutdown_pubkey: PublicKey,
239 prev_latest_per_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
240 latest_per_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
241 funding_info: Option<(OutPoint, Script)>,
244 revocation_base_key: PublicKey,
245 htlc_base_key: PublicKey,
249 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
250 struct LocalSignedTx {
251 /// txid of the transaction in tx, just used to make comparison faster
254 revocation_key: PublicKey,
255 a_htlc_key: PublicKey,
256 b_htlc_key: PublicKey,
257 delayed_payment_key: PublicKey,
259 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Signature, Signature)>,
262 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
263 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
265 /// A ChannelMonitor handles chain events (blocks connected and disconnected) and generates
266 /// on-chain transactions to ensure no loss of funds occurs.
268 /// You MUST ensure that no ChannelMonitors for a given channel anywhere contain out-of-date
269 /// information and are actively monitoring the chain.
271 pub struct ChannelMonitor {
272 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64,
274 key_storage: Storage,
275 their_htlc_base_key: Option<PublicKey>,
276 their_delayed_payment_base_key: Option<PublicKey>,
277 // first is the idx of the first of the two revocation points
278 their_cur_revocation_points: Option<(u64, PublicKey, Option<PublicKey>)>,
280 our_to_self_delay: u16,
281 their_to_self_delay: Option<u16>,
283 old_secrets: [([u8; 32], u64); 49],
284 remote_claimable_outpoints: HashMap<Sha256dHash, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>>,
285 /// We cannot identify HTLC-Success or HTLC-Timeout transactions by themselves on the chain.
286 /// Nor can we figure out their commitment numbers without the commitment transaction they are
287 /// spending. Thus, in order to claim them via revocation key, we track all the remote
288 /// commitment transactions which we find on-chain, mapping them to the commitment number which
289 /// can be used to derive the revocation key and claim the transactions.
290 remote_commitment_txn_on_chain: HashMap<Sha256dHash, (u64, Vec<Script>)>,
291 /// Cache used to make pruning of payment_preimages faster.
292 /// Maps payment_hash values to commitment numbers for remote transactions for non-revoked
293 /// remote transactions (ie should remain pretty small).
294 /// Serialized to disk but should generally not be sent to Watchtowers.
295 remote_hash_commitment_number: HashMap<[u8; 32], u64>,
297 // We store two local commitment transactions to avoid any race conditions where we may update
298 // some monitors (potentially on watchtowers) but then fail to update others, resulting in the
299 // various monitors for one channel being out of sync, and us broadcasting a local
300 // transaction for which we have deleted claim information on some watchtowers.
301 prev_local_signed_commitment_tx: Option<LocalSignedTx>,
302 current_local_signed_commitment_tx: Option<LocalSignedTx>,
304 // Used just for ChannelManager to make sure it has the latest channel data during
306 current_remote_commitment_number: u64,
308 payment_preimages: HashMap<[u8; 32], [u8; 32]>,
310 destination_script: Script,
312 // We simply modify last_block_hash in Channel's block_connected so that serialization is
313 // consistent but hopefully the users' copy handles block_connected in a consistent way.
314 // (we do *not*, however, update them in insert_combine to ensure any local user copies keep
315 // their last_block_hash from its state and not based on updated copies that didn't run through
316 // the full block_connected).
317 pub(crate) last_block_hash: Sha256dHash,
318 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>, //TODO: dedup this a bit...
322 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
323 /// Used only in testing and fuzztarget to check serialization roundtrips don't change the
324 /// underlying object
325 impl PartialEq for ChannelMonitor {
326 fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
327 if self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor != other.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor ||
328 self.key_storage != other.key_storage ||
329 self.their_htlc_base_key != other.their_htlc_base_key ||
330 self.their_delayed_payment_base_key != other.their_delayed_payment_base_key ||
331 self.their_cur_revocation_points != other.their_cur_revocation_points ||
332 self.our_to_self_delay != other.our_to_self_delay ||
333 self.their_to_self_delay != other.their_to_self_delay ||
334 self.remote_claimable_outpoints != other.remote_claimable_outpoints ||
335 self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain != other.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain ||
336 self.remote_hash_commitment_number != other.remote_hash_commitment_number ||
337 self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx != other.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx ||
338 self.current_remote_commitment_number != other.current_remote_commitment_number ||
339 self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx != other.current_local_signed_commitment_tx ||
340 self.payment_preimages != other.payment_preimages ||
341 self.destination_script != other.destination_script
345 for (&(ref secret, ref idx), &(ref o_secret, ref o_idx)) in self.old_secrets.iter().zip(other.old_secrets.iter()) {
346 if secret != o_secret || idx != o_idx {
355 impl ChannelMonitor {
356 pub(super) fn new(revocation_base_key: &SecretKey, delayed_payment_base_key: &SecretKey, htlc_base_key: &SecretKey, payment_base_key: &SecretKey, shutdown_pubkey: &PublicKey, our_to_self_delay: u16, destination_script: Script, logger: Arc<Logger>) -> ChannelMonitor {
358 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: 0,
360 key_storage: Storage::Local {
361 revocation_base_key: revocation_base_key.clone(),
362 htlc_base_key: htlc_base_key.clone(),
363 delayed_payment_base_key: delayed_payment_base_key.clone(),
364 payment_base_key: payment_base_key.clone(),
365 shutdown_pubkey: shutdown_pubkey.clone(),
366 prev_latest_per_commitment_point: None,
367 latest_per_commitment_point: None,
370 their_htlc_base_key: None,
371 their_delayed_payment_base_key: None,
372 their_cur_revocation_points: None,
374 our_to_self_delay: our_to_self_delay,
375 their_to_self_delay: None,
377 old_secrets: [([0; 32], 1 << 48); 49],
378 remote_claimable_outpoints: HashMap::new(),
379 remote_commitment_txn_on_chain: HashMap::new(),
380 remote_hash_commitment_number: HashMap::new(),
382 prev_local_signed_commitment_tx: None,
383 current_local_signed_commitment_tx: None,
384 current_remote_commitment_number: 1 << 48,
386 payment_preimages: HashMap::new(),
387 destination_script: destination_script,
389 last_block_hash: Default::default(),
390 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
396 fn place_secret(idx: u64) -> u8 {
398 if idx & (1 << i) == (1 << i) {
406 fn derive_secret(secret: [u8; 32], bits: u8, idx: u64) -> [u8; 32] {
407 let mut res: [u8; 32] = secret;
409 let bitpos = bits - 1 - i;
410 if idx & (1 << bitpos) == (1 << bitpos) {
411 res[(bitpos / 8) as usize] ^= 1 << (bitpos & 7);
412 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
414 sha.result(&mut res);
420 /// Inserts a revocation secret into this channel monitor. Prunes old preimages if neither
421 /// needed by local commitment transactions HTCLs nor by remote ones. Unless we haven't already seen remote
422 /// commitment transaction's secret, they are de facto pruned (we can use revocation key).
423 pub(super) fn provide_secret(&mut self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
424 let pos = ChannelMonitor::place_secret(idx);
426 let (old_secret, old_idx) = self.old_secrets[i as usize];
427 if ChannelMonitor::derive_secret(secret, pos, old_idx) != old_secret {
428 return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Previous secret did not match new one"));
431 self.old_secrets[pos as usize] = (secret, idx);
433 if !self.payment_preimages.is_empty() {
434 let local_signed_commitment_tx = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx.as_ref().expect("Channel needs at least an initial commitment tx !");
435 let prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.as_ref();
436 let min_idx = self.get_min_seen_secret();
437 let remote_hash_commitment_number = &mut self.remote_hash_commitment_number;
439 self.payment_preimages.retain(|&k, _| {
440 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in &local_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs {
441 if k == htlc.payment_hash {
445 if let Some(prev_local_commitment_tx) = prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
446 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in prev_local_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
447 if k == htlc.payment_hash {
452 let contains = if let Some(cn) = remote_hash_commitment_number.get(&k) {
459 remote_hash_commitment_number.remove(&k);
468 /// Informs this monitor of the latest remote (ie non-broadcastable) commitment transaction.
469 /// The monitor watches for it to be broadcasted and then uses the HTLC information (and
470 /// possibly future revocation/preimage information) to claim outputs where possible.
471 /// We cache also the mapping hash:commitment number to lighten pruning of old preimages by watchtowers.
472 pub(super) fn provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, unsigned_commitment_tx: &Transaction, htlc_outputs: Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>, commitment_number: u64, their_revocation_point: PublicKey) {
473 // TODO: Encrypt the htlc_outputs data with the single-hash of the commitment transaction
474 // so that a remote monitor doesn't learn anything unless there is a malicious close.
475 // (only maybe, sadly we cant do the same for local info, as we need to be aware of
477 for htlc in &htlc_outputs {
478 self.remote_hash_commitment_number.insert(htlc.payment_hash, commitment_number);
480 self.remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(unsigned_commitment_tx.txid(), htlc_outputs);
481 self.current_remote_commitment_number = commitment_number;
482 //TODO: Merge this into the other per-remote-transaction output storage stuff
483 match self.their_cur_revocation_points {
484 Some(old_points) => {
485 if old_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 {
486 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0, old_points.1, Some(their_revocation_point)));
487 } else if old_points.0 == commitment_number + 2 {
488 if let Some(old_second_point) = old_points.2 {
489 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0 - 1, old_second_point, Some(their_revocation_point)));
491 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None));
494 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None));
498 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None));
503 /// Informs this monitor of the latest local (ie broadcastable) commitment transaction. The
504 /// monitor watches for timeouts and may broadcast it if we approach such a timeout. Thus, it
505 /// is important that any clones of this channel monitor (including remote clones) by kept
506 /// up-to-date as our local commitment transaction is updated.
507 /// Panics if set_their_to_self_delay has never been called.
508 /// Also update Storage with latest local per_commitment_point to derive local_delayedkey in
509 /// case of onchain HTLC tx
510 pub(super) fn provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, signed_commitment_tx: Transaction, local_keys: chan_utils::TxCreationKeys, feerate_per_kw: u64, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Signature, Signature)>) {
511 assert!(self.their_to_self_delay.is_some());
512 self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx.take();
513 self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(LocalSignedTx {
514 txid: signed_commitment_tx.txid(),
515 tx: signed_commitment_tx,
516 revocation_key: local_keys.revocation_key,
517 a_htlc_key: local_keys.a_htlc_key,
518 b_htlc_key: local_keys.b_htlc_key,
519 delayed_payment_key: local_keys.a_delayed_payment_key,
523 self.key_storage = if let Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref payment_base_key, ref shutdown_pubkey, ref latest_per_commitment_point, ref mut funding_info, .. } = self.key_storage {
525 revocation_base_key: *revocation_base_key,
526 htlc_base_key: *htlc_base_key,
527 delayed_payment_base_key: *delayed_payment_base_key,
528 payment_base_key: *payment_base_key,
529 shutdown_pubkey: *shutdown_pubkey,
530 prev_latest_per_commitment_point: *latest_per_commitment_point,
531 latest_per_commitment_point: Some(local_keys.per_commitment_point),
532 funding_info: funding_info.take(),
534 } else { unimplemented!(); };
537 /// Provides a payment_hash->payment_preimage mapping. Will be automatically pruned when all
538 /// commitment_tx_infos which contain the payment hash have been revoked.
539 pub(super) fn provide_payment_preimage(&mut self, payment_hash: &[u8; 32], payment_preimage: &[u8; 32]) {
540 self.payment_preimages.insert(payment_hash.clone(), payment_preimage.clone());
543 /// Combines this ChannelMonitor with the information contained in the other ChannelMonitor.
544 /// After a successful call this ChannelMonitor is up-to-date and is safe to use to monitor the
545 /// chain for new blocks/transactions.
546 pub fn insert_combine(&mut self, mut other: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
547 match self.key_storage {
548 Storage::Local { ref funding_info, .. } => {
549 if funding_info.is_none() { return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Try to combine a Local monitor without funding_info")); }
550 let our_funding_info = funding_info;
551 if let Storage::Local { ref funding_info, .. } = other.key_storage {
552 if funding_info.is_none() { return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Try to combine a Local monitor without funding_info")); }
553 // We should be able to compare the entire funding_txo, but in fuzztarget its trivially
554 // easy to collide the funding_txo hash and have a different scriptPubKey.
555 if funding_info.as_ref().unwrap().0 != our_funding_info.as_ref().unwrap().0 {
556 return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Funding transaction outputs are not identical!"));
559 return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Try to combine a Local monitor with a Watchtower one !"));
562 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
563 if let Storage::Watchtower { .. } = other.key_storage {
566 return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Try to combine a Watchtower monitor with a Local one !"));
570 let other_min_secret = other.get_min_seen_secret();
571 let our_min_secret = self.get_min_seen_secret();
572 if our_min_secret > other_min_secret {
573 self.provide_secret(other_min_secret, other.get_secret(other_min_secret).unwrap())?;
575 if let Some(ref local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
576 if let Some(ref other_local_tx) = other.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
577 let our_commitment_number = 0xffffffffffff - ((((local_tx.tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (local_tx.tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor);
578 let other_commitment_number = 0xffffffffffff - ((((other_local_tx.tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (other_local_tx.tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ other.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor);
579 if our_commitment_number >= other_commitment_number {
580 self.key_storage = other.key_storage;
584 // TODO: We should use current_remote_commitment_number and the commitment number out of
585 // local transactions to decide how to merge
586 if our_min_secret >= other_min_secret {
587 self.their_cur_revocation_points = other.their_cur_revocation_points;
588 for (txid, htlcs) in other.remote_claimable_outpoints.drain() {
589 self.remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, htlcs);
591 if let Some(local_tx) = other.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
592 self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(local_tx);
594 if let Some(local_tx) = other.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
595 self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(local_tx);
597 self.payment_preimages = other.payment_preimages;
600 self.current_remote_commitment_number = cmp::min(self.current_remote_commitment_number, other.current_remote_commitment_number);
604 /// Panics if commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor doesn't fit in 48 bits
605 pub(super) fn set_commitment_obscure_factor(&mut self, commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64) {
606 assert!(commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor < (1 << 48));
607 self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor = commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor;
610 /// Allows this monitor to scan only for transactions which are applicable. Note that this is
611 /// optional, without it this monitor cannot be used in an SPV client, but you may wish to
612 /// avoid this (or call unset_funding_info) on a monitor you wish to send to a watchtower as it
613 /// provides slightly better privacy.
614 /// It's the responsibility of the caller to register outpoint and script with passing the former
615 /// value as key to add_update_monitor.
616 pub(super) fn set_funding_info(&mut self, new_funding_info: (OutPoint, Script)) {
617 match self.key_storage {
618 Storage::Local { ref mut funding_info, .. } => {
619 *funding_info = Some(new_funding_info);
621 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
622 panic!("Channel somehow ended up with its internal ChannelMonitor being in Watchtower mode?");
627 /// We log these base keys at channel opening to being able to rebuild redeemscript in case of leaked revoked commit tx
628 pub(super) fn set_their_base_keys(&mut self, their_htlc_base_key: &PublicKey, their_delayed_payment_base_key: &PublicKey) {
629 self.their_htlc_base_key = Some(their_htlc_base_key.clone());
630 self.their_delayed_payment_base_key = Some(their_delayed_payment_base_key.clone());
633 pub(super) fn set_their_to_self_delay(&mut self, their_to_self_delay: u16) {
634 self.their_to_self_delay = Some(their_to_self_delay);
637 pub(super) fn unset_funding_info(&mut self) {
638 match self.key_storage {
639 Storage::Local { ref mut funding_info, .. } => {
640 *funding_info = None;
642 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
643 panic!("Channel somehow ended up with its internal ChannelMonitor being in Watchtower mode?");
648 /// Gets the funding transaction outpoint of the channel this ChannelMonitor is monitoring for.
649 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
650 match self.key_storage {
651 Storage::Local { ref funding_info, .. } => {
653 &Some((outpoint, _)) => Some(outpoint),
657 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
663 /// Gets the sets of all outpoints which this ChannelMonitor expects to hear about spends of.
664 /// Generally useful when deserializing as during normal operation the return values of
665 /// block_connected are sufficient to ensure all relevant outpoints are being monitored (note
666 /// that the get_funding_txo outpoint and transaction must also be monitored for!).
667 pub fn get_monitored_outpoints(&self) -> Vec<(Sha256dHash, u32, &Script)> {
668 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.len() * 2);
669 for (ref txid, &(_, ref outputs)) in self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
670 for (idx, output) in outputs.iter().enumerate() {
671 res.push(((*txid).clone(), idx as u32, output));
677 /// Serializes into a vec, with various modes for the exposed pub fns
678 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W, for_local_storage: bool) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
679 //TODO: We still write out all the serialization here manually instead of using the fancy
680 //serialization framework we have, we should migrate things over to it.
681 writer.write_all(&[SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
682 writer.write_all(&[MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
684 // Set in initial Channel-object creation, so should always be set by now:
685 U48(self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor).write(writer)?;
687 match self.key_storage {
688 Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref payment_base_key, ref shutdown_pubkey, ref prev_latest_per_commitment_point, ref latest_per_commitment_point, ref funding_info } => {
689 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
690 writer.write_all(&revocation_base_key[..])?;
691 writer.write_all(&htlc_base_key[..])?;
692 writer.write_all(&delayed_payment_base_key[..])?;
693 writer.write_all(&payment_base_key[..])?;
694 writer.write_all(&shutdown_pubkey.serialize())?;
695 if let Some(ref prev_latest_per_commitment_point) = *prev_latest_per_commitment_point {
696 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
697 writer.write_all(&prev_latest_per_commitment_point.serialize())?;
699 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
701 if let Some(ref latest_per_commitment_point) = *latest_per_commitment_point {
702 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
703 writer.write_all(&latest_per_commitment_point.serialize())?;
705 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
708 &Some((ref outpoint, ref script)) => {
709 writer.write_all(&outpoint.txid[..])?;
710 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(outpoint.index))?;
711 script.write(writer)?;
714 debug_assert!(false, "Try to serialize a useless Local monitor !");
718 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => unimplemented!(),
721 writer.write_all(&self.their_htlc_base_key.as_ref().unwrap().serialize())?;
722 writer.write_all(&self.their_delayed_payment_base_key.as_ref().unwrap().serialize())?;
724 match self.their_cur_revocation_points {
725 Some((idx, pubkey, second_option)) => {
726 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(idx))?;
727 writer.write_all(&pubkey.serialize())?;
728 match second_option {
729 Some(second_pubkey) => {
730 writer.write_all(&second_pubkey.serialize())?;
733 writer.write_all(&[0; 33])?;
738 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(0))?;
742 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.our_to_self_delay))?;
743 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap()))?;
745 for &(ref secret, ref idx) in self.old_secrets.iter() {
746 writer.write_all(secret)?;
747 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*idx))?;
750 macro_rules! serialize_htlc_in_commitment {
751 ($htlc_output: expr) => {
752 writer.write_all(&[$htlc_output.offered as u8; 1])?;
753 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc_output.amount_msat))?;
754 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array($htlc_output.cltv_expiry))?;
755 writer.write_all(&$htlc_output.payment_hash)?;
756 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array($htlc_output.transaction_output_index))?;
760 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_claimable_outpoints.len() as u64))?;
761 for (ref txid, ref htlc_outputs) in self.remote_claimable_outpoints.iter() {
762 writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
763 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc_outputs.len() as u64))?;
764 for htlc_output in htlc_outputs.iter() {
765 serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output);
769 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.len() as u64))?;
770 for (ref txid, &(commitment_number, ref txouts)) in self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
771 writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
772 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(commitment_number))?;
773 (txouts.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
774 for script in txouts.iter() {
775 script.write(writer)?;
779 if for_local_storage {
780 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_hash_commitment_number.len() as u64))?;
781 for (ref payment_hash, commitment_number) in self.remote_hash_commitment_number.iter() {
782 writer.write_all(*payment_hash)?;
783 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(*commitment_number))?;
786 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(0))?;
789 macro_rules! serialize_local_tx {
790 ($local_tx: expr) => {
791 if let Err(e) = $local_tx.tx.consensus_encode(&mut WriterWriteAdaptor(writer)) {
793 encode::Error::Io(e) => return Err(e),
794 _ => panic!("local tx must have been well-formed!"),
798 writer.write_all(&$local_tx.revocation_key.serialize())?;
799 writer.write_all(&$local_tx.a_htlc_key.serialize())?;
800 writer.write_all(&$local_tx.b_htlc_key.serialize())?;
801 writer.write_all(&$local_tx.delayed_payment_key.serialize())?;
803 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($local_tx.feerate_per_kw))?;
804 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($local_tx.htlc_outputs.len() as u64))?;
805 for &(ref htlc_output, ref their_sig, ref our_sig) in $local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
806 serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output);
807 writer.write_all(&their_sig.serialize_compact(&self.secp_ctx))?;
808 writer.write_all(&our_sig.serialize_compact(&self.secp_ctx))?;
813 if let Some(ref prev_local_tx) = self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
814 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
815 serialize_local_tx!(prev_local_tx);
817 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
820 if let Some(ref cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
821 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
822 serialize_local_tx!(cur_local_tx);
824 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
827 if for_local_storage {
828 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(self.current_remote_commitment_number))?;
830 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(0))?;
833 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.payment_preimages.len() as u64))?;
834 for payment_preimage in self.payment_preimages.values() {
835 writer.write_all(payment_preimage)?;
838 self.last_block_hash.write(writer)?;
839 self.destination_script.write(writer)?;
844 /// Writes this monitor into the given writer, suitable for writing to disk.
846 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor), which
847 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
848 /// the "reorg path" (ie not just starting at the same height but starting at the highest
849 /// common block that appears on your best chain as well as on the chain which contains the
850 /// last block hash returned) upon deserializing the object!
851 pub fn write_for_disk<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
852 self.write(writer, true)
855 /// Encodes this monitor into the given writer, suitable for sending to a remote watchtower
857 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor), which
858 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
859 /// the "reorg path" (ie not just starting at the same height but starting at the highest
860 /// common block that appears on your best chain as well as on the chain which contains the
861 /// last block hash returned) upon deserializing the object!
862 pub fn write_for_watchtower<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
863 self.write(writer, false)
866 //TODO: Functions to serialize/deserialize (with different forms depending on which information
867 //we want to leave out (eg funding_txo, etc).
869 /// Can only fail if idx is < get_min_seen_secret
870 pub(super) fn get_secret(&self, idx: u64) -> Option<[u8; 32]> {
871 for i in 0..self.old_secrets.len() {
872 if (idx & (!((1 << i) - 1))) == self.old_secrets[i].1 {
873 return Some(ChannelMonitor::derive_secret(self.old_secrets[i].0, i as u8, idx))
876 assert!(idx < self.get_min_seen_secret());
880 pub(super) fn get_min_seen_secret(&self) -> u64 {
881 //TODO This can be optimized?
882 let mut min = 1 << 48;
883 for &(_, idx) in self.old_secrets.iter() {
891 pub(super) fn get_cur_remote_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
892 self.current_remote_commitment_number
895 pub(super) fn get_cur_local_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
896 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
897 0xffff_ffff_ffff - ((((local_tx.tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (local_tx.tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor)
898 } else { 0xffff_ffff_ffff }
901 /// Attempts to claim a remote commitment transaction's outputs using the revocation key and
902 /// data in remote_claimable_outpoints. Will directly claim any HTLC outputs which expire at a
903 /// height > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER. In any case, will install monitoring for
904 /// HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions.
905 fn check_spend_remote_transaction(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32) -> (Vec<Transaction>, (Sha256dHash, Vec<TxOut>), Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>) {
906 // Most secp and related errors trying to create keys means we have no hope of constructing
907 // a spend transaction...so we return no transactions to broadcast
908 let mut txn_to_broadcast = Vec::new();
909 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
910 let mut spendable_outputs = Vec::new();
912 let commitment_txid = tx.txid(); //TODO: This is gonna be a performance bottleneck for watchtowers!
913 let per_commitment_option = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(&commitment_txid);
915 macro_rules! ignore_error {
916 ( $thing : expr ) => {
919 Err(_) => return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs)
924 let commitment_number = 0xffffffffffff - ((((tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor);
925 if commitment_number >= self.get_min_seen_secret() {
926 let secret = self.get_secret(commitment_number).unwrap();
927 let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &secret));
928 let (revocation_pubkey, b_htlc_key, local_payment_key) = match self.key_storage {
929 Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, ref payment_base_key, .. } => {
930 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
931 (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_base_key))),
932 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &htlc_base_key))),
933 Some(ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &payment_base_key))))
935 Storage::Watchtower { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
936 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
937 (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &revocation_base_key)),
938 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &htlc_base_key)),
942 let delayed_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key), &self.their_delayed_payment_base_key.unwrap()));
943 let a_htlc_key = match self.their_htlc_base_key {
944 None => return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs),
945 Some(their_htlc_base_key) => ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key), &their_htlc_base_key)),
948 let revokeable_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey, self.our_to_self_delay, &delayed_key);
949 let revokeable_p2wsh = revokeable_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
951 let local_payment_p2wpkh = if let Some(payment_key) = local_payment_key {
952 // Note that the Network here is ignored as we immediately drop the address for the
953 // script_pubkey version.
954 let payment_hash160 = Hash160::from_data(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &payment_key).serialize());
955 Some(Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::All::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&payment_hash160[..]).into_script())
958 let mut total_value = 0;
959 let mut values = Vec::new();
960 let mut inputs = Vec::new();
961 let mut htlc_idxs = Vec::new();
963 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
964 if outp.script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh {
966 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
967 txid: commitment_txid,
970 script_sig: Script::new(),
971 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
974 htlc_idxs.push(None);
975 values.push(outp.value);
976 total_value += outp.value;
977 } else if Some(&outp.script_pubkey) == local_payment_p2wpkh.as_ref() {
978 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WPKH {
979 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: commitment_txid, vout: idx as u32 },
980 key: local_payment_key.unwrap(),
981 output: outp.clone(),
986 macro_rules! sign_input {
987 ($sighash_parts: expr, $input: expr, $htlc_idx: expr, $amount: expr) => {
989 let (sig, redeemscript) = match self.key_storage {
990 Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
991 let redeemscript = if $htlc_idx.is_none() { revokeable_redeemscript.clone() } else {
992 let htlc = &per_commitment_option.unwrap()[$htlc_idx.unwrap()];
993 chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey)
995 let sighash = ignore_error!(Message::from_slice(&$sighash_parts.sighash_all(&$input, &redeemscript, $amount)[..]));
996 let revocation_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key, &revocation_base_key));
997 (self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &revocation_key), redeemscript)
999 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
1003 $input.witness.push(sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
1004 $input.witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1005 if $htlc_idx.is_none() {
1006 $input.witness.push(vec!(1));
1008 $input.witness.push(revocation_pubkey.serialize().to_vec());
1010 $input.witness.push(redeemscript.into_bytes());
1015 if let Some(per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
1016 inputs.reserve_exact(per_commitment_data.len());
1018 for (idx, htlc) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() {
1019 let expected_script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey);
1020 if htlc.transaction_output_index as usize >= tx.output.len() ||
1021 tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 ||
1022 tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].script_pubkey != expected_script.to_v0_p2wsh() {
1023 return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs); // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user
1026 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
1027 txid: commitment_txid,
1028 vout: htlc.transaction_output_index,
1030 script_sig: Script::new(),
1031 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
1032 witness: Vec::new(),
1034 if htlc.cltv_expiry > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER {
1036 htlc_idxs.push(Some(idx));
1037 values.push(tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].value);
1038 total_value += htlc.amount_msat / 1000;
1040 let mut single_htlc_tx = Transaction {
1044 output: vec!(TxOut {
1045 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1046 value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000, //TODO: - fee
1049 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&single_htlc_tx);
1050 sign_input!(sighash_parts, single_htlc_tx.input[0], Some(idx), htlc.amount_msat / 1000);
1051 txn_to_broadcast.push(single_htlc_tx);
1056 if !inputs.is_empty() || !txn_to_broadcast.is_empty() { // ie we're confident this is actually ours
1057 // We're definitely a remote commitment transaction!
1058 watch_outputs.append(&mut tx.output.clone());
1059 self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, (commitment_number, tx.output.iter().map(|output| { output.script_pubkey.clone() }).collect()));
1061 if inputs.is_empty() { return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs); } // Nothing to be done...probably a false positive/local tx
1063 let outputs = vec!(TxOut {
1064 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1065 value: total_value, //TODO: - fee
1067 let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
1074 let mut values_drain = values.drain(..);
1075 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx);
1077 for (input, htlc_idx) in spend_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(htlc_idxs.iter()) {
1078 let value = values_drain.next().unwrap();
1079 sign_input!(sighash_parts, input, htlc_idx, value);
1082 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
1083 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: spend_tx.txid(), vout: 0 },
1084 output: spend_tx.output[0].clone(),
1086 txn_to_broadcast.push(spend_tx);
1087 } else if let Some(per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
1088 // While this isn't useful yet, there is a potential race where if a counterparty
1089 // revokes a state at the same time as the commitment transaction for that state is
1090 // confirmed, and the watchtower receives the block before the user, the user could
1091 // upload a new ChannelMonitor with the revocation secret but the watchtower has
1092 // already processed the block, resulting in the remote_commitment_txn_on_chain entry
1093 // not being generated by the above conditional. Thus, to be safe, we go ahead and
1095 watch_outputs.append(&mut tx.output.clone());
1096 self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, (commitment_number, tx.output.iter().map(|output| { output.script_pubkey.clone() }).collect()));
1098 if let Some(revocation_points) = self.their_cur_revocation_points {
1099 let revocation_point_option =
1100 if revocation_points.0 == commitment_number { Some(&revocation_points.1) }
1101 else if let Some(point) = revocation_points.2.as_ref() {
1102 if revocation_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 { Some(point) } else { None }
1104 if let Some(revocation_point) = revocation_point_option {
1105 let (revocation_pubkey, b_htlc_key) = match self.key_storage {
1106 Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
1107 (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_base_key))),
1108 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &htlc_base_key))))
1110 Storage::Watchtower { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
1111 (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &revocation_base_key)),
1112 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &htlc_base_key)))
1115 let a_htlc_key = match self.their_htlc_base_key {
1116 None => return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs),
1117 Some(their_htlc_base_key) => ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &their_htlc_base_key)),
1120 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
1121 if outp.script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh() {
1122 match self.key_storage {
1123 Storage::Local { ref payment_base_key, .. } => {
1124 if let Ok(local_key) = chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_point, &payment_base_key) {
1125 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WPKH {
1126 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: commitment_txid, vout: idx as u32 },
1128 output: outp.clone(),
1132 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {}
1134 break; // Only to_remote ouput is claimable
1138 let mut total_value = 0;
1139 let mut values = Vec::new();
1140 let mut inputs = Vec::new();
1142 macro_rules! sign_input {
1143 ($sighash_parts: expr, $input: expr, $amount: expr, $preimage: expr) => {
1145 let (sig, redeemscript) = match self.key_storage {
1146 Storage::Local { ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
1147 let htlc = &per_commitment_option.unwrap()[$input.sequence as usize];
1148 let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey);
1149 let sighash = ignore_error!(Message::from_slice(&$sighash_parts.sighash_all(&$input, &redeemscript, $amount)[..]));
1150 let htlc_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &htlc_base_key));
1151 (self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &htlc_key), redeemscript)
1153 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
1157 $input.witness.push(sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
1158 $input.witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1159 $input.witness.push($preimage);
1160 $input.witness.push(redeemscript.into_bytes());
1165 for (idx, htlc) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() {
1166 if let Some(payment_preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
1168 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
1169 txid: commitment_txid,
1170 vout: htlc.transaction_output_index,
1172 script_sig: Script::new(),
1173 sequence: idx as u32, // reset to 0xfffffffd in sign_input
1174 witness: Vec::new(),
1176 if htlc.cltv_expiry > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER {
1178 values.push((tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].value, payment_preimage));
1179 total_value += htlc.amount_msat / 1000;
1181 let mut single_htlc_tx = Transaction {
1185 output: vec!(TxOut {
1186 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1187 value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000, //TODO: - fee
1190 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&single_htlc_tx);
1191 sign_input!(sighash_parts, single_htlc_tx.input[0], htlc.amount_msat / 1000, payment_preimage.to_vec());
1192 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
1193 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: single_htlc_tx.txid(), vout: 0 },
1194 output: single_htlc_tx.output[0].clone(),
1196 txn_to_broadcast.push(single_htlc_tx);
1201 if inputs.is_empty() { return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs); } // Nothing to be done...probably a false positive/local tx
1203 let outputs = vec!(TxOut {
1204 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1205 value: total_value, //TODO: - fee
1207 let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
1214 let mut values_drain = values.drain(..);
1215 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx);
1217 for input in spend_tx.input.iter_mut() {
1218 let value = values_drain.next().unwrap();
1219 sign_input!(sighash_parts, input, value.0, value.1.to_vec());
1222 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
1223 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: spend_tx.txid(), vout: 0 },
1224 output: spend_tx.output[0].clone(),
1226 txn_to_broadcast.push(spend_tx);
1231 (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs)
1234 /// Attempst to claim a remote HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout s outputs using the revocation key
1235 fn check_spend_remote_htlc(&self, tx: &Transaction, commitment_number: u64) -> (Option<Transaction>, Option<SpendableOutputDescriptor>) {
1236 if tx.input.len() != 1 || tx.output.len() != 1 {
1240 macro_rules! ignore_error {
1241 ( $thing : expr ) => {
1244 Err(_) => return (None, None)
1249 let secret = if let Some(secret) = self.get_secret(commitment_number) { secret } else { return (None, None); };
1250 let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &secret));
1251 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
1252 let revocation_pubkey = match self.key_storage {
1253 Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
1254 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_base_key)))
1256 Storage::Watchtower { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
1257 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &revocation_base_key))
1260 let delayed_key = match self.their_delayed_payment_base_key {
1261 None => return (None, None),
1262 Some(their_delayed_payment_base_key) => ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &their_delayed_payment_base_key)),
1264 let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), &delayed_key);
1265 let revokeable_p2wsh = redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
1266 let htlc_txid = tx.txid(); //TODO: This is gonna be a performance bottleneck for watchtowers!
1268 let mut inputs = Vec::new();
1271 if tx.output[0].script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh { //HTLC transactions have one txin, one txout
1273 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
1277 script_sig: Script::new(),
1278 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
1279 witness: Vec::new(),
1281 amount = tx.output[0].value;
1284 if !inputs.is_empty() {
1285 let outputs = vec!(TxOut {
1286 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1287 value: amount, //TODO: - fee
1290 let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
1297 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx);
1299 let sig = match self.key_storage {
1300 Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
1301 let sighash = ignore_error!(Message::from_slice(&sighash_parts.sighash_all(&spend_tx.input[0], &redeemscript, amount)[..]));
1302 let revocation_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key, &revocation_base_key));
1303 self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &revocation_key)
1305 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
1309 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
1310 spend_tx.input[0].witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1311 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(vec!(1));
1312 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(redeemscript.into_bytes());
1314 let outpoint = BitcoinOutPoint { txid: spend_tx.txid(), vout: 0 };
1315 let output = spend_tx.output[0].clone();
1316 (Some(spend_tx), Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput { outpoint, output }))
1317 } else { (None, None) }
1320 fn broadcast_by_local_state(&self, local_tx: &LocalSignedTx, per_commitment_point: &Option<PublicKey>, delayed_payment_base_key: &Option<SecretKey>) -> (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>) {
1321 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
1322 let mut spendable_outputs = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
1324 macro_rules! add_dynamic_output {
1325 ($father_tx: expr, $vout: expr) => {
1326 if let Some(ref per_commitment_point) = *per_commitment_point {
1327 if let Some(ref delayed_payment_base_key) = *delayed_payment_base_key {
1328 if let Ok(local_delayedkey) = chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base_key) {
1329 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WSH {
1330 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: $father_tx.txid(), vout: $vout },
1331 key: local_delayedkey,
1332 witness_script: chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&local_tx.revocation_key, self.our_to_self_delay, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key),
1333 to_self_delay: self.our_to_self_delay,
1334 output: $father_tx.output[$vout as usize].clone(),
1343 let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&local_tx.revocation_key, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), &local_tx.delayed_payment_key);
1344 let revokeable_p2wsh = redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
1345 for (idx, output) in local_tx.tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
1346 if output.script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh {
1347 add_dynamic_output!(local_tx.tx, idx as u32);
1352 for &(ref htlc, ref their_sig, ref our_sig) in local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1354 let mut htlc_timeout_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&local_tx.txid, local_tx.feerate_per_kw, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), htlc, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key, &local_tx.revocation_key);
1356 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
1358 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(their_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
1359 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1360 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
1361 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1363 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new());
1364 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &local_tx.a_htlc_key, &local_tx.b_htlc_key, &local_tx.revocation_key).into_bytes());
1366 add_dynamic_output!(htlc_timeout_tx, 0);
1367 res.push(htlc_timeout_tx);
1369 if let Some(payment_preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
1370 let mut htlc_success_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&local_tx.txid, local_tx.feerate_per_kw, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), htlc, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key, &local_tx.revocation_key);
1372 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
1374 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(their_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
1375 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1376 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
1377 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1379 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(payment_preimage.to_vec());
1380 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &local_tx.a_htlc_key, &local_tx.b_htlc_key, &local_tx.revocation_key).into_bytes());
1382 add_dynamic_output!(htlc_success_tx, 0);
1383 res.push(htlc_success_tx);
1388 (res, spendable_outputs)
1391 /// Attempts to claim any claimable HTLCs in a commitment transaction which was not (yet)
1392 /// revoked using data in local_claimable_outpoints.
1393 /// Should not be used if check_spend_revoked_transaction succeeds.
1394 fn check_spend_local_transaction(&self, tx: &Transaction, _height: u32) -> (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>) {
1395 let commitment_txid = tx.txid();
1396 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1397 if local_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
1398 match self.key_storage {
1399 Storage::Local { ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref latest_per_commitment_point, .. } => {
1400 return self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, latest_per_commitment_point, &Some(*delayed_payment_base_key));
1402 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
1403 return self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, &None, &None);
1408 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1409 if local_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
1410 match self.key_storage {
1411 Storage::Local { ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref prev_latest_per_commitment_point, .. } => {
1412 return self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, prev_latest_per_commitment_point, &Some(*delayed_payment_base_key));
1414 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
1415 return self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, &None, &None);
1420 (Vec::new(), Vec::new())
1423 /// Generate a spendable output event when closing_transaction get registered onchain.
1424 fn check_spend_closing_transaction(&self, tx: &Transaction) -> Option<SpendableOutputDescriptor> {
1425 if tx.input[0].sequence == 0xFFFFFFFF && !tx.input[0].witness.is_empty() && tx.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len() == 71 {
1426 match self.key_storage {
1427 Storage::Local { ref shutdown_pubkey, .. } => {
1428 let our_channel_close_key_hash = Hash160::from_data(&shutdown_pubkey.serialize());
1429 let shutdown_script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::All::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&our_channel_close_key_hash[..]).into_script();
1430 for (idx, output) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
1431 if shutdown_script == output.script_pubkey {
1432 return Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
1433 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), vout: idx as u32 },
1434 output: output.clone(),
1439 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
1440 //TODO: we need to ensure an offline client will generate the event when it
1441 // cames back online after only the watchtower saw the transaction
1448 /// Used by ChannelManager deserialization to broadcast the latest local state if it's copy of
1449 /// the Channel was out-of-date.
1450 pub(super) fn get_latest_local_commitment_txn(&self) -> Vec<Transaction> {
1451 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1452 let mut res = vec![local_tx.tx.clone()];
1453 match self.key_storage {
1454 Storage::Local { ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref prev_latest_per_commitment_point, .. } => {
1455 res.append(&mut self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, prev_latest_per_commitment_point, &Some(*delayed_payment_base_key)).0);
1457 _ => panic!("Can only broadcast by local channelmonitor"),
1465 fn block_connected(&mut self, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], height: u32, block_hash: &Sha256dHash, broadcaster: &BroadcasterInterface)-> (Vec<(Sha256dHash, Vec<TxOut>)>, Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>) {
1466 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
1467 let mut spendable_outputs = Vec::new();
1468 for tx in txn_matched {
1469 if tx.input.len() == 1 {
1470 // Assuming our keys were not leaked (in which case we're screwed no matter what),
1471 // commitment transactions and HTLC transactions will all only ever have one input,
1472 // which is an easy way to filter out any potential non-matching txn for lazy
1474 let prevout = &tx.input[0].previous_output;
1475 let mut txn: Vec<Transaction> = Vec::new();
1476 let funding_txo = match self.key_storage {
1477 Storage::Local { ref funding_info, .. } => {
1478 funding_info.clone()
1480 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
1484 if funding_txo.is_none() || (prevout.txid == funding_txo.as_ref().unwrap().0.txid && prevout.vout == funding_txo.as_ref().unwrap().0.index as u32) {
1485 let (remote_txn, new_outputs, mut spendable_output) = self.check_spend_remote_transaction(tx, height);
1487 spendable_outputs.append(&mut spendable_output);
1488 if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() {
1489 watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
1492 let (remote_txn, mut outputs) = self.check_spend_local_transaction(tx, height);
1493 spendable_outputs.append(&mut outputs);
1496 if !funding_txo.is_none() && txn.is_empty() {
1497 if let Some(spendable_output) = self.check_spend_closing_transaction(tx) {
1498 spendable_outputs.push(spendable_output);
1502 if let Some(&(commitment_number, _)) = self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.get(&prevout.txid) {
1503 let (tx, spendable_output) = self.check_spend_remote_htlc(tx, commitment_number);
1504 if let Some(tx) = tx {
1507 if let Some(spendable_output) = spendable_output {
1508 spendable_outputs.push(spendable_output);
1512 for tx in txn.iter() {
1513 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(tx);
1517 if let Some(ref cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1518 if self.would_broadcast_at_height(height) {
1519 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&cur_local_tx.tx);
1520 match self.key_storage {
1521 Storage::Local { ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref latest_per_commitment_point, .. } => {
1522 let (txs, mut outputs) = self.broadcast_by_local_state(&cur_local_tx, latest_per_commitment_point, &Some(*delayed_payment_base_key));
1523 spendable_outputs.append(&mut outputs);
1525 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
1528 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
1529 let (txs, mut outputs) = self.broadcast_by_local_state(&cur_local_tx, &None, &None);
1530 spendable_outputs.append(&mut outputs);
1532 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
1538 self.last_block_hash = block_hash.clone();
1539 (watch_outputs, spendable_outputs)
1542 pub(super) fn would_broadcast_at_height(&self, height: u32) -> bool {
1543 if let Some(ref cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1544 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in cur_local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1545 // For inbound HTLCs which we know the preimage for, we have to ensure we hit the
1546 // chain with enough room to claim the HTLC without our counterparty being able to
1547 // time out the HTLC first.
1548 // For outbound HTLCs which our counterparty hasn't failed/claimed, our primary
1549 // concern is being able to claim the corresponding inbound HTLC (on another
1550 // channel) before it expires. In fact, we don't even really care if our
1551 // counterparty here claims such an outbound HTLC after it expired as long as we
1552 // can still claim the corresponding HTLC. Thus, to avoid needlessly hitting the
1553 // chain when our counterparty is waiting for expiration to off-chain fail an HTLC
1554 // we give ourselves a few blocks of headroom after expiration before going
1555 // on-chain for an expired HTLC.
1556 // Note that, to avoid a potential attack whereby a node delays claiming an HTLC
1557 // from us until we've reached the point where we go on-chain with the
1558 // corresponding inbound HTLC, we must ensure that outbound HTLCs go on chain at
1559 // least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER blocks prior to the inbound HTLC.
1560 // aka outbound_cltv + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS == height - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
1561 // inbound_cltv == height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
1562 // outbound_cltv + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFER <= inbound_cltv - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
1563 // HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS + 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFER <= inbound_cltv - outbound_cltv
1564 // HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS + 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFER <= CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA
1565 if ( htlc.offered && htlc.cltv_expiry + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS <= height) ||
1566 (!htlc.offered && htlc.cltv_expiry <= height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER && self.payment_preimages.contains_key(&htlc.payment_hash)) {
1575 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
1577 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> ReadableArgs<R, Arc<Logger>> for (Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor) {
1578 fn read(reader: &mut R, logger: Arc<Logger>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1579 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1580 macro_rules! unwrap_obj {
1584 Err(_) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
1589 let _ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1590 let min_ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1591 if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION {
1592 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion);
1595 let commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor = <U48 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.0;
1597 let key_storage = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
1599 let revocation_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
1600 let htlc_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
1601 let delayed_payment_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
1602 let payment_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
1603 let shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
1604 let prev_latest_per_commitment_point = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
1606 1 => Some(Readable::read(reader)?),
1607 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
1609 let latest_per_commitment_point = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
1611 1 => Some(Readable::read(reader)?),
1612 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
1614 // Technically this can fail and serialize fail a round-trip, but only for serialization of
1615 // barely-init'd ChannelMonitors that we can't do anything with.
1616 let outpoint = OutPoint {
1617 txid: Readable::read(reader)?,
1618 index: Readable::read(reader)?,
1620 let funding_info = Some((outpoint, Readable::read(reader)?));
1622 revocation_base_key,
1624 delayed_payment_base_key,
1627 prev_latest_per_commitment_point,
1628 latest_per_commitment_point,
1632 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
1635 let their_htlc_base_key = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
1636 let their_delayed_payment_base_key = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
1638 let their_cur_revocation_points = {
1639 let first_idx = <U48 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.0;
1643 let first_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
1644 let second_point_slice: [u8; 33] = Readable::read(reader)?;
1645 if second_point_slice[0..32] == [0; 32] && second_point_slice[32] == 0 {
1646 Some((first_idx, first_point, None))
1648 Some((first_idx, first_point, Some(unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &second_point_slice)))))
1653 let our_to_self_delay: u16 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1654 let their_to_self_delay: Option<u16> = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
1656 let mut old_secrets = [([0; 32], 1 << 48); 49];
1657 for &mut (ref mut secret, ref mut idx) in old_secrets.iter_mut() {
1658 *secret = Readable::read(reader)?;
1659 *idx = Readable::read(reader)?;
1662 macro_rules! read_htlc_in_commitment {
1665 let offered: bool = Readable::read(reader)?;
1666 let amount_msat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1667 let cltv_expiry: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1668 let payment_hash: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(reader)?;
1669 let transaction_output_index: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1671 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1672 offered, amount_msat, cltv_expiry, payment_hash, transaction_output_index
1678 let remote_claimable_outpoints_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1679 let mut remote_claimable_outpoints = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(remote_claimable_outpoints_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 64));
1680 for _ in 0..remote_claimable_outpoints_len {
1681 let txid: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
1682 let outputs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1683 let mut outputs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
1684 for _ in 0..outputs_count {
1685 outputs.push(read_htlc_in_commitment!());
1687 if let Some(_) = remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, outputs) {
1688 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
1692 let remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1693 let mut remote_commitment_txn_on_chain = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
1694 for _ in 0..remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len {
1695 let txid: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
1696 let commitment_number = <U48 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.0;
1697 let outputs_count = <u64 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?;
1698 let mut outputs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 8));
1699 for _ in 0..outputs_count {
1700 outputs.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
1702 if let Some(_) = remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(txid, (commitment_number, outputs)) {
1703 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
1707 let remote_hash_commitment_number_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1708 let mut remote_hash_commitment_number = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(remote_hash_commitment_number_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
1709 for _ in 0..remote_hash_commitment_number_len {
1710 let txid: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(reader)?;
1711 let commitment_number = <U48 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.0;
1712 if let Some(_) = remote_hash_commitment_number.insert(txid, commitment_number) {
1713 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
1717 macro_rules! read_local_tx {
1720 let tx = match Transaction::consensus_decode(reader.by_ref()) {
1723 encode::Error::Io(ioe) => return Err(DecodeError::Io(ioe)),
1724 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
1728 if tx.input.is_empty() {
1729 // Ensure tx didn't hit the 0-input ambiguity case.
1730 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
1733 let revocation_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
1734 let a_htlc_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
1735 let b_htlc_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
1736 let delayed_payment_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
1737 let feerate_per_kw: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1739 let htlc_outputs_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1740 let mut htlc_outputs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlc_outputs_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
1741 for _ in 0..htlc_outputs_len {
1742 htlc_outputs.push((read_htlc_in_commitment!(), Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
1747 tx, revocation_key, a_htlc_key, b_htlc_key, delayed_payment_key, feerate_per_kw, htlc_outputs
1753 let prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
1756 Some(read_local_tx!())
1758 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
1761 let current_local_signed_commitment_tx = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
1764 Some(read_local_tx!())
1766 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
1769 let current_remote_commitment_number = <U48 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.0;
1771 let payment_preimages_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1772 let mut payment_preimages = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(payment_preimages_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
1773 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
1774 for _ in 0..payment_preimages_len {
1775 let preimage: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(reader)?;
1777 sha.input(&preimage);
1778 let mut hash = [0; 32];
1779 sha.result(&mut hash);
1780 if let Some(_) = payment_preimages.insert(hash, preimage) {
1781 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
1785 let last_block_hash: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
1786 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
1788 Ok((last_block_hash.clone(), ChannelMonitor {
1789 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor,
1792 their_htlc_base_key,
1793 their_delayed_payment_base_key,
1794 their_cur_revocation_points,
1797 their_to_self_delay,
1800 remote_claimable_outpoints,
1801 remote_commitment_txn_on_chain,
1802 remote_hash_commitment_number,
1804 prev_local_signed_commitment_tx,
1805 current_local_signed_commitment_tx,
1806 current_remote_commitment_number,
1821 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Script;
1822 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
1823 use crypto::digest::Digest;
1825 use ln::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor;
1826 use ln::chan_utils::{HTLCOutputInCommitment, TxCreationKeys};
1827 use util::sha2::Sha256;
1828 use util::test_utils::TestLogger;
1829 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
1830 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1, Signature};
1831 use rand::{thread_rng,Rng};
1835 fn test_per_commitment_storage() {
1836 // Test vectors from BOLT 3:
1837 let mut secrets: Vec<[u8; 32]> = Vec::new();
1838 let mut monitor: ChannelMonitor;
1839 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1840 let logger = Arc::new(TestLogger::new());
1842 macro_rules! test_secrets {
1844 let mut idx = 281474976710655;
1845 for secret in secrets.iter() {
1846 assert_eq!(monitor.get_secret(idx).unwrap(), *secret);
1849 assert_eq!(monitor.get_min_seen_secret(), idx + 1);
1850 assert!(monitor.get_secret(idx).is_none());
1855 // insert_secret correct sequence
1856 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
1859 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1860 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1861 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1864 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1865 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1866 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1869 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1870 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1871 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1874 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1875 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1876 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1879 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1880 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
1881 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1884 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1885 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
1886 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1889 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1890 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
1891 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1894 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1895 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
1896 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1901 // insert_secret #1 incorrect
1902 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
1905 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1906 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
1907 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1910 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1911 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1912 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
1913 "Previous secret did not match new one");
1917 // insert_secret #2 incorrect (#1 derived from incorrect)
1918 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
1921 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1922 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
1923 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1926 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1927 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("dddc3a8d14fddf2b68fa8c7fbad2748274937479dd0f8930d5ebb4ab6bd866a3").unwrap());
1928 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1931 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1932 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1933 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1936 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1937 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1938 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
1939 "Previous secret did not match new one");
1943 // insert_secret #3 incorrect
1944 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
1947 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1948 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1949 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1952 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1953 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1954 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1957 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1958 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c51a18b13e8527e579ec56365482c62f180b7d5760b46e9477dae59e87ed423a").unwrap());
1959 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1962 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1963 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1964 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
1965 "Previous secret did not match new one");
1969 // insert_secret #4 incorrect (1,2,3 derived from incorrect)
1970 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
1973 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1974 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
1975 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1978 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1979 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("dddc3a8d14fddf2b68fa8c7fbad2748274937479dd0f8930d5ebb4ab6bd866a3").unwrap());
1980 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1983 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1984 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c51a18b13e8527e579ec56365482c62f180b7d5760b46e9477dae59e87ed423a").unwrap());
1985 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1988 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1989 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("ba65d7b0ef55a3ba300d4e87af29868f394f8f138d78a7011669c79b37b936f4").unwrap());
1990 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1993 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1994 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
1995 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1998 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1999 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
2000 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2003 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2004 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
2005 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2008 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2009 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
2010 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
2011 "Previous secret did not match new one");
2015 // insert_secret #5 incorrect
2016 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
2019 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2020 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
2021 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2024 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2025 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
2026 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2029 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2030 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
2031 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2034 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2035 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
2036 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2039 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2040 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("631373ad5f9ef654bb3dade742d09504c567edd24320d2fcd68e3cc47e2ff6a6").unwrap());
2041 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2044 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2045 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
2046 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
2047 "Previous secret did not match new one");
2051 // insert_secret #6 incorrect (5 derived from incorrect)
2052 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
2055 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2056 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
2057 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2060 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2061 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
2062 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2065 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2066 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
2067 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2070 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2071 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
2072 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2075 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2076 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("631373ad5f9ef654bb3dade742d09504c567edd24320d2fcd68e3cc47e2ff6a6").unwrap());
2077 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2080 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2081 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("b7e76a83668bde38b373970155c868a653304308f9896692f904a23731224bb1").unwrap());
2082 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2085 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2086 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
2087 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2090 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2091 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
2092 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
2093 "Previous secret did not match new one");
2097 // insert_secret #7 incorrect
2098 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
2101 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2102 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
2103 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2106 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2107 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
2108 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2111 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2112 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
2113 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2116 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2117 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
2118 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2121 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2122 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
2123 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2126 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2127 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
2128 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2131 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2132 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("e7971de736e01da8ed58b94c2fc216cb1dca9e326f3a96e7194fe8ea8af6c0a3").unwrap());
2133 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2136 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2137 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
2138 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
2139 "Previous secret did not match new one");
2143 // insert_secret #8 incorrect
2144 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
2147 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2148 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
2149 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2152 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2153 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
2154 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2157 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2158 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
2159 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2162 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2163 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
2164 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2167 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2168 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
2169 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2172 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2173 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
2174 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2177 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2178 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
2179 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2182 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2183 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a7efbc61aac46d34f77778bac22c8a20c6a46ca460addc49009bda875ec88fa4").unwrap());
2184 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
2185 "Previous secret did not match new one");
2190 fn test_prune_preimages() {
2191 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2192 let logger = Arc::new(TestLogger::new());
2193 let dummy_sig = Signature::from_der(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("3045022100fa86fa9a36a8cd6a7bb8f06a541787d51371d067951a9461d5404de6b928782e02201c8b7c334c10aed8976a3a465be9a28abff4cb23acbf00022295b378ce1fa3cd").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
2195 let dummy_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap());
2196 macro_rules! dummy_keys {
2200 per_commitment_point: dummy_key.clone(),
2201 revocation_key: dummy_key.clone(),
2202 a_htlc_key: dummy_key.clone(),
2203 b_htlc_key: dummy_key.clone(),
2204 a_delayed_payment_key: dummy_key.clone(),
2205 b_payment_key: dummy_key.clone(),
2210 let dummy_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
2212 let mut preimages = Vec::new();
2214 let mut rng = thread_rng();
2216 let mut preimage = [0; 32];
2217 rng.fill_bytes(&mut preimage);
2218 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
2219 sha.input(&preimage);
2220 let mut hash = [0; 32];
2221 sha.result(&mut hash);
2222 preimages.push((preimage, hash));
2226 macro_rules! preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs {
2227 ($preimages_slice: expr) => {
2229 let mut res = Vec::new();
2230 for (idx, preimage) in $preimages_slice.iter().enumerate() {
2231 res.push(HTLCOutputInCommitment {
2235 payment_hash: preimage.1.clone(),
2236 transaction_output_index: idx as u32,
2243 macro_rules! preimages_to_local_htlcs {
2244 ($preimages_slice: expr) => {
2246 let mut inp = preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!($preimages_slice);
2247 let res: Vec<_> = inp.drain(..).map(|e| { (e, dummy_sig.clone(), dummy_sig.clone()) }).collect();
2253 macro_rules! test_preimages_exist {
2254 ($preimages_slice: expr, $monitor: expr) => {
2255 for preimage in $preimages_slice {
2256 assert!($monitor.payment_preimages.contains_key(&preimage.1));
2261 // Prune with one old state and a local commitment tx holding a few overlaps with the
2263 let mut monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
2264 monitor.set_their_to_self_delay(10);
2266 monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(dummy_tx.clone(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..10]));
2267 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[5..15]), 281474976710655, dummy_key);
2268 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[15..20]), 281474976710654, dummy_key);
2269 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[17..20]), 281474976710653, dummy_key);
2270 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[18..20]), 281474976710652, dummy_key);
2271 for &(ref preimage, ref hash) in preimages.iter() {
2272 monitor.provide_payment_preimage(hash, preimage);
2275 // Now provide a secret, pruning preimages 10-15
2276 let mut secret = [0; 32];
2277 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
2278 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secret.clone()).unwrap();
2279 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 15);
2280 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
2281 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[15..20], monitor);
2283 // Now provide a further secret, pruning preimages 15-17
2284 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
2285 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secret.clone()).unwrap();
2286 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 13);
2287 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
2288 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[17..20], monitor);
2290 // Now update local commitment tx info, pruning only element 18 as we still care about the
2291 // previous commitment tx's preimages too
2292 monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(dummy_tx.clone(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..5]));
2293 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
2294 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secret.clone()).unwrap();
2295 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 12);
2296 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
2297 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[18..20], monitor);
2299 // But if we do it again, we'll prune 5-10
2300 monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(dummy_tx.clone(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..3]));
2301 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
2302 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secret.clone()).unwrap();
2303 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 5);
2304 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..5], monitor);
2307 // Further testing is done in the ChannelManager integration tests.