1 //! The logic to monitor for on-chain transactions and create the relevant claim responses lives
4 //! ChannelMonitor objects are generated by ChannelManager in response to relevant
5 //! messages/actions, and MUST be persisted to disk (and, preferably, remotely) before progress can
6 //! be made in responding to certain messages, see ManyChannelMonitor for more.
8 //! Note that ChannelMonitors are an important part of the lightning trust model and a copy of the
9 //! latest ChannelMonitor must always be actively monitoring for chain updates (and no out-of-date
10 //! ChannelMonitors should do so). Thus, if you're building rust-lightning into an HSM or other
11 //! security-domain-separated system design, you should consider having multiple paths for
12 //! ChannelMonitors to get out of the HSM and onto monitoring devices.
14 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
15 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxIn,TxOut,SigHashType,Transaction};
16 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
17 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
18 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
19 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::{self, Decodable, Encodable};
20 use bitcoin::util::hash::BitcoinHash;
21 use bitcoin::util::bip143;
23 use bitcoin_hashes::Hash;
24 use bitcoin_hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
25 use bitcoin_hashes::hash160::Hash as Hash160;
26 use bitcoin_hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
28 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Signature};
29 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
32 use ln::msgs::DecodeError;
34 use ln::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment;
35 use ln::channelmanager::{HTLCSource, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
36 use ln::channel::{ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT, OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT};
37 use chain::chaininterface::{ChainListener, ChainWatchInterface, BroadcasterInterface, FeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget};
38 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
39 use chain::keysinterface::SpendableOutputDescriptor;
40 use util::logger::Logger;
41 use util::ser::{ReadableArgs, Readable, Writer, Writeable, WriterWriteAdaptor, U48};
42 use util::{byte_utils, events};
44 use std::collections::{HashMap, hash_map};
45 use std::sync::{Arc,Mutex};
46 use std::{hash,cmp, mem};
48 /// An error enum representing a failure to persist a channel monitor update.
50 pub enum ChannelMonitorUpdateErr {
51 /// Used to indicate a temporary failure (eg connection to a watchtower or remote backup of
52 /// our state failed, but is expected to succeed at some point in the future).
54 /// Such a failure will "freeze" a channel, preventing us from revoking old states or
55 /// submitting new commitment transactions to the remote party.
56 /// ChannelManager::test_restore_channel_monitor can be used to retry the update(s) and restore
57 /// the channel to an operational state.
59 /// Note that continuing to operate when no copy of the updated ChannelMonitor could be
60 /// persisted is unsafe - if you failed to store the update on your own local disk you should
61 /// instead return PermanentFailure to force closure of the channel ASAP.
63 /// Even when a channel has been "frozen" updates to the ChannelMonitor can continue to occur
64 /// (eg if an inbound HTLC which we forwarded was claimed upstream resulting in us attempting
65 /// to claim it on this channel) and those updates must be applied wherever they can be. At
66 /// least one such updated ChannelMonitor must be persisted otherwise PermanentFailure should
67 /// be returned to get things on-chain ASAP using only the in-memory copy. Obviously updates to
68 /// the channel which would invalidate previous ChannelMonitors are not made when a channel has
71 /// Note that even if updates made after TemporaryFailure succeed you must still call
72 /// test_restore_channel_monitor to ensure you have the latest monitor and re-enable normal
73 /// channel operation.
75 /// For deployments where a copy of ChannelMonitors and other local state are backed up in a
76 /// remote location (with local copies persisted immediately), it is anticipated that all
77 /// updates will return TemporaryFailure until the remote copies could be updated.
79 /// Used to indicate no further channel monitor updates will be allowed (eg we've moved on to a
80 /// different watchtower and cannot update with all watchtowers that were previously informed
81 /// of this channel). This will force-close the channel in question.
83 /// Should also be used to indicate a failure to update the local copy of the channel monitor.
87 /// General Err type for ChannelMonitor actions. Generally, this implies that the data provided is
88 /// inconsistent with the ChannelMonitor being called. eg for ChannelMonitor::insert_combine this
89 /// means you tried to merge two monitors for different channels or for a channel which was
90 /// restored from a backup and then generated new commitment updates.
91 /// Contains a human-readable error message.
93 pub struct MonitorUpdateError(pub &'static str);
95 /// Simple structure send back by ManyChannelMonitor in case of HTLC detected onchain from a
96 /// forward channel and from which info are needed to update HTLC in a backward channel.
97 pub struct HTLCUpdate {
98 pub(super) payment_hash: PaymentHash,
99 pub(super) payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
100 pub(super) source: HTLCSource
103 /// Simple trait indicating ability to track a set of ChannelMonitors and multiplex events between
104 /// them. Generally should be implemented by keeping a local SimpleManyChannelMonitor and passing
105 /// events to it, while also taking any add_update_monitor events and passing them to some remote
108 /// Note that any updates to a channel's monitor *must* be applied to each instance of the
109 /// channel's monitor everywhere (including remote watchtowers) *before* this function returns. If
110 /// an update occurs and a remote watchtower is left with old state, it may broadcast transactions
111 /// which we have revoked, allowing our counterparty to claim all funds in the channel!
112 pub trait ManyChannelMonitor: Send + Sync {
113 /// Adds or updates a monitor for the given `funding_txo`.
115 /// Implementor must also ensure that the funding_txo outpoint is registered with any relevant
116 /// ChainWatchInterfaces such that the provided monitor receives block_connected callbacks with
117 /// any spends of it.
118 fn add_update_monitor(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr>;
120 /// Used by ChannelManager to get list of HTLC resolved onchain and which needed to be updated
121 /// with success or failure backward
122 fn fetch_pending_htlc_updated(&self) -> Vec<HTLCUpdate>;
125 /// A simple implementation of a ManyChannelMonitor and ChainListener. Can be used to create a
126 /// watchtower or watch our own channels.
128 /// Note that you must provide your own key by which to refer to channels.
130 /// If you're accepting remote monitors (ie are implementing a watchtower), you must verify that
131 /// users cannot overwrite a given channel by providing a duplicate key. ie you should probably
132 /// index by a PublicKey which is required to sign any updates.
134 /// If you're using this for local monitoring of your own channels, you probably want to use
135 /// `OutPoint` as the key, which will give you a ManyChannelMonitor implementation.
136 pub struct SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
137 #[cfg(test)] // Used in ChannelManager tests to manipulate channels directly
138 pub monitors: Mutex<HashMap<Key, ChannelMonitor>>,
140 monitors: Mutex<HashMap<Key, ChannelMonitor>>,
141 chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>,
142 broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>,
143 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
144 pending_htlc_updated: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, Vec<(HTLCSource, Option<PaymentPreimage>)>>>,
146 fee_estimator: Arc<FeeEstimator>
149 impl<Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash> ChainListener for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
150 fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], _indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) {
151 let block_hash = header.bitcoin_hash();
152 let mut new_events: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(0);
153 let mut htlc_updated_infos = Vec::new();
155 let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
156 for monitor in monitors.values_mut() {
157 let (txn_outputs, spendable_outputs, mut htlc_updated) = monitor.block_connected(txn_matched, height, &block_hash, &*self.broadcaster, &*self.fee_estimator);
158 if spendable_outputs.len() > 0 {
159 new_events.push(events::Event::SpendableOutputs {
160 outputs: spendable_outputs,
164 for (ref txid, ref outputs) in txn_outputs {
165 for (idx, output) in outputs.iter().enumerate() {
166 self.chain_monitor.install_watch_outpoint((txid.clone(), idx as u32), &output.script_pubkey);
169 htlc_updated_infos.append(&mut htlc_updated);
173 // ChannelManager will just need to fetch pending_htlc_updated and pass state backward
174 let mut pending_htlc_updated = self.pending_htlc_updated.lock().unwrap();
175 for htlc in htlc_updated_infos.drain(..) {
176 match pending_htlc_updated.entry(htlc.2) {
177 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut e) => {
178 // In case of reorg we may have htlc outputs solved in a different way so
179 // we prefer to keep claims but don't store duplicate updates for a given
180 // (payment_hash, HTLCSource) pair.
181 let mut existing_claim = false;
182 e.get_mut().retain(|htlc_data| {
183 if htlc.0 == htlc_data.0 {
184 if htlc_data.1.is_some() {
185 existing_claim = true;
191 e.get_mut().push((htlc.0, htlc.1));
194 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
195 e.insert(vec![(htlc.0, htlc.1)]);
200 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
201 pending_events.append(&mut new_events);
204 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, disconnected_height: u32) {
205 let block_hash = header.bitcoin_hash();
206 let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
207 for monitor in monitors.values_mut() {
208 monitor.block_disconnected(disconnected_height, &block_hash);
213 impl<Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash + 'static> SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
214 /// Creates a new object which can be used to monitor several channels given the chain
215 /// interface with which to register to receive notifications.
216 pub fn new(chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>, broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>, logger: Arc<Logger>, feeest: Arc<FeeEstimator>) -> Arc<SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key>> {
217 let res = Arc::new(SimpleManyChannelMonitor {
218 monitors: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
221 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
222 pending_htlc_updated: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
224 fee_estimator: feeest,
226 let weak_res = Arc::downgrade(&res);
227 res.chain_monitor.register_listener(weak_res);
231 /// Adds or updates the monitor which monitors the channel referred to by the given key.
232 pub fn add_update_monitor_by_key(&self, key: Key, monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
233 let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
234 match monitors.get_mut(&key) {
235 Some(orig_monitor) => {
236 log_trace!(self, "Updating Channel Monitor for channel {}", log_funding_info!(monitor.key_storage));
237 return orig_monitor.insert_combine(monitor);
241 match monitor.key_storage {
242 Storage::Local { ref funding_info, .. } => {
245 return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Try to update a useless monitor without funding_txo !"));
247 &Some((ref outpoint, ref script)) => {
248 log_trace!(self, "Got new Channel Monitor for channel {}", log_bytes!(outpoint.to_channel_id()[..]));
249 self.chain_monitor.install_watch_tx(&outpoint.txid, script);
250 self.chain_monitor.install_watch_outpoint((outpoint.txid, outpoint.index as u32), script);
254 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
255 self.chain_monitor.watch_all_txn();
258 monitors.insert(key, monitor);
263 impl ManyChannelMonitor for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<OutPoint> {
264 fn add_update_monitor(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr> {
265 match self.add_update_monitor_by_key(funding_txo, monitor) {
267 Err(_) => Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure),
271 fn fetch_pending_htlc_updated(&self) -> Vec<HTLCUpdate> {
272 let mut updated = self.pending_htlc_updated.lock().unwrap();
273 let mut pending_htlcs_updated = Vec::with_capacity(updated.len());
274 for (k, v) in updated.drain() {
276 pending_htlcs_updated.push(HTLCUpdate {
278 payment_preimage: htlc_data.1,
283 pending_htlcs_updated
287 impl<Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash> events::EventsProvider for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
288 fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
289 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
290 let mut ret = Vec::new();
291 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut *pending_events);
296 /// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, don't try to claim it in a shared transaction,
297 /// instead claiming it in its own individual transaction.
298 const CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 12;
299 /// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, force-close the channel to broadcast the
300 /// HTLC-Success transaction.
301 /// In other words, this is an upper bound on how many blocks we think it can take us to get a
302 /// transaction confirmed (and we use it in a few more, equivalent, places).
303 pub(crate) const CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 6;
304 /// Number of blocks by which point we expect our counterparty to have seen new blocks on the
305 /// network and done a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance (+ we've updated all our
306 /// copies of ChannelMonitors, including watchtowers). We could enforce the contract by failing
307 /// at CLTV expiration height but giving a grace period to our peer may be profitable for us if he
308 /// can provide an over-late preimage. Nevertheless, grace period has to be accounted in our
309 /// CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA to be secure. Following this policy we may decrease the rate of channel failures
310 /// due to expiration but increase the cost of funds being locked longuer in case of failure.
311 /// This delay also cover a low-power peer being slow to process blocks and so being behind us on
312 /// accurate block height.
313 /// In case of onchain failure to be pass backward we may see the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY
314 /// with at worst this delay, so we are not only using this value as a mercy for them but also
315 /// us as a safeguard to delay with enough time.
316 pub(crate) const LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS: u32 = 3;
317 /// Number of blocks we wait on seeing a HTLC output being solved before we fail corresponding inbound
318 /// HTLCs. This prevents us from failing backwards and then getting a reorg resulting in us losing money.
319 /// We use also this delay to be sure we can remove our in-flight claim txn from bump candidates buffer.
320 /// It may cause spurrious generation of bumped claim txn but that's allright given the outpoint is already
321 /// solved by a previous claim tx. What we want to avoid is reorg evicting our claim tx and us not
322 /// keeping bumping another claim tx to solve the outpoint.
323 pub(crate) const ANTI_REORG_DELAY: u32 = 6;
325 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
328 revocation_base_key: SecretKey,
329 htlc_base_key: SecretKey,
330 delayed_payment_base_key: SecretKey,
331 payment_base_key: SecretKey,
332 shutdown_pubkey: PublicKey,
333 prev_latest_per_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
334 latest_per_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
335 funding_info: Option<(OutPoint, Script)>,
336 current_remote_commitment_txid: Option<Sha256dHash>,
337 prev_remote_commitment_txid: Option<Sha256dHash>,
340 revocation_base_key: PublicKey,
341 htlc_base_key: PublicKey,
345 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
346 struct LocalSignedTx {
347 /// txid of the transaction in tx, just used to make comparison faster
350 revocation_key: PublicKey,
351 a_htlc_key: PublicKey,
352 b_htlc_key: PublicKey,
353 delayed_payment_key: PublicKey,
355 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<(Signature, Signature)>, Option<HTLCSource>)>,
359 enum InputDescriptors {
364 RevokedOutput, // either a revoked to_local output on commitment tx, a revoked HTLC-Timeout output or a revoked HTLC-Success output
367 /// Upon discovering of some classes of onchain tx by ChannelMonitor, we may have to take actions on it
368 /// once they mature to enough confirmations (ANTI_REORG_DELAY)
369 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
371 /// Outpoint under claim process by our own tx, once this one get enough confirmations, we remove it from
372 /// bump-txn candidate buffer.
374 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint,
376 /// HTLC output getting solved by a timeout, at maturation we pass upstream payment source information to solve
377 /// inbound HTLC in backward channel. Note, in case of preimage, we pass info to upstream without delay as we can
378 /// only win from it, so it's never an OnchainEvent
380 htlc_update: (HTLCSource, PaymentHash),
384 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
385 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
387 /// A ChannelMonitor handles chain events (blocks connected and disconnected) and generates
388 /// on-chain transactions to ensure no loss of funds occurs.
390 /// You MUST ensure that no ChannelMonitors for a given channel anywhere contain out-of-date
391 /// information and are actively monitoring the chain.
393 pub struct ChannelMonitor {
394 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64,
396 key_storage: Storage,
397 their_htlc_base_key: Option<PublicKey>,
398 their_delayed_payment_base_key: Option<PublicKey>,
399 // first is the idx of the first of the two revocation points
400 their_cur_revocation_points: Option<(u64, PublicKey, Option<PublicKey>)>,
402 our_to_self_delay: u16,
403 their_to_self_delay: Option<u16>,
405 old_secrets: [([u8; 32], u64); 49],
406 remote_claimable_outpoints: HashMap<Sha256dHash, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>>,
407 /// We cannot identify HTLC-Success or HTLC-Timeout transactions by themselves on the chain.
408 /// Nor can we figure out their commitment numbers without the commitment transaction they are
409 /// spending. Thus, in order to claim them via revocation key, we track all the remote
410 /// commitment transactions which we find on-chain, mapping them to the commitment number which
411 /// can be used to derive the revocation key and claim the transactions.
412 remote_commitment_txn_on_chain: HashMap<Sha256dHash, (u64, Vec<Script>)>,
413 /// Cache used to make pruning of payment_preimages faster.
414 /// Maps payment_hash values to commitment numbers for remote transactions for non-revoked
415 /// remote transactions (ie should remain pretty small).
416 /// Serialized to disk but should generally not be sent to Watchtowers.
417 remote_hash_commitment_number: HashMap<PaymentHash, u64>,
419 // We store two local commitment transactions to avoid any race conditions where we may update
420 // some monitors (potentially on watchtowers) but then fail to update others, resulting in the
421 // various monitors for one channel being out of sync, and us broadcasting a local
422 // transaction for which we have deleted claim information on some watchtowers.
423 prev_local_signed_commitment_tx: Option<LocalSignedTx>,
424 current_local_signed_commitment_tx: Option<LocalSignedTx>,
426 // Used just for ChannelManager to make sure it has the latest channel data during
428 current_remote_commitment_number: u64,
430 payment_preimages: HashMap<PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage>,
432 destination_script: Script,
434 // Used to track onchain events, i.e transactions parts of channels confirmed on chain, on which
435 // we have to take actions once they reach enough confs. Key is a block height timer, i.e we enforce
436 // actions when we receive a block with given height. Actions depend on OnchainEvent type.
437 onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf: HashMap<u32, Vec<OnchainEvent>>,
439 // We simply modify last_block_hash in Channel's block_connected so that serialization is
440 // consistent but hopefully the users' copy handles block_connected in a consistent way.
441 // (we do *not*, however, update them in insert_combine to ensure any local user copies keep
442 // their last_block_hash from its state and not based on updated copies that didn't run through
443 // the full block_connected).
444 pub(crate) last_block_hash: Sha256dHash,
445 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>, //TODO: dedup this a bit...
449 macro_rules! subtract_high_prio_fee {
450 ($self: ident, $fee_estimator: expr, $value: expr, $predicted_weight: expr, $spent_txid: expr) => {
452 let mut fee = $fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority) * $predicted_weight / 1000;
454 fee = $fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal) * $predicted_weight / 1000;
456 fee = $fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background) * $predicted_weight / 1000;
458 log_error!($self, "Failed to generate an on-chain punishment tx spending {} as even low priority fee ({} sat) was more than the entire claim balance ({} sat)",
459 $spent_txid, fee, $value);
462 log_warn!($self, "Used low priority fee for on-chain punishment tx spending {} as high priority fee was more than the entire claim balance ({} sat)",
463 $spent_txid, $value);
468 log_warn!($self, "Used medium priority fee for on-chain punishment tx spending {} as high priority fee was more than the entire claim balance ({} sat)",
469 $spent_txid, $value);
481 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
482 /// Used only in testing and fuzztarget to check serialization roundtrips don't change the
483 /// underlying object
484 impl PartialEq for ChannelMonitor {
485 fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
486 if self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor != other.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor ||
487 self.key_storage != other.key_storage ||
488 self.their_htlc_base_key != other.their_htlc_base_key ||
489 self.their_delayed_payment_base_key != other.their_delayed_payment_base_key ||
490 self.their_cur_revocation_points != other.their_cur_revocation_points ||
491 self.our_to_self_delay != other.our_to_self_delay ||
492 self.their_to_self_delay != other.their_to_self_delay ||
493 self.remote_claimable_outpoints != other.remote_claimable_outpoints ||
494 self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain != other.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain ||
495 self.remote_hash_commitment_number != other.remote_hash_commitment_number ||
496 self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx != other.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx ||
497 self.current_remote_commitment_number != other.current_remote_commitment_number ||
498 self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx != other.current_local_signed_commitment_tx ||
499 self.payment_preimages != other.payment_preimages ||
500 self.destination_script != other.destination_script ||
501 self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf != other.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf
505 for (&(ref secret, ref idx), &(ref o_secret, ref o_idx)) in self.old_secrets.iter().zip(other.old_secrets.iter()) {
506 if secret != o_secret || idx != o_idx {
515 impl ChannelMonitor {
516 pub(super) fn new(revocation_base_key: &SecretKey, delayed_payment_base_key: &SecretKey, htlc_base_key: &SecretKey, payment_base_key: &SecretKey, shutdown_pubkey: &PublicKey, our_to_self_delay: u16, destination_script: Script, logger: Arc<Logger>) -> ChannelMonitor {
518 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: 0,
520 key_storage: Storage::Local {
521 revocation_base_key: revocation_base_key.clone(),
522 htlc_base_key: htlc_base_key.clone(),
523 delayed_payment_base_key: delayed_payment_base_key.clone(),
524 payment_base_key: payment_base_key.clone(),
525 shutdown_pubkey: shutdown_pubkey.clone(),
526 prev_latest_per_commitment_point: None,
527 latest_per_commitment_point: None,
529 current_remote_commitment_txid: None,
530 prev_remote_commitment_txid: None,
532 their_htlc_base_key: None,
533 their_delayed_payment_base_key: None,
534 their_cur_revocation_points: None,
536 our_to_self_delay: our_to_self_delay,
537 their_to_self_delay: None,
539 old_secrets: [([0; 32], 1 << 48); 49],
540 remote_claimable_outpoints: HashMap::new(),
541 remote_commitment_txn_on_chain: HashMap::new(),
542 remote_hash_commitment_number: HashMap::new(),
544 prev_local_signed_commitment_tx: None,
545 current_local_signed_commitment_tx: None,
546 current_remote_commitment_number: 1 << 48,
548 payment_preimages: HashMap::new(),
549 destination_script: destination_script,
551 onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf: HashMap::new(),
553 last_block_hash: Default::default(),
554 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
559 fn get_witnesses_weight(inputs: &[InputDescriptors]) -> u64 {
560 let mut tx_weight = 2; // count segwit flags
562 // We use expected weight (and not actual) as signatures and time lock delays may vary
563 tx_weight += match inp {
564 // number_of_witness_elements + sig_length + revocation_sig + pubkey_length + revocationpubkey + witness_script_length + witness_script
565 &InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC => {
566 1 + 1 + 73 + 1 + 33 + 1 + 133
568 // number_of_witness_elements + sig_length + revocation_sig + pubkey_length + revocationpubkey + witness_script_length + witness_script
569 &InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC => {
570 1 + 1 + 73 + 1 + 33 + 1 + 139
572 // number_of_witness_elements + sig_length + remotehtlc_sig + preimage_length + preimage + witness_script_length + witness_script
573 &InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC => {
574 1 + 1 + 73 + 1 + 32 + 1 + 133
576 // number_of_witness_elements + sig_length + revocation_sig + pubkey_length + revocationpubkey + witness_script_length + witness_script
577 &InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC => {
578 1 + 1 + 73 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 139
580 // number_of_witness_elements + sig_length + revocation_sig + true_length + op_true + witness_script_length + witness_script
581 &InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput => {
582 1 + 1 + 73 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 77
590 fn place_secret(idx: u64) -> u8 {
592 if idx & (1 << i) == (1 << i) {
600 fn derive_secret(secret: [u8; 32], bits: u8, idx: u64) -> [u8; 32] {
601 let mut res: [u8; 32] = secret;
603 let bitpos = bits - 1 - i;
604 if idx & (1 << bitpos) == (1 << bitpos) {
605 res[(bitpos / 8) as usize] ^= 1 << (bitpos & 7);
606 res = Sha256::hash(&res).into_inner();
612 /// Inserts a revocation secret into this channel monitor. Prunes old preimages if neither
613 /// needed by local commitment transactions HTCLs nor by remote ones. Unless we haven't already seen remote
614 /// commitment transaction's secret, they are de facto pruned (we can use revocation key).
615 pub(super) fn provide_secret(&mut self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
616 let pos = ChannelMonitor::place_secret(idx);
618 let (old_secret, old_idx) = self.old_secrets[i as usize];
619 if ChannelMonitor::derive_secret(secret, pos, old_idx) != old_secret {
620 return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Previous secret did not match new one"));
623 if self.get_min_seen_secret() <= idx {
626 self.old_secrets[pos as usize] = (secret, idx);
628 // Prune HTLCs from the previous remote commitment tx so we don't generate failure/fulfill
629 // events for now-revoked/fulfilled HTLCs.
630 // TODO: We should probably consider whether we're really getting the next secret here.
631 if let Storage::Local { ref mut prev_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage {
632 if let Some(txid) = prev_remote_commitment_txid.take() {
633 for &mut (_, ref mut source) in self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get_mut(&txid).unwrap() {
639 if !self.payment_preimages.is_empty() {
640 let local_signed_commitment_tx = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx.as_ref().expect("Channel needs at least an initial commitment tx !");
641 let prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.as_ref();
642 let min_idx = self.get_min_seen_secret();
643 let remote_hash_commitment_number = &mut self.remote_hash_commitment_number;
645 self.payment_preimages.retain(|&k, _| {
646 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in &local_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs {
647 if k == htlc.payment_hash {
651 if let Some(prev_local_commitment_tx) = prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
652 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in prev_local_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
653 if k == htlc.payment_hash {
658 let contains = if let Some(cn) = remote_hash_commitment_number.get(&k) {
665 remote_hash_commitment_number.remove(&k);
674 /// Informs this monitor of the latest remote (ie non-broadcastable) commitment transaction.
675 /// The monitor watches for it to be broadcasted and then uses the HTLC information (and
676 /// possibly future revocation/preimage information) to claim outputs where possible.
677 /// We cache also the mapping hash:commitment number to lighten pruning of old preimages by watchtowers.
678 pub(super) fn provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, unsigned_commitment_tx: &Transaction, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>, commitment_number: u64, their_revocation_point: PublicKey) {
679 // TODO: Encrypt the htlc_outputs data with the single-hash of the commitment transaction
680 // so that a remote monitor doesn't learn anything unless there is a malicious close.
681 // (only maybe, sadly we cant do the same for local info, as we need to be aware of
683 for &(ref htlc, _) in &htlc_outputs {
684 self.remote_hash_commitment_number.insert(htlc.payment_hash, commitment_number);
687 let new_txid = unsigned_commitment_tx.txid();
688 log_trace!(self, "Tracking new remote commitment transaction with txid {} at commitment number {} with {} HTLC outputs", new_txid, commitment_number, htlc_outputs.len());
689 log_trace!(self, "New potential remote commitment transaction: {}", encode::serialize_hex(unsigned_commitment_tx));
690 if let Storage::Local { ref mut current_remote_commitment_txid, ref mut prev_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage {
691 *prev_remote_commitment_txid = current_remote_commitment_txid.take();
692 *current_remote_commitment_txid = Some(new_txid);
694 self.remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(new_txid, htlc_outputs);
695 self.current_remote_commitment_number = commitment_number;
696 //TODO: Merge this into the other per-remote-transaction output storage stuff
697 match self.their_cur_revocation_points {
698 Some(old_points) => {
699 if old_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 {
700 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0, old_points.1, Some(their_revocation_point)));
701 } else if old_points.0 == commitment_number + 2 {
702 if let Some(old_second_point) = old_points.2 {
703 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0 - 1, old_second_point, Some(their_revocation_point)));
705 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None));
708 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None));
712 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None));
717 /// Informs this monitor of the latest local (ie broadcastable) commitment transaction. The
718 /// monitor watches for timeouts and may broadcast it if we approach such a timeout. Thus, it
719 /// is important that any clones of this channel monitor (including remote clones) by kept
720 /// up-to-date as our local commitment transaction is updated.
721 /// Panics if set_their_to_self_delay has never been called.
722 /// Also update Storage with latest local per_commitment_point to derive local_delayedkey in
723 /// case of onchain HTLC tx
724 pub(super) fn provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, signed_commitment_tx: Transaction, local_keys: chan_utils::TxCreationKeys, feerate_per_kw: u64, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<(Signature, Signature)>, Option<HTLCSource>)>) {
725 assert!(self.their_to_self_delay.is_some());
726 self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx.take();
727 self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(LocalSignedTx {
728 txid: signed_commitment_tx.txid(),
729 tx: signed_commitment_tx,
730 revocation_key: local_keys.revocation_key,
731 a_htlc_key: local_keys.a_htlc_key,
732 b_htlc_key: local_keys.b_htlc_key,
733 delayed_payment_key: local_keys.a_delayed_payment_key,
738 if let Storage::Local { ref mut latest_per_commitment_point, .. } = self.key_storage {
739 *latest_per_commitment_point = Some(local_keys.per_commitment_point);
741 panic!("Channel somehow ended up with its internal ChannelMonitor being in Watchtower mode?");
745 /// Provides a payment_hash->payment_preimage mapping. Will be automatically pruned when all
746 /// commitment_tx_infos which contain the payment hash have been revoked.
747 pub(super) fn provide_payment_preimage(&mut self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_preimage: &PaymentPreimage) {
748 self.payment_preimages.insert(payment_hash.clone(), payment_preimage.clone());
751 /// Combines this ChannelMonitor with the information contained in the other ChannelMonitor.
752 /// After a successful call this ChannelMonitor is up-to-date and is safe to use to monitor the
753 /// chain for new blocks/transactions.
754 pub fn insert_combine(&mut self, mut other: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
755 match self.key_storage {
756 Storage::Local { ref funding_info, .. } => {
757 if funding_info.is_none() { return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Try to combine a Local monitor without funding_info")); }
758 let our_funding_info = funding_info;
759 if let Storage::Local { ref funding_info, .. } = other.key_storage {
760 if funding_info.is_none() { return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Try to combine a Local monitor without funding_info")); }
761 // We should be able to compare the entire funding_txo, but in fuzztarget it's trivially
762 // easy to collide the funding_txo hash and have a different scriptPubKey.
763 if funding_info.as_ref().unwrap().0 != our_funding_info.as_ref().unwrap().0 {
764 return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Funding transaction outputs are not identical!"));
767 return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Try to combine a Local monitor with a Watchtower one !"));
770 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
771 if let Storage::Watchtower { .. } = other.key_storage {
774 return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Try to combine a Watchtower monitor with a Local one !"));
778 let other_min_secret = other.get_min_seen_secret();
779 let our_min_secret = self.get_min_seen_secret();
780 if our_min_secret > other_min_secret {
781 self.provide_secret(other_min_secret, other.get_secret(other_min_secret).unwrap())?;
783 if let Some(ref local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
784 if let Some(ref other_local_tx) = other.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
785 let our_commitment_number = 0xffffffffffff - ((((local_tx.tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (local_tx.tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor);
786 let other_commitment_number = 0xffffffffffff - ((((other_local_tx.tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (other_local_tx.tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ other.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor);
787 if our_commitment_number >= other_commitment_number {
788 self.key_storage = other.key_storage;
792 // TODO: We should use current_remote_commitment_number and the commitment number out of
793 // local transactions to decide how to merge
794 if our_min_secret >= other_min_secret {
795 self.their_cur_revocation_points = other.their_cur_revocation_points;
796 for (txid, htlcs) in other.remote_claimable_outpoints.drain() {
797 self.remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, htlcs);
799 if let Some(local_tx) = other.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
800 self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(local_tx);
802 if let Some(local_tx) = other.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
803 self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(local_tx);
805 self.payment_preimages = other.payment_preimages;
808 self.current_remote_commitment_number = cmp::min(self.current_remote_commitment_number, other.current_remote_commitment_number);
812 /// Panics if commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor doesn't fit in 48 bits
813 pub(super) fn set_commitment_obscure_factor(&mut self, commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64) {
814 assert!(commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor < (1 << 48));
815 self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor = commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor;
818 /// Allows this monitor to scan only for transactions which are applicable. Note that this is
819 /// optional, without it this monitor cannot be used in an SPV client, but you may wish to
820 /// avoid this (or call unset_funding_info) on a monitor you wish to send to a watchtower as it
821 /// provides slightly better privacy.
822 /// It's the responsibility of the caller to register outpoint and script with passing the former
823 /// value as key to add_update_monitor.
824 pub(super) fn set_funding_info(&mut self, new_funding_info: (OutPoint, Script)) {
825 match self.key_storage {
826 Storage::Local { ref mut funding_info, .. } => {
827 *funding_info = Some(new_funding_info);
829 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
830 panic!("Channel somehow ended up with its internal ChannelMonitor being in Watchtower mode?");
835 /// We log these base keys at channel opening to being able to rebuild redeemscript in case of leaked revoked commit tx
836 pub(super) fn set_their_base_keys(&mut self, their_htlc_base_key: &PublicKey, their_delayed_payment_base_key: &PublicKey) {
837 self.their_htlc_base_key = Some(their_htlc_base_key.clone());
838 self.their_delayed_payment_base_key = Some(their_delayed_payment_base_key.clone());
841 pub(super) fn set_their_to_self_delay(&mut self, their_to_self_delay: u16) {
842 self.their_to_self_delay = Some(their_to_self_delay);
845 pub(super) fn unset_funding_info(&mut self) {
846 match self.key_storage {
847 Storage::Local { ref mut funding_info, .. } => {
848 *funding_info = None;
850 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
851 panic!("Channel somehow ended up with its internal ChannelMonitor being in Watchtower mode?");
856 /// Gets the funding transaction outpoint of the channel this ChannelMonitor is monitoring for.
857 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
858 match self.key_storage {
859 Storage::Local { ref funding_info, .. } => {
861 &Some((outpoint, _)) => Some(outpoint),
865 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
871 /// Gets the sets of all outpoints which this ChannelMonitor expects to hear about spends of.
872 /// Generally useful when deserializing as during normal operation the return values of
873 /// block_connected are sufficient to ensure all relevant outpoints are being monitored (note
874 /// that the get_funding_txo outpoint and transaction must also be monitored for!).
875 pub fn get_monitored_outpoints(&self) -> Vec<(Sha256dHash, u32, &Script)> {
876 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.len() * 2);
877 for (ref txid, &(_, ref outputs)) in self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
878 for (idx, output) in outputs.iter().enumerate() {
879 res.push(((*txid).clone(), idx as u32, output));
885 /// Serializes into a vec, with various modes for the exposed pub fns
886 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W, for_local_storage: bool) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
887 //TODO: We still write out all the serialization here manually instead of using the fancy
888 //serialization framework we have, we should migrate things over to it.
889 writer.write_all(&[SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
890 writer.write_all(&[MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
892 // Set in initial Channel-object creation, so should always be set by now:
893 U48(self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor).write(writer)?;
895 macro_rules! write_option {
902 &None => 0u8.write(writer)?,
907 match self.key_storage {
908 Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref payment_base_key, ref shutdown_pubkey, ref prev_latest_per_commitment_point, ref latest_per_commitment_point, ref funding_info, ref current_remote_commitment_txid, ref prev_remote_commitment_txid } => {
909 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
910 writer.write_all(&revocation_base_key[..])?;
911 writer.write_all(&htlc_base_key[..])?;
912 writer.write_all(&delayed_payment_base_key[..])?;
913 writer.write_all(&payment_base_key[..])?;
914 writer.write_all(&shutdown_pubkey.serialize())?;
915 prev_latest_per_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
916 latest_per_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
918 &Some((ref outpoint, ref script)) => {
919 writer.write_all(&outpoint.txid[..])?;
920 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(outpoint.index))?;
921 script.write(writer)?;
924 debug_assert!(false, "Try to serialize a useless Local monitor !");
927 current_remote_commitment_txid.write(writer)?;
928 prev_remote_commitment_txid.write(writer)?;
930 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => unimplemented!(),
933 writer.write_all(&self.their_htlc_base_key.as_ref().unwrap().serialize())?;
934 writer.write_all(&self.their_delayed_payment_base_key.as_ref().unwrap().serialize())?;
936 match self.their_cur_revocation_points {
937 Some((idx, pubkey, second_option)) => {
938 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(idx))?;
939 writer.write_all(&pubkey.serialize())?;
940 match second_option {
941 Some(second_pubkey) => {
942 writer.write_all(&second_pubkey.serialize())?;
945 writer.write_all(&[0; 33])?;
950 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(0))?;
954 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.our_to_self_delay))?;
955 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap()))?;
957 for &(ref secret, ref idx) in self.old_secrets.iter() {
958 writer.write_all(secret)?;
959 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*idx))?;
962 macro_rules! serialize_htlc_in_commitment {
963 ($htlc_output: expr) => {
964 writer.write_all(&[$htlc_output.offered as u8; 1])?;
965 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc_output.amount_msat))?;
966 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array($htlc_output.cltv_expiry))?;
967 writer.write_all(&$htlc_output.payment_hash.0[..])?;
968 $htlc_output.transaction_output_index.write(writer)?;
972 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_claimable_outpoints.len() as u64))?;
973 for (ref txid, ref htlc_infos) in self.remote_claimable_outpoints.iter() {
974 writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
975 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc_infos.len() as u64))?;
976 for &(ref htlc_output, ref htlc_source) in htlc_infos.iter() {
977 serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output);
978 write_option!(htlc_source);
982 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.len() as u64))?;
983 for (ref txid, &(commitment_number, ref txouts)) in self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
984 writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
985 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(commitment_number))?;
986 (txouts.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
987 for script in txouts.iter() {
988 script.write(writer)?;
992 if for_local_storage {
993 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_hash_commitment_number.len() as u64))?;
994 for (ref payment_hash, commitment_number) in self.remote_hash_commitment_number.iter() {
995 writer.write_all(&payment_hash.0[..])?;
996 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(*commitment_number))?;
999 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(0))?;
1002 macro_rules! serialize_local_tx {
1003 ($local_tx: expr) => {
1004 if let Err(e) = $local_tx.tx.consensus_encode(&mut WriterWriteAdaptor(writer)) {
1006 encode::Error::Io(e) => return Err(e),
1007 _ => panic!("local tx must have been well-formed!"),
1011 writer.write_all(&$local_tx.revocation_key.serialize())?;
1012 writer.write_all(&$local_tx.a_htlc_key.serialize())?;
1013 writer.write_all(&$local_tx.b_htlc_key.serialize())?;
1014 writer.write_all(&$local_tx.delayed_payment_key.serialize())?;
1016 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($local_tx.feerate_per_kw))?;
1017 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($local_tx.htlc_outputs.len() as u64))?;
1018 for &(ref htlc_output, ref sigs, ref htlc_source) in $local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1019 serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output);
1020 if let &Some((ref their_sig, ref our_sig)) = sigs {
1022 writer.write_all(&their_sig.serialize_compact())?;
1023 writer.write_all(&our_sig.serialize_compact())?;
1027 write_option!(htlc_source);
1032 if let Some(ref prev_local_tx) = self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1033 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
1034 serialize_local_tx!(prev_local_tx);
1036 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
1039 if let Some(ref cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1040 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
1041 serialize_local_tx!(cur_local_tx);
1043 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
1046 if for_local_storage {
1047 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(self.current_remote_commitment_number))?;
1049 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(0))?;
1052 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.payment_preimages.len() as u64))?;
1053 for payment_preimage in self.payment_preimages.values() {
1054 writer.write_all(&payment_preimage.0[..])?;
1057 self.last_block_hash.write(writer)?;
1058 self.destination_script.write(writer)?;
1060 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.len() as u64))?;
1061 for (ref target, ref events) in self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.iter() {
1062 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(**target))?;
1063 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(events.len() as u64))?;
1064 for ev in events.iter() {
1066 OnchainEvent::Claim { ref outpoint } => {
1067 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
1068 outpoint.write(writer)?;
1070 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
1071 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
1072 htlc_update.0.write(writer)?;
1073 htlc_update.1.write(writer)?;
1082 /// Writes this monitor into the given writer, suitable for writing to disk.
1084 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor), which
1085 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
1086 /// the "reorg path" (ie not just starting at the same height but starting at the highest
1087 /// common block that appears on your best chain as well as on the chain which contains the
1088 /// last block hash returned) upon deserializing the object!
1089 pub fn write_for_disk<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
1090 self.write(writer, true)
1093 /// Encodes this monitor into the given writer, suitable for sending to a remote watchtower
1095 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor), which
1096 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
1097 /// the "reorg path" (ie not just starting at the same height but starting at the highest
1098 /// common block that appears on your best chain as well as on the chain which contains the
1099 /// last block hash returned) upon deserializing the object!
1100 pub fn write_for_watchtower<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
1101 self.write(writer, false)
1104 /// Can only fail if idx is < get_min_seen_secret
1105 pub(super) fn get_secret(&self, idx: u64) -> Option<[u8; 32]> {
1106 for i in 0..self.old_secrets.len() {
1107 if (idx & (!((1 << i) - 1))) == self.old_secrets[i].1 {
1108 return Some(ChannelMonitor::derive_secret(self.old_secrets[i].0, i as u8, idx))
1111 assert!(idx < self.get_min_seen_secret());
1115 pub(super) fn get_min_seen_secret(&self) -> u64 {
1116 //TODO This can be optimized?
1117 let mut min = 1 << 48;
1118 for &(_, idx) in self.old_secrets.iter() {
1126 pub(super) fn get_cur_remote_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
1127 self.current_remote_commitment_number
1130 pub(super) fn get_cur_local_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
1131 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1132 0xffff_ffff_ffff - ((((local_tx.tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (local_tx.tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor)
1133 } else { 0xffff_ffff_ffff }
1136 /// Attempts to claim a remote commitment transaction's outputs using the revocation key and
1137 /// data in remote_claimable_outpoints. Will directly claim any HTLC outputs which expire at a
1138 /// height > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER. In any case, will install monitoring for
1139 /// HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions.
1140 /// Return updates for HTLC pending in the channel and failed automatically by the broadcast of
1141 /// revoked remote commitment tx
1142 fn check_spend_remote_transaction(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator) -> (Vec<Transaction>, (Sha256dHash, Vec<TxOut>), Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>) {
1143 // Most secp and related errors trying to create keys means we have no hope of constructing
1144 // a spend transaction...so we return no transactions to broadcast
1145 let mut txn_to_broadcast = Vec::new();
1146 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
1147 let mut spendable_outputs = Vec::new();
1149 let commitment_txid = tx.txid(); //TODO: This is gonna be a performance bottleneck for watchtowers!
1150 let per_commitment_option = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(&commitment_txid);
1152 macro_rules! ignore_error {
1153 ( $thing : expr ) => {
1156 Err(_) => return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs)
1161 let commitment_number = 0xffffffffffff - ((((tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor);
1162 if commitment_number >= self.get_min_seen_secret() {
1163 let secret = self.get_secret(commitment_number).unwrap();
1164 let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secret));
1165 let (revocation_pubkey, b_htlc_key, local_payment_key) = match self.key_storage {
1166 Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, ref payment_base_key, .. } => {
1167 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
1168 (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_base_key))),
1169 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &htlc_base_key))),
1170 Some(ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &payment_base_key))))
1172 Storage::Watchtower { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
1173 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
1174 (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &revocation_base_key)),
1175 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &htlc_base_key)),
1179 let delayed_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key), &self.their_delayed_payment_base_key.unwrap()));
1180 let a_htlc_key = match self.their_htlc_base_key {
1181 None => return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs),
1182 Some(their_htlc_base_key) => ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key), &their_htlc_base_key)),
1185 let revokeable_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey, self.our_to_self_delay, &delayed_key);
1186 let revokeable_p2wsh = revokeable_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
1188 let local_payment_p2wpkh = if let Some(payment_key) = local_payment_key {
1189 // Note that the Network here is ignored as we immediately drop the address for the
1190 // script_pubkey version.
1191 let payment_hash160 = Hash160::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &payment_key).serialize());
1192 Some(Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&payment_hash160[..]).into_script())
1195 let mut total_value = 0;
1196 let mut values = Vec::new();
1197 let mut inputs = Vec::new();
1198 let mut htlc_idxs = Vec::new();
1199 let mut input_descriptors = Vec::new();
1201 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
1202 if outp.script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh {
1204 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
1205 txid: commitment_txid,
1208 script_sig: Script::new(),
1209 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
1210 witness: Vec::new(),
1212 htlc_idxs.push(None);
1213 values.push(outp.value);
1214 total_value += outp.value;
1215 input_descriptors.push(InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput);
1216 } else if Some(&outp.script_pubkey) == local_payment_p2wpkh.as_ref() {
1217 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WPKH {
1218 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: commitment_txid, vout: idx as u32 },
1219 key: local_payment_key.unwrap(),
1220 output: outp.clone(),
1225 macro_rules! sign_input {
1226 ($sighash_parts: expr, $input: expr, $htlc_idx: expr, $amount: expr) => {
1228 let (sig, redeemscript) = match self.key_storage {
1229 Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
1230 let redeemscript = if $htlc_idx.is_none() { revokeable_redeemscript.clone() } else {
1231 let htlc = &per_commitment_option.unwrap()[$htlc_idx.unwrap()].0;
1232 chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey)
1234 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&$sighash_parts.sighash_all(&$input, &redeemscript, $amount)[..]);
1235 let revocation_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key, &revocation_base_key));
1236 (self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &revocation_key), redeemscript)
1238 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
1242 $input.witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
1243 $input.witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1244 if $htlc_idx.is_none() {
1245 $input.witness.push(vec!(1));
1247 $input.witness.push(revocation_pubkey.serialize().to_vec());
1249 $input.witness.push(redeemscript.into_bytes());
1254 if let Some(ref per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
1255 inputs.reserve_exact(per_commitment_data.len());
1257 for (idx, &(ref htlc, _)) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() {
1258 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
1259 let expected_script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey);
1260 if transaction_output_index as usize >= tx.output.len() ||
1261 tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 ||
1262 tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].script_pubkey != expected_script.to_v0_p2wsh() {
1263 return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs); // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user
1266 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
1267 txid: commitment_txid,
1268 vout: transaction_output_index,
1270 script_sig: Script::new(),
1271 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
1272 witness: Vec::new(),
1274 if htlc.cltv_expiry > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER {
1276 htlc_idxs.push(Some(idx));
1277 values.push(tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value);
1278 total_value += htlc.amount_msat / 1000;
1279 input_descriptors.push(if htlc.offered { InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC } else { InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC });
1281 let mut single_htlc_tx = Transaction {
1285 output: vec!(TxOut {
1286 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1287 value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1290 let predicted_weight = single_htlc_tx.get_weight() + Self::get_witnesses_weight(&[if htlc.offered { InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC } else { InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC }]);
1291 if subtract_high_prio_fee!(self, fee_estimator, single_htlc_tx.output[0].value, predicted_weight, tx.txid()) {
1292 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&single_htlc_tx);
1293 sign_input!(sighash_parts, single_htlc_tx.input[0], Some(idx), htlc.amount_msat / 1000);
1294 assert!(predicted_weight >= single_htlc_tx.get_weight());
1295 txn_to_broadcast.push(single_htlc_tx);
1302 if !inputs.is_empty() || !txn_to_broadcast.is_empty() || per_commitment_option.is_some() { // ie we're confident this is actually ours
1303 // We're definitely a remote commitment transaction!
1304 log_trace!(self, "Got broadcast of revoked remote commitment transaction, generating general spend tx with {} inputs and {} other txn to broadcast", inputs.len(), txn_to_broadcast.len());
1305 watch_outputs.append(&mut tx.output.clone());
1306 self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, (commitment_number, tx.output.iter().map(|output| { output.script_pubkey.clone() }).collect()));
1308 macro_rules! check_htlc_fails {
1309 ($txid: expr, $commitment_tx: expr) => {
1310 if let Some(ref outpoints) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get($txid) {
1311 for &(ref htlc, ref source_option) in outpoints.iter() {
1312 if let &Some(ref source) = source_option {
1313 log_info!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} remote commitment tx due to broadcast of revoked remote commitment transaction, waiting for confirmation (at height {})", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx, height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
1314 match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
1315 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
1316 let e = entry.get_mut();
1317 e.retain(|ref event| {
1319 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
1320 return htlc_update.0 != **source
1325 e.push(OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ((**source).clone(), htlc.payment_hash.clone())});
1327 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1328 entry.insert(vec![OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ((**source).clone(), htlc.payment_hash.clone())}]);
1336 if let Storage::Local { ref current_remote_commitment_txid, ref prev_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage {
1337 if let &Some(ref txid) = current_remote_commitment_txid {
1338 check_htlc_fails!(txid, "current");
1340 if let &Some(ref txid) = prev_remote_commitment_txid {
1341 check_htlc_fails!(txid, "remote");
1344 // No need to check local commitment txn, symmetric HTLCSource must be present as per-htlc data on remote commitment tx
1346 if inputs.is_empty() { return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs); } // Nothing to be done...probably a false positive/local tx
1348 let outputs = vec!(TxOut {
1349 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1352 let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
1358 let predicted_weight = spend_tx.get_weight() + Self::get_witnesses_weight(&input_descriptors[..]);
1360 if !subtract_high_prio_fee!(self, fee_estimator, spend_tx.output[0].value, predicted_weight, tx.txid()) {
1361 return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs);
1364 let mut values_drain = values.drain(..);
1365 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx);
1367 for (input, htlc_idx) in spend_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(htlc_idxs.iter()) {
1368 let value = values_drain.next().unwrap();
1369 sign_input!(sighash_parts, input, htlc_idx, value);
1371 assert!(predicted_weight >= spend_tx.get_weight());
1373 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
1374 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: spend_tx.txid(), vout: 0 },
1375 output: spend_tx.output[0].clone(),
1377 txn_to_broadcast.push(spend_tx);
1378 } else if let Some(per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
1379 // While this isn't useful yet, there is a potential race where if a counterparty
1380 // revokes a state at the same time as the commitment transaction for that state is
1381 // confirmed, and the watchtower receives the block before the user, the user could
1382 // upload a new ChannelMonitor with the revocation secret but the watchtower has
1383 // already processed the block, resulting in the remote_commitment_txn_on_chain entry
1384 // not being generated by the above conditional. Thus, to be safe, we go ahead and
1386 watch_outputs.append(&mut tx.output.clone());
1387 self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, (commitment_number, tx.output.iter().map(|output| { output.script_pubkey.clone() }).collect()));
1389 log_trace!(self, "Got broadcast of non-revoked remote commitment transaction {}", commitment_txid);
1391 macro_rules! check_htlc_fails {
1392 ($txid: expr, $commitment_tx: expr, $id: tt) => {
1393 if let Some(ref latest_outpoints) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get($txid) {
1394 $id: for &(ref htlc, ref source_option) in latest_outpoints.iter() {
1395 if let &Some(ref source) = source_option {
1396 // Check if the HTLC is present in the commitment transaction that was
1397 // broadcast, but not if it was below the dust limit, which we should
1398 // fail backwards immediately as there is no way for us to learn the
1399 // payment_preimage.
1400 // Note that if the dust limit were allowed to change between
1401 // commitment transactions we'd want to be check whether *any*
1402 // broadcastable commitment transaction has the HTLC in it, but it
1403 // cannot currently change after channel initialization, so we don't
1405 for &(ref broadcast_htlc, ref broadcast_source) in per_commitment_data.iter() {
1406 if broadcast_htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() && Some(source) == broadcast_source.as_ref() {
1410 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} remote commitment tx due to broadcast of remote commitment transaction", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx);
1411 match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
1412 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
1413 let e = entry.get_mut();
1414 e.retain(|ref event| {
1416 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
1417 return htlc_update.0 != **source
1422 e.push(OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ((**source).clone(), htlc.payment_hash.clone())});
1424 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1425 entry.insert(vec![OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ((**source).clone(), htlc.payment_hash.clone())}]);
1433 if let Storage::Local { ref current_remote_commitment_txid, ref prev_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage {
1434 if let &Some(ref txid) = current_remote_commitment_txid {
1435 check_htlc_fails!(txid, "current", 'current_loop);
1437 if let &Some(ref txid) = prev_remote_commitment_txid {
1438 check_htlc_fails!(txid, "previous", 'prev_loop);
1442 if let Some(revocation_points) = self.their_cur_revocation_points {
1443 let revocation_point_option =
1444 if revocation_points.0 == commitment_number { Some(&revocation_points.1) }
1445 else if let Some(point) = revocation_points.2.as_ref() {
1446 if revocation_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 { Some(point) } else { None }
1448 if let Some(revocation_point) = revocation_point_option {
1449 let (revocation_pubkey, b_htlc_key) = match self.key_storage {
1450 Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
1451 (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_base_key))),
1452 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &htlc_base_key))))
1454 Storage::Watchtower { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
1455 (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &revocation_base_key)),
1456 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &htlc_base_key)))
1459 let a_htlc_key = match self.their_htlc_base_key {
1460 None => return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs),
1461 Some(their_htlc_base_key) => ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &their_htlc_base_key)),
1464 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
1465 if outp.script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh() {
1466 match self.key_storage {
1467 Storage::Local { ref payment_base_key, .. } => {
1468 if let Ok(local_key) = chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_point, &payment_base_key) {
1469 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WPKH {
1470 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: commitment_txid, vout: idx as u32 },
1472 output: outp.clone(),
1476 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {}
1478 break; // Only to_remote ouput is claimable
1482 let mut total_value = 0;
1483 let mut values = Vec::new();
1484 let mut inputs = Vec::new();
1485 let mut input_descriptors = Vec::new();
1487 macro_rules! sign_input {
1488 ($sighash_parts: expr, $input: expr, $amount: expr, $preimage: expr) => {
1490 let (sig, redeemscript) = match self.key_storage {
1491 Storage::Local { ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
1492 let htlc = &per_commitment_option.unwrap()[$input.sequence as usize].0;
1493 let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey);
1494 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&$sighash_parts.sighash_all(&$input, &redeemscript, $amount)[..]);
1495 let htlc_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &htlc_base_key));
1496 (self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &htlc_key), redeemscript)
1498 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
1502 $input.witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
1503 $input.witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1504 $input.witness.push($preimage);
1505 $input.witness.push(redeemscript.into_bytes());
1510 for (idx, &(ref htlc, _)) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() {
1511 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
1512 let expected_script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey);
1513 if transaction_output_index as usize >= tx.output.len() ||
1514 tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 ||
1515 tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].script_pubkey != expected_script.to_v0_p2wsh() {
1516 return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs); // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user
1518 if let Some(payment_preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
1520 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
1521 txid: commitment_txid,
1522 vout: transaction_output_index,
1524 script_sig: Script::new(),
1525 sequence: idx as u32, // reset to 0xfffffffd in sign_input
1526 witness: Vec::new(),
1528 if htlc.cltv_expiry > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER {
1530 values.push((tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value, payment_preimage));
1531 total_value += htlc.amount_msat / 1000;
1532 input_descriptors.push(if htlc.offered { InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC } else { InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC });
1534 let mut single_htlc_tx = Transaction {
1538 output: vec!(TxOut {
1539 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1540 value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1543 let predicted_weight = single_htlc_tx.get_weight() + Self::get_witnesses_weight(&[if htlc.offered { InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC } else { InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC }]);
1544 if subtract_high_prio_fee!(self, fee_estimator, single_htlc_tx.output[0].value, predicted_weight, tx.txid()) {
1545 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&single_htlc_tx);
1546 sign_input!(sighash_parts, single_htlc_tx.input[0], htlc.amount_msat / 1000, payment_preimage.0.to_vec());
1547 assert!(predicted_weight >= single_htlc_tx.get_weight());
1548 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
1549 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: single_htlc_tx.txid(), vout: 0 },
1550 output: single_htlc_tx.output[0].clone(),
1552 txn_to_broadcast.push(single_htlc_tx);
1557 // TODO: If the HTLC has already expired, potentially merge it with the
1558 // rest of the claim transaction, as above.
1560 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
1561 txid: commitment_txid,
1562 vout: transaction_output_index,
1564 script_sig: Script::new(),
1565 sequence: idx as u32,
1566 witness: Vec::new(),
1568 let mut timeout_tx = Transaction {
1570 lock_time: htlc.cltv_expiry,
1572 output: vec!(TxOut {
1573 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1574 value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1577 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&timeout_tx);
1578 sign_input!(sighash_parts, timeout_tx.input[0], htlc.amount_msat / 1000, vec![0]);
1579 txn_to_broadcast.push(timeout_tx);
1584 if inputs.is_empty() { return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs); } // Nothing to be done...probably a false positive/local tx
1586 let outputs = vec!(TxOut {
1587 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1590 let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
1596 let predicted_weight = spend_tx.get_weight() + Self::get_witnesses_weight(&input_descriptors[..]);
1597 if !subtract_high_prio_fee!(self, fee_estimator, spend_tx.output[0].value, predicted_weight, tx.txid()) {
1598 return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs);
1601 let mut values_drain = values.drain(..);
1602 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx);
1604 for input in spend_tx.input.iter_mut() {
1605 let value = values_drain.next().unwrap();
1606 sign_input!(sighash_parts, input, value.0, (value.1).0.to_vec());
1609 assert!(predicted_weight >= spend_tx.get_weight());
1610 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
1611 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: spend_tx.txid(), vout: 0 },
1612 output: spend_tx.output[0].clone(),
1614 txn_to_broadcast.push(spend_tx);
1619 (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs)
1622 /// Attempts to claim a remote HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout's outputs using the revocation key
1623 fn check_spend_remote_htlc(&self, tx: &Transaction, commitment_number: u64, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator) -> (Option<Transaction>, Option<SpendableOutputDescriptor>) {
1624 if tx.input.len() != 1 || tx.output.len() != 1 {
1628 macro_rules! ignore_error {
1629 ( $thing : expr ) => {
1632 Err(_) => return (None, None)
1637 let secret = if let Some(secret) = self.get_secret(commitment_number) { secret } else { return (None, None); };
1638 let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secret));
1639 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
1640 let revocation_pubkey = match self.key_storage {
1641 Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
1642 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_base_key)))
1644 Storage::Watchtower { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
1645 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &revocation_base_key))
1648 let delayed_key = match self.their_delayed_payment_base_key {
1649 None => return (None, None),
1650 Some(their_delayed_payment_base_key) => ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &their_delayed_payment_base_key)),
1652 let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), &delayed_key);
1653 let revokeable_p2wsh = redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
1654 let htlc_txid = tx.txid(); //TODO: This is gonna be a performance bottleneck for watchtowers!
1656 let mut inputs = Vec::new();
1659 if tx.output[0].script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh { //HTLC transactions have one txin, one txout
1661 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
1665 script_sig: Script::new(),
1666 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
1667 witness: Vec::new(),
1669 amount = tx.output[0].value;
1672 if !inputs.is_empty() {
1673 let outputs = vec!(TxOut {
1674 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1678 let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
1684 let predicted_weight = spend_tx.get_weight() + Self::get_witnesses_weight(&[InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput]);
1685 if !subtract_high_prio_fee!(self, fee_estimator, spend_tx.output[0].value, predicted_weight, tx.txid()) {
1686 return (None, None);
1689 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx);
1691 let sig = match self.key_storage {
1692 Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
1693 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash_parts.sighash_all(&spend_tx.input[0], &redeemscript, amount)[..]);
1694 let revocation_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key, &revocation_base_key));
1695 self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &revocation_key)
1697 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
1701 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
1702 spend_tx.input[0].witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1703 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(vec!(1));
1704 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(redeemscript.into_bytes());
1706 assert!(predicted_weight >= spend_tx.get_weight());
1707 let outpoint = BitcoinOutPoint { txid: spend_tx.txid(), vout: 0 };
1708 let output = spend_tx.output[0].clone();
1709 (Some(spend_tx), Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput { outpoint, output }))
1710 } else { (None, None) }
1713 fn broadcast_by_local_state(&self, local_tx: &LocalSignedTx, per_commitment_point: &Option<PublicKey>, delayed_payment_base_key: &Option<SecretKey>) -> (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>, Vec<TxOut>) {
1714 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
1715 let mut spendable_outputs = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
1716 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
1718 macro_rules! add_dynamic_output {
1719 ($father_tx: expr, $vout: expr) => {
1720 if let Some(ref per_commitment_point) = *per_commitment_point {
1721 if let Some(ref delayed_payment_base_key) = *delayed_payment_base_key {
1722 if let Ok(local_delayedkey) = chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base_key) {
1723 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WSH {
1724 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: $father_tx.txid(), vout: $vout },
1725 key: local_delayedkey,
1726 witness_script: chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&local_tx.revocation_key, self.our_to_self_delay, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key),
1727 to_self_delay: self.our_to_self_delay,
1728 output: $father_tx.output[$vout as usize].clone(),
1737 let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&local_tx.revocation_key, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), &local_tx.delayed_payment_key);
1738 let revokeable_p2wsh = redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
1739 for (idx, output) in local_tx.tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
1740 if output.script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh {
1741 add_dynamic_output!(local_tx.tx, idx as u32);
1746 for &(ref htlc, ref sigs, _) in local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1747 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
1748 if let &Some((ref their_sig, ref our_sig)) = sigs {
1750 log_trace!(self, "Broadcasting HTLC-Timeout transaction against local commitment transactions");
1751 let mut htlc_timeout_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&local_tx.txid, local_tx.feerate_per_kw, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), htlc, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key, &local_tx.revocation_key);
1753 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
1755 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(their_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
1756 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1757 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
1758 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1760 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new());
1761 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &local_tx.a_htlc_key, &local_tx.b_htlc_key, &local_tx.revocation_key).into_bytes());
1763 add_dynamic_output!(htlc_timeout_tx, 0);
1764 res.push(htlc_timeout_tx);
1766 if let Some(payment_preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
1767 log_trace!(self, "Broadcasting HTLC-Success transaction against local commitment transactions");
1768 let mut htlc_success_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&local_tx.txid, local_tx.feerate_per_kw, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), htlc, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key, &local_tx.revocation_key);
1770 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
1772 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(their_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
1773 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1774 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
1775 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1777 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(payment_preimage.0.to_vec());
1778 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &local_tx.a_htlc_key, &local_tx.b_htlc_key, &local_tx.revocation_key).into_bytes());
1780 add_dynamic_output!(htlc_success_tx, 0);
1781 res.push(htlc_success_tx);
1784 watch_outputs.push(local_tx.tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].clone());
1785 } else { panic!("Should have sigs for non-dust local tx outputs!") }
1789 (res, spendable_outputs, watch_outputs)
1792 /// Attempts to claim any claimable HTLCs in a commitment transaction which was not (yet)
1793 /// revoked using data in local_claimable_outpoints.
1794 /// Should not be used if check_spend_revoked_transaction succeeds.
1795 fn check_spend_local_transaction(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32) -> (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>, (Sha256dHash, Vec<TxOut>)) {
1796 let commitment_txid = tx.txid();
1797 let mut local_txn = Vec::new();
1798 let mut spendable_outputs = Vec::new();
1799 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
1801 macro_rules! wait_threshold_conf {
1802 ($height: expr, $source: expr, $commitment_tx: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
1803 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} local commitment tx due to broadcast of transaction, waiting confirmation (at height{})", log_bytes!($payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx, height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
1804 match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry($height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
1805 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
1806 let e = entry.get_mut();
1807 e.retain(|ref event| {
1809 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
1810 return htlc_update.0 != $source
1815 e.push(OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ($source, $payment_hash)});
1817 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1818 entry.insert(vec![OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ($source, $payment_hash)}]);
1824 macro_rules! append_onchain_update {
1825 ($updates: expr) => {
1826 local_txn.append(&mut $updates.0);
1827 spendable_outputs.append(&mut $updates.1);
1828 watch_outputs.append(&mut $updates.2);
1832 // HTLCs set may differ between last and previous local commitment txn, in case of one them hitting chain, ensure we cancel all HTLCs backward
1833 let mut is_local_tx = false;
1835 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1836 if local_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
1838 log_trace!(self, "Got latest local commitment tx broadcast, searching for available HTLCs to claim");
1839 match self.key_storage {
1840 Storage::Local { ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref latest_per_commitment_point, .. } => {
1841 append_onchain_update!(self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, latest_per_commitment_point, &Some(*delayed_payment_base_key)));
1843 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
1844 append_onchain_update!(self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, &None, &None));
1849 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1850 if local_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
1852 log_trace!(self, "Got previous local commitment tx broadcast, searching for available HTLCs to claim");
1853 match self.key_storage {
1854 Storage::Local { ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref prev_latest_per_commitment_point, .. } => {
1855 append_onchain_update!(self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, prev_latest_per_commitment_point, &Some(*delayed_payment_base_key)));
1857 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
1858 append_onchain_update!(self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, &None, &None));
1864 macro_rules! fail_dust_htlcs_after_threshold_conf {
1865 ($local_tx: expr) => {
1866 for &(ref htlc, _, ref source) in &$local_tx.htlc_outputs {
1867 if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_none() {
1868 if let &Some(ref source) = source {
1869 wait_threshold_conf!(height, source.clone(), "lastest", htlc.payment_hash.clone());
1877 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1878 fail_dust_htlcs_after_threshold_conf!(local_tx);
1880 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1881 fail_dust_htlcs_after_threshold_conf!(local_tx);
1885 (local_txn, spendable_outputs, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs))
1888 /// Generate a spendable output event when closing_transaction get registered onchain.
1889 fn check_spend_closing_transaction(&self, tx: &Transaction) -> Option<SpendableOutputDescriptor> {
1890 if tx.input[0].sequence == 0xFFFFFFFF && !tx.input[0].witness.is_empty() && tx.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len() == 71 {
1891 match self.key_storage {
1892 Storage::Local { ref shutdown_pubkey, .. } => {
1893 let our_channel_close_key_hash = Hash160::hash(&shutdown_pubkey.serialize());
1894 let shutdown_script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&our_channel_close_key_hash[..]).into_script();
1895 for (idx, output) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
1896 if shutdown_script == output.script_pubkey {
1897 return Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
1898 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), vout: idx as u32 },
1899 output: output.clone(),
1904 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
1905 //TODO: we need to ensure an offline client will generate the event when it
1906 // comes back online after only the watchtower saw the transaction
1913 /// Used by ChannelManager deserialization to broadcast the latest local state if it's copy of
1914 /// the Channel was out-of-date.
1915 pub(super) fn get_latest_local_commitment_txn(&self) -> Vec<Transaction> {
1916 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1917 let mut res = vec![local_tx.tx.clone()];
1918 match self.key_storage {
1919 Storage::Local { ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref prev_latest_per_commitment_point, .. } => {
1920 res.append(&mut self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, prev_latest_per_commitment_point, &Some(*delayed_payment_base_key)).0);
1922 _ => panic!("Can only broadcast by local channelmonitor"),
1930 fn block_connected(&mut self, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], height: u32, block_hash: &Sha256dHash, broadcaster: &BroadcasterInterface, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator)-> (Vec<(Sha256dHash, Vec<TxOut>)>, Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>, Vec<(HTLCSource, Option<PaymentPreimage>, PaymentHash)>) {
1931 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
1932 let mut spendable_outputs = Vec::new();
1933 let mut htlc_updated = Vec::new();
1934 for tx in txn_matched {
1935 if tx.input.len() == 1 {
1936 // Assuming our keys were not leaked (in which case we're screwed no matter what),
1937 // commitment transactions and HTLC transactions will all only ever have one input,
1938 // which is an easy way to filter out any potential non-matching txn for lazy
1940 let prevout = &tx.input[0].previous_output;
1941 let mut txn: Vec<Transaction> = Vec::new();
1942 let funding_txo = match self.key_storage {
1943 Storage::Local { ref funding_info, .. } => {
1944 funding_info.clone()
1946 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
1950 if funding_txo.is_none() || (prevout.txid == funding_txo.as_ref().unwrap().0.txid && prevout.vout == funding_txo.as_ref().unwrap().0.index as u32) {
1951 let (remote_txn, new_outputs, mut spendable_output) = self.check_spend_remote_transaction(tx, height, fee_estimator);
1953 spendable_outputs.append(&mut spendable_output);
1954 if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() {
1955 watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
1958 let (local_txn, mut spendable_output, new_outputs) = self.check_spend_local_transaction(tx, height);
1959 spendable_outputs.append(&mut spendable_output);
1961 if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() {
1962 watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
1965 if !funding_txo.is_none() && txn.is_empty() {
1966 if let Some(spendable_output) = self.check_spend_closing_transaction(tx) {
1967 spendable_outputs.push(spendable_output);
1971 if let Some(&(commitment_number, _)) = self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.get(&prevout.txid) {
1972 let (tx, spendable_output) = self.check_spend_remote_htlc(tx, commitment_number, fee_estimator);
1973 if let Some(tx) = tx {
1976 if let Some(spendable_output) = spendable_output {
1977 spendable_outputs.push(spendable_output);
1981 for tx in txn.iter() {
1982 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(tx);
1985 // While all commitment/HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions have one input, HTLCs
1986 // can also be resolved in a few other ways which can have more than one output. Thus,
1987 // we call is_resolving_htlc_output here outside of the tx.input.len() == 1 check.
1988 let mut updated = self.is_resolving_htlc_output(tx, height);
1989 if updated.len() > 0 {
1990 htlc_updated.append(&mut updated);
1993 if let Some(ref cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1994 if self.would_broadcast_at_height(height) {
1995 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&cur_local_tx.tx);
1996 match self.key_storage {
1997 Storage::Local { ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref latest_per_commitment_point, .. } => {
1998 let (txs, mut spendable_output, new_outputs) = self.broadcast_by_local_state(&cur_local_tx, latest_per_commitment_point, &Some(*delayed_payment_base_key));
1999 spendable_outputs.append(&mut spendable_output);
2000 if !new_outputs.is_empty() {
2001 watch_outputs.push((cur_local_tx.txid.clone(), new_outputs));
2004 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
2007 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
2008 let (txs, mut spendable_output, new_outputs) = self.broadcast_by_local_state(&cur_local_tx, &None, &None);
2009 spendable_outputs.append(&mut spendable_output);
2010 if !new_outputs.is_empty() {
2011 watch_outputs.push((cur_local_tx.txid.clone(), new_outputs));
2014 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
2020 if let Some(events) = self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.remove(&height) {
2023 OnchainEvent::Claim { outpoint: _ } => {
2025 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update } => {
2026 log_trace!(self, "HTLC {} failure update has got enough confirmations to be passed upstream", log_bytes!((htlc_update.1).0));
2027 htlc_updated.push((htlc_update.0, None, htlc_update.1));
2032 self.last_block_hash = block_hash.clone();
2033 (watch_outputs, spendable_outputs, htlc_updated)
2036 fn block_disconnected(&mut self, height: u32, block_hash: &Sha256dHash) {
2037 if let Some(_) = self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.remove(&(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1)) {
2039 //- htlc update there as failure-trigger tx (revoked commitment tx, non-revoked commitment tx, HTLC-timeout tx) has been disconnected
2040 //- our claim tx on a commitment tx output
2042 self.last_block_hash = block_hash.clone();
2045 pub(super) fn would_broadcast_at_height(&self, height: u32) -> bool {
2046 // We need to consider all HTLCs which are:
2047 // * in any unrevoked remote commitment transaction, as they could broadcast said
2048 // transactions and we'd end up in a race, or
2049 // * are in our latest local commitment transaction, as this is the thing we will
2050 // broadcast if we go on-chain.
2051 // Note that we consider HTLCs which were below dust threshold here - while they don't
2052 // strictly imply that we need to fail the channel, we need to go ahead and fail them back
2053 // to the source, and if we don't fail the channel we will have to ensure that the next
2054 // updates that peer sends us are update_fails, failing the channel if not. It's probably
2055 // easier to just fail the channel as this case should be rare enough anyway.
2056 macro_rules! scan_commitment {
2057 ($htlcs: expr, $local_tx: expr) => {
2058 for ref htlc in $htlcs {
2059 // For inbound HTLCs which we know the preimage for, we have to ensure we hit the
2060 // chain with enough room to claim the HTLC without our counterparty being able to
2061 // time out the HTLC first.
2062 // For outbound HTLCs which our counterparty hasn't failed/claimed, our primary
2063 // concern is being able to claim the corresponding inbound HTLC (on another
2064 // channel) before it expires. In fact, we don't even really care if our
2065 // counterparty here claims such an outbound HTLC after it expired as long as we
2066 // can still claim the corresponding HTLC. Thus, to avoid needlessly hitting the
2067 // chain when our counterparty is waiting for expiration to off-chain fail an HTLC
2068 // we give ourselves a few blocks of headroom after expiration before going
2069 // on-chain for an expired HTLC.
2070 // Note that, to avoid a potential attack whereby a node delays claiming an HTLC
2071 // from us until we've reached the point where we go on-chain with the
2072 // corresponding inbound HTLC, we must ensure that outbound HTLCs go on chain at
2073 // least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER blocks prior to the inbound HTLC.
2074 // aka outbound_cltv + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS == height - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
2075 // inbound_cltv == height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
2076 // outbound_cltv + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= inbound_cltv - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
2077 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= inbound_cltv - outbound_cltv
2078 // CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA <= inbound_cltv - outbound_cltv (by check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion)
2079 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA
2080 // The final, above, condition is checked for statically in channelmanager
2081 // with CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2.
2082 let htlc_outbound = $local_tx == htlc.offered;
2083 if ( htlc_outbound && htlc.cltv_expiry + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS <= height) ||
2084 (!htlc_outbound && htlc.cltv_expiry <= height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER && self.payment_preimages.contains_key(&htlc.payment_hash)) {
2085 log_info!(self, "Force-closing channel due to {} HTLC timeout, HTLC expiry is {}", if htlc_outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound "}, htlc.cltv_expiry);
2092 if let Some(ref cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
2093 scan_commitment!(cur_local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, _)| a), true);
2096 if let Storage::Local { ref current_remote_commitment_txid, ref prev_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage {
2097 if let &Some(ref txid) = current_remote_commitment_txid {
2098 if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(txid) {
2099 scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _)| a), false);
2102 if let &Some(ref txid) = prev_remote_commitment_txid {
2103 if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(txid) {
2104 scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _)| a), false);
2112 /// Check if any transaction broadcasted is resolving HTLC output by a success or timeout on a local
2113 /// or remote commitment tx, if so send back the source, preimage if found and payment_hash of resolved HTLC
2114 fn is_resolving_htlc_output(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32) -> Vec<(HTLCSource, Option<PaymentPreimage>, PaymentHash)> {
2115 let mut htlc_updated = Vec::new();
2117 'outer_loop: for input in &tx.input {
2118 let mut payment_data = None;
2119 let revocation_sig_claim = (input.witness.len() == 3 && input.witness[2].len() == OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT && input.witness[1].len() == 33)
2120 || (input.witness.len() == 3 && input.witness[2].len() == ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT && input.witness[1].len() == 33);
2121 let accepted_preimage_claim = input.witness.len() == 5 && input.witness[4].len() == ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT;
2122 let offered_preimage_claim = input.witness.len() == 3 && input.witness[2].len() == OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT;
2124 macro_rules! log_claim {
2125 ($tx_info: expr, $local_tx: expr, $htlc: expr, $source_avail: expr) => {
2126 // We found the output in question, but aren't failing it backwards
2127 // as we have no corresponding source and no valid remote commitment txid
2128 // to try a weak source binding with same-hash, same-value still-valid offered HTLC.
2129 // This implies either it is an inbound HTLC or an outbound HTLC on a revoked transaction.
2130 let outbound_htlc = $local_tx == $htlc.offered;
2131 if ($local_tx && revocation_sig_claim) ||
2132 (outbound_htlc && !$source_avail && (accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim)) {
2133 log_error!(self, "Input spending {} ({}:{}) in {} resolves {} HTLC with payment hash {} with {}!",
2134 $tx_info, input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, tx.txid(),
2135 if outbound_htlc { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0),
2136 if revocation_sig_claim { "revocation sig" } else { "preimage claim after we'd passed the HTLC resolution back" });
2138 log_info!(self, "Input spending {} ({}:{}) in {} resolves {} HTLC with payment hash {} with {}",
2139 $tx_info, input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, tx.txid(),
2140 if outbound_htlc { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0),
2141 if revocation_sig_claim { "revocation sig" } else if accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim { "preimage" } else { "timeout" });
2146 macro_rules! check_htlc_valid_remote {
2147 ($remote_txid: expr, $htlc_output: expr) => {
2148 if let &Some(txid) = $remote_txid {
2149 for &(ref pending_htlc, ref pending_source) in self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(&txid).unwrap() {
2150 if pending_htlc.payment_hash == $htlc_output.payment_hash && pending_htlc.amount_msat == $htlc_output.amount_msat {
2151 if let &Some(ref source) = pending_source {
2152 log_claim!("revoked remote commitment tx", false, pending_htlc, true);
2153 payment_data = Some(((**source).clone(), $htlc_output.payment_hash));
2162 macro_rules! scan_commitment {
2163 ($htlcs: expr, $tx_info: expr, $local_tx: expr) => {
2164 for (ref htlc_output, source_option) in $htlcs {
2165 if Some(input.previous_output.vout) == htlc_output.transaction_output_index {
2166 if let Some(ref source) = source_option {
2167 log_claim!($tx_info, $local_tx, htlc_output, true);
2168 // We have a resolution of an HTLC either from one of our latest
2169 // local commitment transactions or an unrevoked remote commitment
2170 // transaction. This implies we either learned a preimage, the HTLC
2171 // has timed out, or we screwed up. In any case, we should now
2172 // resolve the source HTLC with the original sender.
2173 payment_data = Some(((*source).clone(), htlc_output.payment_hash));
2174 } else if !$local_tx {
2175 if let Storage::Local { ref current_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage {
2176 check_htlc_valid_remote!(current_remote_commitment_txid, htlc_output);
2178 if payment_data.is_none() {
2179 if let Storage::Local { ref prev_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage {
2180 check_htlc_valid_remote!(prev_remote_commitment_txid, htlc_output);
2184 if payment_data.is_none() {
2185 log_claim!($tx_info, $local_tx, htlc_output, false);
2186 continue 'outer_loop;
2193 if let Some(ref current_local_signed_commitment_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
2194 if input.previous_output.txid == current_local_signed_commitment_tx.txid {
2195 scan_commitment!(current_local_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, ref b)| (a, b.as_ref())),
2196 "our latest local commitment tx", true);
2199 if let Some(ref prev_local_signed_commitment_tx) = self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
2200 if input.previous_output.txid == prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.txid {
2201 scan_commitment!(prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, ref b)| (a, b.as_ref())),
2202 "our previous local commitment tx", true);
2205 if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(&input.previous_output.txid) {
2206 scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, ref b)| (a, (b.as_ref().clone()).map(|boxed| &**boxed))),
2207 "remote commitment tx", false);
2210 // Check that scan_commitment, above, decided there is some source worth relaying an
2211 // HTLC resolution backwards to and figure out whether we learned a preimage from it.
2212 if let Some((source, payment_hash)) = payment_data {
2213 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
2214 if accepted_preimage_claim {
2215 payment_preimage.0.copy_from_slice(&input.witness[3]);
2216 htlc_updated.push((source, Some(payment_preimage), payment_hash));
2217 } else if offered_preimage_claim {
2218 payment_preimage.0.copy_from_slice(&input.witness[1]);
2219 htlc_updated.push((source, Some(payment_preimage), payment_hash));
2221 log_info!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} timeout by a spend tx, waiting for confirmation (at height{})", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2222 match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
2223 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
2224 let e = entry.get_mut();
2225 e.retain(|ref event| {
2227 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
2228 return htlc_update.0 != source
2233 e.push(OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: (source, payment_hash)});
2235 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2236 entry.insert(vec![OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: (source, payment_hash)}]);
2246 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
2248 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> ReadableArgs<R, Arc<Logger>> for (Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor) {
2249 fn read(reader: &mut R, logger: Arc<Logger>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
2250 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2251 macro_rules! unwrap_obj {
2255 Err(_) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2260 let _ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2261 let min_ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2262 if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION {
2263 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion);
2266 let commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor = <U48 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.0;
2268 let key_storage = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2270 let revocation_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
2271 let htlc_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
2272 let delayed_payment_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
2273 let payment_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
2274 let shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
2275 let prev_latest_per_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
2276 let latest_per_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
2277 // Technically this can fail and serialize fail a round-trip, but only for serialization of
2278 // barely-init'd ChannelMonitors that we can't do anything with.
2279 let outpoint = OutPoint {
2280 txid: Readable::read(reader)?,
2281 index: Readable::read(reader)?,
2283 let funding_info = Some((outpoint, Readable::read(reader)?));
2284 let current_remote_commitment_txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
2285 let prev_remote_commitment_txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
2287 revocation_base_key,
2289 delayed_payment_base_key,
2292 prev_latest_per_commitment_point,
2293 latest_per_commitment_point,
2295 current_remote_commitment_txid,
2296 prev_remote_commitment_txid,
2299 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2302 let their_htlc_base_key = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
2303 let their_delayed_payment_base_key = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
2305 let their_cur_revocation_points = {
2306 let first_idx = <U48 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.0;
2310 let first_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
2311 let second_point_slice: [u8; 33] = Readable::read(reader)?;
2312 if second_point_slice[0..32] == [0; 32] && second_point_slice[32] == 0 {
2313 Some((first_idx, first_point, None))
2315 Some((first_idx, first_point, Some(unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&second_point_slice)))))
2320 let our_to_self_delay: u16 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2321 let their_to_self_delay: Option<u16> = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
2323 let mut old_secrets = [([0; 32], 1 << 48); 49];
2324 for &mut (ref mut secret, ref mut idx) in old_secrets.iter_mut() {
2325 *secret = Readable::read(reader)?;
2326 *idx = Readable::read(reader)?;
2329 macro_rules! read_htlc_in_commitment {
2332 let offered: bool = Readable::read(reader)?;
2333 let amount_msat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2334 let cltv_expiry: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2335 let payment_hash: PaymentHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
2336 let transaction_output_index: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
2338 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
2339 offered, amount_msat, cltv_expiry, payment_hash, transaction_output_index
2345 let remote_claimable_outpoints_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2346 let mut remote_claimable_outpoints = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(remote_claimable_outpoints_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 64));
2347 for _ in 0..remote_claimable_outpoints_len {
2348 let txid: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
2349 let htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2350 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlcs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
2351 for _ in 0..htlcs_count {
2352 htlcs.push((read_htlc_in_commitment!(), <Option<HTLCSource> as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.map(|o: HTLCSource| Box::new(o))));
2354 if let Some(_) = remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, htlcs) {
2355 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
2359 let remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2360 let mut remote_commitment_txn_on_chain = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
2361 for _ in 0..remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len {
2362 let txid: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
2363 let commitment_number = <U48 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.0;
2364 let outputs_count = <u64 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?;
2365 let mut outputs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 8));
2366 for _ in 0..outputs_count {
2367 outputs.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
2369 if let Some(_) = remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(txid, (commitment_number, outputs)) {
2370 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
2374 let remote_hash_commitment_number_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2375 let mut remote_hash_commitment_number = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(remote_hash_commitment_number_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
2376 for _ in 0..remote_hash_commitment_number_len {
2377 let payment_hash: PaymentHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
2378 let commitment_number = <U48 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.0;
2379 if let Some(_) = remote_hash_commitment_number.insert(payment_hash, commitment_number) {
2380 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
2384 macro_rules! read_local_tx {
2387 let tx = match Transaction::consensus_decode(reader.by_ref()) {
2390 encode::Error::Io(ioe) => return Err(DecodeError::Io(ioe)),
2391 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2395 if tx.input.is_empty() {
2396 // Ensure tx didn't hit the 0-input ambiguity case.
2397 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
2400 let revocation_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
2401 let a_htlc_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
2402 let b_htlc_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
2403 let delayed_payment_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
2404 let feerate_per_kw: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2406 let htlcs_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2407 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlcs_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
2408 for _ in 0..htlcs_len {
2409 let htlc = read_htlc_in_commitment!();
2410 let sigs = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2412 1 => Some((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?)),
2413 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2415 htlcs.push((htlc, sigs, Readable::read(reader)?));
2420 tx, revocation_key, a_htlc_key, b_htlc_key, delayed_payment_key, feerate_per_kw,
2427 let prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2430 Some(read_local_tx!())
2432 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2435 let current_local_signed_commitment_tx = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2438 Some(read_local_tx!())
2440 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2443 let current_remote_commitment_number = <U48 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.0;
2445 let payment_preimages_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2446 let mut payment_preimages = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(payment_preimages_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
2447 for _ in 0..payment_preimages_len {
2448 let preimage: PaymentPreimage = Readable::read(reader)?;
2449 let hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
2450 if let Some(_) = payment_preimages.insert(hash, preimage) {
2451 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
2455 let last_block_hash: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
2456 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
2458 let waiting_threshold_conf_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2459 let mut onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(waiting_threshold_conf_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
2460 for _ in 0..waiting_threshold_conf_len {
2461 let height_target = Readable::read(reader)?;
2462 let events_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2463 let mut events = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(events_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
2464 for _ in 0..events_len {
2465 let ev = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2467 let outpoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
2468 OnchainEvent::Claim {
2473 let htlc_source = Readable::read(reader)?;
2474 let hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
2475 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate {
2476 htlc_update: (htlc_source, hash)
2479 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2483 onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.insert(height_target, events);
2486 Ok((last_block_hash.clone(), ChannelMonitor {
2487 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor,
2490 their_htlc_base_key,
2491 their_delayed_payment_base_key,
2492 their_cur_revocation_points,
2495 their_to_self_delay,
2498 remote_claimable_outpoints,
2499 remote_commitment_txn_on_chain,
2500 remote_hash_commitment_number,
2502 prev_local_signed_commitment_tx,
2503 current_local_signed_commitment_tx,
2504 current_remote_commitment_number,
2510 onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf,
2522 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
2523 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
2524 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxIn, TxOut, SigHashType};
2525 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
2526 use bitcoin::util::bip143;
2527 use bitcoin_hashes::Hash;
2528 use bitcoin_hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
2529 use bitcoin_hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
2530 use bitcoin_hashes::hex::FromHex;
2532 use ln::channelmanager::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
2533 use ln::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, InputDescriptors};
2535 use ln::chan_utils::{HTLCOutputInCommitment, TxCreationKeys};
2536 use util::test_utils::TestLogger;
2537 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
2538 use secp256k1::Secp256k1;
2539 use rand::{thread_rng,Rng};
2543 fn test_per_commitment_storage() {
2544 // Test vectors from BOLT 3:
2545 let mut secrets: Vec<[u8; 32]> = Vec::new();
2546 let mut monitor: ChannelMonitor;
2547 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2548 let logger = Arc::new(TestLogger::new());
2550 macro_rules! test_secrets {
2552 let mut idx = 281474976710655;
2553 for secret in secrets.iter() {
2554 assert_eq!(monitor.get_secret(idx).unwrap(), *secret);
2557 assert_eq!(monitor.get_min_seen_secret(), idx + 1);
2558 assert!(monitor.get_secret(idx).is_none());
2563 // insert_secret correct sequence
2564 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
2567 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2568 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
2569 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2572 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2573 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
2574 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2577 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2578 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
2579 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2582 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2583 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
2584 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2587 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2588 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
2589 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2592 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2593 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
2594 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2597 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2598 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
2599 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2602 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2603 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
2604 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2609 // insert_secret #1 incorrect
2610 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
2613 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2614 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
2615 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2618 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2619 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
2620 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
2621 "Previous secret did not match new one");
2625 // insert_secret #2 incorrect (#1 derived from incorrect)
2626 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
2629 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2630 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
2631 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2634 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2635 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("dddc3a8d14fddf2b68fa8c7fbad2748274937479dd0f8930d5ebb4ab6bd866a3").unwrap());
2636 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2639 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2640 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
2641 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2644 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2645 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
2646 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
2647 "Previous secret did not match new one");
2651 // insert_secret #3 incorrect
2652 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
2655 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2656 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
2657 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2660 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2661 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
2662 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2665 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2666 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c51a18b13e8527e579ec56365482c62f180b7d5760b46e9477dae59e87ed423a").unwrap());
2667 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2670 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2671 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
2672 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
2673 "Previous secret did not match new one");
2677 // insert_secret #4 incorrect (1,2,3 derived from incorrect)
2678 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
2681 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2682 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
2683 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2686 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2687 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("dddc3a8d14fddf2b68fa8c7fbad2748274937479dd0f8930d5ebb4ab6bd866a3").unwrap());
2688 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2691 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2692 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c51a18b13e8527e579ec56365482c62f180b7d5760b46e9477dae59e87ed423a").unwrap());
2693 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2696 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2697 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("ba65d7b0ef55a3ba300d4e87af29868f394f8f138d78a7011669c79b37b936f4").unwrap());
2698 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2701 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2702 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
2703 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2706 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2707 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
2708 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2711 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2712 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
2713 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2716 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2717 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
2718 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
2719 "Previous secret did not match new one");
2723 // insert_secret #5 incorrect
2724 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
2727 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2728 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
2729 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2732 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2733 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
2734 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2737 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2738 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
2739 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2742 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2743 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
2744 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2747 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2748 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("631373ad5f9ef654bb3dade742d09504c567edd24320d2fcd68e3cc47e2ff6a6").unwrap());
2749 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2752 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2753 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
2754 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
2755 "Previous secret did not match new one");
2759 // insert_secret #6 incorrect (5 derived from incorrect)
2760 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
2763 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2764 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
2765 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2768 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2769 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
2770 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2773 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2774 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
2775 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2778 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2779 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
2780 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2783 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2784 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("631373ad5f9ef654bb3dade742d09504c567edd24320d2fcd68e3cc47e2ff6a6").unwrap());
2785 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2788 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2789 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("b7e76a83668bde38b373970155c868a653304308f9896692f904a23731224bb1").unwrap());
2790 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2793 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2794 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
2795 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2798 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2799 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
2800 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
2801 "Previous secret did not match new one");
2805 // insert_secret #7 incorrect
2806 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
2809 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2810 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
2811 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2814 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2815 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
2816 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2819 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2820 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
2821 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2824 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2825 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
2826 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2829 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2830 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
2831 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2834 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2835 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
2836 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2839 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2840 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("e7971de736e01da8ed58b94c2fc216cb1dca9e326f3a96e7194fe8ea8af6c0a3").unwrap());
2841 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2844 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2845 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
2846 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
2847 "Previous secret did not match new one");
2851 // insert_secret #8 incorrect
2852 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
2855 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2856 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
2857 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2860 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2861 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
2862 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2865 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2866 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
2867 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2870 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2871 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
2872 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2875 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2876 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
2877 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2880 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2881 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
2882 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2885 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2886 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
2887 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2890 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2891 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a7efbc61aac46d34f77778bac22c8a20c6a46ca460addc49009bda875ec88fa4").unwrap());
2892 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
2893 "Previous secret did not match new one");
2898 fn test_prune_preimages() {
2899 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2900 let logger = Arc::new(TestLogger::new());
2902 let dummy_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
2903 macro_rules! dummy_keys {
2907 per_commitment_point: dummy_key.clone(),
2908 revocation_key: dummy_key.clone(),
2909 a_htlc_key: dummy_key.clone(),
2910 b_htlc_key: dummy_key.clone(),
2911 a_delayed_payment_key: dummy_key.clone(),
2912 b_payment_key: dummy_key.clone(),
2917 let dummy_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
2919 let mut preimages = Vec::new();
2921 let mut rng = thread_rng();
2923 let mut preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
2924 rng.fill_bytes(&mut preimage.0[..]);
2925 let hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
2926 preimages.push((preimage, hash));
2930 macro_rules! preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs {
2931 ($preimages_slice: expr) => {
2933 let mut res = Vec::new();
2934 for (idx, preimage) in $preimages_slice.iter().enumerate() {
2935 res.push((HTLCOutputInCommitment {
2939 payment_hash: preimage.1.clone(),
2940 transaction_output_index: Some(idx as u32),
2947 macro_rules! preimages_to_local_htlcs {
2948 ($preimages_slice: expr) => {
2950 let mut inp = preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!($preimages_slice);
2951 let res: Vec<_> = inp.drain(..).map(|e| { (e.0, None, e.1) }).collect();
2957 macro_rules! test_preimages_exist {
2958 ($preimages_slice: expr, $monitor: expr) => {
2959 for preimage in $preimages_slice {
2960 assert!($monitor.payment_preimages.contains_key(&preimage.1));
2965 // Prune with one old state and a local commitment tx holding a few overlaps with the
2967 let mut monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
2968 monitor.set_their_to_self_delay(10);
2970 monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(dummy_tx.clone(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..10]));
2971 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[5..15]), 281474976710655, dummy_key);
2972 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[15..20]), 281474976710654, dummy_key);
2973 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[17..20]), 281474976710653, dummy_key);
2974 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[18..20]), 281474976710652, dummy_key);
2975 for &(ref preimage, ref hash) in preimages.iter() {
2976 monitor.provide_payment_preimage(hash, preimage);
2979 // Now provide a secret, pruning preimages 10-15
2980 let mut secret = [0; 32];
2981 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
2982 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secret.clone()).unwrap();
2983 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 15);
2984 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
2985 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[15..20], monitor);
2987 // Now provide a further secret, pruning preimages 15-17
2988 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
2989 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secret.clone()).unwrap();
2990 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 13);
2991 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
2992 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[17..20], monitor);
2994 // Now update local commitment tx info, pruning only element 18 as we still care about the
2995 // previous commitment tx's preimages too
2996 monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(dummy_tx.clone(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..5]));
2997 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
2998 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secret.clone()).unwrap();
2999 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 12);
3000 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
3001 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[18..20], monitor);
3003 // But if we do it again, we'll prune 5-10
3004 monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(dummy_tx.clone(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..3]));
3005 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
3006 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secret.clone()).unwrap();
3007 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 5);
3008 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..5], monitor);
3012 fn test_claim_txn_weight_computation() {
3013 // We test Claim txn weight, knowing that we want expected weigth and
3014 // not actual case to avoid sigs and time-lock delays hell variances.
3016 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3017 let privkey = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
3018 let pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &privkey);
3019 let mut sum_actual_sigs: u64 = 0;
3021 macro_rules! sign_input {
3022 ($sighash_parts: expr, $input: expr, $idx: expr, $amount: expr, $input_type: expr, $sum_actual_sigs: expr) => {
3023 let htlc = HTLCOutputInCommitment {
3024 offered: if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC || *$input_type == InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC { true } else { false },
3026 cltv_expiry: 2 << 16,
3027 payment_hash: PaymentHash([1; 32]),
3028 transaction_output_index: Some($idx),
3030 let redeem_script = if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput { chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&pubkey, 256, &pubkey) } else { chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, &pubkey, &pubkey, &pubkey) };
3031 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&$sighash_parts.sighash_all(&$input, &redeem_script, $amount)[..]);
3032 let sig = secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &privkey);
3033 $input.witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
3034 $input.witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
3035 sum_actual_sigs += $input.witness[0].len() as u64;
3036 if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput {
3037 $input.witness.push(vec!(1));
3038 } else if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC || *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC {
3039 $input.witness.push(pubkey.clone().serialize().to_vec());
3040 } else if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC {
3041 $input.witness.push(vec![0]);
3043 $input.witness.push(PaymentPreimage([1; 32]).0.to_vec());
3045 $input.witness.push(redeem_script.into_bytes());
3046 println!("witness[0] {}", $input.witness[0].len());
3047 println!("witness[1] {}", $input.witness[1].len());
3048 println!("witness[2] {}", $input.witness[2].len());
3052 let script_pubkey = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script();
3053 let txid = Sha256dHash::from_hex("56944c5d3f98413ef45cf54545538103cc9f298e0575820ad3591376e2e0f65d").unwrap();
3055 // Justice tx with 1 to_local, 2 revoked offered HTLCs, 1 revoked received HTLCs
3056 let mut claim_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
3058 claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
3059 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
3063 script_sig: Script::new(),
3064 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
3065 witness: Vec::new(),
3068 claim_tx.output.push(TxOut {
3069 script_pubkey: script_pubkey.clone(),
3072 let base_weight = claim_tx.get_weight();
3073 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&claim_tx);
3074 let inputs_des = vec![InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput, InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC, InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC, InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC];
3075 for (idx, inp) in claim_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(inputs_des.iter()).enumerate() {
3076 sign_input!(sighash_parts, inp.0, idx as u32, 0, inp.1, sum_actual_sigs);
3078 assert_eq!(base_weight + ChannelMonitor::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_des[..]), claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_sig */ (73 * inputs_des.len() as u64 - sum_actual_sigs));
3080 // Claim tx with 1 offered HTLCs, 3 received HTLCs
3081 claim_tx.input.clear();
3082 sum_actual_sigs = 0;
3084 claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
3085 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
3089 script_sig: Script::new(),
3090 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
3091 witness: Vec::new(),
3094 let base_weight = claim_tx.get_weight();
3095 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&claim_tx);
3096 let inputs_des = vec![InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC, InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC, InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC, InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC];
3097 for (idx, inp) in claim_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(inputs_des.iter()).enumerate() {
3098 sign_input!(sighash_parts, inp.0, idx as u32, 0, inp.1, sum_actual_sigs);
3100 assert_eq!(base_weight + ChannelMonitor::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_des[..]), claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_sig */ (73 * inputs_des.len() as u64 - sum_actual_sigs));
3102 // Justice tx with 1 revoked HTLC-Success tx output
3103 claim_tx.input.clear();
3104 sum_actual_sigs = 0;
3105 claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
3106 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
3110 script_sig: Script::new(),
3111 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
3112 witness: Vec::new(),
3114 let base_weight = claim_tx.get_weight();
3115 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&claim_tx);
3116 let inputs_des = vec![InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput];
3117 for (idx, inp) in claim_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(inputs_des.iter()).enumerate() {
3118 sign_input!(sighash_parts, inp.0, idx as u32, 0, inp.1, sum_actual_sigs);
3120 assert_eq!(base_weight + ChannelMonitor::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_des[..]), claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_isg */ (73 * inputs_des.len() as u64 - sum_actual_sigs));
3123 // Further testing is done in the ChannelManager integration tests.