1 //! The logic to monitor for on-chain transactions and create the relevant claim responses lives
4 //! ChannelMonitor objects are generated by ChannelManager in response to relevant
5 //! messages/actions, and MUST be persisted to disk (and, preferably, remotely) before progress can
6 //! be made in responding to certain messages, see ManyChannelMonitor for more.
8 //! Note that ChannelMonitors are an important part of the lightning trust model and a copy of the
9 //! latest ChannelMonitor must always be actively monitoring for chain updates (and no out-of-date
10 //! ChannelMonitors should do so). Thus, if you're building rust-lightning into an HSM or other
11 //! security-domain-separated system design, you should consider having multiple paths for
12 //! ChannelMonitors to get out of the HSM and onto monitoring devices.
14 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
15 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxIn,TxOut,SigHashType,Transaction};
16 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
17 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Script;
18 use bitcoin::network::serialize;
19 use bitcoin::network::serialize::BitcoinHash;
20 use bitcoin::network::encodable::{ConsensusDecodable, ConsensusEncodable};
21 use bitcoin::util::hash::Sha256dHash;
22 use bitcoin::util::bip143;
24 use crypto::digest::Digest;
26 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Message,Signature};
27 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
30 use ln::msgs::{DecodeError, HandleError};
32 use ln::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment;
33 use chain::chaininterface::{ChainListener, ChainWatchInterface, BroadcasterInterface};
34 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
35 use chain::keysinterface::SpendableOutputDescriptor;
36 use util::logger::Logger;
37 use util::ser::{ReadableArgs, Readable, Writer, Writeable, WriterWriteAdaptor, U48};
38 use util::sha2::Sha256;
39 use util::{byte_utils, events};
41 use std::collections::HashMap;
42 use std::sync::{Arc,Mutex};
43 use std::{hash,cmp, mem};
45 /// An error enum representing a failure to persist a channel monitor update.
47 pub enum ChannelMonitorUpdateErr {
48 /// Used to indicate a temporary failure (eg connection to a watchtower failed, but is expected
49 /// to succeed at some point in the future).
51 /// Such a failure will "freeze" a channel, preventing us from revoking old states or
52 /// submitting new commitment transactions to the remote party.
53 /// ChannelManager::test_restore_channel_monitor can be used to retry the update(s) and restore
54 /// the channel to an operational state.
56 /// Note that continuing to operate when no copy of the updated ChannelMonitor could be
57 /// persisted is unsafe - if you failed to store the update on your own local disk you should
58 /// instead return PermanentFailure to force closure of the channel ASAP.
60 /// Even when a channel has been "frozen" updates to the ChannelMonitor can continue to occur
61 /// (eg if an inbound HTLC which we forwarded was claimed upstream resulting in us attempting
62 /// to claim it on this channel) and those updates must be applied wherever they can be. At
63 /// least one such updated ChannelMonitor must be persisted otherwise PermanentFailure should
64 /// be returned to get things on-chain ASAP using only the in-memory copy. Obviously updates to
65 /// the channel which would invalidate previous ChannelMonitors are not made when a channel has
68 /// Note that even if updates made after TemporaryFailure succeed you must still call
69 /// test_restore_channel_monitor to ensure you have the latest monitor and re-enable normal
70 /// channel operation.
72 /// Used to indicate no further channel monitor updates will be allowed (eg we've moved on to a
73 /// different watchtower and cannot update with all watchtowers that were previously informed
74 /// of this channel). This will force-close the channel in question.
78 /// Simple trait indicating ability to track a set of ChannelMonitors and multiplex events between
79 /// them. Generally should be implemented by keeping a local SimpleManyChannelMonitor and passing
80 /// events to it, while also taking any add_update_monitor events and passing them to some remote
83 /// Note that any updates to a channel's monitor *must* be applied to each instance of the
84 /// channel's monitor everywhere (including remote watchtowers) *before* this function returns. If
85 /// an update occurs and a remote watchtower is left with old state, it may broadcast transactions
86 /// which we have revoked, allowing our counterparty to claim all funds in the channel!
87 pub trait ManyChannelMonitor: Send + Sync {
88 /// Adds or updates a monitor for the given `funding_txo`.
90 /// Implementor must also ensure that the funding_txo outpoint is registered with any relevant
91 /// ChainWatchInterfaces such that the provided monitor receives block_connected callbacks with
93 fn add_update_monitor(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr>;
96 /// A simple implementation of a ManyChannelMonitor and ChainListener. Can be used to create a
97 /// watchtower or watch our own channels.
99 /// Note that you must provide your own key by which to refer to channels.
101 /// If you're accepting remote monitors (ie are implementing a watchtower), you must verify that
102 /// users cannot overwrite a given channel by providing a duplicate key. ie you should probably
103 /// index by a PublicKey which is required to sign any updates.
105 /// If you're using this for local monitoring of your own channels, you probably want to use
106 /// `OutPoint` as the key, which will give you a ManyChannelMonitor implementation.
107 pub struct SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
108 #[cfg(test)] // Used in ChannelManager tests to manipulate channels directly
109 pub monitors: Mutex<HashMap<Key, ChannelMonitor>>,
111 monitors: Mutex<HashMap<Key, ChannelMonitor>>,
112 chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>,
113 broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>,
114 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
117 impl<Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash> ChainListener for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
118 fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], _indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) {
119 let block_hash = header.bitcoin_hash();
120 let mut new_events: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(0);
122 let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
123 for monitor in monitors.values_mut() {
124 let (txn_outputs, spendable_outputs) = monitor.block_connected(txn_matched, height, &block_hash, &*self.broadcaster);
125 if spendable_outputs.len() > 0 {
126 new_events.push(events::Event::SpendableOutputs {
127 outputs: spendable_outputs,
130 for (ref txid, ref outputs) in txn_outputs {
131 for (idx, output) in outputs.iter().enumerate() {
132 self.chain_monitor.install_watch_outpoint((txid.clone(), idx as u32), &output.script_pubkey);
137 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
138 pending_events.append(&mut new_events);
141 fn block_disconnected(&self, _: &BlockHeader) { }
144 impl<Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash + 'static> SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
145 /// Creates a new object which can be used to monitor several channels given the chain
146 /// interface with which to register to receive notifications.
147 pub fn new(chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>, broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>) -> Arc<SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key>> {
148 let res = Arc::new(SimpleManyChannelMonitor {
149 monitors: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
152 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
154 let weak_res = Arc::downgrade(&res);
155 res.chain_monitor.register_listener(weak_res);
159 /// Adds or udpates the monitor which monitors the channel referred to by the given key.
160 pub fn add_update_monitor_by_key(&self, key: Key, monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
161 let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
162 match monitors.get_mut(&key) {
163 Some(orig_monitor) => return orig_monitor.insert_combine(monitor),
166 match &monitor.funding_txo {
167 &None => self.chain_monitor.watch_all_txn(),
168 &Some((ref outpoint, ref script)) => {
169 self.chain_monitor.install_watch_tx(&outpoint.txid, script);
170 self.chain_monitor.install_watch_outpoint((outpoint.txid, outpoint.index as u32), script);
173 monitors.insert(key, monitor);
178 impl ManyChannelMonitor for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<OutPoint> {
179 fn add_update_monitor(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr> {
180 match self.add_update_monitor_by_key(funding_txo, monitor) {
182 Err(_) => Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure),
187 impl<Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash> events::EventsProvider for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
188 fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
189 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
190 let mut ret = Vec::new();
191 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut *pending_events);
196 /// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, don't try to claim it in a shared transaction,
197 /// instead claiming it in its own individual transaction.
198 const CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 12;
199 /// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, force-close the channel to broadcast the
200 /// HTLC-Success transaction.
201 /// In other words, this is an upper bound on how many blocks we think it can take us to get a
202 /// transaction confirmed (and we use it in a few more, equivalent, places).
203 pub(crate) const CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 6;
204 /// Number of blocks by which point we expect our counterparty to have seen new blocks on the
205 /// network and done a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance (+ we've updated all our
206 /// copies of ChannelMonitors, including watchtowers).
207 pub(crate) const HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS: u32 = 3;
209 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
212 revocation_base_key: SecretKey,
213 htlc_base_key: SecretKey,
214 delayed_payment_base_key: SecretKey,
215 prev_latest_per_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
216 latest_per_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
219 revocation_base_key: PublicKey,
220 htlc_base_key: PublicKey,
221 sigs: HashMap<Sha256dHash, Signature>,
225 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
226 struct LocalSignedTx {
227 /// txid of the transaction in tx, just used to make comparison faster
230 revocation_key: PublicKey,
231 a_htlc_key: PublicKey,
232 b_htlc_key: PublicKey,
233 delayed_payment_key: PublicKey,
235 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Signature, Signature)>,
238 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
239 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
241 /// A ChannelMonitor handles chain events (blocks connected and disconnected) and generates
242 /// on-chain transactions to ensure no loss of funds occurs.
244 /// You MUST ensure that no ChannelMonitors for a given channel anywhere contain out-of-date
245 /// information and are actively monitoring the chain.
246 pub struct ChannelMonitor {
247 funding_txo: Option<(OutPoint, Script)>,
248 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64,
250 key_storage: KeyStorage,
251 their_htlc_base_key: Option<PublicKey>,
252 their_delayed_payment_base_key: Option<PublicKey>,
253 // first is the idx of the first of the two revocation points
254 their_cur_revocation_points: Option<(u64, PublicKey, Option<PublicKey>)>,
256 our_to_self_delay: u16,
257 their_to_self_delay: Option<u16>,
259 old_secrets: [([u8; 32], u64); 49],
260 remote_claimable_outpoints: HashMap<Sha256dHash, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>>,
261 /// We cannot identify HTLC-Success or HTLC-Timeout transactions by themselves on the chain.
262 /// Nor can we figure out their commitment numbers without the commitment transaction they are
263 /// spending. Thus, in order to claim them via revocation key, we track all the remote
264 /// commitment transactions which we find on-chain, mapping them to the commitment number which
265 /// can be used to derive the revocation key and claim the transactions.
266 remote_commitment_txn_on_chain: Mutex<HashMap<Sha256dHash, u64>>,
267 /// Cache used to make pruning of payment_preimages faster.
268 /// Maps payment_hash values to commitment numbers for remote transactions for non-revoked
269 /// remote transactions (ie should remain pretty small).
270 /// Serialized to disk but should generally not be sent to Watchtowers.
271 remote_hash_commitment_number: HashMap<[u8; 32], u64>,
273 // We store two local commitment transactions to avoid any race conditions where we may update
274 // some monitors (potentially on watchtowers) but then fail to update others, resulting in the
275 // various monitors for one channel being out of sync, and us broadcasting a local
276 // transaction for which we have deleted claim information on some watchtowers.
277 prev_local_signed_commitment_tx: Option<LocalSignedTx>,
278 current_local_signed_commitment_tx: Option<LocalSignedTx>,
280 payment_preimages: HashMap<[u8; 32], [u8; 32]>,
282 destination_script: Script,
284 // We simply modify last_block_hash in Channel's block_connected so that serialization is
285 // consistent but hopefully the users' copy handles block_connected in a consistent way.
286 // (we do *not*, however, update them in insert_combine to ensure any local user copies keep
287 // their last_block_hash from its state and not based on updated copies that didn't run through
288 // the full block_connected).
289 pub(crate) last_block_hash: Sha256dHash,
290 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>, //TODO: dedup this a bit...
293 impl Clone for ChannelMonitor {
294 fn clone(&self) -> Self {
296 funding_txo: self.funding_txo.clone(),
297 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor.clone(),
299 key_storage: self.key_storage.clone(),
300 their_htlc_base_key: self.their_htlc_base_key.clone(),
301 their_delayed_payment_base_key: self.their_delayed_payment_base_key.clone(),
302 their_cur_revocation_points: self.their_cur_revocation_points.clone(),
304 our_to_self_delay: self.our_to_self_delay,
305 their_to_self_delay: self.their_to_self_delay,
307 old_secrets: self.old_secrets.clone(),
308 remote_claimable_outpoints: self.remote_claimable_outpoints.clone(),
309 remote_commitment_txn_on_chain: Mutex::new((*self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.lock().unwrap()).clone()),
310 remote_hash_commitment_number: self.remote_hash_commitment_number.clone(),
312 prev_local_signed_commitment_tx: self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.clone(),
313 current_local_signed_commitment_tx: self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx.clone(),
315 payment_preimages: self.payment_preimages.clone(),
317 destination_script: self.destination_script.clone(),
318 last_block_hash: self.last_block_hash.clone(),
319 secp_ctx: self.secp_ctx.clone(),
320 logger: self.logger.clone(),
325 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
326 /// Used only in testing and fuzztarget to check serialization roundtrips don't change the
327 /// underlying object
328 impl PartialEq for ChannelMonitor {
329 fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
330 if self.funding_txo != other.funding_txo ||
331 self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor != other.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor ||
332 self.key_storage != other.key_storage ||
333 self.their_htlc_base_key != other.their_htlc_base_key ||
334 self.their_delayed_payment_base_key != other.their_delayed_payment_base_key ||
335 self.their_cur_revocation_points != other.their_cur_revocation_points ||
336 self.our_to_self_delay != other.our_to_self_delay ||
337 self.their_to_self_delay != other.their_to_self_delay ||
338 self.remote_claimable_outpoints != other.remote_claimable_outpoints ||
339 self.remote_hash_commitment_number != other.remote_hash_commitment_number ||
340 self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx != other.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx ||
341 self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx != other.current_local_signed_commitment_tx ||
342 self.payment_preimages != other.payment_preimages ||
343 self.destination_script != other.destination_script
347 for (&(ref secret, ref idx), &(ref o_secret, ref o_idx)) in self.old_secrets.iter().zip(other.old_secrets.iter()) {
348 if secret != o_secret || idx != o_idx {
352 let us = self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.lock().unwrap();
353 let them = other.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.lock().unwrap();
359 impl ChannelMonitor {
360 pub(super) fn new(revocation_base_key: &SecretKey, delayed_payment_base_key: &SecretKey, htlc_base_key: &SecretKey, our_to_self_delay: u16, destination_script: Script, logger: Arc<Logger>) -> ChannelMonitor {
363 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: 0,
365 key_storage: KeyStorage::PrivMode {
366 revocation_base_key: revocation_base_key.clone(),
367 htlc_base_key: htlc_base_key.clone(),
368 delayed_payment_base_key: delayed_payment_base_key.clone(),
369 prev_latest_per_commitment_point: None,
370 latest_per_commitment_point: None,
372 their_htlc_base_key: None,
373 their_delayed_payment_base_key: None,
374 their_cur_revocation_points: None,
376 our_to_self_delay: our_to_self_delay,
377 their_to_self_delay: None,
379 old_secrets: [([0; 32], 1 << 48); 49],
380 remote_claimable_outpoints: HashMap::new(),
381 remote_commitment_txn_on_chain: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
382 remote_hash_commitment_number: HashMap::new(),
384 prev_local_signed_commitment_tx: None,
385 current_local_signed_commitment_tx: None,
387 payment_preimages: HashMap::new(),
388 destination_script: destination_script,
390 last_block_hash: Default::default(),
391 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
397 fn place_secret(idx: u64) -> u8 {
399 if idx & (1 << i) == (1 << i) {
407 fn derive_secret(secret: [u8; 32], bits: u8, idx: u64) -> [u8; 32] {
408 let mut res: [u8; 32] = secret;
410 let bitpos = bits - 1 - i;
411 if idx & (1 << bitpos) == (1 << bitpos) {
412 res[(bitpos / 8) as usize] ^= 1 << (bitpos & 7);
413 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
415 sha.result(&mut res);
421 /// Inserts a revocation secret into this channel monitor. Also optionally tracks the next
422 /// revocation point which may be required to claim HTLC outputs which we know the preimage of
423 /// in case the remote end force-closes using their latest state. Prunes old preimages if neither
424 /// needed by local commitment transactions HTCLs nor by remote ones. Unless we haven't already seen remote
425 /// commitment transaction's secret, they are de facto pruned (we can use revocation key).
426 pub(super) fn provide_secret(&mut self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32], their_next_revocation_point: Option<(u64, PublicKey)>) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
427 let pos = ChannelMonitor::place_secret(idx);
429 let (old_secret, old_idx) = self.old_secrets[i as usize];
430 if ChannelMonitor::derive_secret(secret, pos, old_idx) != old_secret {
431 return Err(HandleError{err: "Previous secret did not match new one", action: None})
434 self.old_secrets[pos as usize] = (secret, idx);
436 if let Some(new_revocation_point) = their_next_revocation_point {
437 match self.their_cur_revocation_points {
438 Some(old_points) => {
439 if old_points.0 == new_revocation_point.0 + 1 {
440 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0, old_points.1, Some(new_revocation_point.1)));
441 } else if old_points.0 == new_revocation_point.0 + 2 {
442 if let Some(old_second_point) = old_points.2 {
443 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0 - 1, old_second_point, Some(new_revocation_point.1)));
445 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((new_revocation_point.0, new_revocation_point.1, None));
448 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((new_revocation_point.0, new_revocation_point.1, None));
452 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((new_revocation_point.0, new_revocation_point.1, None));
457 if !self.payment_preimages.is_empty() {
458 let local_signed_commitment_tx = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx.as_ref().expect("Channel needs at least an initial commitment tx !");
459 let prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.as_ref();
460 let min_idx = self.get_min_seen_secret();
461 let remote_hash_commitment_number = &mut self.remote_hash_commitment_number;
463 self.payment_preimages.retain(|&k, _| {
464 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in &local_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs {
465 if k == htlc.payment_hash {
469 if let Some(prev_local_commitment_tx) = prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
470 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in prev_local_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
471 if k == htlc.payment_hash {
476 let contains = if let Some(cn) = remote_hash_commitment_number.get(&k) {
483 remote_hash_commitment_number.remove(&k);
492 /// Informs this monitor of the latest remote (ie non-broadcastable) commitment transaction.
493 /// The monitor watches for it to be broadcasted and then uses the HTLC information (and
494 /// possibly future revocation/preimage information) to claim outputs where possible.
495 /// We cache also the mapping hash:commitment number to lighten pruning of old preimages by watchtowers.
496 pub(super) fn provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, unsigned_commitment_tx: &Transaction, htlc_outputs: Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>, commitment_number: u64) {
497 // TODO: Encrypt the htlc_outputs data with the single-hash of the commitment transaction
498 // so that a remote monitor doesn't learn anything unless there is a malicious close.
499 // (only maybe, sadly we cant do the same for local info, as we need to be aware of
501 for htlc in &htlc_outputs {
502 self.remote_hash_commitment_number.insert(htlc.payment_hash, commitment_number);
504 self.remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(unsigned_commitment_tx.txid(), htlc_outputs);
507 /// Informs this monitor of the latest local (ie broadcastable) commitment transaction. The
508 /// monitor watches for timeouts and may broadcast it if we approach such a timeout. Thus, it
509 /// is important that any clones of this channel monitor (including remote clones) by kept
510 /// up-to-date as our local commitment transaction is updated.
511 /// Panics if set_their_to_self_delay has never been called.
512 /// Also update KeyStorage with latest local per_commitment_point to derive local_delayedkey in
513 /// case of onchain HTLC tx
514 pub(super) fn provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, signed_commitment_tx: Transaction, local_keys: chan_utils::TxCreationKeys, feerate_per_kw: u64, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Signature, Signature)>) {
515 assert!(self.their_to_self_delay.is_some());
516 self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx.take();
517 self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(LocalSignedTx {
518 txid: signed_commitment_tx.txid(),
519 tx: signed_commitment_tx,
520 revocation_key: local_keys.revocation_key,
521 a_htlc_key: local_keys.a_htlc_key,
522 b_htlc_key: local_keys.b_htlc_key,
523 delayed_payment_key: local_keys.a_delayed_payment_key,
527 self.key_storage = if let KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, ref delayed_payment_base_key, prev_latest_per_commitment_point: _, ref latest_per_commitment_point } = self.key_storage {
528 KeyStorage::PrivMode {
529 revocation_base_key: *revocation_base_key,
530 htlc_base_key: *htlc_base_key,
531 delayed_payment_base_key: *delayed_payment_base_key,
532 prev_latest_per_commitment_point: *latest_per_commitment_point,
533 latest_per_commitment_point: Some(local_keys.per_commitment_point),
535 } else { unimplemented!(); };
538 /// Provides a payment_hash->payment_preimage mapping. Will be automatically pruned when all
539 /// commitment_tx_infos which contain the payment hash have been revoked.
540 pub(super) fn provide_payment_preimage(&mut self, payment_hash: &[u8; 32], payment_preimage: &[u8; 32]) {
541 self.payment_preimages.insert(payment_hash.clone(), payment_preimage.clone());
544 /// Combines this ChannelMonitor with the information contained in the other ChannelMonitor.
545 /// After a successful call this ChannelMonitor is up-to-date and is safe to use to monitor the
546 /// chain for new blocks/transactions.
547 pub fn insert_combine(&mut self, mut other: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
548 if self.funding_txo.is_some() {
549 // We should be able to compare the entire funding_txo, but in fuzztarget its trivially
550 // easy to collide the funding_txo hash and have a different scriptPubKey.
551 if other.funding_txo.is_some() && other.funding_txo.as_ref().unwrap().0 != self.funding_txo.as_ref().unwrap().0 {
552 return Err(HandleError{err: "Funding transaction outputs are not identical!", action: None});
555 self.funding_txo = other.funding_txo.take();
557 let other_min_secret = other.get_min_seen_secret();
558 let our_min_secret = self.get_min_seen_secret();
559 if our_min_secret > other_min_secret {
560 self.provide_secret(other_min_secret, other.get_secret(other_min_secret).unwrap(), None)?;
562 if our_min_secret >= other_min_secret {
563 self.their_cur_revocation_points = other.their_cur_revocation_points;
564 for (txid, htlcs) in other.remote_claimable_outpoints.drain() {
565 self.remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, htlcs);
567 if let Some(local_tx) = other.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
568 self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(local_tx);
570 if let Some(local_tx) = other.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
571 self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(local_tx);
573 self.payment_preimages = other.payment_preimages;
578 /// Panics if commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor doesn't fit in 48 bits
579 pub(super) fn set_commitment_obscure_factor(&mut self, commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64) {
580 assert!(commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor < (1 << 48));
581 self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor = commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor;
584 /// Allows this monitor to scan only for transactions which are applicable. Note that this is
585 /// optional, without it this monitor cannot be used in an SPV client, but you may wish to
586 /// avoid this (or call unset_funding_info) on a monitor you wish to send to a watchtower as it
587 /// provides slightly better privacy.
588 /// It's the responsibility of the caller to register outpoint and script with passing the former
589 /// value as key to add_update_monitor.
590 pub(super) fn set_funding_info(&mut self, funding_info: (OutPoint, Script)) {
591 self.funding_txo = Some(funding_info);
594 /// We log these base keys at channel opening to being able to rebuild redeemscript in case of leaked revoked commit tx
595 pub(super) fn set_their_base_keys(&mut self, their_htlc_base_key: &PublicKey, their_delayed_payment_base_key: &PublicKey) {
596 self.their_htlc_base_key = Some(their_htlc_base_key.clone());
597 self.their_delayed_payment_base_key = Some(their_delayed_payment_base_key.clone());
600 pub(super) fn set_their_to_self_delay(&mut self, their_to_self_delay: u16) {
601 self.their_to_self_delay = Some(their_to_self_delay);
604 pub(super) fn unset_funding_info(&mut self) {
605 self.funding_txo = None;
608 /// Gets the funding transaction outpoint of the channel this ChannelMonitor is monitoring for.
609 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
610 match self.funding_txo {
611 Some((outpoint, _)) => Some(outpoint),
616 /// Serializes into a vec, with various modes for the exposed pub fns
617 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W, for_local_storage: bool) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
618 //TODO: We still write out all the serialization here manually instead of using the fancy
619 //serialization framework we have, we should migrate things over to it.
620 writer.write_all(&[SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
621 writer.write_all(&[MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
623 match &self.funding_txo {
624 &Some((ref outpoint, ref script)) => {
625 writer.write_all(&outpoint.txid[..])?;
626 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(outpoint.index))?;
627 script.write(writer)?;
630 // We haven't even been initialized...not sure why anyone is serializing us, but
631 // not much to give them.
636 // Set in initial Channel-object creation, so should always be set by now:
637 U48(self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor).write(writer)?;
639 match self.key_storage {
640 KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref prev_latest_per_commitment_point, ref latest_per_commitment_point } => {
641 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
642 writer.write_all(&revocation_base_key[..])?;
643 writer.write_all(&htlc_base_key[..])?;
644 writer.write_all(&delayed_payment_base_key[..])?;
645 if let Some(ref prev_latest_per_commitment_point) = *prev_latest_per_commitment_point {
646 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
647 writer.write_all(&prev_latest_per_commitment_point.serialize())?;
649 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
651 if let Some(ref latest_per_commitment_point) = *latest_per_commitment_point {
652 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
653 writer.write_all(&latest_per_commitment_point.serialize())?;
655 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
659 KeyStorage::SigsMode { .. } => unimplemented!(),
662 writer.write_all(&self.their_htlc_base_key.as_ref().unwrap().serialize())?;
663 writer.write_all(&self.their_delayed_payment_base_key.as_ref().unwrap().serialize())?;
665 match self.their_cur_revocation_points {
666 Some((idx, pubkey, second_option)) => {
667 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(idx))?;
668 writer.write_all(&pubkey.serialize())?;
669 match second_option {
670 Some(second_pubkey) => {
671 writer.write_all(&second_pubkey.serialize())?;
674 writer.write_all(&[0; 33])?;
679 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(0))?;
683 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.our_to_self_delay))?;
684 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap()))?;
686 for &(ref secret, ref idx) in self.old_secrets.iter() {
687 writer.write_all(secret)?;
688 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*idx))?;
691 macro_rules! serialize_htlc_in_commitment {
692 ($htlc_output: expr) => {
693 writer.write_all(&[$htlc_output.offered as u8; 1])?;
694 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc_output.amount_msat))?;
695 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array($htlc_output.cltv_expiry))?;
696 writer.write_all(&$htlc_output.payment_hash)?;
697 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array($htlc_output.transaction_output_index))?;
701 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_claimable_outpoints.len() as u64))?;
702 for (txid, htlc_outputs) in self.remote_claimable_outpoints.iter() {
703 writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
704 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc_outputs.len() as u64))?;
705 for htlc_output in htlc_outputs.iter() {
706 serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output);
711 let remote_commitment_txn_on_chain = self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.lock().unwrap();
712 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.len() as u64))?;
713 for (txid, commitment_number) in remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
714 writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
715 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(*commitment_number))?;
719 if for_local_storage {
720 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_hash_commitment_number.len() as u64))?;
721 for (payment_hash, commitment_number) in self.remote_hash_commitment_number.iter() {
722 writer.write_all(payment_hash)?;
723 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(*commitment_number))?;
726 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(0))?;
729 macro_rules! serialize_local_tx {
730 ($local_tx: expr) => {
731 if let Err(e) = $local_tx.tx.consensus_encode(&mut serialize::RawEncoder::new(WriterWriteAdaptor(writer))) {
733 serialize::Error::Io(e) => return Err(e),
734 _ => panic!("local tx must have been well-formed!"),
738 writer.write_all(&$local_tx.revocation_key.serialize())?;
739 writer.write_all(&$local_tx.a_htlc_key.serialize())?;
740 writer.write_all(&$local_tx.b_htlc_key.serialize())?;
741 writer.write_all(&$local_tx.delayed_payment_key.serialize())?;
743 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($local_tx.feerate_per_kw))?;
744 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($local_tx.htlc_outputs.len() as u64))?;
745 for &(ref htlc_output, ref their_sig, ref our_sig) in $local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
746 serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output);
747 writer.write_all(&their_sig.serialize_compact(&self.secp_ctx))?;
748 writer.write_all(&our_sig.serialize_compact(&self.secp_ctx))?;
753 if let Some(ref prev_local_tx) = self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
754 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
755 serialize_local_tx!(prev_local_tx);
757 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
760 if let Some(ref cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
761 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
762 serialize_local_tx!(cur_local_tx);
764 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
767 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.payment_preimages.len() as u64))?;
768 for payment_preimage in self.payment_preimages.values() {
769 writer.write_all(payment_preimage)?;
772 self.last_block_hash.write(writer)?;
773 self.destination_script.write(writer)?;
778 /// Writes this monitor into the given writer, suitable for writing to disk.
780 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor), which
781 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
782 /// the "reorg path" (ie not just starting at the same height but starting at the highest
783 /// common block that appears on your best chain as well as on the chain which contains the
784 /// last block hash returned) upon deserializing the object!
785 pub fn write_for_disk<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
786 self.write(writer, true)
789 /// Encodes this monitor into the given writer, suitable for sending to a remote watchtower
791 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor), which
792 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
793 /// the "reorg path" (ie not just starting at the same height but starting at the highest
794 /// common block that appears on your best chain as well as on the chain which contains the
795 /// last block hash returned) upon deserializing the object!
796 pub fn write_for_watchtower<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
797 self.write(writer, false)
800 //TODO: Functions to serialize/deserialize (with different forms depending on which information
801 //we want to leave out (eg funding_txo, etc).
803 /// Can only fail if idx is < get_min_seen_secret
804 pub(super) fn get_secret(&self, idx: u64) -> Result<[u8; 32], HandleError> {
805 for i in 0..self.old_secrets.len() {
806 if (idx & (!((1 << i) - 1))) == self.old_secrets[i].1 {
807 return Ok(ChannelMonitor::derive_secret(self.old_secrets[i].0, i as u8, idx))
810 assert!(idx < self.get_min_seen_secret());
811 Err(HandleError{err: "idx too low", action: None})
814 pub(super) fn get_min_seen_secret(&self) -> u64 {
815 //TODO This can be optimized?
816 let mut min = 1 << 48;
817 for &(_, idx) in self.old_secrets.iter() {
825 /// Attempts to claim a remote commitment transaction's outputs using the revocation key and
826 /// data in remote_claimable_outpoints. Will directly claim any HTLC outputs which expire at a
827 /// height > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER. In any case, will install monitoring for
828 /// HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions.
829 fn check_spend_remote_transaction(&self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32) -> (Vec<Transaction>, (Sha256dHash, Vec<TxOut>), Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>) {
830 // Most secp and related errors trying to create keys means we have no hope of constructing
831 // a spend transaction...so we return no transactions to broadcast
832 let mut txn_to_broadcast = Vec::new();
833 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
834 let mut spendable_outputs = Vec::new();
836 let commitment_txid = tx.txid(); //TODO: This is gonna be a performance bottleneck for watchtowers!
837 let per_commitment_option = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(&commitment_txid);
839 macro_rules! ignore_error {
840 ( $thing : expr ) => {
843 Err(_) => return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs)
848 let commitment_number = 0xffffffffffff - ((((tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor);
849 if commitment_number >= self.get_min_seen_secret() {
850 let secret = self.get_secret(commitment_number).unwrap();
851 let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &secret));
852 let (revocation_pubkey, b_htlc_key) = match self.key_storage {
853 KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
854 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
855 (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_base_key))),
856 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &htlc_base_key))))
858 KeyStorage::SigsMode { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
859 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
860 (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &revocation_base_key)),
861 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &htlc_base_key)))
864 let delayed_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key), &self.their_delayed_payment_base_key.unwrap()));
865 let a_htlc_key = match self.their_htlc_base_key {
866 None => return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs),
867 Some(their_htlc_base_key) => ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key), &their_htlc_base_key)),
870 let revokeable_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey, self.our_to_self_delay, &delayed_key);
871 let revokeable_p2wsh = revokeable_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
873 let mut total_value = 0;
874 let mut values = Vec::new();
875 let mut inputs = Vec::new();
876 let mut htlc_idxs = Vec::new();
878 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
879 if outp.script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh {
881 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
882 txid: commitment_txid,
885 script_sig: Script::new(),
886 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
889 htlc_idxs.push(None);
890 values.push(outp.value);
891 total_value += outp.value;
892 break; // There can only be one of these
896 macro_rules! sign_input {
897 ($sighash_parts: expr, $input: expr, $htlc_idx: expr, $amount: expr) => {
899 let (sig, redeemscript) = match self.key_storage {
900 KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
901 let redeemscript = if $htlc_idx.is_none() { revokeable_redeemscript.clone() } else {
902 let htlc = &per_commitment_option.unwrap()[$htlc_idx.unwrap()];
903 chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey)
905 let sighash = ignore_error!(Message::from_slice(&$sighash_parts.sighash_all(&$input, &redeemscript, $amount)[..]));
906 let revocation_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key, &revocation_base_key));
907 (self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &revocation_key), redeemscript)
909 KeyStorage::SigsMode { .. } => {
913 $input.witness.push(sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
914 $input.witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
915 if $htlc_idx.is_none() {
916 $input.witness.push(vec!(1));
918 $input.witness.push(revocation_pubkey.serialize().to_vec());
920 $input.witness.push(redeemscript.into_bytes());
925 if let Some(per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
926 inputs.reserve_exact(per_commitment_data.len());
928 for (idx, htlc) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() {
929 let expected_script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey);
930 if htlc.transaction_output_index as usize >= tx.output.len() ||
931 tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 ||
932 tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].script_pubkey != expected_script.to_v0_p2wsh() {
933 return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs); // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user
936 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
937 txid: commitment_txid,
938 vout: htlc.transaction_output_index,
940 script_sig: Script::new(),
941 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
944 if htlc.cltv_expiry > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER {
946 htlc_idxs.push(Some(idx));
947 values.push(tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].value);
948 total_value += htlc.amount_msat / 1000;
950 let mut single_htlc_tx = Transaction {
955 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
956 value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000, //TODO: - fee
959 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&single_htlc_tx);
960 sign_input!(sighash_parts, single_htlc_tx.input[0], Some(idx), htlc.amount_msat / 1000);
961 txn_to_broadcast.push(single_htlc_tx);
966 if !inputs.is_empty() || !txn_to_broadcast.is_empty() { // ie we're confident this is actually ours
967 // We're definitely a remote commitment transaction!
968 watch_outputs.append(&mut tx.output.clone());
969 self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.lock().unwrap().insert(commitment_txid, commitment_number);
971 if inputs.is_empty() { return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs); } // Nothing to be done...probably a false positive/local tx
973 let outputs = vec!(TxOut {
974 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
975 value: total_value, //TODO: - fee
977 let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
984 let mut values_drain = values.drain(..);
985 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx);
987 for (input, htlc_idx) in spend_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(htlc_idxs.iter()) {
988 let value = values_drain.next().unwrap();
989 sign_input!(sighash_parts, input, htlc_idx, value);
992 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
993 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: spend_tx.txid(), vout: 0 },
994 output: spend_tx.output[0].clone(),
996 txn_to_broadcast.push(spend_tx);
997 } else if let Some(per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
998 // While this isn't useful yet, there is a potential race where if a counterparty
999 // revokes a state at the same time as the commitment transaction for that state is
1000 // confirmed, and the watchtower receives the block before the user, the user could
1001 // upload a new ChannelMonitor with the revocation secret but the watchtower has
1002 // already processed the block, resulting in the remote_commitment_txn_on_chain entry
1003 // not being generated by the above conditional. Thus, to be safe, we go ahead and
1005 watch_outputs.append(&mut tx.output.clone());
1006 self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.lock().unwrap().insert(commitment_txid, commitment_number);
1008 if let Some(revocation_points) = self.their_cur_revocation_points {
1009 let revocation_point_option =
1010 if revocation_points.0 == commitment_number { Some(&revocation_points.1) }
1011 else if let Some(point) = revocation_points.2.as_ref() {
1012 if revocation_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 { Some(point) } else { None }
1014 if let Some(revocation_point) = revocation_point_option {
1015 let (revocation_pubkey, b_htlc_key) = match self.key_storage {
1016 KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
1017 (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_base_key))),
1018 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &htlc_base_key))))
1020 KeyStorage::SigsMode { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
1021 (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &revocation_base_key)),
1022 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &htlc_base_key)))
1025 let a_htlc_key = match self.their_htlc_base_key {
1026 None => return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs),
1027 Some(their_htlc_base_key) => ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &their_htlc_base_key)),
1030 let mut total_value = 0;
1031 let mut values = Vec::new();
1032 let mut inputs = Vec::new();
1034 macro_rules! sign_input {
1035 ($sighash_parts: expr, $input: expr, $amount: expr, $preimage: expr) => {
1037 let (sig, redeemscript) = match self.key_storage {
1038 KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
1039 let htlc = &per_commitment_option.unwrap()[$input.sequence as usize];
1040 let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey);
1041 let sighash = ignore_error!(Message::from_slice(&$sighash_parts.sighash_all(&$input, &redeemscript, $amount)[..]));
1042 let htlc_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &htlc_base_key));
1043 (self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &htlc_key), redeemscript)
1045 KeyStorage::SigsMode { .. } => {
1049 $input.witness.push(sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
1050 $input.witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1051 $input.witness.push($preimage);
1052 $input.witness.push(redeemscript.into_bytes());
1057 for (idx, htlc) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() {
1058 if let Some(payment_preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
1060 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
1061 txid: commitment_txid,
1062 vout: htlc.transaction_output_index,
1064 script_sig: Script::new(),
1065 sequence: idx as u32, // reset to 0xfffffffd in sign_input
1066 witness: Vec::new(),
1068 if htlc.cltv_expiry > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER {
1070 values.push((tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].value, payment_preimage));
1071 total_value += htlc.amount_msat / 1000;
1073 let mut single_htlc_tx = Transaction {
1077 output: vec!(TxOut {
1078 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1079 value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000, //TODO: - fee
1082 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&single_htlc_tx);
1083 sign_input!(sighash_parts, single_htlc_tx.input[0], htlc.amount_msat / 1000, payment_preimage.to_vec());
1084 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
1085 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: single_htlc_tx.txid(), vout: 0 },
1086 output: single_htlc_tx.output[0].clone(),
1088 txn_to_broadcast.push(single_htlc_tx);
1093 if inputs.is_empty() { return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs); } // Nothing to be done...probably a false positive/local tx
1095 let outputs = vec!(TxOut {
1096 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1097 value: total_value, //TODO: - fee
1099 let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
1106 let mut values_drain = values.drain(..);
1107 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx);
1109 for input in spend_tx.input.iter_mut() {
1110 let value = values_drain.next().unwrap();
1111 sign_input!(sighash_parts, input, value.0, value.1.to_vec());
1114 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
1115 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: spend_tx.txid(), vout: 0 },
1116 output: spend_tx.output[0].clone(),
1118 txn_to_broadcast.push(spend_tx);
1123 (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs)
1126 /// Attempst to claim a remote HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout s outputs using the revocation key
1127 fn check_spend_remote_htlc(&self, tx: &Transaction, commitment_number: u64) -> (Option<Transaction>, Option<SpendableOutputDescriptor>) {
1128 if tx.input.len() != 1 || tx.output.len() != 1 {
1132 macro_rules! ignore_error {
1133 ( $thing : expr ) => {
1136 Err(_) => return (None, None)
1141 let secret = ignore_error!(self.get_secret(commitment_number));
1142 let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &secret));
1143 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
1144 let revocation_pubkey = match self.key_storage {
1145 KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
1146 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_base_key)))
1148 KeyStorage::SigsMode { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
1149 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &revocation_base_key))
1152 let delayed_key = match self.their_delayed_payment_base_key {
1153 None => return (None, None),
1154 Some(their_delayed_payment_base_key) => ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &their_delayed_payment_base_key)),
1156 let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), &delayed_key);
1157 let revokeable_p2wsh = redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
1158 let htlc_txid = tx.txid(); //TODO: This is gonna be a performance bottleneck for watchtowers!
1160 let mut inputs = Vec::new();
1163 if tx.output[0].script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh { //HTLC transactions have one txin, one txout
1165 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
1169 script_sig: Script::new(),
1170 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
1171 witness: Vec::new(),
1173 amount = tx.output[0].value;
1176 if !inputs.is_empty() {
1177 let outputs = vec!(TxOut {
1178 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1179 value: amount, //TODO: - fee
1182 let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
1189 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx);
1191 let sig = match self.key_storage {
1192 KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
1193 let sighash = ignore_error!(Message::from_slice(&sighash_parts.sighash_all(&spend_tx.input[0], &redeemscript, amount)[..]));
1194 let revocation_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key, &revocation_base_key));
1195 self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &revocation_key)
1197 KeyStorage::SigsMode { .. } => {
1201 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
1202 spend_tx.input[0].witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1203 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(vec!(1));
1204 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(redeemscript.into_bytes());
1206 let outpoint = BitcoinOutPoint { txid: spend_tx.txid(), vout: 0 };
1207 let output = spend_tx.output[0].clone();
1208 (Some(spend_tx), Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput { outpoint, output }))
1209 } else { (None, None) }
1212 fn broadcast_by_local_state(&self, local_tx: &LocalSignedTx, per_commitment_point: &Option<PublicKey>, delayed_payment_base_key: &Option<SecretKey>) -> (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>) {
1213 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
1214 let mut spendable_outputs = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
1216 for &(ref htlc, ref their_sig, ref our_sig) in local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1218 let mut htlc_timeout_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&local_tx.txid, local_tx.feerate_per_kw, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), htlc, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key, &local_tx.revocation_key);
1220 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
1222 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(their_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
1223 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1224 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
1225 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1227 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new());
1228 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &local_tx.a_htlc_key, &local_tx.b_htlc_key, &local_tx.revocation_key).into_bytes());
1230 if let Some(ref per_commitment_point) = *per_commitment_point {
1231 if let Some(ref delayed_payment_base_key) = *delayed_payment_base_key {
1232 if let Ok(local_delayedkey) = chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base_key) {
1233 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutput {
1234 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: htlc_timeout_tx.txid(), vout: 0 },
1236 witness_script: chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&local_tx.revocation_key, self.our_to_self_delay, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key),
1237 to_self_delay: self.our_to_self_delay
1242 res.push(htlc_timeout_tx);
1244 if let Some(payment_preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
1245 let mut htlc_success_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&local_tx.txid, local_tx.feerate_per_kw, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), htlc, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key, &local_tx.revocation_key);
1247 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
1249 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(their_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
1250 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1251 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
1252 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1254 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(payment_preimage.to_vec());
1255 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &local_tx.a_htlc_key, &local_tx.b_htlc_key, &local_tx.revocation_key).into_bytes());
1257 if let Some(ref per_commitment_point) = *per_commitment_point {
1258 if let Some(ref delayed_payment_base_key) = *delayed_payment_base_key {
1259 if let Ok(local_delayedkey) = chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base_key) {
1260 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutput {
1261 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: htlc_success_tx.txid(), vout: 0 },
1263 witness_script: chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&local_tx.revocation_key, self.our_to_self_delay, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key),
1264 to_self_delay: self.our_to_self_delay
1269 res.push(htlc_success_tx);
1274 (res, spendable_outputs)
1277 /// Attempts to claim any claimable HTLCs in a commitment transaction which was not (yet)
1278 /// revoked using data in local_claimable_outpoints.
1279 /// Should not be used if check_spend_revoked_transaction succeeds.
1280 fn check_spend_local_transaction(&self, tx: &Transaction, _height: u32) -> (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>) {
1281 let commitment_txid = tx.txid();
1282 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1283 if local_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
1284 match self.key_storage {
1285 KeyStorage::PrivMode { revocation_base_key: _, htlc_base_key: _, ref delayed_payment_base_key, prev_latest_per_commitment_point: _, ref latest_per_commitment_point } => {
1286 return self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, latest_per_commitment_point, &Some(*delayed_payment_base_key));
1288 KeyStorage::SigsMode { .. } => {
1289 return self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, &None, &None);
1294 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1295 if local_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
1296 match self.key_storage {
1297 KeyStorage::PrivMode { revocation_base_key: _, htlc_base_key: _, ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref prev_latest_per_commitment_point, .. } => {
1298 return self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, prev_latest_per_commitment_point, &Some(*delayed_payment_base_key));
1300 KeyStorage::SigsMode { .. } => {
1301 return self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, &None, &None);
1306 (Vec::new(), Vec::new())
1309 fn block_connected(&mut self, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], height: u32, block_hash: &Sha256dHash, broadcaster: &BroadcasterInterface)-> (Vec<(Sha256dHash, Vec<TxOut>)>, Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>) {
1310 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
1311 let mut spendable_outputs = Vec::new();
1312 for tx in txn_matched {
1313 if tx.input.len() == 1 {
1314 // Assuming our keys were not leaked (in which case we're screwed no matter what),
1315 // commitment transactions and HTLC transactions will all only ever have one input,
1316 // which is an easy way to filter out any potential non-matching txn for lazy
1318 let prevout = &tx.input[0].previous_output;
1319 let mut txn: Vec<Transaction> = Vec::new();
1320 if self.funding_txo.is_none() || (prevout.txid == self.funding_txo.as_ref().unwrap().0.txid && prevout.vout == self.funding_txo.as_ref().unwrap().0.index as u32) {
1321 let (remote_txn, new_outputs, mut spendable_output) = self.check_spend_remote_transaction(tx, height);
1323 spendable_outputs.append(&mut spendable_output);
1324 if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() {
1325 watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
1328 let (remote_txn, mut outputs) = self.check_spend_local_transaction(tx, height);
1329 spendable_outputs.append(&mut outputs);
1333 let remote_commitment_txn_on_chain = self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.lock().unwrap();
1334 if let Some(commitment_number) = remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.get(&prevout.txid) {
1335 let (tx, spendable_output) = self.check_spend_remote_htlc(tx, *commitment_number);
1336 if let Some(tx) = tx {
1339 if let Some(spendable_output) = spendable_output {
1340 spendable_outputs.push(spendable_output);
1344 for tx in txn.iter() {
1345 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(tx);
1349 if let Some(ref cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1350 if self.would_broadcast_at_height(height) {
1351 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&cur_local_tx.tx);
1352 match self.key_storage {
1353 KeyStorage::PrivMode { revocation_base_key: _, htlc_base_key: _, ref delayed_payment_base_key, prev_latest_per_commitment_point: _, ref latest_per_commitment_point } => {
1354 let (txs, mut outputs) = self.broadcast_by_local_state(&cur_local_tx, latest_per_commitment_point, &Some(*delayed_payment_base_key));
1355 spendable_outputs.append(&mut outputs);
1357 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
1360 KeyStorage::SigsMode { .. } => {
1361 let (txs, mut outputs) = self.broadcast_by_local_state(&cur_local_tx, &None, &None);
1362 spendable_outputs.append(&mut outputs);
1364 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
1370 self.last_block_hash = block_hash.clone();
1371 (watch_outputs, spendable_outputs)
1374 pub(super) fn would_broadcast_at_height(&self, height: u32) -> bool {
1375 if let Some(ref cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1376 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in cur_local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1377 // For inbound HTLCs which we know the preimage for, we have to ensure we hit the
1378 // chain with enough room to claim the HTLC without our counterparty being able to
1379 // time out the HTLC first.
1380 // For outbound HTLCs which our counterparty hasn't failed/claimed, our primary
1381 // concern is being able to claim the corresponding inbound HTLC (on another
1382 // channel) before it expires. In fact, we don't even really care if our
1383 // counterparty here claims such an outbound HTLC after it expired as long as we
1384 // can still claim the corresponding HTLC. Thus, to avoid needlessly hitting the
1385 // chain when our counterparty is waiting for expiration to off-chain fail an HTLC
1386 // we give ourselves a few blocks of headroom after expiration before going
1387 // on-chain for an expired HTLC.
1388 // Note that, to avoid a potential attack whereby a node delays claiming an HTLC
1389 // from us until we've reached the point where we go on-chain with the
1390 // corresponding inbound HTLC, we must ensure that outbound HTLCs go on chain at
1391 // least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER blocks prior to the inbound HTLC.
1392 // aka outbound_cltv + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS == height - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
1393 // inbound_cltv == height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
1394 // outbound_cltv + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFER <= inbound_cltv - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
1395 // HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS + 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFER <= inbound_cltv - outbound_cltv
1396 // HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS + 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFER <= CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA
1397 if ( htlc.offered && htlc.cltv_expiry + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS <= height) ||
1398 (!htlc.offered && htlc.cltv_expiry <= height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER && self.payment_preimages.contains_key(&htlc.payment_hash)) {
1407 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
1409 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> ReadableArgs<R, Arc<Logger>> for (Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor) {
1410 fn read(reader: &mut R, logger: Arc<Logger>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1411 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1412 macro_rules! unwrap_obj {
1416 Err(_) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
1421 let _ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1422 let min_ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1423 if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION {
1424 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion);
1427 // Technically this can fail and serialize fail a round-trip, but only for serialization of
1428 // barely-init'd ChannelMonitors that we can't do anything with.
1429 let outpoint = OutPoint {
1430 txid: Readable::read(reader)?,
1431 index: Readable::read(reader)?,
1433 let funding_txo = Some((outpoint, Readable::read(reader)?));
1434 let commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor = <U48 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.0;
1436 let key_storage = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
1438 let revocation_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
1439 let htlc_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
1440 let delayed_payment_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
1441 let prev_latest_per_commitment_point = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
1443 1 => Some(Readable::read(reader)?),
1444 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
1446 let latest_per_commitment_point = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
1448 1 => Some(Readable::read(reader)?),
1449 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
1451 KeyStorage::PrivMode {
1452 revocation_base_key,
1454 delayed_payment_base_key,
1455 prev_latest_per_commitment_point,
1456 latest_per_commitment_point,
1459 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
1462 let their_htlc_base_key = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
1463 let their_delayed_payment_base_key = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
1465 let their_cur_revocation_points = {
1466 let first_idx = <U48 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.0;
1470 let first_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
1471 let second_point_slice: [u8; 33] = Readable::read(reader)?;
1472 if second_point_slice[0..32] == [0; 32] && second_point_slice[32] == 0 {
1473 Some((first_idx, first_point, None))
1475 Some((first_idx, first_point, Some(unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &second_point_slice)))))
1480 let our_to_self_delay: u16 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1481 let their_to_self_delay: Option<u16> = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
1483 let mut old_secrets = [([0; 32], 1 << 48); 49];
1484 for &mut (ref mut secret, ref mut idx) in old_secrets.iter_mut() {
1485 *secret = Readable::read(reader)?;
1486 *idx = Readable::read(reader)?;
1489 macro_rules! read_htlc_in_commitment {
1492 let offered: bool = Readable::read(reader)?;
1493 let amount_msat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1494 let cltv_expiry: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1495 let payment_hash: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(reader)?;
1496 let transaction_output_index: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1498 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1499 offered, amount_msat, cltv_expiry, payment_hash, transaction_output_index
1505 let remote_claimable_outpoints_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1506 let mut remote_claimable_outpoints = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(remote_claimable_outpoints_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 64));
1507 for _ in 0..remote_claimable_outpoints_len {
1508 let txid: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
1509 let outputs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1510 let mut outputs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
1511 for _ in 0..outputs_count {
1512 outputs.push(read_htlc_in_commitment!());
1514 if let Some(_) = remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, outputs) {
1515 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
1519 let remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1520 let mut remote_commitment_txn_on_chain = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
1521 for _ in 0..remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len {
1522 let txid: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
1523 let commitment_number = <U48 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.0;
1524 if let Some(_) = remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(txid, commitment_number) {
1525 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
1529 let remote_hash_commitment_number_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1530 let mut remote_hash_commitment_number = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(remote_hash_commitment_number_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
1531 for _ in 0..remote_hash_commitment_number_len {
1532 let txid: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(reader)?;
1533 let commitment_number = <U48 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.0;
1534 if let Some(_) = remote_hash_commitment_number.insert(txid, commitment_number) {
1535 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
1539 macro_rules! read_local_tx {
1542 let tx = match Transaction::consensus_decode(&mut serialize::RawDecoder::new(reader.by_ref())) {
1545 serialize::Error::Io(ioe) => return Err(DecodeError::Io(ioe)),
1546 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
1550 if tx.input.is_empty() {
1551 // Ensure tx didn't hit the 0-input ambiguity case.
1552 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
1555 let revocation_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
1556 let a_htlc_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
1557 let b_htlc_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
1558 let delayed_payment_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
1559 let feerate_per_kw: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1561 let htlc_outputs_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1562 let mut htlc_outputs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlc_outputs_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
1563 for _ in 0..htlc_outputs_len {
1564 htlc_outputs.push((read_htlc_in_commitment!(), Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
1569 tx, revocation_key, a_htlc_key, b_htlc_key, delayed_payment_key, feerate_per_kw, htlc_outputs
1575 let prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
1578 Some(read_local_tx!())
1580 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
1583 let current_local_signed_commitment_tx = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
1586 Some(read_local_tx!())
1588 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
1591 let payment_preimages_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1592 let mut payment_preimages = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(payment_preimages_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
1593 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
1594 for _ in 0..payment_preimages_len {
1595 let preimage: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(reader)?;
1597 sha.input(&preimage);
1598 let mut hash = [0; 32];
1599 sha.result(&mut hash);
1600 if let Some(_) = payment_preimages.insert(hash, preimage) {
1601 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
1605 let last_block_hash: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
1606 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
1608 Ok((last_block_hash.clone(), ChannelMonitor {
1610 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor,
1613 their_htlc_base_key,
1614 their_delayed_payment_base_key,
1615 their_cur_revocation_points,
1618 their_to_self_delay,
1621 remote_claimable_outpoints,
1622 remote_commitment_txn_on_chain: Mutex::new(remote_commitment_txn_on_chain),
1623 remote_hash_commitment_number,
1625 prev_local_signed_commitment_tx,
1626 current_local_signed_commitment_tx,
1641 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Script;
1642 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
1643 use crypto::digest::Digest;
1645 use ln::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor;
1646 use ln::chan_utils::{HTLCOutputInCommitment, TxCreationKeys};
1647 use util::sha2::Sha256;
1648 use util::test_utils::TestLogger;
1649 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
1650 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1, Signature};
1651 use rand::{thread_rng,Rng};
1655 fn test_per_commitment_storage() {
1656 // Test vectors from BOLT 3:
1657 let mut secrets: Vec<[u8; 32]> = Vec::new();
1658 let mut monitor: ChannelMonitor;
1659 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1660 let logger = Arc::new(TestLogger::new());
1662 macro_rules! test_secrets {
1664 let mut idx = 281474976710655;
1665 for secret in secrets.iter() {
1666 assert_eq!(monitor.get_secret(idx).unwrap(), *secret);
1669 assert_eq!(monitor.get_min_seen_secret(), idx + 1);
1670 assert!(monitor.get_secret(idx).is_err());
1675 // insert_secret correct sequence
1676 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
1679 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1680 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1681 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1684 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1685 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1686 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1689 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1690 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1691 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1694 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1695 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1696 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1699 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1700 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
1701 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1704 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1705 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
1706 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1709 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1710 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
1711 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1714 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1715 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
1716 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1721 // insert_secret #1 incorrect
1722 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
1725 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1726 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
1727 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1730 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1731 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1732 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err,
1733 "Previous secret did not match new one");
1737 // insert_secret #2 incorrect (#1 derived from incorrect)
1738 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
1741 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1742 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
1743 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1746 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1747 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("dddc3a8d14fddf2b68fa8c7fbad2748274937479dd0f8930d5ebb4ab6bd866a3").unwrap());
1748 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1751 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1752 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1753 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1756 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1757 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1758 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err,
1759 "Previous secret did not match new one");
1763 // insert_secret #3 incorrect
1764 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
1767 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1768 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1769 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1772 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1773 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1774 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1777 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1778 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c51a18b13e8527e579ec56365482c62f180b7d5760b46e9477dae59e87ed423a").unwrap());
1779 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1782 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1783 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1784 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err,
1785 "Previous secret did not match new one");
1789 // insert_secret #4 incorrect (1,2,3 derived from incorrect)
1790 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
1793 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1794 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
1795 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1798 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1799 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("dddc3a8d14fddf2b68fa8c7fbad2748274937479dd0f8930d5ebb4ab6bd866a3").unwrap());
1800 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1803 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1804 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c51a18b13e8527e579ec56365482c62f180b7d5760b46e9477dae59e87ed423a").unwrap());
1805 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1808 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1809 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("ba65d7b0ef55a3ba300d4e87af29868f394f8f138d78a7011669c79b37b936f4").unwrap());
1810 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1813 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1814 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
1815 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1818 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1819 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
1820 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1823 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1824 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
1825 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1828 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1829 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
1830 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err,
1831 "Previous secret did not match new one");
1835 // insert_secret #5 incorrect
1836 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
1839 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1840 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1841 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1844 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1845 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1846 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1849 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1850 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1851 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1854 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1855 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1856 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1859 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1860 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("631373ad5f9ef654bb3dade742d09504c567edd24320d2fcd68e3cc47e2ff6a6").unwrap());
1861 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1864 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1865 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
1866 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err,
1867 "Previous secret did not match new one");
1871 // insert_secret #6 incorrect (5 derived from incorrect)
1872 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
1875 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1876 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1877 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1880 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1881 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1882 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1885 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1886 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1887 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1890 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1891 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1892 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1895 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1896 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("631373ad5f9ef654bb3dade742d09504c567edd24320d2fcd68e3cc47e2ff6a6").unwrap());
1897 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1900 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1901 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("b7e76a83668bde38b373970155c868a653304308f9896692f904a23731224bb1").unwrap());
1902 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1905 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1906 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
1907 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1910 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1911 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
1912 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err,
1913 "Previous secret did not match new one");
1917 // insert_secret #7 incorrect
1918 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
1921 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1922 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1923 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1926 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1927 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1928 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1931 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1932 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1933 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1936 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1937 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1938 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1941 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1942 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
1943 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1946 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1947 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
1948 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1951 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1952 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("e7971de736e01da8ed58b94c2fc216cb1dca9e326f3a96e7194fe8ea8af6c0a3").unwrap());
1953 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1956 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1957 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
1958 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err,
1959 "Previous secret did not match new one");
1963 // insert_secret #8 incorrect
1964 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
1967 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1968 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1969 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1972 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1973 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1974 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1977 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1978 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1979 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1982 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1983 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1984 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1987 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1988 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
1989 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1992 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1993 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
1994 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1997 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1998 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
1999 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
2002 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2003 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a7efbc61aac46d34f77778bac22c8a20c6a46ca460addc49009bda875ec88fa4").unwrap());
2004 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err,
2005 "Previous secret did not match new one");
2010 fn test_prune_preimages() {
2011 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2012 let logger = Arc::new(TestLogger::new());
2013 let dummy_sig = Signature::from_der(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("3045022100fa86fa9a36a8cd6a7bb8f06a541787d51371d067951a9461d5404de6b928782e02201c8b7c334c10aed8976a3a465be9a28abff4cb23acbf00022295b378ce1fa3cd").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
2015 macro_rules! dummy_keys {
2018 let dummy_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap());
2020 per_commitment_point: dummy_key.clone(),
2021 revocation_key: dummy_key.clone(),
2022 a_htlc_key: dummy_key.clone(),
2023 b_htlc_key: dummy_key.clone(),
2024 a_delayed_payment_key: dummy_key.clone(),
2025 b_payment_key: dummy_key.clone(),
2030 let dummy_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
2032 let mut preimages = Vec::new();
2034 let mut rng = thread_rng();
2036 let mut preimage = [0; 32];
2037 rng.fill_bytes(&mut preimage);
2038 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
2039 sha.input(&preimage);
2040 let mut hash = [0; 32];
2041 sha.result(&mut hash);
2042 preimages.push((preimage, hash));
2046 macro_rules! preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs {
2047 ($preimages_slice: expr) => {
2049 let mut res = Vec::new();
2050 for (idx, preimage) in $preimages_slice.iter().enumerate() {
2051 res.push(HTLCOutputInCommitment {
2055 payment_hash: preimage.1.clone(),
2056 transaction_output_index: idx as u32,
2063 macro_rules! preimages_to_local_htlcs {
2064 ($preimages_slice: expr) => {
2066 let mut inp = preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!($preimages_slice);
2067 let res: Vec<_> = inp.drain(..).map(|e| { (e, dummy_sig.clone(), dummy_sig.clone()) }).collect();
2073 macro_rules! test_preimages_exist {
2074 ($preimages_slice: expr, $monitor: expr) => {
2075 for preimage in $preimages_slice {
2076 assert!($monitor.payment_preimages.contains_key(&preimage.1));
2081 // Prune with one old state and a local commitment tx holding a few overlaps with the
2083 let mut monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
2084 monitor.set_their_to_self_delay(10);
2086 monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(dummy_tx.clone(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..10]));
2087 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[5..15]), 281474976710655);
2088 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[15..20]), 281474976710654);
2089 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[17..20]), 281474976710653);
2090 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[18..20]), 281474976710652);
2091 for &(ref preimage, ref hash) in preimages.iter() {
2092 monitor.provide_payment_preimage(hash, preimage);
2095 // Now provide a secret, pruning preimages 10-15
2096 let mut secret = [0; 32];
2097 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
2098 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secret.clone(), None).unwrap();
2099 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 15);
2100 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
2101 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[15..20], monitor);
2103 // Now provide a further secret, pruning preimages 15-17
2104 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
2105 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secret.clone(), None).unwrap();
2106 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 13);
2107 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
2108 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[17..20], monitor);
2110 // Now update local commitment tx info, pruning only element 18 as we still care about the
2111 // previous commitment tx's preimages too
2112 monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(dummy_tx.clone(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..5]));
2113 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
2114 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secret.clone(), None).unwrap();
2115 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 12);
2116 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
2117 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[18..20], monitor);
2119 // But if we do it again, we'll prune 5-10
2120 monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(dummy_tx.clone(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..3]));
2121 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
2122 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secret.clone(), None).unwrap();
2123 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 5);
2124 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..5], monitor);
2127 // Further testing is done in the ChannelManager integration tests.