1 //! The logic to monitor for on-chain transactions and create the relevant claim responses lives
4 //! ChannelMonitor objects are generated by ChannelManager in response to relevant
5 //! messages/actions, and MUST be persisted to disk (and, preferably, remotely) before progress can
6 //! be made in responding to certain messages, see ManyChannelMonitor for more.
8 //! Note that ChannelMonitors are an important part of the lightning trust model and a copy of the
9 //! latest ChannelMonitor must always be actively monitoring for chain updates (and no out-of-date
10 //! ChannelMonitors should do so). Thus, if you're building rust-lightning into an HSM or other
11 //! security-domain-separated system design, you should consider having multiple paths for
12 //! ChannelMonitors to get out of the HSM and onto monitoring devices.
14 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
15 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxIn,TxOut,SigHashType,Transaction};
16 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
17 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
18 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
19 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::{self, Decodable, Encodable};
20 use bitcoin::util::hash::{Hash160, BitcoinHash,Sha256dHash};
21 use bitcoin::util::bip143;
23 use crypto::digest::Digest;
25 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Message,Signature};
26 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
29 use ln::msgs::DecodeError;
31 use ln::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment;
32 use ln::channelmanager::HTLCSource;
33 use chain::chaininterface::{ChainListener, ChainWatchInterface, BroadcasterInterface};
34 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
35 use chain::keysinterface::SpendableOutputDescriptor;
36 use util::logger::Logger;
37 use util::ser::{ReadableArgs, Readable, Writer, Writeable, WriterWriteAdaptor, U48};
38 use util::sha2::Sha256;
39 use util::{byte_utils, events};
41 use std::collections::{HashMap, hash_map};
42 use std::sync::{Arc,Mutex};
43 use std::{hash,cmp, mem};
45 /// An error enum representing a failure to persist a channel monitor update.
47 pub enum ChannelMonitorUpdateErr {
48 /// Used to indicate a temporary failure (eg connection to a watchtower failed, but is expected
49 /// to succeed at some point in the future).
51 /// Such a failure will "freeze" a channel, preventing us from revoking old states or
52 /// submitting new commitment transactions to the remote party.
53 /// ChannelManager::test_restore_channel_monitor can be used to retry the update(s) and restore
54 /// the channel to an operational state.
56 /// Note that continuing to operate when no copy of the updated ChannelMonitor could be
57 /// persisted is unsafe - if you failed to store the update on your own local disk you should
58 /// instead return PermanentFailure to force closure of the channel ASAP.
60 /// Even when a channel has been "frozen" updates to the ChannelMonitor can continue to occur
61 /// (eg if an inbound HTLC which we forwarded was claimed upstream resulting in us attempting
62 /// to claim it on this channel) and those updates must be applied wherever they can be. At
63 /// least one such updated ChannelMonitor must be persisted otherwise PermanentFailure should
64 /// be returned to get things on-chain ASAP using only the in-memory copy. Obviously updates to
65 /// the channel which would invalidate previous ChannelMonitors are not made when a channel has
68 /// Note that even if updates made after TemporaryFailure succeed you must still call
69 /// test_restore_channel_monitor to ensure you have the latest monitor and re-enable normal
70 /// channel operation.
72 /// Used to indicate no further channel monitor updates will be allowed (eg we've moved on to a
73 /// different watchtower and cannot update with all watchtowers that were previously informed
74 /// of this channel). This will force-close the channel in question.
76 /// Should also be used to indicate a failure to update the local copy of the channel monitor.
80 /// General Err type for ChannelMonitor actions. Generally, this implies that the data provided is
81 /// inconsistent with the ChannelMonitor being called. eg for ChannelMonitor::insert_combine this
82 /// means you tried to merge two monitors for different channels or for a channel which was
83 /// restored from a backup and then generated new commitment updates.
84 /// Contains a human-readable error message.
86 pub struct MonitorUpdateError(pub &'static str);
88 /// Simple structure send back by ManyChannelMonitor in case of HTLC detected onchain from a
89 /// forward channel and from which info are needed to update HTLC in a backward channel.
90 pub struct HTLCUpdate {
91 pub(super) payment_hash: [u8; 32],
92 pub(super) payment_preimage: Option<[u8; 32]>,
93 pub(super) source: HTLCSource
96 /// Simple trait indicating ability to track a set of ChannelMonitors and multiplex events between
97 /// them. Generally should be implemented by keeping a local SimpleManyChannelMonitor and passing
98 /// events to it, while also taking any add_update_monitor events and passing them to some remote
101 /// Note that any updates to a channel's monitor *must* be applied to each instance of the
102 /// channel's monitor everywhere (including remote watchtowers) *before* this function returns. If
103 /// an update occurs and a remote watchtower is left with old state, it may broadcast transactions
104 /// which we have revoked, allowing our counterparty to claim all funds in the channel!
105 pub trait ManyChannelMonitor: Send + Sync {
106 /// Adds or updates a monitor for the given `funding_txo`.
108 /// Implementor must also ensure that the funding_txo outpoint is registered with any relevant
109 /// ChainWatchInterfaces such that the provided monitor receives block_connected callbacks with
110 /// any spends of it.
111 fn add_update_monitor(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr>;
113 /// Used by ChannelManager to get list of HTLC resolved onchain and which needed to be updated
114 /// with success or failure backward
115 fn fetch_pending_htlc_updated(&self) -> Vec<HTLCUpdate>;
118 /// A simple implementation of a ManyChannelMonitor and ChainListener. Can be used to create a
119 /// watchtower or watch our own channels.
121 /// Note that you must provide your own key by which to refer to channels.
123 /// If you're accepting remote monitors (ie are implementing a watchtower), you must verify that
124 /// users cannot overwrite a given channel by providing a duplicate key. ie you should probably
125 /// index by a PublicKey which is required to sign any updates.
127 /// If you're using this for local monitoring of your own channels, you probably want to use
128 /// `OutPoint` as the key, which will give you a ManyChannelMonitor implementation.
129 pub struct SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
130 #[cfg(test)] // Used in ChannelManager tests to manipulate channels directly
131 pub monitors: Mutex<HashMap<Key, ChannelMonitor>>,
133 monitors: Mutex<HashMap<Key, ChannelMonitor>>,
134 chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>,
135 broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>,
136 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
137 pending_htlc_updated: Mutex<HashMap<[u8; 32], Vec<(HTLCSource, Option<[u8; 32]>)>>>,
141 impl<Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash> ChainListener for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
142 fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], _indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) {
143 let block_hash = header.bitcoin_hash();
144 let mut new_events: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(0);
145 let mut htlc_updated_infos = Vec::new();
147 let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
148 for monitor in monitors.values_mut() {
149 let (txn_outputs, spendable_outputs, mut htlc_updated) = monitor.block_connected(txn_matched, height, &block_hash, &*self.broadcaster);
150 if spendable_outputs.len() > 0 {
151 new_events.push(events::Event::SpendableOutputs {
152 outputs: spendable_outputs,
156 for (ref txid, ref outputs) in txn_outputs {
157 for (idx, output) in outputs.iter().enumerate() {
158 self.chain_monitor.install_watch_outpoint((txid.clone(), idx as u32), &output.script_pubkey);
161 htlc_updated_infos.append(&mut htlc_updated);
165 // ChannelManager will just need to fetch pending_htlc_updated and pass state backward
166 let mut pending_htlc_updated = self.pending_htlc_updated.lock().unwrap();
167 for htlc in htlc_updated_infos.drain(..) {
168 match pending_htlc_updated.entry(htlc.2) {
169 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut e) => {
170 // In case of reorg we may have htlc outputs solved in a different way so
171 // we prefer to keep claims but don't store duplicate updates for a given
172 // (payment_hash, HTLCSource) pair.
173 // TODO: Note that we currently don't really use this as ChannelManager
174 // will fail/claim backwards after the first block. We really should delay
175 // a few blocks before failing backwards (but can claim backwards
176 // immediately) as long as we have a few blocks of headroom.
177 let mut existing_claim = false;
178 e.get_mut().retain(|htlc_data| {
179 if htlc.0 == htlc_data.0 {
180 if htlc_data.1.is_some() {
181 existing_claim = true;
187 e.get_mut().push((htlc.0, htlc.1));
190 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
191 e.insert(vec![(htlc.0, htlc.1)]);
196 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
197 pending_events.append(&mut new_events);
200 fn block_disconnected(&self, _: &BlockHeader) { }
203 impl<Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash + 'static> SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
204 /// Creates a new object which can be used to monitor several channels given the chain
205 /// interface with which to register to receive notifications.
206 pub fn new(chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>, broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>, logger: Arc<Logger>) -> Arc<SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key>> {
207 let res = Arc::new(SimpleManyChannelMonitor {
208 monitors: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
211 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
212 pending_htlc_updated: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
215 let weak_res = Arc::downgrade(&res);
216 res.chain_monitor.register_listener(weak_res);
220 /// Adds or udpates the monitor which monitors the channel referred to by the given key.
221 pub fn add_update_monitor_by_key(&self, key: Key, monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
222 let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
223 match monitors.get_mut(&key) {
224 Some(orig_monitor) => {
225 log_trace!(self, "Updating Channel Monitor for channel {}", log_funding_info!(monitor.key_storage));
226 return orig_monitor.insert_combine(monitor);
230 match monitor.key_storage {
231 Storage::Local { ref funding_info, .. } => {
234 return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Try to update a useless monitor without funding_txo !"));
236 &Some((ref outpoint, ref script)) => {
237 log_trace!(self, "Got new Channel Monitor for channel {}", log_bytes!(outpoint.to_channel_id()[..]));
238 self.chain_monitor.install_watch_tx(&outpoint.txid, script);
239 self.chain_monitor.install_watch_outpoint((outpoint.txid, outpoint.index as u32), script);
243 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
244 self.chain_monitor.watch_all_txn();
247 monitors.insert(key, monitor);
252 impl ManyChannelMonitor for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<OutPoint> {
253 fn add_update_monitor(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr> {
254 match self.add_update_monitor_by_key(funding_txo, monitor) {
256 Err(_) => Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure),
260 fn fetch_pending_htlc_updated(&self) -> Vec<HTLCUpdate> {
261 let mut updated = self.pending_htlc_updated.lock().unwrap();
262 let mut pending_htlcs_updated = Vec::with_capacity(updated.len());
263 for (k, v) in updated.drain() {
265 pending_htlcs_updated.push(HTLCUpdate {
267 payment_preimage: htlc_data.1,
272 pending_htlcs_updated
276 impl<Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash> events::EventsProvider for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
277 fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
278 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
279 let mut ret = Vec::new();
280 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut *pending_events);
285 /// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, don't try to claim it in a shared transaction,
286 /// instead claiming it in its own individual transaction.
287 const CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 12;
288 /// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, force-close the channel to broadcast the
289 /// HTLC-Success transaction.
290 /// In other words, this is an upper bound on how many blocks we think it can take us to get a
291 /// transaction confirmed (and we use it in a few more, equivalent, places).
292 pub(crate) const CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 6;
293 /// Number of blocks by which point we expect our counterparty to have seen new blocks on the
294 /// network and done a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance (+ we've updated all our
295 /// copies of ChannelMonitors, including watchtowers).
296 pub(crate) const HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS: u32 = 3;
298 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
301 revocation_base_key: SecretKey,
302 htlc_base_key: SecretKey,
303 delayed_payment_base_key: SecretKey,
304 payment_base_key: SecretKey,
305 shutdown_pubkey: PublicKey,
306 prev_latest_per_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
307 latest_per_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
308 funding_info: Option<(OutPoint, Script)>,
311 revocation_base_key: PublicKey,
312 htlc_base_key: PublicKey,
316 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
317 struct LocalSignedTx {
318 /// txid of the transaction in tx, just used to make comparison faster
321 revocation_key: PublicKey,
322 a_htlc_key: PublicKey,
323 b_htlc_key: PublicKey,
324 delayed_payment_key: PublicKey,
326 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Signature, Signature)>,
327 htlc_sources: Vec<([u8; 32], HTLCSource, Option<u32>)>,
330 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
331 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
333 /// A ChannelMonitor handles chain events (blocks connected and disconnected) and generates
334 /// on-chain transactions to ensure no loss of funds occurs.
336 /// You MUST ensure that no ChannelMonitors for a given channel anywhere contain out-of-date
337 /// information and are actively monitoring the chain.
339 pub struct ChannelMonitor {
340 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64,
342 key_storage: Storage,
343 their_htlc_base_key: Option<PublicKey>,
344 their_delayed_payment_base_key: Option<PublicKey>,
345 // first is the idx of the first of the two revocation points
346 their_cur_revocation_points: Option<(u64, PublicKey, Option<PublicKey>)>,
348 our_to_self_delay: u16,
349 their_to_self_delay: Option<u16>,
351 old_secrets: [([u8; 32], u64); 49],
352 remote_claimable_outpoints: HashMap<Sha256dHash, (Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>, Vec<([u8; 32], HTLCSource, Option<u32>)>)>,
353 /// We cannot identify HTLC-Success or HTLC-Timeout transactions by themselves on the chain.
354 /// Nor can we figure out their commitment numbers without the commitment transaction they are
355 /// spending. Thus, in order to claim them via revocation key, we track all the remote
356 /// commitment transactions which we find on-chain, mapping them to the commitment number which
357 /// can be used to derive the revocation key and claim the transactions.
358 remote_commitment_txn_on_chain: HashMap<Sha256dHash, (u64, Vec<Script>)>,
359 /// Cache used to make pruning of payment_preimages faster.
360 /// Maps payment_hash values to commitment numbers for remote transactions for non-revoked
361 /// remote transactions (ie should remain pretty small).
362 /// Serialized to disk but should generally not be sent to Watchtowers.
363 remote_hash_commitment_number: HashMap<[u8; 32], u64>,
365 // We store two local commitment transactions to avoid any race conditions where we may update
366 // some monitors (potentially on watchtowers) but then fail to update others, resulting in the
367 // various monitors for one channel being out of sync, and us broadcasting a local
368 // transaction for which we have deleted claim information on some watchtowers.
369 prev_local_signed_commitment_tx: Option<LocalSignedTx>,
370 current_local_signed_commitment_tx: Option<LocalSignedTx>,
372 // Used just for ChannelManager to make sure it has the latest channel data during
374 current_remote_commitment_number: u64,
376 payment_preimages: HashMap<[u8; 32], [u8; 32]>,
378 destination_script: Script,
380 // We simply modify last_block_hash in Channel's block_connected so that serialization is
381 // consistent but hopefully the users' copy handles block_connected in a consistent way.
382 // (we do *not*, however, update them in insert_combine to ensure any local user copies keep
383 // their last_block_hash from its state and not based on updated copies that didn't run through
384 // the full block_connected).
385 pub(crate) last_block_hash: Sha256dHash,
386 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>, //TODO: dedup this a bit...
390 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
391 /// Used only in testing and fuzztarget to check serialization roundtrips don't change the
392 /// underlying object
393 impl PartialEq for ChannelMonitor {
394 fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
395 if self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor != other.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor ||
396 self.key_storage != other.key_storage ||
397 self.their_htlc_base_key != other.their_htlc_base_key ||
398 self.their_delayed_payment_base_key != other.their_delayed_payment_base_key ||
399 self.their_cur_revocation_points != other.their_cur_revocation_points ||
400 self.our_to_self_delay != other.our_to_self_delay ||
401 self.their_to_self_delay != other.their_to_self_delay ||
402 self.remote_claimable_outpoints != other.remote_claimable_outpoints ||
403 self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain != other.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain ||
404 self.remote_hash_commitment_number != other.remote_hash_commitment_number ||
405 self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx != other.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx ||
406 self.current_remote_commitment_number != other.current_remote_commitment_number ||
407 self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx != other.current_local_signed_commitment_tx ||
408 self.payment_preimages != other.payment_preimages ||
409 self.destination_script != other.destination_script
413 for (&(ref secret, ref idx), &(ref o_secret, ref o_idx)) in self.old_secrets.iter().zip(other.old_secrets.iter()) {
414 if secret != o_secret || idx != o_idx {
423 impl ChannelMonitor {
424 pub(super) fn new(revocation_base_key: &SecretKey, delayed_payment_base_key: &SecretKey, htlc_base_key: &SecretKey, payment_base_key: &SecretKey, shutdown_pubkey: &PublicKey, our_to_self_delay: u16, destination_script: Script, logger: Arc<Logger>) -> ChannelMonitor {
426 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: 0,
428 key_storage: Storage::Local {
429 revocation_base_key: revocation_base_key.clone(),
430 htlc_base_key: htlc_base_key.clone(),
431 delayed_payment_base_key: delayed_payment_base_key.clone(),
432 payment_base_key: payment_base_key.clone(),
433 shutdown_pubkey: shutdown_pubkey.clone(),
434 prev_latest_per_commitment_point: None,
435 latest_per_commitment_point: None,
438 their_htlc_base_key: None,
439 their_delayed_payment_base_key: None,
440 their_cur_revocation_points: None,
442 our_to_self_delay: our_to_self_delay,
443 their_to_self_delay: None,
445 old_secrets: [([0; 32], 1 << 48); 49],
446 remote_claimable_outpoints: HashMap::new(),
447 remote_commitment_txn_on_chain: HashMap::new(),
448 remote_hash_commitment_number: HashMap::new(),
450 prev_local_signed_commitment_tx: None,
451 current_local_signed_commitment_tx: None,
452 current_remote_commitment_number: 1 << 48,
454 payment_preimages: HashMap::new(),
455 destination_script: destination_script,
457 last_block_hash: Default::default(),
458 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
464 fn place_secret(idx: u64) -> u8 {
466 if idx & (1 << i) == (1 << i) {
474 fn derive_secret(secret: [u8; 32], bits: u8, idx: u64) -> [u8; 32] {
475 let mut res: [u8; 32] = secret;
477 let bitpos = bits - 1 - i;
478 if idx & (1 << bitpos) == (1 << bitpos) {
479 res[(bitpos / 8) as usize] ^= 1 << (bitpos & 7);
480 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
482 sha.result(&mut res);
488 /// Inserts a revocation secret into this channel monitor. Prunes old preimages if neither
489 /// needed by local commitment transactions HTCLs nor by remote ones. Unless we haven't already seen remote
490 /// commitment transaction's secret, they are de facto pruned (we can use revocation key).
491 pub(super) fn provide_secret(&mut self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
492 let pos = ChannelMonitor::place_secret(idx);
494 let (old_secret, old_idx) = self.old_secrets[i as usize];
495 if ChannelMonitor::derive_secret(secret, pos, old_idx) != old_secret {
496 return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Previous secret did not match new one"));
499 self.old_secrets[pos as usize] = (secret, idx);
501 if !self.payment_preimages.is_empty() {
502 let local_signed_commitment_tx = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx.as_ref().expect("Channel needs at least an initial commitment tx !");
503 let prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.as_ref();
504 let min_idx = self.get_min_seen_secret();
505 let remote_hash_commitment_number = &mut self.remote_hash_commitment_number;
507 self.payment_preimages.retain(|&k, _| {
508 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in &local_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs {
509 if k == htlc.payment_hash {
513 if let Some(prev_local_commitment_tx) = prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
514 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in prev_local_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
515 if k == htlc.payment_hash {
520 let contains = if let Some(cn) = remote_hash_commitment_number.get(&k) {
527 remote_hash_commitment_number.remove(&k);
536 /// Informs this monitor of the latest remote (ie non-broadcastable) commitment transaction.
537 /// The monitor watches for it to be broadcasted and then uses the HTLC information (and
538 /// possibly future revocation/preimage information) to claim outputs where possible.
539 /// We cache also the mapping hash:commitment number to lighten pruning of old preimages by watchtowers.
540 pub(super) fn provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, unsigned_commitment_tx: &Transaction, htlc_outputs: Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>, htlc_sources: Vec<([u8; 32], HTLCSource, Option<u32>)>, commitment_number: u64, their_revocation_point: PublicKey) {
541 // TODO: Encrypt the htlc_outputs data with the single-hash of the commitment transaction
542 // so that a remote monitor doesn't learn anything unless there is a malicious close.
543 // (only maybe, sadly we cant do the same for local info, as we need to be aware of
545 for ref htlc in &htlc_outputs {
546 self.remote_hash_commitment_number.insert(htlc.payment_hash, commitment_number);
548 // We prune old claimable outpoints, useless to pass backward state when remote commitment
549 // tx get revoked, optimize for storage
550 for (_, htlc_data) in self.remote_claimable_outpoints.iter_mut() {
551 htlc_data.1 = Vec::new();
553 self.remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(unsigned_commitment_tx.txid(), (htlc_outputs, htlc_sources));
554 self.current_remote_commitment_number = commitment_number;
555 //TODO: Merge this into the other per-remote-transaction output storage stuff
556 match self.their_cur_revocation_points {
557 Some(old_points) => {
558 if old_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 {
559 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0, old_points.1, Some(their_revocation_point)));
560 } else if old_points.0 == commitment_number + 2 {
561 if let Some(old_second_point) = old_points.2 {
562 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0 - 1, old_second_point, Some(their_revocation_point)));
564 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None));
567 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None));
571 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None));
576 /// Informs this monitor of the latest local (ie broadcastable) commitment transaction. The
577 /// monitor watches for timeouts and may broadcast it if we approach such a timeout. Thus, it
578 /// is important that any clones of this channel monitor (including remote clones) by kept
579 /// up-to-date as our local commitment transaction is updated.
580 /// Panics if set_their_to_self_delay has never been called.
581 /// Also update Storage with latest local per_commitment_point to derive local_delayedkey in
582 /// case of onchain HTLC tx
583 pub(super) fn provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, signed_commitment_tx: Transaction, local_keys: chan_utils::TxCreationKeys, feerate_per_kw: u64, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Signature, Signature)>, htlc_sources: Vec<([u8; 32], HTLCSource, Option<u32>)>) {
584 assert!(self.their_to_self_delay.is_some());
585 self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx.take();
586 self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(LocalSignedTx {
587 txid: signed_commitment_tx.txid(),
588 tx: signed_commitment_tx,
589 revocation_key: local_keys.revocation_key,
590 a_htlc_key: local_keys.a_htlc_key,
591 b_htlc_key: local_keys.b_htlc_key,
592 delayed_payment_key: local_keys.a_delayed_payment_key,
598 if let Storage::Local { ref mut latest_per_commitment_point, .. } = self.key_storage {
599 *latest_per_commitment_point = Some(local_keys.per_commitment_point);
601 panic!("Channel somehow ended up with its internal ChannelMonitor being in Watchtower mode?");
605 /// Provides a payment_hash->payment_preimage mapping. Will be automatically pruned when all
606 /// commitment_tx_infos which contain the payment hash have been revoked.
607 pub(super) fn provide_payment_preimage(&mut self, payment_hash: &[u8; 32], payment_preimage: &[u8; 32]) {
608 self.payment_preimages.insert(payment_hash.clone(), payment_preimage.clone());
611 /// Combines this ChannelMonitor with the information contained in the other ChannelMonitor.
612 /// After a successful call this ChannelMonitor is up-to-date and is safe to use to monitor the
613 /// chain for new blocks/transactions.
614 pub fn insert_combine(&mut self, mut other: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
615 match self.key_storage {
616 Storage::Local { ref funding_info, .. } => {
617 if funding_info.is_none() { return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Try to combine a Local monitor without funding_info")); }
618 let our_funding_info = funding_info;
619 if let Storage::Local { ref funding_info, .. } = other.key_storage {
620 if funding_info.is_none() { return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Try to combine a Local monitor without funding_info")); }
621 // We should be able to compare the entire funding_txo, but in fuzztarget its trivially
622 // easy to collide the funding_txo hash and have a different scriptPubKey.
623 if funding_info.as_ref().unwrap().0 != our_funding_info.as_ref().unwrap().0 {
624 return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Funding transaction outputs are not identical!"));
627 return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Try to combine a Local monitor with a Watchtower one !"));
630 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
631 if let Storage::Watchtower { .. } = other.key_storage {
634 return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Try to combine a Watchtower monitor with a Local one !"));
638 let other_min_secret = other.get_min_seen_secret();
639 let our_min_secret = self.get_min_seen_secret();
640 if our_min_secret > other_min_secret {
641 self.provide_secret(other_min_secret, other.get_secret(other_min_secret).unwrap())?;
643 if let Some(ref local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
644 if let Some(ref other_local_tx) = other.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
645 let our_commitment_number = 0xffffffffffff - ((((local_tx.tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (local_tx.tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor);
646 let other_commitment_number = 0xffffffffffff - ((((other_local_tx.tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (other_local_tx.tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ other.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor);
647 if our_commitment_number >= other_commitment_number {
648 self.key_storage = other.key_storage;
652 // TODO: We should use current_remote_commitment_number and the commitment number out of
653 // local transactions to decide how to merge
654 if our_min_secret >= other_min_secret {
655 self.their_cur_revocation_points = other.their_cur_revocation_points;
656 for (txid, htlcs) in other.remote_claimable_outpoints.drain() {
657 self.remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, htlcs);
659 if let Some(local_tx) = other.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
660 self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(local_tx);
662 if let Some(local_tx) = other.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
663 self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(local_tx);
665 self.payment_preimages = other.payment_preimages;
668 self.current_remote_commitment_number = cmp::min(self.current_remote_commitment_number, other.current_remote_commitment_number);
672 /// Panics if commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor doesn't fit in 48 bits
673 pub(super) fn set_commitment_obscure_factor(&mut self, commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64) {
674 assert!(commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor < (1 << 48));
675 self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor = commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor;
678 /// Allows this monitor to scan only for transactions which are applicable. Note that this is
679 /// optional, without it this monitor cannot be used in an SPV client, but you may wish to
680 /// avoid this (or call unset_funding_info) on a monitor you wish to send to a watchtower as it
681 /// provides slightly better privacy.
682 /// It's the responsibility of the caller to register outpoint and script with passing the former
683 /// value as key to add_update_monitor.
684 pub(super) fn set_funding_info(&mut self, new_funding_info: (OutPoint, Script)) {
685 match self.key_storage {
686 Storage::Local { ref mut funding_info, .. } => {
687 *funding_info = Some(new_funding_info);
689 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
690 panic!("Channel somehow ended up with its internal ChannelMonitor being in Watchtower mode?");
695 /// We log these base keys at channel opening to being able to rebuild redeemscript in case of leaked revoked commit tx
696 pub(super) fn set_their_base_keys(&mut self, their_htlc_base_key: &PublicKey, their_delayed_payment_base_key: &PublicKey) {
697 self.their_htlc_base_key = Some(their_htlc_base_key.clone());
698 self.their_delayed_payment_base_key = Some(their_delayed_payment_base_key.clone());
701 pub(super) fn set_their_to_self_delay(&mut self, their_to_self_delay: u16) {
702 self.their_to_self_delay = Some(their_to_self_delay);
705 pub(super) fn unset_funding_info(&mut self) {
706 match self.key_storage {
707 Storage::Local { ref mut funding_info, .. } => {
708 *funding_info = None;
710 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
711 panic!("Channel somehow ended up with its internal ChannelMonitor being in Watchtower mode?");
716 /// Gets the funding transaction outpoint of the channel this ChannelMonitor is monitoring for.
717 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
718 match self.key_storage {
719 Storage::Local { ref funding_info, .. } => {
721 &Some((outpoint, _)) => Some(outpoint),
725 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
731 /// Gets the sets of all outpoints which this ChannelMonitor expects to hear about spends of.
732 /// Generally useful when deserializing as during normal operation the return values of
733 /// block_connected are sufficient to ensure all relevant outpoints are being monitored (note
734 /// that the get_funding_txo outpoint and transaction must also be monitored for!).
735 pub fn get_monitored_outpoints(&self) -> Vec<(Sha256dHash, u32, &Script)> {
736 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.len() * 2);
737 for (ref txid, &(_, ref outputs)) in self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
738 for (idx, output) in outputs.iter().enumerate() {
739 res.push(((*txid).clone(), idx as u32, output));
745 /// Serializes into a vec, with various modes for the exposed pub fns
746 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W, for_local_storage: bool) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
747 //TODO: We still write out all the serialization here manually instead of using the fancy
748 //serialization framework we have, we should migrate things over to it.
749 writer.write_all(&[SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
750 writer.write_all(&[MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
752 // Set in initial Channel-object creation, so should always be set by now:
753 U48(self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor).write(writer)?;
755 match self.key_storage {
756 Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref payment_base_key, ref shutdown_pubkey, ref prev_latest_per_commitment_point, ref latest_per_commitment_point, ref funding_info } => {
757 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
758 writer.write_all(&revocation_base_key[..])?;
759 writer.write_all(&htlc_base_key[..])?;
760 writer.write_all(&delayed_payment_base_key[..])?;
761 writer.write_all(&payment_base_key[..])?;
762 writer.write_all(&shutdown_pubkey.serialize())?;
763 if let Some(ref prev_latest_per_commitment_point) = *prev_latest_per_commitment_point {
764 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
765 writer.write_all(&prev_latest_per_commitment_point.serialize())?;
767 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
769 if let Some(ref latest_per_commitment_point) = *latest_per_commitment_point {
770 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
771 writer.write_all(&latest_per_commitment_point.serialize())?;
773 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
776 &Some((ref outpoint, ref script)) => {
777 writer.write_all(&outpoint.txid[..])?;
778 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(outpoint.index))?;
779 script.write(writer)?;
782 debug_assert!(false, "Try to serialize a useless Local monitor !");
786 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => unimplemented!(),
789 writer.write_all(&self.their_htlc_base_key.as_ref().unwrap().serialize())?;
790 writer.write_all(&self.their_delayed_payment_base_key.as_ref().unwrap().serialize())?;
792 match self.their_cur_revocation_points {
793 Some((idx, pubkey, second_option)) => {
794 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(idx))?;
795 writer.write_all(&pubkey.serialize())?;
796 match second_option {
797 Some(second_pubkey) => {
798 writer.write_all(&second_pubkey.serialize())?;
801 writer.write_all(&[0; 33])?;
806 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(0))?;
810 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.our_to_self_delay))?;
811 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap()))?;
813 for &(ref secret, ref idx) in self.old_secrets.iter() {
814 writer.write_all(secret)?;
815 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*idx))?;
818 macro_rules! serialize_htlc_in_commitment {
819 ($htlc_output: expr) => {
820 writer.write_all(&[$htlc_output.offered as u8; 1])?;
821 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc_output.amount_msat))?;
822 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array($htlc_output.cltv_expiry))?;
823 writer.write_all(&$htlc_output.payment_hash)?;
824 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array($htlc_output.transaction_output_index))?;
828 macro_rules! serialize_htlc_source {
829 ($htlc_source: expr) => {
830 $htlc_source.0.write(writer)?;
831 $htlc_source.1.write(writer)?;
832 if let &Some(ref txo) = &$htlc_source.2 {
833 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
836 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
842 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_claimable_outpoints.len() as u64))?;
843 for (ref txid, &(ref htlc_infos, ref htlc_sources)) in self.remote_claimable_outpoints.iter() {
844 writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
845 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc_infos.len() as u64))?;
846 for ref htlc_output in htlc_infos.iter() {
847 serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output);
849 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc_sources.len() as u64))?;
850 for ref htlc_source in htlc_sources.iter() {
851 serialize_htlc_source!(htlc_source);
855 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.len() as u64))?;
856 for (ref txid, &(commitment_number, ref txouts)) in self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
857 writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
858 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(commitment_number))?;
859 (txouts.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
860 for script in txouts.iter() {
861 script.write(writer)?;
865 if for_local_storage {
866 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_hash_commitment_number.len() as u64))?;
867 for (ref payment_hash, commitment_number) in self.remote_hash_commitment_number.iter() {
868 writer.write_all(*payment_hash)?;
869 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(*commitment_number))?;
872 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(0))?;
875 macro_rules! serialize_local_tx {
876 ($local_tx: expr) => {
877 if let Err(e) = $local_tx.tx.consensus_encode(&mut WriterWriteAdaptor(writer)) {
879 encode::Error::Io(e) => return Err(e),
880 _ => panic!("local tx must have been well-formed!"),
884 writer.write_all(&$local_tx.revocation_key.serialize())?;
885 writer.write_all(&$local_tx.a_htlc_key.serialize())?;
886 writer.write_all(&$local_tx.b_htlc_key.serialize())?;
887 writer.write_all(&$local_tx.delayed_payment_key.serialize())?;
889 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($local_tx.feerate_per_kw))?;
890 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($local_tx.htlc_outputs.len() as u64))?;
891 for &(ref htlc_output, ref their_sig, ref our_sig) in $local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
892 serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output);
893 writer.write_all(&their_sig.serialize_compact(&self.secp_ctx))?;
894 writer.write_all(&our_sig.serialize_compact(&self.secp_ctx))?;
896 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($local_tx.htlc_sources.len() as u64))?;
897 for ref htlc_source in $local_tx.htlc_sources.iter() {
898 serialize_htlc_source!(htlc_source);
903 if let Some(ref prev_local_tx) = self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
904 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
905 serialize_local_tx!(prev_local_tx);
907 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
910 if let Some(ref cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
911 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
912 serialize_local_tx!(cur_local_tx);
914 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
917 if for_local_storage {
918 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(self.current_remote_commitment_number))?;
920 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(0))?;
923 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.payment_preimages.len() as u64))?;
924 for payment_preimage in self.payment_preimages.values() {
925 writer.write_all(payment_preimage)?;
928 self.last_block_hash.write(writer)?;
929 self.destination_script.write(writer)?;
934 /// Writes this monitor into the given writer, suitable for writing to disk.
936 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor), which
937 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
938 /// the "reorg path" (ie not just starting at the same height but starting at the highest
939 /// common block that appears on your best chain as well as on the chain which contains the
940 /// last block hash returned) upon deserializing the object!
941 pub fn write_for_disk<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
942 self.write(writer, true)
945 /// Encodes this monitor into the given writer, suitable for sending to a remote watchtower
947 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor), which
948 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
949 /// the "reorg path" (ie not just starting at the same height but starting at the highest
950 /// common block that appears on your best chain as well as on the chain which contains the
951 /// last block hash returned) upon deserializing the object!
952 pub fn write_for_watchtower<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
953 self.write(writer, false)
956 //TODO: Functions to serialize/deserialize (with different forms depending on which information
957 //we want to leave out (eg funding_txo, etc).
959 /// Can only fail if idx is < get_min_seen_secret
960 pub(super) fn get_secret(&self, idx: u64) -> Option<[u8; 32]> {
961 for i in 0..self.old_secrets.len() {
962 if (idx & (!((1 << i) - 1))) == self.old_secrets[i].1 {
963 return Some(ChannelMonitor::derive_secret(self.old_secrets[i].0, i as u8, idx))
966 assert!(idx < self.get_min_seen_secret());
970 pub(super) fn get_min_seen_secret(&self) -> u64 {
971 //TODO This can be optimized?
972 let mut min = 1 << 48;
973 for &(_, idx) in self.old_secrets.iter() {
981 pub(super) fn get_cur_remote_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
982 self.current_remote_commitment_number
985 pub(super) fn get_cur_local_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
986 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
987 0xffff_ffff_ffff - ((((local_tx.tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (local_tx.tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor)
988 } else { 0xffff_ffff_ffff }
991 /// Attempts to claim a remote commitment transaction's outputs using the revocation key and
992 /// data in remote_claimable_outpoints. Will directly claim any HTLC outputs which expire at a
993 /// height > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER. In any case, will install monitoring for
994 /// HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions.
995 /// Return updates for HTLC pending in the channel and failed automatically by the broadcast of
996 /// revoked remote commitment tx
997 fn check_spend_remote_transaction(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32) -> (Vec<Transaction>, (Sha256dHash, Vec<TxOut>), Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>, Vec<(HTLCSource, Option<[u8;32]>, [u8;32])>) {
998 // Most secp and related errors trying to create keys means we have no hope of constructing
999 // a spend transaction...so we return no transactions to broadcast
1000 let mut txn_to_broadcast = Vec::new();
1001 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
1002 let mut spendable_outputs = Vec::new();
1003 let mut htlc_updated = Vec::new();
1005 let commitment_txid = tx.txid(); //TODO: This is gonna be a performance bottleneck for watchtowers!
1006 let per_commitment_option = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(&commitment_txid);
1008 macro_rules! ignore_error {
1009 ( $thing : expr ) => {
1012 Err(_) => return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs, htlc_updated)
1017 let commitment_number = 0xffffffffffff - ((((tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor);
1018 if commitment_number >= self.get_min_seen_secret() {
1019 let secret = self.get_secret(commitment_number).unwrap();
1020 let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &secret));
1021 let (revocation_pubkey, b_htlc_key, local_payment_key) = match self.key_storage {
1022 Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, ref payment_base_key, .. } => {
1023 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
1024 (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_base_key))),
1025 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &htlc_base_key))),
1026 Some(ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &payment_base_key))))
1028 Storage::Watchtower { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
1029 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
1030 (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &revocation_base_key)),
1031 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &htlc_base_key)),
1035 let delayed_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key), &self.their_delayed_payment_base_key.unwrap()));
1036 let a_htlc_key = match self.their_htlc_base_key {
1037 None => return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs, htlc_updated),
1038 Some(their_htlc_base_key) => ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key), &their_htlc_base_key)),
1041 let revokeable_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey, self.our_to_self_delay, &delayed_key);
1042 let revokeable_p2wsh = revokeable_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
1044 let local_payment_p2wpkh = if let Some(payment_key) = local_payment_key {
1045 // Note that the Network here is ignored as we immediately drop the address for the
1046 // script_pubkey version.
1047 let payment_hash160 = Hash160::from_data(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &payment_key).serialize());
1048 Some(Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::All::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&payment_hash160[..]).into_script())
1051 let mut total_value = 0;
1052 let mut values = Vec::new();
1053 let mut inputs = Vec::new();
1054 let mut htlc_idxs = Vec::new();
1056 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
1057 if outp.script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh {
1059 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
1060 txid: commitment_txid,
1063 script_sig: Script::new(),
1064 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
1065 witness: Vec::new(),
1067 htlc_idxs.push(None);
1068 values.push(outp.value);
1069 total_value += outp.value;
1070 } else if Some(&outp.script_pubkey) == local_payment_p2wpkh.as_ref() {
1071 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WPKH {
1072 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: commitment_txid, vout: idx as u32 },
1073 key: local_payment_key.unwrap(),
1074 output: outp.clone(),
1079 macro_rules! sign_input {
1080 ($sighash_parts: expr, $input: expr, $htlc_idx: expr, $amount: expr) => {
1082 let (sig, redeemscript) = match self.key_storage {
1083 Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
1084 let redeemscript = if $htlc_idx.is_none() { revokeable_redeemscript.clone() } else {
1085 let htlc = &per_commitment_option.unwrap().0[$htlc_idx.unwrap()];
1086 chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey)
1088 let sighash = ignore_error!(Message::from_slice(&$sighash_parts.sighash_all(&$input, &redeemscript, $amount)[..]));
1089 let revocation_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key, &revocation_base_key));
1090 (self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &revocation_key), redeemscript)
1092 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
1096 $input.witness.push(sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
1097 $input.witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1098 if $htlc_idx.is_none() {
1099 $input.witness.push(vec!(1));
1101 $input.witness.push(revocation_pubkey.serialize().to_vec());
1103 $input.witness.push(redeemscript.into_bytes());
1108 if let Some(&(ref per_commitment_data, _)) = per_commitment_option {
1109 inputs.reserve_exact(per_commitment_data.len());
1111 for (idx, ref htlc) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() {
1112 let expected_script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey);
1113 if htlc.transaction_output_index as usize >= tx.output.len() ||
1114 tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 ||
1115 tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].script_pubkey != expected_script.to_v0_p2wsh() {
1116 return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs, htlc_updated); // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user
1119 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
1120 txid: commitment_txid,
1121 vout: htlc.transaction_output_index,
1123 script_sig: Script::new(),
1124 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
1125 witness: Vec::new(),
1127 if htlc.cltv_expiry > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER {
1129 htlc_idxs.push(Some(idx));
1130 values.push(tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].value);
1131 total_value += htlc.amount_msat / 1000;
1133 let mut single_htlc_tx = Transaction {
1137 output: vec!(TxOut {
1138 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1139 value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000, //TODO: - fee
1142 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&single_htlc_tx);
1143 sign_input!(sighash_parts, single_htlc_tx.input[0], Some(idx), htlc.amount_msat / 1000);
1144 txn_to_broadcast.push(single_htlc_tx);
1149 if !inputs.is_empty() || !txn_to_broadcast.is_empty() { // ie we're confident this is actually ours
1150 // We're definitely a remote commitment transaction!
1151 watch_outputs.append(&mut tx.output.clone());
1152 self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, (commitment_number, tx.output.iter().map(|output| { output.script_pubkey.clone() }).collect()));
1154 if inputs.is_empty() { return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs, htlc_updated); } // Nothing to be done...probably a false positive/local tx
1156 let outputs = vec!(TxOut {
1157 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1158 value: total_value, //TODO: - fee
1160 let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
1167 let mut values_drain = values.drain(..);
1168 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx);
1170 for (input, htlc_idx) in spend_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(htlc_idxs.iter()) {
1171 let value = values_drain.next().unwrap();
1172 sign_input!(sighash_parts, input, htlc_idx, value);
1175 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
1176 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: spend_tx.txid(), vout: 0 },
1177 output: spend_tx.output[0].clone(),
1179 txn_to_broadcast.push(spend_tx);
1180 } else if let Some(per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
1181 // While this isn't useful yet, there is a potential race where if a counterparty
1182 // revokes a state at the same time as the commitment transaction for that state is
1183 // confirmed, and the watchtower receives the block before the user, the user could
1184 // upload a new ChannelMonitor with the revocation secret but the watchtower has
1185 // already processed the block, resulting in the remote_commitment_txn_on_chain entry
1186 // not being generated by the above conditional. Thus, to be safe, we go ahead and
1188 watch_outputs.append(&mut tx.output.clone());
1189 self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, (commitment_number, tx.output.iter().map(|output| { output.script_pubkey.clone() }).collect()));
1191 if let Some(revocation_points) = self.their_cur_revocation_points {
1192 let revocation_point_option =
1193 if revocation_points.0 == commitment_number { Some(&revocation_points.1) }
1194 else if let Some(point) = revocation_points.2.as_ref() {
1195 if revocation_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 { Some(point) } else { None }
1197 if let Some(revocation_point) = revocation_point_option {
1198 let (revocation_pubkey, b_htlc_key) = match self.key_storage {
1199 Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
1200 (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_base_key))),
1201 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &htlc_base_key))))
1203 Storage::Watchtower { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
1204 (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &revocation_base_key)),
1205 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &htlc_base_key)))
1208 let a_htlc_key = match self.their_htlc_base_key {
1209 None => return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs, htlc_updated),
1210 Some(their_htlc_base_key) => ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &their_htlc_base_key)),
1213 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
1214 if outp.script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh() {
1215 match self.key_storage {
1216 Storage::Local { ref payment_base_key, .. } => {
1217 if let Ok(local_key) = chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_point, &payment_base_key) {
1218 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WPKH {
1219 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: commitment_txid, vout: idx as u32 },
1221 output: outp.clone(),
1225 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {}
1227 break; // Only to_remote ouput is claimable
1231 let mut total_value = 0;
1232 let mut values = Vec::new();
1233 let mut inputs = Vec::new();
1235 macro_rules! sign_input {
1236 ($sighash_parts: expr, $input: expr, $amount: expr, $preimage: expr) => {
1238 let (sig, redeemscript) = match self.key_storage {
1239 Storage::Local { ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
1240 let htlc = &per_commitment_option.unwrap().0[$input.sequence as usize];
1241 let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey);
1242 let sighash = ignore_error!(Message::from_slice(&$sighash_parts.sighash_all(&$input, &redeemscript, $amount)[..]));
1243 let htlc_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &htlc_base_key));
1244 (self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &htlc_key), redeemscript)
1246 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
1250 $input.witness.push(sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
1251 $input.witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1252 $input.witness.push($preimage);
1253 $input.witness.push(redeemscript.into_bytes());
1258 for (idx, ref htlc) in per_commitment_data.0.iter().enumerate() {
1259 let expected_script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey);
1260 if htlc.transaction_output_index as usize >= tx.output.len() ||
1261 tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 ||
1262 tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].script_pubkey != expected_script.to_v0_p2wsh() {
1263 return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs, htlc_updated); // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user
1265 if let Some(payment_preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
1267 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
1268 txid: commitment_txid,
1269 vout: htlc.transaction_output_index,
1271 script_sig: Script::new(),
1272 sequence: idx as u32, // reset to 0xfffffffd in sign_input
1273 witness: Vec::new(),
1275 if htlc.cltv_expiry > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER {
1277 values.push((tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].value, payment_preimage));
1278 total_value += htlc.amount_msat / 1000;
1280 let mut single_htlc_tx = Transaction {
1284 output: vec!(TxOut {
1285 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1286 value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000, //TODO: - fee
1289 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&single_htlc_tx);
1290 sign_input!(sighash_parts, single_htlc_tx.input[0], htlc.amount_msat / 1000, payment_preimage.to_vec());
1291 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
1292 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: single_htlc_tx.txid(), vout: 0 },
1293 output: single_htlc_tx.output[0].clone(),
1295 txn_to_broadcast.push(single_htlc_tx);
1300 if inputs.is_empty() { return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs, htlc_updated); } // Nothing to be done...probably a false positive/local tx
1302 let outputs = vec!(TxOut {
1303 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1304 value: total_value, //TODO: - fee
1306 let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
1313 let mut values_drain = values.drain(..);
1314 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx);
1316 for input in spend_tx.input.iter_mut() {
1317 let value = values_drain.next().unwrap();
1318 sign_input!(sighash_parts, input, value.0, value.1.to_vec());
1321 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
1322 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: spend_tx.txid(), vout: 0 },
1323 output: spend_tx.output[0].clone(),
1325 txn_to_broadcast.push(spend_tx);
1330 (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs, htlc_updated)
1333 /// Attempst to claim a remote HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout s outputs using the revocation key
1334 fn check_spend_remote_htlc(&self, tx: &Transaction, commitment_number: u64) -> (Option<Transaction>, Option<SpendableOutputDescriptor>) {
1335 if tx.input.len() != 1 || tx.output.len() != 1 {
1339 macro_rules! ignore_error {
1340 ( $thing : expr ) => {
1343 Err(_) => return (None, None)
1348 let secret = if let Some(secret) = self.get_secret(commitment_number) { secret } else { return (None, None); };
1349 let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &secret));
1350 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
1351 let revocation_pubkey = match self.key_storage {
1352 Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
1353 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_base_key)))
1355 Storage::Watchtower { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
1356 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &revocation_base_key))
1359 let delayed_key = match self.their_delayed_payment_base_key {
1360 None => return (None, None),
1361 Some(their_delayed_payment_base_key) => ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &their_delayed_payment_base_key)),
1363 let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), &delayed_key);
1364 let revokeable_p2wsh = redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
1365 let htlc_txid = tx.txid(); //TODO: This is gonna be a performance bottleneck for watchtowers!
1367 let mut inputs = Vec::new();
1370 if tx.output[0].script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh { //HTLC transactions have one txin, one txout
1372 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
1376 script_sig: Script::new(),
1377 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
1378 witness: Vec::new(),
1380 amount = tx.output[0].value;
1383 if !inputs.is_empty() {
1384 let outputs = vec!(TxOut {
1385 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1386 value: amount, //TODO: - fee
1389 let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
1396 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx);
1398 let sig = match self.key_storage {
1399 Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
1400 let sighash = ignore_error!(Message::from_slice(&sighash_parts.sighash_all(&spend_tx.input[0], &redeemscript, amount)[..]));
1401 let revocation_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key, &revocation_base_key));
1402 self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &revocation_key)
1404 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
1408 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
1409 spend_tx.input[0].witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1410 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(vec!(1));
1411 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(redeemscript.into_bytes());
1413 let outpoint = BitcoinOutPoint { txid: spend_tx.txid(), vout: 0 };
1414 let output = spend_tx.output[0].clone();
1415 (Some(spend_tx), Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput { outpoint, output }))
1416 } else { (None, None) }
1419 fn broadcast_by_local_state(&self, local_tx: &LocalSignedTx, per_commitment_point: &Option<PublicKey>, delayed_payment_base_key: &Option<SecretKey>) -> (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>, Vec<TxOut>) {
1420 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
1421 let mut spendable_outputs = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
1422 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
1424 macro_rules! add_dynamic_output {
1425 ($father_tx: expr, $vout: expr) => {
1426 if let Some(ref per_commitment_point) = *per_commitment_point {
1427 if let Some(ref delayed_payment_base_key) = *delayed_payment_base_key {
1428 if let Ok(local_delayedkey) = chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base_key) {
1429 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WSH {
1430 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: $father_tx.txid(), vout: $vout },
1431 key: local_delayedkey,
1432 witness_script: chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&local_tx.revocation_key, self.our_to_self_delay, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key),
1433 to_self_delay: self.our_to_self_delay,
1434 output: $father_tx.output[$vout as usize].clone(),
1443 let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&local_tx.revocation_key, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), &local_tx.delayed_payment_key);
1444 let revokeable_p2wsh = redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
1445 for (idx, output) in local_tx.tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
1446 if output.script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh {
1447 add_dynamic_output!(local_tx.tx, idx as u32);
1452 for &(ref htlc, ref their_sig, ref our_sig) in local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1454 let mut htlc_timeout_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&local_tx.txid, local_tx.feerate_per_kw, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), htlc, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key, &local_tx.revocation_key);
1456 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
1458 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(their_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
1459 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1460 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
1461 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1463 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new());
1464 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &local_tx.a_htlc_key, &local_tx.b_htlc_key, &local_tx.revocation_key).into_bytes());
1466 add_dynamic_output!(htlc_timeout_tx, 0);
1467 res.push(htlc_timeout_tx);
1469 if let Some(payment_preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
1470 let mut htlc_success_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&local_tx.txid, local_tx.feerate_per_kw, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), htlc, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key, &local_tx.revocation_key);
1472 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
1474 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(their_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
1475 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1476 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
1477 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1479 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(payment_preimage.to_vec());
1480 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &local_tx.a_htlc_key, &local_tx.b_htlc_key, &local_tx.revocation_key).into_bytes());
1482 add_dynamic_output!(htlc_success_tx, 0);
1483 res.push(htlc_success_tx);
1486 watch_outputs.push(local_tx.tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].clone());
1489 (res, spendable_outputs, watch_outputs)
1492 /// Attempts to claim any claimable HTLCs in a commitment transaction which was not (yet)
1493 /// revoked using data in local_claimable_outpoints.
1494 /// Should not be used if check_spend_revoked_transaction succeeds.
1495 fn check_spend_local_transaction(&self, tx: &Transaction, _height: u32) -> (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>, (Sha256dHash, Vec<TxOut>)) {
1496 let commitment_txid = tx.txid();
1497 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1498 if local_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
1499 match self.key_storage {
1500 Storage::Local { ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref latest_per_commitment_point, .. } => {
1501 let (local_txn, spendable_outputs, watch_outputs) = self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, latest_per_commitment_point, &Some(*delayed_payment_base_key));
1502 return (local_txn, spendable_outputs, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs));
1504 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
1505 let (local_txn, spendable_outputs, watch_outputs) = self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, &None, &None);
1506 return (local_txn, spendable_outputs, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs));
1511 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1512 if local_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
1513 match self.key_storage {
1514 Storage::Local { ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref prev_latest_per_commitment_point, .. } => {
1515 let (local_txn, spendable_outputs, watch_outputs) = self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, prev_latest_per_commitment_point, &Some(*delayed_payment_base_key));
1516 return (local_txn, spendable_outputs, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs));
1518 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
1519 let (local_txn, spendable_outputs, watch_outputs) = self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, &None, &None);
1520 return (local_txn, spendable_outputs, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs));
1525 (Vec::new(), Vec::new(), (commitment_txid, Vec::new()))
1528 /// Generate a spendable output event when closing_transaction get registered onchain.
1529 fn check_spend_closing_transaction(&self, tx: &Transaction) -> Option<SpendableOutputDescriptor> {
1530 if tx.input[0].sequence == 0xFFFFFFFF && !tx.input[0].witness.is_empty() && tx.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len() == 71 {
1531 match self.key_storage {
1532 Storage::Local { ref shutdown_pubkey, .. } => {
1533 let our_channel_close_key_hash = Hash160::from_data(&shutdown_pubkey.serialize());
1534 let shutdown_script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::All::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&our_channel_close_key_hash[..]).into_script();
1535 for (idx, output) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
1536 if shutdown_script == output.script_pubkey {
1537 return Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
1538 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), vout: idx as u32 },
1539 output: output.clone(),
1544 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
1545 //TODO: we need to ensure an offline client will generate the event when it
1546 // cames back online after only the watchtower saw the transaction
1553 /// Used by ChannelManager deserialization to broadcast the latest local state if it's copy of
1554 /// the Channel was out-of-date.
1555 pub(super) fn get_latest_local_commitment_txn(&self) -> Vec<Transaction> {
1556 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1557 let mut res = vec![local_tx.tx.clone()];
1558 match self.key_storage {
1559 Storage::Local { ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref prev_latest_per_commitment_point, .. } => {
1560 res.append(&mut self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, prev_latest_per_commitment_point, &Some(*delayed_payment_base_key)).0);
1562 _ => panic!("Can only broadcast by local channelmonitor"),
1570 fn block_connected(&mut self, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], height: u32, block_hash: &Sha256dHash, broadcaster: &BroadcasterInterface)-> (Vec<(Sha256dHash, Vec<TxOut>)>, Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>, Vec<(HTLCSource, Option<[u8 ; 32]>, [u8; 32])>) {
1571 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
1572 let mut spendable_outputs = Vec::new();
1573 let mut htlc_updated = Vec::new();
1574 for tx in txn_matched {
1575 if tx.input.len() == 1 {
1576 // Assuming our keys were not leaked (in which case we're screwed no matter what),
1577 // commitment transactions and HTLC transactions will all only ever have one input,
1578 // which is an easy way to filter out any potential non-matching txn for lazy
1580 let prevout = &tx.input[0].previous_output;
1581 let mut txn: Vec<Transaction> = Vec::new();
1582 let funding_txo = match self.key_storage {
1583 Storage::Local { ref funding_info, .. } => {
1584 funding_info.clone()
1586 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
1590 if funding_txo.is_none() || (prevout.txid == funding_txo.as_ref().unwrap().0.txid && prevout.vout == funding_txo.as_ref().unwrap().0.index as u32) {
1591 let (remote_txn, new_outputs, mut spendable_output, mut updated) = self.check_spend_remote_transaction(tx, height);
1593 spendable_outputs.append(&mut spendable_output);
1594 if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() {
1595 watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
1598 let (local_txn, mut spendable_output, new_outputs) = self.check_spend_local_transaction(tx, height);
1599 spendable_outputs.append(&mut spendable_output);
1601 if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() {
1602 watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
1605 if !funding_txo.is_none() && txn.is_empty() {
1606 if let Some(spendable_output) = self.check_spend_closing_transaction(tx) {
1607 spendable_outputs.push(spendable_output);
1610 if updated.len() > 0 {
1611 htlc_updated.append(&mut updated);
1614 if let Some(&(commitment_number, _)) = self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.get(&prevout.txid) {
1615 let (tx, spendable_output) = self.check_spend_remote_htlc(tx, commitment_number);
1616 if let Some(tx) = tx {
1619 if let Some(spendable_output) = spendable_output {
1620 spendable_outputs.push(spendable_output);
1624 for tx in txn.iter() {
1625 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(tx);
1627 let mut updated = self.is_resolving_htlc_output(tx);
1628 if updated.len() > 0 {
1629 htlc_updated.append(&mut updated);
1633 if let Some(ref cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1634 if self.would_broadcast_at_height(height) {
1635 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&cur_local_tx.tx);
1636 match self.key_storage {
1637 Storage::Local { ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref latest_per_commitment_point, .. } => {
1638 let (txs, mut spendable_output, new_outputs) = self.broadcast_by_local_state(&cur_local_tx, latest_per_commitment_point, &Some(*delayed_payment_base_key));
1639 spendable_outputs.append(&mut spendable_output);
1640 if !new_outputs.is_empty() {
1641 watch_outputs.push((cur_local_tx.txid.clone(), new_outputs));
1644 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
1647 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
1648 let (txs, mut spendable_output, new_outputs) = self.broadcast_by_local_state(&cur_local_tx, &None, &None);
1649 spendable_outputs.append(&mut spendable_output);
1650 if !new_outputs.is_empty() {
1651 watch_outputs.push((cur_local_tx.txid.clone(), new_outputs));
1654 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
1660 self.last_block_hash = block_hash.clone();
1661 (watch_outputs, spendable_outputs, htlc_updated)
1664 pub(super) fn would_broadcast_at_height(&self, height: u32) -> bool {
1665 if let Some(ref cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1666 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in cur_local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1667 // For inbound HTLCs which we know the preimage for, we have to ensure we hit the
1668 // chain with enough room to claim the HTLC without our counterparty being able to
1669 // time out the HTLC first.
1670 // For outbound HTLCs which our counterparty hasn't failed/claimed, our primary
1671 // concern is being able to claim the corresponding inbound HTLC (on another
1672 // channel) before it expires. In fact, we don't even really care if our
1673 // counterparty here claims such an outbound HTLC after it expired as long as we
1674 // can still claim the corresponding HTLC. Thus, to avoid needlessly hitting the
1675 // chain when our counterparty is waiting for expiration to off-chain fail an HTLC
1676 // we give ourselves a few blocks of headroom after expiration before going
1677 // on-chain for an expired HTLC.
1678 // Note that, to avoid a potential attack whereby a node delays claiming an HTLC
1679 // from us until we've reached the point where we go on-chain with the
1680 // corresponding inbound HTLC, we must ensure that outbound HTLCs go on chain at
1681 // least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER blocks prior to the inbound HTLC.
1682 // aka outbound_cltv + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS == height - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
1683 // inbound_cltv == height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
1684 // outbound_cltv + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFER <= inbound_cltv - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
1685 // HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS + 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFER <= inbound_cltv - outbound_cltv
1686 // HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS + 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFER <= CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA
1687 if ( htlc.offered && htlc.cltv_expiry + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS <= height) ||
1688 (!htlc.offered && htlc.cltv_expiry <= height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER && self.payment_preimages.contains_key(&htlc.payment_hash)) {
1696 /// Check if any transaction broadcasted is resolving HTLC output by a success or timeout on a local
1697 /// or remote commitment tx, if so send back the source, preimage if found and payment_hash of resolved HTLC
1698 fn is_resolving_htlc_output(&mut self, tx: &Transaction) -> Vec<(HTLCSource, Option<[u8;32]>, [u8;32])> {
1699 let mut htlc_updated = Vec::new();
1701 'outer_loop: for input in &tx.input {
1702 let mut payment_data = None;
1704 macro_rules! scan_commitment {
1705 ($htlc_outputs: expr, $htlc_sources: expr) => {
1706 for &(ref payment_hash, ref source, ref vout) in $htlc_sources.iter() {
1707 if &Some(input.previous_output.vout) == vout {
1708 payment_data = Some((source.clone(), *payment_hash));
1711 if payment_data.is_none() {
1712 for htlc_output in $htlc_outputs {
1713 if input.previous_output.vout == htlc_output.transaction_output_index {
1714 log_info!(self, "Inbound HTLC timeout at {} from {} resolved by {}", input.previous_output.vout, input.previous_output.txid, tx.txid());
1715 continue 'outer_loop;
1722 if let Some(ref current_local_signed_commitment_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1723 if input.previous_output.txid == current_local_signed_commitment_tx.txid {
1724 scan_commitment!(current_local_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, _)| a), current_local_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_sources);
1727 if let Some(ref prev_local_signed_commitment_tx) = self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1728 if input.previous_output.txid == prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.txid {
1729 scan_commitment!(prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, _)| a), prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_sources);
1732 if let Some(&(ref htlc_outputs, ref htlc_sources)) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(&input.previous_output.txid) {
1733 scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs, htlc_sources);
1736 // If tx isn't solving htlc output from local/remote commitment tx and htlc isn't outbound we don't need
1737 // to broadcast solving backward
1738 if let Some((source, payment_hash)) = payment_data {
1739 let mut payment_preimage = [0; 32];
1740 if input.witness.len() == 5 && input.witness[4].len() == 138 {
1741 payment_preimage.copy_from_slice(&tx.input[0].witness[3]);
1742 htlc_updated.push((source, Some(payment_preimage), payment_hash));
1743 } else if input.witness.len() == 3 && input.witness[2].len() == 133 {
1744 payment_preimage.copy_from_slice(&tx.input[0].witness[1]);
1745 htlc_updated.push((source, Some(payment_preimage), payment_hash));
1747 htlc_updated.push((source, None, payment_hash));
1755 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
1757 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> ReadableArgs<R, Arc<Logger>> for (Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor) {
1758 fn read(reader: &mut R, logger: Arc<Logger>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1759 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1760 macro_rules! unwrap_obj {
1764 Err(_) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
1769 let _ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1770 let min_ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1771 if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION {
1772 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion);
1775 let commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor = <U48 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.0;
1777 let key_storage = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
1779 let revocation_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
1780 let htlc_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
1781 let delayed_payment_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
1782 let payment_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
1783 let shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
1784 let prev_latest_per_commitment_point = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
1786 1 => Some(Readable::read(reader)?),
1787 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
1789 let latest_per_commitment_point = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
1791 1 => Some(Readable::read(reader)?),
1792 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
1794 // Technically this can fail and serialize fail a round-trip, but only for serialization of
1795 // barely-init'd ChannelMonitors that we can't do anything with.
1796 let outpoint = OutPoint {
1797 txid: Readable::read(reader)?,
1798 index: Readable::read(reader)?,
1800 let funding_info = Some((outpoint, Readable::read(reader)?));
1802 revocation_base_key,
1804 delayed_payment_base_key,
1807 prev_latest_per_commitment_point,
1808 latest_per_commitment_point,
1812 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
1815 let their_htlc_base_key = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
1816 let their_delayed_payment_base_key = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
1818 let their_cur_revocation_points = {
1819 let first_idx = <U48 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.0;
1823 let first_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
1824 let second_point_slice: [u8; 33] = Readable::read(reader)?;
1825 if second_point_slice[0..32] == [0; 32] && second_point_slice[32] == 0 {
1826 Some((first_idx, first_point, None))
1828 Some((first_idx, first_point, Some(unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &second_point_slice)))))
1833 let our_to_self_delay: u16 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1834 let their_to_self_delay: Option<u16> = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
1836 let mut old_secrets = [([0; 32], 1 << 48); 49];
1837 for &mut (ref mut secret, ref mut idx) in old_secrets.iter_mut() {
1838 *secret = Readable::read(reader)?;
1839 *idx = Readable::read(reader)?;
1842 macro_rules! read_htlc_in_commitment {
1845 let offered: bool = Readable::read(reader)?;
1846 let amount_msat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1847 let cltv_expiry: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1848 let payment_hash: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(reader)?;
1849 let transaction_output_index: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1851 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1852 offered, amount_msat, cltv_expiry, payment_hash, transaction_output_index
1858 macro_rules! read_htlc_source {
1861 (Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?,
1862 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
1864 1 => Some(Readable::read(reader)?),
1865 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
1872 let remote_claimable_outpoints_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1873 let mut remote_claimable_outpoints = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(remote_claimable_outpoints_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 64));
1874 for _ in 0..remote_claimable_outpoints_len {
1875 let txid: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
1876 let outputs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1877 let mut outputs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
1878 for _ in 0..outputs_count {
1879 outputs.push(read_htlc_in_commitment!());
1881 let sources_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1882 let mut sources = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(sources_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
1883 for _ in 0..sources_count {
1884 sources.push(read_htlc_source!());
1886 if let Some(_) = remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, (outputs, sources)) {
1887 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
1891 let remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1892 let mut remote_commitment_txn_on_chain = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
1893 for _ in 0..remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len {
1894 let txid: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
1895 let commitment_number = <U48 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.0;
1896 let outputs_count = <u64 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?;
1897 let mut outputs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 8));
1898 for _ in 0..outputs_count {
1899 outputs.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
1901 if let Some(_) = remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(txid, (commitment_number, outputs)) {
1902 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
1906 let remote_hash_commitment_number_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1907 let mut remote_hash_commitment_number = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(remote_hash_commitment_number_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
1908 for _ in 0..remote_hash_commitment_number_len {
1909 let txid: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(reader)?;
1910 let commitment_number = <U48 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.0;
1911 if let Some(_) = remote_hash_commitment_number.insert(txid, commitment_number) {
1912 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
1916 macro_rules! read_local_tx {
1919 let tx = match Transaction::consensus_decode(reader.by_ref()) {
1922 encode::Error::Io(ioe) => return Err(DecodeError::Io(ioe)),
1923 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
1927 if tx.input.is_empty() {
1928 // Ensure tx didn't hit the 0-input ambiguity case.
1929 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
1932 let revocation_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
1933 let a_htlc_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
1934 let b_htlc_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
1935 let delayed_payment_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
1936 let feerate_per_kw: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1938 let htlc_outputs_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1939 let mut htlc_outputs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlc_outputs_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
1940 for _ in 0..htlc_outputs_len {
1941 let out = read_htlc_in_commitment!();
1942 let sigs = (Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?);
1943 htlc_outputs.push((out, sigs.0, sigs.1));
1946 let htlc_sources_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1947 let mut htlc_sources = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlc_outputs_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
1948 for _ in 0..htlc_sources_len {
1949 htlc_sources.push(read_htlc_source!());
1954 tx, revocation_key, a_htlc_key, b_htlc_key, delayed_payment_key, feerate_per_kw, htlc_outputs, htlc_sources
1960 let prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
1963 Some(read_local_tx!())
1965 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
1968 let current_local_signed_commitment_tx = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
1971 Some(read_local_tx!())
1973 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
1976 let current_remote_commitment_number = <U48 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.0;
1978 let payment_preimages_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1979 let mut payment_preimages = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(payment_preimages_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
1980 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
1981 for _ in 0..payment_preimages_len {
1982 let preimage: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(reader)?;
1984 sha.input(&preimage);
1985 let mut hash = [0; 32];
1986 sha.result(&mut hash);
1987 if let Some(_) = payment_preimages.insert(hash, preimage) {
1988 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
1992 let last_block_hash: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
1993 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
1995 Ok((last_block_hash.clone(), ChannelMonitor {
1996 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor,
1999 their_htlc_base_key,
2000 their_delayed_payment_base_key,
2001 their_cur_revocation_points,
2004 their_to_self_delay,
2007 remote_claimable_outpoints,
2008 remote_commitment_txn_on_chain,
2009 remote_hash_commitment_number,
2011 prev_local_signed_commitment_tx,
2012 current_local_signed_commitment_tx,
2013 current_remote_commitment_number,
2028 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Script;
2029 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
2030 use crypto::digest::Digest;
2032 use ln::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor;
2033 use ln::chan_utils::{HTLCOutputInCommitment, TxCreationKeys};
2034 use util::sha2::Sha256;
2035 use util::test_utils::TestLogger;
2036 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
2037 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1, Signature};
2038 use rand::{thread_rng,Rng};
2042 fn test_per_commitment_storage() {
2043 // Test vectors from BOLT 3:
2044 let mut secrets: Vec<[u8; 32]> = Vec::new();
2045 let mut monitor: ChannelMonitor;
2046 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2047 let logger = Arc::new(TestLogger::new());
2049 macro_rules! test_secrets {
2051 let mut idx = 281474976710655;
2052 for secret in secrets.iter() {
2053 assert_eq!(monitor.get_secret(idx).unwrap(), *secret);
2056 assert_eq!(monitor.get_min_seen_secret(), idx + 1);
2057 assert!(monitor.get_secret(idx).is_none());
2062 // insert_secret correct sequence
2063 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
2066 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2067 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
2068 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2071 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2072 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
2073 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2076 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2077 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
2078 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2081 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2082 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
2083 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2086 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2087 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
2088 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2091 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2092 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
2093 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2096 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2097 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
2098 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2101 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2102 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
2103 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2108 // insert_secret #1 incorrect
2109 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
2112 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2113 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
2114 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2117 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2118 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
2119 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
2120 "Previous secret did not match new one");
2124 // insert_secret #2 incorrect (#1 derived from incorrect)
2125 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
2128 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2129 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
2130 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2133 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2134 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("dddc3a8d14fddf2b68fa8c7fbad2748274937479dd0f8930d5ebb4ab6bd866a3").unwrap());
2135 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2138 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2139 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
2140 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2143 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2144 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
2145 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
2146 "Previous secret did not match new one");
2150 // insert_secret #3 incorrect
2151 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
2154 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2155 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
2156 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2159 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2160 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
2161 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2164 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2165 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c51a18b13e8527e579ec56365482c62f180b7d5760b46e9477dae59e87ed423a").unwrap());
2166 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2169 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2170 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
2171 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
2172 "Previous secret did not match new one");
2176 // insert_secret #4 incorrect (1,2,3 derived from incorrect)
2177 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
2180 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2181 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
2182 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2185 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2186 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("dddc3a8d14fddf2b68fa8c7fbad2748274937479dd0f8930d5ebb4ab6bd866a3").unwrap());
2187 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2190 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2191 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c51a18b13e8527e579ec56365482c62f180b7d5760b46e9477dae59e87ed423a").unwrap());
2192 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2195 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2196 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("ba65d7b0ef55a3ba300d4e87af29868f394f8f138d78a7011669c79b37b936f4").unwrap());
2197 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2200 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2201 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
2202 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2205 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2206 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
2207 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2210 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2211 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
2212 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2215 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2216 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
2217 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
2218 "Previous secret did not match new one");
2222 // insert_secret #5 incorrect
2223 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
2226 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2227 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
2228 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2231 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2232 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
2233 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2236 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2237 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
2238 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2241 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2242 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
2243 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2246 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2247 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("631373ad5f9ef654bb3dade742d09504c567edd24320d2fcd68e3cc47e2ff6a6").unwrap());
2248 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2251 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2252 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
2253 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
2254 "Previous secret did not match new one");
2258 // insert_secret #6 incorrect (5 derived from incorrect)
2259 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
2262 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2263 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
2264 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2267 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2268 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
2269 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2272 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2273 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
2274 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2277 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2278 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
2279 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2282 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2283 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("631373ad5f9ef654bb3dade742d09504c567edd24320d2fcd68e3cc47e2ff6a6").unwrap());
2284 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2287 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2288 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("b7e76a83668bde38b373970155c868a653304308f9896692f904a23731224bb1").unwrap());
2289 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2292 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2293 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
2294 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2297 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2298 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
2299 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
2300 "Previous secret did not match new one");
2304 // insert_secret #7 incorrect
2305 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
2308 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2309 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
2310 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2313 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2314 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
2315 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2318 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2319 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
2320 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2323 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2324 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
2325 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2328 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2329 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
2330 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2333 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2334 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
2335 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2338 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2339 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("e7971de736e01da8ed58b94c2fc216cb1dca9e326f3a96e7194fe8ea8af6c0a3").unwrap());
2340 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2343 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2344 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
2345 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
2346 "Previous secret did not match new one");
2350 // insert_secret #8 incorrect
2351 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
2354 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2355 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
2356 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2359 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2360 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
2361 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2364 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2365 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
2366 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2369 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2370 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
2371 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2374 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2375 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
2376 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2379 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2380 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
2381 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2384 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2385 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
2386 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2389 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2390 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a7efbc61aac46d34f77778bac22c8a20c6a46ca460addc49009bda875ec88fa4").unwrap());
2391 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
2392 "Previous secret did not match new one");
2397 fn test_prune_preimages() {
2398 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2399 let logger = Arc::new(TestLogger::new());
2400 let dummy_sig = Signature::from_der(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("3045022100fa86fa9a36a8cd6a7bb8f06a541787d51371d067951a9461d5404de6b928782e02201c8b7c334c10aed8976a3a465be9a28abff4cb23acbf00022295b378ce1fa3cd").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
2402 let dummy_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap());
2403 macro_rules! dummy_keys {
2407 per_commitment_point: dummy_key.clone(),
2408 revocation_key: dummy_key.clone(),
2409 a_htlc_key: dummy_key.clone(),
2410 b_htlc_key: dummy_key.clone(),
2411 a_delayed_payment_key: dummy_key.clone(),
2412 b_payment_key: dummy_key.clone(),
2417 let dummy_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
2419 let mut preimages = Vec::new();
2421 let mut rng = thread_rng();
2423 let mut preimage = [0; 32];
2424 rng.fill_bytes(&mut preimage);
2425 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
2426 sha.input(&preimage);
2427 let mut hash = [0; 32];
2428 sha.result(&mut hash);
2429 preimages.push((preimage, hash));
2433 macro_rules! preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs {
2434 ($preimages_slice: expr) => {
2436 let mut res = Vec::new();
2437 for (idx, preimage) in $preimages_slice.iter().enumerate() {
2438 res.push(HTLCOutputInCommitment {
2442 payment_hash: preimage.1.clone(),
2443 transaction_output_index: idx as u32,
2450 macro_rules! preimages_to_local_htlcs {
2451 ($preimages_slice: expr) => {
2453 let mut inp = preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!($preimages_slice);
2454 let res: Vec<_> = inp.drain(..).map(|e| { (e, dummy_sig.clone(), dummy_sig.clone()) }).collect();
2460 macro_rules! test_preimages_exist {
2461 ($preimages_slice: expr, $monitor: expr) => {
2462 for preimage in $preimages_slice {
2463 assert!($monitor.payment_preimages.contains_key(&preimage.1));
2468 // Prune with one old state and a local commitment tx holding a few overlaps with the
2470 let mut monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
2471 monitor.set_their_to_self_delay(10);
2473 monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(dummy_tx.clone(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..10]), Vec::new());
2474 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[5..15]), Vec::new(), 281474976710655, dummy_key);
2475 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[15..20]), Vec::new(), 281474976710654, dummy_key);
2476 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[17..20]), Vec::new(), 281474976710653, dummy_key);
2477 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[18..20]), Vec::new(), 281474976710652, dummy_key);
2478 for &(ref preimage, ref hash) in preimages.iter() {
2479 monitor.provide_payment_preimage(hash, preimage);
2482 // Now provide a secret, pruning preimages 10-15
2483 let mut secret = [0; 32];
2484 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
2485 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secret.clone()).unwrap();
2486 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 15);
2487 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
2488 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[15..20], monitor);
2490 // Now provide a further secret, pruning preimages 15-17
2491 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
2492 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secret.clone()).unwrap();
2493 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 13);
2494 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
2495 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[17..20], monitor);
2497 // Now update local commitment tx info, pruning only element 18 as we still care about the
2498 // previous commitment tx's preimages too
2499 monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(dummy_tx.clone(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..5]), Vec::new());
2500 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
2501 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secret.clone()).unwrap();
2502 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 12);
2503 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
2504 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[18..20], monitor);
2506 // But if we do it again, we'll prune 5-10
2507 monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(dummy_tx.clone(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..3]), Vec::new());
2508 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
2509 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secret.clone()).unwrap();
2510 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 5);
2511 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..5], monitor);
2514 // Further testing is done in the ChannelManager integration tests.