1 //! The logic to monitor for on-chain transactions and create the relevant claim responses lives
4 //! ChannelMonitor objects are generated by ChannelManager in response to relevant
5 //! messages/actions, and MUST be persisted to disk (and, preferably, remotely) before progress can
6 //! be made in responding to certain messages, see ManyChannelMonitor for more.
8 //! Note that ChannelMonitors are an important part of the lightning trust model and a copy of the
9 //! latest ChannelMonitor must always be actively monitoring for chain updates (and no out-of-date
10 //! ChannelMonitors should do so). Thus, if you're building rust-lightning into an HSM or other
11 //! security-domain-separated system design, you should consider having multiple paths for
12 //! ChannelMonitors to get out of the HSM and onto monitoring devices.
14 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
15 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxIn,TxOut,SigHashType,Transaction};
16 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
17 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
18 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
19 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::{self, Decodable, Encodable};
20 use bitcoin::util::hash::{Hash160, BitcoinHash,Sha256dHash};
21 use bitcoin::util::bip143;
23 use crypto::digest::Digest;
25 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Message,Signature};
26 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
29 use ln::msgs::DecodeError;
31 use ln::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment;
32 use ln::channelmanager::{HTLCSource, HTLCPreviousHopData};
33 use ln::router::{Route, RouteHop};
34 use ln::channel::{ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT, OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT};
35 use chain::chaininterface::{ChainListener, ChainWatchInterface, BroadcasterInterface};
36 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
37 use chain::keysinterface::SpendableOutputDescriptor;
38 use util::logger::Logger;
39 use util::ser::{ReadableArgs, Readable, Writer, Writeable, WriterWriteAdaptor, U48};
40 use util::sha2::Sha256;
41 use util::{byte_utils, events};
43 use std::collections::{HashMap, hash_map};
44 use std::sync::{Arc,Mutex};
45 use std::{hash,cmp, mem};
47 /// An error enum representing a failure to persist a channel monitor update.
49 pub enum ChannelMonitorUpdateErr {
50 /// Used to indicate a temporary failure (eg connection to a watchtower failed, but is expected
51 /// to succeed at some point in the future).
53 /// Such a failure will "freeze" a channel, preventing us from revoking old states or
54 /// submitting new commitment transactions to the remote party.
55 /// ChannelManager::test_restore_channel_monitor can be used to retry the update(s) and restore
56 /// the channel to an operational state.
58 /// Note that continuing to operate when no copy of the updated ChannelMonitor could be
59 /// persisted is unsafe - if you failed to store the update on your own local disk you should
60 /// instead return PermanentFailure to force closure of the channel ASAP.
62 /// Even when a channel has been "frozen" updates to the ChannelMonitor can continue to occur
63 /// (eg if an inbound HTLC which we forwarded was claimed upstream resulting in us attempting
64 /// to claim it on this channel) and those updates must be applied wherever they can be. At
65 /// least one such updated ChannelMonitor must be persisted otherwise PermanentFailure should
66 /// be returned to get things on-chain ASAP using only the in-memory copy. Obviously updates to
67 /// the channel which would invalidate previous ChannelMonitors are not made when a channel has
70 /// Note that even if updates made after TemporaryFailure succeed you must still call
71 /// test_restore_channel_monitor to ensure you have the latest monitor and re-enable normal
72 /// channel operation.
74 /// Used to indicate no further channel monitor updates will be allowed (eg we've moved on to a
75 /// different watchtower and cannot update with all watchtowers that were previously informed
76 /// of this channel). This will force-close the channel in question.
80 /// General Err type for ChannelMonitor actions. Generally, this implies that the data provided is
81 /// inconsistent with the ChannelMonitor being called. eg for ChannelMonitor::insert_combine this
82 /// means you tried to merge two monitors for different channels or for a channel which was
83 /// restored from a backup and then generated new commitment updates.
84 /// Contains a human-readable error message.
86 pub struct MonitorUpdateError(pub &'static str);
88 /// Simple trait indicating ability to track a set of ChannelMonitors and multiplex events between
89 /// them. Generally should be implemented by keeping a local SimpleManyChannelMonitor and passing
90 /// events to it, while also taking any add_update_monitor events and passing them to some remote
93 /// Note that any updates to a channel's monitor *must* be applied to each instance of the
94 /// channel's monitor everywhere (including remote watchtowers) *before* this function returns. If
95 /// an update occurs and a remote watchtower is left with old state, it may broadcast transactions
96 /// which we have revoked, allowing our counterparty to claim all funds in the channel!
97 pub trait ManyChannelMonitor: Send + Sync {
98 /// Adds or updates a monitor for the given `funding_txo`.
100 /// Implementor must also ensure that the funding_txo outpoint is registered with any relevant
101 /// ChainWatchInterfaces such that the provided monitor receives block_connected callbacks with
102 /// any spends of it.
103 fn add_update_monitor(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr>;
105 /// Used by ChannelManager to get list of HTLC resolved onchain and which needed to be updated
106 /// with success or failure backward
107 fn fetch_pending_htlc_updated(&self) -> Vec<([u8; 32], Option<[u8; 32]>, Option<HTLCSource>)>;
110 /// A simple implementation of a ManyChannelMonitor and ChainListener. Can be used to create a
111 /// watchtower or watch our own channels.
113 /// Note that you must provide your own key by which to refer to channels.
115 /// If you're accepting remote monitors (ie are implementing a watchtower), you must verify that
116 /// users cannot overwrite a given channel by providing a duplicate key. ie you should probably
117 /// index by a PublicKey which is required to sign any updates.
119 /// If you're using this for local monitoring of your own channels, you probably want to use
120 /// `OutPoint` as the key, which will give you a ManyChannelMonitor implementation.
121 pub struct SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
122 #[cfg(test)] // Used in ChannelManager tests to manipulate channels directly
123 pub monitors: Mutex<HashMap<Key, ChannelMonitor>>,
125 monitors: Mutex<HashMap<Key, ChannelMonitor>>,
126 chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>,
127 broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>,
128 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
129 pending_htlc_updated: Mutex<HashMap<[u8; 32], Vec<(Option<[u8; 32]>, Option<HTLCSource>)>>>,
133 impl<Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash> ChainListener for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
134 fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], _indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) {
135 let block_hash = header.bitcoin_hash();
136 let mut new_events: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(0);
137 let mut htlc_updated_infos = Vec::new();
139 let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
140 for monitor in monitors.values_mut() {
141 let (txn_outputs, spendable_outputs, mut htlc_updated) = monitor.block_connected(txn_matched, height, &block_hash, &*self.broadcaster);
142 if spendable_outputs.len() > 0 {
143 new_events.push(events::Event::SpendableOutputs {
144 outputs: spendable_outputs,
148 for (ref txid, ref outputs) in txn_outputs {
149 for (idx, output) in outputs.iter().enumerate() {
150 self.chain_monitor.install_watch_outpoint((txid.clone(), idx as u32), &output.script_pubkey);
153 htlc_updated_infos.append(&mut htlc_updated);
157 let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
158 for htlc in &htlc_updated_infos {
159 if htlc.1.is_some() {
160 for monitor in monitors.values_mut() {
161 let our_short_channel_id;
162 match monitor.key_storage {
163 Storage::Local { ref short_channel_id, .. } => {
164 our_short_channel_id = *short_channel_id.as_ref().unwrap();
166 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
170 if let Some(ref htlc_source) = htlc.0 {
172 &HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref source) => {
173 if source.short_channel_id == our_short_channel_id {
174 monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&htlc.2, &htlc.1.unwrap());
175 // We maybe call again same monitor, to be sure that in case of 2 remote commitment tx from different channels
176 // in same block we claim well HTLCs on downstream one
177 // txn_outputs and htlc_data are there irrelevant
178 let (_, spendable_outputs, _) = monitor.block_connected(txn_matched, height, &block_hash, &*self.broadcaster);
179 if spendable_outputs.len() > 0 {
180 new_events.push(events::Event::SpendableOutputs {
181 outputs: spendable_outputs,
187 &HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
197 // ChannelManager will just need to fetch pending_htlc_updated and pass state backward
198 let mut pending_htlc_updated = self.pending_htlc_updated.lock().unwrap();
199 for htlc in htlc_updated_infos.drain(..) {
200 match pending_htlc_updated.entry(htlc.2) {
201 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut e) => {
202 // In case of reorg we may have htlc outputs solved in a different way so
203 // Vacant or Occupied we update key-value with last state of tx resolvation
204 // We need also to keep only one state per-htlc so prune old one in case of
206 e.get_mut().retain(|htlc_data| {
207 if let Some(ref new_htlc_source) = htlc.0 {
208 if let Some(ref old_htlc_source) = htlc_data.1 {
209 if new_htlc_source == old_htlc_source{
216 e.get_mut().push((htlc.1, htlc.0));
218 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
219 e.insert(vec![(htlc.1, htlc.0)]);
224 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
225 pending_events.append(&mut new_events);
228 fn block_disconnected(&self, _: &BlockHeader) { }
231 impl<Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash + 'static> SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
232 /// Creates a new object which can be used to monitor several channels given the chain
233 /// interface with which to register to receive notifications.
234 pub fn new(chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>, broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>, logger: Arc<Logger>) -> Arc<SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key>> {
235 let res = Arc::new(SimpleManyChannelMonitor {
236 monitors: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
239 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
240 pending_htlc_updated: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
243 let weak_res = Arc::downgrade(&res);
244 res.chain_monitor.register_listener(weak_res);
248 /// Adds or udpates the monitor which monitors the channel referred to by the given key.
249 pub fn add_update_monitor_by_key(&self, key: Key, monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
250 let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
251 match monitors.get_mut(&key) {
252 Some(orig_monitor) => {
253 log_trace!(self, "Updating Channel Monitor for channel {}", log_funding_info!(monitor.key_storage));
254 return orig_monitor.insert_combine(monitor);
258 match monitor.key_storage {
259 Storage::Local { ref funding_info, .. } => {
262 return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Try to update a useless monitor without funding_txo !"));
264 &Some((ref outpoint, ref script)) => {
265 log_trace!(self, "Got new Channel Monitor for channel {}", log_bytes!(outpoint.to_channel_id()[..]));
266 self.chain_monitor.install_watch_tx(&outpoint.txid, script);
267 self.chain_monitor.install_watch_outpoint((outpoint.txid, outpoint.index as u32), script);
271 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
272 self.chain_monitor.watch_all_txn();
275 monitors.insert(key, monitor);
281 impl ManyChannelMonitor for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<OutPoint> {
282 fn add_update_monitor(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr> {
283 match self.add_update_monitor_by_key(funding_txo, monitor) {
285 Err(_) => Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure),
289 fn fetch_pending_htlc_updated(&self) -> Vec<([u8; 32], Option<[u8; 32]>, Option<HTLCSource>)> {
290 let mut updated = self.pending_htlc_updated.lock().unwrap();
291 let mut pending_htlcs_updated = Vec::with_capacity(updated.len());
292 for (k, v) in updated.drain() {
294 pending_htlcs_updated.push((k, htlc_data.0, htlc_data.1));
297 pending_htlcs_updated
301 impl<Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash> events::EventsProvider for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
302 fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
303 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
304 let mut ret = Vec::new();
305 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut *pending_events);
310 /// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, don't try to claim it in a shared transaction,
311 /// instead claiming it in its own individual transaction.
312 const CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 12;
313 /// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, force-close the channel to broadcast the
314 /// HTLC-Success transaction.
315 /// In other words, this is an upper bound on how many blocks we think it can take us to get a
316 /// transaction confirmed (and we use it in a few more, equivalent, places).
317 pub(crate) const CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 6;
318 /// Number of blocks by which point we expect our counterparty to have seen new blocks on the
319 /// network and done a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance (+ we've updated all our
320 /// copies of ChannelMonitors, including watchtowers).
321 pub(crate) const HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS: u32 = 3;
323 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
326 revocation_base_key: SecretKey,
327 htlc_base_key: SecretKey,
328 delayed_payment_base_key: SecretKey,
329 payment_base_key: SecretKey,
330 shutdown_pubkey: PublicKey,
331 prev_latest_per_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
332 latest_per_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
333 funding_info: Option<(OutPoint, Script)>,
334 short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
337 revocation_base_key: PublicKey,
338 htlc_base_key: PublicKey,
339 sigs: HashMap<Sha256dHash, Signature>,
343 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
344 struct LocalSignedTx {
345 /// txid of the transaction in tx, just used to make comparison faster
348 revocation_key: PublicKey,
349 a_htlc_key: PublicKey,
350 b_htlc_key: PublicKey,
351 delayed_payment_key: PublicKey,
353 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Signature, Signature, Option<HTLCSource>)>,
356 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
357 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
359 /// A ChannelMonitor handles chain events (blocks connected and disconnected) and generates
360 /// on-chain transactions to ensure no loss of funds occurs.
362 /// You MUST ensure that no ChannelMonitors for a given channel anywhere contain out-of-date
363 /// information and are actively monitoring the chain.
365 pub struct ChannelMonitor {
366 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64,
368 key_storage: Storage,
369 their_htlc_base_key: Option<PublicKey>,
370 their_delayed_payment_base_key: Option<PublicKey>,
371 // first is the idx of the first of the two revocation points
372 their_cur_revocation_points: Option<(u64, PublicKey, Option<PublicKey>)>,
374 our_to_self_delay: u16,
375 their_to_self_delay: Option<u16>,
377 old_secrets: [([u8; 32], u64); 49],
378 remote_claimable_outpoints: HashMap<Sha256dHash, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<HTLCSource>)>>,
379 /// We cannot identify HTLC-Success or HTLC-Timeout transactions by themselves on the chain.
380 /// Nor can we figure out their commitment numbers without the commitment transaction they are
381 /// spending. Thus, in order to claim them via revocation key, we track all the remote
382 /// commitment transactions which we find on-chain, mapping them to the commitment number which
383 /// can be used to derive the revocation key and claim the transactions.
384 remote_commitment_txn_on_chain: HashMap<Sha256dHash, (u64, Vec<Script>)>,
385 /// Cache used to make pruning of payment_preimages faster.
386 /// Maps payment_hash values to commitment numbers for remote transactions for non-revoked
387 /// remote transactions (ie should remain pretty small).
388 /// Serialized to disk but should generally not be sent to Watchtowers.
389 remote_hash_commitment_number: HashMap<[u8; 32], u64>,
391 // We store two local commitment transactions to avoid any race conditions where we may update
392 // some monitors (potentially on watchtowers) but then fail to update others, resulting in the
393 // various monitors for one channel being out of sync, and us broadcasting a local
394 // transaction for which we have deleted claim information on some watchtowers.
395 prev_local_signed_commitment_tx: Option<LocalSignedTx>,
396 current_local_signed_commitment_tx: Option<LocalSignedTx>,
398 // Used just for ChannelManager to make sure it has the latest channel data during
400 current_remote_commitment_number: u64,
402 payment_preimages: HashMap<[u8; 32], [u8; 32]>,
404 destination_script: Script,
406 // We simply modify last_block_hash in Channel's block_connected so that serialization is
407 // consistent but hopefully the users' copy handles block_connected in a consistent way.
408 // (we do *not*, however, update them in insert_combine to ensure any local user copies keep
409 // their last_block_hash from its state and not based on updated copies that didn't run through
410 // the full block_connected).
411 pub(crate) last_block_hash: Sha256dHash,
412 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>, //TODO: dedup this a bit...
416 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
417 /// Used only in testing and fuzztarget to check serialization roundtrips don't change the
418 /// underlying object
419 impl PartialEq for ChannelMonitor {
420 fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
421 if self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor != other.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor ||
422 self.key_storage != other.key_storage ||
423 self.their_htlc_base_key != other.their_htlc_base_key ||
424 self.their_delayed_payment_base_key != other.their_delayed_payment_base_key ||
425 self.their_cur_revocation_points != other.their_cur_revocation_points ||
426 self.our_to_self_delay != other.our_to_self_delay ||
427 self.their_to_self_delay != other.their_to_self_delay ||
428 self.remote_claimable_outpoints != other.remote_claimable_outpoints ||
429 self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain != other.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain ||
430 self.remote_hash_commitment_number != other.remote_hash_commitment_number ||
431 self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx != other.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx ||
432 self.current_remote_commitment_number != other.current_remote_commitment_number ||
433 self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx != other.current_local_signed_commitment_tx ||
434 self.payment_preimages != other.payment_preimages ||
435 self.destination_script != other.destination_script
439 for (&(ref secret, ref idx), &(ref o_secret, ref o_idx)) in self.old_secrets.iter().zip(other.old_secrets.iter()) {
440 if secret != o_secret || idx != o_idx {
449 impl ChannelMonitor {
450 pub(super) fn new(revocation_base_key: &SecretKey, delayed_payment_base_key: &SecretKey, htlc_base_key: &SecretKey, payment_base_key: &SecretKey, shutdown_pubkey: &PublicKey, our_to_self_delay: u16, destination_script: Script, logger: Arc<Logger>) -> ChannelMonitor {
452 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: 0,
454 key_storage: Storage::Local {
455 revocation_base_key: revocation_base_key.clone(),
456 htlc_base_key: htlc_base_key.clone(),
457 delayed_payment_base_key: delayed_payment_base_key.clone(),
458 payment_base_key: payment_base_key.clone(),
459 shutdown_pubkey: shutdown_pubkey.clone(),
460 prev_latest_per_commitment_point: None,
461 latest_per_commitment_point: None,
463 short_channel_id: None,
465 their_htlc_base_key: None,
466 their_delayed_payment_base_key: None,
467 their_cur_revocation_points: None,
469 our_to_self_delay: our_to_self_delay,
470 their_to_self_delay: None,
472 old_secrets: [([0; 32], 1 << 48); 49],
473 remote_claimable_outpoints: HashMap::new(),
474 remote_commitment_txn_on_chain: HashMap::new(),
475 remote_hash_commitment_number: HashMap::new(),
477 prev_local_signed_commitment_tx: None,
478 current_local_signed_commitment_tx: None,
479 current_remote_commitment_number: 1 << 48,
481 payment_preimages: HashMap::new(),
482 destination_script: destination_script,
484 last_block_hash: Default::default(),
485 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
491 fn place_secret(idx: u64) -> u8 {
493 if idx & (1 << i) == (1 << i) {
501 fn derive_secret(secret: [u8; 32], bits: u8, idx: u64) -> [u8; 32] {
502 let mut res: [u8; 32] = secret;
504 let bitpos = bits - 1 - i;
505 if idx & (1 << bitpos) == (1 << bitpos) {
506 res[(bitpos / 8) as usize] ^= 1 << (bitpos & 7);
507 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
509 sha.result(&mut res);
515 /// Inserts a revocation secret into this channel monitor. Prunes old preimages if neither
516 /// needed by local commitment transactions HTCLs nor by remote ones. Unless we haven't already seen remote
517 /// commitment transaction's secret, they are de facto pruned (we can use revocation key).
518 pub(super) fn provide_secret(&mut self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
519 let pos = ChannelMonitor::place_secret(idx);
521 let (old_secret, old_idx) = self.old_secrets[i as usize];
522 if ChannelMonitor::derive_secret(secret, pos, old_idx) != old_secret {
523 return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Previous secret did not match new one"));
526 self.old_secrets[pos as usize] = (secret, idx);
528 if !self.payment_preimages.is_empty() {
529 let local_signed_commitment_tx = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx.as_ref().expect("Channel needs at least an initial commitment tx !");
530 let prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.as_ref();
531 let min_idx = self.get_min_seen_secret();
532 let remote_hash_commitment_number = &mut self.remote_hash_commitment_number;
534 self.payment_preimages.retain(|&k, _| {
535 for &(ref htlc, _, _, _) in &local_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs {
536 if k == htlc.payment_hash {
540 if let Some(prev_local_commitment_tx) = prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
541 for &(ref htlc, _, _, _) in prev_local_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
542 if k == htlc.payment_hash {
547 let contains = if let Some(cn) = remote_hash_commitment_number.get(&k) {
554 remote_hash_commitment_number.remove(&k);
563 /// Informs this monitor of the latest remote (ie non-broadcastable) commitment transaction.
564 /// The monitor watches for it to be broadcasted and then uses the HTLC information (and
565 /// possibly future revocation/preimage information) to claim outputs where possible.
566 /// We cache also the mapping hash:commitment number to lighten pruning of old preimages by watchtowers.
567 pub(super) fn provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, unsigned_commitment_tx: &Transaction, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<HTLCSource>)>, commitment_number: u64, their_revocation_point: PublicKey) {
568 // TODO: Encrypt the htlc_outputs data with the single-hash of the commitment transaction
569 // so that a remote monitor doesn't learn anything unless there is a malicious close.
570 // (only maybe, sadly we cant do the same for local info, as we need to be aware of
572 for &(ref htlc, _) in &htlc_outputs {
573 self.remote_hash_commitment_number.insert(htlc.payment_hash, commitment_number);
575 // We prune old claimable outpoints, useless to pass backward state when remote commitment
576 // tx get revoked, optimize for storage
577 for (_, htlc_data) in self.remote_claimable_outpoints.iter_mut() {
578 for &mut(_, ref mut source) in htlc_data.iter_mut() {
582 self.remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(unsigned_commitment_tx.txid(), htlc_outputs);
583 self.current_remote_commitment_number = commitment_number;
584 //TODO: Merge this into the other per-remote-transaction output storage stuff
585 match self.their_cur_revocation_points {
586 Some(old_points) => {
587 if old_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 {
588 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0, old_points.1, Some(their_revocation_point)));
589 } else if old_points.0 == commitment_number + 2 {
590 if let Some(old_second_point) = old_points.2 {
591 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0 - 1, old_second_point, Some(their_revocation_point)));
593 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None));
596 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None));
600 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None));
605 /// Informs this monitor of the latest local (ie broadcastable) commitment transaction. The
606 /// monitor watches for timeouts and may broadcast it if we approach such a timeout. Thus, it
607 /// is important that any clones of this channel monitor (including remote clones) by kept
608 /// up-to-date as our local commitment transaction is updated.
609 /// Panics if set_their_to_self_delay has never been called.
610 /// Also update Storage with latest local per_commitment_point to derive local_delayedkey in
611 /// case of onchain HTLC tx
612 pub(super) fn provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, signed_commitment_tx: Transaction, local_keys: chan_utils::TxCreationKeys, feerate_per_kw: u64, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Signature, Signature, Option<HTLCSource>)>) {
613 assert!(self.their_to_self_delay.is_some());
614 self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx.take();
615 self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(LocalSignedTx {
616 txid: signed_commitment_tx.txid(),
617 tx: signed_commitment_tx,
618 revocation_key: local_keys.revocation_key,
619 a_htlc_key: local_keys.a_htlc_key,
620 b_htlc_key: local_keys.b_htlc_key,
621 delayed_payment_key: local_keys.a_delayed_payment_key,
625 self.key_storage = if let Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref payment_base_key, ref shutdown_pubkey, ref latest_per_commitment_point, ref mut funding_info, ref short_channel_id, .. } = self.key_storage {
627 revocation_base_key: *revocation_base_key,
628 htlc_base_key: *htlc_base_key,
629 delayed_payment_base_key: *delayed_payment_base_key,
630 payment_base_key: *payment_base_key,
631 shutdown_pubkey: *shutdown_pubkey,
632 prev_latest_per_commitment_point: *latest_per_commitment_point,
633 latest_per_commitment_point: Some(local_keys.per_commitment_point),
634 funding_info: funding_info.take(),
635 short_channel_id: *short_channel_id,
637 } else { unimplemented!(); };
640 /// Provides a payment_hash->payment_preimage mapping. Will be automatically pruned when all
641 /// commitment_tx_infos which contain the payment hash have been revoked.
642 pub(super) fn provide_payment_preimage(&mut self, payment_hash: &[u8; 32], payment_preimage: &[u8; 32]) {
643 self.payment_preimages.insert(payment_hash.clone(), payment_preimage.clone());
646 /// Combines this ChannelMonitor with the information contained in the other ChannelMonitor.
647 /// After a successful call this ChannelMonitor is up-to-date and is safe to use to monitor the
648 /// chain for new blocks/transactions.
649 pub fn insert_combine(&mut self, mut other: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
651 self.key_storage = match self.key_storage {
652 Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref payment_base_key, ref shutdown_pubkey, ref prev_latest_per_commitment_point, ref latest_per_commitment_point, ref mut funding_info, ref mut short_channel_id, .. } => {
654 macro_rules! new_storage_local {
655 ($funding_info: expr, $short_channel_id: expr) => {
657 revocation_base_key: *revocation_base_key,
658 htlc_base_key: *htlc_base_key,
659 delayed_payment_base_key: *delayed_payment_base_key,
660 payment_base_key: *payment_base_key,
661 shutdown_pubkey: *shutdown_pubkey,
662 prev_latest_per_commitment_point: *prev_latest_per_commitment_point,
663 latest_per_commitment_point: *latest_per_commitment_point,
664 funding_info: $funding_info,
665 short_channel_id: $short_channel_id,
670 let our_funding_info = funding_info;
671 let our_short_channel_id = short_channel_id;
672 if let Storage::Local { ref mut funding_info, ref mut short_channel_id, .. } = other.key_storage {
673 if our_funding_info.is_some() {
674 // We should be able to compare the entire funding_txo, but in fuzztarget its trivially
675 // easy to collide the funding_txo hash and have a different scriptPubKey.
676 if funding_info.is_some() && our_funding_info.is_some() && funding_info.as_ref().unwrap().0 != our_funding_info.as_ref().unwrap().0 {
677 return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Funding transaction outputs are not identical!"));
679 new_storage_local!(our_funding_info.take(), our_short_channel_id.take())
682 new_storage_local!(funding_info.take(), short_channel_id.take())
685 return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Try to combine a Local monitor with a Watchtower one !"));
688 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
689 if let Storage::Watchtower { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, ref mut sigs } = other.key_storage {
690 Storage::Watchtower {
691 revocation_base_key: *revocation_base_key,
692 htlc_base_key: *htlc_base_key,
693 sigs: sigs.drain().collect(),
696 return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Try to combine a Watchtower monitor with a Local one !"));
700 let other_min_secret = other.get_min_seen_secret();
701 let our_min_secret = self.get_min_seen_secret();
702 if our_min_secret > other_min_secret {
703 self.provide_secret(other_min_secret, other.get_secret(other_min_secret).unwrap())?;
705 if let Some(ref local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
706 if let Some(ref other_local_tx) = other.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
707 let our_commitment_number = 0xffffffffffff - ((((local_tx.tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (local_tx.tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor);
708 let other_commitment_number = 0xffffffffffff - ((((other_local_tx.tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (other_local_tx.tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ other.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor);
709 if our_commitment_number >= other_commitment_number {
710 self.key_storage = other.key_storage;
714 // TODO: We should use current_remote_commitment_number and the commitment number out of
715 // local transactions to decide how to merge
716 if our_min_secret >= other_min_secret {
717 self.their_cur_revocation_points = other.their_cur_revocation_points;
718 for (txid, htlcs) in other.remote_claimable_outpoints.drain() {
719 self.remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, htlcs);
721 if let Some(local_tx) = other.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
722 self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(local_tx);
724 if let Some(local_tx) = other.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
725 self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(local_tx);
727 self.payment_preimages = other.payment_preimages;
730 self.current_remote_commitment_number = cmp::min(self.current_remote_commitment_number, other.current_remote_commitment_number);
734 /// Panics if commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor doesn't fit in 48 bits
735 pub(super) fn set_commitment_obscure_factor(&mut self, commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64) {
736 assert!(commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor < (1 << 48));
737 self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor = commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor;
740 /// Allows this monitor to scan only for transactions which are applicable. Note that this is
741 /// optional, without it this monitor cannot be used in an SPV client, but you may wish to
742 /// avoid this (or call unset_funding_info) on a monitor you wish to send to a watchtower as it
743 /// provides slightly better privacy.
744 /// It's the responsibility of the caller to register outpoint and script with passing the former
745 /// value as key to add_update_monitor.
746 pub(super) fn set_funding_info(&mut self, funding_info: (OutPoint, Script)) {
747 self.key_storage = match self.key_storage {
748 Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref payment_base_key, ref shutdown_pubkey, ref prev_latest_per_commitment_point, ref latest_per_commitment_point, short_channel_id, .. } => {
750 revocation_base_key: *revocation_base_key,
751 htlc_base_key: *htlc_base_key,
752 delayed_payment_base_key: *delayed_payment_base_key,
753 payment_base_key: *payment_base_key,
754 shutdown_pubkey: *shutdown_pubkey,
755 prev_latest_per_commitment_point: *prev_latest_per_commitment_point,
756 latest_per_commitment_point: *latest_per_commitment_point,
757 funding_info: Some(funding_info.clone()),
758 short_channel_id: short_channel_id,
761 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
767 /// Allows this monitor to get preimages from upstream ChannelMonitor (linked by ManyChannelMonitor)
768 /// in cas of onchain remote commitment tx resolved by a HTLC-Succes one but you may wish to
769 /// avoid this (or call unset_funding_info) on a monitor you wish to send to a watchtower as it
770 /// provides slightly better privacy.
771 pub(super) fn set_short_channel_id(&mut self, short_channel_id: u64) {
772 self.key_storage = match self.key_storage {
773 Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref payment_base_key, ref shutdown_pubkey, ref prev_latest_per_commitment_point, ref latest_per_commitment_point, ref mut funding_info, .. } => {
775 revocation_base_key: *revocation_base_key,
776 htlc_base_key: *htlc_base_key,
777 delayed_payment_base_key: *delayed_payment_base_key,
778 payment_base_key: *payment_base_key,
779 shutdown_pubkey: *shutdown_pubkey,
780 prev_latest_per_commitment_point: *prev_latest_per_commitment_point,
781 latest_per_commitment_point: *latest_per_commitment_point,
782 funding_info: funding_info.take(),
783 short_channel_id: Some(short_channel_id),
786 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
792 /// We log these base keys at channel opening to being able to rebuild redeemscript in case of leaked revoked commit tx
793 pub(super) fn set_their_base_keys(&mut self, their_htlc_base_key: &PublicKey, their_delayed_payment_base_key: &PublicKey) {
794 self.their_htlc_base_key = Some(their_htlc_base_key.clone());
795 self.their_delayed_payment_base_key = Some(their_delayed_payment_base_key.clone());
798 pub(super) fn set_their_to_self_delay(&mut self, their_to_self_delay: u16) {
799 self.their_to_self_delay = Some(their_to_self_delay);
802 pub(super) fn unset_funding_info(&mut self) {
803 self.key_storage = match self.key_storage {
804 Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref payment_base_key, ref shutdown_pubkey, ref prev_latest_per_commitment_point, ref latest_per_commitment_point, short_channel_id, .. } => {
806 revocation_base_key: *revocation_base_key,
807 htlc_base_key: *htlc_base_key,
808 delayed_payment_base_key: *delayed_payment_base_key,
809 payment_base_key: *payment_base_key,
810 shutdown_pubkey: *shutdown_pubkey,
811 prev_latest_per_commitment_point: *prev_latest_per_commitment_point,
812 latest_per_commitment_point: *latest_per_commitment_point,
814 short_channel_id: short_channel_id,
817 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
823 /// Gets the funding transaction outpoint of the channel this ChannelMonitor is monitoring for.
824 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
825 match self.key_storage {
826 Storage::Local { ref funding_info, .. } => {
828 &Some((outpoint, _)) => Some(outpoint),
832 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
838 /// Gets the sets of all outpoints which this ChannelMonitor expects to hear about spends of.
839 /// Generally useful when deserializing as during normal operation the return values of
840 /// block_connected are sufficient to ensure all relevant outpoints are being monitored (note
841 /// that the get_funding_txo outpoint and transaction must also be monitored for!).
842 pub fn get_monitored_outpoints(&self) -> Vec<(Sha256dHash, u32, &Script)> {
843 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.len() * 2);
844 for (ref txid, &(_, ref outputs)) in self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
845 for (idx, output) in outputs.iter().enumerate() {
846 res.push(((*txid).clone(), idx as u32, output));
852 /// Serializes into a vec, with various modes for the exposed pub fns
853 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W, for_local_storage: bool) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
854 //TODO: We still write out all the serialization here manually instead of using the fancy
855 //serialization framework we have, we should migrate things over to it.
856 writer.write_all(&[SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
857 writer.write_all(&[MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
859 // Set in initial Channel-object creation, so should always be set by now:
860 U48(self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor).write(writer)?;
862 match self.key_storage {
863 Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref payment_base_key, ref shutdown_pubkey, ref prev_latest_per_commitment_point, ref latest_per_commitment_point, ref funding_info, ref short_channel_id } => {
864 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
865 writer.write_all(&revocation_base_key[..])?;
866 writer.write_all(&htlc_base_key[..])?;
867 writer.write_all(&delayed_payment_base_key[..])?;
868 writer.write_all(&payment_base_key[..])?;
869 writer.write_all(&shutdown_pubkey.serialize())?;
870 if let Some(ref prev_latest_per_commitment_point) = *prev_latest_per_commitment_point {
871 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
872 writer.write_all(&prev_latest_per_commitment_point.serialize())?;
874 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
876 if let Some(ref latest_per_commitment_point) = *latest_per_commitment_point {
877 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
878 writer.write_all(&latest_per_commitment_point.serialize())?;
880 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
883 &Some((ref outpoint, ref script)) => {
884 writer.write_all(&outpoint.txid[..])?;
885 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(outpoint.index))?;
886 script.write(writer)?;
889 debug_assert!(false, "Try to serialize a useless Local monitor !");
892 match short_channel_id {
893 &Some(short_channel_id) => {
894 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
895 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(short_channel_id))?;
898 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
902 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => unimplemented!(),
905 writer.write_all(&self.their_htlc_base_key.as_ref().unwrap().serialize())?;
906 writer.write_all(&self.their_delayed_payment_base_key.as_ref().unwrap().serialize())?;
908 match self.their_cur_revocation_points {
909 Some((idx, pubkey, second_option)) => {
910 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(idx))?;
911 writer.write_all(&pubkey.serialize())?;
912 match second_option {
913 Some(second_pubkey) => {
914 writer.write_all(&second_pubkey.serialize())?;
917 writer.write_all(&[0; 33])?;
922 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(0))?;
926 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.our_to_self_delay))?;
927 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap()))?;
929 for &(ref secret, ref idx) in self.old_secrets.iter() {
930 writer.write_all(secret)?;
931 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*idx))?;
934 macro_rules! serialize_htlc_in_commitment {
935 ($htlc_output: expr) => {
936 writer.write_all(&[$htlc_output.offered as u8; 1])?;
937 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc_output.amount_msat))?;
938 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array($htlc_output.cltv_expiry))?;
939 writer.write_all(&$htlc_output.payment_hash)?;
940 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array($htlc_output.transaction_output_index))?;
944 macro_rules! serialize_htlc_source {
945 ($htlc_source: expr) => {
946 if let &Some(ref source) = $htlc_source {
947 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
949 &HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref source) => { serialize_htlc_previous_hop_data!(source); },
950 &HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref route, ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat } => { serialize_htlc_outbound_route!(route, session_priv, *first_hop_htlc_msat); },
953 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
958 macro_rules! serialize_htlc_previous_hop_data {
959 ($htlc_source: expr) => {
960 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
961 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc_source.short_channel_id))?;
962 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc_source.htlc_id))?;
963 writer.write_all(&$htlc_source.incoming_packet_shared_secret[..])?;
967 macro_rules! serialize_htlc_outbound_route {
968 ($route: expr, $session_priv: expr, $first_hop_htlc_msat: expr) => {
969 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
970 serialize_route!($route);
971 writer.write_all(&$session_priv[..])?;
972 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($first_hop_htlc_msat))?;
976 macro_rules! serialize_route {
978 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($route.hops.len() as u64))?;
979 for hop in &$route.hops {
980 writer.write_all(&hop.pubkey.serialize())?;
981 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(hop.short_channel_id))?;
982 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(hop.fee_msat))?;
983 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(hop.cltv_expiry_delta))?;
988 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_claimable_outpoints.len() as u64))?;
989 for (ref txid, ref htlc_infos) in self.remote_claimable_outpoints.iter() {
990 writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
991 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc_infos.len() as u64))?;
992 for &(ref htlc_output, ref htlc_source) in htlc_infos.iter() {
993 serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output);
994 serialize_htlc_source!(htlc_source);
998 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.len() as u64))?;
999 for (ref txid, &(commitment_number, ref txouts)) in self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
1000 writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
1001 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(commitment_number))?;
1002 (txouts.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
1003 for script in txouts.iter() {
1004 script.write(writer)?;
1008 if for_local_storage {
1009 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_hash_commitment_number.len() as u64))?;
1010 for (ref payment_hash, commitment_number) in self.remote_hash_commitment_number.iter() {
1011 writer.write_all(*payment_hash)?;
1012 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(*commitment_number))?;
1015 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(0))?;
1018 macro_rules! serialize_local_tx {
1019 ($local_tx: expr) => {
1020 if let Err(e) = $local_tx.tx.consensus_encode(&mut WriterWriteAdaptor(writer)) {
1022 encode::Error::Io(e) => return Err(e),
1023 _ => panic!("local tx must have been well-formed!"),
1027 writer.write_all(&$local_tx.revocation_key.serialize())?;
1028 writer.write_all(&$local_tx.a_htlc_key.serialize())?;
1029 writer.write_all(&$local_tx.b_htlc_key.serialize())?;
1030 writer.write_all(&$local_tx.delayed_payment_key.serialize())?;
1032 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($local_tx.feerate_per_kw))?;
1033 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($local_tx.htlc_outputs.len() as u64))?;
1034 for &(ref htlc_output, ref their_sig, ref our_sig, ref htlc_source) in $local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1035 serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output);
1036 writer.write_all(&their_sig.serialize_compact(&self.secp_ctx))?;
1037 writer.write_all(&our_sig.serialize_compact(&self.secp_ctx))?;
1038 serialize_htlc_source!(htlc_source);
1043 if let Some(ref prev_local_tx) = self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1044 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
1045 serialize_local_tx!(prev_local_tx);
1047 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
1050 if let Some(ref cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1051 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
1052 serialize_local_tx!(cur_local_tx);
1054 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
1057 if for_local_storage {
1058 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(self.current_remote_commitment_number))?;
1060 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(0))?;
1063 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.payment_preimages.len() as u64))?;
1064 for payment_preimage in self.payment_preimages.values() {
1065 writer.write_all(payment_preimage)?;
1068 self.last_block_hash.write(writer)?;
1069 self.destination_script.write(writer)?;
1074 /// Writes this monitor into the given writer, suitable for writing to disk.
1076 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor), which
1077 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
1078 /// the "reorg path" (ie not just starting at the same height but starting at the highest
1079 /// common block that appears on your best chain as well as on the chain which contains the
1080 /// last block hash returned) upon deserializing the object!
1081 pub fn write_for_disk<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
1082 self.write(writer, true)
1085 /// Encodes this monitor into the given writer, suitable for sending to a remote watchtower
1087 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor), which
1088 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
1089 /// the "reorg path" (ie not just starting at the same height but starting at the highest
1090 /// common block that appears on your best chain as well as on the chain which contains the
1091 /// last block hash returned) upon deserializing the object!
1092 pub fn write_for_watchtower<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
1093 self.write(writer, false)
1096 //TODO: Functions to serialize/deserialize (with different forms depending on which information
1097 //we want to leave out (eg funding_txo, etc).
1099 /// Can only fail if idx is < get_min_seen_secret
1100 pub(super) fn get_secret(&self, idx: u64) -> Option<[u8; 32]> {
1101 for i in 0..self.old_secrets.len() {
1102 if (idx & (!((1 << i) - 1))) == self.old_secrets[i].1 {
1103 return Some(ChannelMonitor::derive_secret(self.old_secrets[i].0, i as u8, idx))
1106 assert!(idx < self.get_min_seen_secret());
1110 pub(super) fn get_min_seen_secret(&self) -> u64 {
1111 //TODO This can be optimized?
1112 let mut min = 1 << 48;
1113 for &(_, idx) in self.old_secrets.iter() {
1121 pub(super) fn get_cur_remote_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
1122 self.current_remote_commitment_number
1125 pub(super) fn get_cur_local_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
1126 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1127 0xffff_ffff_ffff - ((((local_tx.tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (local_tx.tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor)
1128 } else { 0xffff_ffff_ffff }
1131 /// Attempts to claim a remote commitment transaction's outputs using the revocation key and
1132 /// data in remote_claimable_outpoints. Will directly claim any HTLC outputs which expire at a
1133 /// height > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER. In any case, will install monitoring for
1134 /// HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions.
1135 fn check_spend_remote_transaction(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32) -> (Vec<Transaction>, (Sha256dHash, Vec<TxOut>), Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>) {
1136 // Most secp and related errors trying to create keys means we have no hope of constructing
1137 // a spend transaction...so we return no transactions to broadcast
1138 let mut txn_to_broadcast = Vec::new();
1139 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
1140 let mut spendable_outputs = Vec::new();
1142 let commitment_txid = tx.txid(); //TODO: This is gonna be a performance bottleneck for watchtowers!
1143 let per_commitment_option = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(&commitment_txid);
1145 macro_rules! ignore_error {
1146 ( $thing : expr ) => {
1149 Err(_) => return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs)
1154 let commitment_number = 0xffffffffffff - ((((tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor);
1155 if commitment_number >= self.get_min_seen_secret() {
1156 let secret = self.get_secret(commitment_number).unwrap();
1157 let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &secret));
1158 let (revocation_pubkey, b_htlc_key, local_payment_key) = match self.key_storage {
1159 Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, ref payment_base_key, .. } => {
1160 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
1161 (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_base_key))),
1162 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &htlc_base_key))),
1163 Some(ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &payment_base_key))))
1165 Storage::Watchtower { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
1166 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
1167 (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &revocation_base_key)),
1168 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &htlc_base_key)),
1172 let delayed_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key), &self.their_delayed_payment_base_key.unwrap()));
1173 let a_htlc_key = match self.their_htlc_base_key {
1174 None => return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs),
1175 Some(their_htlc_base_key) => ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key), &their_htlc_base_key)),
1178 let revokeable_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey, self.our_to_self_delay, &delayed_key);
1179 let revokeable_p2wsh = revokeable_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
1181 let local_payment_p2wpkh = if let Some(payment_key) = local_payment_key {
1182 // Note that the Network here is ignored as we immediately drop the address for the
1183 // script_pubkey version.
1184 let payment_hash160 = Hash160::from_data(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &payment_key).serialize());
1185 Some(Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::All::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&payment_hash160[..]).into_script())
1188 let mut total_value = 0;
1189 let mut values = Vec::new();
1190 let mut inputs = Vec::new();
1191 let mut htlc_idxs = Vec::new();
1193 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
1194 if outp.script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh {
1196 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
1197 txid: commitment_txid,
1200 script_sig: Script::new(),
1201 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
1202 witness: Vec::new(),
1204 htlc_idxs.push(None);
1205 values.push(outp.value);
1206 total_value += outp.value;
1207 } else if Some(&outp.script_pubkey) == local_payment_p2wpkh.as_ref() {
1208 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WPKH {
1209 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: commitment_txid, vout: idx as u32 },
1210 key: local_payment_key.unwrap(),
1211 output: outp.clone(),
1216 macro_rules! sign_input {
1217 ($sighash_parts: expr, $input: expr, $htlc_idx: expr, $amount: expr) => {
1219 let (sig, redeemscript) = match self.key_storage {
1220 Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
1221 let redeemscript = if $htlc_idx.is_none() { revokeable_redeemscript.clone() } else {
1222 let htlc = &per_commitment_option.unwrap()[$htlc_idx.unwrap()].0;
1223 chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey)
1225 let sighash = ignore_error!(Message::from_slice(&$sighash_parts.sighash_all(&$input, &redeemscript, $amount)[..]));
1226 let revocation_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key, &revocation_base_key));
1227 (self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &revocation_key), redeemscript)
1229 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
1233 $input.witness.push(sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
1234 $input.witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1235 if $htlc_idx.is_none() {
1236 $input.witness.push(vec!(1));
1238 $input.witness.push(revocation_pubkey.serialize().to_vec());
1240 $input.witness.push(redeemscript.into_bytes());
1245 if let Some(per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
1246 inputs.reserve_exact(per_commitment_data.len());
1248 for (idx, &(ref htlc, _)) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() {
1249 let expected_script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey);
1250 if htlc.transaction_output_index as usize >= tx.output.len() ||
1251 tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 ||
1252 tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].script_pubkey != expected_script.to_v0_p2wsh() {
1253 return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs); // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user
1256 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
1257 txid: commitment_txid,
1258 vout: htlc.transaction_output_index,
1260 script_sig: Script::new(),
1261 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
1262 witness: Vec::new(),
1264 if htlc.cltv_expiry > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER {
1266 htlc_idxs.push(Some(idx));
1267 values.push(tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].value);
1268 total_value += htlc.amount_msat / 1000;
1270 let mut single_htlc_tx = Transaction {
1274 output: vec!(TxOut {
1275 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1276 value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000, //TODO: - fee
1279 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&single_htlc_tx);
1280 sign_input!(sighash_parts, single_htlc_tx.input[0], Some(idx), htlc.amount_msat / 1000);
1281 txn_to_broadcast.push(single_htlc_tx);
1286 if !inputs.is_empty() || !txn_to_broadcast.is_empty() { // ie we're confident this is actually ours
1287 // We're definitely a remote commitment transaction!
1288 watch_outputs.append(&mut tx.output.clone());
1289 self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, (commitment_number, tx.output.iter().map(|output| { output.script_pubkey.clone() }).collect()));
1291 if inputs.is_empty() { return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs); } // Nothing to be done...probably a false positive/local tx
1293 let outputs = vec!(TxOut {
1294 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1295 value: total_value, //TODO: - fee
1297 let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
1304 let mut values_drain = values.drain(..);
1305 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx);
1307 for (input, htlc_idx) in spend_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(htlc_idxs.iter()) {
1308 let value = values_drain.next().unwrap();
1309 sign_input!(sighash_parts, input, htlc_idx, value);
1312 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
1313 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: spend_tx.txid(), vout: 0 },
1314 output: spend_tx.output[0].clone(),
1316 txn_to_broadcast.push(spend_tx);
1317 } else if let Some(per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
1318 // While this isn't useful yet, there is a potential race where if a counterparty
1319 // revokes a state at the same time as the commitment transaction for that state is
1320 // confirmed, and the watchtower receives the block before the user, the user could
1321 // upload a new ChannelMonitor with the revocation secret but the watchtower has
1322 // already processed the block, resulting in the remote_commitment_txn_on_chain entry
1323 // not being generated by the above conditional. Thus, to be safe, we go ahead and
1325 watch_outputs.append(&mut tx.output.clone());
1326 self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, (commitment_number, tx.output.iter().map(|output| { output.script_pubkey.clone() }).collect()));
1328 if let Some(revocation_points) = self.their_cur_revocation_points {
1329 let revocation_point_option =
1330 if revocation_points.0 == commitment_number { Some(&revocation_points.1) }
1331 else if let Some(point) = revocation_points.2.as_ref() {
1332 if revocation_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 { Some(point) } else { None }
1334 if let Some(revocation_point) = revocation_point_option {
1335 let (revocation_pubkey, b_htlc_key) = match self.key_storage {
1336 Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
1337 (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_base_key))),
1338 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &htlc_base_key))))
1340 Storage::Watchtower { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
1341 (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &revocation_base_key)),
1342 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &htlc_base_key)))
1345 let a_htlc_key = match self.their_htlc_base_key {
1346 None => return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs),
1347 Some(their_htlc_base_key) => ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &their_htlc_base_key)),
1350 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
1351 if outp.script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh() {
1352 match self.key_storage {
1353 Storage::Local { ref payment_base_key, .. } => {
1354 if let Ok(local_key) = chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_point, &payment_base_key) {
1355 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WPKH {
1356 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: commitment_txid, vout: idx as u32 },
1358 output: outp.clone(),
1362 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {}
1364 break; // Only to_remote ouput is claimable
1368 let mut total_value = 0;
1369 let mut values = Vec::new();
1370 let mut inputs = Vec::new();
1372 macro_rules! sign_input {
1373 ($sighash_parts: expr, $input: expr, $amount: expr, $preimage: expr) => {
1375 let (sig, redeemscript) = match self.key_storage {
1376 Storage::Local { ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
1377 let htlc = &per_commitment_option.unwrap()[$input.sequence as usize].0;
1378 let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey);
1379 let sighash = ignore_error!(Message::from_slice(&$sighash_parts.sighash_all(&$input, &redeemscript, $amount)[..]));
1380 let htlc_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &htlc_base_key));
1381 (self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &htlc_key), redeemscript)
1383 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
1387 $input.witness.push(sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
1388 $input.witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1389 $input.witness.push($preimage);
1390 $input.witness.push(redeemscript.into_bytes());
1395 macro_rules! sign_input_timeout {
1396 ($sighash_parts: expr, $input: expr, $amount: expr) => {
1398 let (sig, redeemscript) = match self.key_storage {
1399 Storage::Local { ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
1400 let htlc = &per_commitment_option.unwrap()[$input.sequence as usize].0;
1401 let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey);
1402 let sighash = ignore_error!(Message::from_slice(&$sighash_parts.sighash_all(&$input, &redeemscript, $amount)[..]));
1403 let htlc_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &htlc_base_key));
1404 (self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &htlc_key), redeemscript)
1406 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
1410 $input.witness.push(sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
1411 $input.witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1412 $input.witness.push(vec![0]);
1413 $input.witness.push(redeemscript.into_bytes());
1418 for (idx, &(ref htlc, _)) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() {
1419 if let Some(payment_preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
1421 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
1422 txid: commitment_txid,
1423 vout: htlc.transaction_output_index,
1425 script_sig: Script::new(),
1426 sequence: idx as u32, // reset to 0xfffffffd in sign_input
1427 witness: Vec::new(),
1429 if htlc.cltv_expiry > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER {
1431 values.push((tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].value, payment_preimage));
1432 total_value += htlc.amount_msat / 1000;
1434 let mut single_htlc_tx = Transaction {
1438 output: vec!(TxOut {
1439 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1440 value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000, //TODO: - fee
1443 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&single_htlc_tx);
1444 sign_input!(sighash_parts, single_htlc_tx.input[0], htlc.amount_msat / 1000, payment_preimage.to_vec());
1445 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
1446 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: single_htlc_tx.txid(), vout: 0 },
1447 output: single_htlc_tx.output[0].clone(),
1449 txn_to_broadcast.push(single_htlc_tx);
1454 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
1455 txid: commitment_txid,
1456 vout: htlc.transaction_output_index,
1458 script_sig: Script::new(),
1459 sequence: idx as u32,
1460 witness: Vec::new(),
1462 let mut timeout_tx = Transaction {
1464 lock_time: htlc.cltv_expiry,
1466 output: vec!(TxOut {
1467 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1468 value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1471 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&timeout_tx);
1472 sign_input_timeout!(sighash_parts, timeout_tx.input[0], htlc.amount_msat / 1000);
1473 txn_to_broadcast.push(timeout_tx);
1477 if inputs.is_empty() { return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs); } // Nothing to be done...probably a false positive/local tx
1479 let outputs = vec!(TxOut {
1480 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1481 value: total_value, //TODO: - fee
1483 let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
1490 let mut values_drain = values.drain(..);
1491 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx);
1493 for input in spend_tx.input.iter_mut() {
1494 let value = values_drain.next().unwrap();
1495 sign_input!(sighash_parts, input, value.0, value.1.to_vec());
1498 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
1499 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: spend_tx.txid(), vout: 0 },
1500 output: spend_tx.output[0].clone(),
1502 txn_to_broadcast.push(spend_tx);
1507 (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs)
1510 /// Attempst to claim a remote HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout s outputs using the revocation key
1511 fn check_spend_remote_htlc(&self, tx: &Transaction, commitment_number: u64) -> (Option<Transaction>, Option<SpendableOutputDescriptor>) {
1512 if tx.input.len() != 1 || tx.output.len() != 1 {
1516 macro_rules! ignore_error {
1517 ( $thing : expr ) => {
1520 Err(_) => return (None, None)
1525 let secret = if let Some(secret) = self.get_secret(commitment_number) { secret } else { return (None, None); };
1526 let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &secret));
1527 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
1528 let revocation_pubkey = match self.key_storage {
1529 Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
1530 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_base_key)))
1532 Storage::Watchtower { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
1533 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &revocation_base_key))
1536 let delayed_key = match self.their_delayed_payment_base_key {
1537 None => return (None, None),
1538 Some(their_delayed_payment_base_key) => ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &their_delayed_payment_base_key)),
1540 let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), &delayed_key);
1541 let revokeable_p2wsh = redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
1542 let htlc_txid = tx.txid(); //TODO: This is gonna be a performance bottleneck for watchtowers!
1544 let mut inputs = Vec::new();
1547 if tx.output[0].script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh { //HTLC transactions have one txin, one txout
1549 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
1553 script_sig: Script::new(),
1554 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
1555 witness: Vec::new(),
1557 amount = tx.output[0].value;
1560 if !inputs.is_empty() {
1561 let outputs = vec!(TxOut {
1562 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1563 value: amount, //TODO: - fee
1566 let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
1573 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx);
1575 let sig = match self.key_storage {
1576 Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
1577 let sighash = ignore_error!(Message::from_slice(&sighash_parts.sighash_all(&spend_tx.input[0], &redeemscript, amount)[..]));
1578 let revocation_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key, &revocation_base_key));
1579 self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &revocation_key)
1581 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
1585 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
1586 spend_tx.input[0].witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1587 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(vec!(1));
1588 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(redeemscript.into_bytes());
1590 let outpoint = BitcoinOutPoint { txid: spend_tx.txid(), vout: 0 };
1591 let output = spend_tx.output[0].clone();
1592 (Some(spend_tx), Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput { outpoint, output }))
1593 } else { (None, None) }
1596 fn broadcast_by_local_state(&self, local_tx: &LocalSignedTx, per_commitment_point: &Option<PublicKey>, delayed_payment_base_key: &Option<SecretKey>) -> (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>, Vec<TxOut>) {
1597 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
1598 let mut spendable_outputs = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
1599 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
1601 macro_rules! add_dynamic_output {
1602 ($father_tx: expr, $vout: expr) => {
1603 if let Some(ref per_commitment_point) = *per_commitment_point {
1604 if let Some(ref delayed_payment_base_key) = *delayed_payment_base_key {
1605 if let Ok(local_delayedkey) = chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base_key) {
1606 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WSH {
1607 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: $father_tx.txid(), vout: $vout },
1608 key: local_delayedkey,
1609 witness_script: chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&local_tx.revocation_key, self.our_to_self_delay, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key),
1610 to_self_delay: self.our_to_self_delay,
1611 output: $father_tx.output[$vout as usize].clone(),
1620 let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&local_tx.revocation_key, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), &local_tx.delayed_payment_key);
1621 let revokeable_p2wsh = redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
1622 for (idx, output) in local_tx.tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
1623 if output.script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh {
1624 add_dynamic_output!(local_tx.tx, idx as u32);
1629 for &(ref htlc, ref their_sig, ref our_sig, _) in local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1631 let mut htlc_timeout_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&local_tx.txid, local_tx.feerate_per_kw, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), htlc, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key, &local_tx.revocation_key);
1633 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
1635 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(their_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
1636 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1637 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
1638 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1640 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new());
1641 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &local_tx.a_htlc_key, &local_tx.b_htlc_key, &local_tx.revocation_key).into_bytes());
1643 add_dynamic_output!(htlc_timeout_tx, 0);
1644 res.push(htlc_timeout_tx);
1646 if let Some(payment_preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
1647 let mut htlc_success_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&local_tx.txid, local_tx.feerate_per_kw, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), htlc, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key, &local_tx.revocation_key);
1649 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
1651 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(their_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
1652 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1653 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
1654 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1656 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(payment_preimage.to_vec());
1657 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &local_tx.a_htlc_key, &local_tx.b_htlc_key, &local_tx.revocation_key).into_bytes());
1659 add_dynamic_output!(htlc_success_tx, 0);
1660 res.push(htlc_success_tx);
1663 watch_outputs.push(local_tx.tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].clone());
1666 (res, spendable_outputs, watch_outputs)
1669 /// Attempts to claim any claimable HTLCs in a commitment transaction which was not (yet)
1670 /// revoked using data in local_claimable_outpoints.
1671 /// Should not be used if check_spend_revoked_transaction succeeds.
1672 fn check_spend_local_transaction(&self, tx: &Transaction, _height: u32) -> (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>, (Sha256dHash, Vec<TxOut>)) {
1673 let commitment_txid = tx.txid();
1674 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1675 if local_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
1676 match self.key_storage {
1677 Storage::Local { ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref latest_per_commitment_point, .. } => {
1678 let (local_txn, spendable_outputs, watch_outputs) = self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, latest_per_commitment_point, &Some(*delayed_payment_base_key));
1679 return (local_txn, spendable_outputs, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs));
1681 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
1682 let (local_txn, spendable_outputs, watch_outputs) = self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, &None, &None);
1683 return (local_txn, spendable_outputs, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs));
1688 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1689 if local_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
1690 match self.key_storage {
1691 Storage::Local { ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref prev_latest_per_commitment_point, .. } => {
1692 let (local_txn, spendable_outputs, watch_outputs) = self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, prev_latest_per_commitment_point, &Some(*delayed_payment_base_key));
1693 return (local_txn, spendable_outputs, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs));
1695 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
1696 let (local_txn, spendable_outputs, watch_outputs) = self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, &None, &None);
1697 return (local_txn, spendable_outputs, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs));
1702 (Vec::new(), Vec::new(), (commitment_txid, Vec::new()))
1705 /// Generate a spendable output event when closing_transaction get registered onchain.
1706 fn check_spend_closing_transaction(&self, tx: &Transaction) -> Option<SpendableOutputDescriptor> {
1707 if tx.input[0].sequence == 0xFFFFFFFF && tx.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len() == 71 {
1708 match self.key_storage {
1709 Storage::Local { ref shutdown_pubkey, .. } => {
1710 let our_channel_close_key_hash = Hash160::from_data(&shutdown_pubkey.serialize());
1711 let shutdown_script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::All::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&our_channel_close_key_hash[..]).into_script();
1712 for (idx, output) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
1713 if shutdown_script == output.script_pubkey {
1714 return Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
1715 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), vout: idx as u32 },
1716 output: output.clone(),
1721 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
1722 //TODO: we need to ensure an offline client will generate the event when it
1723 // cames back online after only the watchtower saw the transaction
1730 /// Used by ChannelManager deserialization to broadcast the latest local state if it's copy of
1731 /// the Channel was out-of-date.
1732 pub(super) fn get_latest_local_commitment_txn(&self) -> Vec<Transaction> {
1733 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1734 let mut res = vec![local_tx.tx.clone()];
1735 match self.key_storage {
1736 Storage::Local { ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref prev_latest_per_commitment_point, .. } => {
1737 res.append(&mut self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, prev_latest_per_commitment_point, &Some(*delayed_payment_base_key)).0);
1739 _ => panic!("Can only broadcast by local channelmonitor"),
1747 fn block_connected(&mut self, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], height: u32, block_hash: &Sha256dHash, broadcaster: &BroadcasterInterface)-> (Vec<(Sha256dHash, Vec<TxOut>)>, Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>, Vec<(Option<HTLCSource>, Option<[u8 ; 32]>, [u8; 32])>) {
1748 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
1749 let mut spendable_outputs = Vec::new();
1750 let mut htlc_updated = Vec::new();
1751 for tx in txn_matched {
1752 if tx.input.len() == 1 {
1753 // Assuming our keys were not leaked (in which case we're screwed no matter what),
1754 // commitment transactions and HTLC transactions will all only ever have one input,
1755 // which is an easy way to filter out any potential non-matching txn for lazy
1757 let prevout = &tx.input[0].previous_output;
1758 let mut txn: Vec<Transaction> = Vec::new();
1759 let funding_txo = match self.key_storage {
1760 Storage::Local { ref funding_info, .. } => {
1761 funding_info.clone()
1763 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
1767 if funding_txo.is_none() || (prevout.txid == funding_txo.as_ref().unwrap().0.txid && prevout.vout == funding_txo.as_ref().unwrap().0.index as u32) {
1768 let (remote_txn, new_outputs, mut spendable_output) = self.check_spend_remote_transaction(tx, height);
1770 spendable_outputs.append(&mut spendable_output);
1771 if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() {
1772 watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
1775 let (local_txn, mut spendable_output, new_outputs) = self.check_spend_local_transaction(tx, height);
1776 spendable_outputs.append(&mut spendable_output);
1778 if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() {
1779 watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
1782 if !funding_txo.is_none() && txn.is_empty() {
1783 if let Some(spendable_output) = self.check_spend_closing_transaction(tx) {
1784 spendable_outputs.push(spendable_output);
1788 if let Some(&(commitment_number, _)) = self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.get(&prevout.txid) {
1789 let (tx, spendable_output) = self.check_spend_remote_htlc(tx, commitment_number);
1790 if let Some(tx) = tx {
1793 if let Some(spendable_output) = spendable_output {
1794 spendable_outputs.push(spendable_output);
1798 for tx in txn.iter() {
1799 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(tx);
1801 let mut updated = self.is_resolving_output(tx);
1802 if updated.len() > 0 {
1803 htlc_updated.append(&mut updated);
1807 if let Some(ref cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1808 if self.would_broadcast_at_height(height) {
1809 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&cur_local_tx.tx);
1810 match self.key_storage {
1811 Storage::Local { ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref latest_per_commitment_point, .. } => {
1812 let (txs, mut spendable_output, new_outputs) = self.broadcast_by_local_state(&cur_local_tx, latest_per_commitment_point, &Some(*delayed_payment_base_key));
1813 spendable_outputs.append(&mut spendable_output);
1814 if !new_outputs.is_empty() {
1815 watch_outputs.push((cur_local_tx.txid.clone(), new_outputs));
1818 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
1821 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
1822 let (txs, mut spendable_output, new_outputs) = self.broadcast_by_local_state(&cur_local_tx, &None, &None);
1823 spendable_outputs.append(&mut spendable_output);
1824 if !new_outputs.is_empty() {
1825 watch_outputs.push((cur_local_tx.txid.clone(), new_outputs));
1828 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
1834 self.last_block_hash = block_hash.clone();
1835 (watch_outputs, spendable_outputs, htlc_updated)
1838 pub(super) fn would_broadcast_at_height(&self, height: u32) -> bool {
1839 if let Some(ref cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1840 for &(ref htlc, _, _, _) in cur_local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1841 // For inbound HTLCs which we know the preimage for, we have to ensure we hit the
1842 // chain with enough room to claim the HTLC without our counterparty being able to
1843 // time out the HTLC first.
1844 // For outbound HTLCs which our counterparty hasn't failed/claimed, our primary
1845 // concern is being able to claim the corresponding inbound HTLC (on another
1846 // channel) before it expires. In fact, we don't even really care if our
1847 // counterparty here claims such an outbound HTLC after it expired as long as we
1848 // can still claim the corresponding HTLC. Thus, to avoid needlessly hitting the
1849 // chain when our counterparty is waiting for expiration to off-chain fail an HTLC
1850 // we give ourselves a few blocks of headroom after expiration before going
1851 // on-chain for an expired HTLC.
1852 // Note that, to avoid a potential attack whereby a node delays claiming an HTLC
1853 // from us until we've reached the point where we go on-chain with the
1854 // corresponding inbound HTLC, we must ensure that outbound HTLCs go on chain at
1855 // least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER blocks prior to the inbound HTLC.
1856 // aka outbound_cltv + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS == height - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
1857 // inbound_cltv == height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
1858 // outbound_cltv + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFER <= inbound_cltv - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
1859 // HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS + 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFER <= inbound_cltv - outbound_cltv
1860 // HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS + 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFER <= CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA
1861 if ( htlc.offered && htlc.cltv_expiry + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS <= height) ||
1862 (!htlc.offered && htlc.cltv_expiry <= height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER && self.payment_preimages.contains_key(&htlc.payment_hash)) {
1870 pub(crate) fn is_resolving_output(&mut self, tx: &Transaction) -> Vec<(Option<HTLCSource>, Option<[u8;32]>, [u8;32])> {
1871 let mut htlc_updated = Vec::new();
1873 let commitment_number = 0xffffffffffff - ((((tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor);
1874 if commitment_number >= self.get_min_seen_secret() {
1875 if let Some(ref current_local_signed_commitment_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1876 for htlc_output in ¤t_local_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs {
1877 htlc_updated.push((htlc_output.3.clone(), None, htlc_output.0.payment_hash.clone()))
1880 if let Some(ref prev_local_signed_commitment_tx) = self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1881 for htlc_output in &prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs {
1882 htlc_updated.push((htlc_output.3.clone(), None, htlc_output.0.payment_hash.clone()))
1885 // No need to check remote_claimabe_outpoints, symmetric HTLCSource must be present as per-htlc data on local commitment tx
1886 } else if tx.input.len() > 0{
1887 for input in &tx.input {
1888 let mut payment_data: (Option<HTLCSource>, Option<[u8;32]>, Option<[u8;32]>) = (None, None, None);
1889 if let Some(ref current_local_signed_commitment_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1890 if input.previous_output.txid == current_local_signed_commitment_tx.txid {
1891 for htlc_output in ¤t_local_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs {
1892 if input.previous_output.vout == htlc_output.0.transaction_output_index {
1893 payment_data = (htlc_output.3.clone(), None, Some(htlc_output.0.payment_hash.clone()));
1898 if let Some(ref prev_local_signed_commitment_tx) = self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1899 if input.previous_output.txid == prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.txid {
1900 for htlc_output in &prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs {
1901 if input.previous_output.vout == htlc_output.0.transaction_output_index {
1902 payment_data = (htlc_output.3.clone(), None, Some(htlc_output.0.payment_hash.clone()));
1907 if let Some(htlc_outputs) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(&input.previous_output.txid) {
1908 for htlc_output in htlc_outputs {
1909 if input.previous_output.vout == htlc_output.0.transaction_output_index {
1910 payment_data = (htlc_output.1.clone(), None, Some(htlc_output.0.payment_hash.clone()));
1914 // If tx isn't solving htlc output from local/remote commitment tx and htlc isn't outbound we don't need
1915 // to broadcast solving backward
1916 if payment_data.0.is_some() && payment_data.2.is_some() {
1917 let mut payment_preimage = [0; 32];
1918 let mut preimage = None;
1919 if input.witness.len() == 5 && input.witness[4].len() == ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT {
1920 for (arr, vec) in payment_preimage.iter_mut().zip(tx.input[0].witness[3].iter()) {
1923 preimage = Some(payment_preimage);
1924 } else if input.witness.len() == 3 && input.witness[2].len() == OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT {
1925 for (arr, vec) in payment_preimage.iter_mut().zip(tx.input[0].witness[1].iter()) {
1928 preimage = Some(payment_preimage);
1930 htlc_updated.push((payment_data.0, preimage, payment_data.2.unwrap()));
1939 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
1941 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> ReadableArgs<R, Arc<Logger>> for (Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor) {
1942 fn read(reader: &mut R, logger: Arc<Logger>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1943 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1944 macro_rules! unwrap_obj {
1948 Err(_) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
1953 let _ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1954 let min_ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1955 if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION {
1956 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion);
1959 let commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor = <U48 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.0;
1961 let key_storage = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
1963 let revocation_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
1964 let htlc_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
1965 let delayed_payment_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
1966 let payment_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
1967 let shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
1968 let prev_latest_per_commitment_point = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
1970 1 => Some(Readable::read(reader)?),
1971 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
1973 let latest_per_commitment_point = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
1975 1 => Some(Readable::read(reader)?),
1976 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
1978 // Technically this can fail and serialize fail a round-trip, but only for serialization of
1979 // barely-init'd ChannelMonitors that we can't do anything with.
1980 let outpoint = OutPoint {
1981 txid: Readable::read(reader)?,
1982 index: Readable::read(reader)?,
1984 let funding_info = Some((outpoint, Readable::read(reader)?));
1985 let short_channel_id = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
1987 1 => Some(Readable::read(reader)?),
1988 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
1991 revocation_base_key,
1993 delayed_payment_base_key,
1996 prev_latest_per_commitment_point,
1997 latest_per_commitment_point,
2002 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2005 let their_htlc_base_key = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
2006 let their_delayed_payment_base_key = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
2008 let their_cur_revocation_points = {
2009 let first_idx = <U48 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.0;
2013 let first_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
2014 let second_point_slice: [u8; 33] = Readable::read(reader)?;
2015 if second_point_slice[0..32] == [0; 32] && second_point_slice[32] == 0 {
2016 Some((first_idx, first_point, None))
2018 Some((first_idx, first_point, Some(unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &second_point_slice)))))
2023 let our_to_self_delay: u16 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2024 let their_to_self_delay: Option<u16> = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
2026 let mut old_secrets = [([0; 32], 1 << 48); 49];
2027 for &mut (ref mut secret, ref mut idx) in old_secrets.iter_mut() {
2028 *secret = Readable::read(reader)?;
2029 *idx = Readable::read(reader)?;
2032 macro_rules! read_htlc_in_commitment {
2035 let offered: bool = Readable::read(reader)?;
2036 let amount_msat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2037 let cltv_expiry: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2038 let payment_hash: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(reader)?;
2039 let transaction_output_index: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2041 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
2042 offered, amount_msat, cltv_expiry, payment_hash, transaction_output_index
2048 macro_rules! read_htlc_source {
2051 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2054 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2055 0 => Some(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(read_htlc_previous_hop_data!())),
2056 1 => Some(read_htlc_outbound_route!()),
2057 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2060 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2066 macro_rules! read_htlc_previous_hop_data {
2069 let short_channel_id: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2070 let htlc_id: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2071 let incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(reader)?;
2073 HTLCPreviousHopData {
2074 short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret
2080 macro_rules! read_htlc_outbound_route {
2083 let route = read_route!();
2084 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
2085 let first_hop_htlc_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
2087 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
2088 route, session_priv, first_hop_htlc_msat
2094 macro_rules! read_route {
2097 let route_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2098 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(route_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 64));
2099 for _ in 0..route_len {
2100 let pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
2101 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
2102 let fee_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
2103 let cltv_expiry_delta = Readable::read(reader)?;
2105 hops.push(RouteHop { pubkey, short_channel_id, fee_msat, cltv_expiry_delta });
2114 let remote_claimable_outpoints_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2115 let mut remote_claimable_outpoints = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(remote_claimable_outpoints_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 64));
2116 for _ in 0..remote_claimable_outpoints_len {
2117 let txid: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
2118 let outputs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2119 let mut outputs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
2120 for _ in 0..outputs_count {
2121 let out = read_htlc_in_commitment!();
2122 let source = read_htlc_source!();
2123 outputs.push((out, source));
2125 if let Some(_) = remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, outputs) {
2126 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
2130 let remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2131 let mut remote_commitment_txn_on_chain = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
2132 for _ in 0..remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len {
2133 let txid: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
2134 let commitment_number = <U48 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.0;
2135 let outputs_count = <u64 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?;
2136 let mut outputs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 8));
2137 for _ in 0..outputs_count {
2138 outputs.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
2140 if let Some(_) = remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(txid, (commitment_number, outputs)) {
2141 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
2145 let remote_hash_commitment_number_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2146 let mut remote_hash_commitment_number = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(remote_hash_commitment_number_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
2147 for _ in 0..remote_hash_commitment_number_len {
2148 let txid: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(reader)?;
2149 let commitment_number = <U48 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.0;
2150 if let Some(_) = remote_hash_commitment_number.insert(txid, commitment_number) {
2151 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
2155 macro_rules! read_local_tx {
2158 let tx = match Transaction::consensus_decode(reader.by_ref()) {
2161 encode::Error::Io(ioe) => return Err(DecodeError::Io(ioe)),
2162 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2166 if tx.input.is_empty() {
2167 // Ensure tx didn't hit the 0-input ambiguity case.
2168 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
2171 let revocation_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
2172 let a_htlc_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
2173 let b_htlc_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
2174 let delayed_payment_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
2175 let feerate_per_kw: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2177 let htlc_outputs_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2178 let mut htlc_outputs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlc_outputs_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
2179 for _ in 0..htlc_outputs_len {
2180 let out = read_htlc_in_commitment!();
2181 let sigs = (Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?);
2182 let source = read_htlc_source!();
2183 htlc_outputs.push((out, sigs.0, sigs.1, source));
2188 tx, revocation_key, a_htlc_key, b_htlc_key, delayed_payment_key, feerate_per_kw, htlc_outputs
2194 let prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2197 Some(read_local_tx!())
2199 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2202 let current_local_signed_commitment_tx = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2205 Some(read_local_tx!())
2207 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2210 let current_remote_commitment_number = <U48 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.0;
2212 let payment_preimages_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2213 let mut payment_preimages = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(payment_preimages_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
2214 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
2215 for _ in 0..payment_preimages_len {
2216 let preimage: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(reader)?;
2218 sha.input(&preimage);
2219 let mut hash = [0; 32];
2220 sha.result(&mut hash);
2221 if let Some(_) = payment_preimages.insert(hash, preimage) {
2222 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
2226 let last_block_hash: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
2227 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
2229 Ok((last_block_hash.clone(), ChannelMonitor {
2230 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor,
2233 their_htlc_base_key,
2234 their_delayed_payment_base_key,
2235 their_cur_revocation_points,
2238 their_to_self_delay,
2241 remote_claimable_outpoints,
2242 remote_commitment_txn_on_chain,
2243 remote_hash_commitment_number,
2245 prev_local_signed_commitment_tx,
2246 current_local_signed_commitment_tx,
2247 current_remote_commitment_number,
2262 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Script;
2263 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
2264 use crypto::digest::Digest;
2266 use ln::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor;
2267 use ln::chan_utils::{HTLCOutputInCommitment, TxCreationKeys};
2268 use ln::channelmanager::{HTLCSource, HTLCPreviousHopData};
2269 use util::sha2::Sha256;
2270 use util::test_utils::TestLogger;
2271 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
2272 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1, Signature};
2273 use rand::{thread_rng,Rng};
2277 fn test_per_commitment_storage() {
2278 // Test vectors from BOLT 3:
2279 let mut secrets: Vec<[u8; 32]> = Vec::new();
2280 let mut monitor: ChannelMonitor;
2281 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2282 let logger = Arc::new(TestLogger::new());
2284 macro_rules! test_secrets {
2286 let mut idx = 281474976710655;
2287 for secret in secrets.iter() {
2288 assert_eq!(monitor.get_secret(idx).unwrap(), *secret);
2291 assert_eq!(monitor.get_min_seen_secret(), idx + 1);
2292 assert!(monitor.get_secret(idx).is_none());
2297 // insert_secret correct sequence
2298 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
2301 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2302 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
2303 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2306 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2307 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
2308 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2311 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2312 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
2313 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2316 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2317 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
2318 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2321 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2322 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
2323 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2326 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2327 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
2328 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2331 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2332 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
2333 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2336 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2337 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
2338 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2343 // insert_secret #1 incorrect
2344 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
2347 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2348 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
2349 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2352 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2353 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
2354 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
2355 "Previous secret did not match new one");
2359 // insert_secret #2 incorrect (#1 derived from incorrect)
2360 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
2363 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2364 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
2365 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2368 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2369 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("dddc3a8d14fddf2b68fa8c7fbad2748274937479dd0f8930d5ebb4ab6bd866a3").unwrap());
2370 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2373 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2374 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
2375 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2378 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2379 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
2380 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
2381 "Previous secret did not match new one");
2385 // insert_secret #3 incorrect
2386 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
2389 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2390 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
2391 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2394 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2395 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
2396 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2399 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2400 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c51a18b13e8527e579ec56365482c62f180b7d5760b46e9477dae59e87ed423a").unwrap());
2401 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2404 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2405 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
2406 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
2407 "Previous secret did not match new one");
2411 // insert_secret #4 incorrect (1,2,3 derived from incorrect)
2412 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
2415 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2416 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
2417 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2420 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2421 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("dddc3a8d14fddf2b68fa8c7fbad2748274937479dd0f8930d5ebb4ab6bd866a3").unwrap());
2422 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2425 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2426 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c51a18b13e8527e579ec56365482c62f180b7d5760b46e9477dae59e87ed423a").unwrap());
2427 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2430 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2431 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("ba65d7b0ef55a3ba300d4e87af29868f394f8f138d78a7011669c79b37b936f4").unwrap());
2432 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2435 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2436 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
2437 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2440 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2441 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
2442 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2445 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2446 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
2447 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2450 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2451 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
2452 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
2453 "Previous secret did not match new one");
2457 // insert_secret #5 incorrect
2458 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
2461 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2462 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
2463 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2466 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2467 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
2468 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2471 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2472 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
2473 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2476 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2477 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
2478 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2481 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2482 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("631373ad5f9ef654bb3dade742d09504c567edd24320d2fcd68e3cc47e2ff6a6").unwrap());
2483 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2486 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2487 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
2488 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
2489 "Previous secret did not match new one");
2493 // insert_secret #6 incorrect (5 derived from incorrect)
2494 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
2497 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2498 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
2499 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2502 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2503 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
2504 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2507 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2508 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
2509 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2512 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2513 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
2514 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2517 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2518 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("631373ad5f9ef654bb3dade742d09504c567edd24320d2fcd68e3cc47e2ff6a6").unwrap());
2519 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2522 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2523 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("b7e76a83668bde38b373970155c868a653304308f9896692f904a23731224bb1").unwrap());
2524 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2527 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2528 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
2529 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2532 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2533 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
2534 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
2535 "Previous secret did not match new one");
2539 // insert_secret #7 incorrect
2540 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
2543 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2544 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
2545 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2548 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2549 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
2550 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2553 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2554 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
2555 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2558 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2559 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
2560 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2563 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2564 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
2565 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2568 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2569 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
2570 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2573 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2574 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("e7971de736e01da8ed58b94c2fc216cb1dca9e326f3a96e7194fe8ea8af6c0a3").unwrap());
2575 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2578 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2579 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
2580 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
2581 "Previous secret did not match new one");
2585 // insert_secret #8 incorrect
2586 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
2589 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2590 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
2591 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2594 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2595 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
2596 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2599 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2600 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
2601 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2604 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2605 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
2606 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2609 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2610 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
2611 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2614 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2615 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
2616 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2619 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2620 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
2621 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2624 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2625 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a7efbc61aac46d34f77778bac22c8a20c6a46ca460addc49009bda875ec88fa4").unwrap());
2626 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
2627 "Previous secret did not match new one");
2632 fn test_prune_preimages() {
2633 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2634 let logger = Arc::new(TestLogger::new());
2635 let dummy_sig = Signature::from_der(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("3045022100fa86fa9a36a8cd6a7bb8f06a541787d51371d067951a9461d5404de6b928782e02201c8b7c334c10aed8976a3a465be9a28abff4cb23acbf00022295b378ce1fa3cd").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
2637 let dummy_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap());
2638 macro_rules! dummy_keys {
2642 per_commitment_point: dummy_key.clone(),
2643 revocation_key: dummy_key.clone(),
2644 a_htlc_key: dummy_key.clone(),
2645 b_htlc_key: dummy_key.clone(),
2646 a_delayed_payment_key: dummy_key.clone(),
2647 b_payment_key: dummy_key.clone(),
2652 let dummy_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
2653 let dummy_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id: 0, htlc_id: 0, incoming_packet_shared_secret: [0; 32]});
2655 let mut preimages = Vec::new();
2657 let mut rng = thread_rng();
2659 let mut preimage = [0; 32];
2660 rng.fill_bytes(&mut preimage);
2661 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
2662 sha.input(&preimage);
2663 let mut hash = [0; 32];
2664 sha.result(&mut hash);
2665 preimages.push((preimage, hash));
2669 macro_rules! preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs {
2670 ($preimages_slice: expr) => {
2672 let mut res = Vec::new();
2673 for (idx, preimage) in $preimages_slice.iter().enumerate() {
2674 res.push((HTLCOutputInCommitment {
2678 payment_hash: preimage.1.clone(),
2679 transaction_output_index: idx as u32,
2680 }, Some(dummy_source.clone())));
2686 macro_rules! preimages_to_local_htlcs {
2687 ($preimages_slice: expr) => {
2689 let mut inp = preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!($preimages_slice);
2690 let res: Vec<_> = inp.drain(..).map(|e| { (e.0, dummy_sig.clone(), dummy_sig.clone(), e.1) }).collect();
2696 macro_rules! test_preimages_exist {
2697 ($preimages_slice: expr, $monitor: expr) => {
2698 for preimage in $preimages_slice {
2699 assert!($monitor.payment_preimages.contains_key(&preimage.1));
2704 // Prune with one old state and a local commitment tx holding a few overlaps with the
2706 let mut monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
2707 monitor.set_their_to_self_delay(10);
2709 monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(dummy_tx.clone(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..10]));
2710 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[5..15]), 281474976710655, dummy_key);
2711 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[15..20]), 281474976710654, dummy_key);
2712 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[17..20]), 281474976710653, dummy_key);
2713 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[18..20]), 281474976710652, dummy_key);
2714 for &(ref preimage, ref hash) in preimages.iter() {
2715 monitor.provide_payment_preimage(hash, preimage);
2718 // Now provide a secret, pruning preimages 10-15
2719 let mut secret = [0; 32];
2720 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
2721 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secret.clone()).unwrap();
2722 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 15);
2723 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
2724 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[15..20], monitor);
2726 // Now provide a further secret, pruning preimages 15-17
2727 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
2728 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secret.clone()).unwrap();
2729 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 13);
2730 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
2731 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[17..20], monitor);
2733 // Now update local commitment tx info, pruning only element 18 as we still care about the
2734 // previous commitment tx's preimages too
2735 monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(dummy_tx.clone(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..5]));
2736 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
2737 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secret.clone()).unwrap();
2738 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 12);
2739 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
2740 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[18..20], monitor);
2742 // But if we do it again, we'll prune 5-10
2743 monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(dummy_tx.clone(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..3]));
2744 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
2745 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secret.clone()).unwrap();
2746 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 5);
2747 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..5], monitor);
2750 // Further testing is done in the ChannelManager integration tests.