1 //! The logic to monitor for on-chain transactions and create the relevant claim responses lives
4 //! ChannelMonitor objects are generated by ChannelManager in response to relevant
5 //! messages/actions, and MUST be persisted to disk (and, preferably, remotely) before progress can
6 //! be made in responding to certain messages, see ManyChannelMonitor for more.
8 //! Note that ChannelMonitors are an important part of the lightning trust model and a copy of the
9 //! latest ChannelMonitor must always be actively monitoring for chain updates (and no out-of-date
10 //! ChannelMonitors should do so). Thus, if you're building rust-lightning into an HSM or other
11 //! security-domain-separated system design, you should consider having multiple paths for
12 //! ChannelMonitors to get out of the HSM and onto monitoring devices.
14 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
15 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxIn,TxOut,SigHashType,Transaction};
16 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
17 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
18 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
19 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::{self, Decodable, Encodable};
20 use bitcoin::util::hash::{Hash160, BitcoinHash,Sha256dHash};
21 use bitcoin::util::bip143;
23 use crypto::digest::Digest;
25 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Message,Signature};
26 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
29 use ln::msgs::{DecodeError, HandleError};
31 use ln::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment;
32 use chain::chaininterface::{ChainListener, ChainWatchInterface, BroadcasterInterface};
33 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
34 use chain::keysinterface::SpendableOutputDescriptor;
35 use util::logger::Logger;
36 use util::ser::{ReadableArgs, Readable, Writer, Writeable, WriterWriteAdaptor, U48};
37 use util::sha2::Sha256;
38 use util::{byte_utils, events};
40 use std::collections::HashMap;
41 use std::sync::{Arc,Mutex};
42 use std::{hash,cmp, mem};
44 /// An error enum representing a failure to persist a channel monitor update.
46 pub enum ChannelMonitorUpdateErr {
47 /// Used to indicate a temporary failure (eg connection to a watchtower failed, but is expected
48 /// to succeed at some point in the future).
50 /// Such a failure will "freeze" a channel, preventing us from revoking old states or
51 /// submitting new commitment transactions to the remote party.
52 /// ChannelManager::test_restore_channel_monitor can be used to retry the update(s) and restore
53 /// the channel to an operational state.
55 /// Note that continuing to operate when no copy of the updated ChannelMonitor could be
56 /// persisted is unsafe - if you failed to store the update on your own local disk you should
57 /// instead return PermanentFailure to force closure of the channel ASAP.
59 /// Even when a channel has been "frozen" updates to the ChannelMonitor can continue to occur
60 /// (eg if an inbound HTLC which we forwarded was claimed upstream resulting in us attempting
61 /// to claim it on this channel) and those updates must be applied wherever they can be. At
62 /// least one such updated ChannelMonitor must be persisted otherwise PermanentFailure should
63 /// be returned to get things on-chain ASAP using only the in-memory copy. Obviously updates to
64 /// the channel which would invalidate previous ChannelMonitors are not made when a channel has
67 /// Note that even if updates made after TemporaryFailure succeed you must still call
68 /// test_restore_channel_monitor to ensure you have the latest monitor and re-enable normal
69 /// channel operation.
71 /// Used to indicate no further channel monitor updates will be allowed (eg we've moved on to a
72 /// different watchtower and cannot update with all watchtowers that were previously informed
73 /// of this channel). This will force-close the channel in question.
77 /// Simple trait indicating ability to track a set of ChannelMonitors and multiplex events between
78 /// them. Generally should be implemented by keeping a local SimpleManyChannelMonitor and passing
79 /// events to it, while also taking any add_update_monitor events and passing them to some remote
82 /// Note that any updates to a channel's monitor *must* be applied to each instance of the
83 /// channel's monitor everywhere (including remote watchtowers) *before* this function returns. If
84 /// an update occurs and a remote watchtower is left with old state, it may broadcast transactions
85 /// which we have revoked, allowing our counterparty to claim all funds in the channel!
86 pub trait ManyChannelMonitor: Send + Sync {
87 /// Adds or updates a monitor for the given `funding_txo`.
89 /// Implementor must also ensure that the funding_txo outpoint is registered with any relevant
90 /// ChainWatchInterfaces such that the provided monitor receives block_connected callbacks with
92 fn add_update_monitor(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr>;
95 /// A simple implementation of a ManyChannelMonitor and ChainListener. Can be used to create a
96 /// watchtower or watch our own channels.
98 /// Note that you must provide your own key by which to refer to channels.
100 /// If you're accepting remote monitors (ie are implementing a watchtower), you must verify that
101 /// users cannot overwrite a given channel by providing a duplicate key. ie you should probably
102 /// index by a PublicKey which is required to sign any updates.
104 /// If you're using this for local monitoring of your own channels, you probably want to use
105 /// `OutPoint` as the key, which will give you a ManyChannelMonitor implementation.
106 pub struct SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
107 #[cfg(test)] // Used in ChannelManager tests to manipulate channels directly
108 pub monitors: Mutex<HashMap<Key, ChannelMonitor>>,
110 monitors: Mutex<HashMap<Key, ChannelMonitor>>,
111 chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>,
112 broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>,
113 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
117 impl<Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash> ChainListener for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
118 fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], _indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) {
119 let block_hash = header.bitcoin_hash();
120 let mut new_events: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(0);
122 let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
123 for monitor in monitors.values_mut() {
124 let (txn_outputs, spendable_outputs) = monitor.block_connected(txn_matched, height, &block_hash, &*self.broadcaster);
125 if spendable_outputs.len() > 0 {
126 new_events.push(events::Event::SpendableOutputs {
127 outputs: spendable_outputs,
130 for (ref txid, ref outputs) in txn_outputs {
131 for (idx, output) in outputs.iter().enumerate() {
132 self.chain_monitor.install_watch_outpoint((txid.clone(), idx as u32), &output.script_pubkey);
137 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
138 pending_events.append(&mut new_events);
141 fn block_disconnected(&self, _: &BlockHeader) { }
144 impl<Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash + 'static> SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
145 /// Creates a new object which can be used to monitor several channels given the chain
146 /// interface with which to register to receive notifications.
147 pub fn new(chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>, broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>, logger: Arc<Logger>) -> Arc<SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key>> {
148 let res = Arc::new(SimpleManyChannelMonitor {
149 monitors: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
152 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
155 let weak_res = Arc::downgrade(&res);
156 res.chain_monitor.register_listener(weak_res);
160 /// Adds or udpates the monitor which monitors the channel referred to by the given key.
161 pub fn add_update_monitor_by_key(&self, key: Key, monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
162 let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
163 match monitors.get_mut(&key) {
164 Some(orig_monitor) => {
165 log_trace!(self, "Updating Channel Monitor for channel {}", log_funding_option!(monitor.funding_txo));
166 return orig_monitor.insert_combine(monitor);
170 match &monitor.funding_txo {
172 log_trace!(self, "Got new Channel Monitor for no-funding-set channel (monitoring all txn!)");
173 self.chain_monitor.watch_all_txn()
175 &Some((ref outpoint, ref script)) => {
176 log_trace!(self, "Got new Channel Monitor for channel {}", log_bytes!(outpoint.to_channel_id()[..]));
177 self.chain_monitor.install_watch_tx(&outpoint.txid, script);
178 self.chain_monitor.install_watch_outpoint((outpoint.txid, outpoint.index as u32), script);
181 monitors.insert(key, monitor);
186 impl ManyChannelMonitor for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<OutPoint> {
187 fn add_update_monitor(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr> {
188 match self.add_update_monitor_by_key(funding_txo, monitor) {
190 Err(_) => Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure),
195 impl<Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash> events::EventsProvider for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
196 fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
197 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
198 let mut ret = Vec::new();
199 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut *pending_events);
204 /// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, don't try to claim it in a shared transaction,
205 /// instead claiming it in its own individual transaction.
206 const CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 12;
207 /// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, force-close the channel to broadcast the
208 /// HTLC-Success transaction.
209 /// In other words, this is an upper bound on how many blocks we think it can take us to get a
210 /// transaction confirmed (and we use it in a few more, equivalent, places).
211 pub(crate) const CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 6;
212 /// Number of blocks by which point we expect our counterparty to have seen new blocks on the
213 /// network and done a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance (+ we've updated all our
214 /// copies of ChannelMonitors, including watchtowers).
215 pub(crate) const HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS: u32 = 3;
217 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
220 revocation_base_key: SecretKey,
221 htlc_base_key: SecretKey,
222 delayed_payment_base_key: SecretKey,
223 payment_base_key: SecretKey,
224 shutdown_pubkey: PublicKey,
225 prev_latest_per_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
226 latest_per_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
229 revocation_base_key: PublicKey,
230 htlc_base_key: PublicKey,
231 sigs: HashMap<Sha256dHash, Signature>,
235 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
236 struct LocalSignedTx {
237 /// txid of the transaction in tx, just used to make comparison faster
240 revocation_key: PublicKey,
241 a_htlc_key: PublicKey,
242 b_htlc_key: PublicKey,
243 delayed_payment_key: PublicKey,
245 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Signature, Signature)>,
248 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
249 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
251 /// A ChannelMonitor handles chain events (blocks connected and disconnected) and generates
252 /// on-chain transactions to ensure no loss of funds occurs.
254 /// You MUST ensure that no ChannelMonitors for a given channel anywhere contain out-of-date
255 /// information and are actively monitoring the chain.
257 pub struct ChannelMonitor {
258 funding_txo: Option<(OutPoint, Script)>,
259 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64,
261 key_storage: KeyStorage,
262 their_htlc_base_key: Option<PublicKey>,
263 their_delayed_payment_base_key: Option<PublicKey>,
264 // first is the idx of the first of the two revocation points
265 their_cur_revocation_points: Option<(u64, PublicKey, Option<PublicKey>)>,
267 our_to_self_delay: u16,
268 their_to_self_delay: Option<u16>,
270 old_secrets: [([u8; 32], u64); 49],
271 remote_claimable_outpoints: HashMap<Sha256dHash, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>>,
272 /// We cannot identify HTLC-Success or HTLC-Timeout transactions by themselves on the chain.
273 /// Nor can we figure out their commitment numbers without the commitment transaction they are
274 /// spending. Thus, in order to claim them via revocation key, we track all the remote
275 /// commitment transactions which we find on-chain, mapping them to the commitment number which
276 /// can be used to derive the revocation key and claim the transactions.
277 remote_commitment_txn_on_chain: HashMap<Sha256dHash, (u64, Vec<Script>)>,
278 /// Cache used to make pruning of payment_preimages faster.
279 /// Maps payment_hash values to commitment numbers for remote transactions for non-revoked
280 /// remote transactions (ie should remain pretty small).
281 /// Serialized to disk but should generally not be sent to Watchtowers.
282 remote_hash_commitment_number: HashMap<[u8; 32], u64>,
284 // We store two local commitment transactions to avoid any race conditions where we may update
285 // some monitors (potentially on watchtowers) but then fail to update others, resulting in the
286 // various monitors for one channel being out of sync, and us broadcasting a local
287 // transaction for which we have deleted claim information on some watchtowers.
288 prev_local_signed_commitment_tx: Option<LocalSignedTx>,
289 current_local_signed_commitment_tx: Option<LocalSignedTx>,
291 // Used just for ChannelManager to make sure it has the latest channel data during
293 current_remote_commitment_number: u64,
295 payment_preimages: HashMap<[u8; 32], [u8; 32]>,
297 destination_script: Script,
299 // We simply modify last_block_hash in Channel's block_connected so that serialization is
300 // consistent but hopefully the users' copy handles block_connected in a consistent way.
301 // (we do *not*, however, update them in insert_combine to ensure any local user copies keep
302 // their last_block_hash from its state and not based on updated copies that didn't run through
303 // the full block_connected).
304 pub(crate) last_block_hash: Sha256dHash,
305 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>, //TODO: dedup this a bit...
309 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
310 /// Used only in testing and fuzztarget to check serialization roundtrips don't change the
311 /// underlying object
312 impl PartialEq for ChannelMonitor {
313 fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
314 if self.funding_txo != other.funding_txo ||
315 self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor != other.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor ||
316 self.key_storage != other.key_storage ||
317 self.their_htlc_base_key != other.their_htlc_base_key ||
318 self.their_delayed_payment_base_key != other.their_delayed_payment_base_key ||
319 self.their_cur_revocation_points != other.their_cur_revocation_points ||
320 self.our_to_self_delay != other.our_to_self_delay ||
321 self.their_to_self_delay != other.their_to_self_delay ||
322 self.remote_claimable_outpoints != other.remote_claimable_outpoints ||
323 self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain != other.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain ||
324 self.remote_hash_commitment_number != other.remote_hash_commitment_number ||
325 self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx != other.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx ||
326 self.current_remote_commitment_number != other.current_remote_commitment_number ||
327 self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx != other.current_local_signed_commitment_tx ||
328 self.payment_preimages != other.payment_preimages ||
329 self.destination_script != other.destination_script
333 for (&(ref secret, ref idx), &(ref o_secret, ref o_idx)) in self.old_secrets.iter().zip(other.old_secrets.iter()) {
334 if secret != o_secret || idx != o_idx {
343 impl ChannelMonitor {
344 pub(super) fn new(revocation_base_key: &SecretKey, delayed_payment_base_key: &SecretKey, htlc_base_key: &SecretKey, payment_base_key: &SecretKey, shutdown_pubkey: &PublicKey, our_to_self_delay: u16, destination_script: Script, logger: Arc<Logger>) -> ChannelMonitor {
347 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: 0,
349 key_storage: KeyStorage::PrivMode {
350 revocation_base_key: revocation_base_key.clone(),
351 htlc_base_key: htlc_base_key.clone(),
352 delayed_payment_base_key: delayed_payment_base_key.clone(),
353 payment_base_key: payment_base_key.clone(),
354 shutdown_pubkey: shutdown_pubkey.clone(),
355 prev_latest_per_commitment_point: None,
356 latest_per_commitment_point: None,
358 their_htlc_base_key: None,
359 their_delayed_payment_base_key: None,
360 their_cur_revocation_points: None,
362 our_to_self_delay: our_to_self_delay,
363 their_to_self_delay: None,
365 old_secrets: [([0; 32], 1 << 48); 49],
366 remote_claimable_outpoints: HashMap::new(),
367 remote_commitment_txn_on_chain: HashMap::new(),
368 remote_hash_commitment_number: HashMap::new(),
370 prev_local_signed_commitment_tx: None,
371 current_local_signed_commitment_tx: None,
372 current_remote_commitment_number: 1 << 48,
374 payment_preimages: HashMap::new(),
375 destination_script: destination_script,
377 last_block_hash: Default::default(),
378 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
384 fn place_secret(idx: u64) -> u8 {
386 if idx & (1 << i) == (1 << i) {
394 fn derive_secret(secret: [u8; 32], bits: u8, idx: u64) -> [u8; 32] {
395 let mut res: [u8; 32] = secret;
397 let bitpos = bits - 1 - i;
398 if idx & (1 << bitpos) == (1 << bitpos) {
399 res[(bitpos / 8) as usize] ^= 1 << (bitpos & 7);
400 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
402 sha.result(&mut res);
408 /// Inserts a revocation secret into this channel monitor. Prunes old preimages if neither
409 /// needed by local commitment transactions HTCLs nor by remote ones. Unless we haven't already seen remote
410 /// commitment transaction's secret, they are de facto pruned (we can use revocation key).
411 pub(super) fn provide_secret(&mut self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
412 let pos = ChannelMonitor::place_secret(idx);
414 let (old_secret, old_idx) = self.old_secrets[i as usize];
415 if ChannelMonitor::derive_secret(secret, pos, old_idx) != old_secret {
416 return Err(HandleError{err: "Previous secret did not match new one", action: None})
419 self.old_secrets[pos as usize] = (secret, idx);
421 if !self.payment_preimages.is_empty() {
422 let local_signed_commitment_tx = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx.as_ref().expect("Channel needs at least an initial commitment tx !");
423 let prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.as_ref();
424 let min_idx = self.get_min_seen_secret();
425 let remote_hash_commitment_number = &mut self.remote_hash_commitment_number;
427 self.payment_preimages.retain(|&k, _| {
428 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in &local_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs {
429 if k == htlc.payment_hash {
433 if let Some(prev_local_commitment_tx) = prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
434 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in prev_local_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
435 if k == htlc.payment_hash {
440 let contains = if let Some(cn) = remote_hash_commitment_number.get(&k) {
447 remote_hash_commitment_number.remove(&k);
456 /// Tracks the next revocation point which may be required to claim HTLC outputs which we know
457 /// the preimage of in case the remote end force-closes using their latest state. When called at
458 /// channel opening revocation point is the CURRENT one used for first commitment tx. Needed in case of sizeable push_msat.
459 pub(super) fn provide_their_next_revocation_point(&mut self, their_next_revocation_point: Option<(u64, PublicKey)>) {
460 if let Some(new_revocation_point) = their_next_revocation_point {
461 match self.their_cur_revocation_points {
462 Some(old_points) => {
463 if old_points.0 == new_revocation_point.0 + 1 {
464 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0, old_points.1, Some(new_revocation_point.1)));
465 } else if old_points.0 == new_revocation_point.0 + 2 {
466 if let Some(old_second_point) = old_points.2 {
467 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0 - 1, old_second_point, Some(new_revocation_point.1)));
469 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((new_revocation_point.0, new_revocation_point.1, None));
472 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((new_revocation_point.0, new_revocation_point.1, None));
476 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((new_revocation_point.0, new_revocation_point.1, None));
482 /// Informs this monitor of the latest remote (ie non-broadcastable) commitment transaction.
483 /// The monitor watches for it to be broadcasted and then uses the HTLC information (and
484 /// possibly future revocation/preimage information) to claim outputs where possible.
485 /// We cache also the mapping hash:commitment number to lighten pruning of old preimages by watchtowers.
486 pub(super) fn provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, unsigned_commitment_tx: &Transaction, htlc_outputs: Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>, commitment_number: u64) {
487 // TODO: Encrypt the htlc_outputs data with the single-hash of the commitment transaction
488 // so that a remote monitor doesn't learn anything unless there is a malicious close.
489 // (only maybe, sadly we cant do the same for local info, as we need to be aware of
491 for htlc in &htlc_outputs {
492 self.remote_hash_commitment_number.insert(htlc.payment_hash, commitment_number);
494 self.remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(unsigned_commitment_tx.txid(), htlc_outputs);
495 self.current_remote_commitment_number = commitment_number;
498 /// Informs this monitor of the latest local (ie broadcastable) commitment transaction. The
499 /// monitor watches for timeouts and may broadcast it if we approach such a timeout. Thus, it
500 /// is important that any clones of this channel monitor (including remote clones) by kept
501 /// up-to-date as our local commitment transaction is updated.
502 /// Panics if set_their_to_self_delay has never been called.
503 /// Also update KeyStorage with latest local per_commitment_point to derive local_delayedkey in
504 /// case of onchain HTLC tx
505 pub(super) fn provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, signed_commitment_tx: Transaction, local_keys: chan_utils::TxCreationKeys, feerate_per_kw: u64, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Signature, Signature)>) {
506 assert!(self.their_to_self_delay.is_some());
507 self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx.take();
508 self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(LocalSignedTx {
509 txid: signed_commitment_tx.txid(),
510 tx: signed_commitment_tx,
511 revocation_key: local_keys.revocation_key,
512 a_htlc_key: local_keys.a_htlc_key,
513 b_htlc_key: local_keys.b_htlc_key,
514 delayed_payment_key: local_keys.a_delayed_payment_key,
518 self.key_storage = if let KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref payment_base_key, ref shutdown_pubkey, ref latest_per_commitment_point, .. } = self.key_storage {
519 KeyStorage::PrivMode {
520 revocation_base_key: *revocation_base_key,
521 htlc_base_key: *htlc_base_key,
522 delayed_payment_base_key: *delayed_payment_base_key,
523 payment_base_key: *payment_base_key,
524 shutdown_pubkey: *shutdown_pubkey,
525 prev_latest_per_commitment_point: *latest_per_commitment_point,
526 latest_per_commitment_point: Some(local_keys.per_commitment_point),
528 } else { unimplemented!(); };
531 /// Provides a payment_hash->payment_preimage mapping. Will be automatically pruned when all
532 /// commitment_tx_infos which contain the payment hash have been revoked.
533 pub(super) fn provide_payment_preimage(&mut self, payment_hash: &[u8; 32], payment_preimage: &[u8; 32]) {
534 self.payment_preimages.insert(payment_hash.clone(), payment_preimage.clone());
537 /// Combines this ChannelMonitor with the information contained in the other ChannelMonitor.
538 /// After a successful call this ChannelMonitor is up-to-date and is safe to use to monitor the
539 /// chain for new blocks/transactions.
540 pub fn insert_combine(&mut self, mut other: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
541 if self.funding_txo.is_some() {
542 // We should be able to compare the entire funding_txo, but in fuzztarget its trivially
543 // easy to collide the funding_txo hash and have a different scriptPubKey.
544 if other.funding_txo.is_some() && other.funding_txo.as_ref().unwrap().0 != self.funding_txo.as_ref().unwrap().0 {
545 return Err(HandleError{err: "Funding transaction outputs are not identical!", action: None});
548 self.funding_txo = other.funding_txo.take();
550 let other_min_secret = other.get_min_seen_secret();
551 let our_min_secret = self.get_min_seen_secret();
552 if our_min_secret > other_min_secret {
553 self.provide_secret(other_min_secret, other.get_secret(other_min_secret).unwrap())?;
555 // TODO: We should use current_remote_commitment_number and the commitment number out of
556 // local transactions to decide how to merge
557 if our_min_secret >= other_min_secret {
558 self.their_cur_revocation_points = other.their_cur_revocation_points;
559 for (txid, htlcs) in other.remote_claimable_outpoints.drain() {
560 self.remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, htlcs);
562 if let Some(local_tx) = other.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
563 self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(local_tx);
565 if let Some(local_tx) = other.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
566 self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(local_tx);
568 self.payment_preimages = other.payment_preimages;
570 self.current_remote_commitment_number = cmp::min(self.current_remote_commitment_number, other.current_remote_commitment_number);
574 /// Panics if commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor doesn't fit in 48 bits
575 pub(super) fn set_commitment_obscure_factor(&mut self, commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64) {
576 assert!(commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor < (1 << 48));
577 self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor = commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor;
580 /// Allows this monitor to scan only for transactions which are applicable. Note that this is
581 /// optional, without it this monitor cannot be used in an SPV client, but you may wish to
582 /// avoid this (or call unset_funding_info) on a monitor you wish to send to a watchtower as it
583 /// provides slightly better privacy.
584 /// It's the responsibility of the caller to register outpoint and script with passing the former
585 /// value as key to add_update_monitor.
586 pub(super) fn set_funding_info(&mut self, funding_info: (OutPoint, Script)) {
587 self.funding_txo = Some(funding_info);
590 /// We log these base keys at channel opening to being able to rebuild redeemscript in case of leaked revoked commit tx
591 pub(super) fn set_their_base_keys(&mut self, their_htlc_base_key: &PublicKey, their_delayed_payment_base_key: &PublicKey) {
592 self.their_htlc_base_key = Some(their_htlc_base_key.clone());
593 self.their_delayed_payment_base_key = Some(their_delayed_payment_base_key.clone());
596 pub(super) fn set_their_to_self_delay(&mut self, their_to_self_delay: u16) {
597 self.their_to_self_delay = Some(their_to_self_delay);
600 pub(super) fn unset_funding_info(&mut self) {
601 self.funding_txo = None;
604 /// Gets the funding transaction outpoint of the channel this ChannelMonitor is monitoring for.
605 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
606 match self.funding_txo {
607 Some((outpoint, _)) => Some(outpoint),
612 /// Gets the sets of all outpoints which this ChannelMonitor expects to hear about spends of.
613 /// Generally useful when deserializing as during normal operation the return values of
614 /// block_connected are sufficient to ensure all relevant outpoints are being monitored (note
615 /// that the get_funding_txo outpoint and transaction must also be monitored for!).
616 pub fn get_monitored_outpoints(&self) -> Vec<(Sha256dHash, u32, &Script)> {
617 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.len() * 2);
618 for (ref txid, &(_, ref outputs)) in self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
619 for (idx, output) in outputs.iter().enumerate() {
620 res.push(((*txid).clone(), idx as u32, output));
626 /// Serializes into a vec, with various modes for the exposed pub fns
627 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W, for_local_storage: bool) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
628 //TODO: We still write out all the serialization here manually instead of using the fancy
629 //serialization framework we have, we should migrate things over to it.
630 writer.write_all(&[SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
631 writer.write_all(&[MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
633 match &self.funding_txo {
634 &Some((ref outpoint, ref script)) => {
635 writer.write_all(&outpoint.txid[..])?;
636 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(outpoint.index))?;
637 script.write(writer)?;
640 // We haven't even been initialized...not sure why anyone is serializing us, but
641 // not much to give them.
646 // Set in initial Channel-object creation, so should always be set by now:
647 U48(self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor).write(writer)?;
649 match self.key_storage {
650 KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref payment_base_key, ref shutdown_pubkey, ref prev_latest_per_commitment_point, ref latest_per_commitment_point } => {
651 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
652 writer.write_all(&revocation_base_key[..])?;
653 writer.write_all(&htlc_base_key[..])?;
654 writer.write_all(&delayed_payment_base_key[..])?;
655 writer.write_all(&payment_base_key[..])?;
656 writer.write_all(&shutdown_pubkey.serialize())?;
657 if let Some(ref prev_latest_per_commitment_point) = *prev_latest_per_commitment_point {
658 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
659 writer.write_all(&prev_latest_per_commitment_point.serialize())?;
661 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
663 if let Some(ref latest_per_commitment_point) = *latest_per_commitment_point {
664 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
665 writer.write_all(&latest_per_commitment_point.serialize())?;
667 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
671 KeyStorage::SigsMode { .. } => unimplemented!(),
674 writer.write_all(&self.their_htlc_base_key.as_ref().unwrap().serialize())?;
675 writer.write_all(&self.their_delayed_payment_base_key.as_ref().unwrap().serialize())?;
677 match self.their_cur_revocation_points {
678 Some((idx, pubkey, second_option)) => {
679 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(idx))?;
680 writer.write_all(&pubkey.serialize())?;
681 match second_option {
682 Some(second_pubkey) => {
683 writer.write_all(&second_pubkey.serialize())?;
686 writer.write_all(&[0; 33])?;
691 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(0))?;
695 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.our_to_self_delay))?;
696 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap()))?;
698 for &(ref secret, ref idx) in self.old_secrets.iter() {
699 writer.write_all(secret)?;
700 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*idx))?;
703 macro_rules! serialize_htlc_in_commitment {
704 ($htlc_output: expr) => {
705 writer.write_all(&[$htlc_output.offered as u8; 1])?;
706 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc_output.amount_msat))?;
707 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array($htlc_output.cltv_expiry))?;
708 writer.write_all(&$htlc_output.payment_hash)?;
709 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array($htlc_output.transaction_output_index))?;
713 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_claimable_outpoints.len() as u64))?;
714 for (ref txid, ref htlc_outputs) in self.remote_claimable_outpoints.iter() {
715 writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
716 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc_outputs.len() as u64))?;
717 for htlc_output in htlc_outputs.iter() {
718 serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output);
722 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.len() as u64))?;
723 for (ref txid, &(commitment_number, ref txouts)) in self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
724 writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
725 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(commitment_number))?;
726 (txouts.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
727 for script in txouts.iter() {
728 script.write(writer)?;
732 if for_local_storage {
733 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_hash_commitment_number.len() as u64))?;
734 for (ref payment_hash, commitment_number) in self.remote_hash_commitment_number.iter() {
735 writer.write_all(*payment_hash)?;
736 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(*commitment_number))?;
739 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(0))?;
742 macro_rules! serialize_local_tx {
743 ($local_tx: expr) => {
744 if let Err(e) = $local_tx.tx.consensus_encode(&mut WriterWriteAdaptor(writer)) {
746 encode::Error::Io(e) => return Err(e),
747 _ => panic!("local tx must have been well-formed!"),
751 writer.write_all(&$local_tx.revocation_key.serialize())?;
752 writer.write_all(&$local_tx.a_htlc_key.serialize())?;
753 writer.write_all(&$local_tx.b_htlc_key.serialize())?;
754 writer.write_all(&$local_tx.delayed_payment_key.serialize())?;
756 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($local_tx.feerate_per_kw))?;
757 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($local_tx.htlc_outputs.len() as u64))?;
758 for &(ref htlc_output, ref their_sig, ref our_sig) in $local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
759 serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output);
760 writer.write_all(&their_sig.serialize_compact(&self.secp_ctx))?;
761 writer.write_all(&our_sig.serialize_compact(&self.secp_ctx))?;
766 if let Some(ref prev_local_tx) = self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
767 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
768 serialize_local_tx!(prev_local_tx);
770 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
773 if let Some(ref cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
774 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
775 serialize_local_tx!(cur_local_tx);
777 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
780 if for_local_storage {
781 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(self.current_remote_commitment_number))?;
783 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(0))?;
786 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.payment_preimages.len() as u64))?;
787 for payment_preimage in self.payment_preimages.values() {
788 writer.write_all(payment_preimage)?;
791 self.last_block_hash.write(writer)?;
792 self.destination_script.write(writer)?;
797 /// Writes this monitor into the given writer, suitable for writing to disk.
799 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor), which
800 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
801 /// the "reorg path" (ie not just starting at the same height but starting at the highest
802 /// common block that appears on your best chain as well as on the chain which contains the
803 /// last block hash returned) upon deserializing the object!
804 pub fn write_for_disk<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
805 self.write(writer, true)
808 /// Encodes this monitor into the given writer, suitable for sending to a remote watchtower
810 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor), which
811 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
812 /// the "reorg path" (ie not just starting at the same height but starting at the highest
813 /// common block that appears on your best chain as well as on the chain which contains the
814 /// last block hash returned) upon deserializing the object!
815 pub fn write_for_watchtower<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
816 self.write(writer, false)
819 //TODO: Functions to serialize/deserialize (with different forms depending on which information
820 //we want to leave out (eg funding_txo, etc).
822 /// Can only fail if idx is < get_min_seen_secret
823 pub(super) fn get_secret(&self, idx: u64) -> Result<[u8; 32], HandleError> {
824 for i in 0..self.old_secrets.len() {
825 if (idx & (!((1 << i) - 1))) == self.old_secrets[i].1 {
826 return Ok(ChannelMonitor::derive_secret(self.old_secrets[i].0, i as u8, idx))
829 assert!(idx < self.get_min_seen_secret());
830 Err(HandleError{err: "idx too low", action: None})
833 pub(super) fn get_min_seen_secret(&self) -> u64 {
834 //TODO This can be optimized?
835 let mut min = 1 << 48;
836 for &(_, idx) in self.old_secrets.iter() {
844 pub(super) fn get_cur_remote_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
845 self.current_remote_commitment_number
848 pub(super) fn get_cur_local_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
849 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
850 0xffff_ffff_ffff - ((((local_tx.tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (local_tx.tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor)
851 } else { 0xffff_ffff_ffff }
854 /// Attempts to claim a remote commitment transaction's outputs using the revocation key and
855 /// data in remote_claimable_outpoints. Will directly claim any HTLC outputs which expire at a
856 /// height > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER. In any case, will install monitoring for
857 /// HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions.
858 fn check_spend_remote_transaction(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32) -> (Vec<Transaction>, (Sha256dHash, Vec<TxOut>), Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>) {
859 // Most secp and related errors trying to create keys means we have no hope of constructing
860 // a spend transaction...so we return no transactions to broadcast
861 let mut txn_to_broadcast = Vec::new();
862 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
863 let mut spendable_outputs = Vec::new();
865 let commitment_txid = tx.txid(); //TODO: This is gonna be a performance bottleneck for watchtowers!
866 let per_commitment_option = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(&commitment_txid);
868 macro_rules! ignore_error {
869 ( $thing : expr ) => {
872 Err(_) => return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs)
877 let commitment_number = 0xffffffffffff - ((((tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor);
878 if commitment_number >= self.get_min_seen_secret() {
879 let secret = self.get_secret(commitment_number).unwrap();
880 let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &secret));
881 let (revocation_pubkey, b_htlc_key) = match self.key_storage {
882 KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
883 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
884 (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_base_key))),
885 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &htlc_base_key))))
887 KeyStorage::SigsMode { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
888 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
889 (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &revocation_base_key)),
890 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &htlc_base_key)))
893 let delayed_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key), &self.their_delayed_payment_base_key.unwrap()));
894 let a_htlc_key = match self.their_htlc_base_key {
895 None => return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs),
896 Some(their_htlc_base_key) => ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key), &their_htlc_base_key)),
899 let revokeable_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey, self.our_to_self_delay, &delayed_key);
900 let revokeable_p2wsh = revokeable_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
902 let mut total_value = 0;
903 let mut values = Vec::new();
904 let mut inputs = Vec::new();
905 let mut htlc_idxs = Vec::new();
907 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
908 if outp.script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh {
910 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
911 txid: commitment_txid,
914 script_sig: Script::new(),
915 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
918 htlc_idxs.push(None);
919 values.push(outp.value);
920 total_value += outp.value;
921 } else if outp.script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh() {
922 match self.key_storage {
923 KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref payment_base_key, .. } => {
924 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
925 if let Ok(local_key) = chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &payment_base_key) {
926 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WPKH {
927 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: commitment_txid, vout: idx as u32 },
929 output: outp.clone(),
933 KeyStorage::SigsMode { .. } => {
934 //TODO: we need to ensure an offline client will generate the event when it
935 // cames back online after only the watchtower saw the transaction
941 macro_rules! sign_input {
942 ($sighash_parts: expr, $input: expr, $htlc_idx: expr, $amount: expr) => {
944 let (sig, redeemscript) = match self.key_storage {
945 KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
946 let redeemscript = if $htlc_idx.is_none() { revokeable_redeemscript.clone() } else {
947 let htlc = &per_commitment_option.unwrap()[$htlc_idx.unwrap()];
948 chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey)
950 let sighash = ignore_error!(Message::from_slice(&$sighash_parts.sighash_all(&$input, &redeemscript, $amount)[..]));
951 let revocation_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key, &revocation_base_key));
952 (self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &revocation_key), redeemscript)
954 KeyStorage::SigsMode { .. } => {
958 $input.witness.push(sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
959 $input.witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
960 if $htlc_idx.is_none() {
961 $input.witness.push(vec!(1));
963 $input.witness.push(revocation_pubkey.serialize().to_vec());
965 $input.witness.push(redeemscript.into_bytes());
970 if let Some(per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
971 inputs.reserve_exact(per_commitment_data.len());
973 for (idx, htlc) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() {
974 let expected_script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey);
975 if htlc.transaction_output_index as usize >= tx.output.len() ||
976 tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 ||
977 tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].script_pubkey != expected_script.to_v0_p2wsh() {
978 return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs); // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user
981 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
982 txid: commitment_txid,
983 vout: htlc.transaction_output_index,
985 script_sig: Script::new(),
986 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
989 if htlc.cltv_expiry > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER {
991 htlc_idxs.push(Some(idx));
992 values.push(tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].value);
993 total_value += htlc.amount_msat / 1000;
995 let mut single_htlc_tx = Transaction {
1000 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1001 value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000, //TODO: - fee
1004 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&single_htlc_tx);
1005 sign_input!(sighash_parts, single_htlc_tx.input[0], Some(idx), htlc.amount_msat / 1000);
1006 txn_to_broadcast.push(single_htlc_tx);
1011 if !inputs.is_empty() || !txn_to_broadcast.is_empty() { // ie we're confident this is actually ours
1012 // We're definitely a remote commitment transaction!
1013 watch_outputs.append(&mut tx.output.clone());
1014 self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, (commitment_number, tx.output.iter().map(|output| { output.script_pubkey.clone() }).collect()));
1016 if inputs.is_empty() { return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs); } // Nothing to be done...probably a false positive/local tx
1018 let outputs = vec!(TxOut {
1019 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1020 value: total_value, //TODO: - fee
1022 let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
1029 let mut values_drain = values.drain(..);
1030 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx);
1032 for (input, htlc_idx) in spend_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(htlc_idxs.iter()) {
1033 let value = values_drain.next().unwrap();
1034 sign_input!(sighash_parts, input, htlc_idx, value);
1037 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
1038 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: spend_tx.txid(), vout: 0 },
1039 output: spend_tx.output[0].clone(),
1041 txn_to_broadcast.push(spend_tx);
1042 } else if let Some(per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
1043 // While this isn't useful yet, there is a potential race where if a counterparty
1044 // revokes a state at the same time as the commitment transaction for that state is
1045 // confirmed, and the watchtower receives the block before the user, the user could
1046 // upload a new ChannelMonitor with the revocation secret but the watchtower has
1047 // already processed the block, resulting in the remote_commitment_txn_on_chain entry
1048 // not being generated by the above conditional. Thus, to be safe, we go ahead and
1050 watch_outputs.append(&mut tx.output.clone());
1051 self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, (commitment_number, tx.output.iter().map(|output| { output.script_pubkey.clone() }).collect()));
1053 if let Some(revocation_points) = self.their_cur_revocation_points {
1054 let revocation_point_option =
1055 if revocation_points.0 == commitment_number { Some(&revocation_points.1) }
1056 else if let Some(point) = revocation_points.2.as_ref() {
1057 if revocation_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 { Some(point) } else { None }
1059 if let Some(revocation_point) = revocation_point_option {
1060 let (revocation_pubkey, b_htlc_key) = match self.key_storage {
1061 KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
1062 (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_base_key))),
1063 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &htlc_base_key))))
1065 KeyStorage::SigsMode { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
1066 (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &revocation_base_key)),
1067 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &htlc_base_key)))
1070 let a_htlc_key = match self.their_htlc_base_key {
1071 None => return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs),
1072 Some(their_htlc_base_key) => ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &their_htlc_base_key)),
1076 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
1077 if outp.script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh() {
1078 match self.key_storage {
1079 KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref payment_base_key, .. } => {
1080 if let Ok(local_key) = chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_point, &payment_base_key) {
1081 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WPKH {
1082 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: commitment_txid, vout: idx as u32 },
1084 output: outp.clone(),
1088 KeyStorage::SigsMode { .. } => {
1089 //TODO: we need to ensure an offline client will generate the event when it
1090 // cames back online after only the watchtower saw the transaction
1093 break; // Only to_remote ouput is claimable
1097 let mut total_value = 0;
1098 let mut values = Vec::new();
1099 let mut inputs = Vec::new();
1101 macro_rules! sign_input {
1102 ($sighash_parts: expr, $input: expr, $amount: expr, $preimage: expr) => {
1104 let (sig, redeemscript) = match self.key_storage {
1105 KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
1106 let htlc = &per_commitment_option.unwrap()[$input.sequence as usize];
1107 let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey);
1108 let sighash = ignore_error!(Message::from_slice(&$sighash_parts.sighash_all(&$input, &redeemscript, $amount)[..]));
1109 let htlc_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &htlc_base_key));
1110 (self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &htlc_key), redeemscript)
1112 KeyStorage::SigsMode { .. } => {
1116 $input.witness.push(sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
1117 $input.witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1118 $input.witness.push($preimage);
1119 $input.witness.push(redeemscript.into_bytes());
1124 for (idx, htlc) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() {
1125 if let Some(payment_preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
1127 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
1128 txid: commitment_txid,
1129 vout: htlc.transaction_output_index,
1131 script_sig: Script::new(),
1132 sequence: idx as u32, // reset to 0xfffffffd in sign_input
1133 witness: Vec::new(),
1135 if htlc.cltv_expiry > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER {
1137 values.push((tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].value, payment_preimage));
1138 total_value += htlc.amount_msat / 1000;
1140 let mut single_htlc_tx = Transaction {
1144 output: vec!(TxOut {
1145 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1146 value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000, //TODO: - fee
1149 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&single_htlc_tx);
1150 sign_input!(sighash_parts, single_htlc_tx.input[0], htlc.amount_msat / 1000, payment_preimage.to_vec());
1151 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
1152 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: single_htlc_tx.txid(), vout: 0 },
1153 output: single_htlc_tx.output[0].clone(),
1155 txn_to_broadcast.push(single_htlc_tx);
1160 if inputs.is_empty() { return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs); } // Nothing to be done...probably a false positive/local tx
1162 let outputs = vec!(TxOut {
1163 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1164 value: total_value, //TODO: - fee
1166 let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
1173 let mut values_drain = values.drain(..);
1174 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx);
1176 for input in spend_tx.input.iter_mut() {
1177 let value = values_drain.next().unwrap();
1178 sign_input!(sighash_parts, input, value.0, value.1.to_vec());
1181 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
1182 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: spend_tx.txid(), vout: 0 },
1183 output: spend_tx.output[0].clone(),
1185 txn_to_broadcast.push(spend_tx);
1190 (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs)
1193 /// Attempst to claim a remote HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout s outputs using the revocation key
1194 fn check_spend_remote_htlc(&self, tx: &Transaction, commitment_number: u64) -> (Option<Transaction>, Option<SpendableOutputDescriptor>) {
1195 if tx.input.len() != 1 || tx.output.len() != 1 {
1199 macro_rules! ignore_error {
1200 ( $thing : expr ) => {
1203 Err(_) => return (None, None)
1208 let secret = ignore_error!(self.get_secret(commitment_number));
1209 let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &secret));
1210 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
1211 let revocation_pubkey = match self.key_storage {
1212 KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
1213 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_base_key)))
1215 KeyStorage::SigsMode { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
1216 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &revocation_base_key))
1219 let delayed_key = match self.their_delayed_payment_base_key {
1220 None => return (None, None),
1221 Some(their_delayed_payment_base_key) => ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &their_delayed_payment_base_key)),
1223 let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), &delayed_key);
1224 let revokeable_p2wsh = redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
1225 let htlc_txid = tx.txid(); //TODO: This is gonna be a performance bottleneck for watchtowers!
1227 let mut inputs = Vec::new();
1230 if tx.output[0].script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh { //HTLC transactions have one txin, one txout
1232 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
1236 script_sig: Script::new(),
1237 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
1238 witness: Vec::new(),
1240 amount = tx.output[0].value;
1243 if !inputs.is_empty() {
1244 let outputs = vec!(TxOut {
1245 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1246 value: amount, //TODO: - fee
1249 let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
1256 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx);
1258 let sig = match self.key_storage {
1259 KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
1260 let sighash = ignore_error!(Message::from_slice(&sighash_parts.sighash_all(&spend_tx.input[0], &redeemscript, amount)[..]));
1261 let revocation_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key, &revocation_base_key));
1262 self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &revocation_key)
1264 KeyStorage::SigsMode { .. } => {
1268 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
1269 spend_tx.input[0].witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1270 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(vec!(1));
1271 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(redeemscript.into_bytes());
1273 let outpoint = BitcoinOutPoint { txid: spend_tx.txid(), vout: 0 };
1274 let output = spend_tx.output[0].clone();
1275 (Some(spend_tx), Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput { outpoint, output }))
1276 } else { (None, None) }
1279 fn broadcast_by_local_state(&self, local_tx: &LocalSignedTx, per_commitment_point: &Option<PublicKey>, delayed_payment_base_key: &Option<SecretKey>) -> (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>) {
1280 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
1281 let mut spendable_outputs = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
1283 macro_rules! add_dynamic_output {
1284 ($father_tx: expr, $vout: expr) => {
1285 if let Some(ref per_commitment_point) = *per_commitment_point {
1286 if let Some(ref delayed_payment_base_key) = *delayed_payment_base_key {
1287 if let Ok(local_delayedkey) = chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base_key) {
1288 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WSH {
1289 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: $father_tx.txid(), vout: $vout },
1290 key: local_delayedkey,
1291 witness_script: chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&local_tx.revocation_key, self.our_to_self_delay, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key),
1292 to_self_delay: self.our_to_self_delay,
1293 output: $father_tx.output[$vout as usize].clone(),
1302 let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&local_tx.revocation_key, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), &local_tx.delayed_payment_key);
1303 let revokeable_p2wsh = redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
1304 for (idx, output) in local_tx.tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
1305 if output.script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh {
1306 add_dynamic_output!(local_tx.tx, idx as u32);
1311 for &(ref htlc, ref their_sig, ref our_sig) in local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1313 let mut htlc_timeout_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&local_tx.txid, local_tx.feerate_per_kw, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), htlc, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key, &local_tx.revocation_key);
1315 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
1317 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(their_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
1318 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1319 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
1320 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1322 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new());
1323 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &local_tx.a_htlc_key, &local_tx.b_htlc_key, &local_tx.revocation_key).into_bytes());
1325 add_dynamic_output!(htlc_timeout_tx, 0);
1326 res.push(htlc_timeout_tx);
1328 if let Some(payment_preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
1329 let mut htlc_success_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&local_tx.txid, local_tx.feerate_per_kw, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), htlc, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key, &local_tx.revocation_key);
1331 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
1333 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(their_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
1334 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1335 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
1336 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1338 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(payment_preimage.to_vec());
1339 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &local_tx.a_htlc_key, &local_tx.b_htlc_key, &local_tx.revocation_key).into_bytes());
1341 add_dynamic_output!(htlc_success_tx, 0);
1342 res.push(htlc_success_tx);
1347 (res, spendable_outputs)
1350 /// Attempts to claim any claimable HTLCs in a commitment transaction which was not (yet)
1351 /// revoked using data in local_claimable_outpoints.
1352 /// Should not be used if check_spend_revoked_transaction succeeds.
1353 fn check_spend_local_transaction(&self, tx: &Transaction, _height: u32) -> (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>) {
1354 let commitment_txid = tx.txid();
1355 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1356 if local_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
1357 match self.key_storage {
1358 KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref latest_per_commitment_point, .. } => {
1359 return self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, latest_per_commitment_point, &Some(*delayed_payment_base_key));
1361 KeyStorage::SigsMode { .. } => {
1362 return self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, &None, &None);
1367 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1368 if local_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
1369 match self.key_storage {
1370 KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref prev_latest_per_commitment_point, .. } => {
1371 return self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, prev_latest_per_commitment_point, &Some(*delayed_payment_base_key));
1373 KeyStorage::SigsMode { .. } => {
1374 return self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, &None, &None);
1379 (Vec::new(), Vec::new())
1382 /// Generate a spendable output event when closing_transaction get registered onchain.
1383 fn check_spend_closing_transaction(&self, tx: &Transaction) -> Option<SpendableOutputDescriptor> {
1384 if tx.input[0].sequence == 0xFFFFFFFF && tx.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len() == 71 {
1385 match self.key_storage {
1386 KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref shutdown_pubkey, .. } => {
1387 let our_channel_close_key_hash = Hash160::from_data(&shutdown_pubkey.serialize());
1388 let shutdown_script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::All::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&our_channel_close_key_hash[..]).into_script();
1389 for (idx, output) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
1390 if shutdown_script == output.script_pubkey {
1391 return Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
1392 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), vout: idx as u32 },
1393 output: output.clone(),
1398 KeyStorage::SigsMode { .. } => {
1399 //TODO: we need to ensure an offline client will generate the event when it
1400 // cames back online after only the watchtower saw the transaction
1407 /// Used by ChannelManager deserialization to broadcast the latest local state if it's copy of
1408 /// the Channel was out-of-date.
1409 pub(super) fn get_latest_local_commitment_txn(&self) -> Vec<Transaction> {
1410 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1411 let mut res = vec![local_tx.tx.clone()];
1412 match self.key_storage {
1413 KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref prev_latest_per_commitment_point, .. } => {
1414 res.append(&mut self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, prev_latest_per_commitment_point, &Some(*delayed_payment_base_key)).0);
1416 _ => panic!("Can only broadcast by local channelmonitor"),
1424 fn block_connected(&mut self, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], height: u32, block_hash: &Sha256dHash, broadcaster: &BroadcasterInterface)-> (Vec<(Sha256dHash, Vec<TxOut>)>, Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>) {
1425 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
1426 let mut spendable_outputs = Vec::new();
1427 for tx in txn_matched {
1428 if tx.input.len() == 1 {
1429 // Assuming our keys were not leaked (in which case we're screwed no matter what),
1430 // commitment transactions and HTLC transactions will all only ever have one input,
1431 // which is an easy way to filter out any potential non-matching txn for lazy
1433 let prevout = &tx.input[0].previous_output;
1434 let mut txn: Vec<Transaction> = Vec::new();
1435 if self.funding_txo.is_none() || (prevout.txid == self.funding_txo.as_ref().unwrap().0.txid && prevout.vout == self.funding_txo.as_ref().unwrap().0.index as u32) {
1436 let (remote_txn, new_outputs, mut spendable_output) = self.check_spend_remote_transaction(tx, height);
1438 spendable_outputs.append(&mut spendable_output);
1439 if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() {
1440 watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
1443 let (remote_txn, mut outputs) = self.check_spend_local_transaction(tx, height);
1444 spendable_outputs.append(&mut outputs);
1447 if !self.funding_txo.is_none() && txn.is_empty() {
1448 if let Some(spendable_output) = self.check_spend_closing_transaction(tx) {
1449 spendable_outputs.push(spendable_output);
1453 if let Some(&(commitment_number, _)) = self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.get(&prevout.txid) {
1454 let (tx, spendable_output) = self.check_spend_remote_htlc(tx, commitment_number);
1455 if let Some(tx) = tx {
1458 if let Some(spendable_output) = spendable_output {
1459 spendable_outputs.push(spendable_output);
1463 for tx in txn.iter() {
1464 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(tx);
1468 if let Some(ref cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1469 if self.would_broadcast_at_height(height) {
1470 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&cur_local_tx.tx);
1471 match self.key_storage {
1472 KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref latest_per_commitment_point, .. } => {
1473 let (txs, mut outputs) = self.broadcast_by_local_state(&cur_local_tx, latest_per_commitment_point, &Some(*delayed_payment_base_key));
1474 spendable_outputs.append(&mut outputs);
1476 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
1479 KeyStorage::SigsMode { .. } => {
1480 let (txs, mut outputs) = self.broadcast_by_local_state(&cur_local_tx, &None, &None);
1481 spendable_outputs.append(&mut outputs);
1483 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
1489 self.last_block_hash = block_hash.clone();
1490 (watch_outputs, spendable_outputs)
1493 pub(super) fn would_broadcast_at_height(&self, height: u32) -> bool {
1494 if let Some(ref cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1495 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in cur_local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1496 // For inbound HTLCs which we know the preimage for, we have to ensure we hit the
1497 // chain with enough room to claim the HTLC without our counterparty being able to
1498 // time out the HTLC first.
1499 // For outbound HTLCs which our counterparty hasn't failed/claimed, our primary
1500 // concern is being able to claim the corresponding inbound HTLC (on another
1501 // channel) before it expires. In fact, we don't even really care if our
1502 // counterparty here claims such an outbound HTLC after it expired as long as we
1503 // can still claim the corresponding HTLC. Thus, to avoid needlessly hitting the
1504 // chain when our counterparty is waiting for expiration to off-chain fail an HTLC
1505 // we give ourselves a few blocks of headroom after expiration before going
1506 // on-chain for an expired HTLC.
1507 // Note that, to avoid a potential attack whereby a node delays claiming an HTLC
1508 // from us until we've reached the point where we go on-chain with the
1509 // corresponding inbound HTLC, we must ensure that outbound HTLCs go on chain at
1510 // least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER blocks prior to the inbound HTLC.
1511 // aka outbound_cltv + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS == height - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
1512 // inbound_cltv == height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
1513 // outbound_cltv + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFER <= inbound_cltv - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
1514 // HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS + 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFER <= inbound_cltv - outbound_cltv
1515 // HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS + 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFER <= CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA
1516 if ( htlc.offered && htlc.cltv_expiry + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS <= height) ||
1517 (!htlc.offered && htlc.cltv_expiry <= height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER && self.payment_preimages.contains_key(&htlc.payment_hash)) {
1526 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
1528 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> ReadableArgs<R, Arc<Logger>> for (Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor) {
1529 fn read(reader: &mut R, logger: Arc<Logger>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1530 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1531 macro_rules! unwrap_obj {
1535 Err(_) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
1540 let _ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1541 let min_ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1542 if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION {
1543 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion);
1546 // Technically this can fail and serialize fail a round-trip, but only for serialization of
1547 // barely-init'd ChannelMonitors that we can't do anything with.
1548 let outpoint = OutPoint {
1549 txid: Readable::read(reader)?,
1550 index: Readable::read(reader)?,
1552 let funding_txo = Some((outpoint, Readable::read(reader)?));
1553 let commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor = <U48 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.0;
1555 let key_storage = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
1557 let revocation_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
1558 let htlc_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
1559 let delayed_payment_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
1560 let payment_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
1561 let shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
1562 let prev_latest_per_commitment_point = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
1564 1 => Some(Readable::read(reader)?),
1565 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
1567 let latest_per_commitment_point = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
1569 1 => Some(Readable::read(reader)?),
1570 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
1572 KeyStorage::PrivMode {
1573 revocation_base_key,
1575 delayed_payment_base_key,
1578 prev_latest_per_commitment_point,
1579 latest_per_commitment_point,
1582 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
1585 let their_htlc_base_key = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
1586 let their_delayed_payment_base_key = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
1588 let their_cur_revocation_points = {
1589 let first_idx = <U48 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.0;
1593 let first_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
1594 let second_point_slice: [u8; 33] = Readable::read(reader)?;
1595 if second_point_slice[0..32] == [0; 32] && second_point_slice[32] == 0 {
1596 Some((first_idx, first_point, None))
1598 Some((first_idx, first_point, Some(unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &second_point_slice)))))
1603 let our_to_self_delay: u16 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1604 let their_to_self_delay: Option<u16> = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
1606 let mut old_secrets = [([0; 32], 1 << 48); 49];
1607 for &mut (ref mut secret, ref mut idx) in old_secrets.iter_mut() {
1608 *secret = Readable::read(reader)?;
1609 *idx = Readable::read(reader)?;
1612 macro_rules! read_htlc_in_commitment {
1615 let offered: bool = Readable::read(reader)?;
1616 let amount_msat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1617 let cltv_expiry: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1618 let payment_hash: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(reader)?;
1619 let transaction_output_index: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1621 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1622 offered, amount_msat, cltv_expiry, payment_hash, transaction_output_index
1628 let remote_claimable_outpoints_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1629 let mut remote_claimable_outpoints = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(remote_claimable_outpoints_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 64));
1630 for _ in 0..remote_claimable_outpoints_len {
1631 let txid: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
1632 let outputs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1633 let mut outputs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
1634 for _ in 0..outputs_count {
1635 outputs.push(read_htlc_in_commitment!());
1637 if let Some(_) = remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, outputs) {
1638 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
1642 let remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1643 let mut remote_commitment_txn_on_chain = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
1644 for _ in 0..remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len {
1645 let txid: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
1646 let commitment_number = <U48 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.0;
1647 let outputs_count = <u64 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?;
1648 let mut outputs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 8));
1649 for _ in 0..outputs_count {
1650 outputs.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
1652 if let Some(_) = remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(txid, (commitment_number, outputs)) {
1653 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
1657 let remote_hash_commitment_number_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1658 let mut remote_hash_commitment_number = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(remote_hash_commitment_number_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
1659 for _ in 0..remote_hash_commitment_number_len {
1660 let txid: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(reader)?;
1661 let commitment_number = <U48 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.0;
1662 if let Some(_) = remote_hash_commitment_number.insert(txid, commitment_number) {
1663 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
1667 macro_rules! read_local_tx {
1670 let tx = match Transaction::consensus_decode(reader.by_ref()) {
1673 encode::Error::Io(ioe) => return Err(DecodeError::Io(ioe)),
1674 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
1678 if tx.input.is_empty() {
1679 // Ensure tx didn't hit the 0-input ambiguity case.
1680 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
1683 let revocation_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
1684 let a_htlc_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
1685 let b_htlc_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
1686 let delayed_payment_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
1687 let feerate_per_kw: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1689 let htlc_outputs_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1690 let mut htlc_outputs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlc_outputs_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
1691 for _ in 0..htlc_outputs_len {
1692 htlc_outputs.push((read_htlc_in_commitment!(), Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
1697 tx, revocation_key, a_htlc_key, b_htlc_key, delayed_payment_key, feerate_per_kw, htlc_outputs
1703 let prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
1706 Some(read_local_tx!())
1708 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
1711 let current_local_signed_commitment_tx = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
1714 Some(read_local_tx!())
1716 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
1719 let current_remote_commitment_number = <U48 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.0;
1721 let payment_preimages_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1722 let mut payment_preimages = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(payment_preimages_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
1723 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
1724 for _ in 0..payment_preimages_len {
1725 let preimage: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(reader)?;
1727 sha.input(&preimage);
1728 let mut hash = [0; 32];
1729 sha.result(&mut hash);
1730 if let Some(_) = payment_preimages.insert(hash, preimage) {
1731 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
1735 let last_block_hash: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
1736 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
1738 Ok((last_block_hash.clone(), ChannelMonitor {
1740 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor,
1743 their_htlc_base_key,
1744 their_delayed_payment_base_key,
1745 their_cur_revocation_points,
1748 their_to_self_delay,
1751 remote_claimable_outpoints,
1752 remote_commitment_txn_on_chain,
1753 remote_hash_commitment_number,
1755 prev_local_signed_commitment_tx,
1756 current_local_signed_commitment_tx,
1757 current_remote_commitment_number,
1772 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Script;
1773 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
1774 use crypto::digest::Digest;
1776 use ln::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor;
1777 use ln::chan_utils::{HTLCOutputInCommitment, TxCreationKeys};
1778 use util::sha2::Sha256;
1779 use util::test_utils::TestLogger;
1780 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
1781 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1, Signature};
1782 use rand::{thread_rng,Rng};
1786 fn test_per_commitment_storage() {
1787 // Test vectors from BOLT 3:
1788 let mut secrets: Vec<[u8; 32]> = Vec::new();
1789 let mut monitor: ChannelMonitor;
1790 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1791 let logger = Arc::new(TestLogger::new());
1793 macro_rules! test_secrets {
1795 let mut idx = 281474976710655;
1796 for secret in secrets.iter() {
1797 assert_eq!(monitor.get_secret(idx).unwrap(), *secret);
1800 assert_eq!(monitor.get_min_seen_secret(), idx + 1);
1801 assert!(monitor.get_secret(idx).is_err());
1806 // insert_secret correct sequence
1807 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
1810 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1811 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1812 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1815 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1816 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1817 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1820 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1821 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1822 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1825 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1826 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1827 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1830 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1831 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
1832 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1835 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1836 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
1837 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1840 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1841 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
1842 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1845 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1846 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
1847 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1852 // insert_secret #1 incorrect
1853 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
1856 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1857 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
1858 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1861 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1862 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1863 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().err,
1864 "Previous secret did not match new one");
1868 // insert_secret #2 incorrect (#1 derived from incorrect)
1869 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
1872 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1873 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
1874 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1877 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1878 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("dddc3a8d14fddf2b68fa8c7fbad2748274937479dd0f8930d5ebb4ab6bd866a3").unwrap());
1879 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1882 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1883 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1884 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1887 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1888 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1889 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().err,
1890 "Previous secret did not match new one");
1894 // insert_secret #3 incorrect
1895 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
1898 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1899 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1900 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1903 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1904 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1905 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1908 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1909 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c51a18b13e8527e579ec56365482c62f180b7d5760b46e9477dae59e87ed423a").unwrap());
1910 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1913 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1914 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1915 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().err,
1916 "Previous secret did not match new one");
1920 // insert_secret #4 incorrect (1,2,3 derived from incorrect)
1921 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
1924 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1925 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
1926 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1929 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1930 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("dddc3a8d14fddf2b68fa8c7fbad2748274937479dd0f8930d5ebb4ab6bd866a3").unwrap());
1931 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1934 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1935 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c51a18b13e8527e579ec56365482c62f180b7d5760b46e9477dae59e87ed423a").unwrap());
1936 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1939 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1940 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("ba65d7b0ef55a3ba300d4e87af29868f394f8f138d78a7011669c79b37b936f4").unwrap());
1941 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1944 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1945 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
1946 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1949 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1950 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
1951 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1954 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1955 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
1956 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1959 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1960 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
1961 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().err,
1962 "Previous secret did not match new one");
1966 // insert_secret #5 incorrect
1967 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
1970 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1971 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1972 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1975 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1976 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1977 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1980 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1981 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1982 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1985 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1986 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1987 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1990 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1991 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("631373ad5f9ef654bb3dade742d09504c567edd24320d2fcd68e3cc47e2ff6a6").unwrap());
1992 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1995 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1996 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
1997 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().err,
1998 "Previous secret did not match new one");
2002 // insert_secret #6 incorrect (5 derived from incorrect)
2003 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
2006 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2007 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
2008 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2011 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2012 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
2013 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2016 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2017 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
2018 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2021 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2022 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
2023 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2026 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2027 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("631373ad5f9ef654bb3dade742d09504c567edd24320d2fcd68e3cc47e2ff6a6").unwrap());
2028 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2031 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2032 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("b7e76a83668bde38b373970155c868a653304308f9896692f904a23731224bb1").unwrap());
2033 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2036 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2037 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
2038 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2041 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2042 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
2043 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().err,
2044 "Previous secret did not match new one");
2048 // insert_secret #7 incorrect
2049 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
2052 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2053 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
2054 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2057 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2058 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
2059 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2062 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2063 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
2064 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2067 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2068 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
2069 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2072 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2073 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
2074 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2077 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2078 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
2079 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2082 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2083 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("e7971de736e01da8ed58b94c2fc216cb1dca9e326f3a96e7194fe8ea8af6c0a3").unwrap());
2084 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2087 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2088 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
2089 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().err,
2090 "Previous secret did not match new one");
2094 // insert_secret #8 incorrect
2095 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
2098 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2099 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
2100 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2103 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2104 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
2105 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2108 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2109 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
2110 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2113 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2114 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
2115 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2118 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2119 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
2120 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2123 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2124 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
2125 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2128 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2129 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
2130 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2133 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2134 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a7efbc61aac46d34f77778bac22c8a20c6a46ca460addc49009bda875ec88fa4").unwrap());
2135 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().err,
2136 "Previous secret did not match new one");
2141 fn test_prune_preimages() {
2142 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2143 let logger = Arc::new(TestLogger::new());
2144 let dummy_sig = Signature::from_der(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("3045022100fa86fa9a36a8cd6a7bb8f06a541787d51371d067951a9461d5404de6b928782e02201c8b7c334c10aed8976a3a465be9a28abff4cb23acbf00022295b378ce1fa3cd").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
2146 macro_rules! dummy_keys {
2149 let dummy_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap());
2151 per_commitment_point: dummy_key.clone(),
2152 revocation_key: dummy_key.clone(),
2153 a_htlc_key: dummy_key.clone(),
2154 b_htlc_key: dummy_key.clone(),
2155 a_delayed_payment_key: dummy_key.clone(),
2156 b_payment_key: dummy_key.clone(),
2161 let dummy_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
2163 let mut preimages = Vec::new();
2165 let mut rng = thread_rng();
2167 let mut preimage = [0; 32];
2168 rng.fill_bytes(&mut preimage);
2169 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
2170 sha.input(&preimage);
2171 let mut hash = [0; 32];
2172 sha.result(&mut hash);
2173 preimages.push((preimage, hash));
2177 macro_rules! preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs {
2178 ($preimages_slice: expr) => {
2180 let mut res = Vec::new();
2181 for (idx, preimage) in $preimages_slice.iter().enumerate() {
2182 res.push(HTLCOutputInCommitment {
2186 payment_hash: preimage.1.clone(),
2187 transaction_output_index: idx as u32,
2194 macro_rules! preimages_to_local_htlcs {
2195 ($preimages_slice: expr) => {
2197 let mut inp = preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!($preimages_slice);
2198 let res: Vec<_> = inp.drain(..).map(|e| { (e, dummy_sig.clone(), dummy_sig.clone()) }).collect();
2204 macro_rules! test_preimages_exist {
2205 ($preimages_slice: expr, $monitor: expr) => {
2206 for preimage in $preimages_slice {
2207 assert!($monitor.payment_preimages.contains_key(&preimage.1));
2212 // Prune with one old state and a local commitment tx holding a few overlaps with the
2214 let mut monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
2215 monitor.set_their_to_self_delay(10);
2217 monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(dummy_tx.clone(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..10]));
2218 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[5..15]), 281474976710655);
2219 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[15..20]), 281474976710654);
2220 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[17..20]), 281474976710653);
2221 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[18..20]), 281474976710652);
2222 for &(ref preimage, ref hash) in preimages.iter() {
2223 monitor.provide_payment_preimage(hash, preimage);
2226 // Now provide a secret, pruning preimages 10-15
2227 let mut secret = [0; 32];
2228 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
2229 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secret.clone()).unwrap();
2230 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 15);
2231 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
2232 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[15..20], monitor);
2234 // Now provide a further secret, pruning preimages 15-17
2235 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
2236 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secret.clone()).unwrap();
2237 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 13);
2238 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
2239 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[17..20], monitor);
2241 // Now update local commitment tx info, pruning only element 18 as we still care about the
2242 // previous commitment tx's preimages too
2243 monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(dummy_tx.clone(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..5]));
2244 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
2245 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secret.clone()).unwrap();
2246 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 12);
2247 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
2248 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[18..20], monitor);
2250 // But if we do it again, we'll prune 5-10
2251 monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(dummy_tx.clone(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..3]));
2252 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
2253 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secret.clone()).unwrap();
2254 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 5);
2255 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..5], monitor);
2258 // Further testing is done in the ChannelManager integration tests.