1 //! The logic to monitor for on-chain transactions and create the relevant claim responses lives
4 //! ChannelMonitor objects are generated by ChannelManager in response to relevant
5 //! messages/actions, and MUST be persisted to disk (and, preferably, remotely) before progress can
6 //! be made in responding to certain messages, see ManyChannelMonitor for more.
8 //! Note that ChannelMonitors are an important part of the lightning trust model and a copy of the
9 //! latest ChannelMonitor must always be actively monitoring for chain updates (and no out-of-date
10 //! ChannelMonitors should do so). Thus, if you're building rust-lightning into an HSM or other
11 //! security-domain-separated system design, you should consider having multiple paths for
12 //! ChannelMonitors to get out of the HSM and onto monitoring devices.
14 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
15 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxIn,TxOut,SigHashType,Transaction};
16 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
17 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
18 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
19 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::{self, Decodable, Encodable};
20 use bitcoin::util::hash::{BitcoinHash,Sha256dHash};
21 use bitcoin::util::bip143;
23 use bitcoin_hashes::Hash;
24 use bitcoin_hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
25 use bitcoin_hashes::hash160::Hash as Hash160;
27 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Message,Signature};
28 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
31 use ln::msgs::DecodeError;
33 use ln::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment;
34 use ln::channelmanager::{HTLCSource, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
35 use ln::channel::{ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT, OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT};
36 use chain::chaininterface::{ChainListener, ChainWatchInterface, BroadcasterInterface};
37 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
38 use chain::keysinterface::SpendableOutputDescriptor;
39 use util::logger::Logger;
40 use util::ser::{ReadableArgs, Readable, Writer, Writeable, WriterWriteAdaptor, U48};
41 use util::{byte_utils, events};
43 use std::collections::{HashMap, hash_map};
44 use std::sync::{Arc,Mutex};
45 use std::{hash,cmp, mem};
47 /// An error enum representing a failure to persist a channel monitor update.
49 pub enum ChannelMonitorUpdateErr {
50 /// Used to indicate a temporary failure (eg connection to a watchtower failed, but is expected
51 /// to succeed at some point in the future).
53 /// Such a failure will "freeze" a channel, preventing us from revoking old states or
54 /// submitting new commitment transactions to the remote party.
55 /// ChannelManager::test_restore_channel_monitor can be used to retry the update(s) and restore
56 /// the channel to an operational state.
58 /// Note that continuing to operate when no copy of the updated ChannelMonitor could be
59 /// persisted is unsafe - if you failed to store the update on your own local disk you should
60 /// instead return PermanentFailure to force closure of the channel ASAP.
62 /// Even when a channel has been "frozen" updates to the ChannelMonitor can continue to occur
63 /// (eg if an inbound HTLC which we forwarded was claimed upstream resulting in us attempting
64 /// to claim it on this channel) and those updates must be applied wherever they can be. At
65 /// least one such updated ChannelMonitor must be persisted otherwise PermanentFailure should
66 /// be returned to get things on-chain ASAP using only the in-memory copy. Obviously updates to
67 /// the channel which would invalidate previous ChannelMonitors are not made when a channel has
70 /// Note that even if updates made after TemporaryFailure succeed you must still call
71 /// test_restore_channel_monitor to ensure you have the latest monitor and re-enable normal
72 /// channel operation.
74 /// Used to indicate no further channel monitor updates will be allowed (eg we've moved on to a
75 /// different watchtower and cannot update with all watchtowers that were previously informed
76 /// of this channel). This will force-close the channel in question.
78 /// Should also be used to indicate a failure to update the local copy of the channel monitor.
82 /// General Err type for ChannelMonitor actions. Generally, this implies that the data provided is
83 /// inconsistent with the ChannelMonitor being called. eg for ChannelMonitor::insert_combine this
84 /// means you tried to merge two monitors for different channels or for a channel which was
85 /// restored from a backup and then generated new commitment updates.
86 /// Contains a human-readable error message.
88 pub struct MonitorUpdateError(pub &'static str);
90 /// Simple structure send back by ManyChannelMonitor in case of HTLC detected onchain from a
91 /// forward channel and from which info are needed to update HTLC in a backward channel.
92 pub struct HTLCUpdate {
93 pub(super) payment_hash: PaymentHash,
94 pub(super) payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
95 pub(super) source: HTLCSource
98 /// Simple trait indicating ability to track a set of ChannelMonitors and multiplex events between
99 /// them. Generally should be implemented by keeping a local SimpleManyChannelMonitor and passing
100 /// events to it, while also taking any add_update_monitor events and passing them to some remote
103 /// Note that any updates to a channel's monitor *must* be applied to each instance of the
104 /// channel's monitor everywhere (including remote watchtowers) *before* this function returns. If
105 /// an update occurs and a remote watchtower is left with old state, it may broadcast transactions
106 /// which we have revoked, allowing our counterparty to claim all funds in the channel!
107 pub trait ManyChannelMonitor: Send + Sync {
108 /// Adds or updates a monitor for the given `funding_txo`.
110 /// Implementor must also ensure that the funding_txo outpoint is registered with any relevant
111 /// ChainWatchInterfaces such that the provided monitor receives block_connected callbacks with
112 /// any spends of it.
113 fn add_update_monitor(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr>;
115 /// Used by ChannelManager to get list of HTLC resolved onchain and which needed to be updated
116 /// with success or failure backward
117 fn fetch_pending_htlc_updated(&self) -> Vec<HTLCUpdate>;
120 /// A simple implementation of a ManyChannelMonitor and ChainListener. Can be used to create a
121 /// watchtower or watch our own channels.
123 /// Note that you must provide your own key by which to refer to channels.
125 /// If you're accepting remote monitors (ie are implementing a watchtower), you must verify that
126 /// users cannot overwrite a given channel by providing a duplicate key. ie you should probably
127 /// index by a PublicKey which is required to sign any updates.
129 /// If you're using this for local monitoring of your own channels, you probably want to use
130 /// `OutPoint` as the key, which will give you a ManyChannelMonitor implementation.
131 pub struct SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
132 #[cfg(test)] // Used in ChannelManager tests to manipulate channels directly
133 pub monitors: Mutex<HashMap<Key, ChannelMonitor>>,
135 monitors: Mutex<HashMap<Key, ChannelMonitor>>,
136 chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>,
137 broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>,
138 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
139 pending_htlc_updated: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, Vec<(HTLCSource, Option<PaymentPreimage>)>>>,
143 impl<Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash> ChainListener for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
144 fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], _indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) {
145 let block_hash = header.bitcoin_hash();
146 let mut new_events: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(0);
147 let mut htlc_updated_infos = Vec::new();
149 let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
150 for monitor in monitors.values_mut() {
151 let (txn_outputs, spendable_outputs, mut htlc_updated) = monitor.block_connected(txn_matched, height, &block_hash, &*self.broadcaster);
152 if spendable_outputs.len() > 0 {
153 new_events.push(events::Event::SpendableOutputs {
154 outputs: spendable_outputs,
158 for (ref txid, ref outputs) in txn_outputs {
159 for (idx, output) in outputs.iter().enumerate() {
160 self.chain_monitor.install_watch_outpoint((txid.clone(), idx as u32), &output.script_pubkey);
163 htlc_updated_infos.append(&mut htlc_updated);
167 // ChannelManager will just need to fetch pending_htlc_updated and pass state backward
168 let mut pending_htlc_updated = self.pending_htlc_updated.lock().unwrap();
169 for htlc in htlc_updated_infos.drain(..) {
170 match pending_htlc_updated.entry(htlc.2) {
171 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut e) => {
172 // In case of reorg we may have htlc outputs solved in a different way so
173 // we prefer to keep claims but don't store duplicate updates for a given
174 // (payment_hash, HTLCSource) pair.
175 // TODO: Note that we currently don't really use this as ChannelManager
176 // will fail/claim backwards after the first block. We really should delay
177 // a few blocks before failing backwards (but can claim backwards
178 // immediately) as long as we have a few blocks of headroom.
179 let mut existing_claim = false;
180 e.get_mut().retain(|htlc_data| {
181 if htlc.0 == htlc_data.0 {
182 if htlc_data.1.is_some() {
183 existing_claim = true;
189 e.get_mut().push((htlc.0, htlc.1));
192 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
193 e.insert(vec![(htlc.0, htlc.1)]);
198 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
199 pending_events.append(&mut new_events);
202 fn block_disconnected(&self, _: &BlockHeader) { }
205 impl<Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash + 'static> SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
206 /// Creates a new object which can be used to monitor several channels given the chain
207 /// interface with which to register to receive notifications.
208 pub fn new(chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>, broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>, logger: Arc<Logger>) -> Arc<SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key>> {
209 let res = Arc::new(SimpleManyChannelMonitor {
210 monitors: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
213 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
214 pending_htlc_updated: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
217 let weak_res = Arc::downgrade(&res);
218 res.chain_monitor.register_listener(weak_res);
222 /// Adds or udpates the monitor which monitors the channel referred to by the given key.
223 pub fn add_update_monitor_by_key(&self, key: Key, monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
224 let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
225 match monitors.get_mut(&key) {
226 Some(orig_monitor) => {
227 log_trace!(self, "Updating Channel Monitor for channel {}", log_funding_info!(monitor.key_storage));
228 return orig_monitor.insert_combine(monitor);
232 match monitor.key_storage {
233 Storage::Local { ref funding_info, .. } => {
236 return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Try to update a useless monitor without funding_txo !"));
238 &Some((ref outpoint, ref script)) => {
239 log_trace!(self, "Got new Channel Monitor for channel {}", log_bytes!(outpoint.to_channel_id()[..]));
240 self.chain_monitor.install_watch_tx(&outpoint.txid, script);
241 self.chain_monitor.install_watch_outpoint((outpoint.txid, outpoint.index as u32), script);
245 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
246 self.chain_monitor.watch_all_txn();
249 monitors.insert(key, monitor);
254 impl ManyChannelMonitor for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<OutPoint> {
255 fn add_update_monitor(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr> {
256 match self.add_update_monitor_by_key(funding_txo, monitor) {
258 Err(_) => Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure),
262 fn fetch_pending_htlc_updated(&self) -> Vec<HTLCUpdate> {
263 let mut updated = self.pending_htlc_updated.lock().unwrap();
264 let mut pending_htlcs_updated = Vec::with_capacity(updated.len());
265 for (k, v) in updated.drain() {
267 pending_htlcs_updated.push(HTLCUpdate {
269 payment_preimage: htlc_data.1,
274 pending_htlcs_updated
278 impl<Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash> events::EventsProvider for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
279 fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
280 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
281 let mut ret = Vec::new();
282 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut *pending_events);
287 /// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, don't try to claim it in a shared transaction,
288 /// instead claiming it in its own individual transaction.
289 const CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 12;
290 /// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, force-close the channel to broadcast the
291 /// HTLC-Success transaction.
292 /// In other words, this is an upper bound on how many blocks we think it can take us to get a
293 /// transaction confirmed (and we use it in a few more, equivalent, places).
294 pub(crate) const CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 6;
295 /// Number of blocks by which point we expect our counterparty to have seen new blocks on the
296 /// network and done a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance (+ we've updated all our
297 /// copies of ChannelMonitors, including watchtowers).
298 pub(crate) const HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS: u32 = 3;
299 /// Number of blocks we wait on seeing a confirmed HTLC-Timeout or previous revoked commitment
300 /// transaction before we fail corresponding inbound HTLCs. This prevents us from failing backwards
301 /// and then getting a reorg resulting in us losing money.
302 //TODO: We currently dont actually use this...we should
303 pub(crate) const HTLC_FAIL_ANTI_REORG_DELAY: u32 = 6;
305 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
308 revocation_base_key: SecretKey,
309 htlc_base_key: SecretKey,
310 delayed_payment_base_key: SecretKey,
311 payment_base_key: SecretKey,
312 shutdown_pubkey: PublicKey,
313 prev_latest_per_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
314 latest_per_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
315 funding_info: Option<(OutPoint, Script)>,
316 current_remote_commitment_txid: Option<Sha256dHash>,
317 prev_remote_commitment_txid: Option<Sha256dHash>,
320 revocation_base_key: PublicKey,
321 htlc_base_key: PublicKey,
325 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
326 struct LocalSignedTx {
327 /// txid of the transaction in tx, just used to make comparison faster
330 revocation_key: PublicKey,
331 a_htlc_key: PublicKey,
332 b_htlc_key: PublicKey,
333 delayed_payment_key: PublicKey,
335 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Signature, Signature)>,
336 htlc_sources: Vec<(PaymentHash, HTLCSource, Option<u32>)>,
339 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
340 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
342 /// A ChannelMonitor handles chain events (blocks connected and disconnected) and generates
343 /// on-chain transactions to ensure no loss of funds occurs.
345 /// You MUST ensure that no ChannelMonitors for a given channel anywhere contain out-of-date
346 /// information and are actively monitoring the chain.
348 pub struct ChannelMonitor {
349 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64,
351 key_storage: Storage,
352 their_htlc_base_key: Option<PublicKey>,
353 their_delayed_payment_base_key: Option<PublicKey>,
354 // first is the idx of the first of the two revocation points
355 their_cur_revocation_points: Option<(u64, PublicKey, Option<PublicKey>)>,
357 our_to_self_delay: u16,
358 their_to_self_delay: Option<u16>,
360 old_secrets: [([u8; 32], u64); 49],
361 remote_claimable_outpoints: HashMap<Sha256dHash, (Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>, Vec<(PaymentHash, HTLCSource, Option<u32>)>)>,
362 /// We cannot identify HTLC-Success or HTLC-Timeout transactions by themselves on the chain.
363 /// Nor can we figure out their commitment numbers without the commitment transaction they are
364 /// spending. Thus, in order to claim them via revocation key, we track all the remote
365 /// commitment transactions which we find on-chain, mapping them to the commitment number which
366 /// can be used to derive the revocation key and claim the transactions.
367 remote_commitment_txn_on_chain: HashMap<Sha256dHash, (u64, Vec<Script>)>,
368 /// Cache used to make pruning of payment_preimages faster.
369 /// Maps payment_hash values to commitment numbers for remote transactions for non-revoked
370 /// remote transactions (ie should remain pretty small).
371 /// Serialized to disk but should generally not be sent to Watchtowers.
372 remote_hash_commitment_number: HashMap<PaymentHash, u64>,
374 // We store two local commitment transactions to avoid any race conditions where we may update
375 // some monitors (potentially on watchtowers) but then fail to update others, resulting in the
376 // various monitors for one channel being out of sync, and us broadcasting a local
377 // transaction for which we have deleted claim information on some watchtowers.
378 prev_local_signed_commitment_tx: Option<LocalSignedTx>,
379 current_local_signed_commitment_tx: Option<LocalSignedTx>,
381 // Used just for ChannelManager to make sure it has the latest channel data during
383 current_remote_commitment_number: u64,
385 payment_preimages: HashMap<PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage>,
387 destination_script: Script,
389 // We simply modify last_block_hash in Channel's block_connected so that serialization is
390 // consistent but hopefully the users' copy handles block_connected in a consistent way.
391 // (we do *not*, however, update them in insert_combine to ensure any local user copies keep
392 // their last_block_hash from its state and not based on updated copies that didn't run through
393 // the full block_connected).
394 pub(crate) last_block_hash: Sha256dHash,
395 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>, //TODO: dedup this a bit...
399 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
400 /// Used only in testing and fuzztarget to check serialization roundtrips don't change the
401 /// underlying object
402 impl PartialEq for ChannelMonitor {
403 fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
404 if self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor != other.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor ||
405 self.key_storage != other.key_storage ||
406 self.their_htlc_base_key != other.their_htlc_base_key ||
407 self.their_delayed_payment_base_key != other.their_delayed_payment_base_key ||
408 self.their_cur_revocation_points != other.their_cur_revocation_points ||
409 self.our_to_self_delay != other.our_to_self_delay ||
410 self.their_to_self_delay != other.their_to_self_delay ||
411 self.remote_claimable_outpoints != other.remote_claimable_outpoints ||
412 self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain != other.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain ||
413 self.remote_hash_commitment_number != other.remote_hash_commitment_number ||
414 self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx != other.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx ||
415 self.current_remote_commitment_number != other.current_remote_commitment_number ||
416 self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx != other.current_local_signed_commitment_tx ||
417 self.payment_preimages != other.payment_preimages ||
418 self.destination_script != other.destination_script
422 for (&(ref secret, ref idx), &(ref o_secret, ref o_idx)) in self.old_secrets.iter().zip(other.old_secrets.iter()) {
423 if secret != o_secret || idx != o_idx {
432 impl ChannelMonitor {
433 pub(super) fn new(revocation_base_key: &SecretKey, delayed_payment_base_key: &SecretKey, htlc_base_key: &SecretKey, payment_base_key: &SecretKey, shutdown_pubkey: &PublicKey, our_to_self_delay: u16, destination_script: Script, logger: Arc<Logger>) -> ChannelMonitor {
435 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: 0,
437 key_storage: Storage::Local {
438 revocation_base_key: revocation_base_key.clone(),
439 htlc_base_key: htlc_base_key.clone(),
440 delayed_payment_base_key: delayed_payment_base_key.clone(),
441 payment_base_key: payment_base_key.clone(),
442 shutdown_pubkey: shutdown_pubkey.clone(),
443 prev_latest_per_commitment_point: None,
444 latest_per_commitment_point: None,
446 current_remote_commitment_txid: None,
447 prev_remote_commitment_txid: None,
449 their_htlc_base_key: None,
450 their_delayed_payment_base_key: None,
451 their_cur_revocation_points: None,
453 our_to_self_delay: our_to_self_delay,
454 their_to_self_delay: None,
456 old_secrets: [([0; 32], 1 << 48); 49],
457 remote_claimable_outpoints: HashMap::new(),
458 remote_commitment_txn_on_chain: HashMap::new(),
459 remote_hash_commitment_number: HashMap::new(),
461 prev_local_signed_commitment_tx: None,
462 current_local_signed_commitment_tx: None,
463 current_remote_commitment_number: 1 << 48,
465 payment_preimages: HashMap::new(),
466 destination_script: destination_script,
468 last_block_hash: Default::default(),
469 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
475 fn place_secret(idx: u64) -> u8 {
477 if idx & (1 << i) == (1 << i) {
485 fn derive_secret(secret: [u8; 32], bits: u8, idx: u64) -> [u8; 32] {
486 let mut res: [u8; 32] = secret;
488 let bitpos = bits - 1 - i;
489 if idx & (1 << bitpos) == (1 << bitpos) {
490 res[(bitpos / 8) as usize] ^= 1 << (bitpos & 7);
491 res = Sha256::hash(&res).into_inner();
497 /// Inserts a revocation secret into this channel monitor. Prunes old preimages if neither
498 /// needed by local commitment transactions HTCLs nor by remote ones. Unless we haven't already seen remote
499 /// commitment transaction's secret, they are de facto pruned (we can use revocation key).
500 pub(super) fn provide_secret(&mut self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
501 let pos = ChannelMonitor::place_secret(idx);
503 let (old_secret, old_idx) = self.old_secrets[i as usize];
504 if ChannelMonitor::derive_secret(secret, pos, old_idx) != old_secret {
505 return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Previous secret did not match new one"));
508 if self.get_min_seen_secret() <= idx {
511 self.old_secrets[pos as usize] = (secret, idx);
513 // Prune HTLCs from the previous remote commitment tx so we don't generate failure/fulfill
514 // events for now-revoked/fulfilled HTLCs.
515 // TODO: We should probably consider whether we're really getting the next secret here.
516 if let Storage::Local { ref mut prev_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage {
517 if let Some(txid) = prev_remote_commitment_txid.take() {
518 self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get_mut(&txid).unwrap().1 = Vec::new();
522 if !self.payment_preimages.is_empty() {
523 let local_signed_commitment_tx = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx.as_ref().expect("Channel needs at least an initial commitment tx !");
524 let prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.as_ref();
525 let min_idx = self.get_min_seen_secret();
526 let remote_hash_commitment_number = &mut self.remote_hash_commitment_number;
528 self.payment_preimages.retain(|&k, _| {
529 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in &local_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs {
530 if k == htlc.payment_hash {
534 if let Some(prev_local_commitment_tx) = prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
535 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in prev_local_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
536 if k == htlc.payment_hash {
541 let contains = if let Some(cn) = remote_hash_commitment_number.get(&k) {
548 remote_hash_commitment_number.remove(&k);
557 /// Informs this monitor of the latest remote (ie non-broadcastable) commitment transaction.
558 /// The monitor watches for it to be broadcasted and then uses the HTLC information (and
559 /// possibly future revocation/preimage information) to claim outputs where possible.
560 /// We cache also the mapping hash:commitment number to lighten pruning of old preimages by watchtowers.
561 pub(super) fn provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, unsigned_commitment_tx: &Transaction, htlc_outputs: Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>, htlc_sources: Vec<(PaymentHash, HTLCSource, Option<u32>)>, commitment_number: u64, their_revocation_point: PublicKey) {
562 // TODO: Encrypt the htlc_outputs data with the single-hash of the commitment transaction
563 // so that a remote monitor doesn't learn anything unless there is a malicious close.
564 // (only maybe, sadly we cant do the same for local info, as we need to be aware of
566 for ref htlc in &htlc_outputs {
567 self.remote_hash_commitment_number.insert(htlc.payment_hash, commitment_number);
570 let new_txid = unsigned_commitment_tx.txid();
571 if let Storage::Local { ref mut current_remote_commitment_txid, ref mut prev_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage {
572 *prev_remote_commitment_txid = current_remote_commitment_txid.take();
573 *current_remote_commitment_txid = Some(new_txid);
575 self.remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(new_txid, (htlc_outputs, htlc_sources));
576 self.current_remote_commitment_number = commitment_number;
577 //TODO: Merge this into the other per-remote-transaction output storage stuff
578 match self.their_cur_revocation_points {
579 Some(old_points) => {
580 if old_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 {
581 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0, old_points.1, Some(their_revocation_point)));
582 } else if old_points.0 == commitment_number + 2 {
583 if let Some(old_second_point) = old_points.2 {
584 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0 - 1, old_second_point, Some(their_revocation_point)));
586 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None));
589 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None));
593 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None));
598 /// Informs this monitor of the latest local (ie broadcastable) commitment transaction. The
599 /// monitor watches for timeouts and may broadcast it if we approach such a timeout. Thus, it
600 /// is important that any clones of this channel monitor (including remote clones) by kept
601 /// up-to-date as our local commitment transaction is updated.
602 /// Panics if set_their_to_self_delay has never been called.
603 /// Also update Storage with latest local per_commitment_point to derive local_delayedkey in
604 /// case of onchain HTLC tx
605 pub(super) fn provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, signed_commitment_tx: Transaction, local_keys: chan_utils::TxCreationKeys, feerate_per_kw: u64, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Signature, Signature)>, htlc_sources: Vec<(PaymentHash, HTLCSource, Option<u32>)>) {
606 assert!(self.their_to_self_delay.is_some());
607 self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx.take();
608 self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(LocalSignedTx {
609 txid: signed_commitment_tx.txid(),
610 tx: signed_commitment_tx,
611 revocation_key: local_keys.revocation_key,
612 a_htlc_key: local_keys.a_htlc_key,
613 b_htlc_key: local_keys.b_htlc_key,
614 delayed_payment_key: local_keys.a_delayed_payment_key,
620 if let Storage::Local { ref mut latest_per_commitment_point, .. } = self.key_storage {
621 *latest_per_commitment_point = Some(local_keys.per_commitment_point);
623 panic!("Channel somehow ended up with its internal ChannelMonitor being in Watchtower mode?");
627 /// Provides a payment_hash->payment_preimage mapping. Will be automatically pruned when all
628 /// commitment_tx_infos which contain the payment hash have been revoked.
629 pub(super) fn provide_payment_preimage(&mut self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_preimage: &PaymentPreimage) {
630 self.payment_preimages.insert(payment_hash.clone(), payment_preimage.clone());
633 /// Combines this ChannelMonitor with the information contained in the other ChannelMonitor.
634 /// After a successful call this ChannelMonitor is up-to-date and is safe to use to monitor the
635 /// chain for new blocks/transactions.
636 pub fn insert_combine(&mut self, mut other: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
637 match self.key_storage {
638 Storage::Local { ref funding_info, .. } => {
639 if funding_info.is_none() { return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Try to combine a Local monitor without funding_info")); }
640 let our_funding_info = funding_info;
641 if let Storage::Local { ref funding_info, .. } = other.key_storage {
642 if funding_info.is_none() { return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Try to combine a Local monitor without funding_info")); }
643 // We should be able to compare the entire funding_txo, but in fuzztarget its trivially
644 // easy to collide the funding_txo hash and have a different scriptPubKey.
645 if funding_info.as_ref().unwrap().0 != our_funding_info.as_ref().unwrap().0 {
646 return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Funding transaction outputs are not identical!"));
649 return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Try to combine a Local monitor with a Watchtower one !"));
652 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
653 if let Storage::Watchtower { .. } = other.key_storage {
656 return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Try to combine a Watchtower monitor with a Local one !"));
660 let other_min_secret = other.get_min_seen_secret();
661 let our_min_secret = self.get_min_seen_secret();
662 if our_min_secret > other_min_secret {
663 self.provide_secret(other_min_secret, other.get_secret(other_min_secret).unwrap())?;
665 if let Some(ref local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
666 if let Some(ref other_local_tx) = other.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
667 let our_commitment_number = 0xffffffffffff - ((((local_tx.tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (local_tx.tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor);
668 let other_commitment_number = 0xffffffffffff - ((((other_local_tx.tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (other_local_tx.tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ other.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor);
669 if our_commitment_number >= other_commitment_number {
670 self.key_storage = other.key_storage;
674 // TODO: We should use current_remote_commitment_number and the commitment number out of
675 // local transactions to decide how to merge
676 if our_min_secret >= other_min_secret {
677 self.their_cur_revocation_points = other.their_cur_revocation_points;
678 for (txid, htlcs) in other.remote_claimable_outpoints.drain() {
679 self.remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, htlcs);
681 if let Some(local_tx) = other.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
682 self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(local_tx);
684 if let Some(local_tx) = other.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
685 self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(local_tx);
687 self.payment_preimages = other.payment_preimages;
690 self.current_remote_commitment_number = cmp::min(self.current_remote_commitment_number, other.current_remote_commitment_number);
694 /// Panics if commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor doesn't fit in 48 bits
695 pub(super) fn set_commitment_obscure_factor(&mut self, commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64) {
696 assert!(commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor < (1 << 48));
697 self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor = commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor;
700 /// Allows this monitor to scan only for transactions which are applicable. Note that this is
701 /// optional, without it this monitor cannot be used in an SPV client, but you may wish to
702 /// avoid this (or call unset_funding_info) on a monitor you wish to send to a watchtower as it
703 /// provides slightly better privacy.
704 /// It's the responsibility of the caller to register outpoint and script with passing the former
705 /// value as key to add_update_monitor.
706 pub(super) fn set_funding_info(&mut self, new_funding_info: (OutPoint, Script)) {
707 match self.key_storage {
708 Storage::Local { ref mut funding_info, .. } => {
709 *funding_info = Some(new_funding_info);
711 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
712 panic!("Channel somehow ended up with its internal ChannelMonitor being in Watchtower mode?");
717 /// We log these base keys at channel opening to being able to rebuild redeemscript in case of leaked revoked commit tx
718 pub(super) fn set_their_base_keys(&mut self, their_htlc_base_key: &PublicKey, their_delayed_payment_base_key: &PublicKey) {
719 self.their_htlc_base_key = Some(their_htlc_base_key.clone());
720 self.their_delayed_payment_base_key = Some(their_delayed_payment_base_key.clone());
723 pub(super) fn set_their_to_self_delay(&mut self, their_to_self_delay: u16) {
724 self.their_to_self_delay = Some(their_to_self_delay);
727 pub(super) fn unset_funding_info(&mut self) {
728 match self.key_storage {
729 Storage::Local { ref mut funding_info, .. } => {
730 *funding_info = None;
732 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
733 panic!("Channel somehow ended up with its internal ChannelMonitor being in Watchtower mode?");
738 /// Gets the funding transaction outpoint of the channel this ChannelMonitor is monitoring for.
739 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
740 match self.key_storage {
741 Storage::Local { ref funding_info, .. } => {
743 &Some((outpoint, _)) => Some(outpoint),
747 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
753 /// Gets the sets of all outpoints which this ChannelMonitor expects to hear about spends of.
754 /// Generally useful when deserializing as during normal operation the return values of
755 /// block_connected are sufficient to ensure all relevant outpoints are being monitored (note
756 /// that the get_funding_txo outpoint and transaction must also be monitored for!).
757 pub fn get_monitored_outpoints(&self) -> Vec<(Sha256dHash, u32, &Script)> {
758 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.len() * 2);
759 for (ref txid, &(_, ref outputs)) in self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
760 for (idx, output) in outputs.iter().enumerate() {
761 res.push(((*txid).clone(), idx as u32, output));
767 /// Serializes into a vec, with various modes for the exposed pub fns
768 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W, for_local_storage: bool) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
769 //TODO: We still write out all the serialization here manually instead of using the fancy
770 //serialization framework we have, we should migrate things over to it.
771 writer.write_all(&[SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
772 writer.write_all(&[MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
774 // Set in initial Channel-object creation, so should always be set by now:
775 U48(self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor).write(writer)?;
777 match self.key_storage {
778 Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref payment_base_key, ref shutdown_pubkey, ref prev_latest_per_commitment_point, ref latest_per_commitment_point, ref funding_info, current_remote_commitment_txid, prev_remote_commitment_txid } => {
779 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
780 writer.write_all(&revocation_base_key[..])?;
781 writer.write_all(&htlc_base_key[..])?;
782 writer.write_all(&delayed_payment_base_key[..])?;
783 writer.write_all(&payment_base_key[..])?;
784 writer.write_all(&shutdown_pubkey.serialize())?;
785 if let Some(ref prev_latest_per_commitment_point) = *prev_latest_per_commitment_point {
786 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
787 writer.write_all(&prev_latest_per_commitment_point.serialize())?;
789 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
791 if let Some(ref latest_per_commitment_point) = *latest_per_commitment_point {
792 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
793 writer.write_all(&latest_per_commitment_point.serialize())?;
795 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
798 &Some((ref outpoint, ref script)) => {
799 writer.write_all(&outpoint.txid[..])?;
800 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(outpoint.index))?;
801 script.write(writer)?;
804 debug_assert!(false, "Try to serialize a useless Local monitor !");
807 if let Some(ref txid) = current_remote_commitment_txid {
808 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
809 writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
811 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
813 if let Some(ref txid) = prev_remote_commitment_txid {
814 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
815 writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
817 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
820 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => unimplemented!(),
823 writer.write_all(&self.their_htlc_base_key.as_ref().unwrap().serialize())?;
824 writer.write_all(&self.their_delayed_payment_base_key.as_ref().unwrap().serialize())?;
826 match self.their_cur_revocation_points {
827 Some((idx, pubkey, second_option)) => {
828 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(idx))?;
829 writer.write_all(&pubkey.serialize())?;
830 match second_option {
831 Some(second_pubkey) => {
832 writer.write_all(&second_pubkey.serialize())?;
835 writer.write_all(&[0; 33])?;
840 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(0))?;
844 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.our_to_self_delay))?;
845 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap()))?;
847 for &(ref secret, ref idx) in self.old_secrets.iter() {
848 writer.write_all(secret)?;
849 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*idx))?;
852 macro_rules! serialize_htlc_in_commitment {
853 ($htlc_output: expr) => {
854 writer.write_all(&[$htlc_output.offered as u8; 1])?;
855 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc_output.amount_msat))?;
856 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array($htlc_output.cltv_expiry))?;
857 writer.write_all(&$htlc_output.payment_hash.0[..])?;
858 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array($htlc_output.transaction_output_index))?;
862 macro_rules! serialize_htlc_source {
863 ($htlc_source: expr) => {
864 $htlc_source.0.write(writer)?;
865 $htlc_source.1.write(writer)?;
866 if let &Some(ref txo) = &$htlc_source.2 {
867 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
870 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
876 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_claimable_outpoints.len() as u64))?;
877 for (ref txid, &(ref htlc_infos, ref htlc_sources)) in self.remote_claimable_outpoints.iter() {
878 writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
879 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc_infos.len() as u64))?;
880 for ref htlc_output in htlc_infos.iter() {
881 serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output);
883 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc_sources.len() as u64))?;
884 for ref htlc_source in htlc_sources.iter() {
885 serialize_htlc_source!(htlc_source);
889 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.len() as u64))?;
890 for (ref txid, &(commitment_number, ref txouts)) in self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
891 writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
892 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(commitment_number))?;
893 (txouts.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
894 for script in txouts.iter() {
895 script.write(writer)?;
899 if for_local_storage {
900 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_hash_commitment_number.len() as u64))?;
901 for (ref payment_hash, commitment_number) in self.remote_hash_commitment_number.iter() {
902 writer.write_all(&payment_hash.0[..])?;
903 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(*commitment_number))?;
906 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(0))?;
909 macro_rules! serialize_local_tx {
910 ($local_tx: expr) => {
911 if let Err(e) = $local_tx.tx.consensus_encode(&mut WriterWriteAdaptor(writer)) {
913 encode::Error::Io(e) => return Err(e),
914 _ => panic!("local tx must have been well-formed!"),
918 writer.write_all(&$local_tx.revocation_key.serialize())?;
919 writer.write_all(&$local_tx.a_htlc_key.serialize())?;
920 writer.write_all(&$local_tx.b_htlc_key.serialize())?;
921 writer.write_all(&$local_tx.delayed_payment_key.serialize())?;
923 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($local_tx.feerate_per_kw))?;
924 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($local_tx.htlc_outputs.len() as u64))?;
925 for &(ref htlc_output, ref their_sig, ref our_sig) in $local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
926 serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output);
927 writer.write_all(&their_sig.serialize_compact(&self.secp_ctx))?;
928 writer.write_all(&our_sig.serialize_compact(&self.secp_ctx))?;
930 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($local_tx.htlc_sources.len() as u64))?;
931 for ref htlc_source in $local_tx.htlc_sources.iter() {
932 serialize_htlc_source!(htlc_source);
937 if let Some(ref prev_local_tx) = self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
938 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
939 serialize_local_tx!(prev_local_tx);
941 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
944 if let Some(ref cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
945 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
946 serialize_local_tx!(cur_local_tx);
948 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
951 if for_local_storage {
952 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(self.current_remote_commitment_number))?;
954 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(0))?;
957 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.payment_preimages.len() as u64))?;
958 for payment_preimage in self.payment_preimages.values() {
959 writer.write_all(&payment_preimage.0[..])?;
962 self.last_block_hash.write(writer)?;
963 self.destination_script.write(writer)?;
968 /// Writes this monitor into the given writer, suitable for writing to disk.
970 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor), which
971 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
972 /// the "reorg path" (ie not just starting at the same height but starting at the highest
973 /// common block that appears on your best chain as well as on the chain which contains the
974 /// last block hash returned) upon deserializing the object!
975 pub fn write_for_disk<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
976 self.write(writer, true)
979 /// Encodes this monitor into the given writer, suitable for sending to a remote watchtower
981 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor), which
982 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
983 /// the "reorg path" (ie not just starting at the same height but starting at the highest
984 /// common block that appears on your best chain as well as on the chain which contains the
985 /// last block hash returned) upon deserializing the object!
986 pub fn write_for_watchtower<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
987 self.write(writer, false)
990 //TODO: Functions to serialize/deserialize (with different forms depending on which information
991 //we want to leave out (eg funding_txo, etc).
993 /// Can only fail if idx is < get_min_seen_secret
994 pub(super) fn get_secret(&self, idx: u64) -> Option<[u8; 32]> {
995 for i in 0..self.old_secrets.len() {
996 if (idx & (!((1 << i) - 1))) == self.old_secrets[i].1 {
997 return Some(ChannelMonitor::derive_secret(self.old_secrets[i].0, i as u8, idx))
1000 assert!(idx < self.get_min_seen_secret());
1004 pub(super) fn get_min_seen_secret(&self) -> u64 {
1005 //TODO This can be optimized?
1006 let mut min = 1 << 48;
1007 for &(_, idx) in self.old_secrets.iter() {
1015 pub(super) fn get_cur_remote_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
1016 self.current_remote_commitment_number
1019 pub(super) fn get_cur_local_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
1020 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1021 0xffff_ffff_ffff - ((((local_tx.tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (local_tx.tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor)
1022 } else { 0xffff_ffff_ffff }
1025 /// Attempts to claim a remote commitment transaction's outputs using the revocation key and
1026 /// data in remote_claimable_outpoints. Will directly claim any HTLC outputs which expire at a
1027 /// height > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER. In any case, will install monitoring for
1028 /// HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions.
1029 /// Return updates for HTLC pending in the channel and failed automatically by the broadcast of
1030 /// revoked remote commitment tx
1031 fn check_spend_remote_transaction(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32) -> (Vec<Transaction>, (Sha256dHash, Vec<TxOut>), Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>, Vec<(HTLCSource, Option<PaymentPreimage>, PaymentHash)>) {
1032 // Most secp and related errors trying to create keys means we have no hope of constructing
1033 // a spend transaction...so we return no transactions to broadcast
1034 let mut txn_to_broadcast = Vec::new();
1035 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
1036 let mut spendable_outputs = Vec::new();
1037 let mut htlc_updated = Vec::new();
1039 let commitment_txid = tx.txid(); //TODO: This is gonna be a performance bottleneck for watchtowers!
1040 let per_commitment_option = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(&commitment_txid);
1042 macro_rules! ignore_error {
1043 ( $thing : expr ) => {
1046 Err(_) => return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs, htlc_updated)
1051 let commitment_number = 0xffffffffffff - ((((tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor);
1052 if commitment_number >= self.get_min_seen_secret() {
1053 let secret = self.get_secret(commitment_number).unwrap();
1054 let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &secret));
1055 let (revocation_pubkey, b_htlc_key, local_payment_key) = match self.key_storage {
1056 Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, ref payment_base_key, .. } => {
1057 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
1058 (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_base_key))),
1059 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &htlc_base_key))),
1060 Some(ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &payment_base_key))))
1062 Storage::Watchtower { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
1063 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
1064 (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &revocation_base_key)),
1065 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &htlc_base_key)),
1069 let delayed_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key), &self.their_delayed_payment_base_key.unwrap()));
1070 let a_htlc_key = match self.their_htlc_base_key {
1071 None => return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs, htlc_updated),
1072 Some(their_htlc_base_key) => ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key), &their_htlc_base_key)),
1075 let revokeable_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey, self.our_to_self_delay, &delayed_key);
1076 let revokeable_p2wsh = revokeable_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
1078 let local_payment_p2wpkh = if let Some(payment_key) = local_payment_key {
1079 // Note that the Network here is ignored as we immediately drop the address for the
1080 // script_pubkey version.
1081 let payment_hash160 = Hash160::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &payment_key).serialize());
1082 Some(Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::All::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&payment_hash160[..]).into_script())
1085 let mut total_value = 0;
1086 let mut values = Vec::new();
1087 let mut inputs = Vec::new();
1088 let mut htlc_idxs = Vec::new();
1090 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
1091 if outp.script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh {
1093 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
1094 txid: commitment_txid,
1097 script_sig: Script::new(),
1098 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
1099 witness: Vec::new(),
1101 htlc_idxs.push(None);
1102 values.push(outp.value);
1103 total_value += outp.value;
1104 } else if Some(&outp.script_pubkey) == local_payment_p2wpkh.as_ref() {
1105 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WPKH {
1106 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: commitment_txid, vout: idx as u32 },
1107 key: local_payment_key.unwrap(),
1108 output: outp.clone(),
1113 macro_rules! sign_input {
1114 ($sighash_parts: expr, $input: expr, $htlc_idx: expr, $amount: expr) => {
1116 let (sig, redeemscript) = match self.key_storage {
1117 Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
1118 let redeemscript = if $htlc_idx.is_none() { revokeable_redeemscript.clone() } else {
1119 let htlc = &per_commitment_option.unwrap().0[$htlc_idx.unwrap()];
1120 chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey)
1122 let sighash = ignore_error!(Message::from_slice(&$sighash_parts.sighash_all(&$input, &redeemscript, $amount)[..]));
1123 let revocation_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key, &revocation_base_key));
1124 (self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &revocation_key), redeemscript)
1126 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
1130 $input.witness.push(sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
1131 $input.witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1132 if $htlc_idx.is_none() {
1133 $input.witness.push(vec!(1));
1135 $input.witness.push(revocation_pubkey.serialize().to_vec());
1137 $input.witness.push(redeemscript.into_bytes());
1142 if let Some(&(ref per_commitment_data, _)) = per_commitment_option {
1143 inputs.reserve_exact(per_commitment_data.len());
1145 for (idx, ref htlc) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() {
1146 let expected_script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey);
1147 if htlc.transaction_output_index as usize >= tx.output.len() ||
1148 tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 ||
1149 tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].script_pubkey != expected_script.to_v0_p2wsh() {
1150 return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs, htlc_updated); // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user
1153 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
1154 txid: commitment_txid,
1155 vout: htlc.transaction_output_index,
1157 script_sig: Script::new(),
1158 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
1159 witness: Vec::new(),
1161 if htlc.cltv_expiry > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER {
1163 htlc_idxs.push(Some(idx));
1164 values.push(tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].value);
1165 total_value += htlc.amount_msat / 1000;
1167 let mut single_htlc_tx = Transaction {
1171 output: vec!(TxOut {
1172 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1173 value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000, //TODO: - fee
1176 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&single_htlc_tx);
1177 sign_input!(sighash_parts, single_htlc_tx.input[0], Some(idx), htlc.amount_msat / 1000);
1178 txn_to_broadcast.push(single_htlc_tx);
1183 if !inputs.is_empty() || !txn_to_broadcast.is_empty() { // ie we're confident this is actually ours
1184 // We're definitely a remote commitment transaction!
1185 log_trace!(self, "Got broadcast of revoked remote commitment transaction, generating general spend tx with {} inputs and {} other txn to broadcast", inputs.len(), txn_to_broadcast.len());
1186 watch_outputs.append(&mut tx.output.clone());
1187 self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, (commitment_number, tx.output.iter().map(|output| { output.script_pubkey.clone() }).collect()));
1189 if inputs.is_empty() { return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs, htlc_updated); } // Nothing to be done...probably a false positive/local tx
1191 let outputs = vec!(TxOut {
1192 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1193 value: total_value, //TODO: - fee
1195 let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
1202 let mut values_drain = values.drain(..);
1203 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx);
1205 for (input, htlc_idx) in spend_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(htlc_idxs.iter()) {
1206 let value = values_drain.next().unwrap();
1207 sign_input!(sighash_parts, input, htlc_idx, value);
1210 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
1211 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: spend_tx.txid(), vout: 0 },
1212 output: spend_tx.output[0].clone(),
1214 txn_to_broadcast.push(spend_tx);
1216 // TODO: We really should only fail backwards after our revocation claims have been
1217 // confirmed, but we also need to do more other tracking of in-flight pre-confirm
1218 // on-chain claims, so we can do that at the same time.
1219 if let Storage::Local { ref current_remote_commitment_txid, ref prev_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage {
1220 if let &Some(ref txid) = current_remote_commitment_txid {
1221 if let Some(&(_, ref latest_outpoints)) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(&txid) {
1222 for &(ref payment_hash, ref source, _) in latest_outpoints.iter() {
1223 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from current remote commitment tx due to broadcast of revoked remote commitment transaction", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
1224 htlc_updated.push(((*source).clone(), None, payment_hash.clone()));
1228 if let &Some(ref txid) = prev_remote_commitment_txid {
1229 if let Some(&(_, ref prev_outpoint)) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(&txid) {
1230 for &(ref payment_hash, ref source, _) in prev_outpoint.iter() {
1231 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from previous remote commitment tx due to broadcast of revoked remote commitment transaction", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
1232 htlc_updated.push(((*source).clone(), None, payment_hash.clone()));
1237 // No need to check local commitment txn, symmetric HTLCSource must be present as per-htlc data on remote commitment tx
1238 } else if let Some(per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
1239 // While this isn't useful yet, there is a potential race where if a counterparty
1240 // revokes a state at the same time as the commitment transaction for that state is
1241 // confirmed, and the watchtower receives the block before the user, the user could
1242 // upload a new ChannelMonitor with the revocation secret but the watchtower has
1243 // already processed the block, resulting in the remote_commitment_txn_on_chain entry
1244 // not being generated by the above conditional. Thus, to be safe, we go ahead and
1246 watch_outputs.append(&mut tx.output.clone());
1247 self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, (commitment_number, tx.output.iter().map(|output| { output.script_pubkey.clone() }).collect()));
1249 if let Some(revocation_points) = self.their_cur_revocation_points {
1250 let revocation_point_option =
1251 if revocation_points.0 == commitment_number { Some(&revocation_points.1) }
1252 else if let Some(point) = revocation_points.2.as_ref() {
1253 if revocation_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 { Some(point) } else { None }
1255 if let Some(revocation_point) = revocation_point_option {
1256 let (revocation_pubkey, b_htlc_key) = match self.key_storage {
1257 Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
1258 (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_base_key))),
1259 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &htlc_base_key))))
1261 Storage::Watchtower { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
1262 (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &revocation_base_key)),
1263 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &htlc_base_key)))
1266 let a_htlc_key = match self.their_htlc_base_key {
1267 None => return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs, htlc_updated),
1268 Some(their_htlc_base_key) => ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &their_htlc_base_key)),
1271 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
1272 if outp.script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh() {
1273 match self.key_storage {
1274 Storage::Local { ref payment_base_key, .. } => {
1275 if let Ok(local_key) = chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_point, &payment_base_key) {
1276 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WPKH {
1277 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: commitment_txid, vout: idx as u32 },
1279 output: outp.clone(),
1283 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {}
1285 break; // Only to_remote ouput is claimable
1289 let mut total_value = 0;
1290 let mut values = Vec::new();
1291 let mut inputs = Vec::new();
1293 macro_rules! sign_input {
1294 ($sighash_parts: expr, $input: expr, $amount: expr, $preimage: expr) => {
1296 let (sig, redeemscript) = match self.key_storage {
1297 Storage::Local { ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
1298 let htlc = &per_commitment_option.unwrap().0[$input.sequence as usize];
1299 let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey);
1300 let sighash = ignore_error!(Message::from_slice(&$sighash_parts.sighash_all(&$input, &redeemscript, $amount)[..]));
1301 let htlc_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &htlc_base_key));
1302 (self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &htlc_key), redeemscript)
1304 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
1308 $input.witness.push(sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
1309 $input.witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1310 $input.witness.push($preimage);
1311 $input.witness.push(redeemscript.into_bytes());
1316 for (idx, ref htlc) in per_commitment_data.0.iter().enumerate() {
1317 let expected_script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey);
1318 if htlc.transaction_output_index as usize >= tx.output.len() ||
1319 tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 ||
1320 tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].script_pubkey != expected_script.to_v0_p2wsh() {
1321 return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs, htlc_updated); // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user
1323 if let Some(payment_preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
1325 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
1326 txid: commitment_txid,
1327 vout: htlc.transaction_output_index,
1329 script_sig: Script::new(),
1330 sequence: idx as u32, // reset to 0xfffffffd in sign_input
1331 witness: Vec::new(),
1333 if htlc.cltv_expiry > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER {
1335 values.push((tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].value, payment_preimage));
1336 total_value += htlc.amount_msat / 1000;
1338 let mut single_htlc_tx = Transaction {
1342 output: vec!(TxOut {
1343 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1344 value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000, //TODO: - fee
1347 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&single_htlc_tx);
1348 sign_input!(sighash_parts, single_htlc_tx.input[0], htlc.amount_msat / 1000, payment_preimage.0.to_vec());
1349 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
1350 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: single_htlc_tx.txid(), vout: 0 },
1351 output: single_htlc_tx.output[0].clone(),
1353 txn_to_broadcast.push(single_htlc_tx);
1357 // TODO: If the HTLC has already expired, potentially merge it with the
1358 // rest of the claim transaction, as above.
1360 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
1361 txid: commitment_txid,
1362 vout: htlc.transaction_output_index,
1364 script_sig: Script::new(),
1365 sequence: idx as u32,
1366 witness: Vec::new(),
1368 let mut timeout_tx = Transaction {
1370 lock_time: htlc.cltv_expiry,
1372 output: vec!(TxOut {
1373 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1374 value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1377 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&timeout_tx);
1378 sign_input!(sighash_parts, timeout_tx.input[0], htlc.amount_msat / 1000, vec![0]);
1379 txn_to_broadcast.push(timeout_tx);
1383 if inputs.is_empty() { return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs, htlc_updated); } // Nothing to be done...probably a false positive/local tx
1385 let outputs = vec!(TxOut {
1386 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1387 value: total_value, //TODO: - fee
1389 let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
1396 let mut values_drain = values.drain(..);
1397 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx);
1399 for input in spend_tx.input.iter_mut() {
1400 let value = values_drain.next().unwrap();
1401 sign_input!(sighash_parts, input, value.0, (value.1).0.to_vec());
1404 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
1405 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: spend_tx.txid(), vout: 0 },
1406 output: spend_tx.output[0].clone(),
1408 txn_to_broadcast.push(spend_tx);
1410 // TODO: We need to fail back HTLCs that were't included in the broadcast
1411 // commitment transaction, either because they didn't meet dust or because a
1412 // stale (but not yet revoked) commitment transaction was broadcast!
1417 (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs, htlc_updated)
1420 /// Attempst to claim a remote HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout s outputs using the revocation key
1421 fn check_spend_remote_htlc(&self, tx: &Transaction, commitment_number: u64) -> (Option<Transaction>, Option<SpendableOutputDescriptor>) {
1422 if tx.input.len() != 1 || tx.output.len() != 1 {
1426 macro_rules! ignore_error {
1427 ( $thing : expr ) => {
1430 Err(_) => return (None, None)
1435 let secret = if let Some(secret) = self.get_secret(commitment_number) { secret } else { return (None, None); };
1436 let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &secret));
1437 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
1438 let revocation_pubkey = match self.key_storage {
1439 Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
1440 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_base_key)))
1442 Storage::Watchtower { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
1443 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &revocation_base_key))
1446 let delayed_key = match self.their_delayed_payment_base_key {
1447 None => return (None, None),
1448 Some(their_delayed_payment_base_key) => ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &their_delayed_payment_base_key)),
1450 let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), &delayed_key);
1451 let revokeable_p2wsh = redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
1452 let htlc_txid = tx.txid(); //TODO: This is gonna be a performance bottleneck for watchtowers!
1454 let mut inputs = Vec::new();
1457 if tx.output[0].script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh { //HTLC transactions have one txin, one txout
1459 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
1463 script_sig: Script::new(),
1464 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
1465 witness: Vec::new(),
1467 amount = tx.output[0].value;
1470 if !inputs.is_empty() {
1471 let outputs = vec!(TxOut {
1472 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1473 value: amount, //TODO: - fee
1476 let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
1483 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx);
1485 let sig = match self.key_storage {
1486 Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
1487 let sighash = ignore_error!(Message::from_slice(&sighash_parts.sighash_all(&spend_tx.input[0], &redeemscript, amount)[..]));
1488 let revocation_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key, &revocation_base_key));
1489 self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &revocation_key)
1491 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
1495 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
1496 spend_tx.input[0].witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1497 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(vec!(1));
1498 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(redeemscript.into_bytes());
1500 let outpoint = BitcoinOutPoint { txid: spend_tx.txid(), vout: 0 };
1501 let output = spend_tx.output[0].clone();
1502 (Some(spend_tx), Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput { outpoint, output }))
1503 } else { (None, None) }
1506 fn broadcast_by_local_state(&self, local_tx: &LocalSignedTx, per_commitment_point: &Option<PublicKey>, delayed_payment_base_key: &Option<SecretKey>) -> (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>, Vec<TxOut>) {
1507 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
1508 let mut spendable_outputs = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
1509 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
1511 macro_rules! add_dynamic_output {
1512 ($father_tx: expr, $vout: expr) => {
1513 if let Some(ref per_commitment_point) = *per_commitment_point {
1514 if let Some(ref delayed_payment_base_key) = *delayed_payment_base_key {
1515 if let Ok(local_delayedkey) = chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base_key) {
1516 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WSH {
1517 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: $father_tx.txid(), vout: $vout },
1518 key: local_delayedkey,
1519 witness_script: chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&local_tx.revocation_key, self.our_to_self_delay, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key),
1520 to_self_delay: self.our_to_self_delay,
1521 output: $father_tx.output[$vout as usize].clone(),
1530 let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&local_tx.revocation_key, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), &local_tx.delayed_payment_key);
1531 let revokeable_p2wsh = redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
1532 for (idx, output) in local_tx.tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
1533 if output.script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh {
1534 add_dynamic_output!(local_tx.tx, idx as u32);
1539 for &(ref htlc, ref their_sig, ref our_sig) in local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1541 let mut htlc_timeout_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&local_tx.txid, local_tx.feerate_per_kw, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), htlc, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key, &local_tx.revocation_key);
1543 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
1545 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(their_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
1546 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1547 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
1548 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1550 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new());
1551 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &local_tx.a_htlc_key, &local_tx.b_htlc_key, &local_tx.revocation_key).into_bytes());
1553 add_dynamic_output!(htlc_timeout_tx, 0);
1554 res.push(htlc_timeout_tx);
1556 if let Some(payment_preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
1557 let mut htlc_success_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&local_tx.txid, local_tx.feerate_per_kw, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), htlc, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key, &local_tx.revocation_key);
1559 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
1561 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(their_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
1562 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1563 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
1564 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1566 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(payment_preimage.0.to_vec());
1567 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &local_tx.a_htlc_key, &local_tx.b_htlc_key, &local_tx.revocation_key).into_bytes());
1569 add_dynamic_output!(htlc_success_tx, 0);
1570 res.push(htlc_success_tx);
1573 watch_outputs.push(local_tx.tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].clone());
1576 (res, spendable_outputs, watch_outputs)
1579 /// Attempts to claim any claimable HTLCs in a commitment transaction which was not (yet)
1580 /// revoked using data in local_claimable_outpoints.
1581 /// Should not be used if check_spend_revoked_transaction succeeds.
1582 fn check_spend_local_transaction(&self, tx: &Transaction, _height: u32) -> (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>, (Sha256dHash, Vec<TxOut>)) {
1583 let commitment_txid = tx.txid();
1584 // TODO: If we find a match here we need to fail back HTLCs that were't included in the
1585 // broadcast commitment transaction, either because they didn't meet dust or because they
1586 // weren't yet included in our commitment transaction(s).
1587 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1588 if local_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
1589 match self.key_storage {
1590 Storage::Local { ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref latest_per_commitment_point, .. } => {
1591 let (local_txn, spendable_outputs, watch_outputs) = self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, latest_per_commitment_point, &Some(*delayed_payment_base_key));
1592 return (local_txn, spendable_outputs, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs));
1594 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
1595 let (local_txn, spendable_outputs, watch_outputs) = self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, &None, &None);
1596 return (local_txn, spendable_outputs, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs));
1601 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1602 if local_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
1603 match self.key_storage {
1604 Storage::Local { ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref prev_latest_per_commitment_point, .. } => {
1605 let (local_txn, spendable_outputs, watch_outputs) = self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, prev_latest_per_commitment_point, &Some(*delayed_payment_base_key));
1606 return (local_txn, spendable_outputs, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs));
1608 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
1609 let (local_txn, spendable_outputs, watch_outputs) = self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, &None, &None);
1610 return (local_txn, spendable_outputs, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs));
1615 (Vec::new(), Vec::new(), (commitment_txid, Vec::new()))
1618 /// Generate a spendable output event when closing_transaction get registered onchain.
1619 fn check_spend_closing_transaction(&self, tx: &Transaction) -> Option<SpendableOutputDescriptor> {
1620 if tx.input[0].sequence == 0xFFFFFFFF && !tx.input[0].witness.is_empty() && tx.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len() == 71 {
1621 match self.key_storage {
1622 Storage::Local { ref shutdown_pubkey, .. } => {
1623 let our_channel_close_key_hash = Hash160::hash(&shutdown_pubkey.serialize());
1624 let shutdown_script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::All::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&our_channel_close_key_hash[..]).into_script();
1625 for (idx, output) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
1626 if shutdown_script == output.script_pubkey {
1627 return Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
1628 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), vout: idx as u32 },
1629 output: output.clone(),
1634 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
1635 //TODO: we need to ensure an offline client will generate the event when it
1636 // cames back online after only the watchtower saw the transaction
1643 /// Used by ChannelManager deserialization to broadcast the latest local state if it's copy of
1644 /// the Channel was out-of-date.
1645 pub(super) fn get_latest_local_commitment_txn(&self) -> Vec<Transaction> {
1646 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1647 let mut res = vec![local_tx.tx.clone()];
1648 match self.key_storage {
1649 Storage::Local { ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref prev_latest_per_commitment_point, .. } => {
1650 res.append(&mut self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, prev_latest_per_commitment_point, &Some(*delayed_payment_base_key)).0);
1652 _ => panic!("Can only broadcast by local channelmonitor"),
1660 fn block_connected(&mut self, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], height: u32, block_hash: &Sha256dHash, broadcaster: &BroadcasterInterface)-> (Vec<(Sha256dHash, Vec<TxOut>)>, Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>, Vec<(HTLCSource, Option<PaymentPreimage>, PaymentHash)>) {
1661 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
1662 let mut spendable_outputs = Vec::new();
1663 let mut htlc_updated = Vec::new();
1664 for tx in txn_matched {
1665 if tx.input.len() == 1 {
1666 // Assuming our keys were not leaked (in which case we're screwed no matter what),
1667 // commitment transactions and HTLC transactions will all only ever have one input,
1668 // which is an easy way to filter out any potential non-matching txn for lazy
1670 let prevout = &tx.input[0].previous_output;
1671 let mut txn: Vec<Transaction> = Vec::new();
1672 let funding_txo = match self.key_storage {
1673 Storage::Local { ref funding_info, .. } => {
1674 funding_info.clone()
1676 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
1680 if funding_txo.is_none() || (prevout.txid == funding_txo.as_ref().unwrap().0.txid && prevout.vout == funding_txo.as_ref().unwrap().0.index as u32) {
1681 let (remote_txn, new_outputs, mut spendable_output, mut updated) = self.check_spend_remote_transaction(tx, height);
1683 spendable_outputs.append(&mut spendable_output);
1684 if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() {
1685 watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
1688 let (local_txn, mut spendable_output, new_outputs) = self.check_spend_local_transaction(tx, height);
1689 spendable_outputs.append(&mut spendable_output);
1691 if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() {
1692 watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
1695 if !funding_txo.is_none() && txn.is_empty() {
1696 if let Some(spendable_output) = self.check_spend_closing_transaction(tx) {
1697 spendable_outputs.push(spendable_output);
1700 if updated.len() > 0 {
1701 htlc_updated.append(&mut updated);
1704 if let Some(&(commitment_number, _)) = self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.get(&prevout.txid) {
1705 let (tx, spendable_output) = self.check_spend_remote_htlc(tx, commitment_number);
1706 if let Some(tx) = tx {
1709 if let Some(spendable_output) = spendable_output {
1710 spendable_outputs.push(spendable_output);
1714 for tx in txn.iter() {
1715 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(tx);
1717 let mut updated = self.is_resolving_htlc_output(tx);
1718 if updated.len() > 0 {
1719 htlc_updated.append(&mut updated);
1723 if let Some(ref cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1724 if self.would_broadcast_at_height(height) {
1725 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&cur_local_tx.tx);
1726 match self.key_storage {
1727 Storage::Local { ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref latest_per_commitment_point, .. } => {
1728 let (txs, mut spendable_output, new_outputs) = self.broadcast_by_local_state(&cur_local_tx, latest_per_commitment_point, &Some(*delayed_payment_base_key));
1729 spendable_outputs.append(&mut spendable_output);
1730 if !new_outputs.is_empty() {
1731 watch_outputs.push((cur_local_tx.txid.clone(), new_outputs));
1734 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
1737 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
1738 let (txs, mut spendable_output, new_outputs) = self.broadcast_by_local_state(&cur_local_tx, &None, &None);
1739 spendable_outputs.append(&mut spendable_output);
1740 if !new_outputs.is_empty() {
1741 watch_outputs.push((cur_local_tx.txid.clone(), new_outputs));
1744 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
1750 self.last_block_hash = block_hash.clone();
1751 (watch_outputs, spendable_outputs, htlc_updated)
1754 pub(super) fn would_broadcast_at_height(&self, height: u32) -> bool {
1755 // TODO: We need to consider HTLCs which weren't included in latest local commitment
1756 // transaction (or in any of the latest two local commitment transactions). This probably
1757 // needs to use the same logic as the revoked-tx-announe logic - checking the last two
1758 // remote commitment transactions. This probably has implications for what data we need to
1759 // store in local commitment transactions.
1760 // TODO: We need to consider HTLCs which were below dust threshold here - while they don't
1761 // strictly imply that we need to fail the channel, we need to go ahead and fail them back
1762 // to the source, and if we don't fail the channel we will have to ensure that the next
1763 // updates that peer sends us are update_fails, failing the channel if not. It's probably
1764 // easier to just fail the channel as this case should be rare enough anyway.
1765 if let Some(ref cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1766 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in cur_local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1767 // For inbound HTLCs which we know the preimage for, we have to ensure we hit the
1768 // chain with enough room to claim the HTLC without our counterparty being able to
1769 // time out the HTLC first.
1770 // For outbound HTLCs which our counterparty hasn't failed/claimed, our primary
1771 // concern is being able to claim the corresponding inbound HTLC (on another
1772 // channel) before it expires. In fact, we don't even really care if our
1773 // counterparty here claims such an outbound HTLC after it expired as long as we
1774 // can still claim the corresponding HTLC. Thus, to avoid needlessly hitting the
1775 // chain when our counterparty is waiting for expiration to off-chain fail an HTLC
1776 // we give ourselves a few blocks of headroom after expiration before going
1777 // on-chain for an expired HTLC.
1778 // Note that, to avoid a potential attack whereby a node delays claiming an HTLC
1779 // from us until we've reached the point where we go on-chain with the
1780 // corresponding inbound HTLC, we must ensure that outbound HTLCs go on chain at
1781 // least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER blocks prior to the inbound HTLC.
1782 // aka outbound_cltv + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS == height - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
1783 // inbound_cltv == height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
1784 // outbound_cltv + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFER <= inbound_cltv - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
1785 // HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS + 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFER <= inbound_cltv - outbound_cltv
1786 // HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS + 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFER <= CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA
1787 if ( htlc.offered && htlc.cltv_expiry + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS <= height) ||
1788 (!htlc.offered && htlc.cltv_expiry <= height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER && self.payment_preimages.contains_key(&htlc.payment_hash)) {
1796 /// Check if any transaction broadcasted is resolving HTLC output by a success or timeout on a local
1797 /// or remote commitment tx, if so send back the source, preimage if found and payment_hash of resolved HTLC
1798 fn is_resolving_htlc_output(&mut self, tx: &Transaction) -> Vec<(HTLCSource, Option<PaymentPreimage>, PaymentHash)> {
1799 let mut htlc_updated = Vec::new();
1801 'outer_loop: for input in &tx.input {
1802 let mut payment_data = None;
1804 macro_rules! scan_commitment {
1805 ($htlc_outputs: expr, $htlc_sources: expr, $source: expr) => {
1806 for &(ref payment_hash, ref source, ref vout) in $htlc_sources.iter() {
1807 if &Some(input.previous_output.vout) == vout {
1808 log_trace!(self, "Input spending {}:{} resolves HTLC with payment hash {} from {}", input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), $source);
1809 payment_data = Some((source.clone(), *payment_hash));
1812 if payment_data.is_none() {
1813 for htlc_output in $htlc_outputs {
1814 if input.previous_output.vout == htlc_output.transaction_output_index {
1815 log_info!(self, "Input spending {}:{} in {} resolves inbound HTLC with timeout from {}", input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, tx.txid(), $source);
1816 continue 'outer_loop;
1823 if let Some(ref current_local_signed_commitment_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1824 if input.previous_output.txid == current_local_signed_commitment_tx.txid {
1825 scan_commitment!(current_local_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, _)| a),
1826 current_local_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_sources,
1827 "our latest local commitment tx");
1830 if let Some(ref prev_local_signed_commitment_tx) = self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1831 if input.previous_output.txid == prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.txid {
1832 scan_commitment!(prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, _)| a),
1833 prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_sources,
1834 "our latest local commitment tx");
1837 if let Some(&(ref htlc_outputs, ref htlc_sources)) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(&input.previous_output.txid) {
1838 scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs, htlc_sources, "remote commitment tx");
1841 // If tx isn't solving htlc output from local/remote commitment tx and htlc isn't outbound we don't need
1842 // to broadcast solving backward
1843 if let Some((source, payment_hash)) = payment_data {
1844 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
1845 if (input.witness.len() == 3 && input.witness[2].len() == OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT && input.witness[1].len() == 33)
1846 || (input.witness.len() == 3 && input.witness[2].len() == ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT && input.witness[1].len() == 33) {
1847 log_error!(self, "Remote used revocation sig to take a {} HTLC output at index {} from commitment_tx {}", if input.witness[2].len() == OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT { "offered" } else { "accepted" }, input.previous_output.vout, input.previous_output.txid);
1848 } else if input.witness.len() == 5 && input.witness[4].len() == ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT {
1849 payment_preimage.0.copy_from_slice(&tx.input[0].witness[3]);
1850 htlc_updated.push((source, Some(payment_preimage), payment_hash));
1851 } else if input.witness.len() == 3 && input.witness[2].len() == OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT {
1852 payment_preimage.0.copy_from_slice(&tx.input[0].witness[1]);
1853 htlc_updated.push((source, Some(payment_preimage), payment_hash));
1855 htlc_updated.push((source, None, payment_hash));
1863 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
1865 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> ReadableArgs<R, Arc<Logger>> for (Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor) {
1866 fn read(reader: &mut R, logger: Arc<Logger>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1867 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1868 macro_rules! unwrap_obj {
1872 Err(_) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
1877 let _ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1878 let min_ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1879 if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION {
1880 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion);
1883 let commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor = <U48 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.0;
1885 let key_storage = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
1887 let revocation_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
1888 let htlc_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
1889 let delayed_payment_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
1890 let payment_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
1891 let shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
1892 let prev_latest_per_commitment_point = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
1894 1 => Some(Readable::read(reader)?),
1895 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
1897 let latest_per_commitment_point = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
1899 1 => Some(Readable::read(reader)?),
1900 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
1902 // Technically this can fail and serialize fail a round-trip, but only for serialization of
1903 // barely-init'd ChannelMonitors that we can't do anything with.
1904 let outpoint = OutPoint {
1905 txid: Readable::read(reader)?,
1906 index: Readable::read(reader)?,
1908 let funding_info = Some((outpoint, Readable::read(reader)?));
1909 let current_remote_commitment_txid = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
1911 1 => Some(Readable::read(reader)?),
1912 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
1914 let prev_remote_commitment_txid = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
1916 1 => Some(Readable::read(reader)?),
1917 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
1920 revocation_base_key,
1922 delayed_payment_base_key,
1925 prev_latest_per_commitment_point,
1926 latest_per_commitment_point,
1928 current_remote_commitment_txid,
1929 prev_remote_commitment_txid,
1932 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
1935 let their_htlc_base_key = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
1936 let their_delayed_payment_base_key = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
1938 let their_cur_revocation_points = {
1939 let first_idx = <U48 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.0;
1943 let first_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
1944 let second_point_slice: [u8; 33] = Readable::read(reader)?;
1945 if second_point_slice[0..32] == [0; 32] && second_point_slice[32] == 0 {
1946 Some((first_idx, first_point, None))
1948 Some((first_idx, first_point, Some(unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &second_point_slice)))))
1953 let our_to_self_delay: u16 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1954 let their_to_self_delay: Option<u16> = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
1956 let mut old_secrets = [([0; 32], 1 << 48); 49];
1957 for &mut (ref mut secret, ref mut idx) in old_secrets.iter_mut() {
1958 *secret = Readable::read(reader)?;
1959 *idx = Readable::read(reader)?;
1962 macro_rules! read_htlc_in_commitment {
1965 let offered: bool = Readable::read(reader)?;
1966 let amount_msat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1967 let cltv_expiry: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1968 let payment_hash: PaymentHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
1969 let transaction_output_index: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1971 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1972 offered, amount_msat, cltv_expiry, payment_hash, transaction_output_index
1978 macro_rules! read_htlc_source {
1981 (Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?,
1982 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
1984 1 => Some(Readable::read(reader)?),
1985 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
1992 let remote_claimable_outpoints_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1993 let mut remote_claimable_outpoints = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(remote_claimable_outpoints_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 64));
1994 for _ in 0..remote_claimable_outpoints_len {
1995 let txid: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
1996 let outputs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1997 let mut outputs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
1998 for _ in 0..outputs_count {
1999 outputs.push(read_htlc_in_commitment!());
2001 let sources_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2002 let mut sources = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(sources_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
2003 for _ in 0..sources_count {
2004 sources.push(read_htlc_source!());
2006 if let Some(_) = remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, (outputs, sources)) {
2007 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
2011 let remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2012 let mut remote_commitment_txn_on_chain = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
2013 for _ in 0..remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len {
2014 let txid: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
2015 let commitment_number = <U48 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.0;
2016 let outputs_count = <u64 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?;
2017 let mut outputs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 8));
2018 for _ in 0..outputs_count {
2019 outputs.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
2021 if let Some(_) = remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(txid, (commitment_number, outputs)) {
2022 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
2026 let remote_hash_commitment_number_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2027 let mut remote_hash_commitment_number = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(remote_hash_commitment_number_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
2028 for _ in 0..remote_hash_commitment_number_len {
2029 let payment_hash: PaymentHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
2030 let commitment_number = <U48 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.0;
2031 if let Some(_) = remote_hash_commitment_number.insert(payment_hash, commitment_number) {
2032 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
2036 macro_rules! read_local_tx {
2039 let tx = match Transaction::consensus_decode(reader.by_ref()) {
2042 encode::Error::Io(ioe) => return Err(DecodeError::Io(ioe)),
2043 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2047 if tx.input.is_empty() {
2048 // Ensure tx didn't hit the 0-input ambiguity case.
2049 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
2052 let revocation_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
2053 let a_htlc_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
2054 let b_htlc_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
2055 let delayed_payment_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
2056 let feerate_per_kw: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2058 let htlc_outputs_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2059 let mut htlc_outputs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlc_outputs_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
2060 for _ in 0..htlc_outputs_len {
2061 let out = read_htlc_in_commitment!();
2062 let sigs = (Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?);
2063 htlc_outputs.push((out, sigs.0, sigs.1));
2066 let htlc_sources_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2067 let mut htlc_sources = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlc_outputs_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
2068 for _ in 0..htlc_sources_len {
2069 htlc_sources.push(read_htlc_source!());
2074 tx, revocation_key, a_htlc_key, b_htlc_key, delayed_payment_key, feerate_per_kw, htlc_outputs, htlc_sources
2080 let prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2083 Some(read_local_tx!())
2085 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2088 let current_local_signed_commitment_tx = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2091 Some(read_local_tx!())
2093 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2096 let current_remote_commitment_number = <U48 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.0;
2098 let payment_preimages_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2099 let mut payment_preimages = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(payment_preimages_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
2100 for _ in 0..payment_preimages_len {
2101 let preimage: PaymentPreimage = Readable::read(reader)?;
2102 let hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
2103 if let Some(_) = payment_preimages.insert(hash, preimage) {
2104 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
2108 let last_block_hash: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
2109 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
2111 Ok((last_block_hash.clone(), ChannelMonitor {
2112 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor,
2115 their_htlc_base_key,
2116 their_delayed_payment_base_key,
2117 their_cur_revocation_points,
2120 their_to_self_delay,
2123 remote_claimable_outpoints,
2124 remote_commitment_txn_on_chain,
2125 remote_hash_commitment_number,
2127 prev_local_signed_commitment_tx,
2128 current_local_signed_commitment_tx,
2129 current_remote_commitment_number,
2144 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Script;
2145 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
2146 use bitcoin_hashes::Hash;
2147 use bitcoin_hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
2149 use ln::channelmanager::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
2150 use ln::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor;
2151 use ln::chan_utils::{HTLCOutputInCommitment, TxCreationKeys};
2152 use util::test_utils::TestLogger;
2153 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
2154 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1, Signature};
2155 use rand::{thread_rng,Rng};
2159 fn test_per_commitment_storage() {
2160 // Test vectors from BOLT 3:
2161 let mut secrets: Vec<[u8; 32]> = Vec::new();
2162 let mut monitor: ChannelMonitor;
2163 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2164 let logger = Arc::new(TestLogger::new());
2166 macro_rules! test_secrets {
2168 let mut idx = 281474976710655;
2169 for secret in secrets.iter() {
2170 assert_eq!(monitor.get_secret(idx).unwrap(), *secret);
2173 assert_eq!(monitor.get_min_seen_secret(), idx + 1);
2174 assert!(monitor.get_secret(idx).is_none());
2179 // insert_secret correct sequence
2180 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
2183 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2184 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
2185 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2188 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2189 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
2190 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2193 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2194 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
2195 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2198 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2199 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
2200 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2203 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2204 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
2205 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2208 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2209 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
2210 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2213 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2214 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
2215 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2218 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2219 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
2220 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2225 // insert_secret #1 incorrect
2226 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
2229 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2230 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
2231 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2234 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2235 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
2236 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
2237 "Previous secret did not match new one");
2241 // insert_secret #2 incorrect (#1 derived from incorrect)
2242 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
2245 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2246 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
2247 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2250 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2251 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("dddc3a8d14fddf2b68fa8c7fbad2748274937479dd0f8930d5ebb4ab6bd866a3").unwrap());
2252 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2255 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2256 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
2257 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2260 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2261 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
2262 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
2263 "Previous secret did not match new one");
2267 // insert_secret #3 incorrect
2268 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
2271 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2272 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
2273 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2276 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2277 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
2278 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2281 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2282 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c51a18b13e8527e579ec56365482c62f180b7d5760b46e9477dae59e87ed423a").unwrap());
2283 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2286 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2287 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
2288 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
2289 "Previous secret did not match new one");
2293 // insert_secret #4 incorrect (1,2,3 derived from incorrect)
2294 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
2297 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2298 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
2299 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2302 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2303 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("dddc3a8d14fddf2b68fa8c7fbad2748274937479dd0f8930d5ebb4ab6bd866a3").unwrap());
2304 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2307 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2308 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c51a18b13e8527e579ec56365482c62f180b7d5760b46e9477dae59e87ed423a").unwrap());
2309 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2312 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2313 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("ba65d7b0ef55a3ba300d4e87af29868f394f8f138d78a7011669c79b37b936f4").unwrap());
2314 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2317 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2318 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
2319 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2322 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2323 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
2324 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2327 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2328 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
2329 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2332 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2333 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
2334 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
2335 "Previous secret did not match new one");
2339 // insert_secret #5 incorrect
2340 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
2343 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2344 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
2345 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2348 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2349 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
2350 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2353 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2354 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
2355 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2358 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2359 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
2360 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2363 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2364 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("631373ad5f9ef654bb3dade742d09504c567edd24320d2fcd68e3cc47e2ff6a6").unwrap());
2365 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2368 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2369 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
2370 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
2371 "Previous secret did not match new one");
2375 // insert_secret #6 incorrect (5 derived from incorrect)
2376 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
2379 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2380 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
2381 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2384 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2385 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
2386 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2389 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2390 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
2391 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2394 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2395 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
2396 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2399 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2400 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("631373ad5f9ef654bb3dade742d09504c567edd24320d2fcd68e3cc47e2ff6a6").unwrap());
2401 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2404 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2405 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("b7e76a83668bde38b373970155c868a653304308f9896692f904a23731224bb1").unwrap());
2406 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2409 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2410 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
2411 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2414 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2415 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
2416 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
2417 "Previous secret did not match new one");
2421 // insert_secret #7 incorrect
2422 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
2425 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2426 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
2427 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2430 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2431 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
2432 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2435 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2436 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
2437 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2440 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2441 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
2442 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2445 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2446 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
2447 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2450 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2451 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
2452 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2455 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2456 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("e7971de736e01da8ed58b94c2fc216cb1dca9e326f3a96e7194fe8ea8af6c0a3").unwrap());
2457 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2460 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2461 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
2462 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
2463 "Previous secret did not match new one");
2467 // insert_secret #8 incorrect
2468 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
2471 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2472 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
2473 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2476 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2477 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
2478 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2481 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2482 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
2483 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2486 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2487 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
2488 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2491 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2492 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
2493 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2496 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2497 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
2498 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2501 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2502 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
2503 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2506 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2507 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a7efbc61aac46d34f77778bac22c8a20c6a46ca460addc49009bda875ec88fa4").unwrap());
2508 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
2509 "Previous secret did not match new one");
2514 fn test_prune_preimages() {
2515 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2516 let logger = Arc::new(TestLogger::new());
2517 let dummy_sig = Signature::from_der(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("3045022100fa86fa9a36a8cd6a7bb8f06a541787d51371d067951a9461d5404de6b928782e02201c8b7c334c10aed8976a3a465be9a28abff4cb23acbf00022295b378ce1fa3cd").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
2519 let dummy_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap());
2520 macro_rules! dummy_keys {
2524 per_commitment_point: dummy_key.clone(),
2525 revocation_key: dummy_key.clone(),
2526 a_htlc_key: dummy_key.clone(),
2527 b_htlc_key: dummy_key.clone(),
2528 a_delayed_payment_key: dummy_key.clone(),
2529 b_payment_key: dummy_key.clone(),
2534 let dummy_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
2536 let mut preimages = Vec::new();
2538 let mut rng = thread_rng();
2540 let mut preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
2541 rng.fill_bytes(&mut preimage.0[..]);
2542 let hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
2543 preimages.push((preimage, hash));
2547 macro_rules! preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs {
2548 ($preimages_slice: expr) => {
2550 let mut res = Vec::new();
2551 for (idx, preimage) in $preimages_slice.iter().enumerate() {
2552 res.push(HTLCOutputInCommitment {
2556 payment_hash: preimage.1.clone(),
2557 transaction_output_index: idx as u32,
2564 macro_rules! preimages_to_local_htlcs {
2565 ($preimages_slice: expr) => {
2567 let mut inp = preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!($preimages_slice);
2568 let res: Vec<_> = inp.drain(..).map(|e| { (e, dummy_sig.clone(), dummy_sig.clone()) }).collect();
2574 macro_rules! test_preimages_exist {
2575 ($preimages_slice: expr, $monitor: expr) => {
2576 for preimage in $preimages_slice {
2577 assert!($monitor.payment_preimages.contains_key(&preimage.1));
2582 // Prune with one old state and a local commitment tx holding a few overlaps with the
2584 let mut monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
2585 monitor.set_their_to_self_delay(10);
2587 monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(dummy_tx.clone(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..10]), Vec::new());
2588 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[5..15]), Vec::new(), 281474976710655, dummy_key);
2589 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[15..20]), Vec::new(), 281474976710654, dummy_key);
2590 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[17..20]), Vec::new(), 281474976710653, dummy_key);
2591 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[18..20]), Vec::new(), 281474976710652, dummy_key);
2592 for &(ref preimage, ref hash) in preimages.iter() {
2593 monitor.provide_payment_preimage(hash, preimage);
2596 // Now provide a secret, pruning preimages 10-15
2597 let mut secret = [0; 32];
2598 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
2599 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secret.clone()).unwrap();
2600 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 15);
2601 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
2602 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[15..20], monitor);
2604 // Now provide a further secret, pruning preimages 15-17
2605 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
2606 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secret.clone()).unwrap();
2607 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 13);
2608 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
2609 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[17..20], monitor);
2611 // Now update local commitment tx info, pruning only element 18 as we still care about the
2612 // previous commitment tx's preimages too
2613 monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(dummy_tx.clone(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..5]), Vec::new());
2614 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
2615 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secret.clone()).unwrap();
2616 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 12);
2617 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
2618 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[18..20], monitor);
2620 // But if we do it again, we'll prune 5-10
2621 monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(dummy_tx.clone(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..3]), Vec::new());
2622 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
2623 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secret.clone()).unwrap();
2624 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 5);
2625 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..5], monitor);
2628 // Further testing is done in the ChannelManager integration tests.