1 //! The logic to monitor for on-chain transactions and create the relevant claim responses lives
4 //! ChannelMonitor objects are generated by ChannelManager in response to relevant
5 //! messages/actions, and MUST be persisted to disk (and, preferably, remotely) before progress can
6 //! be made in responding to certain messages, see ManyChannelMonitor for more.
8 //! Note that ChannelMonitors are an important part of the lightning trust model and a copy of the
9 //! latest ChannelMonitor must always be actively monitoring for chain updates (and no out-of-date
10 //! ChannelMonitors should do so). Thus, if you're building rust-lightning into an HSM or other
11 //! security-domain-separated system design, you should consider having multiple paths for
12 //! ChannelMonitors to get out of the HSM and onto monitoring devices.
14 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
15 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxIn,TxOut,SigHashType,Transaction};
16 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
17 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
18 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
19 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::{self, Decodable, Encodable};
20 use bitcoin::util::hash::BitcoinHash;
21 use bitcoin::util::bip143;
23 use bitcoin_hashes::Hash;
24 use bitcoin_hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
25 use bitcoin_hashes::hash160::Hash as Hash160;
26 use bitcoin_hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
28 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Signature};
29 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
32 use ln::msgs::DecodeError;
34 use ln::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment;
35 use ln::channelmanager::{HTLCSource, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
36 use ln::channel::{ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT, OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT};
37 use chain::chaininterface::{ChainListener, ChainWatchInterface, BroadcasterInterface, FeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget};
38 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
39 use chain::keysinterface::SpendableOutputDescriptor;
40 use util::logger::Logger;
41 use util::ser::{ReadableArgs, Readable, Writer, Writeable, WriterWriteAdaptor, U48};
42 use util::{byte_utils, events};
44 use std::collections::{HashMap, hash_map};
45 use std::sync::{Arc,Mutex};
46 use std::{hash,cmp, mem};
48 /// An error enum representing a failure to persist a channel monitor update.
50 pub enum ChannelMonitorUpdateErr {
51 /// Used to indicate a temporary failure (eg connection to a watchtower or remote backup of
52 /// our state failed, but is expected to succeed at some point in the future).
54 /// Such a failure will "freeze" a channel, preventing us from revoking old states or
55 /// submitting new commitment transactions to the remote party.
56 /// ChannelManager::test_restore_channel_monitor can be used to retry the update(s) and restore
57 /// the channel to an operational state.
59 /// Note that continuing to operate when no copy of the updated ChannelMonitor could be
60 /// persisted is unsafe - if you failed to store the update on your own local disk you should
61 /// instead return PermanentFailure to force closure of the channel ASAP.
63 /// Even when a channel has been "frozen" updates to the ChannelMonitor can continue to occur
64 /// (eg if an inbound HTLC which we forwarded was claimed upstream resulting in us attempting
65 /// to claim it on this channel) and those updates must be applied wherever they can be. At
66 /// least one such updated ChannelMonitor must be persisted otherwise PermanentFailure should
67 /// be returned to get things on-chain ASAP using only the in-memory copy. Obviously updates to
68 /// the channel which would invalidate previous ChannelMonitors are not made when a channel has
71 /// Note that even if updates made after TemporaryFailure succeed you must still call
72 /// test_restore_channel_monitor to ensure you have the latest monitor and re-enable normal
73 /// channel operation.
75 /// For deployments where a copy of ChannelMonitors and other local state are backed up in a
76 /// remote location (with local copies persisted immediately), it is anticipated that all
77 /// updates will return TemporaryFailure until the remote copies could be updated.
79 /// Used to indicate no further channel monitor updates will be allowed (eg we've moved on to a
80 /// different watchtower and cannot update with all watchtowers that were previously informed
81 /// of this channel). This will force-close the channel in question.
83 /// Should also be used to indicate a failure to update the local copy of the channel monitor.
87 /// General Err type for ChannelMonitor actions. Generally, this implies that the data provided is
88 /// inconsistent with the ChannelMonitor being called. eg for ChannelMonitor::insert_combine this
89 /// means you tried to merge two monitors for different channels or for a channel which was
90 /// restored from a backup and then generated new commitment updates.
91 /// Contains a human-readable error message.
93 pub struct MonitorUpdateError(pub &'static str);
95 /// Simple structure send back by ManyChannelMonitor in case of HTLC detected onchain from a
96 /// forward channel and from which info are needed to update HTLC in a backward channel.
97 pub struct HTLCUpdate {
98 pub(super) payment_hash: PaymentHash,
99 pub(super) payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
100 pub(super) source: HTLCSource
103 /// Simple trait indicating ability to track a set of ChannelMonitors and multiplex events between
104 /// them. Generally should be implemented by keeping a local SimpleManyChannelMonitor and passing
105 /// events to it, while also taking any add_update_monitor events and passing them to some remote
108 /// Note that any updates to a channel's monitor *must* be applied to each instance of the
109 /// channel's monitor everywhere (including remote watchtowers) *before* this function returns. If
110 /// an update occurs and a remote watchtower is left with old state, it may broadcast transactions
111 /// which we have revoked, allowing our counterparty to claim all funds in the channel!
112 pub trait ManyChannelMonitor: Send + Sync {
113 /// Adds or updates a monitor for the given `funding_txo`.
115 /// Implementor must also ensure that the funding_txo outpoint is registered with any relevant
116 /// ChainWatchInterfaces such that the provided monitor receives block_connected callbacks with
117 /// any spends of it.
118 fn add_update_monitor(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr>;
120 /// Used by ChannelManager to get list of HTLC resolved onchain and which needed to be updated
121 /// with success or failure backward
122 fn fetch_pending_htlc_updated(&self) -> Vec<HTLCUpdate>;
125 /// A simple implementation of a ManyChannelMonitor and ChainListener. Can be used to create a
126 /// watchtower or watch our own channels.
128 /// Note that you must provide your own key by which to refer to channels.
130 /// If you're accepting remote monitors (ie are implementing a watchtower), you must verify that
131 /// users cannot overwrite a given channel by providing a duplicate key. ie you should probably
132 /// index by a PublicKey which is required to sign any updates.
134 /// If you're using this for local monitoring of your own channels, you probably want to use
135 /// `OutPoint` as the key, which will give you a ManyChannelMonitor implementation.
136 pub struct SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
137 #[cfg(test)] // Used in ChannelManager tests to manipulate channels directly
138 pub monitors: Mutex<HashMap<Key, ChannelMonitor>>,
140 monitors: Mutex<HashMap<Key, ChannelMonitor>>,
141 chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>,
142 broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>,
143 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
144 pending_htlc_updated: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, Vec<(HTLCSource, Option<PaymentPreimage>)>>>,
146 fee_estimator: Arc<FeeEstimator>
149 impl<Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash> ChainListener for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
150 fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], _indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) {
151 let block_hash = header.bitcoin_hash();
152 let mut new_events: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(0);
153 let mut htlc_updated_infos = Vec::new();
155 let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
156 for monitor in monitors.values_mut() {
157 let (txn_outputs, spendable_outputs, mut htlc_updated) = monitor.block_connected(txn_matched, height, &block_hash, &*self.broadcaster, &*self.fee_estimator);
158 if spendable_outputs.len() > 0 {
159 new_events.push(events::Event::SpendableOutputs {
160 outputs: spendable_outputs,
164 for (ref txid, ref outputs) in txn_outputs {
165 for (idx, output) in outputs.iter().enumerate() {
166 self.chain_monitor.install_watch_outpoint((txid.clone(), idx as u32), &output.script_pubkey);
169 htlc_updated_infos.append(&mut htlc_updated);
173 // ChannelManager will just need to fetch pending_htlc_updated and pass state backward
174 let mut pending_htlc_updated = self.pending_htlc_updated.lock().unwrap();
175 for htlc in htlc_updated_infos.drain(..) {
176 match pending_htlc_updated.entry(htlc.2) {
177 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut e) => {
178 // In case of reorg we may have htlc outputs solved in a different way so
179 // we prefer to keep claims but don't store duplicate updates for a given
180 // (payment_hash, HTLCSource) pair.
181 let mut existing_claim = false;
182 e.get_mut().retain(|htlc_data| {
183 if htlc.0 == htlc_data.0 {
184 if htlc_data.1.is_some() {
185 existing_claim = true;
191 e.get_mut().push((htlc.0, htlc.1));
194 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
195 e.insert(vec![(htlc.0, htlc.1)]);
200 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
201 pending_events.append(&mut new_events);
204 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, disconnected_height: u32) {
205 let block_hash = header.bitcoin_hash();
206 let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
207 for monitor in monitors.values_mut() {
208 monitor.block_disconnected(disconnected_height, &block_hash);
213 impl<Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash + 'static> SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
214 /// Creates a new object which can be used to monitor several channels given the chain
215 /// interface with which to register to receive notifications.
216 pub fn new(chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>, broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>, logger: Arc<Logger>, feeest: Arc<FeeEstimator>) -> Arc<SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key>> {
217 let res = Arc::new(SimpleManyChannelMonitor {
218 monitors: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
221 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
222 pending_htlc_updated: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
224 fee_estimator: feeest,
226 let weak_res = Arc::downgrade(&res);
227 res.chain_monitor.register_listener(weak_res);
231 /// Adds or updates the monitor which monitors the channel referred to by the given key.
232 pub fn add_update_monitor_by_key(&self, key: Key, monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
233 let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
234 match monitors.get_mut(&key) {
235 Some(orig_monitor) => {
236 log_trace!(self, "Updating Channel Monitor for channel {}", log_funding_info!(monitor.key_storage));
237 return orig_monitor.insert_combine(monitor);
241 match monitor.key_storage {
242 Storage::Local { ref funding_info, .. } => {
245 return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Try to update a useless monitor without funding_txo !"));
247 &Some((ref outpoint, ref script)) => {
248 log_trace!(self, "Got new Channel Monitor for channel {}", log_bytes!(outpoint.to_channel_id()[..]));
249 self.chain_monitor.install_watch_tx(&outpoint.txid, script);
250 self.chain_monitor.install_watch_outpoint((outpoint.txid, outpoint.index as u32), script);
254 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
255 self.chain_monitor.watch_all_txn();
258 monitors.insert(key, monitor);
263 impl ManyChannelMonitor for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<OutPoint> {
264 fn add_update_monitor(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr> {
265 match self.add_update_monitor_by_key(funding_txo, monitor) {
267 Err(_) => Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure),
271 fn fetch_pending_htlc_updated(&self) -> Vec<HTLCUpdate> {
272 let mut updated = self.pending_htlc_updated.lock().unwrap();
273 let mut pending_htlcs_updated = Vec::with_capacity(updated.len());
274 for (k, v) in updated.drain() {
276 pending_htlcs_updated.push(HTLCUpdate {
278 payment_preimage: htlc_data.1,
283 pending_htlcs_updated
287 impl<Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash> events::EventsProvider for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
288 fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
289 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
290 let mut ret = Vec::new();
291 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut *pending_events);
296 /// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, don't try to claim it in a shared transaction,
297 /// instead claiming it in its own individual transaction.
298 const CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 12;
299 /// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, force-close the channel to broadcast the
300 /// HTLC-Success transaction.
301 /// In other words, this is an upper bound on how many blocks we think it can take us to get a
302 /// transaction confirmed (and we use it in a few more, equivalent, places).
303 pub(crate) const CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 6;
304 /// Number of blocks by which point we expect our counterparty to have seen new blocks on the
305 /// network and done a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance (+ we've updated all our
306 /// copies of ChannelMonitors, including watchtowers). We could enforce the contract by failing
307 /// at CLTV expiration height but giving a grace period to our peer may be profitable for us if he
308 /// can provide an over-late preimage. Nevertheless, grace period has to be accounted in our
309 /// CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA to be secure. Following this policy we may decrease the rate of channel failures
310 /// due to expiration but increase the cost of funds being locked longuer in case of failure.
311 /// This delay also cover a low-power peer being slow to process blocks and so being behind us on
312 /// accurate block height.
313 /// In case of onchain failure to be pass backward we may see the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY
314 /// with at worst this delay, so we are not only using this value as a mercy for them but also
315 /// us as a safeguard to delay with enough time.
316 pub(crate) const LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS: u32 = 3;
317 /// Number of blocks we wait on seeing a HTLC output being solved before we fail corresponding inbound
318 /// HTLCs. This prevents us from failing backwards and then getting a reorg resulting in us losing money.
319 /// We use also this delay to be sure we can remove our in-flight claim txn from bump candidates buffer.
320 /// It may cause spurrious generation of bumped claim txn but that's allright given the outpoint is already
321 /// solved by a previous claim tx. What we want to avoid is reorg evicting our claim tx and us not
322 /// keeping bumping another claim tx to solve the outpoint.
323 pub(crate) const ANTI_REORG_DELAY: u32 = 6;
325 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
328 revocation_base_key: SecretKey,
329 htlc_base_key: SecretKey,
330 delayed_payment_base_key: SecretKey,
331 payment_base_key: SecretKey,
332 shutdown_pubkey: PublicKey,
333 prev_latest_per_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
334 latest_per_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
335 funding_info: Option<(OutPoint, Script)>,
336 current_remote_commitment_txid: Option<Sha256dHash>,
337 prev_remote_commitment_txid: Option<Sha256dHash>,
340 revocation_base_key: PublicKey,
341 htlc_base_key: PublicKey,
345 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
346 struct LocalSignedTx {
347 /// txid of the transaction in tx, just used to make comparison faster
350 revocation_key: PublicKey,
351 a_htlc_key: PublicKey,
352 b_htlc_key: PublicKey,
353 delayed_payment_key: PublicKey,
355 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<(Signature, Signature)>, Option<HTLCSource>)>,
359 enum InputDescriptors {
364 RevokedOutput, // either a revoked to_local output on commitment tx, a revoked HTLC-Timeout output or a revoked HTLC-Success output
367 /// When ChannelMonitor discovers an onchain outpoint being a step of a channel and that it needs
368 /// to generate a tx to push channel state forward, we cache outpoint-solving tx material to build
369 /// a new bumped one in case of lenghty confirmation delay
370 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
374 pubkey: Option<PublicKey>,
382 preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
387 sigs: (Signature, Signature),
388 preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
393 /// Upon discovering of some classes of onchain tx by ChannelMonitor, we may have to take actions on it
394 /// once they mature to enough confirmations (ANTI_REORG_DELAY)
395 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
397 /// Outpoint under claim process by our own tx, once this one get enough confirmations, we remove it from
398 /// bump-txn candidate buffer.
400 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint,
402 /// HTLC output getting solved by a timeout, at maturation we pass upstream payment source information to solve
403 /// inbound HTLC in backward channel. Note, in case of preimage, we pass info to upstream without delay as we can
404 /// only win from it, so it's never an OnchainEvent
406 htlc_update: (HTLCSource, PaymentHash),
410 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
411 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
413 /// A ChannelMonitor handles chain events (blocks connected and disconnected) and generates
414 /// on-chain transactions to ensure no loss of funds occurs.
416 /// You MUST ensure that no ChannelMonitors for a given channel anywhere contain out-of-date
417 /// information and are actively monitoring the chain.
419 pub struct ChannelMonitor {
420 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64,
422 key_storage: Storage,
423 their_htlc_base_key: Option<PublicKey>,
424 their_delayed_payment_base_key: Option<PublicKey>,
425 // first is the idx of the first of the two revocation points
426 their_cur_revocation_points: Option<(u64, PublicKey, Option<PublicKey>)>,
428 our_to_self_delay: u16,
429 their_to_self_delay: Option<u16>,
431 old_secrets: [([u8; 32], u64); 49],
432 remote_claimable_outpoints: HashMap<Sha256dHash, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>>,
433 /// We cannot identify HTLC-Success or HTLC-Timeout transactions by themselves on the chain.
434 /// Nor can we figure out their commitment numbers without the commitment transaction they are
435 /// spending. Thus, in order to claim them via revocation key, we track all the remote
436 /// commitment transactions which we find on-chain, mapping them to the commitment number which
437 /// can be used to derive the revocation key and claim the transactions.
438 remote_commitment_txn_on_chain: HashMap<Sha256dHash, (u64, Vec<Script>)>,
439 /// Cache used to make pruning of payment_preimages faster.
440 /// Maps payment_hash values to commitment numbers for remote transactions for non-revoked
441 /// remote transactions (ie should remain pretty small).
442 /// Serialized to disk but should generally not be sent to Watchtowers.
443 remote_hash_commitment_number: HashMap<PaymentHash, u64>,
445 // We store two local commitment transactions to avoid any race conditions where we may update
446 // some monitors (potentially on watchtowers) but then fail to update others, resulting in the
447 // various monitors for one channel being out of sync, and us broadcasting a local
448 // transaction for which we have deleted claim information on some watchtowers.
449 prev_local_signed_commitment_tx: Option<LocalSignedTx>,
450 current_local_signed_commitment_tx: Option<LocalSignedTx>,
452 // Used just for ChannelManager to make sure it has the latest channel data during
454 current_remote_commitment_number: u64,
456 payment_preimages: HashMap<PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage>,
458 destination_script: Script,
459 // Thanks to data loss protection, we may be able to claim our non-htlc funds
460 // back, this is the script we have to spend from but we need to
461 // scan every commitment transaction for that
462 to_remote_rescue: Option<(Script, SecretKey)>,
464 // Used to track outpoint in the process of being claimed by our transactions. We need to scan all transactions
465 // for inputs spending this. If height timer (u32) is expired and claim tx hasn't reached enough confirmations
466 // before, use TxMaterial to regenerate a new claim tx with a satoshis-per-1000-weight-units higher than last
467 // one (u64), if timelock expiration (u32) is near, decrease height timer, the in-between bumps delay.
468 // Last field cached (u32) is height of outpoint confirmation, which is needed to flush this tracker
469 // in case of reorgs, given block timer are scaled on timer expiration we can't deduce from it original height.
470 our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf: HashMap<BitcoinOutPoint, (u32, TxMaterial, u64, u32, u32)>,
472 // Used to track onchain events, i.e transactions parts of channels confirmed on chain, on which
473 // we have to take actions once they reach enough confs. Key is a block height timer, i.e we enforce
474 // actions when we receive a block with given height. Actions depend on OnchainEvent type.
475 onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf: HashMap<u32, Vec<OnchainEvent>>,
477 // We simply modify last_block_hash in Channel's block_connected so that serialization is
478 // consistent but hopefully the users' copy handles block_connected in a consistent way.
479 // (we do *not*, however, update them in insert_combine to ensure any local user copies keep
480 // their last_block_hash from its state and not based on updated copies that didn't run through
481 // the full block_connected).
482 pub(crate) last_block_hash: Sha256dHash,
483 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>, //TODO: dedup this a bit...
487 macro_rules! subtract_high_prio_fee {
488 ($self: ident, $fee_estimator: expr, $value: expr, $predicted_weight: expr, $spent_txid: expr, $used_feerate: expr) => {
490 $used_feerate = $fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority);
491 let mut fee = $used_feerate * ($predicted_weight as u64) / 1000;
493 $used_feerate = $fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
494 fee = $used_feerate * ($predicted_weight as u64) / 1000;
496 $used_feerate = $fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
497 fee = $used_feerate * ($predicted_weight as u64) / 1000;
499 log_error!($self, "Failed to generate an on-chain punishment tx spending {} as even low priority fee ({} sat) was more than the entire claim balance ({} sat)",
500 $spent_txid, fee, $value);
503 log_warn!($self, "Used low priority fee for on-chain punishment tx spending {} as high priority fee was more than the entire claim balance ({} sat)",
504 $spent_txid, $value);
509 log_warn!($self, "Used medium priority fee for on-chain punishment tx spending {} as high priority fee was more than the entire claim balance ({} sat)",
510 $spent_txid, $value);
522 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
523 /// Used only in testing and fuzztarget to check serialization roundtrips don't change the
524 /// underlying object
525 impl PartialEq for ChannelMonitor {
526 fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
527 if self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor != other.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor ||
528 self.key_storage != other.key_storage ||
529 self.their_htlc_base_key != other.their_htlc_base_key ||
530 self.their_delayed_payment_base_key != other.their_delayed_payment_base_key ||
531 self.their_cur_revocation_points != other.their_cur_revocation_points ||
532 self.our_to_self_delay != other.our_to_self_delay ||
533 self.their_to_self_delay != other.their_to_self_delay ||
534 self.remote_claimable_outpoints != other.remote_claimable_outpoints ||
535 self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain != other.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain ||
536 self.remote_hash_commitment_number != other.remote_hash_commitment_number ||
537 self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx != other.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx ||
538 self.current_remote_commitment_number != other.current_remote_commitment_number ||
539 self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx != other.current_local_signed_commitment_tx ||
540 self.payment_preimages != other.payment_preimages ||
541 self.destination_script != other.destination_script ||
542 self.to_remote_rescue != other.to_remote_rescue ||
543 self.our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf != other.our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf ||
544 self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf != other.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf
548 for (&(ref secret, ref idx), &(ref o_secret, ref o_idx)) in self.old_secrets.iter().zip(other.old_secrets.iter()) {
549 if secret != o_secret || idx != o_idx {
558 impl ChannelMonitor {
559 pub(super) fn new(revocation_base_key: &SecretKey, delayed_payment_base_key: &SecretKey, htlc_base_key: &SecretKey, payment_base_key: &SecretKey, shutdown_pubkey: &PublicKey, our_to_self_delay: u16, destination_script: Script, logger: Arc<Logger>) -> ChannelMonitor {
561 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: 0,
563 key_storage: Storage::Local {
564 revocation_base_key: revocation_base_key.clone(),
565 htlc_base_key: htlc_base_key.clone(),
566 delayed_payment_base_key: delayed_payment_base_key.clone(),
567 payment_base_key: payment_base_key.clone(),
568 shutdown_pubkey: shutdown_pubkey.clone(),
569 prev_latest_per_commitment_point: None,
570 latest_per_commitment_point: None,
572 current_remote_commitment_txid: None,
573 prev_remote_commitment_txid: None,
575 their_htlc_base_key: None,
576 their_delayed_payment_base_key: None,
577 their_cur_revocation_points: None,
579 our_to_self_delay: our_to_self_delay,
580 their_to_self_delay: None,
582 old_secrets: [([0; 32], 1 << 48); 49],
583 remote_claimable_outpoints: HashMap::new(),
584 remote_commitment_txn_on_chain: HashMap::new(),
585 remote_hash_commitment_number: HashMap::new(),
587 prev_local_signed_commitment_tx: None,
588 current_local_signed_commitment_tx: None,
589 current_remote_commitment_number: 1 << 48,
591 payment_preimages: HashMap::new(),
592 destination_script: destination_script,
593 to_remote_rescue: None,
595 our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf: HashMap::new(),
597 onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf: HashMap::new(),
599 last_block_hash: Default::default(),
600 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
605 fn get_witnesses_weight(inputs: &[InputDescriptors]) -> usize {
606 let mut tx_weight = 2; // count segwit flags
608 // We use expected weight (and not actual) as signatures and time lock delays may vary
609 tx_weight += match inp {
610 // number_of_witness_elements + sig_length + revocation_sig + pubkey_length + revocationpubkey + witness_script_length + witness_script
611 &InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC => {
612 1 + 1 + 73 + 1 + 33 + 1 + 133
614 // number_of_witness_elements + sig_length + revocation_sig + pubkey_length + revocationpubkey + witness_script_length + witness_script
615 &InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC => {
616 1 + 1 + 73 + 1 + 33 + 1 + 139
618 // number_of_witness_elements + sig_length + remotehtlc_sig + preimage_length + preimage + witness_script_length + witness_script
619 &InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC => {
620 1 + 1 + 73 + 1 + 32 + 1 + 133
622 // number_of_witness_elements + sig_length + revocation_sig + pubkey_length + revocationpubkey + witness_script_length + witness_script
623 &InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC => {
624 1 + 1 + 73 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 139
626 // number_of_witness_elements + sig_length + revocation_sig + true_length + op_true + witness_script_length + witness_script
627 &InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput => {
628 1 + 1 + 73 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 77
635 fn get_height_timer(current_height: u32, timelock_expiration: u32) -> u32 {
636 if timelock_expiration <= current_height || timelock_expiration - current_height <= 3 {
637 return current_height + 1
638 } else if timelock_expiration - current_height <= 15 {
639 return current_height + 3
645 fn place_secret(idx: u64) -> u8 {
647 if idx & (1 << i) == (1 << i) {
655 fn derive_secret(secret: [u8; 32], bits: u8, idx: u64) -> [u8; 32] {
656 let mut res: [u8; 32] = secret;
658 let bitpos = bits - 1 - i;
659 if idx & (1 << bitpos) == (1 << bitpos) {
660 res[(bitpos / 8) as usize] ^= 1 << (bitpos & 7);
661 res = Sha256::hash(&res).into_inner();
667 /// Inserts a revocation secret into this channel monitor. Prunes old preimages if neither
668 /// needed by local commitment transactions HTCLs nor by remote ones. Unless we haven't already seen remote
669 /// commitment transaction's secret, they are de facto pruned (we can use revocation key).
670 pub(super) fn provide_secret(&mut self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
671 let pos = ChannelMonitor::place_secret(idx);
673 let (old_secret, old_idx) = self.old_secrets[i as usize];
674 if ChannelMonitor::derive_secret(secret, pos, old_idx) != old_secret {
675 return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Previous secret did not match new one"));
678 if self.get_min_seen_secret() <= idx {
681 self.old_secrets[pos as usize] = (secret, idx);
683 // Prune HTLCs from the previous remote commitment tx so we don't generate failure/fulfill
684 // events for now-revoked/fulfilled HTLCs.
685 // TODO: We should probably consider whether we're really getting the next secret here.
686 if let Storage::Local { ref mut prev_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage {
687 if let Some(txid) = prev_remote_commitment_txid.take() {
688 for &mut (_, ref mut source) in self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get_mut(&txid).unwrap() {
694 if !self.payment_preimages.is_empty() {
695 let local_signed_commitment_tx = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx.as_ref().expect("Channel needs at least an initial commitment tx !");
696 let prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.as_ref();
697 let min_idx = self.get_min_seen_secret();
698 let remote_hash_commitment_number = &mut self.remote_hash_commitment_number;
700 self.payment_preimages.retain(|&k, _| {
701 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in &local_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs {
702 if k == htlc.payment_hash {
706 if let Some(prev_local_commitment_tx) = prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
707 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in prev_local_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
708 if k == htlc.payment_hash {
713 let contains = if let Some(cn) = remote_hash_commitment_number.get(&k) {
720 remote_hash_commitment_number.remove(&k);
729 /// Informs this monitor of the latest remote (ie non-broadcastable) commitment transaction.
730 /// The monitor watches for it to be broadcasted and then uses the HTLC information (and
731 /// possibly future revocation/preimage information) to claim outputs where possible.
732 /// We cache also the mapping hash:commitment number to lighten pruning of old preimages by watchtowers.
733 pub(super) fn provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, unsigned_commitment_tx: &Transaction, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>, commitment_number: u64, their_revocation_point: PublicKey) {
734 // TODO: Encrypt the htlc_outputs data with the single-hash of the commitment transaction
735 // so that a remote monitor doesn't learn anything unless there is a malicious close.
736 // (only maybe, sadly we cant do the same for local info, as we need to be aware of
738 for &(ref htlc, _) in &htlc_outputs {
739 self.remote_hash_commitment_number.insert(htlc.payment_hash, commitment_number);
742 let new_txid = unsigned_commitment_tx.txid();
743 log_trace!(self, "Tracking new remote commitment transaction with txid {} at commitment number {} with {} HTLC outputs", new_txid, commitment_number, htlc_outputs.len());
744 log_trace!(self, "New potential remote commitment transaction: {}", encode::serialize_hex(unsigned_commitment_tx));
745 if let Storage::Local { ref mut current_remote_commitment_txid, ref mut prev_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage {
746 *prev_remote_commitment_txid = current_remote_commitment_txid.take();
747 *current_remote_commitment_txid = Some(new_txid);
749 self.remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(new_txid, htlc_outputs);
750 self.current_remote_commitment_number = commitment_number;
751 //TODO: Merge this into the other per-remote-transaction output storage stuff
752 match self.their_cur_revocation_points {
753 Some(old_points) => {
754 if old_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 {
755 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0, old_points.1, Some(their_revocation_point)));
756 } else if old_points.0 == commitment_number + 2 {
757 if let Some(old_second_point) = old_points.2 {
758 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0 - 1, old_second_point, Some(their_revocation_point)));
760 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None));
763 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None));
767 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None));
772 pub(super) fn provide_rescue_remote_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, their_revocation_point: PublicKey) {
773 match self.key_storage {
774 Storage::Local { ref payment_base_key, .. } => {
775 if let Ok(payment_key) = chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &their_revocation_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &payment_base_key)) {
776 let to_remote_script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0)
777 .push_slice(&Hash160::hash(&payment_key.serialize())[..])
779 if let Ok(to_remote_key) = chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, &their_revocation_point, &payment_base_key) {
780 self.to_remote_rescue = Some((to_remote_script, to_remote_key));
784 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {}
788 /// Informs this monitor of the latest local (ie broadcastable) commitment transaction. The
789 /// monitor watches for timeouts and may broadcast it if we approach such a timeout. Thus, it
790 /// is important that any clones of this channel monitor (including remote clones) by kept
791 /// up-to-date as our local commitment transaction is updated.
792 /// Panics if set_their_to_self_delay has never been called.
793 /// Also update Storage with latest local per_commitment_point to derive local_delayedkey in
794 /// case of onchain HTLC tx
795 pub(super) fn provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, signed_commitment_tx: Transaction, local_keys: chan_utils::TxCreationKeys, feerate_per_kw: u64, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<(Signature, Signature)>, Option<HTLCSource>)>) {
796 assert!(self.their_to_self_delay.is_some());
797 self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx.take();
798 self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(LocalSignedTx {
799 txid: signed_commitment_tx.txid(),
800 tx: signed_commitment_tx,
801 revocation_key: local_keys.revocation_key,
802 a_htlc_key: local_keys.a_htlc_key,
803 b_htlc_key: local_keys.b_htlc_key,
804 delayed_payment_key: local_keys.a_delayed_payment_key,
809 if let Storage::Local { ref mut latest_per_commitment_point, .. } = self.key_storage {
810 *latest_per_commitment_point = Some(local_keys.per_commitment_point);
812 panic!("Channel somehow ended up with its internal ChannelMonitor being in Watchtower mode?");
816 /// Provides a payment_hash->payment_preimage mapping. Will be automatically pruned when all
817 /// commitment_tx_infos which contain the payment hash have been revoked.
818 pub(super) fn provide_payment_preimage(&mut self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_preimage: &PaymentPreimage) {
819 self.payment_preimages.insert(payment_hash.clone(), payment_preimage.clone());
822 /// Combines this ChannelMonitor with the information contained in the other ChannelMonitor.
823 /// After a successful call this ChannelMonitor is up-to-date and is safe to use to monitor the
824 /// chain for new blocks/transactions.
825 pub fn insert_combine(&mut self, mut other: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
826 match self.key_storage {
827 Storage::Local { ref funding_info, .. } => {
828 if funding_info.is_none() { return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Try to combine a Local monitor without funding_info")); }
829 let our_funding_info = funding_info;
830 if let Storage::Local { ref funding_info, .. } = other.key_storage {
831 if funding_info.is_none() { return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Try to combine a Local monitor without funding_info")); }
832 // We should be able to compare the entire funding_txo, but in fuzztarget it's trivially
833 // easy to collide the funding_txo hash and have a different scriptPubKey.
834 if funding_info.as_ref().unwrap().0 != our_funding_info.as_ref().unwrap().0 {
835 return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Funding transaction outputs are not identical!"));
838 return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Try to combine a Local monitor with a Watchtower one !"));
841 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
842 if let Storage::Watchtower { .. } = other.key_storage {
845 return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Try to combine a Watchtower monitor with a Local one !"));
849 let other_min_secret = other.get_min_seen_secret();
850 let our_min_secret = self.get_min_seen_secret();
851 if our_min_secret > other_min_secret {
852 self.provide_secret(other_min_secret, other.get_secret(other_min_secret).unwrap())?;
854 if let Some(ref local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
855 if let Some(ref other_local_tx) = other.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
856 let our_commitment_number = 0xffffffffffff - ((((local_tx.tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (local_tx.tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor);
857 let other_commitment_number = 0xffffffffffff - ((((other_local_tx.tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (other_local_tx.tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ other.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor);
858 if our_commitment_number >= other_commitment_number {
859 self.key_storage = other.key_storage;
863 // TODO: We should use current_remote_commitment_number and the commitment number out of
864 // local transactions to decide how to merge
865 if our_min_secret >= other_min_secret {
866 self.their_cur_revocation_points = other.their_cur_revocation_points;
867 for (txid, htlcs) in other.remote_claimable_outpoints.drain() {
868 self.remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, htlcs);
870 if let Some(local_tx) = other.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
871 self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(local_tx);
873 if let Some(local_tx) = other.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
874 self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(local_tx);
876 self.payment_preimages = other.payment_preimages;
877 self.to_remote_rescue = other.to_remote_rescue;
880 self.current_remote_commitment_number = cmp::min(self.current_remote_commitment_number, other.current_remote_commitment_number);
884 /// Panics if commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor doesn't fit in 48 bits
885 pub(super) fn set_commitment_obscure_factor(&mut self, commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64) {
886 assert!(commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor < (1 << 48));
887 self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor = commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor;
890 /// Allows this monitor to scan only for transactions which are applicable. Note that this is
891 /// optional, without it this monitor cannot be used in an SPV client, but you may wish to
892 /// avoid this (or call unset_funding_info) on a monitor you wish to send to a watchtower as it
893 /// provides slightly better privacy.
894 /// It's the responsibility of the caller to register outpoint and script with passing the former
895 /// value as key to add_update_monitor.
896 pub(super) fn set_funding_info(&mut self, new_funding_info: (OutPoint, Script)) {
897 match self.key_storage {
898 Storage::Local { ref mut funding_info, .. } => {
899 *funding_info = Some(new_funding_info);
901 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
902 panic!("Channel somehow ended up with its internal ChannelMonitor being in Watchtower mode?");
907 /// We log these base keys at channel opening to being able to rebuild redeemscript in case of leaked revoked commit tx
908 pub(super) fn set_their_base_keys(&mut self, their_htlc_base_key: &PublicKey, their_delayed_payment_base_key: &PublicKey) {
909 self.their_htlc_base_key = Some(their_htlc_base_key.clone());
910 self.their_delayed_payment_base_key = Some(their_delayed_payment_base_key.clone());
913 pub(super) fn set_their_to_self_delay(&mut self, their_to_self_delay: u16) {
914 self.their_to_self_delay = Some(their_to_self_delay);
917 pub(super) fn unset_funding_info(&mut self) {
918 match self.key_storage {
919 Storage::Local { ref mut funding_info, .. } => {
920 *funding_info = None;
922 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
923 panic!("Channel somehow ended up with its internal ChannelMonitor being in Watchtower mode?");
928 /// Gets the funding transaction outpoint of the channel this ChannelMonitor is monitoring for.
929 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
930 match self.key_storage {
931 Storage::Local { ref funding_info, .. } => {
933 &Some((outpoint, _)) => Some(outpoint),
937 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
943 /// Gets the sets of all outpoints which this ChannelMonitor expects to hear about spends of.
944 /// Generally useful when deserializing as during normal operation the return values of
945 /// block_connected are sufficient to ensure all relevant outpoints are being monitored (note
946 /// that the get_funding_txo outpoint and transaction must also be monitored for!).
947 pub fn get_monitored_outpoints(&self) -> Vec<(Sha256dHash, u32, &Script)> {
948 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.len() * 2);
949 for (ref txid, &(_, ref outputs)) in self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
950 for (idx, output) in outputs.iter().enumerate() {
951 res.push(((*txid).clone(), idx as u32, output));
957 /// Serializes into a vec, with various modes for the exposed pub fns
958 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W, for_local_storage: bool) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
959 //TODO: We still write out all the serialization here manually instead of using the fancy
960 //serialization framework we have, we should migrate things over to it.
961 writer.write_all(&[SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
962 writer.write_all(&[MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
964 // Set in initial Channel-object creation, so should always be set by now:
965 U48(self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor).write(writer)?;
967 macro_rules! write_option {
974 &None => 0u8.write(writer)?,
979 match self.key_storage {
980 Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref payment_base_key, ref shutdown_pubkey, ref prev_latest_per_commitment_point, ref latest_per_commitment_point, ref funding_info, ref current_remote_commitment_txid, ref prev_remote_commitment_txid } => {
981 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
982 writer.write_all(&revocation_base_key[..])?;
983 writer.write_all(&htlc_base_key[..])?;
984 writer.write_all(&delayed_payment_base_key[..])?;
985 writer.write_all(&payment_base_key[..])?;
986 writer.write_all(&shutdown_pubkey.serialize())?;
987 prev_latest_per_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
988 latest_per_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
990 &Some((ref outpoint, ref script)) => {
991 writer.write_all(&outpoint.txid[..])?;
992 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(outpoint.index))?;
993 script.write(writer)?;
996 debug_assert!(false, "Try to serialize a useless Local monitor !");
999 current_remote_commitment_txid.write(writer)?;
1000 prev_remote_commitment_txid.write(writer)?;
1002 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => unimplemented!(),
1005 writer.write_all(&self.their_htlc_base_key.as_ref().unwrap().serialize())?;
1006 writer.write_all(&self.their_delayed_payment_base_key.as_ref().unwrap().serialize())?;
1008 match self.their_cur_revocation_points {
1009 Some((idx, pubkey, second_option)) => {
1010 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(idx))?;
1011 writer.write_all(&pubkey.serialize())?;
1012 match second_option {
1013 Some(second_pubkey) => {
1014 writer.write_all(&second_pubkey.serialize())?;
1017 writer.write_all(&[0; 33])?;
1022 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(0))?;
1026 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.our_to_self_delay))?;
1027 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap()))?;
1029 for &(ref secret, ref idx) in self.old_secrets.iter() {
1030 writer.write_all(secret)?;
1031 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*idx))?;
1034 macro_rules! serialize_htlc_in_commitment {
1035 ($htlc_output: expr) => {
1036 writer.write_all(&[$htlc_output.offered as u8; 1])?;
1037 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc_output.amount_msat))?;
1038 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array($htlc_output.cltv_expiry))?;
1039 writer.write_all(&$htlc_output.payment_hash.0[..])?;
1040 $htlc_output.transaction_output_index.write(writer)?;
1044 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_claimable_outpoints.len() as u64))?;
1045 for (ref txid, ref htlc_infos) in self.remote_claimable_outpoints.iter() {
1046 writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
1047 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc_infos.len() as u64))?;
1048 for &(ref htlc_output, ref htlc_source) in htlc_infos.iter() {
1049 serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output);
1050 write_option!(htlc_source);
1054 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.len() as u64))?;
1055 for (ref txid, &(commitment_number, ref txouts)) in self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
1056 writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
1057 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(commitment_number))?;
1058 (txouts.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
1059 for script in txouts.iter() {
1060 script.write(writer)?;
1064 if for_local_storage {
1065 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_hash_commitment_number.len() as u64))?;
1066 for (ref payment_hash, commitment_number) in self.remote_hash_commitment_number.iter() {
1067 writer.write_all(&payment_hash.0[..])?;
1068 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(*commitment_number))?;
1071 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(0))?;
1074 macro_rules! serialize_local_tx {
1075 ($local_tx: expr) => {
1076 if let Err(e) = $local_tx.tx.consensus_encode(&mut WriterWriteAdaptor(writer)) {
1078 encode::Error::Io(e) => return Err(e),
1079 _ => panic!("local tx must have been well-formed!"),
1083 writer.write_all(&$local_tx.revocation_key.serialize())?;
1084 writer.write_all(&$local_tx.a_htlc_key.serialize())?;
1085 writer.write_all(&$local_tx.b_htlc_key.serialize())?;
1086 writer.write_all(&$local_tx.delayed_payment_key.serialize())?;
1088 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($local_tx.feerate_per_kw))?;
1089 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($local_tx.htlc_outputs.len() as u64))?;
1090 for &(ref htlc_output, ref sigs, ref htlc_source) in $local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1091 serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output);
1092 if let &Some((ref their_sig, ref our_sig)) = sigs {
1094 writer.write_all(&their_sig.serialize_compact())?;
1095 writer.write_all(&our_sig.serialize_compact())?;
1099 write_option!(htlc_source);
1104 if let Some(ref prev_local_tx) = self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1105 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
1106 serialize_local_tx!(prev_local_tx);
1108 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
1111 if let Some(ref cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1112 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
1113 serialize_local_tx!(cur_local_tx);
1115 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
1118 if for_local_storage {
1119 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(self.current_remote_commitment_number))?;
1121 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(0))?;
1124 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.payment_preimages.len() as u64))?;
1125 for payment_preimage in self.payment_preimages.values() {
1126 writer.write_all(&payment_preimage.0[..])?;
1129 self.last_block_hash.write(writer)?;
1130 self.destination_script.write(writer)?;
1131 if let Some((ref to_remote_script, ref local_key)) = self.to_remote_rescue {
1132 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
1133 to_remote_script.write(writer)?;
1134 local_key.write(writer)?;
1136 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
1139 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf.len() as u64))?;
1140 for (ref outpoint, claim_tx_data) in self.our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf.iter() {
1141 outpoint.write(writer)?;
1142 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(claim_tx_data.0))?;
1143 match claim_tx_data.1 {
1144 TxMaterial::Revoked { ref script, ref pubkey, ref key, ref is_htlc, ref amount} => {
1145 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
1146 script.write(writer)?;
1147 pubkey.write(writer)?;
1148 writer.write_all(&key[..])?;
1150 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
1152 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
1154 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*amount))?;
1156 TxMaterial::RemoteHTLC { ref script, ref key, ref preimage, ref amount } => {
1157 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
1158 script.write(writer)?;
1160 preimage.write(writer)?;
1161 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*amount))?;
1163 TxMaterial::LocalHTLC { ref script, ref sigs, ref preimage, ref amount } => {
1164 writer.write_all(&[2; 1])?;
1165 script.write(writer)?;
1166 sigs.0.write(writer)?;
1167 sigs.1.write(writer)?;
1168 preimage.write(writer)?;
1169 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*amount))?;
1172 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(claim_tx_data.2))?;
1173 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(claim_tx_data.3))?;
1174 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(claim_tx_data.4))?;
1177 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.len() as u64))?;
1178 for (ref target, ref events) in self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.iter() {
1179 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(**target))?;
1180 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(events.len() as u64))?;
1181 for ev in events.iter() {
1183 OnchainEvent::Claim { ref outpoint } => {
1184 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
1185 outpoint.write(writer)?;
1187 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
1188 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
1189 htlc_update.0.write(writer)?;
1190 htlc_update.1.write(writer)?;
1199 /// Writes this monitor into the given writer, suitable for writing to disk.
1201 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor), which
1202 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
1203 /// the "reorg path" (ie not just starting at the same height but starting at the highest
1204 /// common block that appears on your best chain as well as on the chain which contains the
1205 /// last block hash returned) upon deserializing the object!
1206 pub fn write_for_disk<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
1207 self.write(writer, true)
1210 /// Encodes this monitor into the given writer, suitable for sending to a remote watchtower
1212 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor), which
1213 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
1214 /// the "reorg path" (ie not just starting at the same height but starting at the highest
1215 /// common block that appears on your best chain as well as on the chain which contains the
1216 /// last block hash returned) upon deserializing the object!
1217 pub fn write_for_watchtower<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
1218 self.write(writer, false)
1221 /// Can only fail if idx is < get_min_seen_secret
1222 pub(super) fn get_secret(&self, idx: u64) -> Option<[u8; 32]> {
1223 for i in 0..self.old_secrets.len() {
1224 if (idx & (!((1 << i) - 1))) == self.old_secrets[i].1 {
1225 return Some(ChannelMonitor::derive_secret(self.old_secrets[i].0, i as u8, idx))
1228 assert!(idx < self.get_min_seen_secret());
1232 pub(super) fn get_min_seen_secret(&self) -> u64 {
1233 //TODO This can be optimized?
1234 let mut min = 1 << 48;
1235 for &(_, idx) in self.old_secrets.iter() {
1243 pub(super) fn get_cur_remote_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
1244 self.current_remote_commitment_number
1247 pub(super) fn get_cur_local_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
1248 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1249 0xffff_ffff_ffff - ((((local_tx.tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (local_tx.tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor)
1250 } else { 0xffff_ffff_ffff }
1253 /// Attempts to claim a remote commitment transaction's outputs using the revocation key and
1254 /// data in remote_claimable_outpoints. Will directly claim any HTLC outputs which expire at a
1255 /// height > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER. In any case, will install monitoring for
1256 /// HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions.
1257 /// Return updates for HTLC pending in the channel and failed automatically by the broadcast of
1258 /// revoked remote commitment tx
1259 fn check_spend_remote_transaction(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator) -> (Vec<Transaction>, (Sha256dHash, Vec<TxOut>), Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>) {
1260 // Most secp and related errors trying to create keys means we have no hope of constructing
1261 // a spend transaction...so we return no transactions to broadcast
1262 let mut txn_to_broadcast = Vec::new();
1263 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
1264 let mut spendable_outputs = Vec::new();
1266 let commitment_txid = tx.txid(); //TODO: This is gonna be a performance bottleneck for watchtowers!
1267 let per_commitment_option = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(&commitment_txid);
1269 macro_rules! ignore_error {
1270 ( $thing : expr ) => {
1273 Err(_) => return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs)
1278 let commitment_number = 0xffffffffffff - ((((tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor);
1279 if commitment_number >= self.get_min_seen_secret() {
1280 let secret = self.get_secret(commitment_number).unwrap();
1281 let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secret));
1282 let (revocation_pubkey, b_htlc_key, local_payment_key) = match self.key_storage {
1283 Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, ref payment_base_key, .. } => {
1284 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
1285 (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_base_key))),
1286 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &htlc_base_key))),
1287 Some(ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &payment_base_key))))
1289 Storage::Watchtower { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
1290 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
1291 (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &revocation_base_key)),
1292 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &htlc_base_key)),
1296 let delayed_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key), &self.their_delayed_payment_base_key.unwrap()));
1297 let a_htlc_key = match self.their_htlc_base_key {
1298 None => return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs),
1299 Some(their_htlc_base_key) => ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key), &their_htlc_base_key)),
1302 let revokeable_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey, self.our_to_self_delay, &delayed_key);
1303 let revokeable_p2wsh = revokeable_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
1305 let local_payment_p2wpkh = if let Some(payment_key) = local_payment_key {
1306 // Note that the Network here is ignored as we immediately drop the address for the
1307 // script_pubkey version.
1308 let payment_hash160 = Hash160::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &payment_key).serialize());
1309 Some(Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&payment_hash160[..]).into_script())
1312 let mut total_value = 0;
1313 let mut inputs = Vec::new();
1314 let mut inputs_info = Vec::new();
1315 let mut inputs_desc = Vec::new();
1317 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
1318 if outp.script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh {
1320 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
1321 txid: commitment_txid,
1324 script_sig: Script::new(),
1325 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
1326 witness: Vec::new(),
1328 inputs_desc.push(InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput);
1329 inputs_info.push((None, outp.value, self.our_to_self_delay as u32));
1330 total_value += outp.value;
1331 } else if Some(&outp.script_pubkey) == local_payment_p2wpkh.as_ref() {
1332 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WPKH {
1333 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: commitment_txid, vout: idx as u32 },
1334 key: local_payment_key.unwrap(),
1335 output: outp.clone(),
1340 macro_rules! sign_input {
1341 ($sighash_parts: expr, $input: expr, $htlc_idx: expr, $amount: expr) => {
1343 let (sig, redeemscript, revocation_key) = match self.key_storage {
1344 Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
1345 let redeemscript = if $htlc_idx.is_none() { revokeable_redeemscript.clone() } else {
1346 let htlc = &per_commitment_option.unwrap()[$htlc_idx.unwrap()].0;
1347 chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey)
1349 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&$sighash_parts.sighash_all(&$input, &redeemscript, $amount)[..]);
1350 let revocation_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key, &revocation_base_key));
1351 (self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &revocation_key), redeemscript, revocation_key)
1353 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
1357 $input.witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
1358 $input.witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1359 if $htlc_idx.is_none() {
1360 $input.witness.push(vec!(1));
1362 $input.witness.push(revocation_pubkey.serialize().to_vec());
1364 $input.witness.push(redeemscript.clone().into_bytes());
1365 (redeemscript, revocation_key)
1370 if let Some(ref per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
1371 inputs.reserve_exact(per_commitment_data.len());
1373 for (idx, &(ref htlc, _)) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() {
1374 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
1375 let expected_script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey);
1376 if transaction_output_index as usize >= tx.output.len() ||
1377 tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 ||
1378 tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].script_pubkey != expected_script.to_v0_p2wsh() {
1379 return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs); // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user
1382 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
1383 txid: commitment_txid,
1384 vout: transaction_output_index,
1386 script_sig: Script::new(),
1387 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
1388 witness: Vec::new(),
1390 if htlc.cltv_expiry > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER {
1392 inputs_desc.push(if htlc.offered { InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC } else { InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC });
1393 inputs_info.push((Some(idx), tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value, htlc.cltv_expiry));
1394 total_value += tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value;
1396 let mut single_htlc_tx = Transaction {
1400 output: vec!(TxOut {
1401 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1402 value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1405 let predicted_weight = single_htlc_tx.get_weight() + Self::get_witnesses_weight(&[if htlc.offered { InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC } else { InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC }]);
1406 let height_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, htlc.cltv_expiry);
1407 let mut used_feerate;
1408 if subtract_high_prio_fee!(self, fee_estimator, single_htlc_tx.output[0].value, predicted_weight, tx.txid(), used_feerate) {
1409 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&single_htlc_tx);
1410 let (redeemscript, revocation_key) = sign_input!(sighash_parts, single_htlc_tx.input[0], Some(idx), htlc.amount_msat / 1000);
1411 assert!(predicted_weight >= single_htlc_tx.get_weight());
1412 match self.our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf.entry(single_htlc_tx.input[0].previous_output.clone()) {
1413 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
1414 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert((height_timer, TxMaterial::Revoked { script: redeemscript, pubkey: Some(revocation_pubkey), key: revocation_key, is_htlc: true, amount: htlc.amount_msat / 1000 }, used_feerate, htlc.cltv_expiry, height)); }
1416 txn_to_broadcast.push(single_htlc_tx);
1423 if !inputs.is_empty() || !txn_to_broadcast.is_empty() || per_commitment_option.is_some() { // ie we're confident this is actually ours
1424 // We're definitely a remote commitment transaction!
1425 log_trace!(self, "Got broadcast of revoked remote commitment transaction, generating general spend tx with {} inputs and {} other txn to broadcast", inputs.len(), txn_to_broadcast.len());
1426 watch_outputs.append(&mut tx.output.clone());
1427 self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, (commitment_number, tx.output.iter().map(|output| { output.script_pubkey.clone() }).collect()));
1429 macro_rules! check_htlc_fails {
1430 ($txid: expr, $commitment_tx: expr) => {
1431 if let Some(ref outpoints) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get($txid) {
1432 for &(ref htlc, ref source_option) in outpoints.iter() {
1433 if let &Some(ref source) = source_option {
1434 log_info!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} remote commitment tx due to broadcast of revoked remote commitment transaction, waiting for confirmation (at height {})", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx, height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
1435 match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
1436 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
1437 let e = entry.get_mut();
1438 e.retain(|ref event| {
1440 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
1441 return htlc_update.0 != **source
1446 e.push(OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ((**source).clone(), htlc.payment_hash.clone())});
1448 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1449 entry.insert(vec![OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ((**source).clone(), htlc.payment_hash.clone())}]);
1457 if let Storage::Local { ref current_remote_commitment_txid, ref prev_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage {
1458 if let &Some(ref txid) = current_remote_commitment_txid {
1459 check_htlc_fails!(txid, "current");
1461 if let &Some(ref txid) = prev_remote_commitment_txid {
1462 check_htlc_fails!(txid, "remote");
1465 // No need to check local commitment txn, symmetric HTLCSource must be present as per-htlc data on remote commitment tx
1467 if inputs.is_empty() { return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs); } // Nothing to be done...probably a false positive/local tx
1469 let outputs = vec!(TxOut {
1470 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1473 let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
1480 let predicted_weight = spend_tx.get_weight() + Self::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_desc[..]);
1482 let mut used_feerate;
1483 if !subtract_high_prio_fee!(self, fee_estimator, spend_tx.output[0].value, predicted_weight, tx.txid(), used_feerate) {
1484 return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs);
1487 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx);
1489 for (input, info) in spend_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(inputs_info.iter()) {
1490 let (redeemscript, revocation_key) = sign_input!(sighash_parts, input, info.0, info.1);
1491 let height_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, info.2);
1492 match self.our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf.entry(input.previous_output.clone()) {
1493 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
1494 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert((height_timer, TxMaterial::Revoked { script: redeemscript, pubkey: if info.0.is_some() { Some(revocation_pubkey) } else { None }, key: revocation_key, is_htlc: if info.0.is_some() { true } else { false }, amount: info.1 }, used_feerate, if !info.0.is_some() { height + info.2 } else { info.2 }, height)); }
1497 assert!(predicted_weight >= spend_tx.get_weight());
1499 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
1500 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: spend_tx.txid(), vout: 0 },
1501 output: spend_tx.output[0].clone(),
1503 txn_to_broadcast.push(spend_tx);
1504 } else if let Some(per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
1505 // While this isn't useful yet, there is a potential race where if a counterparty
1506 // revokes a state at the same time as the commitment transaction for that state is
1507 // confirmed, and the watchtower receives the block before the user, the user could
1508 // upload a new ChannelMonitor with the revocation secret but the watchtower has
1509 // already processed the block, resulting in the remote_commitment_txn_on_chain entry
1510 // not being generated by the above conditional. Thus, to be safe, we go ahead and
1512 watch_outputs.append(&mut tx.output.clone());
1513 self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, (commitment_number, tx.output.iter().map(|output| { output.script_pubkey.clone() }).collect()));
1515 log_trace!(self, "Got broadcast of non-revoked remote commitment transaction {}", commitment_txid);
1517 macro_rules! check_htlc_fails {
1518 ($txid: expr, $commitment_tx: expr, $id: tt) => {
1519 if let Some(ref latest_outpoints) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get($txid) {
1520 $id: for &(ref htlc, ref source_option) in latest_outpoints.iter() {
1521 if let &Some(ref source) = source_option {
1522 // Check if the HTLC is present in the commitment transaction that was
1523 // broadcast, but not if it was below the dust limit, which we should
1524 // fail backwards immediately as there is no way for us to learn the
1525 // payment_preimage.
1526 // Note that if the dust limit were allowed to change between
1527 // commitment transactions we'd want to be check whether *any*
1528 // broadcastable commitment transaction has the HTLC in it, but it
1529 // cannot currently change after channel initialization, so we don't
1531 for &(ref broadcast_htlc, ref broadcast_source) in per_commitment_data.iter() {
1532 if broadcast_htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() && Some(source) == broadcast_source.as_ref() {
1536 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} remote commitment tx due to broadcast of remote commitment transaction", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx);
1537 match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
1538 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
1539 let e = entry.get_mut();
1540 e.retain(|ref event| {
1542 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
1543 return htlc_update.0 != **source
1548 e.push(OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ((**source).clone(), htlc.payment_hash.clone())});
1550 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1551 entry.insert(vec![OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ((**source).clone(), htlc.payment_hash.clone())}]);
1559 if let Storage::Local { ref current_remote_commitment_txid, ref prev_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage {
1560 if let &Some(ref txid) = current_remote_commitment_txid {
1561 check_htlc_fails!(txid, "current", 'current_loop);
1563 if let &Some(ref txid) = prev_remote_commitment_txid {
1564 check_htlc_fails!(txid, "previous", 'prev_loop);
1568 if let Some(revocation_points) = self.their_cur_revocation_points {
1569 let revocation_point_option =
1570 if revocation_points.0 == commitment_number { Some(&revocation_points.1) }
1571 else if let Some(point) = revocation_points.2.as_ref() {
1572 if revocation_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 { Some(point) } else { None }
1574 if let Some(revocation_point) = revocation_point_option {
1575 let (revocation_pubkey, b_htlc_key) = match self.key_storage {
1576 Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
1577 (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_base_key))),
1578 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &htlc_base_key))))
1580 Storage::Watchtower { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
1581 (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &revocation_base_key)),
1582 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &htlc_base_key)))
1585 let a_htlc_key = match self.their_htlc_base_key {
1586 None => return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs),
1587 Some(their_htlc_base_key) => ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &their_htlc_base_key)),
1590 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
1591 if outp.script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh() {
1592 match self.key_storage {
1593 Storage::Local { ref payment_base_key, .. } => {
1594 if let Ok(local_key) = chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_point, &payment_base_key) {
1595 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WPKH {
1596 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: commitment_txid, vout: idx as u32 },
1598 output: outp.clone(),
1602 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {}
1604 break; // Only to_remote ouput is claimable
1608 let mut total_value = 0;
1609 let mut inputs = Vec::new();
1610 let mut inputs_desc = Vec::new();
1611 let mut inputs_info = Vec::new();
1613 macro_rules! sign_input {
1614 ($sighash_parts: expr, $input: expr, $amount: expr, $preimage: expr) => {
1616 let (sig, redeemscript, htlc_key) = match self.key_storage {
1617 Storage::Local { ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
1618 let htlc = &per_commitment_option.unwrap()[$input.sequence as usize].0;
1619 let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey);
1620 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&$sighash_parts.sighash_all(&$input, &redeemscript, $amount)[..]);
1621 let htlc_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &htlc_base_key));
1622 (self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &htlc_key), redeemscript, htlc_key)
1624 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
1628 $input.witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
1629 $input.witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1630 $input.witness.push($preimage);
1631 $input.witness.push(redeemscript.clone().into_bytes());
1632 (redeemscript, htlc_key)
1637 for (idx, &(ref htlc, _)) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() {
1638 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
1639 let expected_script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey);
1640 if transaction_output_index as usize >= tx.output.len() ||
1641 tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 ||
1642 tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].script_pubkey != expected_script.to_v0_p2wsh() {
1643 return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs); // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user
1645 if let Some(payment_preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
1648 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
1649 txid: commitment_txid,
1650 vout: transaction_output_index,
1652 script_sig: Script::new(),
1653 sequence: idx as u32, // reset to 0xfffffffd in sign_input
1654 witness: Vec::new(),
1656 if htlc.cltv_expiry > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER {
1658 inputs_desc.push(if htlc.offered { InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC } else { InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC });
1659 inputs_info.push((payment_preimage, tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value, htlc.cltv_expiry));
1660 total_value += tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value;
1662 let mut single_htlc_tx = Transaction {
1666 output: vec!(TxOut {
1667 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1668 value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1671 let predicted_weight = single_htlc_tx.get_weight() + Self::get_witnesses_weight(&[if htlc.offered { InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC } else { InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC }]);
1672 let height_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, htlc.cltv_expiry);
1673 let mut used_feerate;
1674 if subtract_high_prio_fee!(self, fee_estimator, single_htlc_tx.output[0].value, predicted_weight, tx.txid(), used_feerate) {
1675 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&single_htlc_tx);
1676 let (redeemscript, htlc_key) = sign_input!(sighash_parts, single_htlc_tx.input[0], htlc.amount_msat / 1000, payment_preimage.0.to_vec());
1677 assert!(predicted_weight >= single_htlc_tx.get_weight());
1678 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
1679 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: single_htlc_tx.txid(), vout: 0 },
1680 output: single_htlc_tx.output[0].clone(),
1682 match self.our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf.entry(single_htlc_tx.input[0].previous_output.clone()) {
1683 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
1684 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert((height_timer, TxMaterial::RemoteHTLC { script: redeemscript, key: htlc_key, preimage: Some(*payment_preimage), amount: htlc.amount_msat / 1000 }, used_feerate, htlc.cltv_expiry, height)); }
1686 txn_to_broadcast.push(single_htlc_tx);
1692 // TODO: If the HTLC has already expired, potentially merge it with the
1693 // rest of the claim transaction, as above.
1695 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
1696 txid: commitment_txid,
1697 vout: transaction_output_index,
1699 script_sig: Script::new(),
1700 sequence: idx as u32,
1701 witness: Vec::new(),
1703 let mut timeout_tx = Transaction {
1705 lock_time: htlc.cltv_expiry,
1707 output: vec!(TxOut {
1708 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1709 value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1712 let predicted_weight = timeout_tx.get_weight() + Self::get_witnesses_weight(&[InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC]);
1713 let height_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, htlc.cltv_expiry);
1714 let mut used_feerate;
1715 if subtract_high_prio_fee!(self, fee_estimator, timeout_tx.output[0].value, predicted_weight, tx.txid(), used_feerate) {
1716 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&timeout_tx);
1717 let (redeemscript, htlc_key) = sign_input!(sighash_parts, timeout_tx.input[0], htlc.amount_msat / 1000, vec![0]);
1718 assert!(predicted_weight >= timeout_tx.get_weight());
1719 //TODO: track SpendableOutputDescriptor
1720 match self.our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf.entry(timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.clone()) {
1721 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
1722 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert((height_timer, TxMaterial::RemoteHTLC { script : redeemscript, key: htlc_key, preimage: None, amount: htlc.amount_msat / 1000 }, used_feerate, htlc.cltv_expiry, height)); }
1725 txn_to_broadcast.push(timeout_tx);
1730 if inputs.is_empty() { return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs); } // Nothing to be done...probably a false positive/local tx
1732 let outputs = vec!(TxOut {
1733 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1736 let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
1743 let predicted_weight = spend_tx.get_weight() + Self::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_desc[..]);
1745 let mut used_feerate;
1746 if !subtract_high_prio_fee!(self, fee_estimator, spend_tx.output[0].value, predicted_weight, tx.txid(), used_feerate) {
1747 return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs);
1750 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx);
1752 for (input, info) in spend_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(inputs_info.iter()) {
1753 let (redeemscript, htlc_key) = sign_input!(sighash_parts, input, info.1, (info.0).0.to_vec());
1754 let height_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, info.2);
1755 match self.our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf.entry(input.previous_output.clone()) {
1756 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
1757 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert((height_timer, TxMaterial::RemoteHTLC { script: redeemscript, key: htlc_key, preimage: Some(*(info.0)), amount: info.1}, used_feerate, info.2, height)); }
1760 assert!(predicted_weight >= spend_tx.get_weight());
1761 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
1762 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: spend_tx.txid(), vout: 0 },
1763 output: spend_tx.output[0].clone(),
1765 txn_to_broadcast.push(spend_tx);
1768 } else if let Some((ref to_remote_rescue, ref local_key)) = self.to_remote_rescue {
1769 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
1770 if to_remote_rescue == &outp.script_pubkey {
1771 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WPKH {
1772 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: commitment_txid, vout: idx as u32 },
1773 key: local_key.clone(),
1774 output: outp.clone(),
1780 (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs)
1783 /// Attempts to claim a remote HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout's outputs using the revocation key
1784 fn check_spend_remote_htlc(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, commitment_number: u64, height: u32, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator) -> (Option<Transaction>, Option<SpendableOutputDescriptor>) {
1785 if tx.input.len() != 1 || tx.output.len() != 1 {
1789 macro_rules! ignore_error {
1790 ( $thing : expr ) => {
1793 Err(_) => return (None, None)
1798 let secret = if let Some(secret) = self.get_secret(commitment_number) { secret } else { return (None, None); };
1799 let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secret));
1800 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
1801 let revocation_pubkey = match self.key_storage {
1802 Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
1803 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_base_key)))
1805 Storage::Watchtower { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
1806 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &revocation_base_key))
1809 let delayed_key = match self.their_delayed_payment_base_key {
1810 None => return (None, None),
1811 Some(their_delayed_payment_base_key) => ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &their_delayed_payment_base_key)),
1813 let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey, self.our_to_self_delay, &delayed_key);
1814 let revokeable_p2wsh = redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
1815 let htlc_txid = tx.txid(); //TODO: This is gonna be a performance bottleneck for watchtowers!
1817 let mut inputs = Vec::new();
1820 if tx.output[0].script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh { //HTLC transactions have one txin, one txout
1822 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
1826 script_sig: Script::new(),
1827 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
1828 witness: Vec::new(),
1830 amount = tx.output[0].value;
1833 if !inputs.is_empty() {
1834 let outputs = vec!(TxOut {
1835 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1839 let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
1845 let predicted_weight = spend_tx.get_weight() + Self::get_witnesses_weight(&[InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput]);
1846 let mut used_feerate;
1847 if !subtract_high_prio_fee!(self, fee_estimator, spend_tx.output[0].value, predicted_weight, tx.txid(), used_feerate) {
1848 return (None, None);
1851 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx);
1853 let (sig, revocation_key) = match self.key_storage {
1854 Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
1855 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash_parts.sighash_all(&spend_tx.input[0], &redeemscript, amount)[..]);
1856 let revocation_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key, &revocation_base_key));
1857 (self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &revocation_key), revocation_key)
1859 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
1863 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
1864 spend_tx.input[0].witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1865 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(vec!(1));
1866 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(redeemscript.clone().into_bytes());
1868 assert!(predicted_weight >= spend_tx.get_weight());
1869 let outpoint = BitcoinOutPoint { txid: spend_tx.txid(), vout: 0 };
1870 let output = spend_tx.output[0].clone();
1871 let height_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap() as u32); // We can safely unwrap given we are past channel opening
1872 match self.our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf.entry(spend_tx.input[0].previous_output.clone()) {
1873 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
1874 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert((height_timer, TxMaterial::Revoked { script: redeemscript, pubkey: None, key: revocation_key, is_htlc: false, amount: tx.output[0].value }, used_feerate, height + self.our_to_self_delay as u32, height)); }
1876 (Some(spend_tx), Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput { outpoint, output }))
1877 } else { (None, None) }
1880 fn broadcast_by_local_state(&self, local_tx: &LocalSignedTx, per_commitment_point: &Option<PublicKey>, delayed_payment_base_key: &Option<SecretKey>, height: u32) -> (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>, Vec<TxOut>, Vec<(BitcoinOutPoint, (u32, TxMaterial, u64, u32, u32))>) {
1881 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
1882 let mut spendable_outputs = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
1883 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
1884 let mut pending_claims = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
1886 macro_rules! add_dynamic_output {
1887 ($father_tx: expr, $vout: expr) => {
1888 if let Some(ref per_commitment_point) = *per_commitment_point {
1889 if let Some(ref delayed_payment_base_key) = *delayed_payment_base_key {
1890 if let Ok(local_delayedkey) = chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base_key) {
1891 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WSH {
1892 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: $father_tx.txid(), vout: $vout },
1893 key: local_delayedkey,
1894 witness_script: chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&local_tx.revocation_key, self.our_to_self_delay, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key),
1895 to_self_delay: self.our_to_self_delay,
1896 output: $father_tx.output[$vout as usize].clone(),
1905 let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&local_tx.revocation_key, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), &local_tx.delayed_payment_key);
1906 let revokeable_p2wsh = redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
1907 for (idx, output) in local_tx.tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
1908 if output.script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh {
1909 add_dynamic_output!(local_tx.tx, idx as u32);
1914 for &(ref htlc, ref sigs, _) in local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1915 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
1916 if let &Some((ref their_sig, ref our_sig)) = sigs {
1918 log_trace!(self, "Broadcasting HTLC-Timeout transaction against local commitment transactions");
1919 let mut htlc_timeout_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&local_tx.txid, local_tx.feerate_per_kw, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), htlc, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key, &local_tx.revocation_key);
1921 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
1923 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(their_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
1924 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1925 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
1926 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1928 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new());
1929 let htlc_script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &local_tx.a_htlc_key, &local_tx.b_htlc_key, &local_tx.revocation_key);
1930 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(htlc_script.clone().into_bytes());
1932 add_dynamic_output!(htlc_timeout_tx, 0);
1933 let height_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, htlc.cltv_expiry);
1934 pending_claims.push((htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.clone(), (height_timer, TxMaterial::LocalHTLC { script: htlc_script, sigs: (*their_sig, *our_sig), preimage: None, amount: htlc.amount_msat / 1000}, 0, htlc.cltv_expiry, height)));
1935 res.push(htlc_timeout_tx);
1937 if let Some(payment_preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
1938 log_trace!(self, "Broadcasting HTLC-Success transaction against local commitment transactions");
1939 let mut htlc_success_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&local_tx.txid, local_tx.feerate_per_kw, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), htlc, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key, &local_tx.revocation_key);
1941 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
1943 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(their_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
1944 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1945 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
1946 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1948 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(payment_preimage.0.to_vec());
1949 let htlc_script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &local_tx.a_htlc_key, &local_tx.b_htlc_key, &local_tx.revocation_key);
1950 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(htlc_script.clone().into_bytes());
1952 add_dynamic_output!(htlc_success_tx, 0);
1953 let height_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, htlc.cltv_expiry);
1954 pending_claims.push((htlc_success_tx.input[0].previous_output.clone(), (height_timer, TxMaterial::LocalHTLC { script: htlc_script, sigs: (*their_sig, *our_sig), preimage: Some(*payment_preimage), amount: htlc.amount_msat / 1000}, 0, htlc.cltv_expiry, height)));
1955 res.push(htlc_success_tx);
1958 watch_outputs.push(local_tx.tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].clone());
1959 } else { panic!("Should have sigs for non-dust local tx outputs!") }
1963 (res, spendable_outputs, watch_outputs, pending_claims)
1966 /// Attempts to claim any claimable HTLCs in a commitment transaction which was not (yet)
1967 /// revoked using data in local_claimable_outpoints.
1968 /// Should not be used if check_spend_revoked_transaction succeeds.
1969 fn check_spend_local_transaction(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32) -> (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>, (Sha256dHash, Vec<TxOut>)) {
1970 let commitment_txid = tx.txid();
1971 let mut local_txn = Vec::new();
1972 let mut spendable_outputs = Vec::new();
1973 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
1975 macro_rules! wait_threshold_conf {
1976 ($height: expr, $source: expr, $commitment_tx: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
1977 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} local commitment tx due to broadcast of transaction, waiting confirmation (at height{})", log_bytes!($payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx, height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
1978 match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry($height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
1979 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
1980 let e = entry.get_mut();
1981 e.retain(|ref event| {
1983 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
1984 return htlc_update.0 != $source
1989 e.push(OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ($source, $payment_hash)});
1991 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1992 entry.insert(vec![OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ($source, $payment_hash)}]);
1998 macro_rules! append_onchain_update {
1999 ($updates: expr) => {
2000 local_txn.append(&mut $updates.0);
2001 spendable_outputs.append(&mut $updates.1);
2002 watch_outputs.append(&mut $updates.2);
2003 for claim in $updates.3 {
2004 match self.our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf.entry(claim.0) {
2005 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
2006 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(claim.1); }
2012 // HTLCs set may differ between last and previous local commitment txn, in case of one them hitting chain, ensure we cancel all HTLCs backward
2013 let mut is_local_tx = false;
2015 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
2016 if local_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
2018 log_trace!(self, "Got latest local commitment tx broadcast, searching for available HTLCs to claim");
2019 match self.key_storage {
2020 Storage::Local { ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref latest_per_commitment_point, .. } => {
2021 append_onchain_update!(self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, latest_per_commitment_point, &Some(*delayed_payment_base_key), height));
2023 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
2024 append_onchain_update!(self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, &None, &None, height));
2029 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
2030 if local_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
2032 log_trace!(self, "Got previous local commitment tx broadcast, searching for available HTLCs to claim");
2033 match self.key_storage {
2034 Storage::Local { ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref prev_latest_per_commitment_point, .. } => {
2035 append_onchain_update!(self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, prev_latest_per_commitment_point, &Some(*delayed_payment_base_key), height));
2037 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
2038 append_onchain_update!(self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, &None, &None, height));
2044 macro_rules! fail_dust_htlcs_after_threshold_conf {
2045 ($local_tx: expr) => {
2046 for &(ref htlc, _, ref source) in &$local_tx.htlc_outputs {
2047 if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_none() {
2048 if let &Some(ref source) = source {
2049 wait_threshold_conf!(height, source.clone(), "lastest", htlc.payment_hash.clone());
2057 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
2058 fail_dust_htlcs_after_threshold_conf!(local_tx);
2060 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
2061 fail_dust_htlcs_after_threshold_conf!(local_tx);
2065 (local_txn, spendable_outputs, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs))
2068 /// Generate a spendable output event when closing_transaction get registered onchain.
2069 fn check_spend_closing_transaction(&self, tx: &Transaction) -> Option<SpendableOutputDescriptor> {
2070 if tx.input[0].sequence == 0xFFFFFFFF && !tx.input[0].witness.is_empty() && tx.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len() == 71 {
2071 match self.key_storage {
2072 Storage::Local { ref shutdown_pubkey, .. } => {
2073 let our_channel_close_key_hash = Hash160::hash(&shutdown_pubkey.serialize());
2074 let shutdown_script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&our_channel_close_key_hash[..]).into_script();
2075 for (idx, output) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
2076 if shutdown_script == output.script_pubkey {
2077 return Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
2078 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), vout: idx as u32 },
2079 output: output.clone(),
2084 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
2085 //TODO: we need to ensure an offline client will generate the event when it
2086 // comes back online after only the watchtower saw the transaction
2093 /// Used by ChannelManager deserialization to broadcast the latest local state if its copy of
2094 /// the Channel was out-of-date. You may use it to get a broadcastable local toxic tx in case of
2095 /// fallen-behind, i.e when receiving a channel_reestablish with a proof that our remote side knows
2096 /// a higher revocation secret than the local commitment number we are aware of. Broadcasting these
2097 /// transactions are UNSAFE, as they allow remote side to punish you. Nevertheless you may want to
2098 /// broadcast them if remote don't close channel with his higher commitment transaction after a
2099 /// substantial amount of time (a month or even a year) to get back funds. Best may be to contact
2100 /// out-of-band the other node operator to coordinate with him if option is available to you.
2101 /// In any-case, choice is up to the user.
2102 pub fn get_latest_local_commitment_txn(&self) -> Vec<Transaction> {
2103 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
2104 let mut res = vec![local_tx.tx.clone()];
2105 match self.key_storage {
2106 Storage::Local { ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref prev_latest_per_commitment_point, .. } => {
2107 res.append(&mut self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, prev_latest_per_commitment_point, &Some(*delayed_payment_base_key), 0).0);
2108 // We throw away the generated waiting_first_conf data as we aren't (yet) confirmed and we don't actually know what the caller wants to do.
2109 // The data will be re-generated and tracked in check_spend_local_transaction if we get a confirmation.
2111 _ => panic!("Can only broadcast by local channelmonitor"),
2119 fn block_connected(&mut self, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], height: u32, block_hash: &Sha256dHash, broadcaster: &BroadcasterInterface, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator)-> (Vec<(Sha256dHash, Vec<TxOut>)>, Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>, Vec<(HTLCSource, Option<PaymentPreimage>, PaymentHash)>) {
2120 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
2121 let mut spendable_outputs = Vec::new();
2122 let mut htlc_updated = Vec::new();
2123 for tx in txn_matched {
2124 if tx.input.len() == 1 {
2125 // Assuming our keys were not leaked (in which case we're screwed no matter what),
2126 // commitment transactions and HTLC transactions will all only ever have one input,
2127 // which is an easy way to filter out any potential non-matching txn for lazy
2129 let prevout = &tx.input[0].previous_output;
2130 let mut txn: Vec<Transaction> = Vec::new();
2131 let funding_txo = match self.key_storage {
2132 Storage::Local { ref funding_info, .. } => {
2133 funding_info.clone()
2135 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
2139 if funding_txo.is_none() || (prevout.txid == funding_txo.as_ref().unwrap().0.txid && prevout.vout == funding_txo.as_ref().unwrap().0.index as u32) {
2140 if (tx.input[0].sequence >> 8*3) as u8 == 0x80 && (tx.lock_time >> 8*3) as u8 == 0x20 {
2141 let (remote_txn, new_outputs, mut spendable_output) = self.check_spend_remote_transaction(tx, height, fee_estimator);
2143 spendable_outputs.append(&mut spendable_output);
2144 if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() {
2145 watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
2148 let (local_txn, mut spendable_output, new_outputs) = self.check_spend_local_transaction(tx, height);
2149 spendable_outputs.append(&mut spendable_output);
2151 if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() {
2152 watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
2156 if !funding_txo.is_none() && txn.is_empty() {
2157 if let Some(spendable_output) = self.check_spend_closing_transaction(tx) {
2158 spendable_outputs.push(spendable_output);
2162 if let Some(&(commitment_number, _)) = self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.get(&prevout.txid) {
2163 let (tx, spendable_output) = self.check_spend_remote_htlc(tx, commitment_number, height, fee_estimator);
2164 if let Some(tx) = tx {
2167 if let Some(spendable_output) = spendable_output {
2168 spendable_outputs.push(spendable_output);
2172 for tx in txn.iter() {
2173 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(tx);
2176 // While all commitment/HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions have one input, HTLCs
2177 // can also be resolved in a few other ways which can have more than one output. Thus,
2178 // we call is_resolving_htlc_output here outside of the tx.input.len() == 1 check.
2179 let mut updated = self.is_resolving_htlc_output(tx, height);
2180 if updated.len() > 0 {
2181 htlc_updated.append(&mut updated);
2183 for inp in &tx.input {
2184 if self.our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf.contains_key(&inp.previous_output) {
2185 match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
2186 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
2187 let e = entry.get_mut();
2188 e.retain(|ref event| {
2190 OnchainEvent::Claim { outpoint } => {
2191 return outpoint != inp.previous_output
2196 e.push(OnchainEvent::Claim { outpoint: inp.previous_output.clone()});
2198 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2199 entry.insert(vec![OnchainEvent::Claim { outpoint: inp.previous_output.clone()}]);
2205 let mut pending_claims = Vec::new();
2206 if let Some(ref cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
2207 if self.would_broadcast_at_height(height) {
2208 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&cur_local_tx.tx);
2209 match self.key_storage {
2210 Storage::Local { ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref latest_per_commitment_point, .. } => {
2211 let (txs, mut spendable_output, new_outputs, mut pending_txn) = self.broadcast_by_local_state(&cur_local_tx, latest_per_commitment_point, &Some(*delayed_payment_base_key), height);
2212 spendable_outputs.append(&mut spendable_output);
2213 pending_claims.append(&mut pending_txn);
2214 if !new_outputs.is_empty() {
2215 watch_outputs.push((cur_local_tx.txid.clone(), new_outputs));
2218 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
2221 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
2222 let (txs, mut spendable_output, new_outputs, mut pending_txn) = self.broadcast_by_local_state(&cur_local_tx, &None, &None, height);
2223 spendable_outputs.append(&mut spendable_output);
2224 pending_claims.append(&mut pending_txn);
2225 if !new_outputs.is_empty() {
2226 watch_outputs.push((cur_local_tx.txid.clone(), new_outputs));
2229 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
2235 for claim in pending_claims {
2236 match self.our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf.entry(claim.0) {
2237 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
2238 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(claim.1); }
2241 if let Some(events) = self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.remove(&height) {
2244 OnchainEvent::Claim { outpoint } => {
2245 self.our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf.remove(&outpoint);
2247 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update } => {
2248 log_trace!(self, "HTLC {} failure update has got enough confirmations to be passed upstream", log_bytes!((htlc_update.1).0));
2249 htlc_updated.push((htlc_update.0, None, htlc_update.1));
2254 //TODO: iter on buffered TxMaterial in our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf, if block timer is expired generate a bumped claim tx (RBF or CPFP accordingly)
2255 self.last_block_hash = block_hash.clone();
2256 (watch_outputs, spendable_outputs, htlc_updated)
2259 fn block_disconnected(&mut self, height: u32, block_hash: &Sha256dHash) {
2260 if let Some(_) = self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.remove(&(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1)) {
2262 //- htlc update there as failure-trigger tx (revoked commitment tx, non-revoked commitment tx, HTLC-timeout tx) has been disconnected
2263 //- our claim tx on a commitment tx output
2265 self.our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf.retain(|_, ref mut v| if v.3 == height { false } else { true });
2266 self.last_block_hash = block_hash.clone();
2269 pub(super) fn would_broadcast_at_height(&self, height: u32) -> bool {
2270 // We need to consider all HTLCs which are:
2271 // * in any unrevoked remote commitment transaction, as they could broadcast said
2272 // transactions and we'd end up in a race, or
2273 // * are in our latest local commitment transaction, as this is the thing we will
2274 // broadcast if we go on-chain.
2275 // Note that we consider HTLCs which were below dust threshold here - while they don't
2276 // strictly imply that we need to fail the channel, we need to go ahead and fail them back
2277 // to the source, and if we don't fail the channel we will have to ensure that the next
2278 // updates that peer sends us are update_fails, failing the channel if not. It's probably
2279 // easier to just fail the channel as this case should be rare enough anyway.
2280 macro_rules! scan_commitment {
2281 ($htlcs: expr, $local_tx: expr) => {
2282 for ref htlc in $htlcs {
2283 // For inbound HTLCs which we know the preimage for, we have to ensure we hit the
2284 // chain with enough room to claim the HTLC without our counterparty being able to
2285 // time out the HTLC first.
2286 // For outbound HTLCs which our counterparty hasn't failed/claimed, our primary
2287 // concern is being able to claim the corresponding inbound HTLC (on another
2288 // channel) before it expires. In fact, we don't even really care if our
2289 // counterparty here claims such an outbound HTLC after it expired as long as we
2290 // can still claim the corresponding HTLC. Thus, to avoid needlessly hitting the
2291 // chain when our counterparty is waiting for expiration to off-chain fail an HTLC
2292 // we give ourselves a few blocks of headroom after expiration before going
2293 // on-chain for an expired HTLC.
2294 // Note that, to avoid a potential attack whereby a node delays claiming an HTLC
2295 // from us until we've reached the point where we go on-chain with the
2296 // corresponding inbound HTLC, we must ensure that outbound HTLCs go on chain at
2297 // least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER blocks prior to the inbound HTLC.
2298 // aka outbound_cltv + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS == height - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
2299 // inbound_cltv == height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
2300 // outbound_cltv + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= inbound_cltv - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
2301 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= inbound_cltv - outbound_cltv
2302 // CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA <= inbound_cltv - outbound_cltv (by check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion)
2303 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA
2304 // The final, above, condition is checked for statically in channelmanager
2305 // with CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2.
2306 let htlc_outbound = $local_tx == htlc.offered;
2307 if ( htlc_outbound && htlc.cltv_expiry + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS <= height) ||
2308 (!htlc_outbound && htlc.cltv_expiry <= height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER && self.payment_preimages.contains_key(&htlc.payment_hash)) {
2309 log_info!(self, "Force-closing channel due to {} HTLC timeout, HTLC expiry is {}", if htlc_outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound "}, htlc.cltv_expiry);
2316 if let Some(ref cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
2317 scan_commitment!(cur_local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, _)| a), true);
2320 if let Storage::Local { ref current_remote_commitment_txid, ref prev_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage {
2321 if let &Some(ref txid) = current_remote_commitment_txid {
2322 if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(txid) {
2323 scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _)| a), false);
2326 if let &Some(ref txid) = prev_remote_commitment_txid {
2327 if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(txid) {
2328 scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _)| a), false);
2336 /// Check if any transaction broadcasted is resolving HTLC output by a success or timeout on a local
2337 /// or remote commitment tx, if so send back the source, preimage if found and payment_hash of resolved HTLC
2338 fn is_resolving_htlc_output(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32) -> Vec<(HTLCSource, Option<PaymentPreimage>, PaymentHash)> {
2339 let mut htlc_updated = Vec::new();
2341 'outer_loop: for input in &tx.input {
2342 let mut payment_data = None;
2343 let revocation_sig_claim = (input.witness.len() == 3 && input.witness[2].len() == OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT && input.witness[1].len() == 33)
2344 || (input.witness.len() == 3 && input.witness[2].len() == ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT && input.witness[1].len() == 33);
2345 let accepted_preimage_claim = input.witness.len() == 5 && input.witness[4].len() == ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT;
2346 let offered_preimage_claim = input.witness.len() == 3 && input.witness[2].len() == OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT;
2348 macro_rules! log_claim {
2349 ($tx_info: expr, $local_tx: expr, $htlc: expr, $source_avail: expr) => {
2350 // We found the output in question, but aren't failing it backwards
2351 // as we have no corresponding source and no valid remote commitment txid
2352 // to try a weak source binding with same-hash, same-value still-valid offered HTLC.
2353 // This implies either it is an inbound HTLC or an outbound HTLC on a revoked transaction.
2354 let outbound_htlc = $local_tx == $htlc.offered;
2355 if ($local_tx && revocation_sig_claim) ||
2356 (outbound_htlc && !$source_avail && (accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim)) {
2357 log_error!(self, "Input spending {} ({}:{}) in {} resolves {} HTLC with payment hash {} with {}!",
2358 $tx_info, input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, tx.txid(),
2359 if outbound_htlc { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0),
2360 if revocation_sig_claim { "revocation sig" } else { "preimage claim after we'd passed the HTLC resolution back" });
2362 log_info!(self, "Input spending {} ({}:{}) in {} resolves {} HTLC with payment hash {} with {}",
2363 $tx_info, input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, tx.txid(),
2364 if outbound_htlc { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0),
2365 if revocation_sig_claim { "revocation sig" } else if accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim { "preimage" } else { "timeout" });
2370 macro_rules! check_htlc_valid_remote {
2371 ($remote_txid: expr, $htlc_output: expr) => {
2372 if let &Some(txid) = $remote_txid {
2373 for &(ref pending_htlc, ref pending_source) in self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(&txid).unwrap() {
2374 if pending_htlc.payment_hash == $htlc_output.payment_hash && pending_htlc.amount_msat == $htlc_output.amount_msat {
2375 if let &Some(ref source) = pending_source {
2376 log_claim!("revoked remote commitment tx", false, pending_htlc, true);
2377 payment_data = Some(((**source).clone(), $htlc_output.payment_hash));
2386 macro_rules! scan_commitment {
2387 ($htlcs: expr, $tx_info: expr, $local_tx: expr) => {
2388 for (ref htlc_output, source_option) in $htlcs {
2389 if Some(input.previous_output.vout) == htlc_output.transaction_output_index {
2390 if let Some(ref source) = source_option {
2391 log_claim!($tx_info, $local_tx, htlc_output, true);
2392 // We have a resolution of an HTLC either from one of our latest
2393 // local commitment transactions or an unrevoked remote commitment
2394 // transaction. This implies we either learned a preimage, the HTLC
2395 // has timed out, or we screwed up. In any case, we should now
2396 // resolve the source HTLC with the original sender.
2397 payment_data = Some(((*source).clone(), htlc_output.payment_hash));
2398 } else if !$local_tx {
2399 if let Storage::Local { ref current_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage {
2400 check_htlc_valid_remote!(current_remote_commitment_txid, htlc_output);
2402 if payment_data.is_none() {
2403 if let Storage::Local { ref prev_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage {
2404 check_htlc_valid_remote!(prev_remote_commitment_txid, htlc_output);
2408 if payment_data.is_none() {
2409 log_claim!($tx_info, $local_tx, htlc_output, false);
2410 continue 'outer_loop;
2417 if let Some(ref current_local_signed_commitment_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
2418 if input.previous_output.txid == current_local_signed_commitment_tx.txid {
2419 scan_commitment!(current_local_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, ref b)| (a, b.as_ref())),
2420 "our latest local commitment tx", true);
2423 if let Some(ref prev_local_signed_commitment_tx) = self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
2424 if input.previous_output.txid == prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.txid {
2425 scan_commitment!(prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, ref b)| (a, b.as_ref())),
2426 "our previous local commitment tx", true);
2429 if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(&input.previous_output.txid) {
2430 scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, ref b)| (a, (b.as_ref().clone()).map(|boxed| &**boxed))),
2431 "remote commitment tx", false);
2434 // Check that scan_commitment, above, decided there is some source worth relaying an
2435 // HTLC resolution backwards to and figure out whether we learned a preimage from it.
2436 if let Some((source, payment_hash)) = payment_data {
2437 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
2438 if accepted_preimage_claim {
2439 payment_preimage.0.copy_from_slice(&input.witness[3]);
2440 htlc_updated.push((source, Some(payment_preimage), payment_hash));
2441 } else if offered_preimage_claim {
2442 payment_preimage.0.copy_from_slice(&input.witness[1]);
2443 htlc_updated.push((source, Some(payment_preimage), payment_hash));
2445 log_info!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} timeout by a spend tx, waiting for confirmation (at height{})", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2446 match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
2447 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
2448 let e = entry.get_mut();
2449 e.retain(|ref event| {
2451 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
2452 return htlc_update.0 != source
2457 e.push(OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: (source, payment_hash)});
2459 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2460 entry.insert(vec![OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: (source, payment_hash)}]);
2470 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
2472 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> ReadableArgs<R, Arc<Logger>> for (Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor) {
2473 fn read(reader: &mut R, logger: Arc<Logger>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
2474 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2475 macro_rules! unwrap_obj {
2479 Err(_) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2484 let _ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2485 let min_ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2486 if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION {
2487 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion);
2490 let commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor = <U48 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.0;
2492 let key_storage = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2494 let revocation_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
2495 let htlc_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
2496 let delayed_payment_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
2497 let payment_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
2498 let shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
2499 let prev_latest_per_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
2500 let latest_per_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
2501 // Technically this can fail and serialize fail a round-trip, but only for serialization of
2502 // barely-init'd ChannelMonitors that we can't do anything with.
2503 let outpoint = OutPoint {
2504 txid: Readable::read(reader)?,
2505 index: Readable::read(reader)?,
2507 let funding_info = Some((outpoint, Readable::read(reader)?));
2508 let current_remote_commitment_txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
2509 let prev_remote_commitment_txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
2511 revocation_base_key,
2513 delayed_payment_base_key,
2516 prev_latest_per_commitment_point,
2517 latest_per_commitment_point,
2519 current_remote_commitment_txid,
2520 prev_remote_commitment_txid,
2523 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2526 let their_htlc_base_key = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
2527 let their_delayed_payment_base_key = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
2529 let their_cur_revocation_points = {
2530 let first_idx = <U48 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.0;
2534 let first_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
2535 let second_point_slice: [u8; 33] = Readable::read(reader)?;
2536 if second_point_slice[0..32] == [0; 32] && second_point_slice[32] == 0 {
2537 Some((first_idx, first_point, None))
2539 Some((first_idx, first_point, Some(unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&second_point_slice)))))
2544 let our_to_self_delay: u16 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2545 let their_to_self_delay: Option<u16> = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
2547 let mut old_secrets = [([0; 32], 1 << 48); 49];
2548 for &mut (ref mut secret, ref mut idx) in old_secrets.iter_mut() {
2549 *secret = Readable::read(reader)?;
2550 *idx = Readable::read(reader)?;
2553 macro_rules! read_htlc_in_commitment {
2556 let offered: bool = Readable::read(reader)?;
2557 let amount_msat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2558 let cltv_expiry: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2559 let payment_hash: PaymentHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
2560 let transaction_output_index: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
2562 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
2563 offered, amount_msat, cltv_expiry, payment_hash, transaction_output_index
2569 let remote_claimable_outpoints_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2570 let mut remote_claimable_outpoints = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(remote_claimable_outpoints_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 64));
2571 for _ in 0..remote_claimable_outpoints_len {
2572 let txid: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
2573 let htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2574 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlcs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
2575 for _ in 0..htlcs_count {
2576 htlcs.push((read_htlc_in_commitment!(), <Option<HTLCSource> as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.map(|o: HTLCSource| Box::new(o))));
2578 if let Some(_) = remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, htlcs) {
2579 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
2583 let remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2584 let mut remote_commitment_txn_on_chain = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
2585 for _ in 0..remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len {
2586 let txid: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
2587 let commitment_number = <U48 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.0;
2588 let outputs_count = <u64 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?;
2589 let mut outputs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 8));
2590 for _ in 0..outputs_count {
2591 outputs.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
2593 if let Some(_) = remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(txid, (commitment_number, outputs)) {
2594 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
2598 let remote_hash_commitment_number_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2599 let mut remote_hash_commitment_number = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(remote_hash_commitment_number_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
2600 for _ in 0..remote_hash_commitment_number_len {
2601 let payment_hash: PaymentHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
2602 let commitment_number = <U48 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.0;
2603 if let Some(_) = remote_hash_commitment_number.insert(payment_hash, commitment_number) {
2604 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
2608 macro_rules! read_local_tx {
2611 let tx = match Transaction::consensus_decode(reader.by_ref()) {
2614 encode::Error::Io(ioe) => return Err(DecodeError::Io(ioe)),
2615 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2619 if tx.input.is_empty() {
2620 // Ensure tx didn't hit the 0-input ambiguity case.
2621 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
2624 let revocation_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
2625 let a_htlc_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
2626 let b_htlc_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
2627 let delayed_payment_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
2628 let feerate_per_kw: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2630 let htlcs_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2631 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlcs_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
2632 for _ in 0..htlcs_len {
2633 let htlc = read_htlc_in_commitment!();
2634 let sigs = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2636 1 => Some((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?)),
2637 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2639 htlcs.push((htlc, sigs, Readable::read(reader)?));
2644 tx, revocation_key, a_htlc_key, b_htlc_key, delayed_payment_key, feerate_per_kw,
2651 let prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2654 Some(read_local_tx!())
2656 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2659 let current_local_signed_commitment_tx = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2662 Some(read_local_tx!())
2664 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2667 let current_remote_commitment_number = <U48 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.0;
2669 let payment_preimages_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2670 let mut payment_preimages = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(payment_preimages_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
2671 for _ in 0..payment_preimages_len {
2672 let preimage: PaymentPreimage = Readable::read(reader)?;
2673 let hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
2674 if let Some(_) = payment_preimages.insert(hash, preimage) {
2675 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
2679 let last_block_hash: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
2680 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
2681 let to_remote_rescue = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2684 let to_remote_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
2685 let local_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
2686 Some((to_remote_script, local_key))
2688 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2691 let our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2692 let mut our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
2693 for _ in 0..our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf_len {
2694 let outpoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
2695 let height_target = Readable::read(reader)?;
2696 let tx_material = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2698 let script = Readable::read(reader)?;
2699 let pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
2700 let key = Readable::read(reader)?;
2701 let is_htlc = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2704 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2706 let amount = Readable::read(reader)?;
2707 TxMaterial::Revoked {
2716 let script = Readable::read(reader)?;
2717 let key = Readable::read(reader)?;
2718 let preimage = Readable::read(reader)?;
2719 let amount = Readable::read(reader)?;
2720 TxMaterial::RemoteHTLC {
2728 let script = Readable::read(reader)?;
2729 let their_sig = Readable::read(reader)?;
2730 let our_sig = Readable::read(reader)?;
2731 let preimage = Readable::read(reader)?;
2732 let amount = Readable::read(reader)?;
2733 TxMaterial::LocalHTLC {
2735 sigs: (their_sig, our_sig),
2740 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2742 let last_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
2743 let timelock_expiration = Readable::read(reader)?;
2744 let height = Readable::read(reader)?;
2745 our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf.insert(outpoint, (height_target, tx_material, last_fee, timelock_expiration, height));
2748 let waiting_threshold_conf_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2749 let mut onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(waiting_threshold_conf_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
2750 for _ in 0..waiting_threshold_conf_len {
2751 let height_target = Readable::read(reader)?;
2752 let events_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2753 let mut events = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(events_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
2754 for _ in 0..events_len {
2755 let ev = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2757 let outpoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
2758 OnchainEvent::Claim {
2763 let htlc_source = Readable::read(reader)?;
2764 let hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
2765 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate {
2766 htlc_update: (htlc_source, hash)
2769 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2773 onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.insert(height_target, events);
2776 Ok((last_block_hash.clone(), ChannelMonitor {
2777 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor,
2780 their_htlc_base_key,
2781 their_delayed_payment_base_key,
2782 their_cur_revocation_points,
2785 their_to_self_delay,
2788 remote_claimable_outpoints,
2789 remote_commitment_txn_on_chain,
2790 remote_hash_commitment_number,
2792 prev_local_signed_commitment_tx,
2793 current_local_signed_commitment_tx,
2794 current_remote_commitment_number,
2801 our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf,
2803 onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf,
2815 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
2816 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
2817 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxIn, TxOut, SigHashType};
2818 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
2819 use bitcoin::util::bip143;
2820 use bitcoin_hashes::Hash;
2821 use bitcoin_hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
2822 use bitcoin_hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
2823 use bitcoin_hashes::hex::FromHex;
2825 use ln::channelmanager::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
2826 use ln::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, InputDescriptors};
2828 use ln::chan_utils::{HTLCOutputInCommitment, TxCreationKeys};
2829 use util::test_utils::TestLogger;
2830 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
2831 use secp256k1::Secp256k1;
2832 use rand::{thread_rng,Rng};
2836 fn test_per_commitment_storage() {
2837 // Test vectors from BOLT 3:
2838 let mut secrets: Vec<[u8; 32]> = Vec::new();
2839 let mut monitor: ChannelMonitor;
2840 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2841 let logger = Arc::new(TestLogger::new());
2843 macro_rules! test_secrets {
2845 let mut idx = 281474976710655;
2846 for secret in secrets.iter() {
2847 assert_eq!(monitor.get_secret(idx).unwrap(), *secret);
2850 assert_eq!(monitor.get_min_seen_secret(), idx + 1);
2851 assert!(monitor.get_secret(idx).is_none());
2856 // insert_secret correct sequence
2857 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
2860 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2861 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
2862 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2865 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2866 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
2867 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2870 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2871 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
2872 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2875 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2876 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
2877 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2880 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2881 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
2882 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2885 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2886 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
2887 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2890 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2891 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
2892 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2895 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2896 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
2897 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2902 // insert_secret #1 incorrect
2903 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
2906 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2907 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
2908 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2911 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2912 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
2913 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
2914 "Previous secret did not match new one");
2918 // insert_secret #2 incorrect (#1 derived from incorrect)
2919 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
2922 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2923 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
2924 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2927 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2928 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("dddc3a8d14fddf2b68fa8c7fbad2748274937479dd0f8930d5ebb4ab6bd866a3").unwrap());
2929 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2932 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2933 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
2934 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2937 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2938 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
2939 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
2940 "Previous secret did not match new one");
2944 // insert_secret #3 incorrect
2945 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
2948 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2949 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
2950 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2953 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2954 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
2955 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2958 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2959 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c51a18b13e8527e579ec56365482c62f180b7d5760b46e9477dae59e87ed423a").unwrap());
2960 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2963 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2964 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
2965 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
2966 "Previous secret did not match new one");
2970 // insert_secret #4 incorrect (1,2,3 derived from incorrect)
2971 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
2974 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2975 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
2976 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2979 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2980 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("dddc3a8d14fddf2b68fa8c7fbad2748274937479dd0f8930d5ebb4ab6bd866a3").unwrap());
2981 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2984 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2985 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c51a18b13e8527e579ec56365482c62f180b7d5760b46e9477dae59e87ed423a").unwrap());
2986 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2989 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2990 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("ba65d7b0ef55a3ba300d4e87af29868f394f8f138d78a7011669c79b37b936f4").unwrap());
2991 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2994 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2995 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
2996 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2999 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3000 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
3001 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3004 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3005 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
3006 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3009 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3010 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
3011 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
3012 "Previous secret did not match new one");
3016 // insert_secret #5 incorrect
3017 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
3020 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3021 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
3022 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3025 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3026 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
3027 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3030 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3031 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
3032 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3035 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3036 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
3037 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3040 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3041 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("631373ad5f9ef654bb3dade742d09504c567edd24320d2fcd68e3cc47e2ff6a6").unwrap());
3042 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3045 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3046 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
3047 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
3048 "Previous secret did not match new one");
3052 // insert_secret #6 incorrect (5 derived from incorrect)
3053 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
3056 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3057 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
3058 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3061 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3062 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
3063 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3066 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3067 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
3068 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3071 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3072 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
3073 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3076 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3077 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("631373ad5f9ef654bb3dade742d09504c567edd24320d2fcd68e3cc47e2ff6a6").unwrap());
3078 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3081 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3082 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("b7e76a83668bde38b373970155c868a653304308f9896692f904a23731224bb1").unwrap());
3083 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3086 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3087 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
3088 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3091 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3092 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
3093 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
3094 "Previous secret did not match new one");
3098 // insert_secret #7 incorrect
3099 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
3102 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3103 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
3104 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3107 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3108 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
3109 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3112 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3113 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
3114 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3117 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3118 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
3119 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3122 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3123 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
3124 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3127 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3128 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
3129 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3132 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3133 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("e7971de736e01da8ed58b94c2fc216cb1dca9e326f3a96e7194fe8ea8af6c0a3").unwrap());
3134 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3137 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3138 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
3139 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
3140 "Previous secret did not match new one");
3144 // insert_secret #8 incorrect
3145 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
3148 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3149 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
3150 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3153 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3154 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
3155 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3158 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3159 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
3160 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3163 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3164 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
3165 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3168 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3169 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
3170 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3173 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3174 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
3175 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3178 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3179 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
3180 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3183 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3184 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a7efbc61aac46d34f77778bac22c8a20c6a46ca460addc49009bda875ec88fa4").unwrap());
3185 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
3186 "Previous secret did not match new one");
3191 fn test_prune_preimages() {
3192 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3193 let logger = Arc::new(TestLogger::new());
3195 let dummy_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
3196 macro_rules! dummy_keys {
3200 per_commitment_point: dummy_key.clone(),
3201 revocation_key: dummy_key.clone(),
3202 a_htlc_key: dummy_key.clone(),
3203 b_htlc_key: dummy_key.clone(),
3204 a_delayed_payment_key: dummy_key.clone(),
3205 b_payment_key: dummy_key.clone(),
3210 let dummy_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
3212 let mut preimages = Vec::new();
3214 let mut rng = thread_rng();
3216 let mut preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
3217 rng.fill_bytes(&mut preimage.0[..]);
3218 let hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
3219 preimages.push((preimage, hash));
3223 macro_rules! preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs {
3224 ($preimages_slice: expr) => {
3226 let mut res = Vec::new();
3227 for (idx, preimage) in $preimages_slice.iter().enumerate() {
3228 res.push((HTLCOutputInCommitment {
3232 payment_hash: preimage.1.clone(),
3233 transaction_output_index: Some(idx as u32),
3240 macro_rules! preimages_to_local_htlcs {
3241 ($preimages_slice: expr) => {
3243 let mut inp = preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!($preimages_slice);
3244 let res: Vec<_> = inp.drain(..).map(|e| { (e.0, None, e.1) }).collect();
3250 macro_rules! test_preimages_exist {
3251 ($preimages_slice: expr, $monitor: expr) => {
3252 for preimage in $preimages_slice {
3253 assert!($monitor.payment_preimages.contains_key(&preimage.1));
3258 // Prune with one old state and a local commitment tx holding a few overlaps with the
3260 let mut monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
3261 monitor.set_their_to_self_delay(10);
3263 monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(dummy_tx.clone(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..10]));
3264 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[5..15]), 281474976710655, dummy_key);
3265 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[15..20]), 281474976710654, dummy_key);
3266 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[17..20]), 281474976710653, dummy_key);
3267 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[18..20]), 281474976710652, dummy_key);
3268 for &(ref preimage, ref hash) in preimages.iter() {
3269 monitor.provide_payment_preimage(hash, preimage);
3272 // Now provide a secret, pruning preimages 10-15
3273 let mut secret = [0; 32];
3274 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
3275 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secret.clone()).unwrap();
3276 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 15);
3277 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
3278 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[15..20], monitor);
3280 // Now provide a further secret, pruning preimages 15-17
3281 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
3282 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secret.clone()).unwrap();
3283 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 13);
3284 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
3285 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[17..20], monitor);
3287 // Now update local commitment tx info, pruning only element 18 as we still care about the
3288 // previous commitment tx's preimages too
3289 monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(dummy_tx.clone(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..5]));
3290 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
3291 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secret.clone()).unwrap();
3292 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 12);
3293 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
3294 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[18..20], monitor);
3296 // But if we do it again, we'll prune 5-10
3297 monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(dummy_tx.clone(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..3]));
3298 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
3299 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secret.clone()).unwrap();
3300 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 5);
3301 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..5], monitor);
3305 fn test_claim_txn_weight_computation() {
3306 // We test Claim txn weight, knowing that we want expected weigth and
3307 // not actual case to avoid sigs and time-lock delays hell variances.
3309 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3310 let privkey = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
3311 let pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &privkey);
3312 let mut sum_actual_sigs = 0;
3314 macro_rules! sign_input {
3315 ($sighash_parts: expr, $input: expr, $idx: expr, $amount: expr, $input_type: expr, $sum_actual_sigs: expr) => {
3316 let htlc = HTLCOutputInCommitment {
3317 offered: if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC || *$input_type == InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC { true } else { false },
3319 cltv_expiry: 2 << 16,
3320 payment_hash: PaymentHash([1; 32]),
3321 transaction_output_index: Some($idx),
3323 let redeem_script = if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput { chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&pubkey, 256, &pubkey) } else { chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, &pubkey, &pubkey, &pubkey) };
3324 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&$sighash_parts.sighash_all(&$input, &redeem_script, $amount)[..]);
3325 let sig = secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &privkey);
3326 $input.witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
3327 $input.witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
3328 sum_actual_sigs += $input.witness[0].len();
3329 if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput {
3330 $input.witness.push(vec!(1));
3331 } else if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC || *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC {
3332 $input.witness.push(pubkey.clone().serialize().to_vec());
3333 } else if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC {
3334 $input.witness.push(vec![0]);
3336 $input.witness.push(PaymentPreimage([1; 32]).0.to_vec());
3338 $input.witness.push(redeem_script.into_bytes());
3339 println!("witness[0] {}", $input.witness[0].len());
3340 println!("witness[1] {}", $input.witness[1].len());
3341 println!("witness[2] {}", $input.witness[2].len());
3345 let script_pubkey = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script();
3346 let txid = Sha256dHash::from_hex("56944c5d3f98413ef45cf54545538103cc9f298e0575820ad3591376e2e0f65d").unwrap();
3348 // Justice tx with 1 to_local, 2 revoked offered HTLCs, 1 revoked received HTLCs
3349 let mut claim_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
3351 claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
3352 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
3356 script_sig: Script::new(),
3357 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
3358 witness: Vec::new(),
3361 claim_tx.output.push(TxOut {
3362 script_pubkey: script_pubkey.clone(),
3365 let base_weight = claim_tx.get_weight();
3366 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&claim_tx);
3367 let inputs_des = vec![InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput, InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC, InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC, InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC];
3368 for (idx, inp) in claim_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(inputs_des.iter()).enumerate() {
3369 sign_input!(sighash_parts, inp.0, idx as u32, 0, inp.1, sum_actual_sigs);
3371 assert_eq!(base_weight + ChannelMonitor::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_des[..]), claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_sig */ (73 * inputs_des.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
3373 // Claim tx with 1 offered HTLCs, 3 received HTLCs
3374 claim_tx.input.clear();
3375 sum_actual_sigs = 0;
3377 claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
3378 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
3382 script_sig: Script::new(),
3383 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
3384 witness: Vec::new(),
3387 let base_weight = claim_tx.get_weight();
3388 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&claim_tx);
3389 let inputs_des = vec![InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC, InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC, InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC, InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC];
3390 for (idx, inp) in claim_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(inputs_des.iter()).enumerate() {
3391 sign_input!(sighash_parts, inp.0, idx as u32, 0, inp.1, sum_actual_sigs);
3393 assert_eq!(base_weight + ChannelMonitor::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_des[..]), claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_sig */ (73 * inputs_des.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
3395 // Justice tx with 1 revoked HTLC-Success tx output
3396 claim_tx.input.clear();
3397 sum_actual_sigs = 0;
3398 claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
3399 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
3403 script_sig: Script::new(),
3404 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
3405 witness: Vec::new(),
3407 let base_weight = claim_tx.get_weight();
3408 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&claim_tx);
3409 let inputs_des = vec![InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput];
3410 for (idx, inp) in claim_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(inputs_des.iter()).enumerate() {
3411 sign_input!(sighash_parts, inp.0, idx as u32, 0, inp.1, sum_actual_sigs);
3413 assert_eq!(base_weight + ChannelMonitor::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_des[..]), claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_isg */ (73 * inputs_des.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
3416 // Further testing is done in the ChannelManager integration tests.