1 //! The logic to monitor for on-chain transactions and create the relevant claim responses lives
3 //! ChannelMonitor objects are generated by ChannelManager in response to relevant
4 //! messages/actions, and MUST be persisted to disk (and, preferably, remotely) before progress can
5 //! be made in responding to certain messages, see ManyChannelMonitor for more.
6 //! Note that ChannelMonitors are an important part of the lightning trust model and a copy of the
7 //! latest ChannelMonitor must always be actively monitoring for chain updates (and no out-of-date
8 //! ChannelMonitors should do so). Thus, if you're building rust-lightning into an HSM or other
9 //! security-domain-separated system design, you should consider having multiple paths for
10 //! ChannelMonitors to get out of the HSM and onto monitoring devices.
12 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
13 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxIn,TxOut,SigHashType,Transaction};
14 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
15 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Script;
16 use bitcoin::network::serialize;
17 use bitcoin::util::hash::Sha256dHash;
18 use bitcoin::util::bip143;
20 use crypto::digest::Digest;
22 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Message,Signature};
23 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
26 use ln::msgs::{DecodeError, HandleError};
28 use ln::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment;
29 use chain::chaininterface::{ChainListener, ChainWatchInterface, BroadcasterInterface};
30 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
31 use util::ser::{Readable, Writer};
32 use util::sha2::Sha256;
35 use std::collections::HashMap;
36 use std::sync::{Arc,Mutex};
39 /// An error enum representing a failure to persist a channel monitor update.
40 pub enum ChannelMonitorUpdateErr {
41 /// Used to indicate a temporary failure (eg connection to a watchtower failed, but is expected
42 /// to succeed at some point in the future).
43 /// Such a failure will "freeze" a channel, preventing us from revoking old states or
44 /// submitting new commitment transactions to the remote party.
45 /// ChannelManager::test_restore_channel_monitor can be used to retry the update(s) and restore
46 /// the channel to an operational state.
48 /// Used to indicate no further channel monitor updates will be allowed (eg we've moved on to a
49 /// different watchtower and cannot update with all watchtowers that were previously informed
50 /// of this channel). This will force-close the channel in question.
54 /// Simple trait indicating ability to track a set of ChannelMonitors and multiplex events between
55 /// them. Generally should be implemented by keeping a local SimpleManyChannelMonitor and passing
56 /// events to it, while also taking any add_update_monitor events and passing them to some remote
58 /// Note that any updates to a channel's monitor *must* be applied to each instance of the
59 /// channel's monitor everywhere (including remote watchtowers) *before* this function returns. If
60 /// an update occurs and a remote watchtower is left with old state, it may broadcast transactions
61 /// which we have revoked, allowing our counterparty to claim all funds in the channel!
62 pub trait ManyChannelMonitor: Send + Sync {
63 /// Adds or updates a monitor for the given `funding_txo`.
64 /// Implementor must also ensure that the funding_txo outpoint is registered with any relevant
65 /// ChainWatchInterfaces such that the provided monitor receives block_connected callbacks with
67 fn add_update_monitor(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr>;
70 /// A simple implementation of a ManyChannelMonitor and ChainListener. Can be used to create a
71 /// watchtower or watch our own channels.
72 /// Note that you must provide your own key by which to refer to channels.
73 /// If you're accepting remote monitors (ie are implementing a watchtower), you must verify that
74 /// users cannot overwrite a given channel by providing a duplicate key. ie you should probably
75 /// index by a PublicKey which is required to sign any updates.
76 /// If you're using this for local monitoring of your own channels, you probably want to use
77 /// `OutPoint` as the key, which will give you a ManyChannelMonitor implementation.
78 pub struct SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
79 #[cfg(test)] // Used in ChannelManager tests to manipulate channels directly
80 pub monitors: Mutex<HashMap<Key, ChannelMonitor>>,
82 monitors: Mutex<HashMap<Key, ChannelMonitor>>,
83 chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>,
84 broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>
87 impl<Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash> ChainListener for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
88 fn block_connected(&self, _header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], _indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) {
89 let monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
90 for monitor in monitors.values() {
91 let txn_outputs = monitor.block_connected(txn_matched, height, &*self.broadcaster);
92 for (ref txid, ref outputs) in txn_outputs {
93 for (idx, output) in outputs.iter().enumerate() {
94 self.chain_monitor.install_watch_outpoint((txid.clone(), idx as u32), &output.script_pubkey);
100 fn block_disconnected(&self, _: &BlockHeader) { }
103 impl<Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash + 'static> SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
104 /// Creates a new object which can be used to monitor several channels given the chain
105 /// interface with which to register to receive notifications.
106 pub fn new(chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>, broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>) -> Arc<SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key>> {
107 let res = Arc::new(SimpleManyChannelMonitor {
108 monitors: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
112 let weak_res = Arc::downgrade(&res);
113 res.chain_monitor.register_listener(weak_res);
117 /// Adds or udpates the monitor which monitors the channel referred to by the given key.
118 pub fn add_update_monitor_by_key(&self, key: Key, monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
119 let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
120 match monitors.get_mut(&key) {
121 Some(orig_monitor) => return orig_monitor.insert_combine(monitor),
124 match &monitor.funding_txo {
125 &None => self.chain_monitor.watch_all_txn(),
126 &Some((ref outpoint, ref script)) => {
127 self.chain_monitor.install_watch_tx(&outpoint.txid, script);
128 self.chain_monitor.install_watch_outpoint((outpoint.txid, outpoint.index as u32), script);
131 monitors.insert(key, monitor);
136 impl ManyChannelMonitor for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<OutPoint> {
137 fn add_update_monitor(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr> {
138 match self.add_update_monitor_by_key(funding_txo, monitor) {
140 Err(_) => Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure),
145 /// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, don't try to claim it in a shared transaction,
146 /// instead claiming it in its own individual transaction.
147 const CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 12;
148 /// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, force-close the channel to broadcast the
149 /// HTLC-Success transaction.
150 const CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 6;
152 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
155 revocation_base_key: SecretKey,
156 htlc_base_key: SecretKey,
159 revocation_base_key: PublicKey,
160 htlc_base_key: PublicKey,
161 sigs: HashMap<Sha256dHash, Signature>,
165 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
166 struct LocalSignedTx {
167 /// txid of the transaction in tx, just used to make comparison faster
170 revocation_key: PublicKey,
171 a_htlc_key: PublicKey,
172 b_htlc_key: PublicKey,
173 delayed_payment_key: PublicKey,
175 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Signature, Signature)>,
178 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
179 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
181 /// A ChannelMonitor handles chain events (blocks connected and disconnected) and generates
182 /// on-chain transactions to ensure no loss of funds occurs.
183 /// You MUST ensure that no ChannelMonitors for a given channel anywhere contain out-of-date
184 /// information and are actively monitoring the chain.
185 pub struct ChannelMonitor {
186 funding_txo: Option<(OutPoint, Script)>,
187 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64,
189 key_storage: KeyStorage,
190 delayed_payment_base_key: PublicKey,
191 their_htlc_base_key: Option<PublicKey>,
192 their_delayed_payment_base_key: Option<PublicKey>,
193 // first is the idx of the first of the two revocation points
194 their_cur_revocation_points: Option<(u64, PublicKey, Option<PublicKey>)>,
196 our_to_self_delay: u16,
197 their_to_self_delay: Option<u16>,
199 old_secrets: [([u8; 32], u64); 49],
200 remote_claimable_outpoints: HashMap<Sha256dHash, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>>,
201 /// We cannot identify HTLC-Success or HTLC-Timeout transactions by themselves on the chain.
202 /// Nor can we figure out their commitment numbers without the commitment transaction they are
203 /// spending. Thus, in order to claim them via revocation key, we track all the remote
204 /// commitment transactions which we find on-chain, mapping them to the commitment number which
205 /// can be used to derive the revocation key and claim the transactions.
206 remote_commitment_txn_on_chain: Mutex<HashMap<Sha256dHash, u64>>,
207 /// Cache used to make pruning of payment_preimages faster.
208 /// Maps payment_hash values to commitment numbers for remote transactions for non-revoked
209 /// remote transactions (ie should remain pretty small).
210 /// Serialized to disk but should generally not be sent to Watchtowers.
211 remote_hash_commitment_number: HashMap<[u8; 32], u64>,
213 // We store two local commitment transactions to avoid any race conditions where we may update
214 // some monitors (potentially on watchtowers) but then fail to update others, resulting in the
215 // various monitors for one channel being out of sync, and us broadcasting a local
216 // transaction for which we have deleted claim information on some watchtowers.
217 prev_local_signed_commitment_tx: Option<LocalSignedTx>,
218 current_local_signed_commitment_tx: Option<LocalSignedTx>,
220 payment_preimages: HashMap<[u8; 32], [u8; 32]>,
222 destination_script: Script,
223 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>, //TODO: dedup this a bit...
225 impl Clone for ChannelMonitor {
226 fn clone(&self) -> Self {
228 funding_txo: self.funding_txo.clone(),
229 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor.clone(),
231 key_storage: self.key_storage.clone(),
232 delayed_payment_base_key: self.delayed_payment_base_key.clone(),
233 their_htlc_base_key: self.their_htlc_base_key.clone(),
234 their_delayed_payment_base_key: self.their_delayed_payment_base_key.clone(),
235 their_cur_revocation_points: self.their_cur_revocation_points.clone(),
237 our_to_self_delay: self.our_to_self_delay,
238 their_to_self_delay: self.their_to_self_delay,
240 old_secrets: self.old_secrets.clone(),
241 remote_claimable_outpoints: self.remote_claimable_outpoints.clone(),
242 remote_commitment_txn_on_chain: Mutex::new((*self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.lock().unwrap()).clone()),
243 remote_hash_commitment_number: self.remote_hash_commitment_number.clone(),
245 prev_local_signed_commitment_tx: self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.clone(),
246 current_local_signed_commitment_tx: self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx.clone(),
248 payment_preimages: self.payment_preimages.clone(),
250 destination_script: self.destination_script.clone(),
251 secp_ctx: self.secp_ctx.clone(),
256 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
257 /// Used only in testing and fuzztarget to check serialization roundtrips don't change the
258 /// underlying object
259 impl PartialEq for ChannelMonitor {
260 fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
261 if self.funding_txo != other.funding_txo ||
262 self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor != other.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor ||
263 self.key_storage != other.key_storage ||
264 self.delayed_payment_base_key != other.delayed_payment_base_key ||
265 self.their_htlc_base_key != other.their_htlc_base_key ||
266 self.their_delayed_payment_base_key != other.their_delayed_payment_base_key ||
267 self.their_cur_revocation_points != other.their_cur_revocation_points ||
268 self.our_to_self_delay != other.our_to_self_delay ||
269 self.their_to_self_delay != other.their_to_self_delay ||
270 self.remote_claimable_outpoints != other.remote_claimable_outpoints ||
271 self.remote_hash_commitment_number != other.remote_hash_commitment_number ||
272 self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx != other.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx ||
273 self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx != other.current_local_signed_commitment_tx ||
274 self.payment_preimages != other.payment_preimages ||
275 self.destination_script != other.destination_script
279 for (&(ref secret, ref idx), &(ref o_secret, ref o_idx)) in self.old_secrets.iter().zip(other.old_secrets.iter()) {
280 if secret != o_secret || idx != o_idx {
284 let us = self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.lock().unwrap();
285 let them = other.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.lock().unwrap();
291 impl ChannelMonitor {
292 pub(super) fn new(revocation_base_key: &SecretKey, delayed_payment_base_key: &PublicKey, htlc_base_key: &SecretKey, our_to_self_delay: u16, destination_script: Script) -> ChannelMonitor {
295 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: 0,
297 key_storage: KeyStorage::PrivMode {
298 revocation_base_key: revocation_base_key.clone(),
299 htlc_base_key: htlc_base_key.clone(),
301 delayed_payment_base_key: delayed_payment_base_key.clone(),
302 their_htlc_base_key: None,
303 their_delayed_payment_base_key: None,
304 their_cur_revocation_points: None,
306 our_to_self_delay: our_to_self_delay,
307 their_to_self_delay: None,
309 old_secrets: [([0; 32], 1 << 48); 49],
310 remote_claimable_outpoints: HashMap::new(),
311 remote_commitment_txn_on_chain: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
312 remote_hash_commitment_number: HashMap::new(),
314 prev_local_signed_commitment_tx: None,
315 current_local_signed_commitment_tx: None,
317 payment_preimages: HashMap::new(),
319 destination_script: destination_script,
320 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
325 fn place_secret(idx: u64) -> u8 {
327 if idx & (1 << i) == (1 << i) {
335 fn derive_secret(secret: [u8; 32], bits: u8, idx: u64) -> [u8; 32] {
336 let mut res: [u8; 32] = secret;
338 let bitpos = bits - 1 - i;
339 if idx & (1 << bitpos) == (1 << bitpos) {
340 res[(bitpos / 8) as usize] ^= 1 << (bitpos & 7);
341 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
343 sha.result(&mut res);
349 /// Inserts a revocation secret into this channel monitor. Also optionally tracks the next
350 /// revocation point which may be required to claim HTLC outputs which we know the preimage of
351 /// in case the remote end force-closes using their latest state. Prunes old preimages if neither
352 /// needed by local commitment transactions HTCLs nor by remote ones. Unless we haven't already seen remote
353 /// commitment transaction's secret, they are de facto pruned (we can use revocation key).
354 pub(super) fn provide_secret(&mut self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32], their_next_revocation_point: Option<(u64, PublicKey)>) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
355 let pos = ChannelMonitor::place_secret(idx);
357 let (old_secret, old_idx) = self.old_secrets[i as usize];
358 if ChannelMonitor::derive_secret(secret, pos, old_idx) != old_secret {
359 return Err(HandleError{err: "Previous secret did not match new one", action: None})
362 self.old_secrets[pos as usize] = (secret, idx);
364 if let Some(new_revocation_point) = their_next_revocation_point {
365 match self.their_cur_revocation_points {
366 Some(old_points) => {
367 if old_points.0 == new_revocation_point.0 + 1 {
368 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0, old_points.1, Some(new_revocation_point.1)));
369 } else if old_points.0 == new_revocation_point.0 + 2 {
370 if let Some(old_second_point) = old_points.2 {
371 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0 - 1, old_second_point, Some(new_revocation_point.1)));
373 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((new_revocation_point.0, new_revocation_point.1, None));
376 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((new_revocation_point.0, new_revocation_point.1, None));
380 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((new_revocation_point.0, new_revocation_point.1, None));
385 if !self.payment_preimages.is_empty() {
386 let local_signed_commitment_tx = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx.as_ref().expect("Channel needs at least an initial commitment tx !");
387 let prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.as_ref();
388 let min_idx = self.get_min_seen_secret();
389 let remote_hash_commitment_number = &mut self.remote_hash_commitment_number;
391 self.payment_preimages.retain(|&k, _| {
392 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in &local_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs {
393 if k == htlc.payment_hash {
397 if let Some(prev_local_commitment_tx) = prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
398 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in prev_local_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
399 if k == htlc.payment_hash {
404 let contains = if let Some(cn) = remote_hash_commitment_number.get(&k) {
411 remote_hash_commitment_number.remove(&k);
420 /// Informs this monitor of the latest remote (ie non-broadcastable) commitment transaction.
421 /// The monitor watches for it to be broadcasted and then uses the HTLC information (and
422 /// possibly future revocation/preimage information) to claim outputs where possible.
423 /// We cache also the mapping hash:commitment number to lighten pruning of old preimages by watchtowers.
424 pub(super) fn provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, unsigned_commitment_tx: &Transaction, htlc_outputs: Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>, commitment_number: u64) {
425 // TODO: Encrypt the htlc_outputs data with the single-hash of the commitment transaction
426 // so that a remote monitor doesn't learn anything unless there is a malicious close.
427 // (only maybe, sadly we cant do the same for local info, as we need to be aware of
429 for htlc in &htlc_outputs {
430 self.remote_hash_commitment_number.insert(htlc.payment_hash, commitment_number);
432 self.remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(unsigned_commitment_tx.txid(), htlc_outputs);
435 /// Informs this monitor of the latest local (ie broadcastable) commitment transaction. The
436 /// monitor watches for timeouts and may broadcast it if we approach such a timeout. Thus, it
437 /// is important that any clones of this channel monitor (including remote clones) by kept
438 /// up-to-date as our local commitment transaction is updated.
439 /// Panics if set_their_to_self_delay has never been called.
440 pub(super) fn provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, signed_commitment_tx: Transaction, local_keys: chan_utils::TxCreationKeys, feerate_per_kw: u64, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Signature, Signature)>) {
441 assert!(self.their_to_self_delay.is_some());
442 self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx.take();
443 self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(LocalSignedTx {
444 txid: signed_commitment_tx.txid(),
445 tx: signed_commitment_tx,
446 revocation_key: local_keys.revocation_key,
447 a_htlc_key: local_keys.a_htlc_key,
448 b_htlc_key: local_keys.b_htlc_key,
449 delayed_payment_key: local_keys.a_delayed_payment_key,
455 /// Provides a payment_hash->payment_preimage mapping. Will be automatically pruned when all
456 /// commitment_tx_infos which contain the payment hash have been revoked.
457 pub(super) fn provide_payment_preimage(&mut self, payment_hash: &[u8; 32], payment_preimage: &[u8; 32]) {
458 self.payment_preimages.insert(payment_hash.clone(), payment_preimage.clone());
461 /// Combines this ChannelMonitor with the information contained in the other ChannelMonitor.
462 /// After a successful call this ChannelMonitor is up-to-date and is safe to use to monitor the
463 /// chain for new blocks/transactions.
464 pub fn insert_combine(&mut self, mut other: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
465 if self.funding_txo.is_some() {
466 // We should be able to compare the entire funding_txo, but in fuzztarget its trivially
467 // easy to collide the funding_txo hash and have a different scriptPubKey.
468 if other.funding_txo.is_some() && other.funding_txo.as_ref().unwrap().0 != self.funding_txo.as_ref().unwrap().0 {
469 return Err(HandleError{err: "Funding transaction outputs are not identical!", action: None});
472 self.funding_txo = other.funding_txo.take();
474 let other_min_secret = other.get_min_seen_secret();
475 let our_min_secret = self.get_min_seen_secret();
476 if our_min_secret > other_min_secret {
477 self.provide_secret(other_min_secret, other.get_secret(other_min_secret).unwrap(), None)?;
479 if our_min_secret >= other_min_secret {
480 self.their_cur_revocation_points = other.their_cur_revocation_points;
481 for (txid, htlcs) in other.remote_claimable_outpoints.drain() {
482 self.remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, htlcs);
484 if let Some(local_tx) = other.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
485 self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(local_tx);
487 if let Some(local_tx) = other.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
488 self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(local_tx);
490 self.payment_preimages = other.payment_preimages;
495 /// Panics if commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor doesn't fit in 48 bits
496 pub(super) fn set_commitment_obscure_factor(&mut self, commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64) {
497 assert!(commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor < (1 << 48));
498 self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor = commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor;
501 /// Allows this monitor to scan only for transactions which are applicable. Note that this is
502 /// optional, without it this monitor cannot be used in an SPV client, but you may wish to
503 /// avoid this (or call unset_funding_info) on a monitor you wish to send to a watchtower as it
504 /// provides slightly better privacy.
505 /// It's the responsibility of the caller to register outpoint and script with passing the former
506 /// value as key to add_update_monitor.
507 pub(super) fn set_funding_info(&mut self, funding_info: (OutPoint, Script)) {
508 self.funding_txo = Some(funding_info);
511 /// We log these base keys at channel opening to being able to rebuild redeemscript in case of leaked revoked commit tx
512 pub(super) fn set_their_base_keys(&mut self, their_htlc_base_key: &PublicKey, their_delayed_payment_base_key: &PublicKey) {
513 self.their_htlc_base_key = Some(their_htlc_base_key.clone());
514 self.their_delayed_payment_base_key = Some(their_delayed_payment_base_key.clone());
517 pub(super) fn set_their_to_self_delay(&mut self, their_to_self_delay: u16) {
518 self.their_to_self_delay = Some(their_to_self_delay);
521 pub(super) fn unset_funding_info(&mut self) {
522 self.funding_txo = None;
525 /// Gets the funding transaction outpoint of the channel this ChannelMonitor is monitoring for.
526 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
527 match self.funding_txo {
528 Some((outpoint, _)) => Some(outpoint),
533 /// Serializes into a vec, with various modes for the exposed pub fns
534 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W, for_local_storage: bool) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
535 //TODO: We still write out all the serialization here manually instead of using the fancy
536 //serialization framework we have, we should migrate things over to it.
537 writer.write_all(&[SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
538 writer.write_all(&[MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
540 match &self.funding_txo {
541 &Some((ref outpoint, ref script)) => {
542 writer.write_all(&outpoint.txid[..])?;
543 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(outpoint.index))?;
544 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(script.len() as u64))?;
545 writer.write_all(&script[..])?;
548 // We haven't even been initialized...not sure why anyone is serializing us, but
549 // not much to give them.
554 // Set in initial Channel-object creation, so should always be set by now:
555 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor))?;
557 match self.key_storage {
558 KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key } => {
559 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
560 writer.write_all(&revocation_base_key[..])?;
561 writer.write_all(&htlc_base_key[..])?;
563 KeyStorage::SigsMode { .. } => unimplemented!(),
566 writer.write_all(&self.delayed_payment_base_key.serialize())?;
567 writer.write_all(&self.their_htlc_base_key.as_ref().unwrap().serialize())?;
568 writer.write_all(&self.their_delayed_payment_base_key.as_ref().unwrap().serialize())?;
570 match self.their_cur_revocation_points {
571 Some((idx, pubkey, second_option)) => {
572 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(idx))?;
573 writer.write_all(&pubkey.serialize())?;
574 match second_option {
575 Some(second_pubkey) => {
576 writer.write_all(&second_pubkey.serialize())?;
579 writer.write_all(&[0; 33])?;
584 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(0))?;
588 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.our_to_self_delay))?;
589 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap()))?;
591 for &(ref secret, ref idx) in self.old_secrets.iter() {
592 writer.write_all(secret)?;
593 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*idx))?;
596 macro_rules! serialize_htlc_in_commitment {
597 ($htlc_output: expr) => {
598 writer.write_all(&[$htlc_output.offered as u8; 1])?;
599 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc_output.amount_msat))?;
600 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array($htlc_output.cltv_expiry))?;
601 writer.write_all(&$htlc_output.payment_hash)?;
602 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array($htlc_output.transaction_output_index))?;
606 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_claimable_outpoints.len() as u64))?;
607 for (txid, htlc_outputs) in self.remote_claimable_outpoints.iter() {
608 writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
609 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc_outputs.len() as u64))?;
610 for htlc_output in htlc_outputs.iter() {
611 serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output);
616 let remote_commitment_txn_on_chain = self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.lock().unwrap();
617 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.len() as u64))?;
618 for (txid, commitment_number) in remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
619 writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
620 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(*commitment_number))?;
624 if for_local_storage {
625 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_hash_commitment_number.len() as u64))?;
626 for (payment_hash, commitment_number) in self.remote_hash_commitment_number.iter() {
627 writer.write_all(payment_hash)?;
628 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(*commitment_number))?;
631 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(0))?;
634 macro_rules! serialize_local_tx {
635 ($local_tx: expr) => {
636 let tx_ser = serialize::serialize(&$local_tx.tx).unwrap();
637 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(tx_ser.len() as u64))?;
638 writer.write_all(&tx_ser)?;
640 writer.write_all(&$local_tx.revocation_key.serialize())?;
641 writer.write_all(&$local_tx.a_htlc_key.serialize())?;
642 writer.write_all(&$local_tx.b_htlc_key.serialize())?;
643 writer.write_all(&$local_tx.delayed_payment_key.serialize())?;
645 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($local_tx.feerate_per_kw))?;
646 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($local_tx.htlc_outputs.len() as u64))?;
647 for &(ref htlc_output, ref their_sig, ref our_sig) in $local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
648 serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output);
649 writer.write_all(&their_sig.serialize_compact(&self.secp_ctx))?;
650 writer.write_all(&our_sig.serialize_compact(&self.secp_ctx))?;
655 if let Some(ref prev_local_tx) = self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
656 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
657 serialize_local_tx!(prev_local_tx);
659 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
662 if let Some(ref cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
663 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
664 serialize_local_tx!(cur_local_tx);
666 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
669 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.payment_preimages.len() as u64))?;
670 for payment_preimage in self.payment_preimages.values() {
671 writer.write_all(payment_preimage)?;
674 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.destination_script.len() as u64))?;
675 writer.write_all(&self.destination_script[..])?;
680 /// Writes this monitor into the given writer, suitable for writing to disk.
681 pub fn write_for_disk<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
682 self.write(writer, true)
685 /// Encodes this monitor into the given writer, suitable for sending to a remote watchtower
686 pub fn write_for_watchtower<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
687 self.write(writer, false)
690 //TODO: Functions to serialize/deserialize (with different forms depending on which information
691 //we want to leave out (eg funding_txo, etc).
693 /// Can only fail if idx is < get_min_seen_secret
694 pub(super) fn get_secret(&self, idx: u64) -> Result<[u8; 32], HandleError> {
695 for i in 0..self.old_secrets.len() {
696 if (idx & (!((1 << i) - 1))) == self.old_secrets[i].1 {
697 return Ok(ChannelMonitor::derive_secret(self.old_secrets[i].0, i as u8, idx))
700 assert!(idx < self.get_min_seen_secret());
701 Err(HandleError{err: "idx too low", action: None})
704 pub(super) fn get_min_seen_secret(&self) -> u64 {
705 //TODO This can be optimized?
706 let mut min = 1 << 48;
707 for &(_, idx) in self.old_secrets.iter() {
715 /// Attempts to claim a remote commitment transaction's outputs using the revocation key and
716 /// data in remote_claimable_outpoints. Will directly claim any HTLC outputs which expire at a
717 /// height > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER. In any case, will install monitoring for
718 /// HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions.
719 fn check_spend_remote_transaction(&self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32) -> (Vec<Transaction>, (Sha256dHash, Vec<TxOut>)) {
720 // Most secp and related errors trying to create keys means we have no hope of constructing
721 // a spend transaction...so we return no transactions to broadcast
722 let mut txn_to_broadcast = Vec::new();
723 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
725 let commitment_txid = tx.txid(); //TODO: This is gonna be a performance bottleneck for watchtowers!
726 let per_commitment_option = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(&commitment_txid);
728 macro_rules! ignore_error {
729 ( $thing : expr ) => {
732 Err(_) => return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs))
737 let commitment_number = 0xffffffffffff - ((((tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor);
738 if commitment_number >= self.get_min_seen_secret() {
739 let secret = self.get_secret(commitment_number).unwrap();
740 let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &secret));
741 let (revocation_pubkey, b_htlc_key) = match self.key_storage {
742 KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key } => {
743 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
744 (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_base_key))),
745 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &htlc_base_key))))
747 KeyStorage::SigsMode { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
748 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
749 (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &revocation_base_key)),
750 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &htlc_base_key)))
753 let delayed_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key), &self.delayed_payment_base_key));
754 let a_htlc_key = match self.their_htlc_base_key {
755 None => return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs)),
756 Some(their_htlc_base_key) => ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key), &their_htlc_base_key)),
759 let revokeable_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey, self.our_to_self_delay, &delayed_key);
760 let revokeable_p2wsh = revokeable_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
762 let mut total_value = 0;
763 let mut values = Vec::new();
764 let mut inputs = Vec::new();
765 let mut htlc_idxs = Vec::new();
767 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
768 if outp.script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh {
770 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
771 txid: commitment_txid,
774 script_sig: Script::new(),
775 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
778 htlc_idxs.push(None);
779 values.push(outp.value);
780 total_value += outp.value;
781 break; // There can only be one of these
785 macro_rules! sign_input {
786 ($sighash_parts: expr, $input: expr, $htlc_idx: expr, $amount: expr) => {
788 let (sig, redeemscript) = match self.key_storage {
789 KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
790 let redeemscript = if $htlc_idx.is_none() { revokeable_redeemscript.clone() } else {
791 let htlc = &per_commitment_option.unwrap()[$htlc_idx.unwrap()];
792 chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey)
794 let sighash = ignore_error!(Message::from_slice(&$sighash_parts.sighash_all(&$input, &redeemscript, $amount)[..]));
795 let revocation_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key, &revocation_base_key));
796 (self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &revocation_key), redeemscript)
798 KeyStorage::SigsMode { .. } => {
802 $input.witness.push(sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
803 $input.witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
804 if $htlc_idx.is_none() {
805 $input.witness.push(vec!(1));
807 $input.witness.push(revocation_pubkey.serialize().to_vec());
809 $input.witness.push(redeemscript.into_bytes());
814 if let Some(per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
815 inputs.reserve_exact(per_commitment_data.len());
817 for (idx, htlc) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() {
818 let expected_script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey);
819 if htlc.transaction_output_index as usize >= tx.output.len() ||
820 tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 ||
821 tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].script_pubkey != expected_script.to_v0_p2wsh() {
822 return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs)); // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user
825 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
826 txid: commitment_txid,
827 vout: htlc.transaction_output_index,
829 script_sig: Script::new(),
830 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
833 if htlc.cltv_expiry > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER {
835 htlc_idxs.push(Some(idx));
836 values.push(tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].value);
837 total_value += htlc.amount_msat / 1000;
839 let mut single_htlc_tx = Transaction {
844 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
845 value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000, //TODO: - fee
848 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&single_htlc_tx);
849 sign_input!(sighash_parts, single_htlc_tx.input[0], Some(idx), htlc.amount_msat / 1000);
850 txn_to_broadcast.push(single_htlc_tx); // TODO: This is not yet tested in ChannelManager!
855 if !inputs.is_empty() || !txn_to_broadcast.is_empty() { // ie we're confident this is actually ours
856 // We're definitely a remote commitment transaction!
857 watch_outputs.append(&mut tx.output.clone());
858 self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.lock().unwrap().insert(commitment_txid, commitment_number);
860 if inputs.is_empty() { return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs)); } // Nothing to be done...probably a false positive/local tx
862 let outputs = vec!(TxOut {
863 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
864 value: total_value, //TODO: - fee
866 let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
873 let mut values_drain = values.drain(..);
874 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx);
876 for (input, htlc_idx) in spend_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(htlc_idxs.iter()) {
877 let value = values_drain.next().unwrap();
878 sign_input!(sighash_parts, input, htlc_idx, value);
881 txn_to_broadcast.push(spend_tx);
882 } else if let Some(per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
883 // While this isn't useful yet, there is a potential race where if a counterparty
884 // revokes a state at the same time as the commitment transaction for that state is
885 // confirmed, and the watchtower receives the block before the user, the user could
886 // upload a new ChannelMonitor with the revocation secret but the watchtower has
887 // already processed the block, resulting in the remote_commitment_txn_on_chain entry
888 // not being generated by the above conditional. Thus, to be safe, we go ahead and
890 watch_outputs.append(&mut tx.output.clone());
891 self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.lock().unwrap().insert(commitment_txid, commitment_number);
893 if let Some(revocation_points) = self.their_cur_revocation_points {
894 let revocation_point_option =
895 if revocation_points.0 == commitment_number { Some(&revocation_points.1) }
896 else if let Some(point) = revocation_points.2.as_ref() {
897 if revocation_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 { Some(point) } else { None }
899 if let Some(revocation_point) = revocation_point_option {
900 let (revocation_pubkey, b_htlc_key) = match self.key_storage {
901 KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key } => {
902 (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_base_key))),
903 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &htlc_base_key))))
905 KeyStorage::SigsMode { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
906 (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &revocation_base_key)),
907 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &htlc_base_key)))
910 let a_htlc_key = match self.their_htlc_base_key {
911 None => return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs)),
912 Some(their_htlc_base_key) => ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &their_htlc_base_key)),
915 let mut total_value = 0;
916 let mut values = Vec::new();
917 let mut inputs = Vec::new();
919 macro_rules! sign_input {
920 ($sighash_parts: expr, $input: expr, $amount: expr, $preimage: expr) => {
922 let (sig, redeemscript) = match self.key_storage {
923 KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
924 let htlc = &per_commitment_option.unwrap()[$input.sequence as usize];
925 let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey);
926 let sighash = ignore_error!(Message::from_slice(&$sighash_parts.sighash_all(&$input, &redeemscript, $amount)[..]));
927 let htlc_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &htlc_base_key));
928 (self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &htlc_key), redeemscript)
930 KeyStorage::SigsMode { .. } => {
934 $input.witness.push(sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
935 $input.witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
936 $input.witness.push($preimage);
937 $input.witness.push(redeemscript.into_bytes());
942 for (idx, htlc) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() {
943 if let Some(payment_preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
945 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
946 txid: commitment_txid,
947 vout: htlc.transaction_output_index,
949 script_sig: Script::new(),
950 sequence: idx as u32, // reset to 0xfffffffd in sign_input
953 if htlc.cltv_expiry > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER {
955 values.push((tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].value, payment_preimage));
956 total_value += htlc.amount_msat / 1000;
958 let mut single_htlc_tx = Transaction {
963 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
964 value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000, //TODO: - fee
967 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&single_htlc_tx);
968 sign_input!(sighash_parts, single_htlc_tx.input[0], htlc.amount_msat / 1000, payment_preimage.to_vec());
969 txn_to_broadcast.push(single_htlc_tx);
974 if inputs.is_empty() { return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs)); } // Nothing to be done...probably a false positive/local tx
976 let outputs = vec!(TxOut {
977 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
978 value: total_value, //TODO: - fee
980 let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
987 let mut values_drain = values.drain(..);
988 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx);
990 for input in spend_tx.input.iter_mut() {
991 let value = values_drain.next().unwrap();
992 sign_input!(sighash_parts, input, value.0, value.1.to_vec());
995 txn_to_broadcast.push(spend_tx);
1000 (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs))
1003 /// Attempst to claim a remote HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout s outputs using the revocation key
1004 fn check_spend_remote_htlc(&self, tx: &Transaction, commitment_number: u64) -> Option<Transaction> {
1005 let htlc_txid = tx.txid(); //TODO: This is gonna be a performance bottleneck for watchtowers!
1007 macro_rules! ignore_error {
1008 ( $thing : expr ) => {
1011 Err(_) => return None
1016 let secret = ignore_error!(self.get_secret(commitment_number));
1017 let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &secret));
1018 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
1019 let revocation_pubkey = match self.key_storage {
1020 KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
1021 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_base_key)))
1023 KeyStorage::SigsMode { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
1024 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &revocation_base_key))
1027 let delayed_key = match self.their_delayed_payment_base_key {
1028 None => return None,
1029 Some(their_delayed_payment_base_key) => ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &their_delayed_payment_base_key)),
1031 let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), &delayed_key);
1032 let revokeable_p2wsh = redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
1034 let mut inputs = Vec::new();
1037 if tx.output[0].script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh { //HTLC transactions have one txin, one txout
1039 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
1043 script_sig: Script::new(),
1044 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
1045 witness: Vec::new(),
1047 amount = tx.output[0].value;
1050 if !inputs.is_empty() {
1051 let outputs = vec!(TxOut {
1052 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1053 value: amount, //TODO: - fee
1056 let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
1063 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx);
1065 let sig = match self.key_storage {
1066 KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
1067 let sighash = ignore_error!(Message::from_slice(&sighash_parts.sighash_all(&spend_tx.input[0], &redeemscript, amount)[..]));
1068 let revocation_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key, &revocation_base_key));
1069 self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &revocation_key)
1071 KeyStorage::SigsMode { .. } => {
1075 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
1076 spend_tx.input[0].witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1077 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(vec!(1));
1078 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(redeemscript.into_bytes());
1084 fn broadcast_by_local_state(&self, local_tx: &LocalSignedTx) -> Vec<Transaction> {
1085 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
1087 for &(ref htlc, ref their_sig, ref our_sig) in local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1089 let mut htlc_timeout_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&local_tx.txid, local_tx.feerate_per_kw, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), htlc, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key, &local_tx.revocation_key);
1091 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
1093 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(their_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
1094 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1095 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
1096 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1098 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new());
1099 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &local_tx.a_htlc_key, &local_tx.b_htlc_key, &local_tx.revocation_key).into_bytes());
1101 res.push(htlc_timeout_tx);
1103 if let Some(payment_preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
1104 let mut htlc_success_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&local_tx.txid, local_tx.feerate_per_kw, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), htlc, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key, &local_tx.revocation_key);
1106 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
1108 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(their_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
1109 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1110 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
1111 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1113 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(payment_preimage.to_vec());
1114 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &local_tx.a_htlc_key, &local_tx.b_htlc_key, &local_tx.revocation_key).into_bytes());
1116 res.push(htlc_success_tx);
1124 /// Attempts to claim any claimable HTLCs in a commitment transaction which was not (yet)
1125 /// revoked using data in local_claimable_outpoints.
1126 /// Should not be used if check_spend_revoked_transaction succeeds.
1127 fn check_spend_local_transaction(&self, tx: &Transaction, _height: u32) -> Vec<Transaction> {
1128 let commitment_txid = tx.txid();
1129 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1130 if local_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
1131 return self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx);
1134 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1135 if local_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
1136 return self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx);
1142 fn block_connected(&self, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], height: u32, broadcaster: &BroadcasterInterface)-> Vec<(Sha256dHash, Vec<TxOut>)> {
1143 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
1144 for tx in txn_matched {
1145 if tx.input.len() == 1 {
1146 // Assuming our keys were not leaked (in which case we're screwed no matter what),
1147 // commitment transactions and HTLC transactions will all only ever have one input,
1148 // which is an easy way to filter out any potential non-matching txn for lazy
1150 let prevout = &tx.input[0].previous_output;
1151 let mut txn: Vec<Transaction> = Vec::new();
1152 if self.funding_txo.is_none() || (prevout.txid == self.funding_txo.as_ref().unwrap().0.txid && prevout.vout == self.funding_txo.as_ref().unwrap().0.index as u32) {
1153 let (remote_txn, new_outputs) = self.check_spend_remote_transaction(tx, height);
1155 if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() {
1156 watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
1159 txn = self.check_spend_local_transaction(tx, height);
1162 let remote_commitment_txn_on_chain = self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.lock().unwrap();
1163 if let Some(commitment_number) = remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.get(&prevout.txid) {
1164 if let Some(tx) = self.check_spend_remote_htlc(tx, *commitment_number) {
1169 for tx in txn.iter() {
1170 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(tx);
1174 if let Some(ref cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1175 let mut needs_broadcast = false;
1176 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in cur_local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1177 if htlc.cltv_expiry <= height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER {
1178 if htlc.offered || self.payment_preimages.contains_key(&htlc.payment_hash) {
1179 needs_broadcast = true;
1184 if needs_broadcast {
1185 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&cur_local_tx.tx);
1186 for tx in self.broadcast_by_local_state(&cur_local_tx) {
1187 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
1194 pub(super) fn would_broadcast_at_height(&self, height: u32) -> bool {
1195 if let Some(ref cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1196 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in cur_local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1197 if htlc.cltv_expiry <= height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER {
1198 if htlc.offered || self.payment_preimages.contains_key(&htlc.payment_hash) {
1208 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for ChannelMonitor {
1209 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1210 // TODO: read_to_end and then deserializing from that vector is really dumb, we should
1211 // actually use the fancy serialization framework we have instead of hacking around it.
1212 let mut datavec = Vec::new();
1213 reader.read_to_end(&mut datavec)?;
1214 let data = &datavec;
1216 let mut read_pos = 0;
1217 macro_rules! read_bytes {
1218 ($byte_count: expr) => {
1220 if ($byte_count as usize) > data.len() - read_pos {
1221 return Err(DecodeError::ShortRead);
1223 read_pos += $byte_count as usize;
1224 &data[read_pos - $byte_count as usize..read_pos]
1229 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1230 macro_rules! unwrap_obj {
1234 Err(_) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
1239 let _ver = read_bytes!(1)[0];
1240 let min_ver = read_bytes!(1)[0];
1241 if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION {
1242 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion);
1245 // Technically this can fail and serialize fail a round-trip, but only for serialization of
1246 // barely-init'd ChannelMonitors that we can't do anything with.
1247 let outpoint = OutPoint {
1248 txid: Sha256dHash::from(read_bytes!(32)),
1249 index: byte_utils::slice_to_be16(read_bytes!(2)),
1251 let script_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8));
1252 let funding_txo = Some((outpoint, Script::from(read_bytes!(script_len).to_vec())));
1253 let commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor = byte_utils::slice_to_be48(read_bytes!(6));
1255 let key_storage = match read_bytes!(1)[0] {
1257 KeyStorage::PrivMode {
1258 revocation_base_key: unwrap_obj!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(32))),
1259 htlc_base_key: unwrap_obj!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(32))),
1262 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
1265 let delayed_payment_base_key = unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(33)));
1266 let their_htlc_base_key = Some(unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(33))));
1267 let their_delayed_payment_base_key = Some(unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(33))));
1269 let their_cur_revocation_points = {
1270 let first_idx = byte_utils::slice_to_be48(read_bytes!(6));
1274 let first_point = unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(33)));
1275 let second_point_slice = read_bytes!(33);
1276 if second_point_slice[0..32] == [0; 32] && second_point_slice[32] == 0 {
1277 Some((first_idx, first_point, None))
1279 Some((first_idx, first_point, Some(unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, second_point_slice)))))
1284 let our_to_self_delay = byte_utils::slice_to_be16(read_bytes!(2));
1285 let their_to_self_delay = Some(byte_utils::slice_to_be16(read_bytes!(2)));
1287 let mut old_secrets = [([0; 32], 1 << 48); 49];
1288 for &mut (ref mut secret, ref mut idx) in old_secrets.iter_mut() {
1289 secret.copy_from_slice(read_bytes!(32));
1290 *idx = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8));
1293 macro_rules! read_htlc_in_commitment {
1296 let offered = match read_bytes!(1)[0] {
1297 0 => false, 1 => true,
1298 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
1300 let amount_msat = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8));
1301 let cltv_expiry = byte_utils::slice_to_be32(read_bytes!(4));
1302 let mut payment_hash = [0; 32];
1303 payment_hash[..].copy_from_slice(read_bytes!(32));
1304 let transaction_output_index = byte_utils::slice_to_be32(read_bytes!(4));
1306 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1307 offered, amount_msat, cltv_expiry, payment_hash, transaction_output_index
1313 let remote_claimable_outpoints_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8));
1314 if remote_claimable_outpoints_len > data.len() as u64 / 64 { return Err(DecodeError::BadLengthDescriptor); }
1315 let mut remote_claimable_outpoints = HashMap::with_capacity(remote_claimable_outpoints_len as usize);
1316 for _ in 0..remote_claimable_outpoints_len {
1317 let txid = Sha256dHash::from(read_bytes!(32));
1318 let outputs_count = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8));
1319 if outputs_count > data.len() as u64 / 32 { return Err(DecodeError::BadLengthDescriptor); }
1320 let mut outputs = Vec::with_capacity(outputs_count as usize);
1321 for _ in 0..outputs_count {
1322 outputs.push(read_htlc_in_commitment!());
1324 if let Some(_) = remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, outputs) {
1325 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
1329 let remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8));
1330 if remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len > data.len() as u64 / 32 { return Err(DecodeError::BadLengthDescriptor); }
1331 let mut remote_commitment_txn_on_chain = HashMap::with_capacity(remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len as usize);
1332 for _ in 0..remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len {
1333 let txid = Sha256dHash::from(read_bytes!(32));
1334 let commitment_number = byte_utils::slice_to_be48(read_bytes!(6));
1335 if let Some(_) = remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(txid, commitment_number) {
1336 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
1340 let remote_hash_commitment_number_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8));
1341 if remote_hash_commitment_number_len > data.len() as u64 / 32 { return Err(DecodeError::BadLengthDescriptor); }
1342 let mut remote_hash_commitment_number = HashMap::with_capacity(remote_hash_commitment_number_len as usize);
1343 for _ in 0..remote_hash_commitment_number_len {
1344 let mut txid = [0; 32];
1345 txid[..].copy_from_slice(read_bytes!(32));
1346 let commitment_number = byte_utils::slice_to_be48(read_bytes!(6));
1347 if let Some(_) = remote_hash_commitment_number.insert(txid, commitment_number) {
1348 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
1352 macro_rules! read_local_tx {
1355 let tx_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8));
1356 let tx_ser = read_bytes!(tx_len);
1357 let tx: Transaction = unwrap_obj!(serialize::deserialize(tx_ser));
1358 if serialize::serialize(&tx).unwrap() != tx_ser {
1359 // We check that the tx re-serializes to the same form to ensure there is
1360 // no extra data, and as rust-bitcoin doesn't handle the 0-input ambiguity
1362 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
1365 let revocation_key = unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(33)));
1366 let a_htlc_key = unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(33)));
1367 let b_htlc_key = unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(33)));
1368 let delayed_payment_key = unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(33)));
1369 let feerate_per_kw = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8));
1371 let htlc_outputs_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8));
1372 if htlc_outputs_len > data.len() as u64 / 128 { return Err(DecodeError::BadLengthDescriptor); }
1373 let mut htlc_outputs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_outputs_len as usize);
1374 for _ in 0..htlc_outputs_len {
1375 htlc_outputs.push((read_htlc_in_commitment!(),
1376 unwrap_obj!(Signature::from_compact(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(64))),
1377 unwrap_obj!(Signature::from_compact(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(64)))));
1382 tx, revocation_key, a_htlc_key, b_htlc_key, delayed_payment_key, feerate_per_kw, htlc_outputs
1388 let prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = match read_bytes!(1)[0] {
1391 Some(read_local_tx!())
1393 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
1396 let current_local_signed_commitment_tx = match read_bytes!(1)[0] {
1399 Some(read_local_tx!())
1401 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
1404 let payment_preimages_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8));
1405 if payment_preimages_len > data.len() as u64 / 32 { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
1406 let mut payment_preimages = HashMap::with_capacity(payment_preimages_len as usize);
1407 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
1408 for _ in 0..payment_preimages_len {
1409 let mut preimage = [0; 32];
1410 preimage[..].copy_from_slice(read_bytes!(32));
1412 sha.input(&preimage);
1413 let mut hash = [0; 32];
1414 sha.result(&mut hash);
1415 if let Some(_) = payment_preimages.insert(hash, preimage) {
1416 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
1420 let destination_script_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8));
1421 let destination_script = Script::from(read_bytes!(destination_script_len).to_vec());
1425 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor,
1428 delayed_payment_base_key,
1429 their_htlc_base_key,
1430 their_delayed_payment_base_key,
1431 their_cur_revocation_points,
1434 their_to_self_delay,
1437 remote_claimable_outpoints,
1438 remote_commitment_txn_on_chain: Mutex::new(remote_commitment_txn_on_chain),
1439 remote_hash_commitment_number,
1441 prev_local_signed_commitment_tx,
1442 current_local_signed_commitment_tx,
1455 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Script;
1456 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
1457 use crypto::digest::Digest;
1459 use ln::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor;
1460 use ln::chan_utils::{HTLCOutputInCommitment, TxCreationKeys};
1461 use util::sha2::Sha256;
1462 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
1463 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1, Signature};
1464 use rand::{thread_rng,Rng};
1467 fn test_per_commitment_storage() {
1468 // Test vectors from BOLT 3:
1469 let mut secrets: Vec<[u8; 32]> = Vec::new();
1470 let mut monitor: ChannelMonitor;
1471 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1473 macro_rules! test_secrets {
1475 let mut idx = 281474976710655;
1476 for secret in secrets.iter() {
1477 assert_eq!(monitor.get_secret(idx).unwrap(), *secret);
1480 assert_eq!(monitor.get_min_seen_secret(), idx + 1);
1481 assert!(monitor.get_secret(idx).is_err());
1485 let delayed_payment_base_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap());
1488 // insert_secret correct sequence
1489 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &delayed_payment_base_key, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
1492 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1493 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1494 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1497 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1498 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1499 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1502 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1503 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1504 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1507 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1508 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1509 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1512 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1513 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
1514 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1517 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1518 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
1519 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1522 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1523 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
1524 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1527 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1528 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
1529 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1534 // insert_secret #1 incorrect
1535 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &delayed_payment_base_key, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
1538 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1539 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
1540 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1543 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1544 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1545 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err,
1546 "Previous secret did not match new one");
1550 // insert_secret #2 incorrect (#1 derived from incorrect)
1551 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &delayed_payment_base_key, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
1554 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1555 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
1556 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1559 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1560 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("dddc3a8d14fddf2b68fa8c7fbad2748274937479dd0f8930d5ebb4ab6bd866a3").unwrap());
1561 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1564 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1565 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1566 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1569 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1570 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1571 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err,
1572 "Previous secret did not match new one");
1576 // insert_secret #3 incorrect
1577 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &delayed_payment_base_key, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
1580 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1581 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1582 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1585 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1586 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1587 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1590 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1591 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c51a18b13e8527e579ec56365482c62f180b7d5760b46e9477dae59e87ed423a").unwrap());
1592 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1595 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1596 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1597 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err,
1598 "Previous secret did not match new one");
1602 // insert_secret #4 incorrect (1,2,3 derived from incorrect)
1603 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &delayed_payment_base_key, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
1606 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1607 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
1608 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1611 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1612 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("dddc3a8d14fddf2b68fa8c7fbad2748274937479dd0f8930d5ebb4ab6bd866a3").unwrap());
1613 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1616 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1617 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c51a18b13e8527e579ec56365482c62f180b7d5760b46e9477dae59e87ed423a").unwrap());
1618 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1621 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1622 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("ba65d7b0ef55a3ba300d4e87af29868f394f8f138d78a7011669c79b37b936f4").unwrap());
1623 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1626 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1627 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
1628 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1631 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1632 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
1633 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1636 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1637 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
1638 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1641 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1642 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
1643 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err,
1644 "Previous secret did not match new one");
1648 // insert_secret #5 incorrect
1649 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &delayed_payment_base_key, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
1652 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1653 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1654 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1657 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1658 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1659 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1662 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1663 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1664 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1667 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1668 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1669 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1672 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1673 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("631373ad5f9ef654bb3dade742d09504c567edd24320d2fcd68e3cc47e2ff6a6").unwrap());
1674 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1677 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1678 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
1679 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err,
1680 "Previous secret did not match new one");
1684 // insert_secret #6 incorrect (5 derived from incorrect)
1685 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &delayed_payment_base_key, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
1688 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1689 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1690 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1693 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1694 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1695 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1698 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1699 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1700 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1703 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1704 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1705 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1708 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1709 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("631373ad5f9ef654bb3dade742d09504c567edd24320d2fcd68e3cc47e2ff6a6").unwrap());
1710 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1713 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1714 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("b7e76a83668bde38b373970155c868a653304308f9896692f904a23731224bb1").unwrap());
1715 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1718 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1719 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
1720 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1723 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1724 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
1725 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err,
1726 "Previous secret did not match new one");
1730 // insert_secret #7 incorrect
1731 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &delayed_payment_base_key, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
1734 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1735 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1736 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1739 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1740 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1741 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1744 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1745 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1746 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1749 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1750 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1751 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1754 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1755 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
1756 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1759 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1760 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
1761 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1764 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1765 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("e7971de736e01da8ed58b94c2fc216cb1dca9e326f3a96e7194fe8ea8af6c0a3").unwrap());
1766 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1769 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1770 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
1771 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err,
1772 "Previous secret did not match new one");
1776 // insert_secret #8 incorrect
1777 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &delayed_payment_base_key, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
1780 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1781 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1782 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1785 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1786 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1787 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1790 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1791 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1792 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1795 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1796 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1797 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1800 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1801 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
1802 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1805 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1806 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
1807 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1810 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1811 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
1812 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1815 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1816 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a7efbc61aac46d34f77778bac22c8a20c6a46ca460addc49009bda875ec88fa4").unwrap());
1817 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err,
1818 "Previous secret did not match new one");
1823 fn test_prune_preimages() {
1824 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1825 let dummy_sig = Signature::from_der(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("3045022100fa86fa9a36a8cd6a7bb8f06a541787d51371d067951a9461d5404de6b928782e02201c8b7c334c10aed8976a3a465be9a28abff4cb23acbf00022295b378ce1fa3cd").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
1827 macro_rules! dummy_keys {
1830 let dummy_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap());
1832 per_commitment_point: dummy_key.clone(),
1833 revocation_key: dummy_key.clone(),
1834 a_htlc_key: dummy_key.clone(),
1835 b_htlc_key: dummy_key.clone(),
1836 a_delayed_payment_key: dummy_key.clone(),
1837 b_payment_key: dummy_key.clone(),
1842 let dummy_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
1844 let mut preimages = Vec::new();
1846 let mut rng = thread_rng();
1848 let mut preimage = [0; 32];
1849 rng.fill_bytes(&mut preimage);
1850 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
1851 sha.input(&preimage);
1852 let mut hash = [0; 32];
1853 sha.result(&mut hash);
1854 preimages.push((preimage, hash));
1858 macro_rules! preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs {
1859 ($preimages_slice: expr) => {
1861 let mut res = Vec::new();
1862 for (idx, preimage) in $preimages_slice.iter().enumerate() {
1863 res.push(HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1867 payment_hash: preimage.1.clone(),
1868 transaction_output_index: idx as u32,
1875 macro_rules! preimages_to_local_htlcs {
1876 ($preimages_slice: expr) => {
1878 let mut inp = preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!($preimages_slice);
1879 let res: Vec<_> = inp.drain(..).map(|e| { (e, dummy_sig.clone(), dummy_sig.clone()) }).collect();
1885 macro_rules! test_preimages_exist {
1886 ($preimages_slice: expr, $monitor: expr) => {
1887 for preimage in $preimages_slice {
1888 assert!($monitor.payment_preimages.contains_key(&preimage.1));
1893 // Prune with one old state and a local commitment tx holding a few overlaps with the
1895 let delayed_payment_base_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap());
1896 let mut monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &delayed_payment_base_key, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
1897 monitor.set_their_to_self_delay(10);
1899 monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(dummy_tx.clone(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..10]));
1900 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[5..15]), 281474976710655);
1901 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[15..20]), 281474976710654);
1902 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[17..20]), 281474976710653);
1903 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[18..20]), 281474976710652);
1904 for &(ref preimage, ref hash) in preimages.iter() {
1905 monitor.provide_payment_preimage(hash, preimage);
1908 // Now provide a secret, pruning preimages 10-15
1909 let mut secret = [0; 32];
1910 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1911 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secret.clone(), None).unwrap();
1912 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 15);
1913 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
1914 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[15..20], monitor);
1916 // Now provide a further secret, pruning preimages 15-17
1917 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1918 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secret.clone(), None).unwrap();
1919 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 13);
1920 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
1921 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[17..20], monitor);
1923 // Now update local commitment tx info, pruning only element 18 as we still care about the
1924 // previous commitment tx's preimages too
1925 monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(dummy_tx.clone(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..5]));
1926 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1927 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secret.clone(), None).unwrap();
1928 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 12);
1929 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
1930 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[18..20], monitor);
1932 // But if we do it again, we'll prune 5-10
1933 monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(dummy_tx.clone(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..3]));
1934 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1935 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secret.clone(), None).unwrap();
1936 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 5);
1937 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..5], monitor);
1940 // Further testing is done in the ChannelManager integration tests.