1 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
2 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxIn,TxOut,SigHashType,Transaction};
3 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Script;
4 use bitcoin::util::hash::Sha256dHash;
5 use bitcoin::util::bip143;
7 use crypto::digest::Digest;
9 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Message,Signature};
10 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
12 use ln::msgs::HandleError;
14 use ln::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment;
15 use chain::chaininterface::{ChainListener, ChainWatchInterface, BroadcasterInterface};
16 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
17 use util::sha2::Sha256;
19 use std::collections::HashMap;
20 use std::sync::{Arc,Mutex};
23 pub enum ChannelMonitorUpdateErr {
24 /// Used to indicate a temporary failure (eg connection to a watchtower failed, but is expected
25 /// to succeed at some point in the future).
26 /// Such a failure will "freeze" a channel, preventing us from revoking old states or
27 /// submitting new commitment transactions to the remote party.
28 /// ChannelManager::test_restore_channel_monitor can be used to retry the update(s) and restore
29 /// the channel to an operational state.
31 /// Used to indicate no further channel monitor updates will be allowed (eg we've moved on to a
32 /// different watchtower and cannot update with all watchtowers that were previously informed
33 /// of this channel). This will force-close the channel in question.
37 /// Simple trait indicating ability to track a set of ChannelMonitors and multiplex events between
38 /// them. Generally should be implemented by keeping a local SimpleManyChannelMonitor and passing
39 /// events to it, while also taking any add_update_monitor events and passing them to some remote
41 /// Note that any updates to a channel's monitor *must* be applied to each instance of the
42 /// channel's monitor everywhere (including remote watchtowers) *before* this function returns. If
43 /// an update occurs and a remote watchtower is left with old state, it may broadcast transactions
44 /// which we have revoked, allowing our counterparty to claim all funds in the channel!
45 pub trait ManyChannelMonitor: Send + Sync {
46 /// Adds or updates a monitor for the given `funding_txo`.
47 fn add_update_monitor(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr>;
50 /// A simple implementation of a ManyChannelMonitor and ChainListener. Can be used to create a
51 /// watchtower or watch our own channels.
52 /// Note that you must provide your own key by which to refer to channels.
53 /// If you're accepting remote monitors (ie are implementing a watchtower), you must verify that
54 /// users cannot overwrite a given channel by providing a duplicate key. ie you should probably
55 /// index by a PublicKey which is required to sign any updates.
56 /// If you're using this for local monitoring of your own channels, you probably want to use
57 /// `OutPoint` as the key, which will give you a ManyChannelMonitor implementation.
58 pub struct SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
59 monitors: Mutex<HashMap<Key, ChannelMonitor>>,
60 chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>,
61 broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>
64 impl<Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash> ChainListener for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
65 fn block_connected(&self, _header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], _indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) {
66 let monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
67 for monitor in monitors.values() {
68 monitor.block_connected(txn_matched, height, &*self.broadcaster);
72 fn block_disconnected(&self, _: &BlockHeader) { }
75 impl<Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash + 'static> SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
76 pub fn new(chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>, broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>) -> Arc<SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key>> {
77 let res = Arc::new(SimpleManyChannelMonitor {
78 monitors: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
82 let weak_res = Arc::downgrade(&res);
83 res.chain_monitor.register_listener(weak_res);
87 pub fn add_update_monitor_by_key(&self, key: Key, monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
88 let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
89 match monitors.get_mut(&key) {
90 Some(orig_monitor) => return orig_monitor.insert_combine(monitor),
93 match monitor.funding_txo {
94 None => self.chain_monitor.watch_all_txn(),
95 Some(outpoint) => self.chain_monitor.install_watch_outpoint((outpoint.txid, outpoint.index as u32)),
97 monitors.insert(key, monitor);
102 impl ManyChannelMonitor for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<OutPoint> {
103 fn add_update_monitor(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr> {
104 match self.add_update_monitor_by_key(funding_txo, monitor) {
106 Err(_) => Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure),
111 /// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, don't try to claim it in a shared transaction,
112 /// instead claiming it in its own individual transaction.
113 const CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 12;
114 /// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, force-close the channel to broadcast the
115 /// HTLC-Success transaction.
116 const CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 6;
121 revocation_base_key: SecretKey,
122 htlc_base_key: SecretKey,
125 revocation_base_key: PublicKey,
126 htlc_base_key: PublicKey,
127 sigs: HashMap<Sha256dHash, Signature>,
132 struct LocalSignedTx {
135 revocation_key: PublicKey,
136 a_htlc_key: PublicKey,
137 b_htlc_key: PublicKey,
138 delayed_payment_key: PublicKey,
140 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Signature, Signature)>,
143 pub struct ChannelMonitor {
144 funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
145 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64,
147 key_storage: KeyStorage,
148 delayed_payment_base_key: PublicKey,
149 their_htlc_base_key: Option<PublicKey>,
150 // first is the idx of the first of the two revocation points
151 their_cur_revocation_points: Option<(u64, PublicKey, Option<PublicKey>)>,
153 our_to_self_delay: u16,
154 their_to_self_delay: Option<u16>,
156 old_secrets: [([u8; 32], u64); 49],
157 remote_claimable_outpoints: HashMap<Sha256dHash, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>>,
158 remote_htlc_outputs_on_chain: Mutex<HashMap<Sha256dHash, u64>>,
160 // We store two local commitment transactions to avoid any race conditions where we may update
161 // some monitors (potentially on watchtowers) but then fail to update others, resulting in the
162 // various monitors for one channel being out of sync, and us broadcasting a local
163 // transaction for which we have deleted claim information on some watchtowers.
164 prev_local_signed_commitment_tx: Option<LocalSignedTx>,
165 current_local_signed_commitment_tx: Option<LocalSignedTx>,
167 payment_preimages: HashMap<[u8; 32], [u8; 32]>,
169 destination_script: Script,
170 secp_ctx: Secp256k1, //TODO: dedup this a bit...
172 impl Clone for ChannelMonitor {
173 fn clone(&self) -> Self {
175 funding_txo: self.funding_txo.clone(),
176 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor.clone(),
178 key_storage: self.key_storage.clone(),
179 delayed_payment_base_key: self.delayed_payment_base_key.clone(),
180 their_htlc_base_key: self.their_htlc_base_key.clone(),
181 their_cur_revocation_points: self.their_cur_revocation_points.clone(),
183 our_to_self_delay: self.our_to_self_delay,
184 their_to_self_delay: self.their_to_self_delay,
186 old_secrets: self.old_secrets.clone(),
187 remote_claimable_outpoints: self.remote_claimable_outpoints.clone(),
188 remote_htlc_outputs_on_chain: Mutex::new((*self.remote_htlc_outputs_on_chain.lock().unwrap()).clone()),
190 prev_local_signed_commitment_tx: self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.clone(),
191 current_local_signed_commitment_tx: self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx.clone(),
193 payment_preimages: self.payment_preimages.clone(),
195 destination_script: self.destination_script.clone(),
196 secp_ctx: self.secp_ctx.clone(),
201 impl ChannelMonitor {
202 pub fn new(revocation_base_key: &SecretKey, delayed_payment_base_key: &PublicKey, htlc_base_key: &SecretKey, our_to_self_delay: u16, destination_script: Script) -> ChannelMonitor {
205 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: 0,
207 key_storage: KeyStorage::PrivMode {
208 revocation_base_key: revocation_base_key.clone(),
209 htlc_base_key: htlc_base_key.clone(),
211 delayed_payment_base_key: delayed_payment_base_key.clone(),
212 their_htlc_base_key: None,
213 their_cur_revocation_points: None,
215 our_to_self_delay: our_to_self_delay,
216 their_to_self_delay: None,
218 old_secrets: [([0; 32], 1 << 48); 49],
219 remote_claimable_outpoints: HashMap::new(),
220 remote_htlc_outputs_on_chain: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
222 prev_local_signed_commitment_tx: None,
223 current_local_signed_commitment_tx: None,
225 payment_preimages: HashMap::new(),
227 destination_script: destination_script,
228 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
233 fn place_secret(idx: u64) -> u8 {
235 if idx & (1 << i) == (1 << i) {
243 fn derive_secret(secret: [u8; 32], bits: u8, idx: u64) -> [u8; 32] {
244 let mut res: [u8; 32] = secret;
246 let bitpos = bits - 1 - i;
247 if idx & (1 << bitpos) == (1 << bitpos) {
248 res[(bitpos / 8) as usize] ^= 1 << (bitpos & 7);
249 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
251 sha.result(&mut res);
257 /// Inserts a revocation secret into this channel monitor. Also optionally tracks the next
258 /// revocation point which may be required to claim HTLC outputs which we know the preimage of
259 /// in case the remote end force-closes using their latest state.
260 pub fn provide_secret(&mut self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32], their_next_revocation_point: Option<(u64, PublicKey)>) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
261 let pos = ChannelMonitor::place_secret(idx);
263 let (old_secret, old_idx) = self.old_secrets[i as usize];
264 if ChannelMonitor::derive_secret(secret, pos, old_idx) != old_secret {
265 return Err(HandleError{err: "Previous secret did not match new one", msg: None})
268 self.old_secrets[pos as usize] = (secret, idx);
270 if let Some(new_revocation_point) = their_next_revocation_point {
271 match self.their_cur_revocation_points {
272 Some(old_points) => {
273 if old_points.0 == new_revocation_point.0 + 1 {
274 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0, old_points.1, Some(new_revocation_point.1)));
275 } else if old_points.0 == new_revocation_point.0 + 2 {
276 if let Some(old_second_point) = old_points.2 {
277 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0 - 1, old_second_point, Some(new_revocation_point.1)));
279 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((new_revocation_point.0, new_revocation_point.1, None));
282 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((new_revocation_point.0, new_revocation_point.1, None));
286 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((new_revocation_point.0, new_revocation_point.1, None));
290 // TODO: Prune payment_preimages no longer needed by the revocation (just have to check
291 // that non-revoked remote commitment tx(n) do not need it, and our latest local commitment
292 // tx does not need it.
296 /// Informs this monitor of the latest remote (ie non-broadcastable) commitment transaction.
297 /// The monitor watches for it to be broadcasted and then uses the HTLC information (and
298 /// possibly future revocation/preimage information) to claim outputs where possible.
299 pub fn provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, unsigned_commitment_tx: &Transaction, htlc_outputs: Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>) {
300 // TODO: Encrypt the htlc_outputs data with the single-hash of the commitment transaction
301 // so that a remote monitor doesn't learn anything unless there is a malicious close.
302 // (only maybe, sadly we cant do the same for local info, as we need to be aware of
304 self.remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(unsigned_commitment_tx.txid(), htlc_outputs);
307 /// Informs this monitor of the latest local (ie broadcastable) commitment transaction. The
308 /// monitor watches for timeouts and may broadcast it if we approach such a timeout. Thus, it
309 /// is important that any clones of this channel monitor (including remote clones) by kept
310 /// up-to-date as our local commitment transaction is updated.
311 /// Panics if set_their_to_self_delay has never been called.
312 pub fn provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, signed_commitment_tx: Transaction, local_keys: chan_utils::TxCreationKeys, feerate_per_kw: u64, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Signature, Signature)>) {
313 assert!(self.their_to_self_delay.is_some());
314 self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx.take();
315 self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(LocalSignedTx {
316 txid: signed_commitment_tx.txid(),
317 tx: signed_commitment_tx,
318 revocation_key: local_keys.revocation_key,
319 a_htlc_key: local_keys.a_htlc_key,
320 b_htlc_key: local_keys.b_htlc_key,
321 delayed_payment_key: local_keys.a_delayed_payment_key,
327 /// Provides a payment_hash->payment_preimage mapping. Will be automatically pruned when all
328 /// commitment_tx_infos which contain the payment hash have been revoked.
329 pub fn provide_payment_preimage(&mut self, payment_hash: &[u8; 32], payment_preimage: &[u8; 32]) {
330 self.payment_preimages.insert(payment_hash.clone(), payment_preimage.clone());
333 pub fn insert_combine(&mut self, mut other: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
334 match self.funding_txo {
335 Some(txo) => if other.funding_txo.is_some() && other.funding_txo.unwrap() != txo {
336 return Err(HandleError{err: "Funding transaction outputs are not identical!", msg: None});
338 None => if other.funding_txo.is_some() {
339 self.funding_txo = other.funding_txo;
342 let other_min_secret = other.get_min_seen_secret();
343 let our_min_secret = self.get_min_seen_secret();
344 if our_min_secret > other_min_secret {
345 self.provide_secret(other_min_secret, other.get_secret(other_min_secret).unwrap(), None)?;
347 if our_min_secret >= other_min_secret {
348 self.their_cur_revocation_points = other.their_cur_revocation_points;
349 for (txid, htlcs) in other.remote_claimable_outpoints.drain() {
350 self.remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, htlcs);
352 if let Some(local_tx) = other.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
353 self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(local_tx);
355 if let Some(local_tx) = other.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
356 self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(local_tx);
358 self.payment_preimages = other.payment_preimages;
363 /// Panics if commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor doesn't fit in 48 bits
364 pub fn set_commitment_obscure_factor(&mut self, commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64) {
365 assert!(commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor < (1 << 48));
366 self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor = commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor;
369 /// Allows this monitor to scan only for transactions which are applicable. Note that this is
370 /// optional, without it this monitor cannot be used in an SPV client, but you may wish to
371 /// avoid this (or call unset_funding_info) on a monitor you wish to send to a watchtower as it
372 /// provides slightly better privacy.
373 pub fn set_funding_info(&mut self, funding_info: OutPoint) {
374 self.funding_txo = Some(funding_info);
377 pub fn set_their_htlc_base_key(&mut self, their_htlc_base_key: &PublicKey) {
378 self.their_htlc_base_key = Some(their_htlc_base_key.clone());
381 pub fn set_their_to_self_delay(&mut self, their_to_self_delay: u16) {
382 self.their_to_self_delay = Some(their_to_self_delay);
385 pub fn unset_funding_info(&mut self) {
386 self.funding_txo = None;
389 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
393 //TODO: Functions to serialize/deserialize (with different forms depending on which information
394 //we want to leave out (eg funding_txo, etc).
396 /// Can only fail if idx is < get_min_seen_secret
397 pub fn get_secret(&self, idx: u64) -> Result<[u8; 32], HandleError> {
398 for i in 0..self.old_secrets.len() {
399 if (idx & (!((1 << i) - 1))) == self.old_secrets[i].1 {
400 return Ok(ChannelMonitor::derive_secret(self.old_secrets[i].0, i as u8, idx))
403 assert!(idx < self.get_min_seen_secret());
404 Err(HandleError{err: "idx too low", msg: None})
407 pub fn get_min_seen_secret(&self) -> u64 {
408 //TODO This can be optimized?
409 let mut min = 1 << 48;
410 for &(_, idx) in self.old_secrets.iter() {
418 /// Attempts to claim a remote commitment transaction's outputs using the revocation key and
419 /// data in remote_claimable_outpoints. Will directly claim any HTLC outputs which expire at a
420 /// height > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER. In any case, will install monitoring for
421 /// HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions, and claim them using the revocation key (if
422 /// applicable) as well.
423 fn check_spend_remote_transaction(&self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32) -> Vec<Transaction> {
424 // Most secp and related errors trying to create keys means we have no hope of constructing
425 // a spend transaction...so we return no transactions to broadcast
426 let mut txn_to_broadcast = Vec::new();
427 macro_rules! ignore_error {
428 ( $thing : expr ) => {
431 Err(_) => return txn_to_broadcast
436 let commitment_txid = tx.txid(); //TODO: This is gonna be a performance bottleneck for watchtowers!
437 let per_commitment_option = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(&commitment_txid);
439 let commitment_number = (((tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor;
440 if commitment_number >= self.get_min_seen_secret() {
441 let secret = self.get_secret(commitment_number).unwrap();
442 let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &secret));
443 let (revocation_pubkey, b_htlc_key) = match self.key_storage {
444 KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key } => {
445 let per_commitment_point = ignore_error!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key));
446 (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &ignore_error!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_base_key)))),
447 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &ignore_error!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &htlc_base_key)))))
449 KeyStorage::SigsMode { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
450 let per_commitment_point = ignore_error!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key));
451 (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &revocation_base_key)),
452 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &htlc_base_key)))
455 let delayed_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &ignore_error!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key)), &self.delayed_payment_base_key));
456 let a_htlc_key = match self.their_htlc_base_key {
457 None => return txn_to_broadcast,
458 Some(their_htlc_base_key) => ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &ignore_error!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key)), &their_htlc_base_key)),
461 let revokeable_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey, self.our_to_self_delay, &delayed_key);
462 let revokeable_p2wsh = revokeable_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
464 let mut total_value = 0;
465 let mut values = Vec::new();
466 let mut inputs = Vec::new();
467 let mut htlc_idxs = Vec::new();
469 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
470 if outp.script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh {
472 prev_hash: commitment_txid,
473 prev_index: idx as u32,
474 script_sig: Script::new(),
475 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
478 htlc_idxs.push(None);
479 values.push(outp.value);
480 total_value += outp.value;
481 break; // There can only be one of these
485 macro_rules! sign_input {
486 ($sighash_parts: expr, $input: expr, $htlc_idx: expr, $amount: expr) => {
488 let (sig, redeemscript) = match self.key_storage {
489 KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
490 let redeemscript = if $htlc_idx.is_none() { revokeable_redeemscript.clone() } else {
491 let htlc = &per_commitment_option.unwrap()[$htlc_idx.unwrap()];
492 chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey)
494 let sighash = ignore_error!(Message::from_slice(&$sighash_parts.sighash_all(&$input, &redeemscript, $amount)[..]));
495 let revocation_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key, &revocation_base_key));
496 (ignore_error!(self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &revocation_key)), redeemscript)
498 KeyStorage::SigsMode { .. } => {
502 $input.witness.push(sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
503 $input.witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
504 if $htlc_idx.is_none() {
505 $input.witness.push(vec!(1));
507 $input.witness.push(revocation_pubkey.serialize().to_vec());
509 $input.witness.push(redeemscript.into_vec());
514 if let Some(per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
515 inputs.reserve_exact(per_commitment_data.len());
517 for (idx, htlc) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() {
518 let expected_script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey);
519 if htlc.transaction_output_index as usize >= tx.output.len() ||
520 tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 ||
521 tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].script_pubkey != expected_script.to_v0_p2wsh() {
522 return txn_to_broadcast; // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user
525 prev_hash: commitment_txid,
526 prev_index: htlc.transaction_output_index,
527 script_sig: Script::new(),
528 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
531 if htlc.cltv_expiry > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER {
533 htlc_idxs.push(Some(idx));
534 values.push(tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].value);
535 total_value += htlc.amount_msat / 1000;
537 let mut single_htlc_tx = Transaction {
542 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
543 value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000, //TODO: - fee
546 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&single_htlc_tx);
547 sign_input!(sighash_parts, single_htlc_tx.input[0], Some(idx), htlc.amount_msat / 1000);
548 txn_to_broadcast.push(single_htlc_tx); // TODO: This is not yet tested in ChannelManager!
553 if !inputs.is_empty() || !txn_to_broadcast.is_empty() {
554 // We're definitely a remote commitment transaction!
555 // TODO: Register commitment_txid with the ChainWatchInterface!
556 self.remote_htlc_outputs_on_chain.lock().unwrap().insert(commitment_txid, commitment_number);
558 if inputs.is_empty() { return txn_to_broadcast; } // Nothing to be done...probably a false positive/local tx
560 let outputs = vec!(TxOut {
561 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
562 value: total_value, //TODO: - fee
564 let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
571 let mut values_drain = values.drain(..);
572 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx);
574 for (input, htlc_idx) in spend_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(htlc_idxs.iter()) {
575 let value = values_drain.next().unwrap();
576 sign_input!(sighash_parts, input, htlc_idx, value);
579 txn_to_broadcast.push(spend_tx);
580 } else if let Some(per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
581 if let Some(revocation_points) = self.their_cur_revocation_points {
582 let revocation_point_option =
583 if revocation_points.0 == commitment_number { Some(&revocation_points.1) }
584 else if let Some(point) = revocation_points.2.as_ref() {
585 if revocation_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 { Some(point) } else { None }
587 if let Some(revocation_point) = revocation_point_option {
588 let (revocation_pubkey, b_htlc_key) = match self.key_storage {
589 KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key } => {
590 (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &ignore_error!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_base_key)))),
591 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &ignore_error!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &htlc_base_key)))))
593 KeyStorage::SigsMode { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
594 (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &revocation_base_key)),
595 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &htlc_base_key)))
598 let a_htlc_key = match self.their_htlc_base_key {
599 None => return txn_to_broadcast,
600 Some(their_htlc_base_key) => ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &their_htlc_base_key)),
603 let mut total_value = 0;
604 let mut values = Vec::new();
605 let mut inputs = Vec::new();
607 macro_rules! sign_input {
608 ($sighash_parts: expr, $input: expr, $amount: expr, $preimage: expr) => {
610 let (sig, redeemscript) = match self.key_storage {
611 KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
612 let htlc = &per_commitment_option.unwrap()[$input.sequence as usize];
613 let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey);
614 let sighash = ignore_error!(Message::from_slice(&$sighash_parts.sighash_all(&$input, &redeemscript, $amount)[..]));
615 let htlc_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &htlc_base_key));
616 (ignore_error!(self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &htlc_key)), redeemscript)
618 KeyStorage::SigsMode { .. } => {
622 $input.witness.push(sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
623 $input.witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
624 $input.witness.push($preimage);
625 $input.witness.push(redeemscript.into_vec());
630 for (idx, htlc) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() {
631 if let Some(payment_preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
633 prev_hash: commitment_txid,
634 prev_index: htlc.transaction_output_index,
635 script_sig: Script::new(),
636 sequence: idx as u32, // reset to 0xfffffffd in sign_input
639 if htlc.cltv_expiry > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER {
641 values.push((tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].value, payment_preimage));
642 total_value += htlc.amount_msat / 1000;
644 let mut single_htlc_tx = Transaction {
649 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
650 value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000, //TODO: - fee
653 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&single_htlc_tx);
654 sign_input!(sighash_parts, single_htlc_tx.input[0], htlc.amount_msat / 1000, payment_preimage.to_vec());
655 txn_to_broadcast.push(single_htlc_tx);
660 if inputs.is_empty() { return txn_to_broadcast; } // Nothing to be done...probably a false positive/local tx
662 let outputs = vec!(TxOut {
663 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
664 value: total_value, //TODO: - fee
666 let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
673 let mut values_drain = values.drain(..);
674 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx);
676 for input in spend_tx.input.iter_mut() {
677 let value = values_drain.next().unwrap();
678 sign_input!(sighash_parts, input, value.0, value.1.to_vec());
681 txn_to_broadcast.push(spend_tx);
685 //TODO: For each input check if its in our remote_htlc_outputs_on_chain map!
691 fn broadcast_by_local_state(&self, local_tx: &LocalSignedTx) -> Vec<Transaction> {
692 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
694 for &(ref htlc, ref their_sig, ref our_sig) in local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
696 let mut htlc_timeout_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&local_tx.txid, local_tx.feerate_per_kw, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), htlc, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key, &local_tx.revocation_key);
698 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
700 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(their_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
701 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
702 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
703 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
705 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new());
706 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &local_tx.a_htlc_key, &local_tx.b_htlc_key, &local_tx.revocation_key).into_vec());
708 res.push(htlc_timeout_tx);
710 if let Some(payment_preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
711 let mut htlc_success_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&local_tx.txid, local_tx.feerate_per_kw, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), htlc, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key, &local_tx.revocation_key);
713 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
715 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(their_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
716 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
717 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
718 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
720 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(payment_preimage.to_vec());
721 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &local_tx.a_htlc_key, &local_tx.b_htlc_key, &local_tx.revocation_key).into_vec());
723 res.push(htlc_success_tx);
731 /// Attempts to claim any claimable HTLCs in a commitment transaction which was not (yet)
732 /// revoked using data in local_claimable_outpoints.
733 /// Should not be used if check_spend_revoked_transaction succeeds.
734 fn check_spend_local_transaction(&self, tx: &Transaction, _height: u32) -> Vec<Transaction> {
735 let commitment_txid = tx.txid();
736 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
737 if local_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
738 return self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx);
741 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
742 if local_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
743 return self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx);
749 fn block_connected(&self, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], height: u32, broadcaster: &BroadcasterInterface) {
750 for tx in txn_matched {
751 for txin in tx.input.iter() {
752 if self.funding_txo.is_none() || (txin.prev_hash == self.funding_txo.unwrap().txid && txin.prev_index == self.funding_txo.unwrap().index as u32) {
753 let mut txn = self.check_spend_remote_transaction(tx, height);
755 txn = self.check_spend_local_transaction(tx, height);
757 for tx in txn.iter() {
758 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(tx);
763 if let Some(ref cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
764 let mut needs_broadcast = false;
765 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in cur_local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
766 if htlc.cltv_expiry <= height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER {
767 if htlc.offered || self.payment_preimages.contains_key(&htlc.payment_hash) {
768 needs_broadcast = true;
774 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&cur_local_tx.tx);
775 for tx in self.broadcast_by_local_state(&cur_local_tx) {
776 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
782 pub fn would_broadcast_at_height(&self, height: u32) -> bool {
783 if let Some(ref cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
784 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in cur_local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
785 if htlc.cltv_expiry <= height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER {
786 if htlc.offered || self.payment_preimages.contains_key(&htlc.payment_hash) {
798 use bitcoin::util::misc::hex_bytes;
799 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Script;
800 use ln::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor;
801 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
802 use secp256k1::Secp256k1;
805 fn test_per_commitment_storage() {
806 // Test vectors from BOLT 3:
807 let mut secrets: Vec<[u8; 32]> = Vec::new();
808 let mut monitor: ChannelMonitor;
809 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
811 macro_rules! test_secrets {
813 let mut idx = 281474976710655;
814 for secret in secrets.iter() {
815 assert_eq!(monitor.get_secret(idx).unwrap(), *secret);
818 assert_eq!(monitor.get_min_seen_secret(), idx + 1);
819 assert!(monitor.get_secret(idx).is_err());
824 // insert_secret correct sequence
825 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::new(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
828 secrets.push([0; 32]);
829 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
830 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
833 secrets.push([0; 32]);
834 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
835 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
838 secrets.push([0; 32]);
839 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
840 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
843 secrets.push([0; 32]);
844 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
845 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
848 secrets.push([0; 32]);
849 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
850 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
853 secrets.push([0; 32]);
854 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
855 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
858 secrets.push([0; 32]);
859 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
860 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
863 secrets.push([0; 32]);
864 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
865 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
870 // insert_secret #1 incorrect
871 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::new(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
874 secrets.push([0; 32]);
875 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
876 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
879 secrets.push([0; 32]);
880 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
881 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err,
882 "Previous secret did not match new one");
886 // insert_secret #2 incorrect (#1 derived from incorrect)
887 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::new(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
890 secrets.push([0; 32]);
891 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
892 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
895 secrets.push([0; 32]);
896 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("dddc3a8d14fddf2b68fa8c7fbad2748274937479dd0f8930d5ebb4ab6bd866a3").unwrap());
897 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
900 secrets.push([0; 32]);
901 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
902 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
905 secrets.push([0; 32]);
906 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
907 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err,
908 "Previous secret did not match new one");
912 // insert_secret #3 incorrect
913 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::new(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
916 secrets.push([0; 32]);
917 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
918 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
921 secrets.push([0; 32]);
922 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
923 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
926 secrets.push([0; 32]);
927 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("c51a18b13e8527e579ec56365482c62f180b7d5760b46e9477dae59e87ed423a").unwrap());
928 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
931 secrets.push([0; 32]);
932 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
933 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err,
934 "Previous secret did not match new one");
938 // insert_secret #4 incorrect (1,2,3 derived from incorrect)
939 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::new(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
942 secrets.push([0; 32]);
943 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
944 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
947 secrets.push([0; 32]);
948 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("dddc3a8d14fddf2b68fa8c7fbad2748274937479dd0f8930d5ebb4ab6bd866a3").unwrap());
949 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
952 secrets.push([0; 32]);
953 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("c51a18b13e8527e579ec56365482c62f180b7d5760b46e9477dae59e87ed423a").unwrap());
954 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
957 secrets.push([0; 32]);
958 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("ba65d7b0ef55a3ba300d4e87af29868f394f8f138d78a7011669c79b37b936f4").unwrap());
959 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
962 secrets.push([0; 32]);
963 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
964 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
967 secrets.push([0; 32]);
968 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
969 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
972 secrets.push([0; 32]);
973 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
974 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
977 secrets.push([0; 32]);
978 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
979 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err,
980 "Previous secret did not match new one");
984 // insert_secret #5 incorrect
985 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::new(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
988 secrets.push([0; 32]);
989 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
990 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
993 secrets.push([0; 32]);
994 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
995 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
998 secrets.push([0; 32]);
999 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1000 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1003 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1004 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1005 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1008 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1009 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("631373ad5f9ef654bb3dade742d09504c567edd24320d2fcd68e3cc47e2ff6a6").unwrap());
1010 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1013 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1014 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
1015 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err,
1016 "Previous secret did not match new one");
1020 // insert_secret #6 incorrect (5 derived from incorrect)
1021 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::new(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
1024 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1025 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1026 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1029 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1030 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1031 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1034 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1035 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1036 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1039 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1040 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1041 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1044 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1045 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("631373ad5f9ef654bb3dade742d09504c567edd24320d2fcd68e3cc47e2ff6a6").unwrap());
1046 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1049 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1050 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("b7e76a83668bde38b373970155c868a653304308f9896692f904a23731224bb1").unwrap());
1051 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1054 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1055 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
1056 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1059 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1060 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
1061 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err,
1062 "Previous secret did not match new one");
1066 // insert_secret #7 incorrect
1067 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::new(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
1070 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1071 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1072 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1075 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1076 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1077 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1080 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1081 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1082 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1085 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1086 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1087 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1090 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1091 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
1092 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1095 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1096 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
1097 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1100 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1101 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("e7971de736e01da8ed58b94c2fc216cb1dca9e326f3a96e7194fe8ea8af6c0a3").unwrap());
1102 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1105 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1106 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
1107 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err,
1108 "Previous secret did not match new one");
1112 // insert_secret #8 incorrect
1113 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::new(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
1116 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1117 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1118 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1121 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1122 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1123 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1126 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1127 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1128 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1131 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1132 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1133 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1136 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1137 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
1138 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1141 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1142 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
1143 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1146 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1147 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
1148 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1151 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1152 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("a7efbc61aac46d34f77778bac22c8a20c6a46ca460addc49009bda875ec88fa4").unwrap());
1153 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err,
1154 "Previous secret did not match new one");
1158 // Further testing is done in the ChannelManager integration tests.