git.bitcoin.ninja Git - rust-lightning/blob - src/ln/channelmonitor.rs

   1 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
   2 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxIn,TxOut,SigHashType,Transaction};
   3 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Script;
   4 use bitcoin::util::hash::Sha256dHash;
   5 use bitcoin::util::bip143;
   6
   7 use crypto::digest::Digest;
   8
   9 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Message,Signature};
  10 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
  11
  12 use ln::msgs::HandleError;
  13 use ln::chan_utils;
  14 use ln::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment;
  15 use chain::chaininterface::{ChainListener, ChainWatchInterface, BroadcasterInterface};
  16 use util::sha2::Sha256;
  17
  18 use std::collections::HashMap;
  19 use std::sync::{Arc,Mutex};
  20 use std::{hash,cmp};
  21
  22 pub enum ChannelMonitorUpdateErr {
  23         /// Used to indicate a temporary failure (eg connection to a watchtower failed, but is expected
  24         /// to succeed at some point in the future).
  25         /// Such a failure will "freeze" a channel, preventing us from revoking old states or
  26         /// submitting new commitment transactions to the remote party.
  27         /// ChannelManager::test_restore_channel_monitor can be used to retry the update(s) and restore
  28         /// the channel to an operational state.
  29         TemporaryFailure,
  30         /// Used to indicate no further channel monitor updates will be allowed (eg we've moved on to a
  31         /// different watchtower and cannot update with all watchtowers that were previously informed
  32         /// of this channel). This will force-close the channel in question.
  33         PermanentFailure,
  34 }
  35
  36 /// Simple trait indicating ability to track a set of ChannelMonitors and multiplex events between
  37 /// them. Generally should be implemented by keeping a local SimpleManyChannelMonitor and passing
  38 /// events to it, while also taking any add_update_monitor events and passing them to some remote
  39 /// server(s).
  40 /// Note that any updates to a channel's monitor *must* be applied to each instance of the
  41 /// channel's monitor everywhere (including remote watchtowers) *before* this function returns. If
  42 /// an update occurs and a remote watchtower is left with old state, it may broadcast transactions
  43 /// which we have revoked, allowing our counterparty to claim all funds in the channel!
  44 pub trait ManyChannelMonitor: Send + Sync {
  45         /// Adds or updates a monitor for the given funding_txid+funding_output_index.
  46         fn add_update_monitor(&self, funding_txo: (Sha256dHash, u16), monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr>;
  47 }
  48
  49 /// A simple implementation of a ManyChannelMonitor and ChainListener. Can be used to create a
  50 /// watchtower or watch our own channels.
  51 /// Note that you must provide your own key by which to refer to channels.
  52 /// If you're accepting remote monitors (ie are implementing a watchtower), you must verify that
  53 /// users cannot overwrite a given channel by providing a duplicate key. ie you should probably
  54 /// index by a PublicKey which is required to sign any updates.
  55 /// If you're using this for local monitoring of your own channels, you probably want to use
  56 /// (Sha256dHash, u16) as the key, which will give you a ManyChannelMonitor implementation.
  57 pub struct SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
  58         monitors: Mutex<HashMap<Key, ChannelMonitor>>,
  59         chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>,
  60         broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>
  61 }
  62
  63 impl<Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash> ChainListener for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
  64         fn block_connected(&self, _header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], _indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) {
  65                 let monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
  66                 for monitor in monitors.values() {
  67                         monitor.block_connected(txn_matched, height, &*self.broadcaster);
  68                 }
  69         }
  70
  71         fn block_disconnected(&self, _: &BlockHeader) { }
  72 }
  73
  74 impl<Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash + 'static> SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
  75         pub fn new(chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>, broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>) -> Arc<SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key>> {
  76                 let res = Arc::new(SimpleManyChannelMonitor {
  77                         monitors: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
  78                         chain_monitor,
  79                         broadcaster
  80                 });
  81                 let weak_res = Arc::downgrade(&res);
  82                 res.chain_monitor.register_listener(weak_res);
  83                 res
  84         }
  85
  86         pub fn add_update_monitor_by_key(&self, key: Key, monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
  87                 let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
  88                 match monitors.get_mut(&key) {
  89                         Some(orig_monitor) => return orig_monitor.insert_combine(monitor),
  90                         None => {}
  91                 };
  92                 match monitor.funding_txo {
  93                         None => self.chain_monitor.watch_all_txn(),
  94                         Some((funding_txid, funding_output_index)) => self.chain_monitor.install_watch_outpoint((funding_txid, funding_output_index as u32)),
  95                 }
  96                 monitors.insert(key, monitor);
  97                 Ok(())
  98         }
  99 }
 100
 101 impl ManyChannelMonitor for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<(Sha256dHash, u16)> {
 102         fn add_update_monitor(&self, funding_txo: (Sha256dHash, u16), monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr> {
 103                 match self.add_update_monitor_by_key(funding_txo, monitor) {
 104                         Ok(_) => Ok(()),
 105                         Err(_) => Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure),
 106                 }
 107         }
 108 }
 109
 110 /// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, don't try to claim it in a shared transaction,
 111 /// instead claiming it in its own individual transaction.
 112 const CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 12;
 113 /// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, force-close the channel to broadcast the
 114 /// HTLC-Success transaction.
 115 const CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 6;
 116
 117 #[derive(Clone)]
 118 enum KeyStorage {
 119         PrivMode {
 120                 revocation_base_key: SecretKey,
 121                 htlc_base_key: SecretKey,
 122         },
 123         SigsMode {
 124                 revocation_base_key: PublicKey,
 125                 htlc_base_key: PublicKey,
 126                 sigs: HashMap<Sha256dHash, Signature>,
 127         }
 128 }
 129
 130 #[derive(Clone)]
 131 struct LocalSignedTx {
 132         txid: Sha256dHash,
 133         tx: Transaction,
 134         revocation_key: PublicKey,
 135         a_htlc_key: PublicKey,
 136         b_htlc_key: PublicKey,
 137         delayed_payment_key: PublicKey,
 138         feerate_per_kw: u64,
 139         htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Signature, Signature)>,
 140 }
 141
 142 pub struct ChannelMonitor {
 143         funding_txo: Option<(Sha256dHash, u16)>,
 144         commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64,
 145
 146         key_storage: KeyStorage,
 147         delayed_payment_base_key: PublicKey,
 148         their_htlc_base_key: Option<PublicKey>,
 149         // first is the idx of the first of the two revocation points
 150         their_cur_revocation_points: Option<(u64, PublicKey, Option<PublicKey>)>,
 151
 152         our_to_self_delay: u16,
 153         their_to_self_delay: Option<u16>,
 154
 155         old_secrets: [([u8; 32], u64); 49],
 156         remote_claimable_outpoints: HashMap<Sha256dHash, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>>,
 157         remote_htlc_outputs_on_chain: Mutex<HashMap<Sha256dHash, u64>>,
 158
 159         // We store two local commitment transactions to avoid any race conditions where we may update
 160         // some monitors (potentially on watchtowers) but then fail to update others, resulting in the
 161         // various monitors for one channel being out of sync, and us broadcasting a local
 162         // transaction for which we have deleted claim information on some watchtowers.
 163         prev_local_signed_commitment_tx: Option<LocalSignedTx>,
 164         current_local_signed_commitment_tx: Option<LocalSignedTx>,
 165
 166         payment_preimages: HashMap<[u8; 32], [u8; 32]>,
 167
 168         destination_script: Script,
 169         secp_ctx: Secp256k1, //TODO: dedup this a bit...
 170 }
 171 impl Clone for ChannelMonitor {
 172         fn clone(&self) -> Self {
 173                 ChannelMonitor {
 174                         funding_txo: self.funding_txo.clone(),
 175                         commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor.clone(),
 176
 177                         key_storage: self.key_storage.clone(),
 178                         delayed_payment_base_key: self.delayed_payment_base_key.clone(),
 179                         their_htlc_base_key: self.their_htlc_base_key.clone(),
 180                         their_cur_revocation_points: self.their_cur_revocation_points.clone(),
 181
 182                         our_to_self_delay: self.our_to_self_delay,
 183                         their_to_self_delay: self.their_to_self_delay,
 184
 185                         old_secrets: self.old_secrets.clone(),
 186                         remote_claimable_outpoints: self.remote_claimable_outpoints.clone(),
 187                         remote_htlc_outputs_on_chain: Mutex::new((*self.remote_htlc_outputs_on_chain.lock().unwrap()).clone()),
 188
 189                         prev_local_signed_commitment_tx: self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.clone(),
 190                         current_local_signed_commitment_tx: self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx.clone(),
 191
 192                         payment_preimages: self.payment_preimages.clone(),
 193
 194                         destination_script: self.destination_script.clone(),
 195                         secp_ctx: self.secp_ctx.clone(),
 196                 }
 197         }
 198 }
 199
 200 impl ChannelMonitor {
 201         pub fn new(revocation_base_key: &SecretKey, delayed_payment_base_key: &PublicKey, htlc_base_key: &SecretKey, our_to_self_delay: u16, destination_script: Script) -> ChannelMonitor {
 202                 ChannelMonitor {
 203                         funding_txo: None,
 204                         commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: 0,
 205
 206                         key_storage: KeyStorage::PrivMode {
 207                                 revocation_base_key: revocation_base_key.clone(),
 208                                 htlc_base_key: htlc_base_key.clone(),
 209                         },
 210                         delayed_payment_base_key: delayed_payment_base_key.clone(),
 211                         their_htlc_base_key: None,
 212                         their_cur_revocation_points: None,
 213
 214                         our_to_self_delay: our_to_self_delay,
 215                         their_to_self_delay: None,
 216
 217                         old_secrets: [([0; 32], 1 << 48); 49],
 218                         remote_claimable_outpoints: HashMap::new(),
 219                         remote_htlc_outputs_on_chain: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
 220
 221                         prev_local_signed_commitment_tx: None,
 222                         current_local_signed_commitment_tx: None,
 223
 224                         payment_preimages: HashMap::new(),
 225
 226                         destination_script: destination_script,
 227                         secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
 228                 }
 229         }
 230
 231         #[inline]
 232         fn place_secret(idx: u64) -> u8 {
 233                 for i in 0..48 {
 234                         if idx & (1 << i) == (1 << i) {
 235                                 return i
 236                         }
 237                 }
 238                 48
 239         }
 240
 241         #[inline]
 242         fn derive_secret(secret: [u8; 32], bits: u8, idx: u64) -> [u8; 32] {
 243                 let mut res: [u8; 32] = secret;
 244                 for i in 0..bits {
 245                         let bitpos = bits - 1 - i;
 246                         if idx & (1 << bitpos) == (1 << bitpos) {
 247                                 res[(bitpos / 8) as usize] ^= 1 << (bitpos & 7);
 248                                 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
 249                                 sha.input(&res);
 250                                 sha.result(&mut res);
 251                         }
 252                 }
 253                 res
 254         }
 255
 256         /// Inserts a revocation secret into this channel monitor. Also optionally tracks the next
 257         /// revocation point which may be required to claim HTLC outputs which we know the preimage of
 258         /// in case the remote end force-closes using their latest state.
 259         pub fn provide_secret(&mut self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32], their_next_revocation_point: Option<(u64, PublicKey)>) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
 260                 let pos = ChannelMonitor::place_secret(idx);
 261                 for i in 0..pos {
 262                         let (old_secret, old_idx) = self.old_secrets[i as usize];
 263                         if ChannelMonitor::derive_secret(secret, pos, old_idx) != old_secret {
 264                                 return Err(HandleError{err: "Previous secret did not match new one", msg: None})
 265                         }
 266                 }
 267                 self.old_secrets[pos as usize] = (secret, idx);
 268
 269                 if let Some(new_revocation_point) = their_next_revocation_point {
 270                         match self.their_cur_revocation_points {
 271                                 Some(old_points) => {
 272                                         if old_points.0 == new_revocation_point.0 + 1 {
 273                                                 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0, old_points.1, Some(new_revocation_point.1)));
 274                                         } else if old_points.0 == new_revocation_point.0 + 2 {
 275                                                 if let Some(old_second_point) = old_points.2 {
 276                                                         self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0 - 1, old_second_point, Some(new_revocation_point.1)));
 277                                                 } else {
 278                                                         self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((new_revocation_point.0, new_revocation_point.1, None));
 279                                                 }
 280                                         } else {
 281                                                 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((new_revocation_point.0, new_revocation_point.1, None));
 282                                         }
 283                                 },
 284                                 None => {
 285                                         self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((new_revocation_point.0, new_revocation_point.1, None));
 286                                 }
 287                         }
 288                 }
 289                 // TODO: Prune payment_preimages no longer needed by the revocation (just have to check
 290                 // that non-revoked remote commitment tx(n) do not need it, and our latest local commitment
 291                 // tx does not need it.
 292                 Ok(())
 293         }
 294
 295         /// Informs this monitor of the latest remote (ie non-broadcastable) commitment transaction.
 296         /// The monitor watches for it to be broadcasted and then uses the HTLC information (and
 297         /// possibly future revocation/preimage information) to claim outputs where possible.
 298         pub fn provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, unsigned_commitment_tx: &Transaction, htlc_outputs: Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>) {
 299                 // TODO: Encrypt the htlc_outputs data with the single-hash of the commitment transaction
 300                 // so that a remote monitor doesn't learn anything unless there is a malicious close.
 301                 // (only maybe, sadly we cant do the same for local info, as we need to be aware of
 302                 // timeouts)
 303                 self.remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(unsigned_commitment_tx.txid(), htlc_outputs);
 304         }
 305
 306         /// Informs this monitor of the latest local (ie broadcastable) commitment transaction. The
 307         /// monitor watches for timeouts and may broadcast it if we approach such a timeout. Thus, it
 308         /// is important that any clones of this channel monitor (including remote clones) by kept
 309         /// up-to-date as our local commitment transaction is updated.
 310         /// Panics if set_their_to_self_delay has never been called.
 311         pub fn provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, signed_commitment_tx: Transaction, local_keys: chan_utils::TxCreationKeys, feerate_per_kw: u64, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Signature, Signature)>) {
 312                 assert!(self.their_to_self_delay.is_some());
 313                 self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx.take();
 314                 self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(LocalSignedTx {
 315                         txid: signed_commitment_tx.txid(),
 316                         tx: signed_commitment_tx,
 317                         revocation_key: local_keys.revocation_key,
 318                         a_htlc_key: local_keys.a_htlc_key,
 319                         b_htlc_key: local_keys.b_htlc_key,
 320                         delayed_payment_key: local_keys.a_delayed_payment_key,
 321                         feerate_per_kw,
 322                         htlc_outputs,
 323                 });
 324         }
 325
 326         /// Provides a payment_hash->payment_preimage mapping. Will be automatically pruned when all
 327         /// commitment_tx_infos which contain the payment hash have been revoked.
 328         pub fn provide_payment_preimage(&mut self, payment_hash: &[u8; 32], payment_preimage: &[u8; 32]) {
 329                 self.payment_preimages.insert(payment_hash.clone(), payment_preimage.clone());
 330         }
 331
 332         pub fn insert_combine(&mut self, mut other: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
 333                 match self.funding_txo {
 334                         Some(txo) => if other.funding_txo.is_some() && other.funding_txo.unwrap() != txo {
 335                                 return Err(HandleError{err: "Funding transaction outputs are not identical!", msg: None});
 336                         },
 337                         None => if other.funding_txo.is_some() {
 338                                 self.funding_txo = other.funding_txo;
 339                         }
 340                 }
 341                 let other_min_secret = other.get_min_seen_secret();
 342                 let our_min_secret = self.get_min_seen_secret();
 343                 if our_min_secret > other_min_secret {
 344                         self.provide_secret(other_min_secret, other.get_secret(other_min_secret).unwrap(), None)?;
 345                 }
 346                 if our_min_secret >= other_min_secret {
 347                         self.their_cur_revocation_points = other.their_cur_revocation_points;
 348                         for (txid, htlcs) in other.remote_claimable_outpoints.drain() {
 349                                 self.remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, htlcs);
 350                         }
 351                         if let Some(local_tx) = other.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
 352                                 self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(local_tx);
 353                         }
 354                         if let Some(local_tx) = other.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
 355                                 self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(local_tx);
 356                         }
 357                         self.payment_preimages = other.payment_preimages;
 358                 }
 359                 Ok(())
 360         }
 361
 362         /// Panics if commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor doesn't fit in 48 bits
 363         pub fn set_commitment_obscure_factor(&mut self, commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64) {
 364                 assert!(commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor < (1 << 48));
 365                 self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor = commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor;
 366         }
 367
 368         /// Allows this monitor to scan only for transactions which are applicable. Note that this is
 369         /// optional, without it this monitor cannot be used in an SPV client, but you may wish to
 370         /// avoid this (or call unset_funding_info) on a monitor you wish to send to a watchtower as it
 371         /// provides slightly better privacy.
 372         pub fn set_funding_info(&mut self, funding_txid: Sha256dHash, funding_output_index: u16) {
 373                 self.funding_txo = Some((funding_txid, funding_output_index));
 374         }
 375
 376         pub fn set_their_htlc_base_key(&mut self, their_htlc_base_key: &PublicKey) {
 377                 self.their_htlc_base_key = Some(their_htlc_base_key.clone());
 378         }
 379
 380         pub fn set_their_to_self_delay(&mut self, their_to_self_delay: u16) {
 381                 self.their_to_self_delay = Some(their_to_self_delay);
 382         }
 383
 384         pub fn unset_funding_info(&mut self) {
 385                 self.funding_txo = None;
 386         }
 387
 388         pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<(Sha256dHash, u16)> {
 389                 self.funding_txo
 390         }
 391
 392         //TODO: Functions to serialize/deserialize (with different forms depending on which information
 393         //we want to leave out (eg funding_txo, etc).
 394
 395         /// Can only fail if idx is < get_min_seen_secret
 396         pub fn get_secret(&self, idx: u64) -> Result<[u8; 32], HandleError> {
 397                 for i in 0..self.old_secrets.len() {
 398                         if (idx & (!((1 << i) - 1))) == self.old_secrets[i].1 {
 399                                 return Ok(ChannelMonitor::derive_secret(self.old_secrets[i].0, i as u8, idx))
 400                         }
 401                 }
 402                 assert!(idx < self.get_min_seen_secret());
 403                 Err(HandleError{err: "idx too low", msg: None})
 404         }
 405
 406         pub fn get_min_seen_secret(&self) -> u64 {
 407                 //TODO This can be optimized?
 408                 let mut min = 1 << 48;
 409                 for &(_, idx) in self.old_secrets.iter() {
 410                         if idx < min {
 411                                 min = idx;
 412                         }
 413                 }
 414                 min
 415         }
 416
 417         /// Attempts to claim a remote commitment transaction's outputs using the revocation key and
 418         /// data in remote_claimable_outpoints. Will directly claim any HTLC outputs which expire at a
 419         /// height > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER. In any case, will install monitoring for
 420         /// HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions, and claim them using the revocation key (if
 421         /// applicable) as well.
 422         fn check_spend_remote_transaction(&self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32) -> Vec<Transaction> {
 423                 // Most secp and related errors trying to create keys means we have no hope of constructing
 424                 // a spend transaction...so we return no transactions to broadcast
 425                 let mut txn_to_broadcast = Vec::new();
 426                 macro_rules! ignore_error {
 427                         ( $thing : expr ) => {
 428                                 match $thing {
 429                                         Ok(a) => a,
 430                                         Err(_) => return txn_to_broadcast
 431                                 }
 432                         };
 433                 }
 434
 435                 let commitment_txid = tx.txid(); //TODO: This is gonna be a performance bottleneck for watchtowers!
 436                 let per_commitment_option = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(&commitment_txid);
 437
 438                 let commitment_number = (((tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor;
 439                 if commitment_number >= self.get_min_seen_secret() {
 440                         let secret = self.get_secret(commitment_number).unwrap();
 441                         let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &secret));
 442                         let (revocation_pubkey, b_htlc_key) = match self.key_storage {
 443                                 KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key } => {
 444                                         let per_commitment_point = ignore_error!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key));
 445                                         (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &ignore_error!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_base_key)))),
 446                                         ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &ignore_error!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &htlc_base_key)))))
 447                                 },
 448                                 KeyStorage::SigsMode { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
 449                                         let per_commitment_point = ignore_error!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key));
 450                                         (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &revocation_base_key)),
 451                                         ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &htlc_base_key)))
 452                                 },
 453                         };
 454                         let delayed_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &ignore_error!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key)), &self.delayed_payment_base_key));
 455                         let a_htlc_key = match self.their_htlc_base_key {
 456                                 None => return txn_to_broadcast,
 457                                 Some(their_htlc_base_key) => ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &ignore_error!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key)), &their_htlc_base_key)),
 458                         };
 459
 460                         let revokeable_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey, self.our_to_self_delay, &delayed_key);
 461                         let revokeable_p2wsh = revokeable_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
 462
 463                         let mut total_value = 0;
 464                         let mut values = Vec::new();
 465                         let mut inputs = Vec::new();
 466                         let mut htlc_idxs = Vec::new();
 467
 468                         for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
 469                                 if outp.script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh {
 470                                         inputs.push(TxIn {
 471                                                 prev_hash: commitment_txid,
 472                                                 prev_index: idx as u32,
 473                                                 script_sig: Script::new(),
 474                                                 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
 475                                                 witness: Vec::new(),
 476                                         });
 477                                         htlc_idxs.push(None);
 478                                         values.push(outp.value);
 479                                         total_value += outp.value;
 480                                         break; // There can only be one of these
 481                                 }
 482                         }
 483
 484                         macro_rules! sign_input {
 485                                 ($sighash_parts: expr, $input: expr, $htlc_idx: expr, $amount: expr) => {
 486                                         {
 487                                                 let (sig, redeemscript) = match self.key_storage {
 488                                                         KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
 489                                                                 let redeemscript = if $htlc_idx.is_none() { revokeable_redeemscript.clone() } else {
 490                                                                         let htlc = &per_commitment_option.unwrap()[$htlc_idx.unwrap()];
 491                                                                         chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey)
 492                                                                 };
 493                                                                 let sighash = ignore_error!(Message::from_slice(&$sighash_parts.sighash_all(&$input, &redeemscript, $amount)[..]));
 494                                                                 let revocation_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key, &revocation_base_key));
 495                                                                 (ignore_error!(self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &revocation_key)), redeemscript)
 496                                                         },
 497                                                         KeyStorage::SigsMode { .. } => {
 498                                                                 unimplemented!();
 499                                                         }
 500                                                 };
 501                                                 $input.witness.push(sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
 502                                                 $input.witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
 503                                                 if $htlc_idx.is_none() {
 504                                                         $input.witness.push(vec!(1));
 505                                                 } else {
 506                                                         $input.witness.push(revocation_pubkey.serialize().to_vec());
 507                                                 }
 508                                                 $input.witness.push(redeemscript.into_vec());
 509                                         }
 510                                 }
 511                         }
 512
 513                         if let Some(per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
 514                                 inputs.reserve_exact(per_commitment_data.len());
 515
 516                                 for (idx, htlc) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() {
 517                                         let expected_script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey);
 518                                         if htlc.transaction_output_index as usize >= tx.output.len() ||
 519                                                         tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 ||
 520                                                         tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].script_pubkey != expected_script.to_v0_p2wsh() {
 521                                                 return txn_to_broadcast; // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user
 522                                         }
 523                                         let input = TxIn {
 524                                                 prev_hash: commitment_txid,
 525                                                 prev_index: htlc.transaction_output_index,
 526                                                 script_sig: Script::new(),
 527                                                 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
 528                                                 witness: Vec::new(),
 529                                         };
 530                                         if htlc.cltv_expiry > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER {
 531                                                 inputs.push(input);
 532                                                 htlc_idxs.push(Some(idx));
 533                                                 values.push(tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].value);
 534                                                 total_value += htlc.amount_msat / 1000;
 535                                         } else {
 536                                                 let mut single_htlc_tx = Transaction {
 537                                                         version: 2,
 538                                                         lock_time: 0,
 539                                                         input: vec![input],
 540                                                         output: vec!(TxOut {
 541                                                                 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
 542                                                                 value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000, //TODO: - fee
 543                                                         }),
 544                                                 };
 545                                                 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&single_htlc_tx);
 546                                                 sign_input!(sighash_parts, single_htlc_tx.input[0], Some(idx), htlc.amount_msat / 1000);
 547                                                 txn_to_broadcast.push(single_htlc_tx); // TODO: This is not yet tested in ChannelManager!
 548                                         }
 549                                 }
 550                         }
 551
 552                         if !inputs.is_empty() || !txn_to_broadcast.is_empty() {
 553                                 // We're definitely a remote commitment transaction!
 554                                 // TODO: Register commitment_txid with the ChainWatchInterface!
 555                                 self.remote_htlc_outputs_on_chain.lock().unwrap().insert(commitment_txid, commitment_number);
 556                         }
 557                         if inputs.is_empty() { return txn_to_broadcast; } // Nothing to be done...probably a false positive/local tx
 558
 559                         let outputs = vec!(TxOut {
 560                                 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
 561                                 value: total_value, //TODO: - fee
 562                         });
 563                         let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
 564                                 version: 2,
 565                                 lock_time: 0,
 566                                 input: inputs,
 567                                 output: outputs,
 568                         };
 569
 570                         let mut values_drain = values.drain(..);
 571                         let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx);
 572
 573                         for (input, htlc_idx) in spend_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(htlc_idxs.iter()) {
 574                                 let value = values_drain.next().unwrap();
 575                                 sign_input!(sighash_parts, input, htlc_idx, value);
 576                         }
 577
 578                         txn_to_broadcast.push(spend_tx);
 579                 } else if let Some(per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
 580                         if let Some(revocation_points) = self.their_cur_revocation_points {
 581                                 let revocation_point_option =
 582                                         if revocation_points.0 == commitment_number { Some(&revocation_points.1) }
 583                                         else if let Some(point) = revocation_points.2.as_ref() {
 584                                                 if revocation_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 { Some(point) } else { None }
 585                                         } else { None };
 586                                 if let Some(revocation_point) = revocation_point_option {
 587                                         let (revocation_pubkey, b_htlc_key) = match self.key_storage {
 588                                                 KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key } => {
 589                                                         (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &ignore_error!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_base_key)))),
 590                                                         ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &ignore_error!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &htlc_base_key)))))
 591                                                 },
 592                                                 KeyStorage::SigsMode { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
 593                                                         (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &revocation_base_key)),
 594                                                         ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &htlc_base_key)))
 595                                                 },
 596                                         };
 597                                         let a_htlc_key = match self.their_htlc_base_key {
 598                                                 None => return txn_to_broadcast,
 599                                                 Some(their_htlc_base_key) => ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &their_htlc_base_key)),
 600                                         };
 601
 602                                         let mut total_value = 0;
 603                                         let mut values = Vec::new();
 604                                         let mut inputs = Vec::new();
 605
 606                                         macro_rules! sign_input {
 607                                                 ($sighash_parts: expr, $input: expr, $amount: expr, $preimage: expr) => {
 608                                                         {
 609                                                                 let (sig, redeemscript) = match self.key_storage {
 610                                                                         KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
 611                                                                                 let htlc = &per_commitment_option.unwrap()[$input.sequence as usize];
 612                                                                                 let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey);
 613                                                                                 let sighash = ignore_error!(Message::from_slice(&$sighash_parts.sighash_all(&$input, &redeemscript, $amount)[..]));
 614                                                                                 let htlc_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &htlc_base_key));
 615                                                                                 (ignore_error!(self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &htlc_key)), redeemscript)
 616                                                                         },
 617                                                                         KeyStorage::SigsMode { .. } => {
 618                                                                                 unimplemented!();
 619                                                                         }
 620                                                                 };
 621                                                                 $input.witness.push(sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
 622                                                                 $input.witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
 623                                                                 $input.witness.push($preimage);
 624                                                                 $input.witness.push(redeemscript.into_vec());
 625                                                         }
 626                                                 }
 627                                         }
 628
 629                                         for (idx, htlc) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() {
 630                                                 if let Some(payment_preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
 631                                                         let input = TxIn {
 632                                                                 prev_hash: commitment_txid,
 633                                                                 prev_index: htlc.transaction_output_index,
 634                                                                 script_sig: Script::new(),
 635                                                                 sequence: idx as u32, // reset to 0xfffffffd in sign_input
 636                                                                 witness: Vec::new(),
 637                                                         };
 638                                                         if htlc.cltv_expiry > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER {
 639                                                                 inputs.push(input);
 640                                                                 values.push((tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].value, payment_preimage));
 641                                                                 total_value += htlc.amount_msat / 1000;
 642                                                         } else {
 643                                                                 let mut single_htlc_tx = Transaction {
 644                                                                         version: 2,
 645                                                                         lock_time: 0,
 646                                                                         input: vec![input],
 647                                                                         output: vec!(TxOut {
 648                                                                                 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
 649                                                                                 value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000, //TODO: - fee
 650                                                                         }),
 651                                                                 };
 652                                                                 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&single_htlc_tx);
 653                                                                 sign_input!(sighash_parts, single_htlc_tx.input[0], htlc.amount_msat / 1000, payment_preimage.to_vec());
 654                                                                 txn_to_broadcast.push(single_htlc_tx);
 655                                                         }
 656                                                 }
 657                                         }
 658
 659                                         if inputs.is_empty() { return txn_to_broadcast; } // Nothing to be done...probably a false positive/local tx
 660
 661                                         let outputs = vec!(TxOut {
 662                                                 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
 663                                                 value: total_value, //TODO: - fee
 664                                         });
 665                                         let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
 666                                                 version: 2,
 667                                                 lock_time: 0,
 668                                                 input: inputs,
 669                                                 output: outputs,
 670                                         };
 671
 672                                         let mut values_drain = values.drain(..);
 673                                         let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx);
 674
 675                                         for input in spend_tx.input.iter_mut() {
 676                                                 let value = values_drain.next().unwrap();
 677                                                 sign_input!(sighash_parts, input, value.0, value.1.to_vec());
 678                                         }
 679
 680                                         txn_to_broadcast.push(spend_tx);
 681                                 }
 682                         }
 683                 } else {
 684                         //TODO: For each input check if its in our remote_htlc_outputs_on_chain map!
 685                 }
 686
 687                 txn_to_broadcast
 688         }
 689
 690         fn broadcast_by_local_state(&self, local_tx: &LocalSignedTx) -> Vec<Transaction> {
 691                 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
 692
 693                 for &(ref htlc, ref their_sig, ref our_sig) in local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
 694                         if htlc.offered {
 695                                 let mut htlc_timeout_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&local_tx.txid, local_tx.feerate_per_kw, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), htlc, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key, &local_tx.revocation_key);
 696
 697                                 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
 698
 699                                 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(their_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
 700                                 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
 701                                 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
 702                                 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
 703
 704                                 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new());
 705                                 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &local_tx.a_htlc_key, &local_tx.b_htlc_key, &local_tx.revocation_key).into_vec());
 706
 707                                 res.push(htlc_timeout_tx);
 708                         } else {
 709                                 if let Some(payment_preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
 710                                         let mut htlc_success_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&local_tx.txid, local_tx.feerate_per_kw, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), htlc, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key, &local_tx.revocation_key);
 711
 712                                         htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
 713
 714                                         htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(their_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
 715                                         htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
 716                                         htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
 717                                         htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
 718
 719                                         htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(payment_preimage.to_vec());
 720                                         htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &local_tx.a_htlc_key, &local_tx.b_htlc_key, &local_tx.revocation_key).into_vec());
 721
 722                                         res.push(htlc_success_tx);
 723                                 }
 724                         }
 725                 }
 726
 727                 res
 728         }
 729
 730         /// Attempts to claim any claimable HTLCs in a commitment transaction which was not (yet)
 731         /// revoked using data in local_claimable_outpoints.
 732         /// Should not be used if check_spend_revoked_transaction succeeds.
 733         fn check_spend_local_transaction(&self, tx: &Transaction, _height: u32) -> Vec<Transaction> {
 734                 let commitment_txid = tx.txid();
 735                 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
 736                         if local_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
 737                                 return self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx);
 738                         }
 739                 }
 740                 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
 741                         if local_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
 742                                 return self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx);
 743                         }
 744                 }
 745                 Vec::new()
 746         }
 747
 748         fn block_connected(&self, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], height: u32, broadcaster: &BroadcasterInterface) {
 749                 for tx in txn_matched {
 750                         for txin in tx.input.iter() {
 751                                 if self.funding_txo.is_none() || (txin.prev_hash == self.funding_txo.unwrap().0 && txin.prev_index == self.funding_txo.unwrap().1 as u32) {
 752                                         let mut txn = self.check_spend_remote_transaction(tx, height);
 753                                         if txn.is_empty() {
 754                                                 txn = self.check_spend_local_transaction(tx, height);
 755                                         }
 756                                         for tx in txn.iter() {
 757                                                 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(tx);
 758                                         }
 759                                 }
 760                         }
 761                 }
 762                 if let Some(ref cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
 763                         let mut needs_broadcast = false;
 764                         for &(ref htlc, _, _) in cur_local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
 765                                 if htlc.cltv_expiry <= height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER {
 766                                         if htlc.offered || self.payment_preimages.contains_key(&htlc.payment_hash) {
 767                                                 needs_broadcast = true;
 768                                         }
 769                                 }
 770                         }
 771
 772                         if needs_broadcast {
 773                                 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&cur_local_tx.tx);
 774                                 for tx in self.broadcast_by_local_state(&cur_local_tx) {
 775                                         broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
 776                                 }
 777                         }
 778                 }
 779         }
 780
 781         pub fn would_broadcast_at_height(&self, height: u32) -> bool {
 782                 if let Some(ref cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
 783                         for &(ref htlc, _, _) in cur_local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
 784                                 if htlc.cltv_expiry <= height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER {
 785                                         if htlc.offered || self.payment_preimages.contains_key(&htlc.payment_hash) {
 786                                                 return true;
 787                                         }
 788                                 }
 789                         }
 790                 }
 791                 false
 792         }
 793 }
 794
 795 #[cfg(test)]
 796 mod tests {
 797         use bitcoin::util::misc::hex_bytes;
 798         use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Script;
 799         use ln::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor;
 800         use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
 801         use secp256k1::Secp256k1;
 802
 803         #[test]
 804         fn test_per_commitment_storage() {
 805                 // Test vectors from BOLT 3:
 806                 let mut secrets: Vec<[u8; 32]> = Vec::new();
 807                 let mut monitor: ChannelMonitor;
 808                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
 809
 810                 macro_rules! test_secrets {
 811                         () => {
 812                                 let mut idx = 281474976710655;
 813                                 for secret in secrets.iter() {
 814                                         assert_eq!(monitor.get_secret(idx).unwrap(), *secret);
 815                                         idx -= 1;
 816                                 }
 817                                 assert_eq!(monitor.get_min_seen_secret(), idx + 1);
 818                                 assert!(monitor.get_secret(idx).is_err());
 819                         };
 820                 }
 821
 822                 {
 823                         // insert_secret correct sequence
 824                         monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::new(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
 825                         secrets.clear();
 826
 827                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 828                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
 829                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
 830                         test_secrets!();
 831
 832                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 833                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
 834                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
 835                         test_secrets!();
 836
 837                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 838                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
 839                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
 840                         test_secrets!();
 841
 842                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 843                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
 844                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
 845                         test_secrets!();
 846
 847                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 848                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
 849                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
 850                         test_secrets!();
 851
 852                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 853                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
 854                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
 855                         test_secrets!();
 856
 857                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 858                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
 859                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
 860                         test_secrets!();
 861
 862                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 863                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
 864                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
 865                         test_secrets!();
 866                 }
 867
 868                 {
 869                         // insert_secret #1 incorrect
 870                         monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::new(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
 871                         secrets.clear();
 872
 873                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 874                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
 875                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
 876                         test_secrets!();
 877
 878                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 879                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
 880                         assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err,
 881                                         "Previous secret did not match new one");
 882                 }
 883
 884                 {
 885                         // insert_secret #2 incorrect (#1 derived from incorrect)
 886                         monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::new(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
 887                         secrets.clear();
 888
 889                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 890                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
 891                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
 892                         test_secrets!();
 893
 894                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 895                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("dddc3a8d14fddf2b68fa8c7fbad2748274937479dd0f8930d5ebb4ab6bd866a3").unwrap());
 896                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
 897                         test_secrets!();
 898
 899                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 900                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
 901                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
 902                         test_secrets!();
 903
 904                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 905                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
 906                         assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err,
 907                                         "Previous secret did not match new one");
 908                 }
 909
 910                 {
 911                         // insert_secret #3 incorrect
 912                         monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::new(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
 913                         secrets.clear();
 914
 915                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 916                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
 917                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
 918                         test_secrets!();
 919
 920                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 921                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
 922                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
 923                         test_secrets!();
 924
 925                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 926                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("c51a18b13e8527e579ec56365482c62f180b7d5760b46e9477dae59e87ed423a").unwrap());
 927                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
 928                         test_secrets!();
 929
 930                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 931                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
 932                         assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err,
 933                                         "Previous secret did not match new one");
 934                 }
 935
 936                 {
 937                         // insert_secret #4 incorrect (1,2,3 derived from incorrect)
 938                         monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::new(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
 939                         secrets.clear();
 940
 941                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 942                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
 943                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
 944                         test_secrets!();
 945
 946                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 947                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("dddc3a8d14fddf2b68fa8c7fbad2748274937479dd0f8930d5ebb4ab6bd866a3").unwrap());
 948                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
 949                         test_secrets!();
 950
 951                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 952                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("c51a18b13e8527e579ec56365482c62f180b7d5760b46e9477dae59e87ed423a").unwrap());
 953                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
 954                         test_secrets!();
 955
 956                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 957                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("ba65d7b0ef55a3ba300d4e87af29868f394f8f138d78a7011669c79b37b936f4").unwrap());
 958                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
 959                         test_secrets!();
 960
 961                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 962                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
 963                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
 964                         test_secrets!();
 965
 966                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 967                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
 968                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
 969                         test_secrets!();
 970
 971                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 972                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
 973                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
 974                         test_secrets!();
 975
 976                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 977                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
 978                         assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err,
 979                                         "Previous secret did not match new one");
 980                 }
 981
 982                 {
 983                         // insert_secret #5 incorrect
 984                         monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::new(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
 985                         secrets.clear();
 986
 987                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 988                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
 989                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
 990                         test_secrets!();
 991
 992                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 993                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
 994                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
 995                         test_secrets!();
 996
 997                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 998                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
 999                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1000                         test_secrets!();
1001
1002                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1003                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1004                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1005                         test_secrets!();
1006
1007                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1008                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("631373ad5f9ef654bb3dade742d09504c567edd24320d2fcd68e3cc47e2ff6a6").unwrap());
1009                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1010                         test_secrets!();
1011
1012                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1013                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
1014                         assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err,
1015                                         "Previous secret did not match new one");
1016                 }
1017
1018                 {
1019                         // insert_secret #6 incorrect (5 derived from incorrect)
1020                         monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::new(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
1021                         secrets.clear();
1022
1023                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1024                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1025                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1026                         test_secrets!();
1027
1028                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1029                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1030                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1031                         test_secrets!();
1032
1033                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1034                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1035                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1036                         test_secrets!();
1037
1038                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1039                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1040                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1041                         test_secrets!();
1042
1043                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1044                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("631373ad5f9ef654bb3dade742d09504c567edd24320d2fcd68e3cc47e2ff6a6").unwrap());
1045                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1046                         test_secrets!();
1047
1048                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1049                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("b7e76a83668bde38b373970155c868a653304308f9896692f904a23731224bb1").unwrap());
1050                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1051                         test_secrets!();
1052
1053                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1054                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
1055                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1056                         test_secrets!();
1057
1058                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1059                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
1060                         assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err,
1061                                         "Previous secret did not match new one");
1062                 }
1063
1064                 {
1065                         // insert_secret #7 incorrect
1066                         monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::new(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
1067                         secrets.clear();
1068
1069                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1070                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1071                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1072                         test_secrets!();
1073
1074                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1075                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1076                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1077                         test_secrets!();
1078
1079                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1080                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1081                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1082                         test_secrets!();
1083
1084                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1085                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1086                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1087                         test_secrets!();
1088
1089                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1090                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
1091                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1092                         test_secrets!();
1093
1094                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1095                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
1096                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1097                         test_secrets!();
1098
1099                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1100                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("e7971de736e01da8ed58b94c2fc216cb1dca9e326f3a96e7194fe8ea8af6c0a3").unwrap());
1101                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1102                         test_secrets!();
1103
1104                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1105                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
1106                         assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err,
1107                                         "Previous secret did not match new one");
1108                 }
1109
1110                 {
1111                         // insert_secret #8 incorrect
1112                         monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::new(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
1113                         secrets.clear();
1114
1115                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1116                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1117                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1118                         test_secrets!();
1119
1120                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1121                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1122                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1123                         test_secrets!();
1124
1125                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1126                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1127                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1128                         test_secrets!();
1129
1130                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1131                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1132                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1133                         test_secrets!();
1134
1135                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1136                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
1137                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1138                         test_secrets!();
1139
1140                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1141                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
1142                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1143                         test_secrets!();
1144
1145                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1146                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
1147                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1148                         test_secrets!();
1149
1150                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1151                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("a7efbc61aac46d34f77778bac22c8a20c6a46ca460addc49009bda875ec88fa4").unwrap());
1152                         assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err,
1153                                         "Previous secret did not match new one");
1154                 }
1155         }
1156
1157         // Further testing is done in the ChannelManager integration tests.
1158 }