1 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
2 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxIn,TxOut,SigHashType,Transaction};
3 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
4 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Script;
5 use bitcoin::network::serialize;
6 use bitcoin::util::hash::Sha256dHash;
7 use bitcoin::util::bip143;
9 use crypto::digest::Digest;
11 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Message,Signature};
12 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
15 use ln::msgs::HandleError;
17 use ln::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment;
18 use chain::chaininterface::{ChainListener, ChainWatchInterface, BroadcasterInterface};
19 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
20 use util::sha2::Sha256;
23 use std::collections::HashMap;
24 use std::sync::{Arc,Mutex};
27 pub enum ChannelMonitorUpdateErr {
28 /// Used to indicate a temporary failure (eg connection to a watchtower failed, but is expected
29 /// to succeed at some point in the future).
30 /// Such a failure will "freeze" a channel, preventing us from revoking old states or
31 /// submitting new commitment transactions to the remote party.
32 /// ChannelManager::test_restore_channel_monitor can be used to retry the update(s) and restore
33 /// the channel to an operational state.
35 /// Used to indicate no further channel monitor updates will be allowed (eg we've moved on to a
36 /// different watchtower and cannot update with all watchtowers that were previously informed
37 /// of this channel). This will force-close the channel in question.
41 /// Simple trait indicating ability to track a set of ChannelMonitors and multiplex events between
42 /// them. Generally should be implemented by keeping a local SimpleManyChannelMonitor and passing
43 /// events to it, while also taking any add_update_monitor events and passing them to some remote
45 /// Note that any updates to a channel's monitor *must* be applied to each instance of the
46 /// channel's monitor everywhere (including remote watchtowers) *before* this function returns. If
47 /// an update occurs and a remote watchtower is left with old state, it may broadcast transactions
48 /// which we have revoked, allowing our counterparty to claim all funds in the channel!
49 /// A call to add_update_monitor is needed to register outpoint and its txid with ChainWatchInterface
50 /// after setting funding_txo in a ChannelMonitor
51 pub trait ManyChannelMonitor: Send + Sync {
52 /// Adds or updates a monitor for the given `funding_txo`.
53 fn add_update_monitor(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr>;
56 /// A simple implementation of a ManyChannelMonitor and ChainListener. Can be used to create a
57 /// watchtower or watch our own channels.
58 /// Note that you must provide your own key by which to refer to channels.
59 /// If you're accepting remote monitors (ie are implementing a watchtower), you must verify that
60 /// users cannot overwrite a given channel by providing a duplicate key. ie you should probably
61 /// index by a PublicKey which is required to sign any updates.
62 /// If you're using this for local monitoring of your own channels, you probably want to use
63 /// `OutPoint` as the key, which will give you a ManyChannelMonitor implementation.
64 pub struct SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
65 monitors: Mutex<HashMap<Key, ChannelMonitor>>,
66 chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>,
67 broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>
70 impl<Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash> ChainListener for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
71 fn block_connected(&self, _header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], _indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) {
72 let monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
73 for monitor in monitors.values() {
74 let txn_outputs = monitor.block_connected(txn_matched, height, &*self.broadcaster);
75 for (ref txid, ref outputs) in txn_outputs {
76 for (idx, output) in outputs.iter().enumerate() {
77 self.chain_monitor.install_watch_outpoint((txid.clone(), idx as u32), &output.script_pubkey);
83 fn block_disconnected(&self, _: &BlockHeader) { }
86 impl<Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash + 'static> SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
87 pub fn new(chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>, broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>) -> Arc<SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key>> {
88 let res = Arc::new(SimpleManyChannelMonitor {
89 monitors: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
93 let weak_res = Arc::downgrade(&res);
94 res.chain_monitor.register_listener(weak_res);
98 pub fn add_update_monitor_by_key(&self, key: Key, monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
99 let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
100 match monitors.get_mut(&key) {
101 Some(orig_monitor) => return orig_monitor.insert_combine(monitor),
104 match &monitor.funding_txo {
105 &None => self.chain_monitor.watch_all_txn(),
106 &Some((ref outpoint, ref script)) => {
107 self.chain_monitor.install_watch_tx(&outpoint.txid, script);
108 self.chain_monitor.install_watch_outpoint((outpoint.txid, outpoint.index as u32), script);
111 monitors.insert(key, monitor);
116 impl ManyChannelMonitor for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<OutPoint> {
117 fn add_update_monitor(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr> {
118 match self.add_update_monitor_by_key(funding_txo, monitor) {
120 Err(_) => Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure),
125 /// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, don't try to claim it in a shared transaction,
126 /// instead claiming it in its own individual transaction.
127 const CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 12;
128 /// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, force-close the channel to broadcast the
129 /// HTLC-Success transaction.
130 const CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 6;
132 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
135 revocation_base_key: SecretKey,
136 htlc_base_key: SecretKey,
139 revocation_base_key: PublicKey,
140 htlc_base_key: PublicKey,
141 sigs: HashMap<Sha256dHash, Signature>,
145 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
146 struct LocalSignedTx {
147 /// txid of the transaction in tx, just used to make comparison faster
150 revocation_key: PublicKey,
151 a_htlc_key: PublicKey,
152 b_htlc_key: PublicKey,
153 delayed_payment_key: PublicKey,
155 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Signature, Signature)>,
158 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
159 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
161 pub struct ChannelMonitor {
162 funding_txo: Option<(OutPoint, Script)>,
163 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64,
165 key_storage: KeyStorage,
166 delayed_payment_base_key: PublicKey,
167 their_htlc_base_key: Option<PublicKey>,
168 // first is the idx of the first of the two revocation points
169 their_cur_revocation_points: Option<(u64, PublicKey, Option<PublicKey>)>,
171 our_to_self_delay: u16,
172 their_to_self_delay: Option<u16>,
174 old_secrets: [([u8; 32], u64); 49],
175 remote_claimable_outpoints: HashMap<Sha256dHash, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>>,
176 /// We cannot identify HTLC-Success or HTLC-Timeout transactions by themselves on the chain.
177 /// Nor can we figure out their commitment numbers without the commitment transaction they are
178 /// spending. Thus, in order to claim them via revocation key, we track all the remote
179 /// commitment transactions which we find on-chain, mapping them to the commitment number which
180 /// can be used to derive the revocation key and claim the transactions.
181 remote_commitment_txn_on_chain: Mutex<HashMap<Sha256dHash, u64>>,
182 /// Cache used to make pruning of payment_preimages faster.
183 /// Maps payment_hash values to commitment numbers for remote transactions for non-revoked
184 /// remote transactions (ie should remain pretty small).
185 /// Serialized to disk but should generally not be sent to Watchtowers.
186 remote_hash_commitment_number: HashMap<[u8; 32], u64>,
188 // We store two local commitment transactions to avoid any race conditions where we may update
189 // some monitors (potentially on watchtowers) but then fail to update others, resulting in the
190 // various monitors for one channel being out of sync, and us broadcasting a local
191 // transaction for which we have deleted claim information on some watchtowers.
192 prev_local_signed_commitment_tx: Option<LocalSignedTx>,
193 current_local_signed_commitment_tx: Option<LocalSignedTx>,
195 payment_preimages: HashMap<[u8; 32], [u8; 32]>,
197 destination_script: Script,
198 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>, //TODO: dedup this a bit...
200 impl Clone for ChannelMonitor {
201 fn clone(&self) -> Self {
203 funding_txo: self.funding_txo.clone(),
204 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor.clone(),
206 key_storage: self.key_storage.clone(),
207 delayed_payment_base_key: self.delayed_payment_base_key.clone(),
208 their_htlc_base_key: self.their_htlc_base_key.clone(),
209 their_cur_revocation_points: self.their_cur_revocation_points.clone(),
211 our_to_self_delay: self.our_to_self_delay,
212 their_to_self_delay: self.their_to_self_delay,
214 old_secrets: self.old_secrets.clone(),
215 remote_claimable_outpoints: self.remote_claimable_outpoints.clone(),
216 remote_commitment_txn_on_chain: Mutex::new((*self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.lock().unwrap()).clone()),
217 remote_hash_commitment_number: self.remote_hash_commitment_number.clone(),
219 prev_local_signed_commitment_tx: self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.clone(),
220 current_local_signed_commitment_tx: self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx.clone(),
222 payment_preimages: self.payment_preimages.clone(),
224 destination_script: self.destination_script.clone(),
225 secp_ctx: self.secp_ctx.clone(),
230 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
231 /// Used only in testing and fuzztarget to check serialization roundtrips don't change the
232 /// underlying object
233 impl PartialEq for ChannelMonitor {
234 fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
235 if self.funding_txo != other.funding_txo ||
236 self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor != other.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor ||
237 self.key_storage != other.key_storage ||
238 self.delayed_payment_base_key != other.delayed_payment_base_key ||
239 self.their_htlc_base_key != other.their_htlc_base_key ||
240 self.their_cur_revocation_points != other.their_cur_revocation_points ||
241 self.our_to_self_delay != other.our_to_self_delay ||
242 self.their_to_self_delay != other.their_to_self_delay ||
243 self.remote_claimable_outpoints != other.remote_claimable_outpoints ||
244 self.remote_hash_commitment_number != other.remote_hash_commitment_number ||
245 self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx != other.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx ||
246 self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx != other.current_local_signed_commitment_tx ||
247 self.payment_preimages != other.payment_preimages ||
248 self.destination_script != other.destination_script
252 for (&(ref secret, ref idx), &(ref o_secret, ref o_idx)) in self.old_secrets.iter().zip(other.old_secrets.iter()) {
253 if secret != o_secret || idx != o_idx {
257 let us = self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.lock().unwrap();
258 let them = other.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.lock().unwrap();
264 impl ChannelMonitor {
265 pub fn new(revocation_base_key: &SecretKey, delayed_payment_base_key: &PublicKey, htlc_base_key: &SecretKey, our_to_self_delay: u16, destination_script: Script) -> ChannelMonitor {
268 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: 0,
270 key_storage: KeyStorage::PrivMode {
271 revocation_base_key: revocation_base_key.clone(),
272 htlc_base_key: htlc_base_key.clone(),
274 delayed_payment_base_key: delayed_payment_base_key.clone(),
275 their_htlc_base_key: None,
276 their_cur_revocation_points: None,
278 our_to_self_delay: our_to_self_delay,
279 their_to_self_delay: None,
281 old_secrets: [([0; 32], 1 << 48); 49],
282 remote_claimable_outpoints: HashMap::new(),
283 remote_commitment_txn_on_chain: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
284 remote_hash_commitment_number: HashMap::new(),
286 prev_local_signed_commitment_tx: None,
287 current_local_signed_commitment_tx: None,
289 payment_preimages: HashMap::new(),
291 destination_script: destination_script,
292 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
297 fn place_secret(idx: u64) -> u8 {
299 if idx & (1 << i) == (1 << i) {
307 fn derive_secret(secret: [u8; 32], bits: u8, idx: u64) -> [u8; 32] {
308 let mut res: [u8; 32] = secret;
310 let bitpos = bits - 1 - i;
311 if idx & (1 << bitpos) == (1 << bitpos) {
312 res[(bitpos / 8) as usize] ^= 1 << (bitpos & 7);
313 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
315 sha.result(&mut res);
321 /// Inserts a revocation secret into this channel monitor. Also optionally tracks the next
322 /// revocation point which may be required to claim HTLC outputs which we know the preimage of
323 /// in case the remote end force-closes using their latest state. Prunes old preimages if neither
324 /// needed by local commitment transactions HTCLs nor by remote ones. Unless we haven't already seen remote
325 /// commitment transaction's secret, they are de facto pruned (we can use revocation key).
326 pub(super) fn provide_secret(&mut self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32], their_next_revocation_point: Option<(u64, PublicKey)>) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
327 let pos = ChannelMonitor::place_secret(idx);
329 let (old_secret, old_idx) = self.old_secrets[i as usize];
330 if ChannelMonitor::derive_secret(secret, pos, old_idx) != old_secret {
331 return Err(HandleError{err: "Previous secret did not match new one", action: None})
334 self.old_secrets[pos as usize] = (secret, idx);
336 if let Some(new_revocation_point) = their_next_revocation_point {
337 match self.their_cur_revocation_points {
338 Some(old_points) => {
339 if old_points.0 == new_revocation_point.0 + 1 {
340 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0, old_points.1, Some(new_revocation_point.1)));
341 } else if old_points.0 == new_revocation_point.0 + 2 {
342 if let Some(old_second_point) = old_points.2 {
343 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0 - 1, old_second_point, Some(new_revocation_point.1)));
345 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((new_revocation_point.0, new_revocation_point.1, None));
348 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((new_revocation_point.0, new_revocation_point.1, None));
352 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((new_revocation_point.0, new_revocation_point.1, None));
357 if !self.payment_preimages.is_empty() {
358 let local_signed_commitment_tx = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx.as_ref().expect("Channel needs at least an initial commitment tx !");
359 let prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.as_ref();
360 let min_idx = self.get_min_seen_secret();
361 let remote_hash_commitment_number = &mut self.remote_hash_commitment_number;
363 self.payment_preimages.retain(|&k, _| {
364 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in &local_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs {
365 if k == htlc.payment_hash {
369 if let Some(prev_local_commitment_tx) = prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
370 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in prev_local_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
371 if k == htlc.payment_hash {
376 let contains = if let Some(cn) = remote_hash_commitment_number.get(&k) {
383 remote_hash_commitment_number.remove(&k);
392 /// Informs this monitor of the latest remote (ie non-broadcastable) commitment transaction.
393 /// The monitor watches for it to be broadcasted and then uses the HTLC information (and
394 /// possibly future revocation/preimage information) to claim outputs where possible.
395 /// We cache also the mapping hash:commitment number to lighten pruning of old preimages by watchtowers.
396 pub(super) fn provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, unsigned_commitment_tx: &Transaction, htlc_outputs: Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>, commitment_number: u64) {
397 // TODO: Encrypt the htlc_outputs data with the single-hash of the commitment transaction
398 // so that a remote monitor doesn't learn anything unless there is a malicious close.
399 // (only maybe, sadly we cant do the same for local info, as we need to be aware of
401 for htlc in &htlc_outputs {
402 self.remote_hash_commitment_number.insert(htlc.payment_hash, commitment_number);
404 self.remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(unsigned_commitment_tx.txid(), htlc_outputs);
407 /// Informs this monitor of the latest local (ie broadcastable) commitment transaction. The
408 /// monitor watches for timeouts and may broadcast it if we approach such a timeout. Thus, it
409 /// is important that any clones of this channel monitor (including remote clones) by kept
410 /// up-to-date as our local commitment transaction is updated.
411 /// Panics if set_their_to_self_delay has never been called.
412 pub(super) fn provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, signed_commitment_tx: Transaction, local_keys: chan_utils::TxCreationKeys, feerate_per_kw: u64, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Signature, Signature)>) {
413 assert!(self.their_to_self_delay.is_some());
414 self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx.take();
415 self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(LocalSignedTx {
416 txid: signed_commitment_tx.txid(),
417 tx: signed_commitment_tx,
418 revocation_key: local_keys.revocation_key,
419 a_htlc_key: local_keys.a_htlc_key,
420 b_htlc_key: local_keys.b_htlc_key,
421 delayed_payment_key: local_keys.a_delayed_payment_key,
427 /// Provides a payment_hash->payment_preimage mapping. Will be automatically pruned when all
428 /// commitment_tx_infos which contain the payment hash have been revoked.
429 pub(super) fn provide_payment_preimage(&mut self, payment_hash: &[u8; 32], payment_preimage: &[u8; 32]) {
430 self.payment_preimages.insert(payment_hash.clone(), payment_preimage.clone());
433 pub fn insert_combine(&mut self, mut other: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
434 if self.funding_txo.is_some() {
435 // We should be able to compare the entire funding_txo, but in fuzztarget its trivially
436 // easy to collide the funding_txo hash and have a different scriptPubKey.
437 if other.funding_txo.is_some() && other.funding_txo.as_ref().unwrap().0 != self.funding_txo.as_ref().unwrap().0 {
438 return Err(HandleError{err: "Funding transaction outputs are not identical!", action: None});
441 self.funding_txo = other.funding_txo.take();
443 let other_min_secret = other.get_min_seen_secret();
444 let our_min_secret = self.get_min_seen_secret();
445 if our_min_secret > other_min_secret {
446 self.provide_secret(other_min_secret, other.get_secret(other_min_secret).unwrap(), None)?;
448 if our_min_secret >= other_min_secret {
449 self.their_cur_revocation_points = other.their_cur_revocation_points;
450 for (txid, htlcs) in other.remote_claimable_outpoints.drain() {
451 self.remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, htlcs);
453 if let Some(local_tx) = other.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
454 self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(local_tx);
456 if let Some(local_tx) = other.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
457 self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(local_tx);
459 self.payment_preimages = other.payment_preimages;
464 /// Panics if commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor doesn't fit in 48 bits
465 pub(super) fn set_commitment_obscure_factor(&mut self, commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64) {
466 assert!(commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor < (1 << 48));
467 self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor = commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor;
470 /// Allows this monitor to scan only for transactions which are applicable. Note that this is
471 /// optional, without it this monitor cannot be used in an SPV client, but you may wish to
472 /// avoid this (or call unset_funding_info) on a monitor you wish to send to a watchtower as it
473 /// provides slightly better privacy.
474 /// It's the responsability of the caller to register outpoint and script with passing the former
475 /// value as key to add_update_monitor.
476 pub(super) fn set_funding_info(&mut self, funding_info: (OutPoint, Script)) {
477 self.funding_txo = Some(funding_info);
480 pub(super) fn set_their_htlc_base_key(&mut self, their_htlc_base_key: &PublicKey) {
481 self.their_htlc_base_key = Some(their_htlc_base_key.clone());
484 pub(super) fn set_their_to_self_delay(&mut self, their_to_self_delay: u16) {
485 self.their_to_self_delay = Some(their_to_self_delay);
488 pub(super) fn unset_funding_info(&mut self) {
489 self.funding_txo = None;
492 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
493 match self.funding_txo {
494 Some((outpoint, _)) => Some(outpoint),
499 /// Serializes into a vec, with various modes for the exposed pub fns
500 fn serialize(&self, for_local_storage: bool) -> Vec<u8> {
501 let mut res = Vec::new();
502 res.push(SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
503 res.push(MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
505 match &self.funding_txo {
506 &Some((ref outpoint, ref script)) => {
507 res.extend_from_slice(&outpoint.txid[..]);
508 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(outpoint.index));
509 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(script.len() as u64));
510 res.extend_from_slice(&script[..]);
513 // We haven't even been initialized...not sure why anyone is serializing us, but
514 // not much to give them.
519 // Set in initial Channel-object creation, so should always be set by now:
520 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor));
522 match self.key_storage {
523 KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key } => {
525 res.extend_from_slice(&revocation_base_key[..]);
526 res.extend_from_slice(&htlc_base_key[..]);
528 KeyStorage::SigsMode { .. } => unimplemented!(),
531 res.extend_from_slice(&self.delayed_payment_base_key.serialize());
532 res.extend_from_slice(&self.their_htlc_base_key.as_ref().unwrap().serialize());
534 match self.their_cur_revocation_points {
535 Some((idx, pubkey, second_option)) => {
536 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(idx));
537 res.extend_from_slice(&pubkey.serialize());
538 match second_option {
539 Some(second_pubkey) => {
540 res.extend_from_slice(&second_pubkey.serialize());
543 res.extend_from_slice(&[0; 33]);
548 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(0));
552 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.our_to_self_delay));
553 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap()));
555 for &(ref secret, ref idx) in self.old_secrets.iter() {
556 res.extend_from_slice(secret);
557 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*idx));
560 macro_rules! serialize_htlc_in_commitment {
561 ($htlc_output: expr) => {
562 res.push($htlc_output.offered as u8);
563 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc_output.amount_msat));
564 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array($htlc_output.cltv_expiry));
565 res.extend_from_slice(&$htlc_output.payment_hash);
566 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array($htlc_output.transaction_output_index));
570 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_claimable_outpoints.len() as u64));
571 for (txid, htlc_outputs) in self.remote_claimable_outpoints.iter() {
572 res.extend_from_slice(&txid[..]);
573 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc_outputs.len() as u64));
574 for htlc_output in htlc_outputs.iter() {
575 serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output);
580 let remote_commitment_txn_on_chain = self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.lock().unwrap();
581 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.len() as u64));
582 for (txid, commitment_number) in remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
583 res.extend_from_slice(&txid[..]);
584 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(*commitment_number));
588 if for_local_storage {
589 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_hash_commitment_number.len() as u64));
590 for (payment_hash, commitment_number) in self.remote_hash_commitment_number.iter() {
591 res.extend_from_slice(payment_hash);
592 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(*commitment_number));
595 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(0));
598 macro_rules! serialize_local_tx {
599 ($local_tx: expr) => {
600 let tx_ser = serialize::serialize(&$local_tx.tx).unwrap();
601 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(tx_ser.len() as u64));
602 res.extend_from_slice(&tx_ser);
604 res.extend_from_slice(&$local_tx.revocation_key.serialize());
605 res.extend_from_slice(&$local_tx.a_htlc_key.serialize());
606 res.extend_from_slice(&$local_tx.b_htlc_key.serialize());
607 res.extend_from_slice(&$local_tx.delayed_payment_key.serialize());
609 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($local_tx.feerate_per_kw));
610 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($local_tx.htlc_outputs.len() as u64));
611 for &(ref htlc_output, ref their_sig, ref our_sig) in $local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
612 serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output);
613 res.extend_from_slice(&their_sig.serialize_compact(&self.secp_ctx));
614 res.extend_from_slice(&our_sig.serialize_compact(&self.secp_ctx));
619 if let Some(ref prev_local_tx) = self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
621 serialize_local_tx!(prev_local_tx);
626 if let Some(ref cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
628 serialize_local_tx!(cur_local_tx);
633 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.payment_preimages.len() as u64));
634 for payment_preimage in self.payment_preimages.values() {
635 res.extend_from_slice(payment_preimage);
638 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.destination_script.len() as u64));
639 res.extend_from_slice(&self.destination_script[..]);
644 /// Encodes this monitor into a byte array, suitable for writing to disk.
645 pub fn serialize_for_disk(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
649 /// Encodes this monitor into a byte array, suitable for sending to a remote watchtower
650 pub fn serialize_for_watchtower(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
651 self.serialize(false)
654 /// Attempts to decode a serialized monitor
655 pub fn deserialize(data: &[u8]) -> Option<Self> {
656 let mut read_pos = 0;
657 macro_rules! read_bytes {
658 ($byte_count: expr) => {
660 if ($byte_count as usize) > data.len() - read_pos {
663 read_pos += $byte_count as usize;
664 &data[read_pos - $byte_count as usize..read_pos]
669 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
670 macro_rules! unwrap_obj {
674 Err(_) => return None,
679 let _ver = read_bytes!(1)[0];
680 let min_ver = read_bytes!(1)[0];
681 if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION {
685 // Technically this can fail and serialize fail a round-trip, but only for serialization of
686 // barely-init'd ChannelMonitors that we can't do anything with.
687 let outpoint = OutPoint {
688 txid: Sha256dHash::from(read_bytes!(32)),
689 index: byte_utils::slice_to_be16(read_bytes!(2)),
691 let script_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8));
692 let funding_txo = Some((outpoint, Script::from(read_bytes!(script_len).to_vec())));
693 let commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor = byte_utils::slice_to_be48(read_bytes!(6));
695 let key_storage = match read_bytes!(1)[0] {
697 KeyStorage::PrivMode {
698 revocation_base_key: unwrap_obj!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(32))),
699 htlc_base_key: unwrap_obj!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(32))),
705 let delayed_payment_base_key = unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(33)));
706 let their_htlc_base_key = Some(unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(33))));
708 let their_cur_revocation_points = {
709 let first_idx = byte_utils::slice_to_be48(read_bytes!(6));
713 let first_point = unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(33)));
714 let second_point_slice = read_bytes!(33);
715 if second_point_slice[0..32] == [0; 32] && second_point_slice[32] == 0 {
716 Some((first_idx, first_point, None))
718 Some((first_idx, first_point, Some(unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, second_point_slice)))))
723 let our_to_self_delay = byte_utils::slice_to_be16(read_bytes!(2));
724 let their_to_self_delay = Some(byte_utils::slice_to_be16(read_bytes!(2)));
726 let mut old_secrets = [([0; 32], 1 << 48); 49];
727 for &mut (ref mut secret, ref mut idx) in old_secrets.iter_mut() {
728 secret.copy_from_slice(read_bytes!(32));
729 *idx = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8));
732 macro_rules! read_htlc_in_commitment {
735 let offered = match read_bytes!(1)[0] {
736 0 => false, 1 => true,
739 let amount_msat = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8));
740 let cltv_expiry = byte_utils::slice_to_be32(read_bytes!(4));
741 let mut payment_hash = [0; 32];
742 payment_hash[..].copy_from_slice(read_bytes!(32));
743 let transaction_output_index = byte_utils::slice_to_be32(read_bytes!(4));
745 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
746 offered, amount_msat, cltv_expiry, payment_hash, transaction_output_index
752 let remote_claimable_outpoints_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8));
753 if remote_claimable_outpoints_len > data.len() as u64 / 64 { return None; }
754 let mut remote_claimable_outpoints = HashMap::with_capacity(remote_claimable_outpoints_len as usize);
755 for _ in 0..remote_claimable_outpoints_len {
756 let txid = Sha256dHash::from(read_bytes!(32));
757 let outputs_count = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8));
758 if outputs_count > data.len() as u64 / 32 { return None; }
759 let mut outputs = Vec::with_capacity(outputs_count as usize);
760 for _ in 0..outputs_count {
761 outputs.push(read_htlc_in_commitment!());
763 if let Some(_) = remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, outputs) {
768 let remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8));
769 if remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len > data.len() as u64 / 32 { return None; }
770 let mut remote_commitment_txn_on_chain = HashMap::with_capacity(remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len as usize);
771 for _ in 0..remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len {
772 let txid = Sha256dHash::from(read_bytes!(32));
773 let commitment_number = byte_utils::slice_to_be48(read_bytes!(6));
774 if let Some(_) = remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(txid, commitment_number) {
779 let remote_hash_commitment_number_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8));
780 if remote_hash_commitment_number_len > data.len() as u64 / 32 { return None; }
781 let mut remote_hash_commitment_number = HashMap::with_capacity(remote_hash_commitment_number_len as usize);
782 for _ in 0..remote_hash_commitment_number_len {
783 let mut txid = [0; 32];
784 txid[..].copy_from_slice(read_bytes!(32));
785 let commitment_number = byte_utils::slice_to_be48(read_bytes!(6));
786 if let Some(_) = remote_hash_commitment_number.insert(txid, commitment_number) {
791 macro_rules! read_local_tx {
794 let tx_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8));
795 let tx_ser = read_bytes!(tx_len);
796 let tx: Transaction = unwrap_obj!(serialize::deserialize(tx_ser));
797 if serialize::serialize(&tx).unwrap() != tx_ser {
798 // We check that the tx re-serializes to the same form to ensure there is
799 // no extra data, and as rust-bitcoin doesn't handle the 0-input ambiguity
804 let revocation_key = unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(33)));
805 let a_htlc_key = unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(33)));
806 let b_htlc_key = unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(33)));
807 let delayed_payment_key = unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(33)));
808 let feerate_per_kw = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8));
810 let htlc_outputs_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8));
811 if htlc_outputs_len > data.len() as u64 / 128 { return None; }
812 let mut htlc_outputs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_outputs_len as usize);
813 for _ in 0..htlc_outputs_len {
814 htlc_outputs.push((read_htlc_in_commitment!(),
815 unwrap_obj!(Signature::from_compact(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(64))),
816 unwrap_obj!(Signature::from_compact(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(64)))));
821 tx, revocation_key, a_htlc_key, b_htlc_key, delayed_payment_key, feerate_per_kw, htlc_outputs
827 let prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = match read_bytes!(1)[0] {
830 Some(read_local_tx!())
835 let current_local_signed_commitment_tx = match read_bytes!(1)[0] {
838 Some(read_local_tx!())
843 let payment_preimages_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8));
844 if payment_preimages_len > data.len() as u64 / 32 { return None; }
845 let mut payment_preimages = HashMap::with_capacity(payment_preimages_len as usize);
846 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
847 for _ in 0..payment_preimages_len {
848 let mut preimage = [0; 32];
849 preimage[..].copy_from_slice(read_bytes!(32));
851 sha.input(&preimage);
852 let mut hash = [0; 32];
853 sha.result(&mut hash);
854 if let Some(_) = payment_preimages.insert(hash, preimage) {
859 let destination_script_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8));
860 let destination_script = Script::from(read_bytes!(destination_script_len).to_vec());
862 Some(ChannelMonitor {
864 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor,
867 delayed_payment_base_key,
869 their_cur_revocation_points,
875 remote_claimable_outpoints,
876 remote_commitment_txn_on_chain: Mutex::new(remote_commitment_txn_on_chain),
877 remote_hash_commitment_number,
879 prev_local_signed_commitment_tx,
880 current_local_signed_commitment_tx,
889 //TODO: Functions to serialize/deserialize (with different forms depending on which information
890 //we want to leave out (eg funding_txo, etc).
892 /// Can only fail if idx is < get_min_seen_secret
893 pub fn get_secret(&self, idx: u64) -> Result<[u8; 32], HandleError> {
894 for i in 0..self.old_secrets.len() {
895 if (idx & (!((1 << i) - 1))) == self.old_secrets[i].1 {
896 return Ok(ChannelMonitor::derive_secret(self.old_secrets[i].0, i as u8, idx))
899 assert!(idx < self.get_min_seen_secret());
900 Err(HandleError{err: "idx too low", action: None})
903 pub fn get_min_seen_secret(&self) -> u64 {
904 //TODO This can be optimized?
905 let mut min = 1 << 48;
906 for &(_, idx) in self.old_secrets.iter() {
914 /// Attempts to claim a remote commitment transaction's outputs using the revocation key and
915 /// data in remote_claimable_outpoints. Will directly claim any HTLC outputs which expire at a
916 /// height > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER. In any case, will install monitoring for
917 /// HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions, and claim them using the revocation key (if
918 /// applicable) as well.
919 fn check_spend_remote_transaction(&self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32) -> (Vec<Transaction>, (Sha256dHash, Vec<TxOut>)) {
920 // Most secp and related errors trying to create keys means we have no hope of constructing
921 // a spend transaction...so we return no transactions to broadcast
922 let mut txn_to_broadcast = Vec::new();
923 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
925 let commitment_txid = tx.txid(); //TODO: This is gonna be a performance bottleneck for watchtowers!
926 let per_commitment_option = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(&commitment_txid);
928 macro_rules! ignore_error {
929 ( $thing : expr ) => {
932 Err(_) => return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs))
937 let commitment_number = 0xffffffffffff - ((((tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor);
938 if commitment_number >= self.get_min_seen_secret() {
939 let secret = self.get_secret(commitment_number).unwrap();
940 let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &secret));
941 let (revocation_pubkey, b_htlc_key) = match self.key_storage {
942 KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key } => {
943 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
944 (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_base_key))),
945 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &htlc_base_key))))
947 KeyStorage::SigsMode { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
948 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
949 (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &revocation_base_key)),
950 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &htlc_base_key)))
953 let delayed_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key), &self.delayed_payment_base_key));
954 let a_htlc_key = match self.their_htlc_base_key {
955 None => return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs)),
956 Some(their_htlc_base_key) => ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key), &their_htlc_base_key)),
959 let revokeable_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey, self.our_to_self_delay, &delayed_key);
960 let revokeable_p2wsh = revokeable_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
962 let mut total_value = 0;
963 let mut values = Vec::new();
964 let mut inputs = Vec::new();
965 let mut htlc_idxs = Vec::new();
967 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
968 if outp.script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh {
970 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
971 txid: commitment_txid,
974 script_sig: Script::new(),
975 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
978 htlc_idxs.push(None);
979 values.push(outp.value);
980 total_value += outp.value;
981 break; // There can only be one of these
985 macro_rules! sign_input {
986 ($sighash_parts: expr, $input: expr, $htlc_idx: expr, $amount: expr) => {
988 let (sig, redeemscript) = match self.key_storage {
989 KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
990 let redeemscript = if $htlc_idx.is_none() { revokeable_redeemscript.clone() } else {
991 let htlc = &per_commitment_option.unwrap()[$htlc_idx.unwrap()];
992 chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey)
994 let sighash = ignore_error!(Message::from_slice(&$sighash_parts.sighash_all(&$input, &redeemscript, $amount)[..]));
995 let revocation_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key, &revocation_base_key));
996 (self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &revocation_key), redeemscript)
998 KeyStorage::SigsMode { .. } => {
1002 $input.witness.push(sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
1003 $input.witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1004 if $htlc_idx.is_none() {
1005 $input.witness.push(vec!(1));
1007 $input.witness.push(revocation_pubkey.serialize().to_vec());
1009 $input.witness.push(redeemscript.into_bytes());
1014 if let Some(per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
1015 inputs.reserve_exact(per_commitment_data.len());
1017 for (idx, htlc) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() {
1018 let expected_script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey);
1019 if htlc.transaction_output_index as usize >= tx.output.len() ||
1020 tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 ||
1021 tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].script_pubkey != expected_script.to_v0_p2wsh() {
1022 return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs)); // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user
1025 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
1026 txid: commitment_txid,
1027 vout: htlc.transaction_output_index,
1029 script_sig: Script::new(),
1030 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
1031 witness: Vec::new(),
1033 if htlc.cltv_expiry > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER {
1035 htlc_idxs.push(Some(idx));
1036 values.push(tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].value);
1037 total_value += htlc.amount_msat / 1000;
1039 let mut single_htlc_tx = Transaction {
1043 output: vec!(TxOut {
1044 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1045 value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000, //TODO: - fee
1048 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&single_htlc_tx);
1049 sign_input!(sighash_parts, single_htlc_tx.input[0], Some(idx), htlc.amount_msat / 1000);
1050 txn_to_broadcast.push(single_htlc_tx); // TODO: This is not yet tested in ChannelManager!
1055 if !inputs.is_empty() || !txn_to_broadcast.is_empty() { // ie we're confident this is actually ours
1056 // We're definitely a remote commitment transaction!
1057 watch_outputs.append(&mut tx.output.clone());
1058 self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.lock().unwrap().insert(commitment_txid, commitment_number);
1060 if inputs.is_empty() { return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs)); } // Nothing to be done...probably a false positive/local tx
1062 let outputs = vec!(TxOut {
1063 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1064 value: total_value, //TODO: - fee
1066 let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
1073 let mut values_drain = values.drain(..);
1074 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx);
1076 for (input, htlc_idx) in spend_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(htlc_idxs.iter()) {
1077 let value = values_drain.next().unwrap();
1078 sign_input!(sighash_parts, input, htlc_idx, value);
1081 txn_to_broadcast.push(spend_tx);
1082 } else if let Some(per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
1083 // While this isn't useful yet, there is a potential race where if a counterparty
1084 // revokes a state at the same time as the commitment transaction for that state is
1085 // confirmed, and the watchtower receives the block before the user, the user could
1086 // upload a new ChannelMonitor with the revocation secret but the watchtower has
1087 // already processed the block, resulting in the remote_commitment_txn_on_chain entry
1088 // not being generated by the above conditional. Thus, to be safe, we go ahead and
1090 watch_outputs.append(&mut tx.output.clone());
1091 self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.lock().unwrap().insert(commitment_txid, commitment_number);
1093 if let Some(revocation_points) = self.their_cur_revocation_points {
1094 let revocation_point_option =
1095 if revocation_points.0 == commitment_number { Some(&revocation_points.1) }
1096 else if let Some(point) = revocation_points.2.as_ref() {
1097 if revocation_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 { Some(point) } else { None }
1099 if let Some(revocation_point) = revocation_point_option {
1100 let (revocation_pubkey, b_htlc_key) = match self.key_storage {
1101 KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key } => {
1102 (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_base_key))),
1103 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &htlc_base_key))))
1105 KeyStorage::SigsMode { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
1106 (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &revocation_base_key)),
1107 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &htlc_base_key)))
1110 let a_htlc_key = match self.their_htlc_base_key {
1111 None => return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs)),
1112 Some(their_htlc_base_key) => ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &their_htlc_base_key)),
1115 let mut total_value = 0;
1116 let mut values = Vec::new();
1117 let mut inputs = Vec::new();
1119 macro_rules! sign_input {
1120 ($sighash_parts: expr, $input: expr, $amount: expr, $preimage: expr) => {
1122 let (sig, redeemscript) = match self.key_storage {
1123 KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
1124 let htlc = &per_commitment_option.unwrap()[$input.sequence as usize];
1125 let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey);
1126 let sighash = ignore_error!(Message::from_slice(&$sighash_parts.sighash_all(&$input, &redeemscript, $amount)[..]));
1127 let htlc_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &htlc_base_key));
1128 (self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &htlc_key), redeemscript)
1130 KeyStorage::SigsMode { .. } => {
1134 $input.witness.push(sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
1135 $input.witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1136 $input.witness.push($preimage);
1137 $input.witness.push(redeemscript.into_bytes());
1142 for (idx, htlc) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() {
1143 if let Some(payment_preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
1145 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
1146 txid: commitment_txid,
1147 vout: htlc.transaction_output_index,
1149 script_sig: Script::new(),
1150 sequence: idx as u32, // reset to 0xfffffffd in sign_input
1151 witness: Vec::new(),
1153 if htlc.cltv_expiry > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER {
1155 values.push((tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].value, payment_preimage));
1156 total_value += htlc.amount_msat / 1000;
1158 let mut single_htlc_tx = Transaction {
1162 output: vec!(TxOut {
1163 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1164 value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000, //TODO: - fee
1167 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&single_htlc_tx);
1168 sign_input!(sighash_parts, single_htlc_tx.input[0], htlc.amount_msat / 1000, payment_preimage.to_vec());
1169 txn_to_broadcast.push(single_htlc_tx);
1174 if inputs.is_empty() { return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs)); } // Nothing to be done...probably a false positive/local tx
1176 let outputs = vec!(TxOut {
1177 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1178 value: total_value, //TODO: - fee
1180 let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
1187 let mut values_drain = values.drain(..);
1188 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx);
1190 for input in spend_tx.input.iter_mut() {
1191 let value = values_drain.next().unwrap();
1192 sign_input!(sighash_parts, input, value.0, value.1.to_vec());
1195 txn_to_broadcast.push(spend_tx);
1199 //TODO: For each input check if its in our remote_commitment_txn_on_chain map!
1202 (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs))
1205 fn broadcast_by_local_state(&self, local_tx: &LocalSignedTx) -> Vec<Transaction> {
1206 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
1208 for &(ref htlc, ref their_sig, ref our_sig) in local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1210 let mut htlc_timeout_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&local_tx.txid, local_tx.feerate_per_kw, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), htlc, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key, &local_tx.revocation_key);
1212 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
1214 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(their_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
1215 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1216 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
1217 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1219 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new());
1220 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &local_tx.a_htlc_key, &local_tx.b_htlc_key, &local_tx.revocation_key).into_bytes());
1222 res.push(htlc_timeout_tx);
1224 if let Some(payment_preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
1225 let mut htlc_success_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&local_tx.txid, local_tx.feerate_per_kw, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), htlc, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key, &local_tx.revocation_key);
1227 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
1229 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(their_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
1230 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1231 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
1232 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1234 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(payment_preimage.to_vec());
1235 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &local_tx.a_htlc_key, &local_tx.b_htlc_key, &local_tx.revocation_key).into_bytes());
1237 res.push(htlc_success_tx);
1245 /// Attempts to claim any claimable HTLCs in a commitment transaction which was not (yet)
1246 /// revoked using data in local_claimable_outpoints.
1247 /// Should not be used if check_spend_revoked_transaction succeeds.
1248 fn check_spend_local_transaction(&self, tx: &Transaction, _height: u32) -> Vec<Transaction> {
1249 let commitment_txid = tx.txid();
1250 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1251 if local_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
1252 return self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx);
1255 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1256 if local_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
1257 return self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx);
1263 fn block_connected(&self, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], height: u32, broadcaster: &BroadcasterInterface)-> Vec<(Sha256dHash, Vec<TxOut>)> {
1264 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
1265 for tx in txn_matched {
1266 for txin in tx.input.iter() {
1267 if self.funding_txo.is_none() || (txin.previous_output.txid == self.funding_txo.as_ref().unwrap().0.txid && txin.previous_output.vout == self.funding_txo.as_ref().unwrap().0.index as u32) {
1268 let (mut txn, new_outputs) = self.check_spend_remote_transaction(tx, height);
1269 if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() {
1270 watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
1273 txn = self.check_spend_local_transaction(tx, height);
1275 for tx in txn.iter() {
1276 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(tx);
1281 if let Some(ref cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1282 let mut needs_broadcast = false;
1283 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in cur_local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1284 if htlc.cltv_expiry <= height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER {
1285 if htlc.offered || self.payment_preimages.contains_key(&htlc.payment_hash) {
1286 needs_broadcast = true;
1291 if needs_broadcast {
1292 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&cur_local_tx.tx);
1293 for tx in self.broadcast_by_local_state(&cur_local_tx) {
1294 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
1301 pub fn would_broadcast_at_height(&self, height: u32) -> bool {
1302 if let Some(ref cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1303 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in cur_local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1304 if htlc.cltv_expiry <= height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER {
1305 if htlc.offered || self.payment_preimages.contains_key(&htlc.payment_hash) {
1317 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Script;
1318 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
1319 use crypto::digest::Digest;
1321 use ln::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor;
1322 use ln::chan_utils::{HTLCOutputInCommitment, TxCreationKeys};
1323 use util::sha2::Sha256;
1324 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
1325 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1, Signature};
1326 use rand::{thread_rng,Rng};
1329 fn test_per_commitment_storage() {
1330 // Test vectors from BOLT 3:
1331 let mut secrets: Vec<[u8; 32]> = Vec::new();
1332 let mut monitor: ChannelMonitor;
1333 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1335 macro_rules! test_secrets {
1337 let mut idx = 281474976710655;
1338 for secret in secrets.iter() {
1339 assert_eq!(monitor.get_secret(idx).unwrap(), *secret);
1342 assert_eq!(monitor.get_min_seen_secret(), idx + 1);
1343 assert!(monitor.get_secret(idx).is_err());
1347 let delayed_payment_base_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap());
1350 // insert_secret correct sequence
1351 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &delayed_payment_base_key, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
1354 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1355 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1356 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1359 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1360 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1361 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1364 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1365 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1366 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1369 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1370 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1371 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1374 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1375 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
1376 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1379 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1380 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
1381 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1384 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1385 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
1386 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1389 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1390 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
1391 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1396 // insert_secret #1 incorrect
1397 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &delayed_payment_base_key, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
1400 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1401 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
1402 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1405 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1406 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1407 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err,
1408 "Previous secret did not match new one");
1412 // insert_secret #2 incorrect (#1 derived from incorrect)
1413 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &delayed_payment_base_key, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
1416 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1417 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
1418 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1421 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1422 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("dddc3a8d14fddf2b68fa8c7fbad2748274937479dd0f8930d5ebb4ab6bd866a3").unwrap());
1423 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1426 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1427 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1428 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1431 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1432 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1433 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err,
1434 "Previous secret did not match new one");
1438 // insert_secret #3 incorrect
1439 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &delayed_payment_base_key, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
1442 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1443 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1444 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1447 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1448 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1449 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1452 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1453 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c51a18b13e8527e579ec56365482c62f180b7d5760b46e9477dae59e87ed423a").unwrap());
1454 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1457 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1458 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1459 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err,
1460 "Previous secret did not match new one");
1464 // insert_secret #4 incorrect (1,2,3 derived from incorrect)
1465 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &delayed_payment_base_key, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
1468 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1469 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
1470 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1473 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1474 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("dddc3a8d14fddf2b68fa8c7fbad2748274937479dd0f8930d5ebb4ab6bd866a3").unwrap());
1475 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1478 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1479 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c51a18b13e8527e579ec56365482c62f180b7d5760b46e9477dae59e87ed423a").unwrap());
1480 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1483 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1484 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("ba65d7b0ef55a3ba300d4e87af29868f394f8f138d78a7011669c79b37b936f4").unwrap());
1485 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1488 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1489 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
1490 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1493 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1494 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
1495 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1498 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1499 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
1500 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1503 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1504 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
1505 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err,
1506 "Previous secret did not match new one");
1510 // insert_secret #5 incorrect
1511 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &delayed_payment_base_key, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
1514 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1515 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1516 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1519 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1520 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1521 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1524 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1525 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1526 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1529 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1530 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1531 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1534 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1535 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("631373ad5f9ef654bb3dade742d09504c567edd24320d2fcd68e3cc47e2ff6a6").unwrap());
1536 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1539 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1540 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
1541 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err,
1542 "Previous secret did not match new one");
1546 // insert_secret #6 incorrect (5 derived from incorrect)
1547 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &delayed_payment_base_key, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
1550 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1551 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1552 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1555 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1556 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1557 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1560 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1561 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1562 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1565 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1566 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1567 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1570 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1571 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("631373ad5f9ef654bb3dade742d09504c567edd24320d2fcd68e3cc47e2ff6a6").unwrap());
1572 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1575 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1576 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("b7e76a83668bde38b373970155c868a653304308f9896692f904a23731224bb1").unwrap());
1577 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1580 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1581 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
1582 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1585 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1586 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
1587 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err,
1588 "Previous secret did not match new one");
1592 // insert_secret #7 incorrect
1593 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &delayed_payment_base_key, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
1596 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1597 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1598 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1601 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1602 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1603 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1606 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1607 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1608 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1611 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1612 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1613 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1616 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1617 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
1618 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1621 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1622 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
1623 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1626 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1627 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("e7971de736e01da8ed58b94c2fc216cb1dca9e326f3a96e7194fe8ea8af6c0a3").unwrap());
1628 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1631 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1632 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
1633 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err,
1634 "Previous secret did not match new one");
1638 // insert_secret #8 incorrect
1639 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &delayed_payment_base_key, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
1642 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1643 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1644 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1647 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1648 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1649 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1652 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1653 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1654 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1657 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1658 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1659 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1662 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1663 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
1664 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1667 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1668 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
1669 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1672 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1673 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
1674 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1677 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1678 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a7efbc61aac46d34f77778bac22c8a20c6a46ca460addc49009bda875ec88fa4").unwrap());
1679 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err,
1680 "Previous secret did not match new one");
1685 fn test_prune_preimages() {
1686 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1687 let dummy_sig = Signature::from_der(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("3045022100fa86fa9a36a8cd6a7bb8f06a541787d51371d067951a9461d5404de6b928782e02201c8b7c334c10aed8976a3a465be9a28abff4cb23acbf00022295b378ce1fa3cd").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
1689 macro_rules! dummy_keys {
1692 let dummy_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap());
1694 per_commitment_point: dummy_key.clone(),
1695 revocation_key: dummy_key.clone(),
1696 a_htlc_key: dummy_key.clone(),
1697 b_htlc_key: dummy_key.clone(),
1698 a_delayed_payment_key: dummy_key.clone(),
1699 b_payment_key: dummy_key.clone(),
1704 let dummy_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
1706 let mut preimages = Vec::new();
1708 let mut rng = thread_rng();
1710 let mut preimage = [0; 32];
1711 rng.fill_bytes(&mut preimage);
1712 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
1713 sha.input(&preimage);
1714 let mut hash = [0; 32];
1715 sha.result(&mut hash);
1716 preimages.push((preimage, hash));
1720 macro_rules! preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs {
1721 ($preimages_slice: expr) => {
1723 let mut res = Vec::new();
1724 for (idx, preimage) in $preimages_slice.iter().enumerate() {
1725 res.push(HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1729 payment_hash: preimage.1.clone(),
1730 transaction_output_index: idx as u32,
1737 macro_rules! preimages_to_local_htlcs {
1738 ($preimages_slice: expr) => {
1740 let mut inp = preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!($preimages_slice);
1741 let res: Vec<_> = inp.drain(..).map(|e| { (e, dummy_sig.clone(), dummy_sig.clone()) }).collect();
1747 macro_rules! test_preimages_exist {
1748 ($preimages_slice: expr, $monitor: expr) => {
1749 for preimage in $preimages_slice {
1750 assert!($monitor.payment_preimages.contains_key(&preimage.1));
1755 // Prune with one old state and a local commitment tx holding a few overlaps with the
1757 let delayed_payment_base_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap());
1758 let mut monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &delayed_payment_base_key, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
1759 monitor.set_their_to_self_delay(10);
1761 monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(dummy_tx.clone(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..10]));
1762 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[5..15]), 281474976710655);
1763 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[15..20]), 281474976710654);
1764 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[17..20]), 281474976710653);
1765 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[18..20]), 281474976710652);
1766 for &(ref preimage, ref hash) in preimages.iter() {
1767 monitor.provide_payment_preimage(hash, preimage);
1770 // Now provide a secret, pruning preimages 10-15
1771 let mut secret = [0; 32];
1772 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1773 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secret.clone(), None).unwrap();
1774 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 15);
1775 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
1776 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[15..20], monitor);
1778 // Now provide a further secret, pruning preimages 15-17
1779 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1780 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secret.clone(), None).unwrap();
1781 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 13);
1782 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
1783 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[17..20], monitor);
1785 // Now update local commitment tx info, pruning only element 18 as we still care about the
1786 // previous commitment tx's preimages too
1787 monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(dummy_tx.clone(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..5]));
1788 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1789 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secret.clone(), None).unwrap();
1790 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 12);
1791 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
1792 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[18..20], monitor);
1794 // But if we do it again, we'll prune 5-10
1795 monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(dummy_tx.clone(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..3]));
1796 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1797 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secret.clone(), None).unwrap();
1798 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 5);
1799 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..5], monitor);
1802 // Further testing is done in the ChannelManager integration tests.