_ Git - rust-lightning/blob - src/ln/channelmonitor.rs

   1 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
   2 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxIn,TxOut,SigHashType,Transaction};
   3 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Script;
   4 use bitcoin::util::hash::Sha256dHash;
   5 use bitcoin::util::bip143;
   6
   7 use crypto::sha2::Sha256;
   8 use crypto::digest::Digest;
   9
  10 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Message,Signature};
  11 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
  12
  13 use ln::msgs::HandleError;
  14 use ln::chan_utils;
  15 use ln::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment;
  16 use chain::chaininterface::{ChainListener, ChainWatchInterface, BroadcasterInterface};
  17
  18 use std::collections::HashMap;
  19 use std::sync::{Arc,Mutex};
  20 use std::{hash,cmp};
  21
  22 /// Simple trait indicating ability to track a set of ChannelMonitors and multiplex events between
  23 /// them. Generally should be implemented by keeping a local SimpleManyChannelMonitor and passing
  24 /// events to it, while also taking any add_update_monitor events and passing them to some remote
  25 /// server(s).
  26 pub trait ManyChannelMonitor: Send + Sync {
  27         /// Adds or updates a monitor for the given funding_txid+funding_output_index.
  28         fn add_update_monitor(&self, funding_txo: (Sha256dHash, u16), monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), HandleError>;
  29 }
  30
  31 /// A simple implementation of a ManyChannelMonitor and ChainListener. Can be used to create a
  32 /// watchtower or watch our own channels.
  33 /// Note that you must provide your own key by which to refer to channels.
  34 /// If you're accepting remote monitors (ie are implementing a watchtower), you must verify that
  35 /// users cannot overwrite a given channel by providing a duplicate key. ie you should probably
  36 /// index by a PublicKey which is required to sign any updates.
  37 /// If you're using this for local monitoring of your own channels, you probably want to use
  38 /// (Sha256dHash, u16) as the key, which will give you a ManyChannelMonitor implementation.
  39 pub struct SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
  40         monitors: Mutex<HashMap<Key, ChannelMonitor>>,
  41         chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>,
  42         broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>
  43 }
  44
  45 impl<Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash> ChainListener for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
  46         fn block_connected(&self, _header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], _indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) {
  47                 let monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
  48                 for monitor in monitors.values() {
  49                         monitor.block_connected(txn_matched, height, &*self.broadcaster);
  50                 }
  51         }
  52
  53         fn block_disconnected(&self, _: &BlockHeader) { }
  54 }
  55
  56 impl<Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash + 'static> SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
  57         pub fn new(chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>, broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>) -> Arc<SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key>> {
  58                 let res = Arc::new(SimpleManyChannelMonitor {
  59                         monitors: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
  60                         chain_monitor,
  61                         broadcaster
  62                 });
  63                 let weak_res = Arc::downgrade(&res);
  64                 res.chain_monitor.register_listener(weak_res);
  65                 res
  66         }
  67
  68         pub fn add_update_monitor_by_key(&self, key: Key, monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
  69                 let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
  70                 match monitors.get_mut(&key) {
  71                         Some(orig_monitor) => return orig_monitor.insert_combine(monitor),
  72                         None => {}
  73                 };
  74                 match monitor.funding_txo {
  75                         None => self.chain_monitor.watch_all_txn(),
  76                         Some((funding_txid, funding_output_index)) => self.chain_monitor.install_watch_outpoint((funding_txid, funding_output_index as u32)),
  77                 }
  78                 monitors.insert(key, monitor);
  79                 Ok(())
  80         }
  81 }
  82
  83 impl ManyChannelMonitor for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<(Sha256dHash, u16)> {
  84         fn add_update_monitor(&self, funding_txo: (Sha256dHash, u16), monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
  85                 self.add_update_monitor_by_key(funding_txo, monitor)
  86         }
  87 }
  88
  89 /// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, don't try to claim it directly, instead broadcast
  90 /// the HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transaction and claim the revocation from that.
  91 const CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 12;
  92
  93 #[derive(Clone)]
  94 enum RevocationStorage {
  95         PrivMode {
  96                 revocation_base_key: SecretKey,
  97         },
  98         SigsMode {
  99                 revocation_base_key: PublicKey,
 100                 sigs: HashMap<Sha256dHash, Signature>,
 101         }
 102 }
 103
 104 #[derive(Clone)]
 105 struct PerCommitmentTransactionData {
 106         revoked_output_index: u32,
 107         htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Signature)>,
 108 }
 109
 110 #[derive(Clone)]
 111 pub struct ChannelMonitor {
 112         funding_txo: Option<(Sha256dHash, u16)>,
 113         commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64,
 114
 115         revocation_base_key: RevocationStorage,
 116         delayed_payment_base_key: PublicKey,
 117         htlc_base_key: PublicKey,
 118         their_htlc_base_key: Option<PublicKey>,
 119         to_self_delay: u16,
 120
 121         old_secrets: [([u8; 32], u64); 49],
 122         claimable_outpoints: HashMap<Sha256dHash, PerCommitmentTransactionData>,
 123         payment_preimages: Vec<[u8; 32]>,
 124
 125         destination_script: Script,
 126         secp_ctx: Secp256k1, //TODO: dedup this a bit...
 127 }
 128
 129 impl ChannelMonitor {
 130         pub fn new(revocation_base_key: &SecretKey, delayed_payment_base_key: &PublicKey, htlc_base_key: &PublicKey, to_self_delay: u16, destination_script: Script) -> ChannelMonitor {
 131                 ChannelMonitor {
 132                         funding_txo: None,
 133                         commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: 0,
 134
 135                         revocation_base_key: RevocationStorage::PrivMode {
 136                                 revocation_base_key: revocation_base_key.clone(),
 137                         },
 138                         delayed_payment_base_key: delayed_payment_base_key.clone(),
 139                         htlc_base_key: htlc_base_key.clone(),
 140                         their_htlc_base_key: None,
 141                         to_self_delay: to_self_delay,
 142
 143                         old_secrets: [([0; 32], 1 << 48); 49],
 144                         claimable_outpoints: HashMap::new(),
 145                         payment_preimages: Vec::new(),
 146
 147                         destination_script: destination_script,
 148                         secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
 149                 }
 150         }
 151
 152         #[inline]
 153         fn place_secret(idx: u64) -> u8 {
 154                 for i in 0..48 {
 155                         if idx & (1 << i) == (1 << i) {
 156                                 return i
 157                         }
 158                 }
 159                 48
 160         }
 161
 162         #[inline]
 163         fn derive_secret(secret: [u8; 32], bits: u8, idx: u64) -> [u8; 32] {
 164                 let mut res: [u8; 32] = secret;
 165                 for i in 0..bits {
 166                         let bitpos = bits - 1 - i;
 167                         if idx & (1 << bitpos) == (1 << bitpos) {
 168                                 res[(bitpos / 8) as usize] ^= 1 << (bitpos & 7);
 169                                 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
 170                                 sha.input(&res);
 171                                 sha.result(&mut res);
 172                         }
 173                 }
 174                 res
 175         }
 176
 177         /// Inserts a revocation secret into this channel monitor. Requires the revocation_base_key of
 178         /// the node which we are monitoring the channel on behalf of in order to generate signatures
 179         /// over revocation-claim transactions.
 180         pub fn provide_secret(&mut self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
 181                 let pos = ChannelMonitor::place_secret(idx);
 182                 for i in 0..pos {
 183                         let (old_secret, old_idx) = self.old_secrets[i as usize];
 184                         if ChannelMonitor::derive_secret(secret, pos, old_idx) != old_secret {
 185                                 return Err(HandleError{err: "Previous secret did not match new one", msg: None})
 186                         }
 187                 }
 188                 self.old_secrets[pos as usize] = (secret, idx);
 189                 Ok(())
 190         }
 191
 192         /// Informs this watcher of the set of HTLC outputs in a commitment transaction which our
 193         /// counterparty may broadcast. This allows us to reconstruct the commitment transaction's
 194         /// outputs fully, claiming revoked, unexpired HTLC outputs as well as revoked refund outputs.
 195         /// TODO: Doc new params!
 196         /// TODO: This seems to be wrong...we should be calling this from commitment_signed, but we
 197         /// should be calling this about remote transactions, ie ones that they can revoke_and_ack...
 198         pub fn provide_tx_info(&mut self, commitment_tx: &Transaction, revokeable_out_index: u32, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Signature)>) {
 199                 // TODO: Encrypt the htlc_outputs data with the single-hash of the commitment transaction
 200                 // so that a remote monitor doesn't learn anything unless there is a malicious close.
 201                 self.claimable_outpoints.insert(commitment_tx.txid(), PerCommitmentTransactionData{
 202                         revoked_output_index: revokeable_out_index,
 203                         htlcs: htlc_outputs
 204                 });
 205         }
 206
 207         pub fn insert_combine(&mut self, other: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
 208                 match self.funding_txo {
 209                         Some(txo) => if other.funding_txo.is_some() && other.funding_txo.unwrap() != txo {
 210                                 return Err(HandleError{err: "Funding transaction outputs are not identical!", msg: None});
 211                         },
 212                         None => if other.funding_txo.is_some() {
 213                                 self.funding_txo = other.funding_txo;
 214                         }
 215                 }
 216                 let other_max_secret = other.get_min_seen_secret();
 217                 if self.get_min_seen_secret() > other_max_secret {
 218                         self.provide_secret(other_max_secret, other.get_secret(other_max_secret).unwrap())
 219                 } else { Ok(()) }
 220         }
 221
 222         /// Panics if commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor doesn't fit in 48 bits
 223         pub fn set_commitment_obscure_factor(&mut self, commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64) {
 224                 assert!(commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor < (1 << 48));
 225                 self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor = commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor;
 226         }
 227
 228         /// Allows this monitor to scan only for transactions which are applicable. Note that this is
 229         /// optional, without it this monitor cannot be used in an SPV client, but you may wish to
 230         /// avoid this (or call unset_funding_info) on a monitor you wish to send to a watchtower as it
 231         /// provides slightly better privacy.
 232         pub fn set_funding_info(&mut self, funding_txid: Sha256dHash, funding_output_index: u16) {
 233                 self.funding_txo = Some((funding_txid, funding_output_index));
 234         }
 235
 236         pub fn set_their_htlc_base_key(&mut self, their_htlc_base_key: &PublicKey) {
 237                 self.their_htlc_base_key = Some(their_htlc_base_key.clone());
 238         }
 239
 240         pub fn unset_funding_info(&mut self) {
 241                 self.funding_txo = None;
 242         }
 243
 244         pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<(Sha256dHash, u16)> {
 245                 self.funding_txo
 246         }
 247
 248         //TODO: Functions to serialize/deserialize (with different forms depending on which information
 249         //we want to leave out (eg funding_txo, etc).
 250
 251         /// Can only fail if idx is < get_min_seen_secret
 252         pub fn get_secret(&self, idx: u64) -> Result<[u8; 32], HandleError> {
 253                 for i in 0..self.old_secrets.len() {
 254                         if (idx & (!((1 << i) - 1))) == self.old_secrets[i].1 {
 255                                 return Ok(ChannelMonitor::derive_secret(self.old_secrets[i].0, i as u8, idx))
 256                         }
 257                 }
 258                 assert!(idx < self.get_min_seen_secret());
 259                 Err(HandleError{err: "idx too low", msg: None})
 260         }
 261
 262         pub fn get_min_seen_secret(&self) -> u64 {
 263                 //TODO This can be optimized?
 264                 let mut min = 1 << 48;
 265                 for &(_, idx) in self.old_secrets.iter() {
 266                         if idx < min {
 267                                 min = idx;
 268                         }
 269                 }
 270                 min
 271         }
 272
 273         #[inline]
 274         fn check_spend_transaction(&self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32) -> Vec<Transaction> {
 275                 // Most secp and related errors trying to create keys means we have no hope of constructing
 276                 // a spend transaction...so we return no transactions to broadcast
 277                 macro_rules! ignore_error {
 278                         ( $thing : expr ) => {
 279                                 match $thing {
 280                                         Ok(a) => a,
 281                                         Err(_) => return Vec::new()
 282                                 }
 283                         };
 284                 }
 285
 286                 let mut txn_to_broadcast = Vec::new();
 287
 288                 let commitment_number = (((tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor;
 289                 if commitment_number >= self.get_min_seen_secret() {
 290                         let secret = self.get_secret(commitment_number).unwrap();
 291                         let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &secret));
 292                         let revocation_pubkey = match self.revocation_base_key {
 293                                 RevocationStorage::PrivMode { ref revocation_base_key } => {
 294                                         ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &ignore_error!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key)), &ignore_error!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_base_key))))
 295                                 },
 296                                 RevocationStorage::SigsMode { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
 297                                         ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &ignore_error!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key)), &revocation_base_key))
 298                                 },
 299                         };
 300                         let delayed_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &ignore_error!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key)), &self.delayed_payment_base_key));
 301                         let a_htlc_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &ignore_error!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key)), &self.htlc_base_key));
 302                         let b_htlc_key = match self.their_htlc_base_key {
 303                                 None => return Vec::new(),
 304                                 Some(their_htlc_base_key) => ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &ignore_error!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key)), &their_htlc_base_key)),
 305                         };
 306
 307                         let revokeable_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey, self.to_self_delay, &delayed_key);
 308
 309                         let commitment_txid = tx.txid();
 310
 311                         let mut total_value = 0;
 312                         let mut values = Vec::new();
 313                         let inputs = match self.claimable_outpoints.get(&commitment_txid) {
 314                                 Some(per_commitment_data) => {
 315                                         let mut inp = Vec::with_capacity(per_commitment_data.htlcs.len() + 1);
 316
 317                                         if per_commitment_data.revoked_output_index as usize >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[per_commitment_data.revoked_output_index as usize].script_pubkey != revokeable_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh() {
 318                                                 return Vec::new(); // Corrupted per_commitment_data, not much we can do
 319                                         }
 320
 321                                         inp.push(TxIn {
 322                                                 prev_hash: commitment_txid,
 323                                                 prev_index: per_commitment_data.revoked_output_index,
 324                                                 script_sig: Script::new(),
 325                                                 sequence: 0xffffffff,
 326                                         });
 327                                         values.push(tx.output[per_commitment_data.revoked_output_index as usize].value);
 328                                         total_value += tx.output[per_commitment_data.revoked_output_index as usize].value;
 329
 330                                         for &(ref htlc, ref _next_tx_sig) in per_commitment_data.htlcs.iter() {
 331                                                 let expected_script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey, htlc.offered);
 332                                                 if htlc.transaction_output_index as usize >= tx.output.len() ||
 333                                                                 tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 ||
 334                                                                 tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].script_pubkey != expected_script.to_v0_p2wsh() {
 335                                                         return Vec::new(); // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user
 336                                                 }
 337                                                 if htlc.cltv_expiry > height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER {
 338                                                         inp.push(TxIn {
 339                                                                 prev_hash: commitment_txid,
 340                                                                 prev_index: htlc.transaction_output_index,
 341                                                                 script_sig: Script::new(),
 342                                                                 sequence: 0xffffffff,
 343                                                         });
 344                                                         values.push(tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].value);
 345                                                         total_value += htlc.amount_msat / 1000;
 346                                                 } else {
 347                                                         //TODO: Mark as "bad"
 348                                                         //then broadcast using next_tx_sig
 349                                                 }
 350                                         }
 351                                         inp
 352                                 }, None => {
 353                                         let mut inp = Vec::new(); // This is unlikely to succeed
 354                                         for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
 355                                                 if outp.script_pubkey == revokeable_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh() {
 356                                                         inp.push(TxIn {
 357                                                                 prev_hash: commitment_txid,
 358                                                                 prev_index: idx as u32,
 359                                                                 script_sig: Script::new(),
 360                                                                 sequence: 0xffffffff,
 361                                                         });
 362                                                         values.push(outp.value);
 363                                                         total_value += outp.value;
 364                                                         break; // There can only be one of these
 365                                                 }
 366                                         }
 367                                         if inp.is_empty() { return Vec::new(); } // Nothing to be done...probably a false positive
 368                                         inp
 369                                 }
 370                         };
 371
 372                         let outputs = vec!(TxOut {
 373                                 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
 374                                 value: total_value, //TODO: - fee
 375                         });
 376                         let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
 377                                 version: 2,
 378                                 lock_time: 0,
 379                                 input: inputs,
 380                                 output: outputs,
 381                                 witness: Vec::new(),
 382                         };
 383
 384                         let mut values_drain = values.drain(..);
 385
 386                         // First input is the generic revokeable_redeemscript
 387                         // TODO: Make one SighashComponents and use that throughout instead of re-building it
 388                         // each time.
 389                         {
 390                                 let sig = match self.revocation_base_key {
 391                                         RevocationStorage::PrivMode { ref revocation_base_key } => {
 392                                                 let sighash = ignore_error!(Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx).sighash_all(&spend_tx, 0, &revokeable_redeemscript, values_drain.next().unwrap())[..]));
 393                                                 let revocation_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key, &revocation_base_key));
 394                                                 ignore_error!(self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &revocation_key))
 395                                         },
 396                                         RevocationStorage::SigsMode { .. } => {
 397                                                 unimplemented!();
 398                                         }
 399                                 };
 400
 401                                 spend_tx.witness.push(Vec::new());
 402                                 spend_tx.witness[0].push(sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
 403                                 spend_tx.witness[0][0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
 404                                 spend_tx.witness[0].push(vec!(1)); // First if branch is revocation_key
 405                         }
 406
 407                         match self.claimable_outpoints.get(&commitment_txid) {
 408                                 None => {},
 409                                 Some(per_commitment_data) => {
 410                                         let mut htlc_idx = 0;
 411                                         for (idx, _) in spend_tx.input.iter().enumerate() {
 412                                                 if idx == 0 { continue; } // We already signed the first input
 413
 414                                                 let mut htlc;
 415                                                 while {
 416                                                         htlc = &per_commitment_data.htlcs[htlc_idx].0;
 417                                                         htlc_idx += 1;
 418                                                         htlc.cltv_expiry > height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
 419                                                 } {}
 420
 421                                                 let sig = match self.revocation_base_key {
 422                                                         RevocationStorage::PrivMode { ref revocation_base_key } => {
 423                                                                 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey, htlc.offered);
 424                                                                 let sighash = ignore_error!(Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx).sighash_all(&spend_tx, idx, &htlc_redeemscript, values_drain.next().unwrap())[..]));
 425
 426                                                                 let revocation_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key, &revocation_base_key));
 427                                                                 ignore_error!(self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &revocation_key))
 428                                                         },
 429                                                         RevocationStorage::SigsMode { .. } => {
 430                                                                 unimplemented!();
 431                                                         }
 432                                                 };
 433
 434                                                 spend_tx.witness.push(Vec::new());
 435                                                 spend_tx.witness[0].push(revocation_pubkey.serialize().to_vec()); // First if branch is revocation_key
 436                                                 spend_tx.witness[0].push(sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
 437                                                 spend_tx.witness[0][0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
 438                                         }
 439                                 }
 440                         }
 441
 442                         txn_to_broadcast.push(spend_tx);
 443                 }
 444
 445                 txn_to_broadcast
 446         }
 447
 448         fn block_connected(&self, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], height: u32, broadcaster: &BroadcasterInterface) {
 449                 for tx in txn_matched {
 450                         if tx.input.len() != 1 {
 451                                 // We currently only ever sign something spending a commitment or HTLC
 452                                 // transaction with 1 input, so we can skip most transactions trivially.
 453                                 continue;
 454                         }
 455
 456                         for txin in tx.input.iter() {
 457                                 if self.funding_txo.is_none() || (txin.prev_hash == self.funding_txo.unwrap().0 && txin.prev_index == self.funding_txo.unwrap().1 as u32) {
 458                                         for tx in self.check_spend_transaction(tx, height).iter() {
 459                                                 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(tx);
 460                                         }
 461                                 }
 462                         }
 463                 }
 464         }
 465 }
 466
 467 #[cfg(test)]
 468 mod tests {
 469         use bitcoin::util::misc::hex_bytes;
 470         use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Script;
 471         use ln::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor;
 472         use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
 473         use secp256k1::Secp256k1;
 474
 475         #[test]
 476         fn test_per_commitment_storage() {
 477                 // Test vectors from BOLT 3:
 478                 let mut secrets: Vec<[u8; 32]> = Vec::new();
 479                 let mut monitor: ChannelMonitor;
 480                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
 481
 482                 macro_rules! test_secrets {
 483                         () => {
 484                                 let mut idx = 281474976710655;
 485                                 for secret in secrets.iter() {
 486                                         assert_eq!(monitor.get_secret(idx).unwrap(), *secret);
 487                                         idx -= 1;
 488                                 }
 489                                 assert_eq!(monitor.get_min_seen_secret(), idx + 1);
 490                                 assert!(monitor.get_secret(idx).is_err());
 491                         };
 492                 }
 493
 494                 {
 495                         // insert_secret correct sequence
 496                         monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::new(), &PublicKey::new(), 0, Script::new());
 497                         secrets.clear();
 498
 499                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 500                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
 501                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 502                         test_secrets!();
 503
 504                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 505                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
 506                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 507                         test_secrets!();
 508
 509                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 510                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
 511                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 512                         test_secrets!();
 513
 514                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 515                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
 516                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 517                         test_secrets!();
 518
 519                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 520                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
 521                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 522                         test_secrets!();
 523
 524                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 525                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
 526                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 527                         test_secrets!();
 528
 529                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 530                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
 531                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 532                         test_secrets!();
 533
 534                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 535                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
 536                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 537                         test_secrets!();
 538                 }
 539
 540                 {
 541                         // insert_secret #1 incorrect
 542                         monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::new(), &PublicKey::new(), 0, Script::new());
 543                         secrets.clear();
 544
 545                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 546                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
 547                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 548                         test_secrets!();
 549
 550                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 551                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
 552                         assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().err,
 553                                         "Previous secret did not match new one");
 554                 }
 555
 556                 {
 557                         // insert_secret #2 incorrect (#1 derived from incorrect)
 558                         monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::new(), &PublicKey::new(), 0, Script::new());
 559                         secrets.clear();
 560
 561                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 562                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
 563                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 564                         test_secrets!();
 565
 566                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 567                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("dddc3a8d14fddf2b68fa8c7fbad2748274937479dd0f8930d5ebb4ab6bd866a3").unwrap());
 568                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 569                         test_secrets!();
 570
 571                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 572                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
 573                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 574                         test_secrets!();
 575
 576                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 577                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
 578                         assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().err,
 579                                         "Previous secret did not match new one");
 580                 }
 581
 582                 {
 583                         // insert_secret #3 incorrect
 584                         monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::new(), &PublicKey::new(), 0, Script::new());
 585                         secrets.clear();
 586
 587                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 588                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
 589                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 590                         test_secrets!();
 591
 592                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 593                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
 594                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 595                         test_secrets!();
 596
 597                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 598                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("c51a18b13e8527e579ec56365482c62f180b7d5760b46e9477dae59e87ed423a").unwrap());
 599                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 600                         test_secrets!();
 601
 602                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 603                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
 604                         assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().err,
 605                                         "Previous secret did not match new one");
 606                 }
 607
 608                 {
 609                         // insert_secret #4 incorrect (1,2,3 derived from incorrect)
 610                         monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::new(), &PublicKey::new(), 0, Script::new());
 611                         secrets.clear();
 612
 613                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 614                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
 615                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 616                         test_secrets!();
 617
 618                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 619                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("dddc3a8d14fddf2b68fa8c7fbad2748274937479dd0f8930d5ebb4ab6bd866a3").unwrap());
 620                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 621                         test_secrets!();
 622
 623                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 624                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("c51a18b13e8527e579ec56365482c62f180b7d5760b46e9477dae59e87ed423a").unwrap());
 625                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 626                         test_secrets!();
 627
 628                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 629                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("ba65d7b0ef55a3ba300d4e87af29868f394f8f138d78a7011669c79b37b936f4").unwrap());
 630                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 631                         test_secrets!();
 632
 633                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 634                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
 635                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 636                         test_secrets!();
 637
 638                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 639                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
 640                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 641                         test_secrets!();
 642
 643                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 644                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
 645                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 646                         test_secrets!();
 647
 648                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 649                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
 650                         assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().err,
 651                                         "Previous secret did not match new one");
 652                 }
 653
 654                 {
 655                         // insert_secret #5 incorrect
 656                         monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::new(), &PublicKey::new(), 0, Script::new());
 657                         secrets.clear();
 658
 659                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 660                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
 661                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 662                         test_secrets!();
 663
 664                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 665                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
 666                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 667                         test_secrets!();
 668
 669                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 670                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
 671                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 672                         test_secrets!();
 673
 674                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 675                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
 676                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 677                         test_secrets!();
 678
 679                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 680                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("631373ad5f9ef654bb3dade742d09504c567edd24320d2fcd68e3cc47e2ff6a6").unwrap());
 681                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 682                         test_secrets!();
 683
 684                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 685                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
 686                         assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().err,
 687                                         "Previous secret did not match new one");
 688                 }
 689
 690                 {
 691                         // insert_secret #6 incorrect (5 derived from incorrect)
 692                         monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::new(), &PublicKey::new(), 0, Script::new());
 693                         secrets.clear();
 694
 695                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 696                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
 697                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 698                         test_secrets!();
 699
 700                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 701                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
 702                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 703                         test_secrets!();
 704
 705                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 706                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
 707                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 708                         test_secrets!();
 709
 710                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 711                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
 712                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 713                         test_secrets!();
 714
 715                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 716                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("631373ad5f9ef654bb3dade742d09504c567edd24320d2fcd68e3cc47e2ff6a6").unwrap());
 717                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 718                         test_secrets!();
 719
 720                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 721                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("b7e76a83668bde38b373970155c868a653304308f9896692f904a23731224bb1").unwrap());
 722                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 723                         test_secrets!();
 724
 725                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 726                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
 727                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 728                         test_secrets!();
 729
 730                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 731                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
 732                         assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().err,
 733                                         "Previous secret did not match new one");
 734                 }
 735
 736                 {
 737                         // insert_secret #7 incorrect
 738                         monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::new(), &PublicKey::new(), 0, Script::new());
 739                         secrets.clear();
 740
 741                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 742                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
 743                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 744                         test_secrets!();
 745
 746                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 747                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
 748                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 749                         test_secrets!();
 750
 751                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 752                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
 753                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 754                         test_secrets!();
 755
 756                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 757                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
 758                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 759                         test_secrets!();
 760
 761                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 762                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
 763                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 764                         test_secrets!();
 765
 766                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 767                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
 768                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 769                         test_secrets!();
 770
 771                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 772                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("e7971de736e01da8ed58b94c2fc216cb1dca9e326f3a96e7194fe8ea8af6c0a3").unwrap());
 773                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 774                         test_secrets!();
 775
 776                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 777                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
 778                         assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().err,
 779                                         "Previous secret did not match new one");
 780                 }
 781
 782                 {
 783                         // insert_secret #8 incorrect
 784                         monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::new(), &PublicKey::new(), 0, Script::new());
 785                         secrets.clear();
 786
 787                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 788                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
 789                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 790                         test_secrets!();
 791
 792                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 793                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
 794                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 795                         test_secrets!();
 796
 797                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 798                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
 799                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 800                         test_secrets!();
 801
 802                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 803                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
 804                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 805                         test_secrets!();
 806
 807                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 808                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
 809                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 810                         test_secrets!();
 811
 812                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 813                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
 814                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 815                         test_secrets!();
 816
 817                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 818                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
 819                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 820                         test_secrets!();
 821
 822                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 823                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("a7efbc61aac46d34f77778bac22c8a20c6a46ca460addc49009bda875ec88fa4").unwrap());
 824                         assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().err,
 825                                         "Previous secret did not match new one");
 826                 }
 827         }
 828 }