1 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
2 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxIn,TxOut,SigHashType,Transaction};
3 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
4 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Script;
5 use bitcoin::network::serialize;
6 use bitcoin::util::hash::Sha256dHash;
7 use bitcoin::util::bip143;
9 use crypto::digest::Digest;
11 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Message,Signature};
12 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
15 use ln::msgs::HandleError;
17 use ln::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment;
18 use chain::chaininterface::{ChainListener, ChainWatchInterface, BroadcasterInterface};
19 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
20 use util::sha2::Sha256;
23 use std::collections::HashMap;
24 use std::sync::{Arc,Mutex};
27 pub enum ChannelMonitorUpdateErr {
28 /// Used to indicate a temporary failure (eg connection to a watchtower failed, but is expected
29 /// to succeed at some point in the future).
30 /// Such a failure will "freeze" a channel, preventing us from revoking old states or
31 /// submitting new commitment transactions to the remote party.
32 /// ChannelManager::test_restore_channel_monitor can be used to retry the update(s) and restore
33 /// the channel to an operational state.
35 /// Used to indicate no further channel monitor updates will be allowed (eg we've moved on to a
36 /// different watchtower and cannot update with all watchtowers that were previously informed
37 /// of this channel). This will force-close the channel in question.
41 /// Simple trait indicating ability to track a set of ChannelMonitors and multiplex events between
42 /// them. Generally should be implemented by keeping a local SimpleManyChannelMonitor and passing
43 /// events to it, while also taking any add_update_monitor events and passing them to some remote
45 /// Note that any updates to a channel's monitor *must* be applied to each instance of the
46 /// channel's monitor everywhere (including remote watchtowers) *before* this function returns. If
47 /// an update occurs and a remote watchtower is left with old state, it may broadcast transactions
48 /// which we have revoked, allowing our counterparty to claim all funds in the channel!
49 pub trait ManyChannelMonitor: Send + Sync {
50 /// Adds or updates a monitor for the given `funding_txo`.
51 fn add_update_monitor(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr>;
54 /// A simple implementation of a ManyChannelMonitor and ChainListener. Can be used to create a
55 /// watchtower or watch our own channels.
56 /// Note that you must provide your own key by which to refer to channels.
57 /// If you're accepting remote monitors (ie are implementing a watchtower), you must verify that
58 /// users cannot overwrite a given channel by providing a duplicate key. ie you should probably
59 /// index by a PublicKey which is required to sign any updates.
60 /// If you're using this for local monitoring of your own channels, you probably want to use
61 /// `OutPoint` as the key, which will give you a ManyChannelMonitor implementation.
62 pub struct SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
63 monitors: Mutex<HashMap<Key, ChannelMonitor>>,
64 chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>,
65 broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>
68 impl<Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash> ChainListener for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
69 fn block_connected(&self, _header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], _indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) {
70 let monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
71 for monitor in monitors.values() {
72 let txn_outputs = monitor.block_connected(txn_matched, height, &*self.broadcaster);
73 for (ref txid, ref outputs) in txn_outputs {
74 for (idx, output) in outputs.iter().enumerate() {
75 self.chain_monitor.install_watch_outpoint((txid.clone(), idx as u32), &output.script_pubkey);
81 fn block_disconnected(&self, _: &BlockHeader) { }
84 impl<Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash + 'static> SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
85 pub fn new(chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>, broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>) -> Arc<SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key>> {
86 let res = Arc::new(SimpleManyChannelMonitor {
87 monitors: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
91 let weak_res = Arc::downgrade(&res);
92 res.chain_monitor.register_listener(weak_res);
96 pub fn add_update_monitor_by_key(&self, key: Key, monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
97 let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
98 match monitors.get_mut(&key) {
99 Some(orig_monitor) => return orig_monitor.insert_combine(monitor),
102 match &monitor.funding_txo {
103 &None => self.chain_monitor.watch_all_txn(),
104 &Some((ref outpoint, ref script)) => {
105 self.chain_monitor.install_watch_tx(&outpoint.txid, script);
106 self.chain_monitor.install_watch_outpoint((outpoint.txid, outpoint.index as u32), script);
109 monitors.insert(key, monitor);
114 impl ManyChannelMonitor for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<OutPoint> {
115 fn add_update_monitor(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr> {
116 match self.add_update_monitor_by_key(funding_txo, monitor) {
118 Err(_) => Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure),
123 /// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, don't try to claim it in a shared transaction,
124 /// instead claiming it in its own individual transaction.
125 const CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 12;
126 /// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, force-close the channel to broadcast the
127 /// HTLC-Success transaction.
128 const CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 6;
130 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
133 revocation_base_key: SecretKey,
134 htlc_base_key: SecretKey,
137 revocation_base_key: PublicKey,
138 htlc_base_key: PublicKey,
139 sigs: HashMap<Sha256dHash, Signature>,
143 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
144 struct LocalSignedTx {
145 /// txid of the transaction in tx, just used to make comparison faster
148 revocation_key: PublicKey,
149 a_htlc_key: PublicKey,
150 b_htlc_key: PublicKey,
151 delayed_payment_key: PublicKey,
153 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Signature, Signature)>,
156 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
157 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
159 pub struct ChannelMonitor {
160 funding_txo: Option<(OutPoint, Script)>,
161 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64,
163 key_storage: KeyStorage,
164 delayed_payment_base_key: PublicKey,
165 their_htlc_base_key: Option<PublicKey>,
166 // first is the idx of the first of the two revocation points
167 their_cur_revocation_points: Option<(u64, PublicKey, Option<PublicKey>)>,
169 our_to_self_delay: u16,
170 their_to_self_delay: Option<u16>,
172 old_secrets: [([u8; 32], u64); 49],
173 remote_claimable_outpoints: HashMap<Sha256dHash, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>>,
174 /// We cannot identify HTLC-Success or HTLC-Timeout transactions by themselves on the chain.
175 /// Nor can we figure out their commitment numbers without the commitment transaction they are
176 /// spending. Thus, in order to claim them via revocation key, we track all the remote
177 /// commitment transactions which we find on-chain, mapping them to the commitment number which
178 /// can be used to derive the revocation key and claim the transactions.
179 remote_commitment_txn_on_chain: Mutex<HashMap<Sha256dHash, u64>>,
180 /// Cache used to make pruning of payment_preimages faster.
181 /// Maps payment_hash values to commitment numbers for remote transactions for non-revoked
182 /// remote transactions (ie should remain pretty small).
183 /// Serialized to disk but should generally not be sent to Watchtowers.
184 remote_hash_commitment_number: HashMap<[u8; 32], u64>,
186 // We store two local commitment transactions to avoid any race conditions where we may update
187 // some monitors (potentially on watchtowers) but then fail to update others, resulting in the
188 // various monitors for one channel being out of sync, and us broadcasting a local
189 // transaction for which we have deleted claim information on some watchtowers.
190 prev_local_signed_commitment_tx: Option<LocalSignedTx>,
191 current_local_signed_commitment_tx: Option<LocalSignedTx>,
193 payment_preimages: HashMap<[u8; 32], [u8; 32]>,
195 destination_script: Script,
196 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>, //TODO: dedup this a bit...
198 impl Clone for ChannelMonitor {
199 fn clone(&self) -> Self {
201 funding_txo: self.funding_txo.clone(),
202 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor.clone(),
204 key_storage: self.key_storage.clone(),
205 delayed_payment_base_key: self.delayed_payment_base_key.clone(),
206 their_htlc_base_key: self.their_htlc_base_key.clone(),
207 their_cur_revocation_points: self.their_cur_revocation_points.clone(),
209 our_to_self_delay: self.our_to_self_delay,
210 their_to_self_delay: self.their_to_self_delay,
212 old_secrets: self.old_secrets.clone(),
213 remote_claimable_outpoints: self.remote_claimable_outpoints.clone(),
214 remote_commitment_txn_on_chain: Mutex::new((*self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.lock().unwrap()).clone()),
215 remote_hash_commitment_number: self.remote_hash_commitment_number.clone(),
217 prev_local_signed_commitment_tx: self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.clone(),
218 current_local_signed_commitment_tx: self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx.clone(),
220 payment_preimages: self.payment_preimages.clone(),
222 destination_script: self.destination_script.clone(),
223 secp_ctx: self.secp_ctx.clone(),
228 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
229 /// Used only in testing and fuzztarget to check serialization roundtrips don't change the
230 /// underlying object
231 impl PartialEq for ChannelMonitor {
232 fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
233 if self.funding_txo != other.funding_txo ||
234 self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor != other.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor ||
235 self.key_storage != other.key_storage ||
236 self.delayed_payment_base_key != other.delayed_payment_base_key ||
237 self.their_htlc_base_key != other.their_htlc_base_key ||
238 self.their_cur_revocation_points != other.their_cur_revocation_points ||
239 self.our_to_self_delay != other.our_to_self_delay ||
240 self.their_to_self_delay != other.their_to_self_delay ||
241 self.remote_claimable_outpoints != other.remote_claimable_outpoints ||
242 self.remote_hash_commitment_number != other.remote_hash_commitment_number ||
243 self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx != other.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx ||
244 self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx != other.current_local_signed_commitment_tx ||
245 self.payment_preimages != other.payment_preimages ||
246 self.destination_script != other.destination_script
250 for (&(ref secret, ref idx), &(ref o_secret, ref o_idx)) in self.old_secrets.iter().zip(other.old_secrets.iter()) {
251 if secret != o_secret || idx != o_idx {
255 let us = self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.lock().unwrap();
256 let them = other.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.lock().unwrap();
262 impl ChannelMonitor {
263 pub fn new(revocation_base_key: &SecretKey, delayed_payment_base_key: &PublicKey, htlc_base_key: &SecretKey, our_to_self_delay: u16, destination_script: Script) -> ChannelMonitor {
266 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: 0,
268 key_storage: KeyStorage::PrivMode {
269 revocation_base_key: revocation_base_key.clone(),
270 htlc_base_key: htlc_base_key.clone(),
272 delayed_payment_base_key: delayed_payment_base_key.clone(),
273 their_htlc_base_key: None,
274 their_cur_revocation_points: None,
276 our_to_self_delay: our_to_self_delay,
277 their_to_self_delay: None,
279 old_secrets: [([0; 32], 1 << 48); 49],
280 remote_claimable_outpoints: HashMap::new(),
281 remote_commitment_txn_on_chain: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
282 remote_hash_commitment_number: HashMap::new(),
284 prev_local_signed_commitment_tx: None,
285 current_local_signed_commitment_tx: None,
287 payment_preimages: HashMap::new(),
289 destination_script: destination_script,
290 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
295 fn place_secret(idx: u64) -> u8 {
297 if idx & (1 << i) == (1 << i) {
305 fn derive_secret(secret: [u8; 32], bits: u8, idx: u64) -> [u8; 32] {
306 let mut res: [u8; 32] = secret;
308 let bitpos = bits - 1 - i;
309 if idx & (1 << bitpos) == (1 << bitpos) {
310 res[(bitpos / 8) as usize] ^= 1 << (bitpos & 7);
311 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
313 sha.result(&mut res);
319 /// Inserts a revocation secret into this channel monitor. Also optionally tracks the next
320 /// revocation point which may be required to claim HTLC outputs which we know the preimage of
321 /// in case the remote end force-closes using their latest state. Prunes old preimages if neither
322 /// needed by local commitment transactions HTCLs nor by remote ones. Unless we haven't already seen remote
323 /// commitment transaction's secret, they are de facto pruned (we can use revocation key).
324 pub(super) fn provide_secret(&mut self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32], their_next_revocation_point: Option<(u64, PublicKey)>) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
325 let pos = ChannelMonitor::place_secret(idx);
327 let (old_secret, old_idx) = self.old_secrets[i as usize];
328 if ChannelMonitor::derive_secret(secret, pos, old_idx) != old_secret {
329 return Err(HandleError{err: "Previous secret did not match new one", action: None})
332 self.old_secrets[pos as usize] = (secret, idx);
334 if let Some(new_revocation_point) = their_next_revocation_point {
335 match self.their_cur_revocation_points {
336 Some(old_points) => {
337 if old_points.0 == new_revocation_point.0 + 1 {
338 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0, old_points.1, Some(new_revocation_point.1)));
339 } else if old_points.0 == new_revocation_point.0 + 2 {
340 if let Some(old_second_point) = old_points.2 {
341 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0 - 1, old_second_point, Some(new_revocation_point.1)));
343 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((new_revocation_point.0, new_revocation_point.1, None));
346 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((new_revocation_point.0, new_revocation_point.1, None));
350 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((new_revocation_point.0, new_revocation_point.1, None));
355 if !self.payment_preimages.is_empty() {
356 let local_signed_commitment_tx = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx.as_ref().expect("Channel needs at least an initial commitment tx !");
357 let prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.as_ref();
358 let min_idx = self.get_min_seen_secret();
359 let remote_hash_commitment_number = &mut self.remote_hash_commitment_number;
361 self.payment_preimages.retain(|&k, _| {
362 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in &local_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs {
363 if k == htlc.payment_hash {
367 if let Some(prev_local_commitment_tx) = prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
368 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in prev_local_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
369 if k == htlc.payment_hash {
374 let contains = if let Some(cn) = remote_hash_commitment_number.get(&k) {
381 remote_hash_commitment_number.remove(&k);
390 /// Informs this monitor of the latest remote (ie non-broadcastable) commitment transaction.
391 /// The monitor watches for it to be broadcasted and then uses the HTLC information (and
392 /// possibly future revocation/preimage information) to claim outputs where possible.
393 /// We cache also the mapping hash:commitment number to lighten pruning of old preimages by watchtowers.
394 pub(super) fn provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, unsigned_commitment_tx: &Transaction, htlc_outputs: Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>, commitment_number: u64) {
395 // TODO: Encrypt the htlc_outputs data with the single-hash of the commitment transaction
396 // so that a remote monitor doesn't learn anything unless there is a malicious close.
397 // (only maybe, sadly we cant do the same for local info, as we need to be aware of
399 for htlc in &htlc_outputs {
400 self.remote_hash_commitment_number.insert(htlc.payment_hash, commitment_number);
402 self.remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(unsigned_commitment_tx.txid(), htlc_outputs);
405 /// Informs this monitor of the latest local (ie broadcastable) commitment transaction. The
406 /// monitor watches for timeouts and may broadcast it if we approach such a timeout. Thus, it
407 /// is important that any clones of this channel monitor (including remote clones) by kept
408 /// up-to-date as our local commitment transaction is updated.
409 /// Panics if set_their_to_self_delay has never been called.
410 pub(super) fn provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, signed_commitment_tx: Transaction, local_keys: chan_utils::TxCreationKeys, feerate_per_kw: u64, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Signature, Signature)>) {
411 assert!(self.their_to_self_delay.is_some());
412 self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx.take();
413 self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(LocalSignedTx {
414 txid: signed_commitment_tx.txid(),
415 tx: signed_commitment_tx,
416 revocation_key: local_keys.revocation_key,
417 a_htlc_key: local_keys.a_htlc_key,
418 b_htlc_key: local_keys.b_htlc_key,
419 delayed_payment_key: local_keys.a_delayed_payment_key,
425 /// Provides a payment_hash->payment_preimage mapping. Will be automatically pruned when all
426 /// commitment_tx_infos which contain the payment hash have been revoked.
427 pub(super) fn provide_payment_preimage(&mut self, payment_hash: &[u8; 32], payment_preimage: &[u8; 32]) {
428 self.payment_preimages.insert(payment_hash.clone(), payment_preimage.clone());
431 pub fn insert_combine(&mut self, mut other: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
432 if self.funding_txo.is_some() {
433 // We should be able to compare the entire funding_txo, but in fuzztarget its trivially
434 // easy to collide the funding_txo hash and have a different scriptPubKey.
435 if other.funding_txo.is_some() && other.funding_txo.as_ref().unwrap().0 != self.funding_txo.as_ref().unwrap().0 {
436 return Err(HandleError{err: "Funding transaction outputs are not identical!", action: None});
439 self.funding_txo = other.funding_txo.take();
441 let other_min_secret = other.get_min_seen_secret();
442 let our_min_secret = self.get_min_seen_secret();
443 if our_min_secret > other_min_secret {
444 self.provide_secret(other_min_secret, other.get_secret(other_min_secret).unwrap(), None)?;
446 if our_min_secret >= other_min_secret {
447 self.their_cur_revocation_points = other.their_cur_revocation_points;
448 for (txid, htlcs) in other.remote_claimable_outpoints.drain() {
449 self.remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, htlcs);
451 if let Some(local_tx) = other.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
452 self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(local_tx);
454 if let Some(local_tx) = other.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
455 self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(local_tx);
457 self.payment_preimages = other.payment_preimages;
462 /// Panics if commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor doesn't fit in 48 bits
463 pub(super) fn set_commitment_obscure_factor(&mut self, commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64) {
464 assert!(commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor < (1 << 48));
465 self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor = commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor;
468 /// Allows this monitor to scan only for transactions which are applicable. Note that this is
469 /// optional, without it this monitor cannot be used in an SPV client, but you may wish to
470 /// avoid this (or call unset_funding_info) on a monitor you wish to send to a watchtower as it
471 /// provides slightly better privacy.
472 /// It is the responsability of the caller to register outpoint and script with passing the former
473 /// value as key to update current monitor
474 pub(super) fn set_funding_info(&mut self, funding_info: (OutPoint, Script)) {
475 self.funding_txo = Some(funding_info);
478 pub(super) fn set_their_htlc_base_key(&mut self, their_htlc_base_key: &PublicKey) {
479 self.their_htlc_base_key = Some(their_htlc_base_key.clone());
482 pub(super) fn set_their_to_self_delay(&mut self, their_to_self_delay: u16) {
483 self.their_to_self_delay = Some(their_to_self_delay);
486 pub(super) fn unset_funding_info(&mut self) {
487 self.funding_txo = None;
490 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
491 match self.funding_txo {
492 Some((outpoint, _)) => Some(outpoint),
497 /// Serializes into a vec, with various modes for the exposed pub fns
498 fn serialize(&self, for_local_storage: bool) -> Vec<u8> {
499 let mut res = Vec::new();
500 res.push(SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
501 res.push(MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
503 match &self.funding_txo {
504 &Some((ref outpoint, ref script)) => {
505 res.extend_from_slice(&outpoint.txid[..]);
506 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(outpoint.index));
507 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(script.len() as u64));
508 res.extend_from_slice(&script[..]);
511 // We haven't even been initialized...not sure why anyone is serializing us, but
512 // not much to give them.
517 // Set in initial Channel-object creation, so should always be set by now:
518 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor));
520 match self.key_storage {
521 KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key } => {
523 res.extend_from_slice(&revocation_base_key[..]);
524 res.extend_from_slice(&htlc_base_key[..]);
526 KeyStorage::SigsMode { .. } => unimplemented!(),
529 res.extend_from_slice(&self.delayed_payment_base_key.serialize());
530 res.extend_from_slice(&self.their_htlc_base_key.as_ref().unwrap().serialize());
532 match self.their_cur_revocation_points {
533 Some((idx, pubkey, second_option)) => {
534 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(idx));
535 res.extend_from_slice(&pubkey.serialize());
536 match second_option {
537 Some(second_pubkey) => {
538 res.extend_from_slice(&second_pubkey.serialize());
541 res.extend_from_slice(&[0; 33]);
546 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(0));
550 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.our_to_self_delay));
551 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap()));
553 for &(ref secret, ref idx) in self.old_secrets.iter() {
554 res.extend_from_slice(secret);
555 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*idx));
558 macro_rules! serialize_htlc_in_commitment {
559 ($htlc_output: expr) => {
560 res.push($htlc_output.offered as u8);
561 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc_output.amount_msat));
562 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array($htlc_output.cltv_expiry));
563 res.extend_from_slice(&$htlc_output.payment_hash);
564 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array($htlc_output.transaction_output_index));
568 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_claimable_outpoints.len() as u64));
569 for (txid, htlc_outputs) in self.remote_claimable_outpoints.iter() {
570 res.extend_from_slice(&txid[..]);
571 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc_outputs.len() as u64));
572 for htlc_output in htlc_outputs.iter() {
573 serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output);
578 let remote_commitment_txn_on_chain = self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.lock().unwrap();
579 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.len() as u64));
580 for (txid, commitment_number) in remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
581 res.extend_from_slice(&txid[..]);
582 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(*commitment_number));
586 if for_local_storage {
587 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_hash_commitment_number.len() as u64));
588 for (payment_hash, commitment_number) in self.remote_hash_commitment_number.iter() {
589 res.extend_from_slice(payment_hash);
590 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(*commitment_number));
593 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(0));
596 macro_rules! serialize_local_tx {
597 ($local_tx: expr) => {
598 let tx_ser = serialize::serialize(&$local_tx.tx).unwrap();
599 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(tx_ser.len() as u64));
600 res.extend_from_slice(&tx_ser);
602 res.extend_from_slice(&$local_tx.revocation_key.serialize());
603 res.extend_from_slice(&$local_tx.a_htlc_key.serialize());
604 res.extend_from_slice(&$local_tx.b_htlc_key.serialize());
605 res.extend_from_slice(&$local_tx.delayed_payment_key.serialize());
607 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($local_tx.feerate_per_kw));
608 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($local_tx.htlc_outputs.len() as u64));
609 for &(ref htlc_output, ref their_sig, ref our_sig) in $local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
610 serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output);
611 res.extend_from_slice(&their_sig.serialize_compact(&self.secp_ctx));
612 res.extend_from_slice(&our_sig.serialize_compact(&self.secp_ctx));
617 if let Some(ref prev_local_tx) = self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
619 serialize_local_tx!(prev_local_tx);
624 if let Some(ref cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
626 serialize_local_tx!(cur_local_tx);
631 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.payment_preimages.len() as u64));
632 for payment_preimage in self.payment_preimages.values() {
633 res.extend_from_slice(payment_preimage);
636 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.destination_script.len() as u64));
637 res.extend_from_slice(&self.destination_script[..]);
642 /// Encodes this monitor into a byte array, suitable for writing to disk.
643 pub fn serialize_for_disk(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
647 /// Encodes this monitor into a byte array, suitable for sending to a remote watchtower
648 pub fn serialize_for_watchtower(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
649 self.serialize(false)
652 /// Attempts to decode a serialized monitor
653 pub fn deserialize(data: &[u8]) -> Option<Self> {
654 let mut read_pos = 0;
655 macro_rules! read_bytes {
656 ($byte_count: expr) => {
658 if ($byte_count as usize) > data.len() - read_pos {
661 read_pos += $byte_count as usize;
662 &data[read_pos - $byte_count as usize..read_pos]
667 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
668 macro_rules! unwrap_obj {
672 Err(_) => return None,
677 let _ver = read_bytes!(1)[0];
678 let min_ver = read_bytes!(1)[0];
679 if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION {
683 // Technically this can fail and serialize fail a round-trip, but only for serialization of
684 // barely-init'd ChannelMonitors that we can't do anything with.
685 let outpoint = OutPoint {
686 txid: Sha256dHash::from(read_bytes!(32)),
687 index: byte_utils::slice_to_be16(read_bytes!(2)),
689 let script_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8));
690 let funding_txo = Some((outpoint, Script::from(read_bytes!(script_len).to_vec())));
691 let commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor = byte_utils::slice_to_be48(read_bytes!(6));
693 let key_storage = match read_bytes!(1)[0] {
695 KeyStorage::PrivMode {
696 revocation_base_key: unwrap_obj!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(32))),
697 htlc_base_key: unwrap_obj!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(32))),
703 let delayed_payment_base_key = unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(33)));
704 let their_htlc_base_key = Some(unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(33))));
706 let their_cur_revocation_points = {
707 let first_idx = byte_utils::slice_to_be48(read_bytes!(6));
711 let first_point = unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(33)));
712 let second_point_slice = read_bytes!(33);
713 if second_point_slice[0..32] == [0; 32] && second_point_slice[32] == 0 {
714 Some((first_idx, first_point, None))
716 Some((first_idx, first_point, Some(unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, second_point_slice)))))
721 let our_to_self_delay = byte_utils::slice_to_be16(read_bytes!(2));
722 let their_to_self_delay = Some(byte_utils::slice_to_be16(read_bytes!(2)));
724 let mut old_secrets = [([0; 32], 1 << 48); 49];
725 for &mut (ref mut secret, ref mut idx) in old_secrets.iter_mut() {
726 secret.copy_from_slice(read_bytes!(32));
727 *idx = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8));
730 macro_rules! read_htlc_in_commitment {
733 let offered = match read_bytes!(1)[0] {
734 0 => false, 1 => true,
737 let amount_msat = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8));
738 let cltv_expiry = byte_utils::slice_to_be32(read_bytes!(4));
739 let mut payment_hash = [0; 32];
740 payment_hash[..].copy_from_slice(read_bytes!(32));
741 let transaction_output_index = byte_utils::slice_to_be32(read_bytes!(4));
743 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
744 offered, amount_msat, cltv_expiry, payment_hash, transaction_output_index
750 let remote_claimable_outpoints_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8));
751 if remote_claimable_outpoints_len > data.len() as u64 / 64 { return None; }
752 let mut remote_claimable_outpoints = HashMap::with_capacity(remote_claimable_outpoints_len as usize);
753 for _ in 0..remote_claimable_outpoints_len {
754 let txid = Sha256dHash::from(read_bytes!(32));
755 let outputs_count = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8));
756 if outputs_count > data.len() as u64 / 32 { return None; }
757 let mut outputs = Vec::with_capacity(outputs_count as usize);
758 for _ in 0..outputs_count {
759 outputs.push(read_htlc_in_commitment!());
761 if let Some(_) = remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, outputs) {
766 let remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8));
767 if remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len > data.len() as u64 / 32 { return None; }
768 let mut remote_commitment_txn_on_chain = HashMap::with_capacity(remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len as usize);
769 for _ in 0..remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len {
770 let txid = Sha256dHash::from(read_bytes!(32));
771 let commitment_number = byte_utils::slice_to_be48(read_bytes!(6));
772 if let Some(_) = remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(txid, commitment_number) {
777 let remote_hash_commitment_number_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8));
778 if remote_hash_commitment_number_len > data.len() as u64 / 32 { return None; }
779 let mut remote_hash_commitment_number = HashMap::with_capacity(remote_hash_commitment_number_len as usize);
780 for _ in 0..remote_hash_commitment_number_len {
781 let mut txid = [0; 32];
782 txid[..].copy_from_slice(read_bytes!(32));
783 let commitment_number = byte_utils::slice_to_be48(read_bytes!(6));
784 if let Some(_) = remote_hash_commitment_number.insert(txid, commitment_number) {
789 macro_rules! read_local_tx {
792 let tx_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8));
793 let tx_ser = read_bytes!(tx_len);
794 let tx: Transaction = unwrap_obj!(serialize::deserialize(tx_ser));
795 if serialize::serialize(&tx).unwrap() != tx_ser {
796 // We check that the tx re-serializes to the same form to ensure there is
797 // no extra data, and as rust-bitcoin doesn't handle the 0-input ambiguity
802 let revocation_key = unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(33)));
803 let a_htlc_key = unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(33)));
804 let b_htlc_key = unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(33)));
805 let delayed_payment_key = unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(33)));
806 let feerate_per_kw = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8));
808 let htlc_outputs_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8));
809 if htlc_outputs_len > data.len() as u64 / 128 { return None; }
810 let mut htlc_outputs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_outputs_len as usize);
811 for _ in 0..htlc_outputs_len {
812 htlc_outputs.push((read_htlc_in_commitment!(),
813 unwrap_obj!(Signature::from_compact(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(64))),
814 unwrap_obj!(Signature::from_compact(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(64)))));
819 tx, revocation_key, a_htlc_key, b_htlc_key, delayed_payment_key, feerate_per_kw, htlc_outputs
825 let prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = match read_bytes!(1)[0] {
828 Some(read_local_tx!())
833 let current_local_signed_commitment_tx = match read_bytes!(1)[0] {
836 Some(read_local_tx!())
841 let payment_preimages_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8));
842 if payment_preimages_len > data.len() as u64 / 32 { return None; }
843 let mut payment_preimages = HashMap::with_capacity(payment_preimages_len as usize);
844 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
845 for _ in 0..payment_preimages_len {
846 let mut preimage = [0; 32];
847 preimage[..].copy_from_slice(read_bytes!(32));
849 sha.input(&preimage);
850 let mut hash = [0; 32];
851 sha.result(&mut hash);
852 if let Some(_) = payment_preimages.insert(hash, preimage) {
857 let destination_script_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8));
858 let destination_script = Script::from(read_bytes!(destination_script_len).to_vec());
860 Some(ChannelMonitor {
862 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor,
865 delayed_payment_base_key,
867 their_cur_revocation_points,
873 remote_claimable_outpoints,
874 remote_commitment_txn_on_chain: Mutex::new(remote_commitment_txn_on_chain),
875 remote_hash_commitment_number,
877 prev_local_signed_commitment_tx,
878 current_local_signed_commitment_tx,
887 //TODO: Functions to serialize/deserialize (with different forms depending on which information
888 //we want to leave out (eg funding_txo, etc).
890 /// Can only fail if idx is < get_min_seen_secret
891 pub fn get_secret(&self, idx: u64) -> Result<[u8; 32], HandleError> {
892 for i in 0..self.old_secrets.len() {
893 if (idx & (!((1 << i) - 1))) == self.old_secrets[i].1 {
894 return Ok(ChannelMonitor::derive_secret(self.old_secrets[i].0, i as u8, idx))
897 assert!(idx < self.get_min_seen_secret());
898 Err(HandleError{err: "idx too low", action: None})
901 pub fn get_min_seen_secret(&self) -> u64 {
902 //TODO This can be optimized?
903 let mut min = 1 << 48;
904 for &(_, idx) in self.old_secrets.iter() {
912 /// Attempts to claim a remote commitment transaction's outputs using the revocation key and
913 /// data in remote_claimable_outpoints. Will directly claim any HTLC outputs which expire at a
914 /// height > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER. In any case, will install monitoring for
915 /// HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions, and claim them using the revocation key (if
916 /// applicable) as well.
917 fn check_spend_remote_transaction(&self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32) -> (Vec<Transaction>, (Sha256dHash, Vec<TxOut>)) {
918 // Most secp and related errors trying to create keys means we have no hope of constructing
919 // a spend transaction...so we return no transactions to broadcast
920 let mut txn_to_broadcast = Vec::new();
921 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
923 let commitment_txid = tx.txid(); //TODO: This is gonna be a performance bottleneck for watchtowers!
924 let per_commitment_option = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(&commitment_txid);
926 macro_rules! ignore_error {
927 ( $thing : expr ) => {
930 Err(_) => return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs))
935 let commitment_number = 0xffffffffffff - ((((tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor);
936 if commitment_number >= self.get_min_seen_secret() {
937 let secret = self.get_secret(commitment_number).unwrap();
938 let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &secret));
939 let (revocation_pubkey, b_htlc_key) = match self.key_storage {
940 KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key } => {
941 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
942 (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_base_key))),
943 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &htlc_base_key))))
945 KeyStorage::SigsMode { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
946 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
947 (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &revocation_base_key)),
948 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &htlc_base_key)))
951 let delayed_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key), &self.delayed_payment_base_key));
952 let a_htlc_key = match self.their_htlc_base_key {
953 None => return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs)),
954 Some(their_htlc_base_key) => ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key), &their_htlc_base_key)),
957 let revokeable_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey, self.our_to_self_delay, &delayed_key);
958 let revokeable_p2wsh = revokeable_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
960 let mut total_value = 0;
961 let mut values = Vec::new();
962 let mut inputs = Vec::new();
963 let mut htlc_idxs = Vec::new();
965 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
966 if outp.script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh {
968 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
969 txid: commitment_txid,
972 script_sig: Script::new(),
973 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
976 htlc_idxs.push(None);
977 values.push(outp.value);
978 total_value += outp.value;
979 break; // There can only be one of these
983 macro_rules! sign_input {
984 ($sighash_parts: expr, $input: expr, $htlc_idx: expr, $amount: expr) => {
986 let (sig, redeemscript) = match self.key_storage {
987 KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
988 let redeemscript = if $htlc_idx.is_none() { revokeable_redeemscript.clone() } else {
989 let htlc = &per_commitment_option.unwrap()[$htlc_idx.unwrap()];
990 chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey)
992 let sighash = ignore_error!(Message::from_slice(&$sighash_parts.sighash_all(&$input, &redeemscript, $amount)[..]));
993 let revocation_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key, &revocation_base_key));
994 (self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &revocation_key), redeemscript)
996 KeyStorage::SigsMode { .. } => {
1000 $input.witness.push(sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
1001 $input.witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1002 if $htlc_idx.is_none() {
1003 $input.witness.push(vec!(1));
1005 $input.witness.push(revocation_pubkey.serialize().to_vec());
1007 $input.witness.push(redeemscript.into_bytes());
1012 if let Some(per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
1013 inputs.reserve_exact(per_commitment_data.len());
1015 for (idx, htlc) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() {
1016 let expected_script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey);
1017 if htlc.transaction_output_index as usize >= tx.output.len() ||
1018 tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 ||
1019 tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].script_pubkey != expected_script.to_v0_p2wsh() {
1020 return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs)); // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user
1023 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
1024 txid: commitment_txid,
1025 vout: htlc.transaction_output_index,
1027 script_sig: Script::new(),
1028 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
1029 witness: Vec::new(),
1031 if htlc.cltv_expiry > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER {
1033 htlc_idxs.push(Some(idx));
1034 values.push(tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].value);
1035 total_value += htlc.amount_msat / 1000;
1037 let mut single_htlc_tx = Transaction {
1041 output: vec!(TxOut {
1042 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1043 value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000, //TODO: - fee
1046 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&single_htlc_tx);
1047 sign_input!(sighash_parts, single_htlc_tx.input[0], Some(idx), htlc.amount_msat / 1000);
1048 txn_to_broadcast.push(single_htlc_tx); // TODO: This is not yet tested in ChannelManager!
1053 if !inputs.is_empty() || !txn_to_broadcast.is_empty() { // ie we're confident this is actually ours
1054 // We're definitely a remote commitment transaction!
1055 watch_outputs.append(&mut tx.output.clone());
1056 self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.lock().unwrap().insert(commitment_txid, commitment_number);
1058 if inputs.is_empty() { return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs)); } // Nothing to be done...probably a false positive/local tx
1060 let outputs = vec!(TxOut {
1061 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1062 value: total_value, //TODO: - fee
1064 let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
1071 let mut values_drain = values.drain(..);
1072 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx);
1074 for (input, htlc_idx) in spend_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(htlc_idxs.iter()) {
1075 let value = values_drain.next().unwrap();
1076 sign_input!(sighash_parts, input, htlc_idx, value);
1079 txn_to_broadcast.push(spend_tx);
1080 } else if let Some(per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
1081 // While this isn't useful yet, there is a potential race where if a counterparty
1082 // revokes a state at the same time as the commitment transaction for that state is
1083 // confirmed, and the watchtower receives the block before the user, the user could
1084 // upload a new ChannelMonitor with the revocation secret but the watchtower has
1085 // already processed the block, resulting in the remote_commitment_txn_on_chain entry
1086 // not being generated by the above conditional. Thus, to be safe, we go ahead and
1088 watch_outputs.append(&mut tx.output.clone());
1089 self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.lock().unwrap().insert(commitment_txid, commitment_number);
1091 if let Some(revocation_points) = self.their_cur_revocation_points {
1092 let revocation_point_option =
1093 if revocation_points.0 == commitment_number { Some(&revocation_points.1) }
1094 else if let Some(point) = revocation_points.2.as_ref() {
1095 if revocation_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 { Some(point) } else { None }
1097 if let Some(revocation_point) = revocation_point_option {
1098 let (revocation_pubkey, b_htlc_key) = match self.key_storage {
1099 KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key } => {
1100 (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_base_key))),
1101 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &htlc_base_key))))
1103 KeyStorage::SigsMode { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
1104 (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &revocation_base_key)),
1105 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &htlc_base_key)))
1108 let a_htlc_key = match self.their_htlc_base_key {
1109 None => return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs)),
1110 Some(their_htlc_base_key) => ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &their_htlc_base_key)),
1113 let mut total_value = 0;
1114 let mut values = Vec::new();
1115 let mut inputs = Vec::new();
1117 macro_rules! sign_input {
1118 ($sighash_parts: expr, $input: expr, $amount: expr, $preimage: expr) => {
1120 let (sig, redeemscript) = match self.key_storage {
1121 KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
1122 let htlc = &per_commitment_option.unwrap()[$input.sequence as usize];
1123 let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey);
1124 let sighash = ignore_error!(Message::from_slice(&$sighash_parts.sighash_all(&$input, &redeemscript, $amount)[..]));
1125 let htlc_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &htlc_base_key));
1126 (self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &htlc_key), redeemscript)
1128 KeyStorage::SigsMode { .. } => {
1132 $input.witness.push(sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
1133 $input.witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1134 $input.witness.push($preimage);
1135 $input.witness.push(redeemscript.into_bytes());
1140 for (idx, htlc) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() {
1141 if let Some(payment_preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
1143 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
1144 txid: commitment_txid,
1145 vout: htlc.transaction_output_index,
1147 script_sig: Script::new(),
1148 sequence: idx as u32, // reset to 0xfffffffd in sign_input
1149 witness: Vec::new(),
1151 if htlc.cltv_expiry > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER {
1153 values.push((tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].value, payment_preimage));
1154 total_value += htlc.amount_msat / 1000;
1156 let mut single_htlc_tx = Transaction {
1160 output: vec!(TxOut {
1161 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1162 value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000, //TODO: - fee
1165 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&single_htlc_tx);
1166 sign_input!(sighash_parts, single_htlc_tx.input[0], htlc.amount_msat / 1000, payment_preimage.to_vec());
1167 txn_to_broadcast.push(single_htlc_tx);
1172 if inputs.is_empty() { return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs)); } // Nothing to be done...probably a false positive/local tx
1174 let outputs = vec!(TxOut {
1175 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1176 value: total_value, //TODO: - fee
1178 let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
1185 let mut values_drain = values.drain(..);
1186 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx);
1188 for input in spend_tx.input.iter_mut() {
1189 let value = values_drain.next().unwrap();
1190 sign_input!(sighash_parts, input, value.0, value.1.to_vec());
1193 txn_to_broadcast.push(spend_tx);
1197 //TODO: For each input check if its in our remote_commitment_txn_on_chain map!
1200 (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs))
1203 fn broadcast_by_local_state(&self, local_tx: &LocalSignedTx) -> Vec<Transaction> {
1204 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
1206 for &(ref htlc, ref their_sig, ref our_sig) in local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1208 let mut htlc_timeout_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&local_tx.txid, local_tx.feerate_per_kw, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), htlc, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key, &local_tx.revocation_key);
1210 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
1212 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(their_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
1213 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1214 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
1215 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1217 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new());
1218 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &local_tx.a_htlc_key, &local_tx.b_htlc_key, &local_tx.revocation_key).into_bytes());
1220 res.push(htlc_timeout_tx);
1222 if let Some(payment_preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
1223 let mut htlc_success_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&local_tx.txid, local_tx.feerate_per_kw, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), htlc, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key, &local_tx.revocation_key);
1225 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
1227 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(their_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
1228 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1229 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
1230 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1232 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(payment_preimage.to_vec());
1233 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &local_tx.a_htlc_key, &local_tx.b_htlc_key, &local_tx.revocation_key).into_bytes());
1235 res.push(htlc_success_tx);
1243 /// Attempts to claim any claimable HTLCs in a commitment transaction which was not (yet)
1244 /// revoked using data in local_claimable_outpoints.
1245 /// Should not be used if check_spend_revoked_transaction succeeds.
1246 fn check_spend_local_transaction(&self, tx: &Transaction, _height: u32) -> Vec<Transaction> {
1247 let commitment_txid = tx.txid();
1248 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1249 if local_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
1250 return self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx);
1253 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1254 if local_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
1255 return self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx);
1261 fn block_connected(&self, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], height: u32, broadcaster: &BroadcasterInterface)-> Vec<(Sha256dHash, Vec<TxOut>)> {
1262 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
1263 for tx in txn_matched {
1264 for txin in tx.input.iter() {
1265 if self.funding_txo.is_none() || (txin.previous_output.txid == self.funding_txo.as_ref().unwrap().0.txid && txin.previous_output.vout == self.funding_txo.as_ref().unwrap().0.index as u32) {
1266 let (mut txn, new_outputs) = self.check_spend_remote_transaction(tx, height);
1267 if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() {
1268 watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
1271 txn = self.check_spend_local_transaction(tx, height);
1273 for tx in txn.iter() {
1274 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(tx);
1279 if let Some(ref cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1280 let mut needs_broadcast = false;
1281 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in cur_local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1282 if htlc.cltv_expiry <= height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER {
1283 if htlc.offered || self.payment_preimages.contains_key(&htlc.payment_hash) {
1284 needs_broadcast = true;
1289 if needs_broadcast {
1290 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&cur_local_tx.tx);
1291 for tx in self.broadcast_by_local_state(&cur_local_tx) {
1292 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
1299 pub fn would_broadcast_at_height(&self, height: u32) -> bool {
1300 if let Some(ref cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1301 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in cur_local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1302 if htlc.cltv_expiry <= height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER {
1303 if htlc.offered || self.payment_preimages.contains_key(&htlc.payment_hash) {
1315 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Script;
1316 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
1317 use crypto::digest::Digest;
1319 use ln::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor;
1320 use ln::chan_utils::{HTLCOutputInCommitment, TxCreationKeys};
1321 use util::sha2::Sha256;
1322 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
1323 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1, Signature};
1324 use rand::{thread_rng,Rng};
1327 fn test_per_commitment_storage() {
1328 // Test vectors from BOLT 3:
1329 let mut secrets: Vec<[u8; 32]> = Vec::new();
1330 let mut monitor: ChannelMonitor;
1331 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1333 macro_rules! test_secrets {
1335 let mut idx = 281474976710655;
1336 for secret in secrets.iter() {
1337 assert_eq!(monitor.get_secret(idx).unwrap(), *secret);
1340 assert_eq!(monitor.get_min_seen_secret(), idx + 1);
1341 assert!(monitor.get_secret(idx).is_err());
1345 let delayed_payment_base_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap());
1348 // insert_secret correct sequence
1349 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &delayed_payment_base_key, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
1352 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1353 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1354 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1357 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1358 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1359 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1362 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1363 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1364 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1367 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1368 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1369 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1372 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1373 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
1374 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1377 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1378 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
1379 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1382 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1383 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
1384 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1387 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1388 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
1389 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1394 // insert_secret #1 incorrect
1395 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &delayed_payment_base_key, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
1398 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1399 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
1400 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1403 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1404 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1405 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err,
1406 "Previous secret did not match new one");
1410 // insert_secret #2 incorrect (#1 derived from incorrect)
1411 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &delayed_payment_base_key, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
1414 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1415 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
1416 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1419 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1420 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("dddc3a8d14fddf2b68fa8c7fbad2748274937479dd0f8930d5ebb4ab6bd866a3").unwrap());
1421 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1424 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1425 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1426 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1429 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1430 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1431 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err,
1432 "Previous secret did not match new one");
1436 // insert_secret #3 incorrect
1437 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &delayed_payment_base_key, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
1440 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1441 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1442 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1445 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1446 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1447 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1450 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1451 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c51a18b13e8527e579ec56365482c62f180b7d5760b46e9477dae59e87ed423a").unwrap());
1452 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1455 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1456 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1457 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err,
1458 "Previous secret did not match new one");
1462 // insert_secret #4 incorrect (1,2,3 derived from incorrect)
1463 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &delayed_payment_base_key, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
1466 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1467 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
1468 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1471 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1472 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("dddc3a8d14fddf2b68fa8c7fbad2748274937479dd0f8930d5ebb4ab6bd866a3").unwrap());
1473 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1476 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1477 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c51a18b13e8527e579ec56365482c62f180b7d5760b46e9477dae59e87ed423a").unwrap());
1478 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1481 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1482 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("ba65d7b0ef55a3ba300d4e87af29868f394f8f138d78a7011669c79b37b936f4").unwrap());
1483 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1486 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1487 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
1488 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1491 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1492 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
1493 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1496 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1497 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
1498 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1501 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1502 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
1503 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err,
1504 "Previous secret did not match new one");
1508 // insert_secret #5 incorrect
1509 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &delayed_payment_base_key, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
1512 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1513 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1514 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1517 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1518 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1519 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1522 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1523 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1524 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1527 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1528 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1529 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1532 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1533 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("631373ad5f9ef654bb3dade742d09504c567edd24320d2fcd68e3cc47e2ff6a6").unwrap());
1534 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1537 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1538 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
1539 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err,
1540 "Previous secret did not match new one");
1544 // insert_secret #6 incorrect (5 derived from incorrect)
1545 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &delayed_payment_base_key, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
1548 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1549 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1550 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1553 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1554 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1555 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1558 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1559 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1560 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1563 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1564 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1565 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1568 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1569 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("631373ad5f9ef654bb3dade742d09504c567edd24320d2fcd68e3cc47e2ff6a6").unwrap());
1570 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1573 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1574 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("b7e76a83668bde38b373970155c868a653304308f9896692f904a23731224bb1").unwrap());
1575 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1578 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1579 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
1580 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1583 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1584 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
1585 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err,
1586 "Previous secret did not match new one");
1590 // insert_secret #7 incorrect
1591 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &delayed_payment_base_key, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
1594 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1595 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1596 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1599 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1600 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1601 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1604 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1605 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1606 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1609 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1610 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1611 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1614 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1615 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
1616 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1619 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1620 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
1621 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1624 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1625 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("e7971de736e01da8ed58b94c2fc216cb1dca9e326f3a96e7194fe8ea8af6c0a3").unwrap());
1626 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1629 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1630 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
1631 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err,
1632 "Previous secret did not match new one");
1636 // insert_secret #8 incorrect
1637 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &delayed_payment_base_key, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
1640 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1641 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1642 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1645 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1646 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1647 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1650 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1651 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1652 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1655 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1656 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1657 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1660 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1661 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
1662 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1665 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1666 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
1667 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1670 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1671 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
1672 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1675 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1676 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a7efbc61aac46d34f77778bac22c8a20c6a46ca460addc49009bda875ec88fa4").unwrap());
1677 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err,
1678 "Previous secret did not match new one");
1683 fn test_prune_preimages() {
1684 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1685 let dummy_sig = Signature::from_der(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("3045022100fa86fa9a36a8cd6a7bb8f06a541787d51371d067951a9461d5404de6b928782e02201c8b7c334c10aed8976a3a465be9a28abff4cb23acbf00022295b378ce1fa3cd").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
1687 macro_rules! dummy_keys {
1690 let dummy_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap());
1692 per_commitment_point: dummy_key.clone(),
1693 revocation_key: dummy_key.clone(),
1694 a_htlc_key: dummy_key.clone(),
1695 b_htlc_key: dummy_key.clone(),
1696 a_delayed_payment_key: dummy_key.clone(),
1697 b_payment_key: dummy_key.clone(),
1702 let dummy_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
1704 let mut preimages = Vec::new();
1706 let mut rng = thread_rng();
1708 let mut preimage = [0; 32];
1709 rng.fill_bytes(&mut preimage);
1710 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
1711 sha.input(&preimage);
1712 let mut hash = [0; 32];
1713 sha.result(&mut hash);
1714 preimages.push((preimage, hash));
1718 macro_rules! preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs {
1719 ($preimages_slice: expr) => {
1721 let mut res = Vec::new();
1722 for (idx, preimage) in $preimages_slice.iter().enumerate() {
1723 res.push(HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1727 payment_hash: preimage.1.clone(),
1728 transaction_output_index: idx as u32,
1735 macro_rules! preimages_to_local_htlcs {
1736 ($preimages_slice: expr) => {
1738 let mut inp = preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!($preimages_slice);
1739 let res: Vec<_> = inp.drain(..).map(|e| { (e, dummy_sig.clone(), dummy_sig.clone()) }).collect();
1745 macro_rules! test_preimages_exist {
1746 ($preimages_slice: expr, $monitor: expr) => {
1747 for preimage in $preimages_slice {
1748 assert!($monitor.payment_preimages.contains_key(&preimage.1));
1753 // Prune with one old state and a local commitment tx holding a few overlaps with the
1755 let delayed_payment_base_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap());
1756 let mut monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &delayed_payment_base_key, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
1757 monitor.set_their_to_self_delay(10);
1759 monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(dummy_tx.clone(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..10]));
1760 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[5..15]), 281474976710655);
1761 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[15..20]), 281474976710654);
1762 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[17..20]), 281474976710653);
1763 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[18..20]), 281474976710652);
1764 for &(ref preimage, ref hash) in preimages.iter() {
1765 monitor.provide_payment_preimage(hash, preimage);
1768 // Now provide a secret, pruning preimages 10-15
1769 let mut secret = [0; 32];
1770 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1771 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secret.clone(), None).unwrap();
1772 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 15);
1773 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
1774 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[15..20], monitor);
1776 // Now provide a further secret, pruning preimages 15-17
1777 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1778 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secret.clone(), None).unwrap();
1779 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 13);
1780 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
1781 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[17..20], monitor);
1783 // Now update local commitment tx info, pruning only element 18 as we still care about the
1784 // previous commitment tx's preimages too
1785 monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(dummy_tx.clone(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..5]));
1786 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1787 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secret.clone(), None).unwrap();
1788 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 12);
1789 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
1790 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[18..20], monitor);
1792 // But if we do it again, we'll prune 5-10
1793 monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(dummy_tx.clone(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..3]));
1794 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1795 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secret.clone(), None).unwrap();
1796 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 5);
1797 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..5], monitor);
1800 // Further testing is done in the ChannelManager integration tests.