1 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
2 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxIn,TxOut,SigHashType,Transaction};
3 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
4 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Script;
5 use bitcoin::network::serialize;
6 use bitcoin::util::hash::Sha256dHash;
7 use bitcoin::util::bip143;
9 use crypto::digest::Digest;
11 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Message,Signature};
12 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
15 use ln::msgs::HandleError;
17 use ln::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment;
18 use chain::chaininterface::{ChainListener, ChainWatchInterface, BroadcasterInterface};
19 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
20 use util::sha2::Sha256;
23 use std::collections::HashMap;
24 use std::sync::{Arc,Mutex};
27 pub enum ChannelMonitorUpdateErr {
28 /// Used to indicate a temporary failure (eg connection to a watchtower failed, but is expected
29 /// to succeed at some point in the future).
30 /// Such a failure will "freeze" a channel, preventing us from revoking old states or
31 /// submitting new commitment transactions to the remote party.
32 /// ChannelManager::test_restore_channel_monitor can be used to retry the update(s) and restore
33 /// the channel to an operational state.
35 /// Used to indicate no further channel monitor updates will be allowed (eg we've moved on to a
36 /// different watchtower and cannot update with all watchtowers that were previously informed
37 /// of this channel). This will force-close the channel in question.
41 /// Simple trait indicating ability to track a set of ChannelMonitors and multiplex events between
42 /// them. Generally should be implemented by keeping a local SimpleManyChannelMonitor and passing
43 /// events to it, while also taking any add_update_monitor events and passing them to some remote
45 /// Note that any updates to a channel's monitor *must* be applied to each instance of the
46 /// channel's monitor everywhere (including remote watchtowers) *before* this function returns. If
47 /// an update occurs and a remote watchtower is left with old state, it may broadcast transactions
48 /// which we have revoked, allowing our counterparty to claim all funds in the channel!
49 pub trait ManyChannelMonitor: Send + Sync {
50 /// Adds or updates a monitor for the given `funding_txo`.
51 /// Implementor must also ensure that the funding_txo outpoint is registered with any relevant
52 /// ChainWatchInterfaces such that the provided monitor receives block_connected callbacks with
54 fn add_update_monitor(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr>;
57 /// A simple implementation of a ManyChannelMonitor and ChainListener. Can be used to create a
58 /// watchtower or watch our own channels.
59 /// Note that you must provide your own key by which to refer to channels.
60 /// If you're accepting remote monitors (ie are implementing a watchtower), you must verify that
61 /// users cannot overwrite a given channel by providing a duplicate key. ie you should probably
62 /// index by a PublicKey which is required to sign any updates.
63 /// If you're using this for local monitoring of your own channels, you probably want to use
64 /// `OutPoint` as the key, which will give you a ManyChannelMonitor implementation.
65 pub struct SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
66 #[cfg(test)] // Used in ChannelManager tests to manipulate channels directly
67 pub monitors: Mutex<HashMap<Key, ChannelMonitor>>,
69 monitors: Mutex<HashMap<Key, ChannelMonitor>>,
70 chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>,
71 broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>
74 impl<Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash> ChainListener for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
75 fn block_connected(&self, _header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], _indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) {
76 let monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
77 for monitor in monitors.values() {
78 let txn_outputs = monitor.block_connected(txn_matched, height, &*self.broadcaster);
79 for (ref txid, ref outputs) in txn_outputs {
80 for (idx, output) in outputs.iter().enumerate() {
81 self.chain_monitor.install_watch_outpoint((txid.clone(), idx as u32), &output.script_pubkey);
87 fn block_disconnected(&self, _: &BlockHeader) { }
90 impl<Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash + 'static> SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
91 pub fn new(chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>, broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>) -> Arc<SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key>> {
92 let res = Arc::new(SimpleManyChannelMonitor {
93 monitors: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
97 let weak_res = Arc::downgrade(&res);
98 res.chain_monitor.register_listener(weak_res);
102 pub fn add_update_monitor_by_key(&self, key: Key, monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
103 let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
104 match monitors.get_mut(&key) {
105 Some(orig_monitor) => return orig_monitor.insert_combine(monitor),
108 match &monitor.funding_txo {
109 &None => self.chain_monitor.watch_all_txn(),
110 &Some((ref outpoint, ref script)) => {
111 self.chain_monitor.install_watch_tx(&outpoint.txid, script);
112 self.chain_monitor.install_watch_outpoint((outpoint.txid, outpoint.index as u32), script);
115 monitors.insert(key, monitor);
120 impl ManyChannelMonitor for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<OutPoint> {
121 fn add_update_monitor(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr> {
122 match self.add_update_monitor_by_key(funding_txo, monitor) {
124 Err(_) => Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure),
129 /// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, don't try to claim it in a shared transaction,
130 /// instead claiming it in its own individual transaction.
131 const CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 12;
132 /// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, force-close the channel to broadcast the
133 /// HTLC-Success transaction.
134 const CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 6;
136 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
139 revocation_base_key: SecretKey,
140 htlc_base_key: SecretKey,
143 revocation_base_key: PublicKey,
144 htlc_base_key: PublicKey,
145 sigs: HashMap<Sha256dHash, Signature>,
149 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
150 struct LocalSignedTx {
151 /// txid of the transaction in tx, just used to make comparison faster
154 revocation_key: PublicKey,
155 a_htlc_key: PublicKey,
156 b_htlc_key: PublicKey,
157 delayed_payment_key: PublicKey,
159 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Signature, Signature)>,
162 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
163 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
165 pub struct ChannelMonitor {
166 funding_txo: Option<(OutPoint, Script)>,
167 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64,
169 key_storage: KeyStorage,
170 delayed_payment_base_key: PublicKey,
171 their_htlc_base_key: Option<PublicKey>,
172 their_delayed_payment_base_key: Option<PublicKey>,
173 // first is the idx of the first of the two revocation points
174 their_cur_revocation_points: Option<(u64, PublicKey, Option<PublicKey>)>,
176 our_to_self_delay: u16,
177 their_to_self_delay: Option<u16>,
179 old_secrets: [([u8; 32], u64); 49],
180 remote_claimable_outpoints: HashMap<Sha256dHash, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>>,
181 /// We cannot identify HTLC-Success or HTLC-Timeout transactions by themselves on the chain.
182 /// Nor can we figure out their commitment numbers without the commitment transaction they are
183 /// spending. Thus, in order to claim them via revocation key, we track all the remote
184 /// commitment transactions which we find on-chain, mapping them to the commitment number which
185 /// can be used to derive the revocation key and claim the transactions.
186 remote_commitment_txn_on_chain: Mutex<HashMap<Sha256dHash, u64>>,
187 /// Cache used to make pruning of payment_preimages faster.
188 /// Maps payment_hash values to commitment numbers for remote transactions for non-revoked
189 /// remote transactions (ie should remain pretty small).
190 /// Serialized to disk but should generally not be sent to Watchtowers.
191 remote_hash_commitment_number: HashMap<[u8; 32], u64>,
193 // We store two local commitment transactions to avoid any race conditions where we may update
194 // some monitors (potentially on watchtowers) but then fail to update others, resulting in the
195 // various monitors for one channel being out of sync, and us broadcasting a local
196 // transaction for which we have deleted claim information on some watchtowers.
197 prev_local_signed_commitment_tx: Option<LocalSignedTx>,
198 current_local_signed_commitment_tx: Option<LocalSignedTx>,
200 payment_preimages: HashMap<[u8; 32], [u8; 32]>,
202 destination_script: Script,
203 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>, //TODO: dedup this a bit...
205 impl Clone for ChannelMonitor {
206 fn clone(&self) -> Self {
208 funding_txo: self.funding_txo.clone(),
209 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor.clone(),
211 key_storage: self.key_storage.clone(),
212 delayed_payment_base_key: self.delayed_payment_base_key.clone(),
213 their_htlc_base_key: self.their_htlc_base_key.clone(),
214 their_delayed_payment_base_key: self.their_delayed_payment_base_key.clone(),
215 their_cur_revocation_points: self.their_cur_revocation_points.clone(),
217 our_to_self_delay: self.our_to_self_delay,
218 their_to_self_delay: self.their_to_self_delay,
220 old_secrets: self.old_secrets.clone(),
221 remote_claimable_outpoints: self.remote_claimable_outpoints.clone(),
222 remote_commitment_txn_on_chain: Mutex::new((*self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.lock().unwrap()).clone()),
223 remote_hash_commitment_number: self.remote_hash_commitment_number.clone(),
225 prev_local_signed_commitment_tx: self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.clone(),
226 current_local_signed_commitment_tx: self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx.clone(),
228 payment_preimages: self.payment_preimages.clone(),
230 destination_script: self.destination_script.clone(),
231 secp_ctx: self.secp_ctx.clone(),
236 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
237 /// Used only in testing and fuzztarget to check serialization roundtrips don't change the
238 /// underlying object
239 impl PartialEq for ChannelMonitor {
240 fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
241 if self.funding_txo != other.funding_txo ||
242 self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor != other.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor ||
243 self.key_storage != other.key_storage ||
244 self.delayed_payment_base_key != other.delayed_payment_base_key ||
245 self.their_htlc_base_key != other.their_htlc_base_key ||
246 self.their_delayed_payment_base_key != other.their_delayed_payment_base_key ||
247 self.their_cur_revocation_points != other.their_cur_revocation_points ||
248 self.our_to_self_delay != other.our_to_self_delay ||
249 self.their_to_self_delay != other.their_to_self_delay ||
250 self.remote_claimable_outpoints != other.remote_claimable_outpoints ||
251 self.remote_hash_commitment_number != other.remote_hash_commitment_number ||
252 self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx != other.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx ||
253 self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx != other.current_local_signed_commitment_tx ||
254 self.payment_preimages != other.payment_preimages ||
255 self.destination_script != other.destination_script
259 for (&(ref secret, ref idx), &(ref o_secret, ref o_idx)) in self.old_secrets.iter().zip(other.old_secrets.iter()) {
260 if secret != o_secret || idx != o_idx {
264 let us = self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.lock().unwrap();
265 let them = other.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.lock().unwrap();
271 impl ChannelMonitor {
272 pub fn new(revocation_base_key: &SecretKey, delayed_payment_base_key: &PublicKey, htlc_base_key: &SecretKey, our_to_self_delay: u16, destination_script: Script) -> ChannelMonitor {
275 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: 0,
277 key_storage: KeyStorage::PrivMode {
278 revocation_base_key: revocation_base_key.clone(),
279 htlc_base_key: htlc_base_key.clone(),
281 delayed_payment_base_key: delayed_payment_base_key.clone(),
282 their_htlc_base_key: None,
283 their_delayed_payment_base_key: None,
284 their_cur_revocation_points: None,
286 our_to_self_delay: our_to_self_delay,
287 their_to_self_delay: None,
289 old_secrets: [([0; 32], 1 << 48); 49],
290 remote_claimable_outpoints: HashMap::new(),
291 remote_commitment_txn_on_chain: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
292 remote_hash_commitment_number: HashMap::new(),
294 prev_local_signed_commitment_tx: None,
295 current_local_signed_commitment_tx: None,
297 payment_preimages: HashMap::new(),
299 destination_script: destination_script,
300 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
305 fn place_secret(idx: u64) -> u8 {
307 if idx & (1 << i) == (1 << i) {
315 fn derive_secret(secret: [u8; 32], bits: u8, idx: u64) -> [u8; 32] {
316 let mut res: [u8; 32] = secret;
318 let bitpos = bits - 1 - i;
319 if idx & (1 << bitpos) == (1 << bitpos) {
320 res[(bitpos / 8) as usize] ^= 1 << (bitpos & 7);
321 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
323 sha.result(&mut res);
329 /// Inserts a revocation secret into this channel monitor. Also optionally tracks the next
330 /// revocation point which may be required to claim HTLC outputs which we know the preimage of
331 /// in case the remote end force-closes using their latest state. Prunes old preimages if neither
332 /// needed by local commitment transactions HTCLs nor by remote ones. Unless we haven't already seen remote
333 /// commitment transaction's secret, they are de facto pruned (we can use revocation key).
334 pub(super) fn provide_secret(&mut self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32], their_next_revocation_point: Option<(u64, PublicKey)>) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
335 let pos = ChannelMonitor::place_secret(idx);
337 let (old_secret, old_idx) = self.old_secrets[i as usize];
338 if ChannelMonitor::derive_secret(secret, pos, old_idx) != old_secret {
339 return Err(HandleError{err: "Previous secret did not match new one", action: None})
342 self.old_secrets[pos as usize] = (secret, idx);
344 if let Some(new_revocation_point) = their_next_revocation_point {
345 match self.their_cur_revocation_points {
346 Some(old_points) => {
347 if old_points.0 == new_revocation_point.0 + 1 {
348 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0, old_points.1, Some(new_revocation_point.1)));
349 } else if old_points.0 == new_revocation_point.0 + 2 {
350 if let Some(old_second_point) = old_points.2 {
351 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0 - 1, old_second_point, Some(new_revocation_point.1)));
353 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((new_revocation_point.0, new_revocation_point.1, None));
356 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((new_revocation_point.0, new_revocation_point.1, None));
360 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((new_revocation_point.0, new_revocation_point.1, None));
365 if !self.payment_preimages.is_empty() {
366 let local_signed_commitment_tx = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx.as_ref().expect("Channel needs at least an initial commitment tx !");
367 let prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.as_ref();
368 let min_idx = self.get_min_seen_secret();
369 let remote_hash_commitment_number = &mut self.remote_hash_commitment_number;
371 self.payment_preimages.retain(|&k, _| {
372 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in &local_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs {
373 if k == htlc.payment_hash {
377 if let Some(prev_local_commitment_tx) = prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
378 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in prev_local_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
379 if k == htlc.payment_hash {
384 let contains = if let Some(cn) = remote_hash_commitment_number.get(&k) {
391 remote_hash_commitment_number.remove(&k);
400 /// Informs this monitor of the latest remote (ie non-broadcastable) commitment transaction.
401 /// The monitor watches for it to be broadcasted and then uses the HTLC information (and
402 /// possibly future revocation/preimage information) to claim outputs where possible.
403 /// We cache also the mapping hash:commitment number to lighten pruning of old preimages by watchtowers.
404 pub(super) fn provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, unsigned_commitment_tx: &Transaction, htlc_outputs: Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>, commitment_number: u64) {
405 // TODO: Encrypt the htlc_outputs data with the single-hash of the commitment transaction
406 // so that a remote monitor doesn't learn anything unless there is a malicious close.
407 // (only maybe, sadly we cant do the same for local info, as we need to be aware of
409 for htlc in &htlc_outputs {
410 self.remote_hash_commitment_number.insert(htlc.payment_hash, commitment_number);
412 self.remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(unsigned_commitment_tx.txid(), htlc_outputs);
415 /// Informs this monitor of the latest local (ie broadcastable) commitment transaction. The
416 /// monitor watches for timeouts and may broadcast it if we approach such a timeout. Thus, it
417 /// is important that any clones of this channel monitor (including remote clones) by kept
418 /// up-to-date as our local commitment transaction is updated.
419 /// Panics if set_their_to_self_delay has never been called.
420 pub(super) fn provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, signed_commitment_tx: Transaction, local_keys: chan_utils::TxCreationKeys, feerate_per_kw: u64, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Signature, Signature)>) {
421 assert!(self.their_to_self_delay.is_some());
422 self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx.take();
423 self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(LocalSignedTx {
424 txid: signed_commitment_tx.txid(),
425 tx: signed_commitment_tx,
426 revocation_key: local_keys.revocation_key,
427 a_htlc_key: local_keys.a_htlc_key,
428 b_htlc_key: local_keys.b_htlc_key,
429 delayed_payment_key: local_keys.a_delayed_payment_key,
435 /// Provides a payment_hash->payment_preimage mapping. Will be automatically pruned when all
436 /// commitment_tx_infos which contain the payment hash have been revoked.
437 pub(super) fn provide_payment_preimage(&mut self, payment_hash: &[u8; 32], payment_preimage: &[u8; 32]) {
438 self.payment_preimages.insert(payment_hash.clone(), payment_preimage.clone());
441 pub fn insert_combine(&mut self, mut other: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
442 if self.funding_txo.is_some() {
443 // We should be able to compare the entire funding_txo, but in fuzztarget its trivially
444 // easy to collide the funding_txo hash and have a different scriptPubKey.
445 if other.funding_txo.is_some() && other.funding_txo.as_ref().unwrap().0 != self.funding_txo.as_ref().unwrap().0 {
446 return Err(HandleError{err: "Funding transaction outputs are not identical!", action: None});
449 self.funding_txo = other.funding_txo.take();
451 let other_min_secret = other.get_min_seen_secret();
452 let our_min_secret = self.get_min_seen_secret();
453 if our_min_secret > other_min_secret {
454 self.provide_secret(other_min_secret, other.get_secret(other_min_secret).unwrap(), None)?;
456 if our_min_secret >= other_min_secret {
457 self.their_cur_revocation_points = other.their_cur_revocation_points;
458 for (txid, htlcs) in other.remote_claimable_outpoints.drain() {
459 self.remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, htlcs);
461 if let Some(local_tx) = other.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
462 self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(local_tx);
464 if let Some(local_tx) = other.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
465 self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(local_tx);
467 self.payment_preimages = other.payment_preimages;
472 /// Panics if commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor doesn't fit in 48 bits
473 pub(super) fn set_commitment_obscure_factor(&mut self, commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64) {
474 assert!(commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor < (1 << 48));
475 self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor = commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor;
478 /// Allows this monitor to scan only for transactions which are applicable. Note that this is
479 /// optional, without it this monitor cannot be used in an SPV client, but you may wish to
480 /// avoid this (or call unset_funding_info) on a monitor you wish to send to a watchtower as it
481 /// provides slightly better privacy.
482 /// It's the responsibility of the caller to register outpoint and script with passing the former
483 /// value as key to add_update_monitor.
484 pub(super) fn set_funding_info(&mut self, funding_info: (OutPoint, Script)) {
485 self.funding_txo = Some(funding_info);
488 /// We log these base keys at channel opening to being able to rebuild redeemscript in case of leaked revoked commit tx
489 pub(super) fn set_their_base_keys(&mut self, their_htlc_base_key: &PublicKey, their_delayed_payment_base_key: &PublicKey) {
490 self.their_htlc_base_key = Some(their_htlc_base_key.clone());
491 self.their_delayed_payment_base_key = Some(their_delayed_payment_base_key.clone());
494 pub(super) fn set_their_to_self_delay(&mut self, their_to_self_delay: u16) {
495 self.their_to_self_delay = Some(their_to_self_delay);
498 pub(super) fn unset_funding_info(&mut self) {
499 self.funding_txo = None;
502 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
503 match self.funding_txo {
504 Some((outpoint, _)) => Some(outpoint),
509 /// Serializes into a vec, with various modes for the exposed pub fns
510 fn serialize(&self, for_local_storage: bool) -> Vec<u8> {
511 let mut res = Vec::new();
512 res.push(SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
513 res.push(MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
515 match &self.funding_txo {
516 &Some((ref outpoint, ref script)) => {
517 res.extend_from_slice(&outpoint.txid[..]);
518 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(outpoint.index));
519 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(script.len() as u64));
520 res.extend_from_slice(&script[..]);
523 // We haven't even been initialized...not sure why anyone is serializing us, but
524 // not much to give them.
529 // Set in initial Channel-object creation, so should always be set by now:
530 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor));
532 match self.key_storage {
533 KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key } => {
535 res.extend_from_slice(&revocation_base_key[..]);
536 res.extend_from_slice(&htlc_base_key[..]);
538 KeyStorage::SigsMode { .. } => unimplemented!(),
541 res.extend_from_slice(&self.delayed_payment_base_key.serialize());
542 res.extend_from_slice(&self.their_htlc_base_key.as_ref().unwrap().serialize());
543 res.extend_from_slice(&self.their_delayed_payment_base_key.as_ref().unwrap().serialize());
545 match self.their_cur_revocation_points {
546 Some((idx, pubkey, second_option)) => {
547 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(idx));
548 res.extend_from_slice(&pubkey.serialize());
549 match second_option {
550 Some(second_pubkey) => {
551 res.extend_from_slice(&second_pubkey.serialize());
554 res.extend_from_slice(&[0; 33]);
559 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(0));
563 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.our_to_self_delay));
564 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap()));
566 for &(ref secret, ref idx) in self.old_secrets.iter() {
567 res.extend_from_slice(secret);
568 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*idx));
571 macro_rules! serialize_htlc_in_commitment {
572 ($htlc_output: expr) => {
573 res.push($htlc_output.offered as u8);
574 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc_output.amount_msat));
575 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array($htlc_output.cltv_expiry));
576 res.extend_from_slice(&$htlc_output.payment_hash);
577 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array($htlc_output.transaction_output_index));
581 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_claimable_outpoints.len() as u64));
582 for (txid, htlc_outputs) in self.remote_claimable_outpoints.iter() {
583 res.extend_from_slice(&txid[..]);
584 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc_outputs.len() as u64));
585 for htlc_output in htlc_outputs.iter() {
586 serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output);
591 let remote_commitment_txn_on_chain = self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.lock().unwrap();
592 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.len() as u64));
593 for (txid, commitment_number) in remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
594 res.extend_from_slice(&txid[..]);
595 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(*commitment_number));
599 if for_local_storage {
600 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_hash_commitment_number.len() as u64));
601 for (payment_hash, commitment_number) in self.remote_hash_commitment_number.iter() {
602 res.extend_from_slice(payment_hash);
603 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(*commitment_number));
606 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(0));
609 macro_rules! serialize_local_tx {
610 ($local_tx: expr) => {
611 let tx_ser = serialize::serialize(&$local_tx.tx).unwrap();
612 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(tx_ser.len() as u64));
613 res.extend_from_slice(&tx_ser);
615 res.extend_from_slice(&$local_tx.revocation_key.serialize());
616 res.extend_from_slice(&$local_tx.a_htlc_key.serialize());
617 res.extend_from_slice(&$local_tx.b_htlc_key.serialize());
618 res.extend_from_slice(&$local_tx.delayed_payment_key.serialize());
620 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($local_tx.feerate_per_kw));
621 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($local_tx.htlc_outputs.len() as u64));
622 for &(ref htlc_output, ref their_sig, ref our_sig) in $local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
623 serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output);
624 res.extend_from_slice(&their_sig.serialize_compact(&self.secp_ctx));
625 res.extend_from_slice(&our_sig.serialize_compact(&self.secp_ctx));
630 if let Some(ref prev_local_tx) = self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
632 serialize_local_tx!(prev_local_tx);
637 if let Some(ref cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
639 serialize_local_tx!(cur_local_tx);
644 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.payment_preimages.len() as u64));
645 for payment_preimage in self.payment_preimages.values() {
646 res.extend_from_slice(payment_preimage);
649 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.destination_script.len() as u64));
650 res.extend_from_slice(&self.destination_script[..]);
655 /// Encodes this monitor into a byte array, suitable for writing to disk.
656 pub fn serialize_for_disk(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
660 /// Encodes this monitor into a byte array, suitable for sending to a remote watchtower
661 pub fn serialize_for_watchtower(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
662 self.serialize(false)
665 /// Attempts to decode a serialized monitor
666 pub fn deserialize(data: &[u8]) -> Option<Self> {
667 let mut read_pos = 0;
668 macro_rules! read_bytes {
669 ($byte_count: expr) => {
671 if ($byte_count as usize) > data.len() - read_pos {
674 read_pos += $byte_count as usize;
675 &data[read_pos - $byte_count as usize..read_pos]
680 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
681 macro_rules! unwrap_obj {
685 Err(_) => return None,
690 let _ver = read_bytes!(1)[0];
691 let min_ver = read_bytes!(1)[0];
692 if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION {
696 // Technically this can fail and serialize fail a round-trip, but only for serialization of
697 // barely-init'd ChannelMonitors that we can't do anything with.
698 let outpoint = OutPoint {
699 txid: Sha256dHash::from(read_bytes!(32)),
700 index: byte_utils::slice_to_be16(read_bytes!(2)),
702 let script_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8));
703 let funding_txo = Some((outpoint, Script::from(read_bytes!(script_len).to_vec())));
704 let commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor = byte_utils::slice_to_be48(read_bytes!(6));
706 let key_storage = match read_bytes!(1)[0] {
708 KeyStorage::PrivMode {
709 revocation_base_key: unwrap_obj!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(32))),
710 htlc_base_key: unwrap_obj!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(32))),
716 let delayed_payment_base_key = unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(33)));
717 let their_htlc_base_key = Some(unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(33))));
718 let their_delayed_payment_base_key = Some(unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(33))));
720 let their_cur_revocation_points = {
721 let first_idx = byte_utils::slice_to_be48(read_bytes!(6));
725 let first_point = unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(33)));
726 let second_point_slice = read_bytes!(33);
727 if second_point_slice[0..32] == [0; 32] && second_point_slice[32] == 0 {
728 Some((first_idx, first_point, None))
730 Some((first_idx, first_point, Some(unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, second_point_slice)))))
735 let our_to_self_delay = byte_utils::slice_to_be16(read_bytes!(2));
736 let their_to_self_delay = Some(byte_utils::slice_to_be16(read_bytes!(2)));
738 let mut old_secrets = [([0; 32], 1 << 48); 49];
739 for &mut (ref mut secret, ref mut idx) in old_secrets.iter_mut() {
740 secret.copy_from_slice(read_bytes!(32));
741 *idx = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8));
744 macro_rules! read_htlc_in_commitment {
747 let offered = match read_bytes!(1)[0] {
748 0 => false, 1 => true,
751 let amount_msat = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8));
752 let cltv_expiry = byte_utils::slice_to_be32(read_bytes!(4));
753 let mut payment_hash = [0; 32];
754 payment_hash[..].copy_from_slice(read_bytes!(32));
755 let transaction_output_index = byte_utils::slice_to_be32(read_bytes!(4));
757 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
758 offered, amount_msat, cltv_expiry, payment_hash, transaction_output_index
764 let remote_claimable_outpoints_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8));
765 if remote_claimable_outpoints_len > data.len() as u64 / 64 { return None; }
766 let mut remote_claimable_outpoints = HashMap::with_capacity(remote_claimable_outpoints_len as usize);
767 for _ in 0..remote_claimable_outpoints_len {
768 let txid = Sha256dHash::from(read_bytes!(32));
769 let outputs_count = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8));
770 if outputs_count > data.len() as u64 / 32 { return None; }
771 let mut outputs = Vec::with_capacity(outputs_count as usize);
772 for _ in 0..outputs_count {
773 outputs.push(read_htlc_in_commitment!());
775 if let Some(_) = remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, outputs) {
780 let remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8));
781 if remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len > data.len() as u64 / 32 { return None; }
782 let mut remote_commitment_txn_on_chain = HashMap::with_capacity(remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len as usize);
783 for _ in 0..remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len {
784 let txid = Sha256dHash::from(read_bytes!(32));
785 let commitment_number = byte_utils::slice_to_be48(read_bytes!(6));
786 if let Some(_) = remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(txid, commitment_number) {
791 let remote_hash_commitment_number_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8));
792 if remote_hash_commitment_number_len > data.len() as u64 / 32 { return None; }
793 let mut remote_hash_commitment_number = HashMap::with_capacity(remote_hash_commitment_number_len as usize);
794 for _ in 0..remote_hash_commitment_number_len {
795 let mut txid = [0; 32];
796 txid[..].copy_from_slice(read_bytes!(32));
797 let commitment_number = byte_utils::slice_to_be48(read_bytes!(6));
798 if let Some(_) = remote_hash_commitment_number.insert(txid, commitment_number) {
803 macro_rules! read_local_tx {
806 let tx_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8));
807 let tx_ser = read_bytes!(tx_len);
808 let tx: Transaction = unwrap_obj!(serialize::deserialize(tx_ser));
809 if serialize::serialize(&tx).unwrap() != tx_ser {
810 // We check that the tx re-serializes to the same form to ensure there is
811 // no extra data, and as rust-bitcoin doesn't handle the 0-input ambiguity
816 let revocation_key = unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(33)));
817 let a_htlc_key = unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(33)));
818 let b_htlc_key = unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(33)));
819 let delayed_payment_key = unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(33)));
820 let feerate_per_kw = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8));
822 let htlc_outputs_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8));
823 if htlc_outputs_len > data.len() as u64 / 128 { return None; }
824 let mut htlc_outputs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_outputs_len as usize);
825 for _ in 0..htlc_outputs_len {
826 htlc_outputs.push((read_htlc_in_commitment!(),
827 unwrap_obj!(Signature::from_compact(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(64))),
828 unwrap_obj!(Signature::from_compact(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(64)))));
833 tx, revocation_key, a_htlc_key, b_htlc_key, delayed_payment_key, feerate_per_kw, htlc_outputs
839 let prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = match read_bytes!(1)[0] {
842 Some(read_local_tx!())
847 let current_local_signed_commitment_tx = match read_bytes!(1)[0] {
850 Some(read_local_tx!())
855 let payment_preimages_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8));
856 if payment_preimages_len > data.len() as u64 / 32 { return None; }
857 let mut payment_preimages = HashMap::with_capacity(payment_preimages_len as usize);
858 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
859 for _ in 0..payment_preimages_len {
860 let mut preimage = [0; 32];
861 preimage[..].copy_from_slice(read_bytes!(32));
863 sha.input(&preimage);
864 let mut hash = [0; 32];
865 sha.result(&mut hash);
866 if let Some(_) = payment_preimages.insert(hash, preimage) {
871 let destination_script_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8));
872 let destination_script = Script::from(read_bytes!(destination_script_len).to_vec());
874 Some(ChannelMonitor {
876 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor,
879 delayed_payment_base_key,
881 their_delayed_payment_base_key,
882 their_cur_revocation_points,
888 remote_claimable_outpoints,
889 remote_commitment_txn_on_chain: Mutex::new(remote_commitment_txn_on_chain),
890 remote_hash_commitment_number,
892 prev_local_signed_commitment_tx,
893 current_local_signed_commitment_tx,
902 //TODO: Functions to serialize/deserialize (with different forms depending on which information
903 //we want to leave out (eg funding_txo, etc).
905 /// Can only fail if idx is < get_min_seen_secret
906 pub fn get_secret(&self, idx: u64) -> Result<[u8; 32], HandleError> {
907 for i in 0..self.old_secrets.len() {
908 if (idx & (!((1 << i) - 1))) == self.old_secrets[i].1 {
909 return Ok(ChannelMonitor::derive_secret(self.old_secrets[i].0, i as u8, idx))
912 assert!(idx < self.get_min_seen_secret());
913 Err(HandleError{err: "idx too low", action: None})
916 pub fn get_min_seen_secret(&self) -> u64 {
917 //TODO This can be optimized?
918 let mut min = 1 << 48;
919 for &(_, idx) in self.old_secrets.iter() {
927 /// Attempts to claim a remote commitment transaction's outputs using the revocation key and
928 /// data in remote_claimable_outpoints. Will directly claim any HTLC outputs which expire at a
929 /// height > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER. In any case, will install monitoring for
930 /// HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions.
931 fn check_spend_remote_transaction(&self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32) -> (Vec<Transaction>, (Sha256dHash, Vec<TxOut>)) {
932 // Most secp and related errors trying to create keys means we have no hope of constructing
933 // a spend transaction...so we return no transactions to broadcast
934 let mut txn_to_broadcast = Vec::new();
935 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
937 let commitment_txid = tx.txid(); //TODO: This is gonna be a performance bottleneck for watchtowers!
938 let per_commitment_option = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(&commitment_txid);
940 macro_rules! ignore_error {
941 ( $thing : expr ) => {
944 Err(_) => return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs))
949 let commitment_number = 0xffffffffffff - ((((tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor);
950 if commitment_number >= self.get_min_seen_secret() {
951 let secret = self.get_secret(commitment_number).unwrap();
952 let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &secret));
953 let (revocation_pubkey, b_htlc_key) = match self.key_storage {
954 KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key } => {
955 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
956 (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_base_key))),
957 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &htlc_base_key))))
959 KeyStorage::SigsMode { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
960 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
961 (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &revocation_base_key)),
962 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &htlc_base_key)))
965 let delayed_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key), &self.delayed_payment_base_key));
966 let a_htlc_key = match self.their_htlc_base_key {
967 None => return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs)),
968 Some(their_htlc_base_key) => ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key), &their_htlc_base_key)),
971 let revokeable_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey, self.our_to_self_delay, &delayed_key);
972 let revokeable_p2wsh = revokeable_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
974 let mut total_value = 0;
975 let mut values = Vec::new();
976 let mut inputs = Vec::new();
977 let mut htlc_idxs = Vec::new();
979 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
980 if outp.script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh {
982 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
983 txid: commitment_txid,
986 script_sig: Script::new(),
987 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
990 htlc_idxs.push(None);
991 values.push(outp.value);
992 total_value += outp.value;
993 break; // There can only be one of these
997 macro_rules! sign_input {
998 ($sighash_parts: expr, $input: expr, $htlc_idx: expr, $amount: expr) => {
1000 let (sig, redeemscript) = match self.key_storage {
1001 KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
1002 let redeemscript = if $htlc_idx.is_none() { revokeable_redeemscript.clone() } else {
1003 let htlc = &per_commitment_option.unwrap()[$htlc_idx.unwrap()];
1004 chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey)
1006 let sighash = ignore_error!(Message::from_slice(&$sighash_parts.sighash_all(&$input, &redeemscript, $amount)[..]));
1007 let revocation_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key, &revocation_base_key));
1008 (self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &revocation_key), redeemscript)
1010 KeyStorage::SigsMode { .. } => {
1014 $input.witness.push(sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
1015 $input.witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1016 if $htlc_idx.is_none() {
1017 $input.witness.push(vec!(1));
1019 $input.witness.push(revocation_pubkey.serialize().to_vec());
1021 $input.witness.push(redeemscript.into_bytes());
1026 if let Some(per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
1027 inputs.reserve_exact(per_commitment_data.len());
1029 for (idx, htlc) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() {
1030 let expected_script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey);
1031 if htlc.transaction_output_index as usize >= tx.output.len() ||
1032 tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 ||
1033 tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].script_pubkey != expected_script.to_v0_p2wsh() {
1034 return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs)); // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user
1037 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
1038 txid: commitment_txid,
1039 vout: htlc.transaction_output_index,
1041 script_sig: Script::new(),
1042 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
1043 witness: Vec::new(),
1045 if htlc.cltv_expiry > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER {
1047 htlc_idxs.push(Some(idx));
1048 values.push(tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].value);
1049 total_value += htlc.amount_msat / 1000;
1051 let mut single_htlc_tx = Transaction {
1055 output: vec!(TxOut {
1056 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1057 value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000, //TODO: - fee
1060 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&single_htlc_tx);
1061 sign_input!(sighash_parts, single_htlc_tx.input[0], Some(idx), htlc.amount_msat / 1000);
1062 txn_to_broadcast.push(single_htlc_tx); // TODO: This is not yet tested in ChannelManager!
1067 if !inputs.is_empty() || !txn_to_broadcast.is_empty() { // ie we're confident this is actually ours
1068 // We're definitely a remote commitment transaction!
1069 watch_outputs.append(&mut tx.output.clone());
1070 self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.lock().unwrap().insert(commitment_txid, commitment_number);
1072 if inputs.is_empty() { return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs)); } // Nothing to be done...probably a false positive/local tx
1074 let outputs = vec!(TxOut {
1075 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1076 value: total_value, //TODO: - fee
1078 let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
1085 let mut values_drain = values.drain(..);
1086 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx);
1088 for (input, htlc_idx) in spend_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(htlc_idxs.iter()) {
1089 let value = values_drain.next().unwrap();
1090 sign_input!(sighash_parts, input, htlc_idx, value);
1093 txn_to_broadcast.push(spend_tx);
1094 } else if let Some(per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
1095 // While this isn't useful yet, there is a potential race where if a counterparty
1096 // revokes a state at the same time as the commitment transaction for that state is
1097 // confirmed, and the watchtower receives the block before the user, the user could
1098 // upload a new ChannelMonitor with the revocation secret but the watchtower has
1099 // already processed the block, resulting in the remote_commitment_txn_on_chain entry
1100 // not being generated by the above conditional. Thus, to be safe, we go ahead and
1102 watch_outputs.append(&mut tx.output.clone());
1103 self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.lock().unwrap().insert(commitment_txid, commitment_number);
1105 if let Some(revocation_points) = self.their_cur_revocation_points {
1106 let revocation_point_option =
1107 if revocation_points.0 == commitment_number { Some(&revocation_points.1) }
1108 else if let Some(point) = revocation_points.2.as_ref() {
1109 if revocation_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 { Some(point) } else { None }
1111 if let Some(revocation_point) = revocation_point_option {
1112 let (revocation_pubkey, b_htlc_key) = match self.key_storage {
1113 KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key } => {
1114 (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_base_key))),
1115 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &htlc_base_key))))
1117 KeyStorage::SigsMode { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
1118 (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &revocation_base_key)),
1119 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &htlc_base_key)))
1122 let a_htlc_key = match self.their_htlc_base_key {
1123 None => return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs)),
1124 Some(their_htlc_base_key) => ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &their_htlc_base_key)),
1127 let mut total_value = 0;
1128 let mut values = Vec::new();
1129 let mut inputs = Vec::new();
1131 macro_rules! sign_input {
1132 ($sighash_parts: expr, $input: expr, $amount: expr, $preimage: expr) => {
1134 let (sig, redeemscript) = match self.key_storage {
1135 KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
1136 let htlc = &per_commitment_option.unwrap()[$input.sequence as usize];
1137 let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey);
1138 let sighash = ignore_error!(Message::from_slice(&$sighash_parts.sighash_all(&$input, &redeemscript, $amount)[..]));
1139 let htlc_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &htlc_base_key));
1140 (self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &htlc_key), redeemscript)
1142 KeyStorage::SigsMode { .. } => {
1146 $input.witness.push(sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
1147 $input.witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1148 $input.witness.push($preimage);
1149 $input.witness.push(redeemscript.into_bytes());
1154 for (idx, htlc) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() {
1155 if let Some(payment_preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
1157 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
1158 txid: commitment_txid,
1159 vout: htlc.transaction_output_index,
1161 script_sig: Script::new(),
1162 sequence: idx as u32, // reset to 0xfffffffd in sign_input
1163 witness: Vec::new(),
1165 if htlc.cltv_expiry > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER {
1167 values.push((tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].value, payment_preimage));
1168 total_value += htlc.amount_msat / 1000;
1170 let mut single_htlc_tx = Transaction {
1174 output: vec!(TxOut {
1175 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1176 value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000, //TODO: - fee
1179 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&single_htlc_tx);
1180 sign_input!(sighash_parts, single_htlc_tx.input[0], htlc.amount_msat / 1000, payment_preimage.to_vec());
1181 txn_to_broadcast.push(single_htlc_tx);
1186 if inputs.is_empty() { return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs)); } // Nothing to be done...probably a false positive/local tx
1188 let outputs = vec!(TxOut {
1189 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1190 value: total_value, //TODO: - fee
1192 let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
1199 let mut values_drain = values.drain(..);
1200 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx);
1202 for input in spend_tx.input.iter_mut() {
1203 let value = values_drain.next().unwrap();
1204 sign_input!(sighash_parts, input, value.0, value.1.to_vec());
1207 txn_to_broadcast.push(spend_tx);
1212 (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs))
1215 /// Attempst to claim a remote HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout s outputs using the revocation key
1216 fn check_spend_remote_htlc(&self, tx: &Transaction, commitment_number: u64) -> Option<Transaction> {
1217 let htlc_txid = tx.txid(); //TODO: This is gonna be a performance bottleneck for watchtowers!
1219 macro_rules! ignore_error {
1220 ( $thing : expr ) => {
1223 Err(_) => return None
1228 let secret = ignore_error!(self.get_secret(commitment_number));
1229 let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &secret));
1230 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
1231 let revocation_pubkey = match self.key_storage {
1232 KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
1233 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_base_key)))
1235 KeyStorage::SigsMode { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
1236 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &revocation_base_key))
1239 let delayed_key = match self.their_delayed_payment_base_key {
1240 None => return None,
1241 Some(their_delayed_payment_base_key) => ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &their_delayed_payment_base_key)),
1243 let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), &delayed_key);
1244 let revokeable_p2wsh = redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
1246 let mut inputs = Vec::new();
1249 if tx.output[0].script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh { //HTLC transactions have one txin, one txout
1251 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
1255 script_sig: Script::new(),
1256 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
1257 witness: Vec::new(),
1259 amount = tx.output[0].value;
1262 if !inputs.is_empty() {
1263 let outputs = vec!(TxOut {
1264 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1265 value: amount, //TODO: - fee
1268 let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
1275 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx);
1277 let sig = match self.key_storage {
1278 KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
1279 let sighash = ignore_error!(Message::from_slice(&sighash_parts.sighash_all(&spend_tx.input[0], &redeemscript, amount)[..]));
1280 let revocation_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key, &revocation_base_key));
1281 self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &revocation_key)
1283 KeyStorage::SigsMode { .. } => {
1287 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
1288 spend_tx.input[0].witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1289 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(vec!(1));
1290 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(redeemscript.into_bytes());
1296 fn broadcast_by_local_state(&self, local_tx: &LocalSignedTx) -> Vec<Transaction> {
1297 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
1299 for &(ref htlc, ref their_sig, ref our_sig) in local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1301 let mut htlc_timeout_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&local_tx.txid, local_tx.feerate_per_kw, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), htlc, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key, &local_tx.revocation_key);
1303 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
1305 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(their_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
1306 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1307 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
1308 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1310 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new());
1311 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &local_tx.a_htlc_key, &local_tx.b_htlc_key, &local_tx.revocation_key).into_bytes());
1313 res.push(htlc_timeout_tx);
1315 if let Some(payment_preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
1316 let mut htlc_success_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&local_tx.txid, local_tx.feerate_per_kw, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), htlc, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key, &local_tx.revocation_key);
1318 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
1320 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(their_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
1321 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1322 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
1323 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1325 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(payment_preimage.to_vec());
1326 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &local_tx.a_htlc_key, &local_tx.b_htlc_key, &local_tx.revocation_key).into_bytes());
1328 res.push(htlc_success_tx);
1336 /// Attempts to claim any claimable HTLCs in a commitment transaction which was not (yet)
1337 /// revoked using data in local_claimable_outpoints.
1338 /// Should not be used if check_spend_revoked_transaction succeeds.
1339 fn check_spend_local_transaction(&self, tx: &Transaction, _height: u32) -> Vec<Transaction> {
1340 let commitment_txid = tx.txid();
1341 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1342 if local_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
1343 return self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx);
1346 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1347 if local_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
1348 return self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx);
1354 fn block_connected(&self, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], height: u32, broadcaster: &BroadcasterInterface)-> Vec<(Sha256dHash, Vec<TxOut>)> {
1355 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
1356 for tx in txn_matched {
1357 if tx.input.len() == 1 {
1358 // Assuming our keys were not leaked (in which case we're screwed no matter what),
1359 // commitment transactions and HTLC transactions will all only ever have one input,
1360 // which is an easy way to filter out any potential non-matching txn for lazy
1362 let prevout = &tx.input[0].previous_output;
1363 let mut txn: Vec<Transaction> = Vec::new();
1364 if self.funding_txo.is_none() || (prevout.txid == self.funding_txo.as_ref().unwrap().0.txid && prevout.vout == self.funding_txo.as_ref().unwrap().0.index as u32) {
1365 let (remote_txn, new_outputs) = self.check_spend_remote_transaction(tx, height);
1367 if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() {
1368 watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
1371 txn = self.check_spend_local_transaction(tx, height);
1374 let remote_commitment_txn_on_chain = self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.lock().unwrap();
1375 if let Some(commitment_number) = remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.get(&prevout.txid) {
1376 if let Some(tx) = self.check_spend_remote_htlc(tx, *commitment_number) {
1381 for tx in txn.iter() {
1382 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(tx);
1386 if let Some(ref cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1387 let mut needs_broadcast = false;
1388 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in cur_local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1389 if htlc.cltv_expiry <= height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER {
1390 if htlc.offered || self.payment_preimages.contains_key(&htlc.payment_hash) {
1391 needs_broadcast = true;
1396 if needs_broadcast {
1397 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&cur_local_tx.tx);
1398 for tx in self.broadcast_by_local_state(&cur_local_tx) {
1399 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
1406 pub fn would_broadcast_at_height(&self, height: u32) -> bool {
1407 if let Some(ref cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1408 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in cur_local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1409 if htlc.cltv_expiry <= height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER {
1410 if htlc.offered || self.payment_preimages.contains_key(&htlc.payment_hash) {
1422 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Script;
1423 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
1424 use crypto::digest::Digest;
1426 use ln::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor;
1427 use ln::chan_utils::{HTLCOutputInCommitment, TxCreationKeys};
1428 use util::sha2::Sha256;
1429 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
1430 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1, Signature};
1431 use rand::{thread_rng,Rng};
1434 fn test_per_commitment_storage() {
1435 // Test vectors from BOLT 3:
1436 let mut secrets: Vec<[u8; 32]> = Vec::new();
1437 let mut monitor: ChannelMonitor;
1438 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1440 macro_rules! test_secrets {
1442 let mut idx = 281474976710655;
1443 for secret in secrets.iter() {
1444 assert_eq!(monitor.get_secret(idx).unwrap(), *secret);
1447 assert_eq!(monitor.get_min_seen_secret(), idx + 1);
1448 assert!(monitor.get_secret(idx).is_err());
1452 let delayed_payment_base_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap());
1455 // insert_secret correct sequence
1456 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &delayed_payment_base_key, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
1459 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1460 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1461 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1464 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1465 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1466 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1469 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1470 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1471 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1474 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1475 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1476 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1479 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1480 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
1481 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1484 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1485 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
1486 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1489 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1490 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
1491 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1494 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1495 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
1496 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1501 // insert_secret #1 incorrect
1502 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &delayed_payment_base_key, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
1505 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1506 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
1507 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1510 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1511 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1512 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err,
1513 "Previous secret did not match new one");
1517 // insert_secret #2 incorrect (#1 derived from incorrect)
1518 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &delayed_payment_base_key, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
1521 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1522 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
1523 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1526 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1527 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("dddc3a8d14fddf2b68fa8c7fbad2748274937479dd0f8930d5ebb4ab6bd866a3").unwrap());
1528 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1531 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1532 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1533 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1536 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1537 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1538 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err,
1539 "Previous secret did not match new one");
1543 // insert_secret #3 incorrect
1544 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &delayed_payment_base_key, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
1547 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1548 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1549 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1552 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1553 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1554 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1557 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1558 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c51a18b13e8527e579ec56365482c62f180b7d5760b46e9477dae59e87ed423a").unwrap());
1559 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1562 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1563 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1564 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err,
1565 "Previous secret did not match new one");
1569 // insert_secret #4 incorrect (1,2,3 derived from incorrect)
1570 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &delayed_payment_base_key, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
1573 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1574 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
1575 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1578 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1579 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("dddc3a8d14fddf2b68fa8c7fbad2748274937479dd0f8930d5ebb4ab6bd866a3").unwrap());
1580 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1583 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1584 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c51a18b13e8527e579ec56365482c62f180b7d5760b46e9477dae59e87ed423a").unwrap());
1585 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1588 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1589 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("ba65d7b0ef55a3ba300d4e87af29868f394f8f138d78a7011669c79b37b936f4").unwrap());
1590 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1593 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1594 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
1595 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1598 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1599 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
1600 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1603 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1604 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
1605 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1608 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1609 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
1610 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err,
1611 "Previous secret did not match new one");
1615 // insert_secret #5 incorrect
1616 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &delayed_payment_base_key, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
1619 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1620 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1621 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1624 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1625 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1626 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1629 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1630 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1631 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1634 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1635 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1636 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1639 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1640 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("631373ad5f9ef654bb3dade742d09504c567edd24320d2fcd68e3cc47e2ff6a6").unwrap());
1641 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1644 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1645 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
1646 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err,
1647 "Previous secret did not match new one");
1651 // insert_secret #6 incorrect (5 derived from incorrect)
1652 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &delayed_payment_base_key, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
1655 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1656 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1657 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1660 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1661 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1662 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1665 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1666 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1667 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1670 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1671 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1672 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1675 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1676 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("631373ad5f9ef654bb3dade742d09504c567edd24320d2fcd68e3cc47e2ff6a6").unwrap());
1677 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1680 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1681 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("b7e76a83668bde38b373970155c868a653304308f9896692f904a23731224bb1").unwrap());
1682 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1685 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1686 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
1687 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1690 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1691 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
1692 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err,
1693 "Previous secret did not match new one");
1697 // insert_secret #7 incorrect
1698 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &delayed_payment_base_key, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
1701 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1702 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1703 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1706 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1707 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1708 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1711 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1712 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1713 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1716 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1717 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1718 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1721 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1722 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
1723 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1726 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1727 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
1728 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1731 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1732 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("e7971de736e01da8ed58b94c2fc216cb1dca9e326f3a96e7194fe8ea8af6c0a3").unwrap());
1733 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1736 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1737 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
1738 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err,
1739 "Previous secret did not match new one");
1743 // insert_secret #8 incorrect
1744 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &delayed_payment_base_key, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
1747 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1748 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1749 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1752 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1753 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1754 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1757 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1758 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1759 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1762 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1763 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1764 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1767 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1768 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
1769 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1772 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1773 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
1774 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1777 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1778 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
1779 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1782 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1783 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a7efbc61aac46d34f77778bac22c8a20c6a46ca460addc49009bda875ec88fa4").unwrap());
1784 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err,
1785 "Previous secret did not match new one");
1790 fn test_prune_preimages() {
1791 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1792 let dummy_sig = Signature::from_der(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("3045022100fa86fa9a36a8cd6a7bb8f06a541787d51371d067951a9461d5404de6b928782e02201c8b7c334c10aed8976a3a465be9a28abff4cb23acbf00022295b378ce1fa3cd").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
1794 macro_rules! dummy_keys {
1797 let dummy_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap());
1799 per_commitment_point: dummy_key.clone(),
1800 revocation_key: dummy_key.clone(),
1801 a_htlc_key: dummy_key.clone(),
1802 b_htlc_key: dummy_key.clone(),
1803 a_delayed_payment_key: dummy_key.clone(),
1804 b_payment_key: dummy_key.clone(),
1809 let dummy_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
1811 let mut preimages = Vec::new();
1813 let mut rng = thread_rng();
1815 let mut preimage = [0; 32];
1816 rng.fill_bytes(&mut preimage);
1817 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
1818 sha.input(&preimage);
1819 let mut hash = [0; 32];
1820 sha.result(&mut hash);
1821 preimages.push((preimage, hash));
1825 macro_rules! preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs {
1826 ($preimages_slice: expr) => {
1828 let mut res = Vec::new();
1829 for (idx, preimage) in $preimages_slice.iter().enumerate() {
1830 res.push(HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1834 payment_hash: preimage.1.clone(),
1835 transaction_output_index: idx as u32,
1842 macro_rules! preimages_to_local_htlcs {
1843 ($preimages_slice: expr) => {
1845 let mut inp = preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!($preimages_slice);
1846 let res: Vec<_> = inp.drain(..).map(|e| { (e, dummy_sig.clone(), dummy_sig.clone()) }).collect();
1852 macro_rules! test_preimages_exist {
1853 ($preimages_slice: expr, $monitor: expr) => {
1854 for preimage in $preimages_slice {
1855 assert!($monitor.payment_preimages.contains_key(&preimage.1));
1860 // Prune with one old state and a local commitment tx holding a few overlaps with the
1862 let delayed_payment_base_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap());
1863 let mut monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &delayed_payment_base_key, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
1864 monitor.set_their_to_self_delay(10);
1866 monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(dummy_tx.clone(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..10]));
1867 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[5..15]), 281474976710655);
1868 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[15..20]), 281474976710654);
1869 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[17..20]), 281474976710653);
1870 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[18..20]), 281474976710652);
1871 for &(ref preimage, ref hash) in preimages.iter() {
1872 monitor.provide_payment_preimage(hash, preimage);
1875 // Now provide a secret, pruning preimages 10-15
1876 let mut secret = [0; 32];
1877 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1878 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secret.clone(), None).unwrap();
1879 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 15);
1880 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
1881 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[15..20], monitor);
1883 // Now provide a further secret, pruning preimages 15-17
1884 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1885 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secret.clone(), None).unwrap();
1886 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 13);
1887 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
1888 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[17..20], monitor);
1890 // Now update local commitment tx info, pruning only element 18 as we still care about the
1891 // previous commitment tx's preimages too
1892 monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(dummy_tx.clone(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..5]));
1893 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1894 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secret.clone(), None).unwrap();
1895 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 12);
1896 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
1897 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[18..20], monitor);
1899 // But if we do it again, we'll prune 5-10
1900 monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(dummy_tx.clone(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..3]));
1901 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1902 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secret.clone(), None).unwrap();
1903 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 5);
1904 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..5], monitor);
1907 // Further testing is done in the ChannelManager integration tests.