eefe51f3ee6581f2bc1f028f2d3d8fbbf3e25cb2
[rust-lightning] / src / ln / channelmonitor.rs
1 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
2 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxIn,TxOut,SigHashType,Transaction};
3 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Script;
4 use bitcoin::util::hash::Sha256dHash;
5 use bitcoin::util::bip143;
6
7 use crypto::digest::Digest;
8
9 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Message,Signature};
10 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
11
12 use ln::msgs::HandleError;
13 use ln::chan_utils;
14 use ln::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment;
15 use chain::chaininterface::{ChainListener, ChainWatchInterface, BroadcasterInterface};
16 use util::sha2::Sha256;
17
18 use std::collections::HashMap;
19 use std::sync::{Arc,Mutex};
20 use std::{hash,cmp};
21
22 pub enum ChannelMonitorUpdateErr {
23         /// Used to indicate a temporary failure (eg connection to a watchtower failed, but is expected
24         /// to succeed at some point in the future).
25         /// Such a failure will "freeze" a channel, preventing us from revoking old states or
26         /// submitting new commitment transactions to the remote party.
27         /// ChannelManager::test_restore_channel_monitor can be used to retry the update(s) and restore
28         /// the channel to an operational state.
29         TemporaryFailure,
30         /// Used to indicate no further channel monitor updates will be allowed (eg we've moved on to a
31         /// different watchtower and cannot update with all watchtowers that were previously informed
32         /// of this channel). This will force-close the channel in question.
33         PermanentFailure,
34 }
35
36 /// Simple trait indicating ability to track a set of ChannelMonitors and multiplex events between
37 /// them. Generally should be implemented by keeping a local SimpleManyChannelMonitor and passing
38 /// events to it, while also taking any add_update_monitor events and passing them to some remote
39 /// server(s).
40 /// Note that any updates to a channel's monitor *must* be applied to each instance of the
41 /// channel's monitor everywhere (including remote watchtowers) *before* this function returns. If
42 /// an update occurs and a remote watchtower is left with old state, it may broadcast transactions
43 /// which we have revoked, allowing our counterparty to claim all funds in the channel!
44 pub trait ManyChannelMonitor: Send + Sync {
45         /// Adds or updates a monitor for the given funding_txid+funding_output_index.
46         fn add_update_monitor(&self, funding_txo: (Sha256dHash, u16), monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr>;
47 }
48
49 /// A simple implementation of a ManyChannelMonitor and ChainListener. Can be used to create a
50 /// watchtower or watch our own channels.
51 /// Note that you must provide your own key by which to refer to channels.
52 /// If you're accepting remote monitors (ie are implementing a watchtower), you must verify that
53 /// users cannot overwrite a given channel by providing a duplicate key. ie you should probably
54 /// index by a PublicKey which is required to sign any updates.
55 /// If you're using this for local monitoring of your own channels, you probably want to use
56 /// (Sha256dHash, u16) as the key, which will give you a ManyChannelMonitor implementation.
57 pub struct SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
58         monitors: Mutex<HashMap<Key, ChannelMonitor>>,
59         chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>,
60         broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>
61 }
62
63 impl<Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash> ChainListener for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
64         fn block_connected(&self, _header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], _indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) {
65                 let monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
66                 for monitor in monitors.values() {
67                         monitor.block_connected(txn_matched, height, &*self.broadcaster);
68                 }
69         }
70
71         fn block_disconnected(&self, _: &BlockHeader) { }
72 }
73
74 impl<Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash + 'static> SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
75         pub fn new(chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>, broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>) -> Arc<SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key>> {
76                 let res = Arc::new(SimpleManyChannelMonitor {
77                         monitors: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
78                         chain_monitor,
79                         broadcaster
80                 });
81                 let weak_res = Arc::downgrade(&res);
82                 res.chain_monitor.register_listener(weak_res);
83                 res
84         }
85
86         pub fn add_update_monitor_by_key(&self, key: Key, monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
87                 let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
88                 match monitors.get_mut(&key) {
89                         Some(orig_monitor) => return orig_monitor.insert_combine(monitor),
90                         None => {}
91                 };
92                 match monitor.funding_txo {
93                         None => self.chain_monitor.watch_all_txn(),
94                         Some((funding_txid, funding_output_index)) => self.chain_monitor.install_watch_outpoint((funding_txid, funding_output_index as u32)),
95                 }
96                 monitors.insert(key, monitor);
97                 Ok(())
98         }
99 }
100
101 impl ManyChannelMonitor for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<(Sha256dHash, u16)> {
102         fn add_update_monitor(&self, funding_txo: (Sha256dHash, u16), monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr> {
103                 match self.add_update_monitor_by_key(funding_txo, monitor) {
104                         Ok(_) => Ok(()),
105                         Err(_) => Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure),
106                 }
107         }
108 }
109
110 /// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, don't try to claim it in a shared transaction,
111 /// instead claiming it in its own individual transaction.
112 const CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 12;
113 /// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, force-close the channel to broadcast the
114 /// HTLC-Success transaction.
115 const CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 6;
116
117 #[derive(Clone)]
118 enum KeyStorage {
119         PrivMode {
120                 revocation_base_key: SecretKey,
121                 htlc_base_key: SecretKey,
122         },
123         SigsMode {
124                 revocation_base_key: PublicKey,
125                 htlc_base_key: PublicKey,
126                 sigs: HashMap<Sha256dHash, Signature>,
127         }
128 }
129
130 #[derive(Clone)]
131 struct LocalSignedTx {
132         txid: Sha256dHash,
133         tx: Transaction,
134         revocation_key: PublicKey,
135         a_htlc_key: PublicKey,
136         b_htlc_key: PublicKey,
137         delayed_payment_key: PublicKey,
138         feerate_per_kw: u64,
139         htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Signature, Signature)>,
140 }
141
142 pub struct ChannelMonitor {
143         funding_txo: Option<(Sha256dHash, u16)>,
144         commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64,
145
146         key_storage: KeyStorage,
147         delayed_payment_base_key: PublicKey,
148         their_htlc_base_key: Option<PublicKey>,
149         // first is the idx of the first of the two revocation points
150         their_cur_revocation_points: Option<(u64, PublicKey, Option<PublicKey>)>,
151
152         our_to_self_delay: u16,
153         their_to_self_delay: Option<u16>,
154
155         old_secrets: [([u8; 32], u64); 49],
156         remote_claimable_outpoints: HashMap<Sha256dHash, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>>,
157         remote_htlc_outputs_on_chain: Mutex<HashMap<Sha256dHash, u64>>,
158         //hash to commitment number mapping use to determine the state of transaction owning it
159         // (revoked/non-revoked) and so lightnen pruning
160         remote_hash_commitment_number: HashMap<[u8; 32], u64>,
161
162         // We store two local commitment transactions to avoid any race conditions where we may update
163         // some monitors (potentially on watchtowers) but then fail to update others, resulting in the
164         // various monitors for one channel being out of sync, and us broadcasting a local
165         // transaction for which we have deleted claim information on some watchtowers.
166         prev_local_signed_commitment_tx: Option<LocalSignedTx>,
167         current_local_signed_commitment_tx: Option<LocalSignedTx>,
168
169         payment_preimages: HashMap<[u8; 32], [u8; 32]>,
170
171         destination_script: Script,
172         secp_ctx: Secp256k1, //TODO: dedup this a bit...
173 }
174 impl Clone for ChannelMonitor {
175         fn clone(&self) -> Self {
176                 ChannelMonitor {
177                         funding_txo: self.funding_txo.clone(),
178                         commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor.clone(),
179
180                         key_storage: self.key_storage.clone(),
181                         delayed_payment_base_key: self.delayed_payment_base_key.clone(),
182                         their_htlc_base_key: self.their_htlc_base_key.clone(),
183                         their_cur_revocation_points: self.their_cur_revocation_points.clone(),
184
185                         our_to_self_delay: self.our_to_self_delay,
186                         their_to_self_delay: self.their_to_self_delay,
187
188                         old_secrets: self.old_secrets.clone(),
189                         remote_claimable_outpoints: self.remote_claimable_outpoints.clone(),
190                         remote_htlc_outputs_on_chain: Mutex::new((*self.remote_htlc_outputs_on_chain.lock().unwrap()).clone()),
191                         remote_hash_commitment_number: self.remote_hash_commitment_number.clone(),
192
193                         prev_local_signed_commitment_tx: self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.clone(),
194                         current_local_signed_commitment_tx: self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx.clone(),
195
196                         payment_preimages: self.payment_preimages.clone(),
197
198                         destination_script: self.destination_script.clone(),
199                         secp_ctx: self.secp_ctx.clone(),
200                 }
201         }
202 }
203
204 impl ChannelMonitor {
205         pub fn new(revocation_base_key: &SecretKey, delayed_payment_base_key: &PublicKey, htlc_base_key: &SecretKey, our_to_self_delay: u16, destination_script: Script) -> ChannelMonitor {
206                 ChannelMonitor {
207                         funding_txo: None,
208                         commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: 0,
209
210                         key_storage: KeyStorage::PrivMode {
211                                 revocation_base_key: revocation_base_key.clone(),
212                                 htlc_base_key: htlc_base_key.clone(),
213                         },
214                         delayed_payment_base_key: delayed_payment_base_key.clone(),
215                         their_htlc_base_key: None,
216                         their_cur_revocation_points: None,
217
218                         our_to_self_delay: our_to_self_delay,
219                         their_to_self_delay: None,
220
221                         old_secrets: [([0; 32], 1 << 48); 49],
222                         remote_claimable_outpoints: HashMap::new(),
223                         remote_htlc_outputs_on_chain: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
224                         remote_hash_commitment_number: HashMap::new(),
225
226                         prev_local_signed_commitment_tx: None,
227                         current_local_signed_commitment_tx: None,
228
229                         payment_preimages: HashMap::new(),
230
231                         destination_script: destination_script,
232                         secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
233                 }
234         }
235
236         #[inline]
237         fn place_secret(idx: u64) -> u8 {
238                 for i in 0..48 {
239                         if idx & (1 << i) == (1 << i) {
240                                 return i
241                         }
242                 }
243                 48
244         }
245
246         #[inline]
247         fn derive_secret(secret: [u8; 32], bits: u8, idx: u64) -> [u8; 32] {
248                 let mut res: [u8; 32] = secret;
249                 for i in 0..bits {
250                         let bitpos = bits - 1 - i;
251                         if idx & (1 << bitpos) == (1 << bitpos) {
252                                 res[(bitpos / 8) as usize] ^= 1 << (bitpos & 7);
253                                 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
254                                 sha.input(&res);
255                                 sha.result(&mut res);
256                         }
257                 }
258                 res
259         }
260
261         /// Inserts a revocation secret into this channel monitor. Also optionally tracks the next
262         /// revocation point which may be required to claim HTLC outputs which we know the preimage of
263         /// in case the remote end force-closes using their latest state. Prunes old preimages if neither
264         /// needed by local commitment transactions HTCLs nor by remote ones. Unless we haven't already seen remote
265         /// commitment transaction's secret, they are de facto pruned (we can use revocation key).
266         pub fn provide_secret(&mut self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32], their_next_revocation_point: Option<(u64, PublicKey)>) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
267                 let pos = ChannelMonitor::place_secret(idx);
268                 for i in 0..pos {
269                         let (old_secret, old_idx) = self.old_secrets[i as usize];
270                         if ChannelMonitor::derive_secret(secret, pos, old_idx) != old_secret {
271                                 return Err(HandleError{err: "Previous secret did not match new one", msg: None})
272                         }
273                 }
274                 self.old_secrets[pos as usize] = (secret, idx);
275
276                 if let Some(new_revocation_point) = their_next_revocation_point {
277                         match self.their_cur_revocation_points {
278                                 Some(old_points) => {
279                                         if old_points.0 == new_revocation_point.0 + 1 {
280                                                 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0, old_points.1, Some(new_revocation_point.1)));
281                                         } else if old_points.0 == new_revocation_point.0 + 2 {
282                                                 if let Some(old_second_point) = old_points.2 {
283                                                         self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0 - 1, old_second_point, Some(new_revocation_point.1)));
284                                                 } else {
285                                                         self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((new_revocation_point.0, new_revocation_point.1, None));
286                                                 }
287                                         } else {
288                                                 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((new_revocation_point.0, new_revocation_point.1, None));
289                                         }
290                                 },
291                                 None => {
292                                         self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((new_revocation_point.0, new_revocation_point.1, None));
293                                 }
294                         }
295                 }
296
297                 let local_signed_commitment_tx = &self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx;
298                 let min_idx = self.get_min_seen_secret();
299                 let remote_hash_commitment_number = &mut self.remote_hash_commitment_number;
300                 self.payment_preimages.retain(|&k, _| {
301                         for &(ref htlc, _s1, _s2) in &local_signed_commitment_tx.as_ref().expect("Channel needs at least an initial commitment tx !").htlc_outputs {
302                                 if k == htlc.payment_hash {
303                                         return true
304                                 }
305                         }
306                         let contains = if let Some(cn) = remote_hash_commitment_number.get(&k) {
307                                 if *cn < min_idx {
308                                         return true
309                                 }
310                                 true
311                         } else { false };
312                         if contains {
313                                 remote_hash_commitment_number.remove(&k);
314                         }
315                         false
316                 });
317
318                 Ok(())
319         }
320
321         /// Informs this monitor of the latest remote (ie non-broadcastable) commitment transaction.
322         /// The monitor watches for it to be broadcasted and then uses the HTLC information (and
323         /// possibly future revocation/preimage information) to claim outputs where possible.
324         /// We cache also the mapping hash:commitment number to lighten pruning of old preimages by watchtowers.
325         pub fn provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, unsigned_commitment_tx: &Transaction, htlc_outputs: Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>, commitment_number: u64) {
326                 // TODO: Encrypt the htlc_outputs data with the single-hash of the commitment transaction
327                 // so that a remote monitor doesn't learn anything unless there is a malicious close.
328                 // (only maybe, sadly we cant do the same for local info, as we need to be aware of
329                 // timeouts)
330                 for htlc in &htlc_outputs {
331                         self.remote_hash_commitment_number.insert(htlc.payment_hash, commitment_number);
332                 }
333                 self.remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(unsigned_commitment_tx.txid(), htlc_outputs);
334         }
335
336         /// Informs this monitor of the latest local (ie broadcastable) commitment transaction. The
337         /// monitor watches for timeouts and may broadcast it if we approach such a timeout. Thus, it
338         /// is important that any clones of this channel monitor (including remote clones) by kept
339         /// up-to-date as our local commitment transaction is updated.
340         /// Panics if set_their_to_self_delay has never been called.
341         pub fn provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, signed_commitment_tx: Transaction, local_keys: chan_utils::TxCreationKeys, feerate_per_kw: u64, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Signature, Signature)>) {
342                 assert!(self.their_to_self_delay.is_some());
343                 self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx.take();
344                 self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(LocalSignedTx {
345                         txid: signed_commitment_tx.txid(),
346                         tx: signed_commitment_tx,
347                         revocation_key: local_keys.revocation_key,
348                         a_htlc_key: local_keys.a_htlc_key,
349                         b_htlc_key: local_keys.b_htlc_key,
350                         delayed_payment_key: local_keys.a_delayed_payment_key,
351                         feerate_per_kw,
352                         htlc_outputs,
353                 });
354         }
355
356         /// Provides a payment_hash->payment_preimage mapping. Will be automatically pruned when all
357         /// commitment_tx_infos which contain the payment hash have been revoked.
358         pub fn provide_payment_preimage(&mut self, payment_hash: &[u8; 32], payment_preimage: &[u8; 32]) {
359                 self.payment_preimages.insert(payment_hash.clone(), payment_preimage.clone());
360         }
361
362         pub fn insert_combine(&mut self, mut other: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
363                 match self.funding_txo {
364                         Some(txo) => if other.funding_txo.is_some() && other.funding_txo.unwrap() != txo {
365                                 return Err(HandleError{err: "Funding transaction outputs are not identical!", msg: None});
366                         },
367                         None => if other.funding_txo.is_some() {
368                                 self.funding_txo = other.funding_txo;
369                         }
370                 }
371                 let other_min_secret = other.get_min_seen_secret();
372                 let our_min_secret = self.get_min_seen_secret();
373                 if our_min_secret > other_min_secret {
374                         self.provide_secret(other_min_secret, other.get_secret(other_min_secret).unwrap(), None)?;
375                 }
376                 if our_min_secret >= other_min_secret {
377                         self.their_cur_revocation_points = other.their_cur_revocation_points;
378                         for (txid, htlcs) in other.remote_claimable_outpoints.drain() {
379                                 self.remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, htlcs);
380                         }
381                         if let Some(local_tx) = other.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
382                                 self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(local_tx);
383                         }
384                         if let Some(local_tx) = other.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
385                                 self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(local_tx);
386                         }
387                         self.payment_preimages = other.payment_preimages;
388                 }
389                 Ok(())
390         }
391
392         /// Panics if commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor doesn't fit in 48 bits
393         pub fn set_commitment_obscure_factor(&mut self, commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64) {
394                 assert!(commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor < (1 << 48));
395                 self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor = commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor;
396         }
397
398         /// Allows this monitor to scan only for transactions which are applicable. Note that this is
399         /// optional, without it this monitor cannot be used in an SPV client, but you may wish to
400         /// avoid this (or call unset_funding_info) on a monitor you wish to send to a watchtower as it
401         /// provides slightly better privacy.
402         pub fn set_funding_info(&mut self, funding_txid: Sha256dHash, funding_output_index: u16) {
403                 self.funding_txo = Some((funding_txid, funding_output_index));
404         }
405
406         pub fn set_their_htlc_base_key(&mut self, their_htlc_base_key: &PublicKey) {
407                 self.their_htlc_base_key = Some(their_htlc_base_key.clone());
408         }
409
410         pub fn set_their_to_self_delay(&mut self, their_to_self_delay: u16) {
411                 self.their_to_self_delay = Some(their_to_self_delay);
412         }
413
414         pub fn unset_funding_info(&mut self) {
415                 self.funding_txo = None;
416         }
417
418         pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<(Sha256dHash, u16)> {
419                 self.funding_txo
420         }
421
422         //TODO: Functions to serialize/deserialize (with different forms depending on which information
423         //we want to leave out (eg funding_txo, etc).
424
425         /// Can only fail if idx is < get_min_seen_secret
426         pub fn get_secret(&self, idx: u64) -> Result<[u8; 32], HandleError> {
427                 for i in 0..self.old_secrets.len() {
428                         if (idx & (!((1 << i) - 1))) == self.old_secrets[i].1 {
429                                 return Ok(ChannelMonitor::derive_secret(self.old_secrets[i].0, i as u8, idx))
430                         }
431                 }
432                 assert!(idx < self.get_min_seen_secret());
433                 Err(HandleError{err: "idx too low", msg: None})
434         }
435
436         pub fn get_min_seen_secret(&self) -> u64 {
437                 //TODO This can be optimized?
438                 let mut min = 1 << 48;
439                 for &(_, idx) in self.old_secrets.iter() {
440                         if idx < min {
441                                 min = idx;
442                         }
443                 }
444                 min
445         }
446
447         /// Attempts to claim a remote commitment transaction's outputs using the revocation key and
448         /// data in remote_claimable_outpoints. Will directly claim any HTLC outputs which expire at a
449         /// height > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER. In any case, will install monitoring for
450         /// HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions, and claim them using the revocation key (if
451         /// applicable) as well.
452         fn check_spend_remote_transaction(&self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32) -> Vec<Transaction> {
453                 // Most secp and related errors trying to create keys means we have no hope of constructing
454                 // a spend transaction...so we return no transactions to broadcast
455                 let mut txn_to_broadcast = Vec::new();
456                 macro_rules! ignore_error {
457                         ( $thing : expr ) => {
458                                 match $thing {
459                                         Ok(a) => a,
460                                         Err(_) => return txn_to_broadcast
461                                 }
462                         };
463                 }
464
465                 let commitment_txid = tx.txid(); //TODO: This is gonna be a performance bottleneck for watchtowers!
466                 let per_commitment_option = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(&commitment_txid);
467
468                 let commitment_number = (((tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor;
469                 if commitment_number >= self.get_min_seen_secret() {
470                         let secret = self.get_secret(commitment_number).unwrap();
471                         let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &secret));
472                         let (revocation_pubkey, b_htlc_key) = match self.key_storage {
473                                 KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key } => {
474                                         let per_commitment_point = ignore_error!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key));
475                                         (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &ignore_error!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_base_key)))),
476                                         ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &ignore_error!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &htlc_base_key)))))
477                                 },
478                                 KeyStorage::SigsMode { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
479                                         let per_commitment_point = ignore_error!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key));
480                                         (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &revocation_base_key)),
481                                         ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &htlc_base_key)))
482                                 },
483                         };
484                         let delayed_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &ignore_error!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key)), &self.delayed_payment_base_key));
485                         let a_htlc_key = match self.their_htlc_base_key {
486                                 None => return txn_to_broadcast,
487                                 Some(their_htlc_base_key) => ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &ignore_error!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key)), &their_htlc_base_key)),
488                         };
489
490                         let revokeable_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey, self.our_to_self_delay, &delayed_key);
491                         let revokeable_p2wsh = revokeable_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
492
493                         let mut total_value = 0;
494                         let mut values = Vec::new();
495                         let mut inputs = Vec::new();
496                         let mut htlc_idxs = Vec::new();
497
498                         for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
499                                 if outp.script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh {
500                                         inputs.push(TxIn {
501                                                 prev_hash: commitment_txid,
502                                                 prev_index: idx as u32,
503                                                 script_sig: Script::new(),
504                                                 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
505                                                 witness: Vec::new(),
506                                         });
507                                         htlc_idxs.push(None);
508                                         values.push(outp.value);
509                                         total_value += outp.value;
510                                         break; // There can only be one of these
511                                 }
512                         }
513
514                         macro_rules! sign_input {
515                                 ($sighash_parts: expr, $input: expr, $htlc_idx: expr, $amount: expr) => {
516                                         {
517                                                 let (sig, redeemscript) = match self.key_storage {
518                                                         KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
519                                                                 let redeemscript = if $htlc_idx.is_none() { revokeable_redeemscript.clone() } else {
520                                                                         let htlc = &per_commitment_option.unwrap()[$htlc_idx.unwrap()];
521                                                                         chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey)
522                                                                 };
523                                                                 let sighash = ignore_error!(Message::from_slice(&$sighash_parts.sighash_all(&$input, &redeemscript, $amount)[..]));
524                                                                 let revocation_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key, &revocation_base_key));
525                                                                 (ignore_error!(self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &revocation_key)), redeemscript)
526                                                         },
527                                                         KeyStorage::SigsMode { .. } => {
528                                                                 unimplemented!();
529                                                         }
530                                                 };
531                                                 $input.witness.push(sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
532                                                 $input.witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
533                                                 if $htlc_idx.is_none() {
534                                                         $input.witness.push(vec!(1));
535                                                 } else {
536                                                         $input.witness.push(revocation_pubkey.serialize().to_vec());
537                                                 }
538                                                 $input.witness.push(redeemscript.into_vec());
539                                         }
540                                 }
541                         }
542
543                         if let Some(per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
544                                 inputs.reserve_exact(per_commitment_data.len());
545
546                                 for (idx, htlc) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() {
547                                         let expected_script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey);
548                                         if htlc.transaction_output_index as usize >= tx.output.len() ||
549                                                         tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 ||
550                                                         tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].script_pubkey != expected_script.to_v0_p2wsh() {
551                                                 return txn_to_broadcast; // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user
552                                         }
553                                         let input = TxIn {
554                                                 prev_hash: commitment_txid,
555                                                 prev_index: htlc.transaction_output_index,
556                                                 script_sig: Script::new(),
557                                                 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
558                                                 witness: Vec::new(),
559                                         };
560                                         if htlc.cltv_expiry > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER {
561                                                 inputs.push(input);
562                                                 htlc_idxs.push(Some(idx));
563                                                 values.push(tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].value);
564                                                 total_value += htlc.amount_msat / 1000;
565                                         } else {
566                                                 let mut single_htlc_tx = Transaction {
567                                                         version: 2,
568                                                         lock_time: 0,
569                                                         input: vec![input],
570                                                         output: vec!(TxOut {
571                                                                 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
572                                                                 value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000, //TODO: - fee
573                                                         }),
574                                                 };
575                                                 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&single_htlc_tx);
576                                                 sign_input!(sighash_parts, single_htlc_tx.input[0], Some(idx), htlc.amount_msat / 1000);
577                                                 txn_to_broadcast.push(single_htlc_tx); // TODO: This is not yet tested in ChannelManager!
578                                         }
579                                 }
580                         }
581
582                         if !inputs.is_empty() || !txn_to_broadcast.is_empty() {
583                                 // We're definitely a remote commitment transaction!
584                                 // TODO: Register commitment_txid with the ChainWatchInterface!
585                                 self.remote_htlc_outputs_on_chain.lock().unwrap().insert(commitment_txid, commitment_number);
586                         }
587                         if inputs.is_empty() { return txn_to_broadcast; } // Nothing to be done...probably a false positive/local tx
588
589                         let outputs = vec!(TxOut {
590                                 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
591                                 value: total_value, //TODO: - fee
592                         });
593                         let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
594                                 version: 2,
595                                 lock_time: 0,
596                                 input: inputs,
597                                 output: outputs,
598                         };
599
600                         let mut values_drain = values.drain(..);
601                         let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx);
602
603                         for (input, htlc_idx) in spend_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(htlc_idxs.iter()) {
604                                 let value = values_drain.next().unwrap();
605                                 sign_input!(sighash_parts, input, htlc_idx, value);
606                         }
607
608                         txn_to_broadcast.push(spend_tx);
609                 } else if let Some(per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
610                         if let Some(revocation_points) = self.their_cur_revocation_points {
611                                 let revocation_point_option =
612                                         if revocation_points.0 == commitment_number { Some(&revocation_points.1) }
613                                         else if let Some(point) = revocation_points.2.as_ref() {
614                                                 if revocation_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 { Some(point) } else { None }
615                                         } else { None };
616                                 if let Some(revocation_point) = revocation_point_option {
617                                         let (revocation_pubkey, b_htlc_key) = match self.key_storage {
618                                                 KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key } => {
619                                                         (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &ignore_error!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_base_key)))),
620                                                         ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &ignore_error!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &htlc_base_key)))))
621                                                 },
622                                                 KeyStorage::SigsMode { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
623                                                         (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &revocation_base_key)),
624                                                         ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &htlc_base_key)))
625                                                 },
626                                         };
627                                         let a_htlc_key = match self.their_htlc_base_key {
628                                                 None => return txn_to_broadcast,
629                                                 Some(their_htlc_base_key) => ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &their_htlc_base_key)),
630                                         };
631
632                                         let mut total_value = 0;
633                                         let mut values = Vec::new();
634                                         let mut inputs = Vec::new();
635
636                                         macro_rules! sign_input {
637                                                 ($sighash_parts: expr, $input: expr, $amount: expr, $preimage: expr) => {
638                                                         {
639                                                                 let (sig, redeemscript) = match self.key_storage {
640                                                                         KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
641                                                                                 let htlc = &per_commitment_option.unwrap()[$input.sequence as usize];
642                                                                                 let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey);
643                                                                                 let sighash = ignore_error!(Message::from_slice(&$sighash_parts.sighash_all(&$input, &redeemscript, $amount)[..]));
644                                                                                 let htlc_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &htlc_base_key));
645                                                                                 (ignore_error!(self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &htlc_key)), redeemscript)
646                                                                         },
647                                                                         KeyStorage::SigsMode { .. } => {
648                                                                                 unimplemented!();
649                                                                         }
650                                                                 };
651                                                                 $input.witness.push(sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
652                                                                 $input.witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
653                                                                 $input.witness.push($preimage);
654                                                                 $input.witness.push(redeemscript.into_vec());
655                                                         }
656                                                 }
657                                         }
658
659                                         for (idx, htlc) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() {
660                                                 if let Some(payment_preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
661                                                         let input = TxIn {
662                                                                 prev_hash: commitment_txid,
663                                                                 prev_index: htlc.transaction_output_index,
664                                                                 script_sig: Script::new(),
665                                                                 sequence: idx as u32, // reset to 0xfffffffd in sign_input
666                                                                 witness: Vec::new(),
667                                                         };
668                                                         if htlc.cltv_expiry > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER {
669                                                                 inputs.push(input);
670                                                                 values.push((tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].value, payment_preimage));
671                                                                 total_value += htlc.amount_msat / 1000;
672                                                         } else {
673                                                                 let mut single_htlc_tx = Transaction {
674                                                                         version: 2,
675                                                                         lock_time: 0,
676                                                                         input: vec![input],
677                                                                         output: vec!(TxOut {
678                                                                                 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
679                                                                                 value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000, //TODO: - fee
680                                                                         }),
681                                                                 };
682                                                                 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&single_htlc_tx);
683                                                                 sign_input!(sighash_parts, single_htlc_tx.input[0], htlc.amount_msat / 1000, payment_preimage.to_vec());
684                                                                 txn_to_broadcast.push(single_htlc_tx);
685                                                         }
686                                                 }
687                                         }
688
689                                         if inputs.is_empty() { return txn_to_broadcast; } // Nothing to be done...probably a false positive/local tx
690
691                                         let outputs = vec!(TxOut {
692                                                 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
693                                                 value: total_value, //TODO: - fee
694                                         });
695                                         let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
696                                                 version: 2,
697                                                 lock_time: 0,
698                                                 input: inputs,
699                                                 output: outputs,
700                                         };
701
702                                         let mut values_drain = values.drain(..);
703                                         let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx);
704
705                                         for input in spend_tx.input.iter_mut() {
706                                                 let value = values_drain.next().unwrap();
707                                                 sign_input!(sighash_parts, input, value.0, value.1.to_vec());
708                                         }
709
710                                         txn_to_broadcast.push(spend_tx);
711                                 }
712                         }
713                 } else {
714                         //TODO: For each input check if its in our remote_htlc_outputs_on_chain map!
715                 }
716
717                 txn_to_broadcast
718         }
719
720         fn broadcast_by_local_state(&self, local_tx: &LocalSignedTx) -> Vec<Transaction> {
721                 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
722
723                 for &(ref htlc, ref their_sig, ref our_sig) in local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
724                         if htlc.offered {
725                                 let mut htlc_timeout_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&local_tx.txid, local_tx.feerate_per_kw, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), htlc, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key, &local_tx.revocation_key);
726
727                                 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
728
729                                 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(their_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
730                                 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
731                                 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
732                                 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
733
734                                 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new());
735                                 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &local_tx.a_htlc_key, &local_tx.b_htlc_key, &local_tx.revocation_key).into_vec());
736
737                                 res.push(htlc_timeout_tx);
738                         } else {
739                                 if let Some(payment_preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
740                                         let mut htlc_success_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&local_tx.txid, local_tx.feerate_per_kw, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), htlc, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key, &local_tx.revocation_key);
741
742                                         htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
743
744                                         htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(their_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
745                                         htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
746                                         htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
747                                         htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
748
749                                         htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(payment_preimage.to_vec());
750                                         htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &local_tx.a_htlc_key, &local_tx.b_htlc_key, &local_tx.revocation_key).into_vec());
751
752                                         res.push(htlc_success_tx);
753                                 }
754                         }
755                 }
756
757                 res
758         }
759
760         /// Attempts to claim any claimable HTLCs in a commitment transaction which was not (yet)
761         /// revoked using data in local_claimable_outpoints.
762         /// Should not be used if check_spend_revoked_transaction succeeds.
763         fn check_spend_local_transaction(&self, tx: &Transaction, _height: u32) -> Vec<Transaction> {
764                 let commitment_txid = tx.txid();
765                 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
766                         if local_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
767                                 return self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx);
768                         }
769                 }
770                 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
771                         if local_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
772                                 return self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx);
773                         }
774                 }
775                 Vec::new()
776         }
777
778         fn block_connected(&self, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], height: u32, broadcaster: &BroadcasterInterface) {
779                 for tx in txn_matched {
780                         for txin in tx.input.iter() {
781                                 if self.funding_txo.is_none() || (txin.prev_hash == self.funding_txo.unwrap().0 && txin.prev_index == self.funding_txo.unwrap().1 as u32) {
782                                         let mut txn = self.check_spend_remote_transaction(tx, height);
783                                         if txn.is_empty() {
784                                                 txn = self.check_spend_local_transaction(tx, height);
785                                         }
786                                         for tx in txn.iter() {
787                                                 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(tx);
788                                         }
789                                 }
790                         }
791                 }
792                 if let Some(ref cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
793                         let mut needs_broadcast = false;
794                         for &(ref htlc, _, _) in cur_local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
795                                 if htlc.cltv_expiry <= height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER {
796                                         if htlc.offered || self.payment_preimages.contains_key(&htlc.payment_hash) {
797                                                 needs_broadcast = true;
798                                         }
799                                 }
800                         }
801
802                         if needs_broadcast {
803                                 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&cur_local_tx.tx);
804                                 for tx in self.broadcast_by_local_state(&cur_local_tx) {
805                                         broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
806                                 }
807                         }
808                 }
809         }
810
811         pub fn would_broadcast_at_height(&self, height: u32) -> bool {
812                 if let Some(ref cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
813                         for &(ref htlc, _, _) in cur_local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
814                                 if htlc.cltv_expiry <= height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER {
815                                         if htlc.offered || self.payment_preimages.contains_key(&htlc.payment_hash) {
816                                                 return true;
817                                         }
818                                 }
819                         }
820                 }
821                 false
822         }
823 }
824
825 #[cfg(test)]
826 mod tests {
827         use bitcoin::util::misc::hex_bytes;
828         use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Script;
829         use bitcoin::util::hash::{Hash160,Sha256dHash};
830         use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
831         use ln::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor;
832         use ln::channelmonitor::LocalSignedTx;
833         use ln::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment;
834         use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
835         use secp256k1::{Secp256k1, Signature};
836         use rand::{thread_rng,Rng};
837
838         #[test]
839         fn test_per_commitment_storage() {
840                 // Test vectors from BOLT 3:
841                 let mut secrets: Vec<[u8; 32]> = Vec::new();
842                 let mut monitor: ChannelMonitor;
843                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
844
845                 macro_rules! test_secrets {
846                         () => {
847                                 let mut idx = 281474976710655;
848                                 for secret in secrets.iter() {
849                                         assert_eq!(monitor.get_secret(idx).unwrap(), *secret);
850                                         idx -= 1;
851                                 }
852                                 assert_eq!(monitor.get_min_seen_secret(), idx + 1);
853                                 assert!(monitor.get_secret(idx).is_err());
854                         };
855                 }
856
857                 {
858                         // insert_secret correct sequence
859                         monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::new(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
860                         secrets.clear();
861
862                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
863                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
864                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
865                         test_secrets!();
866
867                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
868                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
869                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
870                         test_secrets!();
871
872                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
873                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
874                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
875                         test_secrets!();
876
877                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
878                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
879                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
880                         test_secrets!();
881
882                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
883                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
884                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
885                         test_secrets!();
886
887                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
888                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
889                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
890                         test_secrets!();
891
892                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
893                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
894                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
895                         test_secrets!();
896
897                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
898                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
899                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
900                         test_secrets!();
901                 }
902
903                 {
904                         // insert_secret #1 incorrect
905                         monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::new(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
906                         secrets.clear();
907
908                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
909                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
910                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
911                         test_secrets!();
912
913                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
914                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
915                         assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err,
916                                         "Previous secret did not match new one");
917                 }
918
919                 {
920                         // insert_secret #2 incorrect (#1 derived from incorrect)
921                         monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::new(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
922                         secrets.clear();
923
924                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
925                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
926                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
927                         test_secrets!();
928
929                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
930                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("dddc3a8d14fddf2b68fa8c7fbad2748274937479dd0f8930d5ebb4ab6bd866a3").unwrap());
931                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
932                         test_secrets!();
933
934                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
935                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
936                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
937                         test_secrets!();
938
939                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
940                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
941                         assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err,
942                                         "Previous secret did not match new one");
943                 }
944
945                 {
946                         // insert_secret #3 incorrect
947                         monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::new(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
948                         secrets.clear();
949
950                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
951                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
952                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
953                         test_secrets!();
954
955                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
956                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
957                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
958                         test_secrets!();
959
960                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
961                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("c51a18b13e8527e579ec56365482c62f180b7d5760b46e9477dae59e87ed423a").unwrap());
962                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
963                         test_secrets!();
964
965                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
966                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
967                         assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err,
968                                         "Previous secret did not match new one");
969                 }
970
971                 {
972                         // insert_secret #4 incorrect (1,2,3 derived from incorrect)
973                         monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::new(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
974                         secrets.clear();
975
976                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
977                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
978                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
979                         test_secrets!();
980
981                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
982                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("dddc3a8d14fddf2b68fa8c7fbad2748274937479dd0f8930d5ebb4ab6bd866a3").unwrap());
983                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
984                         test_secrets!();
985
986                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
987                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("c51a18b13e8527e579ec56365482c62f180b7d5760b46e9477dae59e87ed423a").unwrap());
988                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
989                         test_secrets!();
990
991                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
992                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("ba65d7b0ef55a3ba300d4e87af29868f394f8f138d78a7011669c79b37b936f4").unwrap());
993                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
994                         test_secrets!();
995
996                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
997                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
998                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
999                         test_secrets!();
1000
1001                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1002                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
1003                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1004                         test_secrets!();
1005
1006                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1007                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
1008                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1009                         test_secrets!();
1010
1011                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1012                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
1013                         assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err,
1014                                         "Previous secret did not match new one");
1015                 }
1016
1017                 {
1018                         // insert_secret #5 incorrect
1019                         monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::new(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
1020                         secrets.clear();
1021
1022                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1023                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1024                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1025                         test_secrets!();
1026
1027                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1028                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1029                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1030                         test_secrets!();
1031
1032                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1033                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1034                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1035                         test_secrets!();
1036
1037                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1038                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1039                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1040                         test_secrets!();
1041
1042                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1043                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("631373ad5f9ef654bb3dade742d09504c567edd24320d2fcd68e3cc47e2ff6a6").unwrap());
1044                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1045                         test_secrets!();
1046
1047                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1048                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
1049                         assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err,
1050                                         "Previous secret did not match new one");
1051                 }
1052
1053                 {
1054                         // insert_secret #6 incorrect (5 derived from incorrect)
1055                         monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::new(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
1056                         secrets.clear();
1057
1058                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1059                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1060                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1061                         test_secrets!();
1062
1063                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1064                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1065                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1066                         test_secrets!();
1067
1068                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1069                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1070                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1071                         test_secrets!();
1072
1073                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1074                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1075                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1076                         test_secrets!();
1077
1078                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1079                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("631373ad5f9ef654bb3dade742d09504c567edd24320d2fcd68e3cc47e2ff6a6").unwrap());
1080                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1081                         test_secrets!();
1082
1083                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1084                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("b7e76a83668bde38b373970155c868a653304308f9896692f904a23731224bb1").unwrap());
1085                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1086                         test_secrets!();
1087
1088                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1089                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
1090                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1091                         test_secrets!();
1092
1093                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1094                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
1095                         assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err,
1096                                         "Previous secret did not match new one");
1097                 }
1098
1099                 {
1100                         // insert_secret #7 incorrect
1101                         monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::new(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
1102                         secrets.clear();
1103
1104                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1105                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1106                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1107                         test_secrets!();
1108
1109                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1110                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1111                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1112                         test_secrets!();
1113
1114                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1115                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1116                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1117                         test_secrets!();
1118
1119                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1120                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1121                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1122                         test_secrets!();
1123
1124                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1125                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
1126                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1127                         test_secrets!();
1128
1129                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1130                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
1131                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1132                         test_secrets!();
1133
1134                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1135                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("e7971de736e01da8ed58b94c2fc216cb1dca9e326f3a96e7194fe8ea8af6c0a3").unwrap());
1136                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1137                         test_secrets!();
1138
1139                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1140                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
1141                         assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err,
1142                                         "Previous secret did not match new one");
1143                 }
1144
1145                 {
1146                         // insert_secret #8 incorrect
1147                         monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::new(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
1148                         secrets.clear();
1149
1150                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1151                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1152                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1153                         test_secrets!();
1154
1155                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1156                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1157                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1158                         test_secrets!();
1159
1160                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1161                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1162                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1163                         test_secrets!();
1164
1165                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1166                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1167                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1168                         test_secrets!();
1169
1170                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1171                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
1172                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1173                         test_secrets!();
1174
1175                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1176                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
1177                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1178                         test_secrets!();
1179
1180                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1181                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
1182                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1183                         test_secrets!();
1184
1185                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1186                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("a7efbc61aac46d34f77778bac22c8a20c6a46ca460addc49009bda875ec88fa4").unwrap());
1187                         assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err,
1188                                         "Previous secret did not match new one");
1189                 }
1190         }
1191
1192         macro_rules! gen_local_tx {
1193                 ($hex : expr, $monitor : expr, $htlcs : expr, $rng : expr, $preimage : expr, $hash : expr) => {
1194                         {
1195                                 let mut htlcs = Vec::new();
1196                                 for _i in 0..$htlcs {
1197                                         $rng.fill_bytes(&mut $preimage);
1198                                         $hash[0..20].clone_from_slice(&Hash160::from_data(&$preimage)[0..20]);
1199                                         $monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&$hash, &$preimage);
1200                                         htlcs.push((HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1201                                                 offered : true,
1202                                                 amount_msat : 0,
1203                                                 cltv_expiry : 0,
1204                                                 payment_hash : $hash.clone(),
1205                                                 transaction_output_index : 0,
1206                                         }, Signature::from_der(&Secp256k1::new(), $hex).unwrap(),
1207                                         Signature::from_der(&Secp256k1::new(), $hex).unwrap()))
1208                                 }
1209
1210                                 Some(LocalSignedTx {
1211                                         txid: Sha256dHash::from_data(&[]),
1212                                         tx: Transaction {
1213                                                 version: 0,
1214                                                 lock_time: 0,
1215                                                 input: Vec::new(),
1216                                                 output: Vec::new(),
1217                                         },
1218                                         revocation_key: PublicKey::new(),
1219                                         a_htlc_key: PublicKey::new(),
1220                                         b_htlc_key: PublicKey::new(),
1221                                         delayed_payment_key: PublicKey::new(),
1222                                         feerate_per_kw: 0,
1223                                         htlc_outputs: htlcs,
1224                                 })
1225                         }
1226                 }
1227         }
1228
1229         macro_rules! gen_remote_outpoints {
1230                 ($monitor : expr, $tx : expr, $htlcs : expr, $rng : expr, $preimage : expr, $hash: expr, $number : expr) => {
1231                         {
1232                                 let mut commitment_number = $number;
1233                                 for i in 0..$tx {
1234                                         let tx_zero = Transaction {
1235                                                 version : 0,
1236                                                 lock_time : i,
1237                                                 input : Vec::new(),
1238                                                 output: Vec::new(),
1239                                         };
1240
1241                                         let mut htlcs = Vec::new();
1242                                         for _i in 0..$htlcs {
1243                                                 $rng.fill_bytes(&mut $preimage);
1244                                                 $hash[0..20].clone_from_slice(&Hash160::from_data(&$preimage)[0..20]);
1245                                                 $monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&$hash, &$preimage);
1246                                                 htlcs.push(HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1247                                                         offered : true,
1248                                                         amount_msat : 0,
1249                                                         cltv_expiry : 0,
1250                                                         payment_hash : $hash.clone(),
1251                                                         transaction_output_index : 0,
1252                                                 });
1253                                         }
1254                                         commitment_number -= 1;
1255                                         $monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&tx_zero, htlcs, commitment_number);
1256                                 }
1257                         }
1258                 }
1259         }
1260
1261         #[test]
1262         fn test_prune_preimages() {
1263                 let mut secret = [0; 32];
1264                 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1265                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1266                 let mut preimage: [u8;32] = [0;32];
1267                 let mut hash: [u8;32] = [0;32];
1268                 let mut rng  = thread_rng();
1269
1270                 {
1271                         // insert 30 random hash, 10 from local, 10 from remote, prune 30/50
1272                         let mut monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::new(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
1273
1274                         for _i in 0..30 {
1275                                 rng.fill_bytes(&mut preimage);
1276                                 hash[0..20].clone_from_slice(&Hash160::from_data(&preimage)[0..20]);
1277                                 monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&hash, &preimage);
1278                         }
1279                         monitor.current_local_signed_commitment_tx = gen_local_tx!(&hex_bytes("3045022100fa86fa9a36a8cd6a7bb8f06a541787d51371d067951a9461d5404de6b928782e02201c8b7c334c10aed8976a3a465be9a28abff4cb23acbf00022295b378ce1fa3cd").unwrap()[..], monitor, 10, rng, preimage, hash);
1280                         gen_remote_outpoints!(monitor, 1, 10, rng, preimage, hash, 281474976710654);
1281                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secret.clone(), None).unwrap();
1282                         assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 20);
1283                 }
1284
1285                 {
1286                         // insert 30 random hash, prune 30/30
1287                         let mut monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::new(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
1288
1289                         for _i in 0..30 {
1290                                 rng.fill_bytes(&mut preimage);
1291                                 hash[0..20].clone_from_slice(&Hash160::from_data(&preimage)[0..20]);
1292                                 monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&hash, &preimage);
1293                         }
1294                         monitor.current_local_signed_commitment_tx = gen_local_tx!(&hex_bytes("3045022100fa86fa9a36a8cd6a7bb8f06a541787d51371d067951a9461d5404de6b928782e02201c8b7c334c10aed8976a3a465be9a28abff4cb23acbf00022295b378ce1fa3cd").unwrap()[..], monitor, 0, rng, preimage, hash);
1295                         gen_remote_outpoints!(monitor, 0, 0, rng, preimage, hash, 281474976710655);
1296                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secret.clone(), None).unwrap();
1297                         assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 0);
1298                 }
1299
1300                 {
1301                         // insert 30 random hash, 25 on 5 remotes, prune 30/55
1302                         let mut monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::new(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
1303
1304                         for _i in 0..30 {
1305                                 rng.fill_bytes(&mut preimage);
1306                                 hash[0..20].clone_from_slice(&Hash160::from_data(&preimage)[0..20]);
1307                                 monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&hash, &preimage);
1308                         }
1309                         monitor.current_local_signed_commitment_tx = gen_local_tx!(&hex_bytes("3045022100fa86fa9a36a8cd6a7bb8f06a541787d51371d067951a9461d5404de6b928782e02201c8b7c334c10aed8976a3a465be9a28abff4cb23acbf00022295b378ce1fa3cd").unwrap()[..], monitor, 0, rng, preimage, hash);
1310                         gen_remote_outpoints!(monitor, 5, 5, rng, preimage, hash, 281474976710654);
1311                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secret.clone(), None).unwrap();
1312                         assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 25);
1313                 }
1314
1315                 {
1316                         // insert 30 random hash, 25 from local, prune 30/55
1317                         let mut monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::new(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
1318
1319                         for _i in 0..30 {
1320                                 rng.fill_bytes(&mut preimage);
1321                                 hash[0..20].clone_from_slice(&Hash160::from_data(&preimage)[0..20]);
1322                                 monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&hash, &preimage);
1323                         }
1324                         monitor.current_local_signed_commitment_tx = gen_local_tx!(&hex_bytes("3045022100fa86fa9a36a8cd6a7bb8f06a541787d51371d067951a9461d5404de6b928782e02201c8b7c334c10aed8976a3a465be9a28abff4cb23acbf00022295b378ce1fa3cd").unwrap()[..], monitor, 25, rng, preimage, hash);
1325                         gen_remote_outpoints!(monitor, 0, 0, rng, preimage, hash, 281474976710655);
1326                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secret.clone(), None).unwrap();
1327                         assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 25);
1328                 }
1329         }
1330
1331         // Further testing is done in the ChannelManager integration tests.
1332 }