1 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
2 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxIn,TxOut,SigHashType,Transaction};
3 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Script;
4 use bitcoin::util::hash::Sha256dHash;
5 use bitcoin::util::bip143;
7 use crypto::digest::Digest;
9 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Message,Signature};
10 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
12 use ln::msgs::HandleError;
14 use ln::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment;
15 use chain::chaininterface::{ChainListener, ChainWatchInterface, BroadcasterInterface};
16 use util::sha2::Sha256;
18 use std::collections::HashMap;
19 use std::sync::{Arc,Mutex};
22 pub enum ChannelMonitorUpdateErr {
23 /// Used to indicate a temporary failure (eg connection to a watchtower failed, but is expected
24 /// to succeed at some point in the future).
25 /// Such a failure will "freeze" a channel, preventing us from revoking old states or
26 /// submitting new commitment transactions to the remote party.
27 /// ChannelManager::test_restore_channel_monitor can be used to retry the update(s) and restore
28 /// the channel to an operational state.
30 /// Used to indicate no further channel monitor updates will be allowed (eg we've moved on to a
31 /// different watchtower and cannot update with all watchtowers that were previously informed
32 /// of this channel). This will force-close the channel in question.
36 /// Simple trait indicating ability to track a set of ChannelMonitors and multiplex events between
37 /// them. Generally should be implemented by keeping a local SimpleManyChannelMonitor and passing
38 /// events to it, while also taking any add_update_monitor events and passing them to some remote
40 /// Note that any updates to a channel's monitor *must* be applied to each instance of the
41 /// channel's monitor everywhere (including remote watchtowers) *before* this function returns. If
42 /// an update occurs and a remote watchtower is left with old state, it may broadcast transactions
43 /// which we have revoked, allowing our counterparty to claim all funds in the channel!
44 pub trait ManyChannelMonitor: Send + Sync {
45 /// Adds or updates a monitor for the given funding_txid+funding_output_index.
46 fn add_update_monitor(&self, funding_txo: (Sha256dHash, u16), monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr>;
49 /// A simple implementation of a ManyChannelMonitor and ChainListener. Can be used to create a
50 /// watchtower or watch our own channels.
51 /// Note that you must provide your own key by which to refer to channels.
52 /// If you're accepting remote monitors (ie are implementing a watchtower), you must verify that
53 /// users cannot overwrite a given channel by providing a duplicate key. ie you should probably
54 /// index by a PublicKey which is required to sign any updates.
55 /// If you're using this for local monitoring of your own channels, you probably want to use
56 /// (Sha256dHash, u16) as the key, which will give you a ManyChannelMonitor implementation.
57 pub struct SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
58 monitors: Mutex<HashMap<Key, ChannelMonitor>>,
59 chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>,
60 broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>
63 impl<Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash> ChainListener for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
64 fn block_connected(&self, _header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], _indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) {
65 let monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
66 for monitor in monitors.values() {
67 monitor.block_connected(txn_matched, height, &*self.broadcaster);
71 fn block_disconnected(&self, _: &BlockHeader) { }
74 impl<Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash + 'static> SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
75 pub fn new(chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>, broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>) -> Arc<SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key>> {
76 let res = Arc::new(SimpleManyChannelMonitor {
77 monitors: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
81 let weak_res = Arc::downgrade(&res);
82 res.chain_monitor.register_listener(weak_res);
86 pub fn add_update_monitor_by_key(&self, key: Key, monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
87 let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
88 match monitors.get_mut(&key) {
89 Some(orig_monitor) => return orig_monitor.insert_combine(monitor),
92 match monitor.funding_txo {
93 None => self.chain_monitor.watch_all_txn(),
94 Some((funding_txid, funding_output_index)) => self.chain_monitor.install_watch_outpoint((funding_txid, funding_output_index as u32)),
96 monitors.insert(key, monitor);
101 impl ManyChannelMonitor for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<(Sha256dHash, u16)> {
102 fn add_update_monitor(&self, funding_txo: (Sha256dHash, u16), monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr> {
103 match self.add_update_monitor_by_key(funding_txo, monitor) {
105 Err(_) => Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure),
110 /// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, don't try to claim it in a shared transaction,
111 /// instead claiming it in its own individual transaction.
112 const CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 12;
113 /// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, force-close the channel to broadcast the
114 /// HTLC-Success transaction.
115 const CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 6;
120 revocation_base_key: SecretKey,
121 htlc_base_key: SecretKey,
124 revocation_base_key: PublicKey,
125 htlc_base_key: PublicKey,
126 sigs: HashMap<Sha256dHash, Signature>,
131 struct LocalSignedTx {
134 revocation_key: PublicKey,
135 a_htlc_key: PublicKey,
136 b_htlc_key: PublicKey,
137 delayed_payment_key: PublicKey,
139 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Signature, Signature)>,
142 pub struct ChannelMonitor {
143 funding_txo: Option<(Sha256dHash, u16)>,
144 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64,
146 key_storage: KeyStorage,
147 delayed_payment_base_key: PublicKey,
148 their_htlc_base_key: Option<PublicKey>,
149 // first is the idx of the first of the two revocation points
150 their_cur_revocation_points: Option<(u64, PublicKey, Option<PublicKey>)>,
152 our_to_self_delay: u16,
153 their_to_self_delay: Option<u16>,
155 old_secrets: [([u8; 32], u64); 49],
156 remote_claimable_outpoints: HashMap<Sha256dHash, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>>,
157 remote_htlc_outputs_on_chain: Mutex<HashMap<Sha256dHash, u64>>,
158 //hash to commitment number mapping use to determine the state of transaction owning it
159 // (revoked/non-revoked) and so lightnen pruning
160 remote_hash_commitment_number: HashMap<[u8; 32], u64>,
162 // We store two local commitment transactions to avoid any race conditions where we may update
163 // some monitors (potentially on watchtowers) but then fail to update others, resulting in the
164 // various monitors for one channel being out of sync, and us broadcasting a local
165 // transaction for which we have deleted claim information on some watchtowers.
166 prev_local_signed_commitment_tx: Option<LocalSignedTx>,
167 current_local_signed_commitment_tx: Option<LocalSignedTx>,
169 payment_preimages: HashMap<[u8; 32], [u8; 32]>,
171 destination_script: Script,
172 secp_ctx: Secp256k1, //TODO: dedup this a bit...
174 impl Clone for ChannelMonitor {
175 fn clone(&self) -> Self {
177 funding_txo: self.funding_txo.clone(),
178 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor.clone(),
180 key_storage: self.key_storage.clone(),
181 delayed_payment_base_key: self.delayed_payment_base_key.clone(),
182 their_htlc_base_key: self.their_htlc_base_key.clone(),
183 their_cur_revocation_points: self.their_cur_revocation_points.clone(),
185 our_to_self_delay: self.our_to_self_delay,
186 their_to_self_delay: self.their_to_self_delay,
188 old_secrets: self.old_secrets.clone(),
189 remote_claimable_outpoints: self.remote_claimable_outpoints.clone(),
190 remote_htlc_outputs_on_chain: Mutex::new((*self.remote_htlc_outputs_on_chain.lock().unwrap()).clone()),
191 remote_hash_commitment_number: self.remote_hash_commitment_number.clone(),
193 prev_local_signed_commitment_tx: self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.clone(),
194 current_local_signed_commitment_tx: self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx.clone(),
196 payment_preimages: self.payment_preimages.clone(),
198 destination_script: self.destination_script.clone(),
199 secp_ctx: self.secp_ctx.clone(),
204 impl ChannelMonitor {
205 pub fn new(revocation_base_key: &SecretKey, delayed_payment_base_key: &PublicKey, htlc_base_key: &SecretKey, our_to_self_delay: u16, destination_script: Script) -> ChannelMonitor {
208 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: 0,
210 key_storage: KeyStorage::PrivMode {
211 revocation_base_key: revocation_base_key.clone(),
212 htlc_base_key: htlc_base_key.clone(),
214 delayed_payment_base_key: delayed_payment_base_key.clone(),
215 their_htlc_base_key: None,
216 their_cur_revocation_points: None,
218 our_to_self_delay: our_to_self_delay,
219 their_to_self_delay: None,
221 old_secrets: [([0; 32], 1 << 48); 49],
222 remote_claimable_outpoints: HashMap::new(),
223 remote_htlc_outputs_on_chain: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
224 remote_hash_commitment_number: HashMap::new(),
226 prev_local_signed_commitment_tx: None,
227 current_local_signed_commitment_tx: None,
229 payment_preimages: HashMap::new(),
231 destination_script: destination_script,
232 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
237 fn place_secret(idx: u64) -> u8 {
239 if idx & (1 << i) == (1 << i) {
247 fn derive_secret(secret: [u8; 32], bits: u8, idx: u64) -> [u8; 32] {
248 let mut res: [u8; 32] = secret;
250 let bitpos = bits - 1 - i;
251 if idx & (1 << bitpos) == (1 << bitpos) {
252 res[(bitpos / 8) as usize] ^= 1 << (bitpos & 7);
253 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
255 sha.result(&mut res);
261 /// Inserts a revocation secret into this channel monitor. Also optionally tracks the next
262 /// revocation point which may be required to claim HTLC outputs which we know the preimage of
263 /// in case the remote end force-closes using their latest state. Prunes old preimages if neither
264 /// needed by local commitment transactions HTCLs nor by remote ones. Unless we haven't already seen remote
265 /// commitment transaction's secret, they are de facto pruned (we can use revocation key).
266 pub fn provide_secret(&mut self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32], their_next_revocation_point: Option<(u64, PublicKey)>) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
267 let pos = ChannelMonitor::place_secret(idx);
269 let (old_secret, old_idx) = self.old_secrets[i as usize];
270 if ChannelMonitor::derive_secret(secret, pos, old_idx) != old_secret {
271 return Err(HandleError{err: "Previous secret did not match new one", msg: None})
274 self.old_secrets[pos as usize] = (secret, idx);
276 if let Some(new_revocation_point) = their_next_revocation_point {
277 match self.their_cur_revocation_points {
278 Some(old_points) => {
279 if old_points.0 == new_revocation_point.0 + 1 {
280 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0, old_points.1, Some(new_revocation_point.1)));
281 } else if old_points.0 == new_revocation_point.0 + 2 {
282 if let Some(old_second_point) = old_points.2 {
283 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0 - 1, old_second_point, Some(new_revocation_point.1)));
285 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((new_revocation_point.0, new_revocation_point.1, None));
288 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((new_revocation_point.0, new_revocation_point.1, None));
292 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((new_revocation_point.0, new_revocation_point.1, None));
297 let local_signed_commitment_tx = &self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx;
298 let min_idx = self.get_min_seen_secret();
299 let remote_hash_commitment_number = &mut self.remote_hash_commitment_number;
300 self.payment_preimages.retain(|&k, _| {
301 for &(ref htlc, _s1, _s2) in &local_signed_commitment_tx.as_ref().expect("Channel needs at least an initial commitment tx !").htlc_outputs {
302 if k == htlc.payment_hash {
306 let contains = if let Some(cn) = remote_hash_commitment_number.get(&k) {
313 remote_hash_commitment_number.remove(&k);
321 /// Informs this monitor of the latest remote (ie non-broadcastable) commitment transaction.
322 /// The monitor watches for it to be broadcasted and then uses the HTLC information (and
323 /// possibly future revocation/preimage information) to claim outputs where possible.
324 /// We cache also the mapping hash:commitment number to lighten pruning of old preimages by watchtowers.
325 pub fn provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, unsigned_commitment_tx: &Transaction, htlc_outputs: Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>, commitment_number: u64) {
326 // TODO: Encrypt the htlc_outputs data with the single-hash of the commitment transaction
327 // so that a remote monitor doesn't learn anything unless there is a malicious close.
328 // (only maybe, sadly we cant do the same for local info, as we need to be aware of
330 for htlc in &htlc_outputs {
331 self.remote_hash_commitment_number.insert(htlc.payment_hash, commitment_number);
333 self.remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(unsigned_commitment_tx.txid(), htlc_outputs);
336 /// Informs this monitor of the latest local (ie broadcastable) commitment transaction. The
337 /// monitor watches for timeouts and may broadcast it if we approach such a timeout. Thus, it
338 /// is important that any clones of this channel monitor (including remote clones) by kept
339 /// up-to-date as our local commitment transaction is updated.
340 /// Panics if set_their_to_self_delay has never been called.
341 pub fn provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, signed_commitment_tx: Transaction, local_keys: chan_utils::TxCreationKeys, feerate_per_kw: u64, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Signature, Signature)>) {
342 assert!(self.their_to_self_delay.is_some());
343 self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx.take();
344 self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(LocalSignedTx {
345 txid: signed_commitment_tx.txid(),
346 tx: signed_commitment_tx,
347 revocation_key: local_keys.revocation_key,
348 a_htlc_key: local_keys.a_htlc_key,
349 b_htlc_key: local_keys.b_htlc_key,
350 delayed_payment_key: local_keys.a_delayed_payment_key,
356 /// Provides a payment_hash->payment_preimage mapping. Will be automatically pruned when all
357 /// commitment_tx_infos which contain the payment hash have been revoked.
358 pub fn provide_payment_preimage(&mut self, payment_hash: &[u8; 32], payment_preimage: &[u8; 32]) {
359 self.payment_preimages.insert(payment_hash.clone(), payment_preimage.clone());
362 pub fn insert_combine(&mut self, mut other: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
363 match self.funding_txo {
364 Some(txo) => if other.funding_txo.is_some() && other.funding_txo.unwrap() != txo {
365 return Err(HandleError{err: "Funding transaction outputs are not identical!", msg: None});
367 None => if other.funding_txo.is_some() {
368 self.funding_txo = other.funding_txo;
371 let other_min_secret = other.get_min_seen_secret();
372 let our_min_secret = self.get_min_seen_secret();
373 if our_min_secret > other_min_secret {
374 self.provide_secret(other_min_secret, other.get_secret(other_min_secret).unwrap(), None)?;
376 if our_min_secret >= other_min_secret {
377 self.their_cur_revocation_points = other.their_cur_revocation_points;
378 for (txid, htlcs) in other.remote_claimable_outpoints.drain() {
379 self.remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, htlcs);
381 if let Some(local_tx) = other.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
382 self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(local_tx);
384 if let Some(local_tx) = other.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
385 self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(local_tx);
387 self.payment_preimages = other.payment_preimages;
392 /// Panics if commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor doesn't fit in 48 bits
393 pub fn set_commitment_obscure_factor(&mut self, commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64) {
394 assert!(commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor < (1 << 48));
395 self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor = commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor;
398 /// Allows this monitor to scan only for transactions which are applicable. Note that this is
399 /// optional, without it this monitor cannot be used in an SPV client, but you may wish to
400 /// avoid this (or call unset_funding_info) on a monitor you wish to send to a watchtower as it
401 /// provides slightly better privacy.
402 pub fn set_funding_info(&mut self, funding_txid: Sha256dHash, funding_output_index: u16) {
403 self.funding_txo = Some((funding_txid, funding_output_index));
406 pub fn set_their_htlc_base_key(&mut self, their_htlc_base_key: &PublicKey) {
407 self.their_htlc_base_key = Some(their_htlc_base_key.clone());
410 pub fn set_their_to_self_delay(&mut self, their_to_self_delay: u16) {
411 self.their_to_self_delay = Some(their_to_self_delay);
414 pub fn unset_funding_info(&mut self) {
415 self.funding_txo = None;
418 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<(Sha256dHash, u16)> {
422 //TODO: Functions to serialize/deserialize (with different forms depending on which information
423 //we want to leave out (eg funding_txo, etc).
425 /// Can only fail if idx is < get_min_seen_secret
426 pub fn get_secret(&self, idx: u64) -> Result<[u8; 32], HandleError> {
427 for i in 0..self.old_secrets.len() {
428 if (idx & (!((1 << i) - 1))) == self.old_secrets[i].1 {
429 return Ok(ChannelMonitor::derive_secret(self.old_secrets[i].0, i as u8, idx))
432 assert!(idx < self.get_min_seen_secret());
433 Err(HandleError{err: "idx too low", msg: None})
436 pub fn get_min_seen_secret(&self) -> u64 {
437 //TODO This can be optimized?
438 let mut min = 1 << 48;
439 for &(_, idx) in self.old_secrets.iter() {
447 /// Attempts to claim a remote commitment transaction's outputs using the revocation key and
448 /// data in remote_claimable_outpoints. Will directly claim any HTLC outputs which expire at a
449 /// height > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER. In any case, will install monitoring for
450 /// HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions, and claim them using the revocation key (if
451 /// applicable) as well.
452 fn check_spend_remote_transaction(&self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32) -> Vec<Transaction> {
453 // Most secp and related errors trying to create keys means we have no hope of constructing
454 // a spend transaction...so we return no transactions to broadcast
455 let mut txn_to_broadcast = Vec::new();
456 macro_rules! ignore_error {
457 ( $thing : expr ) => {
460 Err(_) => return txn_to_broadcast
465 let commitment_txid = tx.txid(); //TODO: This is gonna be a performance bottleneck for watchtowers!
466 let per_commitment_option = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(&commitment_txid);
468 let commitment_number = (((tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor;
469 if commitment_number >= self.get_min_seen_secret() {
470 let secret = self.get_secret(commitment_number).unwrap();
471 let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &secret));
472 let (revocation_pubkey, b_htlc_key) = match self.key_storage {
473 KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key } => {
474 let per_commitment_point = ignore_error!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key));
475 (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &ignore_error!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_base_key)))),
476 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &ignore_error!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &htlc_base_key)))))
478 KeyStorage::SigsMode { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
479 let per_commitment_point = ignore_error!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key));
480 (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &revocation_base_key)),
481 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &htlc_base_key)))
484 let delayed_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &ignore_error!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key)), &self.delayed_payment_base_key));
485 let a_htlc_key = match self.their_htlc_base_key {
486 None => return txn_to_broadcast,
487 Some(their_htlc_base_key) => ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &ignore_error!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key)), &their_htlc_base_key)),
490 let revokeable_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey, self.our_to_self_delay, &delayed_key);
491 let revokeable_p2wsh = revokeable_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
493 let mut total_value = 0;
494 let mut values = Vec::new();
495 let mut inputs = Vec::new();
496 let mut htlc_idxs = Vec::new();
498 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
499 if outp.script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh {
501 prev_hash: commitment_txid,
502 prev_index: idx as u32,
503 script_sig: Script::new(),
504 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
507 htlc_idxs.push(None);
508 values.push(outp.value);
509 total_value += outp.value;
510 break; // There can only be one of these
514 macro_rules! sign_input {
515 ($sighash_parts: expr, $input: expr, $htlc_idx: expr, $amount: expr) => {
517 let (sig, redeemscript) = match self.key_storage {
518 KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
519 let redeemscript = if $htlc_idx.is_none() { revokeable_redeemscript.clone() } else {
520 let htlc = &per_commitment_option.unwrap()[$htlc_idx.unwrap()];
521 chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey)
523 let sighash = ignore_error!(Message::from_slice(&$sighash_parts.sighash_all(&$input, &redeemscript, $amount)[..]));
524 let revocation_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key, &revocation_base_key));
525 (ignore_error!(self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &revocation_key)), redeemscript)
527 KeyStorage::SigsMode { .. } => {
531 $input.witness.push(sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
532 $input.witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
533 if $htlc_idx.is_none() {
534 $input.witness.push(vec!(1));
536 $input.witness.push(revocation_pubkey.serialize().to_vec());
538 $input.witness.push(redeemscript.into_vec());
543 if let Some(per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
544 inputs.reserve_exact(per_commitment_data.len());
546 for (idx, htlc) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() {
547 let expected_script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey);
548 if htlc.transaction_output_index as usize >= tx.output.len() ||
549 tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 ||
550 tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].script_pubkey != expected_script.to_v0_p2wsh() {
551 return txn_to_broadcast; // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user
554 prev_hash: commitment_txid,
555 prev_index: htlc.transaction_output_index,
556 script_sig: Script::new(),
557 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
560 if htlc.cltv_expiry > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER {
562 htlc_idxs.push(Some(idx));
563 values.push(tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].value);
564 total_value += htlc.amount_msat / 1000;
566 let mut single_htlc_tx = Transaction {
571 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
572 value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000, //TODO: - fee
575 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&single_htlc_tx);
576 sign_input!(sighash_parts, single_htlc_tx.input[0], Some(idx), htlc.amount_msat / 1000);
577 txn_to_broadcast.push(single_htlc_tx); // TODO: This is not yet tested in ChannelManager!
582 if !inputs.is_empty() || !txn_to_broadcast.is_empty() {
583 // We're definitely a remote commitment transaction!
584 // TODO: Register commitment_txid with the ChainWatchInterface!
585 self.remote_htlc_outputs_on_chain.lock().unwrap().insert(commitment_txid, commitment_number);
587 if inputs.is_empty() { return txn_to_broadcast; } // Nothing to be done...probably a false positive/local tx
589 let outputs = vec!(TxOut {
590 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
591 value: total_value, //TODO: - fee
593 let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
600 let mut values_drain = values.drain(..);
601 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx);
603 for (input, htlc_idx) in spend_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(htlc_idxs.iter()) {
604 let value = values_drain.next().unwrap();
605 sign_input!(sighash_parts, input, htlc_idx, value);
608 txn_to_broadcast.push(spend_tx);
609 } else if let Some(per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
610 if let Some(revocation_points) = self.their_cur_revocation_points {
611 let revocation_point_option =
612 if revocation_points.0 == commitment_number { Some(&revocation_points.1) }
613 else if let Some(point) = revocation_points.2.as_ref() {
614 if revocation_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 { Some(point) } else { None }
616 if let Some(revocation_point) = revocation_point_option {
617 let (revocation_pubkey, b_htlc_key) = match self.key_storage {
618 KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key } => {
619 (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &ignore_error!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_base_key)))),
620 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &ignore_error!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &htlc_base_key)))))
622 KeyStorage::SigsMode { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
623 (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &revocation_base_key)),
624 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &htlc_base_key)))
627 let a_htlc_key = match self.their_htlc_base_key {
628 None => return txn_to_broadcast,
629 Some(their_htlc_base_key) => ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &their_htlc_base_key)),
632 let mut total_value = 0;
633 let mut values = Vec::new();
634 let mut inputs = Vec::new();
636 macro_rules! sign_input {
637 ($sighash_parts: expr, $input: expr, $amount: expr, $preimage: expr) => {
639 let (sig, redeemscript) = match self.key_storage {
640 KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
641 let htlc = &per_commitment_option.unwrap()[$input.sequence as usize];
642 let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey);
643 let sighash = ignore_error!(Message::from_slice(&$sighash_parts.sighash_all(&$input, &redeemscript, $amount)[..]));
644 let htlc_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &htlc_base_key));
645 (ignore_error!(self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &htlc_key)), redeemscript)
647 KeyStorage::SigsMode { .. } => {
651 $input.witness.push(sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
652 $input.witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
653 $input.witness.push($preimage);
654 $input.witness.push(redeemscript.into_vec());
659 for (idx, htlc) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() {
660 if let Some(payment_preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
662 prev_hash: commitment_txid,
663 prev_index: htlc.transaction_output_index,
664 script_sig: Script::new(),
665 sequence: idx as u32, // reset to 0xfffffffd in sign_input
668 if htlc.cltv_expiry > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER {
670 values.push((tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].value, payment_preimage));
671 total_value += htlc.amount_msat / 1000;
673 let mut single_htlc_tx = Transaction {
678 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
679 value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000, //TODO: - fee
682 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&single_htlc_tx);
683 sign_input!(sighash_parts, single_htlc_tx.input[0], htlc.amount_msat / 1000, payment_preimage.to_vec());
684 txn_to_broadcast.push(single_htlc_tx);
689 if inputs.is_empty() { return txn_to_broadcast; } // Nothing to be done...probably a false positive/local tx
691 let outputs = vec!(TxOut {
692 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
693 value: total_value, //TODO: - fee
695 let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
702 let mut values_drain = values.drain(..);
703 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx);
705 for input in spend_tx.input.iter_mut() {
706 let value = values_drain.next().unwrap();
707 sign_input!(sighash_parts, input, value.0, value.1.to_vec());
710 txn_to_broadcast.push(spend_tx);
714 //TODO: For each input check if its in our remote_htlc_outputs_on_chain map!
720 fn broadcast_by_local_state(&self, local_tx: &LocalSignedTx) -> Vec<Transaction> {
721 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
723 for &(ref htlc, ref their_sig, ref our_sig) in local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
725 let mut htlc_timeout_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&local_tx.txid, local_tx.feerate_per_kw, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), htlc, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key, &local_tx.revocation_key);
727 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
729 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(their_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
730 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
731 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
732 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
734 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new());
735 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &local_tx.a_htlc_key, &local_tx.b_htlc_key, &local_tx.revocation_key).into_vec());
737 res.push(htlc_timeout_tx);
739 if let Some(payment_preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
740 let mut htlc_success_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&local_tx.txid, local_tx.feerate_per_kw, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), htlc, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key, &local_tx.revocation_key);
742 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
744 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(their_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
745 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
746 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
747 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
749 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(payment_preimage.to_vec());
750 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &local_tx.a_htlc_key, &local_tx.b_htlc_key, &local_tx.revocation_key).into_vec());
752 res.push(htlc_success_tx);
760 /// Attempts to claim any claimable HTLCs in a commitment transaction which was not (yet)
761 /// revoked using data in local_claimable_outpoints.
762 /// Should not be used if check_spend_revoked_transaction succeeds.
763 fn check_spend_local_transaction(&self, tx: &Transaction, _height: u32) -> Vec<Transaction> {
764 let commitment_txid = tx.txid();
765 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
766 if local_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
767 return self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx);
770 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
771 if local_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
772 return self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx);
778 fn block_connected(&self, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], height: u32, broadcaster: &BroadcasterInterface) {
779 for tx in txn_matched {
780 for txin in tx.input.iter() {
781 if self.funding_txo.is_none() || (txin.prev_hash == self.funding_txo.unwrap().0 && txin.prev_index == self.funding_txo.unwrap().1 as u32) {
782 let mut txn = self.check_spend_remote_transaction(tx, height);
784 txn = self.check_spend_local_transaction(tx, height);
786 for tx in txn.iter() {
787 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(tx);
792 if let Some(ref cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
793 let mut needs_broadcast = false;
794 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in cur_local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
795 if htlc.cltv_expiry <= height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER {
796 if htlc.offered || self.payment_preimages.contains_key(&htlc.payment_hash) {
797 needs_broadcast = true;
803 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&cur_local_tx.tx);
804 for tx in self.broadcast_by_local_state(&cur_local_tx) {
805 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
811 pub fn would_broadcast_at_height(&self, height: u32) -> bool {
812 if let Some(ref cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
813 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in cur_local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
814 if htlc.cltv_expiry <= height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER {
815 if htlc.offered || self.payment_preimages.contains_key(&htlc.payment_hash) {
827 use bitcoin::util::misc::hex_bytes;
828 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Script;
829 use bitcoin::util::hash::{Hash160,Sha256dHash};
830 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
831 use ln::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor;
832 use ln::channelmonitor::LocalSignedTx;
833 use ln::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment;
834 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
835 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1, Signature};
836 use rand::{thread_rng,Rng};
839 fn test_per_commitment_storage() {
840 // Test vectors from BOLT 3:
841 let mut secrets: Vec<[u8; 32]> = Vec::new();
842 let mut monitor: ChannelMonitor;
843 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
845 macro_rules! test_secrets {
847 let mut idx = 281474976710655;
848 for secret in secrets.iter() {
849 assert_eq!(monitor.get_secret(idx).unwrap(), *secret);
852 assert_eq!(monitor.get_min_seen_secret(), idx + 1);
853 assert!(monitor.get_secret(idx).is_err());
858 // insert_secret correct sequence
859 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::new(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
862 secrets.push([0; 32]);
863 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
864 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
867 secrets.push([0; 32]);
868 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
869 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
872 secrets.push([0; 32]);
873 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
874 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
877 secrets.push([0; 32]);
878 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
879 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
882 secrets.push([0; 32]);
883 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
884 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
887 secrets.push([0; 32]);
888 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
889 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
892 secrets.push([0; 32]);
893 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
894 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
897 secrets.push([0; 32]);
898 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
899 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
904 // insert_secret #1 incorrect
905 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::new(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
908 secrets.push([0; 32]);
909 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
910 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
913 secrets.push([0; 32]);
914 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
915 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err,
916 "Previous secret did not match new one");
920 // insert_secret #2 incorrect (#1 derived from incorrect)
921 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::new(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
924 secrets.push([0; 32]);
925 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
926 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
929 secrets.push([0; 32]);
930 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("dddc3a8d14fddf2b68fa8c7fbad2748274937479dd0f8930d5ebb4ab6bd866a3").unwrap());
931 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
934 secrets.push([0; 32]);
935 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
936 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
939 secrets.push([0; 32]);
940 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
941 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err,
942 "Previous secret did not match new one");
946 // insert_secret #3 incorrect
947 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::new(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
950 secrets.push([0; 32]);
951 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
952 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
955 secrets.push([0; 32]);
956 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
957 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
960 secrets.push([0; 32]);
961 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("c51a18b13e8527e579ec56365482c62f180b7d5760b46e9477dae59e87ed423a").unwrap());
962 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
965 secrets.push([0; 32]);
966 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
967 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err,
968 "Previous secret did not match new one");
972 // insert_secret #4 incorrect (1,2,3 derived from incorrect)
973 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::new(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
976 secrets.push([0; 32]);
977 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
978 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
981 secrets.push([0; 32]);
982 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("dddc3a8d14fddf2b68fa8c7fbad2748274937479dd0f8930d5ebb4ab6bd866a3").unwrap());
983 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
986 secrets.push([0; 32]);
987 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("c51a18b13e8527e579ec56365482c62f180b7d5760b46e9477dae59e87ed423a").unwrap());
988 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
991 secrets.push([0; 32]);
992 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("ba65d7b0ef55a3ba300d4e87af29868f394f8f138d78a7011669c79b37b936f4").unwrap());
993 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
996 secrets.push([0; 32]);
997 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
998 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1001 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1002 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
1003 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1006 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1007 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
1008 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1011 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1012 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
1013 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err,
1014 "Previous secret did not match new one");
1018 // insert_secret #5 incorrect
1019 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::new(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
1022 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1023 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1024 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1027 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1028 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1029 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1032 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1033 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1034 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1037 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1038 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1039 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1042 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1043 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("631373ad5f9ef654bb3dade742d09504c567edd24320d2fcd68e3cc47e2ff6a6").unwrap());
1044 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1047 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1048 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
1049 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err,
1050 "Previous secret did not match new one");
1054 // insert_secret #6 incorrect (5 derived from incorrect)
1055 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::new(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
1058 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1059 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1060 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1063 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1064 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1065 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1068 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1069 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1070 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1073 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1074 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1075 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1078 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1079 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("631373ad5f9ef654bb3dade742d09504c567edd24320d2fcd68e3cc47e2ff6a6").unwrap());
1080 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1083 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1084 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("b7e76a83668bde38b373970155c868a653304308f9896692f904a23731224bb1").unwrap());
1085 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1088 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1089 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
1090 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1093 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1094 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
1095 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err,
1096 "Previous secret did not match new one");
1100 // insert_secret #7 incorrect
1101 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::new(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
1104 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1105 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1106 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1109 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1110 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1111 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1114 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1115 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1116 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1119 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1120 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1121 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1124 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1125 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
1126 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1129 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1130 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
1131 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1134 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1135 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("e7971de736e01da8ed58b94c2fc216cb1dca9e326f3a96e7194fe8ea8af6c0a3").unwrap());
1136 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1139 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1140 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
1141 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err,
1142 "Previous secret did not match new one");
1146 // insert_secret #8 incorrect
1147 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::new(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
1150 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1151 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1152 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1155 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1156 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1157 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1160 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1161 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1162 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1165 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1166 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1167 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1170 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1171 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
1172 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1175 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1176 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
1177 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1180 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1181 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
1182 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1185 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1186 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("a7efbc61aac46d34f77778bac22c8a20c6a46ca460addc49009bda875ec88fa4").unwrap());
1187 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err,
1188 "Previous secret did not match new one");
1192 macro_rules! gen_local_tx {
1193 ($hex : expr, $monitor : expr, $htlcs : expr, $rng : expr, $preimage : expr, $hash : expr) => {
1195 let mut htlcs = Vec::new();
1196 for _i in 0..$htlcs {
1197 $rng.fill_bytes(&mut $preimage);
1198 $hash[0..20].clone_from_slice(&Hash160::from_data(&$preimage)[0..20]);
1199 $monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&$hash, &$preimage);
1200 htlcs.push((HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1204 payment_hash : $hash.clone(),
1205 transaction_output_index : 0,
1206 }, Signature::from_der(&Secp256k1::new(), $hex).unwrap(),
1207 Signature::from_der(&Secp256k1::new(), $hex).unwrap()))
1210 Some(LocalSignedTx {
1211 txid: Sha256dHash::from_data(&[]),
1218 revocation_key: PublicKey::new(),
1219 a_htlc_key: PublicKey::new(),
1220 b_htlc_key: PublicKey::new(),
1221 delayed_payment_key: PublicKey::new(),
1223 htlc_outputs: htlcs,
1229 macro_rules! gen_remote_outpoints {
1230 ($monitor : expr, $tx : expr, $htlcs : expr, $rng : expr, $preimage : expr, $hash: expr, $number : expr) => {
1232 let mut commitment_number = $number;
1234 let tx_zero = Transaction {
1241 let mut htlcs = Vec::new();
1242 for _i in 0..$htlcs {
1243 $rng.fill_bytes(&mut $preimage);
1244 $hash[0..20].clone_from_slice(&Hash160::from_data(&$preimage)[0..20]);
1245 $monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&$hash, &$preimage);
1246 htlcs.push(HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1250 payment_hash : $hash.clone(),
1251 transaction_output_index : 0,
1254 commitment_number -= 1;
1255 $monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&tx_zero, htlcs, commitment_number);
1262 fn test_prune_preimages() {
1263 let mut secret = [0; 32];
1264 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1265 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1266 let mut preimage: [u8;32] = [0;32];
1267 let mut hash: [u8;32] = [0;32];
1268 let mut rng = thread_rng();
1271 // insert 30 random hash, 10 from local, 10 from remote, prune 30/50
1272 let mut monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::new(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
1275 rng.fill_bytes(&mut preimage);
1276 hash[0..20].clone_from_slice(&Hash160::from_data(&preimage)[0..20]);
1277 monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&hash, &preimage);
1279 monitor.current_local_signed_commitment_tx = gen_local_tx!(&hex_bytes("3045022100fa86fa9a36a8cd6a7bb8f06a541787d51371d067951a9461d5404de6b928782e02201c8b7c334c10aed8976a3a465be9a28abff4cb23acbf00022295b378ce1fa3cd").unwrap()[..], monitor, 10, rng, preimage, hash);
1280 gen_remote_outpoints!(monitor, 1, 10, rng, preimage, hash, 281474976710654);
1281 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secret.clone(), None).unwrap();
1282 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 20);
1286 // insert 30 random hash, prune 30/30
1287 let mut monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::new(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
1290 rng.fill_bytes(&mut preimage);
1291 hash[0..20].clone_from_slice(&Hash160::from_data(&preimage)[0..20]);
1292 monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&hash, &preimage);
1294 monitor.current_local_signed_commitment_tx = gen_local_tx!(&hex_bytes("3045022100fa86fa9a36a8cd6a7bb8f06a541787d51371d067951a9461d5404de6b928782e02201c8b7c334c10aed8976a3a465be9a28abff4cb23acbf00022295b378ce1fa3cd").unwrap()[..], monitor, 0, rng, preimage, hash);
1295 gen_remote_outpoints!(monitor, 0, 0, rng, preimage, hash, 281474976710655);
1296 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secret.clone(), None).unwrap();
1297 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 0);
1301 // insert 30 random hash, 25 on 5 remotes, prune 30/55
1302 let mut monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::new(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
1305 rng.fill_bytes(&mut preimage);
1306 hash[0..20].clone_from_slice(&Hash160::from_data(&preimage)[0..20]);
1307 monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&hash, &preimage);
1309 monitor.current_local_signed_commitment_tx = gen_local_tx!(&hex_bytes("3045022100fa86fa9a36a8cd6a7bb8f06a541787d51371d067951a9461d5404de6b928782e02201c8b7c334c10aed8976a3a465be9a28abff4cb23acbf00022295b378ce1fa3cd").unwrap()[..], monitor, 0, rng, preimage, hash);
1310 gen_remote_outpoints!(monitor, 5, 5, rng, preimage, hash, 281474976710654);
1311 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secret.clone(), None).unwrap();
1312 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 25);
1316 // insert 30 random hash, 25 from local, prune 30/55
1317 let mut monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::new(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
1320 rng.fill_bytes(&mut preimage);
1321 hash[0..20].clone_from_slice(&Hash160::from_data(&preimage)[0..20]);
1322 monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&hash, &preimage);
1324 monitor.current_local_signed_commitment_tx = gen_local_tx!(&hex_bytes("3045022100fa86fa9a36a8cd6a7bb8f06a541787d51371d067951a9461d5404de6b928782e02201c8b7c334c10aed8976a3a465be9a28abff4cb23acbf00022295b378ce1fa3cd").unwrap()[..], monitor, 25, rng, preimage, hash);
1325 gen_remote_outpoints!(monitor, 0, 0, rng, preimage, hash, 281474976710655);
1326 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secret.clone(), None).unwrap();
1327 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 25);
1331 // Further testing is done in the ChannelManager integration tests.