1 //! The logic to monitor for on-chain transactions and create the relevant claim responses lives
4 //! ChannelMonitor objects are generated by ChannelManager in response to relevant
5 //! messages/actions, and MUST be persisted to disk (and, preferably, remotely) before progress can
6 //! be made in responding to certain messages, see ManyChannelMonitor for more.
8 //! Note that ChannelMonitors are an important part of the lightning trust model and a copy of the
9 //! latest ChannelMonitor must always be actively monitoring for chain updates (and no out-of-date
10 //! ChannelMonitors should do so). Thus, if you're building rust-lightning into an HSM or other
11 //! security-domain-separated system design, you should consider having multiple paths for
12 //! ChannelMonitors to get out of the HSM and onto monitoring devices.
14 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
15 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxIn,TxOut,SigHashType,Transaction};
16 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
17 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
18 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
19 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::{self, Decodable, Encodable};
20 use bitcoin::util::hash::BitcoinHash;
21 use bitcoin::util::bip143;
23 use bitcoin_hashes::Hash;
24 use bitcoin_hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
25 use bitcoin_hashes::hash160::Hash as Hash160;
26 use bitcoin_hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
28 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Signature};
29 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
32 use ln::msgs::DecodeError;
34 use ln::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment;
35 use ln::channelmanager::{HTLCSource, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
36 use ln::channel::{ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT, OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT};
37 use chain::chaininterface::{ChainListener, ChainWatchInterface, BroadcasterInterface, FeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget};
38 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
39 use chain::keysinterface::SpendableOutputDescriptor;
40 use util::logger::Logger;
41 use util::ser::{ReadableArgs, Readable, Writer, Writeable, WriterWriteAdaptor, U48};
42 use util::{byte_utils, events};
44 use std::collections::{HashMap, hash_map};
45 use std::sync::{Arc,Mutex};
46 use std::{hash,cmp, mem};
48 /// An error enum representing a failure to persist a channel monitor update.
50 pub enum ChannelMonitorUpdateErr {
51 /// Used to indicate a temporary failure (eg connection to a watchtower or remote backup of
52 /// our state failed, but is expected to succeed at some point in the future).
54 /// Such a failure will "freeze" a channel, preventing us from revoking old states or
55 /// submitting new commitment transactions to the remote party.
56 /// ChannelManager::test_restore_channel_monitor can be used to retry the update(s) and restore
57 /// the channel to an operational state.
59 /// Note that continuing to operate when no copy of the updated ChannelMonitor could be
60 /// persisted is unsafe - if you failed to store the update on your own local disk you should
61 /// instead return PermanentFailure to force closure of the channel ASAP.
63 /// Even when a channel has been "frozen" updates to the ChannelMonitor can continue to occur
64 /// (eg if an inbound HTLC which we forwarded was claimed upstream resulting in us attempting
65 /// to claim it on this channel) and those updates must be applied wherever they can be. At
66 /// least one such updated ChannelMonitor must be persisted otherwise PermanentFailure should
67 /// be returned to get things on-chain ASAP using only the in-memory copy. Obviously updates to
68 /// the channel which would invalidate previous ChannelMonitors are not made when a channel has
71 /// Note that even if updates made after TemporaryFailure succeed you must still call
72 /// test_restore_channel_monitor to ensure you have the latest monitor and re-enable normal
73 /// channel operation.
75 /// For deployments where a copy of ChannelMonitors and other local state are backed up in a
76 /// remote location (with local copies persisted immediately), it is anticipated that all
77 /// updates will return TemporaryFailure until the remote copies could be updated.
79 /// Used to indicate no further channel monitor updates will be allowed (eg we've moved on to a
80 /// different watchtower and cannot update with all watchtowers that were previously informed
81 /// of this channel). This will force-close the channel in question.
83 /// Should also be used to indicate a failure to update the local copy of the channel monitor.
87 /// General Err type for ChannelMonitor actions. Generally, this implies that the data provided is
88 /// inconsistent with the ChannelMonitor being called. eg for ChannelMonitor::insert_combine this
89 /// means you tried to merge two monitors for different channels or for a channel which was
90 /// restored from a backup and then generated new commitment updates.
91 /// Contains a human-readable error message.
93 pub struct MonitorUpdateError(pub &'static str);
95 /// Simple structure send back by ManyChannelMonitor in case of HTLC detected onchain from a
96 /// forward channel and from which info are needed to update HTLC in a backward channel.
97 pub struct HTLCUpdate {
98 pub(super) payment_hash: PaymentHash,
99 pub(super) payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
100 pub(super) source: HTLCSource
103 /// Simple trait indicating ability to track a set of ChannelMonitors and multiplex events between
104 /// them. Generally should be implemented by keeping a local SimpleManyChannelMonitor and passing
105 /// events to it, while also taking any add_update_monitor events and passing them to some remote
108 /// Note that any updates to a channel's monitor *must* be applied to each instance of the
109 /// channel's monitor everywhere (including remote watchtowers) *before* this function returns. If
110 /// an update occurs and a remote watchtower is left with old state, it may broadcast transactions
111 /// which we have revoked, allowing our counterparty to claim all funds in the channel!
112 pub trait ManyChannelMonitor: Send + Sync {
113 /// Adds or updates a monitor for the given `funding_txo`.
115 /// Implementor must also ensure that the funding_txo outpoint is registered with any relevant
116 /// ChainWatchInterfaces such that the provided monitor receives block_connected callbacks with
117 /// any spends of it.
118 fn add_update_monitor(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr>;
120 /// Used by ChannelManager to get list of HTLC resolved onchain and which needed to be updated
121 /// with success or failure backward
122 fn fetch_pending_htlc_updated(&self) -> Vec<HTLCUpdate>;
125 /// A simple implementation of a ManyChannelMonitor and ChainListener. Can be used to create a
126 /// watchtower or watch our own channels.
128 /// Note that you must provide your own key by which to refer to channels.
130 /// If you're accepting remote monitors (ie are implementing a watchtower), you must verify that
131 /// users cannot overwrite a given channel by providing a duplicate key. ie you should probably
132 /// index by a PublicKey which is required to sign any updates.
134 /// If you're using this for local monitoring of your own channels, you probably want to use
135 /// `OutPoint` as the key, which will give you a ManyChannelMonitor implementation.
136 pub struct SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
137 #[cfg(test)] // Used in ChannelManager tests to manipulate channels directly
138 pub monitors: Mutex<HashMap<Key, ChannelMonitor>>,
140 monitors: Mutex<HashMap<Key, ChannelMonitor>>,
141 chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>,
142 broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>,
143 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
144 pending_htlc_updated: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, Vec<(HTLCSource, Option<PaymentPreimage>)>>>,
146 fee_estimator: Arc<FeeEstimator>
149 impl<Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash> ChainListener for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
150 fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], _indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) {
151 let block_hash = header.bitcoin_hash();
152 let mut new_events: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(0);
153 let mut htlc_updated_infos = Vec::new();
155 let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
156 for monitor in monitors.values_mut() {
157 let (txn_outputs, spendable_outputs, mut htlc_updated) = monitor.block_connected(txn_matched, height, &block_hash, &*self.broadcaster, &*self.fee_estimator);
158 if spendable_outputs.len() > 0 {
159 new_events.push(events::Event::SpendableOutputs {
160 outputs: spendable_outputs,
164 for (ref txid, ref outputs) in txn_outputs {
165 for (idx, output) in outputs.iter().enumerate() {
166 self.chain_monitor.install_watch_outpoint((txid.clone(), idx as u32), &output.script_pubkey);
169 htlc_updated_infos.append(&mut htlc_updated);
173 // ChannelManager will just need to fetch pending_htlc_updated and pass state backward
174 let mut pending_htlc_updated = self.pending_htlc_updated.lock().unwrap();
175 for htlc in htlc_updated_infos.drain(..) {
176 match pending_htlc_updated.entry(htlc.2) {
177 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut e) => {
178 // In case of reorg we may have htlc outputs solved in a different way so
179 // we prefer to keep claims but don't store duplicate updates for a given
180 // (payment_hash, HTLCSource) pair.
181 let mut existing_claim = false;
182 e.get_mut().retain(|htlc_data| {
183 if htlc.0 == htlc_data.0 {
184 if htlc_data.1.is_some() {
185 existing_claim = true;
191 e.get_mut().push((htlc.0, htlc.1));
194 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
195 e.insert(vec![(htlc.0, htlc.1)]);
200 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
201 pending_events.append(&mut new_events);
204 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, disconnected_height: u32) {
205 let block_hash = header.bitcoin_hash();
206 let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
207 for monitor in monitors.values_mut() {
208 monitor.block_disconnected(disconnected_height, &block_hash);
213 impl<Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash + 'static> SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
214 /// Creates a new object which can be used to monitor several channels given the chain
215 /// interface with which to register to receive notifications.
216 pub fn new(chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>, broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>, logger: Arc<Logger>, feeest: Arc<FeeEstimator>) -> Arc<SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key>> {
217 let res = Arc::new(SimpleManyChannelMonitor {
218 monitors: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
221 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
222 pending_htlc_updated: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
224 fee_estimator: feeest,
226 let weak_res = Arc::downgrade(&res);
227 res.chain_monitor.register_listener(weak_res);
231 /// Adds or updates the monitor which monitors the channel referred to by the given key.
232 pub fn add_update_monitor_by_key(&self, key: Key, monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
233 let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
234 match monitors.get_mut(&key) {
235 Some(orig_monitor) => {
236 log_trace!(self, "Updating Channel Monitor for channel {}", log_funding_info!(monitor.key_storage));
237 return orig_monitor.insert_combine(monitor);
241 match monitor.key_storage {
242 Storage::Local { ref funding_info, .. } => {
245 return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Try to update a useless monitor without funding_txo !"));
247 &Some((ref outpoint, ref script)) => {
248 log_trace!(self, "Got new Channel Monitor for channel {}", log_bytes!(outpoint.to_channel_id()[..]));
249 self.chain_monitor.install_watch_tx(&outpoint.txid, script);
250 self.chain_monitor.install_watch_outpoint((outpoint.txid, outpoint.index as u32), script);
254 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
255 self.chain_monitor.watch_all_txn();
258 monitors.insert(key, monitor);
263 impl ManyChannelMonitor for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<OutPoint> {
264 fn add_update_monitor(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr> {
265 match self.add_update_monitor_by_key(funding_txo, monitor) {
267 Err(_) => Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure),
271 fn fetch_pending_htlc_updated(&self) -> Vec<HTLCUpdate> {
272 let mut updated = self.pending_htlc_updated.lock().unwrap();
273 let mut pending_htlcs_updated = Vec::with_capacity(updated.len());
274 for (k, v) in updated.drain() {
276 pending_htlcs_updated.push(HTLCUpdate {
278 payment_preimage: htlc_data.1,
283 pending_htlcs_updated
287 impl<Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash> events::EventsProvider for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
288 fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
289 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
290 let mut ret = Vec::new();
291 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut *pending_events);
296 /// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, don't try to claim it in a shared transaction,
297 /// instead claiming it in its own individual transaction.
298 const CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 12;
299 /// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, force-close the channel to broadcast the
300 /// HTLC-Success transaction.
301 /// In other words, this is an upper bound on how many blocks we think it can take us to get a
302 /// transaction confirmed (and we use it in a few more, equivalent, places).
303 pub(crate) const CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 6;
304 /// Number of blocks by which point we expect our counterparty to have seen new blocks on the
305 /// network and done a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance (+ we've updated all our
306 /// copies of ChannelMonitors, including watchtowers). We could enforce the contract by failing
307 /// at CLTV expiration height but giving a grace period to our peer may be profitable for us if he
308 /// can provide an over-late preimage. Nevertheless, grace period has to be accounted in our
309 /// CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA to be secure. Following this policy we may decrease the rate of channel failures
310 /// due to expiration but increase the cost of funds being locked longuer in case of failure.
311 /// This delay also cover a low-power peer being slow to process blocks and so being behind us on
312 /// accurate block height.
313 /// In case of onchain failure to be pass backward we may see the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY
314 /// with at worst this delay, so we are not only using this value as a mercy for them but also
315 /// us as a safeguard to delay with enough time.
316 pub(crate) const LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS: u32 = 3;
317 /// Number of blocks we wait on seeing a HTLC output being solved before we fail corresponding inbound
318 /// HTLCs. This prevents us from failing backwards and then getting a reorg resulting in us losing money.
319 /// We use also this delay to be sure we can remove our in-flight claim txn from bump candidates buffer.
320 /// It may cause spurrious generation of bumped claim txn but that's allright given the outpoint is already
321 /// solved by a previous claim tx. What we want to avoid is reorg evicting our claim tx and us not
322 /// keeping bumping another claim tx to solve the outpoint.
323 pub(crate) const ANTI_REORG_DELAY: u32 = 6;
325 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
328 revocation_base_key: SecretKey,
329 htlc_base_key: SecretKey,
330 delayed_payment_base_key: SecretKey,
331 payment_base_key: SecretKey,
332 shutdown_pubkey: PublicKey,
333 prev_latest_per_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
334 latest_per_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
335 funding_info: Option<(OutPoint, Script)>,
336 current_remote_commitment_txid: Option<Sha256dHash>,
337 prev_remote_commitment_txid: Option<Sha256dHash>,
340 revocation_base_key: PublicKey,
341 htlc_base_key: PublicKey,
345 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
346 struct LocalSignedTx {
347 /// txid of the transaction in tx, just used to make comparison faster
350 revocation_key: PublicKey,
351 a_htlc_key: PublicKey,
352 b_htlc_key: PublicKey,
353 delayed_payment_key: PublicKey,
355 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<(Signature, Signature)>, Option<HTLCSource>)>,
359 enum InputDescriptors {
364 RevokedOutput, // either a revoked to_local output on commitment tx, a revoked HTLC-Timeout output or a revoked HTLC-Success output
367 /// When ChannelMonitor discovers an onchain outpoint being a step of a channel and that it needs
368 /// to generate a tx to push channel state forward, we cache outpoint-solving tx material to build
369 /// a new bumped one in case of lenghty confirmation delay
370 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
374 pubkey: Option<PublicKey>,
382 preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
387 sigs: (Signature, Signature),
388 preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
393 /// Upon discovering of some classes of onchain tx by ChannelMonitor, we may have to take actions on it
394 /// once they mature to enough confirmations (ANTI_REORG_DELAY)
395 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
397 /// Outpoint under claim process by our own tx, once this one get enough confirmations, we remove it from
398 /// bump-txn candidate buffer.
400 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint,
402 /// HTLC output getting solved by a timeout, at maturation we pass upstream payment source information to solve
403 /// inbound HTLC in backward channel. Note, in case of preimage, we pass info to upstream without delay as we can
404 /// only win from it, so it's never an OnchainEvent
406 htlc_update: (HTLCSource, PaymentHash),
410 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
411 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
413 /// A ChannelMonitor handles chain events (blocks connected and disconnected) and generates
414 /// on-chain transactions to ensure no loss of funds occurs.
416 /// You MUST ensure that no ChannelMonitors for a given channel anywhere contain out-of-date
417 /// information and are actively monitoring the chain.
419 pub struct ChannelMonitor {
420 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64,
422 key_storage: Storage,
423 their_htlc_base_key: Option<PublicKey>,
424 their_delayed_payment_base_key: Option<PublicKey>,
425 // first is the idx of the first of the two revocation points
426 their_cur_revocation_points: Option<(u64, PublicKey, Option<PublicKey>)>,
428 our_to_self_delay: u16,
429 their_to_self_delay: Option<u16>,
431 old_secrets: [([u8; 32], u64); 49],
432 remote_claimable_outpoints: HashMap<Sha256dHash, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>>,
433 /// We cannot identify HTLC-Success or HTLC-Timeout transactions by themselves on the chain.
434 /// Nor can we figure out their commitment numbers without the commitment transaction they are
435 /// spending. Thus, in order to claim them via revocation key, we track all the remote
436 /// commitment transactions which we find on-chain, mapping them to the commitment number which
437 /// can be used to derive the revocation key and claim the transactions.
438 remote_commitment_txn_on_chain: HashMap<Sha256dHash, (u64, Vec<Script>)>,
439 /// Cache used to make pruning of payment_preimages faster.
440 /// Maps payment_hash values to commitment numbers for remote transactions for non-revoked
441 /// remote transactions (ie should remain pretty small).
442 /// Serialized to disk but should generally not be sent to Watchtowers.
443 remote_hash_commitment_number: HashMap<PaymentHash, u64>,
445 // We store two local commitment transactions to avoid any race conditions where we may update
446 // some monitors (potentially on watchtowers) but then fail to update others, resulting in the
447 // various monitors for one channel being out of sync, and us broadcasting a local
448 // transaction for which we have deleted claim information on some watchtowers.
449 prev_local_signed_commitment_tx: Option<LocalSignedTx>,
450 current_local_signed_commitment_tx: Option<LocalSignedTx>,
452 // Used just for ChannelManager to make sure it has the latest channel data during
454 current_remote_commitment_number: u64,
456 payment_preimages: HashMap<PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage>,
458 destination_script: Script,
460 // Used to track outpoint in the process of being claimed by our transactions. We need to scan all transactions
461 // for inputs spending this. If height timer (u32) is expired and claim tx hasn't reached enough confirmations
462 // before, use TxMaterial to regenerate a new claim tx with a satoshis-per-1000-weight-units higher than last
464 our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf: HashMap<BitcoinOutPoint, (u32, TxMaterial, u64)>,
466 // Used to track onchain events, i.e transactions parts of channels confirmed on chain, on which
467 // we have to take actions once they reach enough confs. Key is a block height timer, i.e we enforce
468 // actions when we receive a block with given height. Actions depend on OnchainEvent type.
469 onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf: HashMap<u32, Vec<OnchainEvent>>,
471 // We simply modify last_block_hash in Channel's block_connected so that serialization is
472 // consistent but hopefully the users' copy handles block_connected in a consistent way.
473 // (we do *not*, however, update them in insert_combine to ensure any local user copies keep
474 // their last_block_hash from its state and not based on updated copies that didn't run through
475 // the full block_connected).
476 pub(crate) last_block_hash: Sha256dHash,
477 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>, //TODO: dedup this a bit...
481 macro_rules! subtract_high_prio_fee {
482 ($self: ident, $fee_estimator: expr, $value: expr, $predicted_weight: expr, $spent_txid: expr, $used_feerate: expr) => {
484 $used_feerate = $fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority);
485 let mut fee = $used_feerate * $predicted_weight / 1000;
487 $used_feerate = $fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
488 fee = $used_feerate * $predicted_weight / 1000;
490 $used_feerate = $fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
491 fee = $used_feerate * $predicted_weight / 1000;
493 log_error!($self, "Failed to generate an on-chain punishment tx spending {} as even low priority fee ({} sat) was more than the entire claim balance ({} sat)",
494 $spent_txid, fee, $value);
497 log_warn!($self, "Used low priority fee for on-chain punishment tx spending {} as high priority fee was more than the entire claim balance ({} sat)",
498 $spent_txid, $value);
503 log_warn!($self, "Used medium priority fee for on-chain punishment tx spending {} as high priority fee was more than the entire claim balance ({} sat)",
504 $spent_txid, $value);
516 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
517 /// Used only in testing and fuzztarget to check serialization roundtrips don't change the
518 /// underlying object
519 impl PartialEq for ChannelMonitor {
520 fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
521 if self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor != other.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor ||
522 self.key_storage != other.key_storage ||
523 self.their_htlc_base_key != other.their_htlc_base_key ||
524 self.their_delayed_payment_base_key != other.their_delayed_payment_base_key ||
525 self.their_cur_revocation_points != other.their_cur_revocation_points ||
526 self.our_to_self_delay != other.our_to_self_delay ||
527 self.their_to_self_delay != other.their_to_self_delay ||
528 self.remote_claimable_outpoints != other.remote_claimable_outpoints ||
529 self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain != other.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain ||
530 self.remote_hash_commitment_number != other.remote_hash_commitment_number ||
531 self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx != other.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx ||
532 self.current_remote_commitment_number != other.current_remote_commitment_number ||
533 self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx != other.current_local_signed_commitment_tx ||
534 self.payment_preimages != other.payment_preimages ||
535 self.destination_script != other.destination_script ||
536 self.our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf != other.our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf ||
537 self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf != other.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf
541 for (&(ref secret, ref idx), &(ref o_secret, ref o_idx)) in self.old_secrets.iter().zip(other.old_secrets.iter()) {
542 if secret != o_secret || idx != o_idx {
551 impl ChannelMonitor {
552 pub(super) fn new(revocation_base_key: &SecretKey, delayed_payment_base_key: &SecretKey, htlc_base_key: &SecretKey, payment_base_key: &SecretKey, shutdown_pubkey: &PublicKey, our_to_self_delay: u16, destination_script: Script, logger: Arc<Logger>) -> ChannelMonitor {
554 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: 0,
556 key_storage: Storage::Local {
557 revocation_base_key: revocation_base_key.clone(),
558 htlc_base_key: htlc_base_key.clone(),
559 delayed_payment_base_key: delayed_payment_base_key.clone(),
560 payment_base_key: payment_base_key.clone(),
561 shutdown_pubkey: shutdown_pubkey.clone(),
562 prev_latest_per_commitment_point: None,
563 latest_per_commitment_point: None,
565 current_remote_commitment_txid: None,
566 prev_remote_commitment_txid: None,
568 their_htlc_base_key: None,
569 their_delayed_payment_base_key: None,
570 their_cur_revocation_points: None,
572 our_to_self_delay: our_to_self_delay,
573 their_to_self_delay: None,
575 old_secrets: [([0; 32], 1 << 48); 49],
576 remote_claimable_outpoints: HashMap::new(),
577 remote_commitment_txn_on_chain: HashMap::new(),
578 remote_hash_commitment_number: HashMap::new(),
580 prev_local_signed_commitment_tx: None,
581 current_local_signed_commitment_tx: None,
582 current_remote_commitment_number: 1 << 48,
584 payment_preimages: HashMap::new(),
585 destination_script: destination_script,
587 our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf: HashMap::new(),
589 onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf: HashMap::new(),
591 last_block_hash: Default::default(),
592 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
597 fn get_witnesses_weight(inputs: &[InputDescriptors]) -> u64 {
598 let mut tx_weight = 2; // count segwit flags
600 // We use expected weight (and not actual) as signatures and time lock delays may vary
601 tx_weight += match inp {
602 // number_of_witness_elements + sig_length + revocation_sig + pubkey_length + revocationpubkey + witness_script_length + witness_script
603 &InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC => {
604 1 + 1 + 73 + 1 + 33 + 1 + 133
606 // number_of_witness_elements + sig_length + revocation_sig + pubkey_length + revocationpubkey + witness_script_length + witness_script
607 &InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC => {
608 1 + 1 + 73 + 1 + 33 + 1 + 139
610 // number_of_witness_elements + sig_length + remotehtlc_sig + preimage_length + preimage + witness_script_length + witness_script
611 &InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC => {
612 1 + 1 + 73 + 1 + 32 + 1 + 133
614 // number_of_witness_elements + sig_length + revocation_sig + pubkey_length + revocationpubkey + witness_script_length + witness_script
615 &InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC => {
616 1 + 1 + 73 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 139
618 // number_of_witness_elements + sig_length + revocation_sig + true_length + op_true + witness_script_length + witness_script
619 &InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput => {
620 1 + 1 + 73 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 77
628 fn place_secret(idx: u64) -> u8 {
630 if idx & (1 << i) == (1 << i) {
638 fn derive_secret(secret: [u8; 32], bits: u8, idx: u64) -> [u8; 32] {
639 let mut res: [u8; 32] = secret;
641 let bitpos = bits - 1 - i;
642 if idx & (1 << bitpos) == (1 << bitpos) {
643 res[(bitpos / 8) as usize] ^= 1 << (bitpos & 7);
644 res = Sha256::hash(&res).into_inner();
650 /// Inserts a revocation secret into this channel monitor. Prunes old preimages if neither
651 /// needed by local commitment transactions HTCLs nor by remote ones. Unless we haven't already seen remote
652 /// commitment transaction's secret, they are de facto pruned (we can use revocation key).
653 pub(super) fn provide_secret(&mut self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
654 let pos = ChannelMonitor::place_secret(idx);
656 let (old_secret, old_idx) = self.old_secrets[i as usize];
657 if ChannelMonitor::derive_secret(secret, pos, old_idx) != old_secret {
658 return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Previous secret did not match new one"));
661 if self.get_min_seen_secret() <= idx {
664 self.old_secrets[pos as usize] = (secret, idx);
666 // Prune HTLCs from the previous remote commitment tx so we don't generate failure/fulfill
667 // events for now-revoked/fulfilled HTLCs.
668 // TODO: We should probably consider whether we're really getting the next secret here.
669 if let Storage::Local { ref mut prev_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage {
670 if let Some(txid) = prev_remote_commitment_txid.take() {
671 for &mut (_, ref mut source) in self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get_mut(&txid).unwrap() {
677 if !self.payment_preimages.is_empty() {
678 let local_signed_commitment_tx = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx.as_ref().expect("Channel needs at least an initial commitment tx !");
679 let prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.as_ref();
680 let min_idx = self.get_min_seen_secret();
681 let remote_hash_commitment_number = &mut self.remote_hash_commitment_number;
683 self.payment_preimages.retain(|&k, _| {
684 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in &local_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs {
685 if k == htlc.payment_hash {
689 if let Some(prev_local_commitment_tx) = prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
690 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in prev_local_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
691 if k == htlc.payment_hash {
696 let contains = if let Some(cn) = remote_hash_commitment_number.get(&k) {
703 remote_hash_commitment_number.remove(&k);
712 /// Informs this monitor of the latest remote (ie non-broadcastable) commitment transaction.
713 /// The monitor watches for it to be broadcasted and then uses the HTLC information (and
714 /// possibly future revocation/preimage information) to claim outputs where possible.
715 /// We cache also the mapping hash:commitment number to lighten pruning of old preimages by watchtowers.
716 pub(super) fn provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, unsigned_commitment_tx: &Transaction, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>, commitment_number: u64, their_revocation_point: PublicKey) {
717 // TODO: Encrypt the htlc_outputs data with the single-hash of the commitment transaction
718 // so that a remote monitor doesn't learn anything unless there is a malicious close.
719 // (only maybe, sadly we cant do the same for local info, as we need to be aware of
721 for &(ref htlc, _) in &htlc_outputs {
722 self.remote_hash_commitment_number.insert(htlc.payment_hash, commitment_number);
725 let new_txid = unsigned_commitment_tx.txid();
726 log_trace!(self, "Tracking new remote commitment transaction with txid {} at commitment number {} with {} HTLC outputs", new_txid, commitment_number, htlc_outputs.len());
727 log_trace!(self, "New potential remote commitment transaction: {}", encode::serialize_hex(unsigned_commitment_tx));
728 if let Storage::Local { ref mut current_remote_commitment_txid, ref mut prev_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage {
729 *prev_remote_commitment_txid = current_remote_commitment_txid.take();
730 *current_remote_commitment_txid = Some(new_txid);
732 self.remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(new_txid, htlc_outputs);
733 self.current_remote_commitment_number = commitment_number;
734 //TODO: Merge this into the other per-remote-transaction output storage stuff
735 match self.their_cur_revocation_points {
736 Some(old_points) => {
737 if old_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 {
738 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0, old_points.1, Some(their_revocation_point)));
739 } else if old_points.0 == commitment_number + 2 {
740 if let Some(old_second_point) = old_points.2 {
741 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0 - 1, old_second_point, Some(their_revocation_point)));
743 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None));
746 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None));
750 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None));
755 /// Informs this monitor of the latest local (ie broadcastable) commitment transaction. The
756 /// monitor watches for timeouts and may broadcast it if we approach such a timeout. Thus, it
757 /// is important that any clones of this channel monitor (including remote clones) by kept
758 /// up-to-date as our local commitment transaction is updated.
759 /// Panics if set_their_to_self_delay has never been called.
760 /// Also update Storage with latest local per_commitment_point to derive local_delayedkey in
761 /// case of onchain HTLC tx
762 pub(super) fn provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, signed_commitment_tx: Transaction, local_keys: chan_utils::TxCreationKeys, feerate_per_kw: u64, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<(Signature, Signature)>, Option<HTLCSource>)>) {
763 assert!(self.their_to_self_delay.is_some());
764 self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx.take();
765 self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(LocalSignedTx {
766 txid: signed_commitment_tx.txid(),
767 tx: signed_commitment_tx,
768 revocation_key: local_keys.revocation_key,
769 a_htlc_key: local_keys.a_htlc_key,
770 b_htlc_key: local_keys.b_htlc_key,
771 delayed_payment_key: local_keys.a_delayed_payment_key,
776 if let Storage::Local { ref mut latest_per_commitment_point, .. } = self.key_storage {
777 *latest_per_commitment_point = Some(local_keys.per_commitment_point);
779 panic!("Channel somehow ended up with its internal ChannelMonitor being in Watchtower mode?");
783 /// Provides a payment_hash->payment_preimage mapping. Will be automatically pruned when all
784 /// commitment_tx_infos which contain the payment hash have been revoked.
785 pub(super) fn provide_payment_preimage(&mut self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_preimage: &PaymentPreimage) {
786 self.payment_preimages.insert(payment_hash.clone(), payment_preimage.clone());
789 /// Combines this ChannelMonitor with the information contained in the other ChannelMonitor.
790 /// After a successful call this ChannelMonitor is up-to-date and is safe to use to monitor the
791 /// chain for new blocks/transactions.
792 pub fn insert_combine(&mut self, mut other: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
793 match self.key_storage {
794 Storage::Local { ref funding_info, .. } => {
795 if funding_info.is_none() { return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Try to combine a Local monitor without funding_info")); }
796 let our_funding_info = funding_info;
797 if let Storage::Local { ref funding_info, .. } = other.key_storage {
798 if funding_info.is_none() { return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Try to combine a Local monitor without funding_info")); }
799 // We should be able to compare the entire funding_txo, but in fuzztarget it's trivially
800 // easy to collide the funding_txo hash and have a different scriptPubKey.
801 if funding_info.as_ref().unwrap().0 != our_funding_info.as_ref().unwrap().0 {
802 return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Funding transaction outputs are not identical!"));
805 return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Try to combine a Local monitor with a Watchtower one !"));
808 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
809 if let Storage::Watchtower { .. } = other.key_storage {
812 return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Try to combine a Watchtower monitor with a Local one !"));
816 let other_min_secret = other.get_min_seen_secret();
817 let our_min_secret = self.get_min_seen_secret();
818 if our_min_secret > other_min_secret {
819 self.provide_secret(other_min_secret, other.get_secret(other_min_secret).unwrap())?;
821 if let Some(ref local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
822 if let Some(ref other_local_tx) = other.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
823 let our_commitment_number = 0xffffffffffff - ((((local_tx.tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (local_tx.tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor);
824 let other_commitment_number = 0xffffffffffff - ((((other_local_tx.tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (other_local_tx.tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ other.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor);
825 if our_commitment_number >= other_commitment_number {
826 self.key_storage = other.key_storage;
830 // TODO: We should use current_remote_commitment_number and the commitment number out of
831 // local transactions to decide how to merge
832 if our_min_secret >= other_min_secret {
833 self.their_cur_revocation_points = other.their_cur_revocation_points;
834 for (txid, htlcs) in other.remote_claimable_outpoints.drain() {
835 self.remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, htlcs);
837 if let Some(local_tx) = other.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
838 self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(local_tx);
840 if let Some(local_tx) = other.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
841 self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(local_tx);
843 self.payment_preimages = other.payment_preimages;
846 self.current_remote_commitment_number = cmp::min(self.current_remote_commitment_number, other.current_remote_commitment_number);
850 /// Panics if commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor doesn't fit in 48 bits
851 pub(super) fn set_commitment_obscure_factor(&mut self, commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64) {
852 assert!(commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor < (1 << 48));
853 self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor = commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor;
856 /// Allows this monitor to scan only for transactions which are applicable. Note that this is
857 /// optional, without it this monitor cannot be used in an SPV client, but you may wish to
858 /// avoid this (or call unset_funding_info) on a monitor you wish to send to a watchtower as it
859 /// provides slightly better privacy.
860 /// It's the responsibility of the caller to register outpoint and script with passing the former
861 /// value as key to add_update_monitor.
862 pub(super) fn set_funding_info(&mut self, new_funding_info: (OutPoint, Script)) {
863 match self.key_storage {
864 Storage::Local { ref mut funding_info, .. } => {
865 *funding_info = Some(new_funding_info);
867 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
868 panic!("Channel somehow ended up with its internal ChannelMonitor being in Watchtower mode?");
873 /// We log these base keys at channel opening to being able to rebuild redeemscript in case of leaked revoked commit tx
874 pub(super) fn set_their_base_keys(&mut self, their_htlc_base_key: &PublicKey, their_delayed_payment_base_key: &PublicKey) {
875 self.their_htlc_base_key = Some(their_htlc_base_key.clone());
876 self.their_delayed_payment_base_key = Some(their_delayed_payment_base_key.clone());
879 pub(super) fn set_their_to_self_delay(&mut self, their_to_self_delay: u16) {
880 self.their_to_self_delay = Some(their_to_self_delay);
883 pub(super) fn unset_funding_info(&mut self) {
884 match self.key_storage {
885 Storage::Local { ref mut funding_info, .. } => {
886 *funding_info = None;
888 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
889 panic!("Channel somehow ended up with its internal ChannelMonitor being in Watchtower mode?");
894 /// Gets the funding transaction outpoint of the channel this ChannelMonitor is monitoring for.
895 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
896 match self.key_storage {
897 Storage::Local { ref funding_info, .. } => {
899 &Some((outpoint, _)) => Some(outpoint),
903 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
909 /// Gets the sets of all outpoints which this ChannelMonitor expects to hear about spends of.
910 /// Generally useful when deserializing as during normal operation the return values of
911 /// block_connected are sufficient to ensure all relevant outpoints are being monitored (note
912 /// that the get_funding_txo outpoint and transaction must also be monitored for!).
913 pub fn get_monitored_outpoints(&self) -> Vec<(Sha256dHash, u32, &Script)> {
914 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.len() * 2);
915 for (ref txid, &(_, ref outputs)) in self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
916 for (idx, output) in outputs.iter().enumerate() {
917 res.push(((*txid).clone(), idx as u32, output));
923 /// Serializes into a vec, with various modes for the exposed pub fns
924 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W, for_local_storage: bool) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
925 //TODO: We still write out all the serialization here manually instead of using the fancy
926 //serialization framework we have, we should migrate things over to it.
927 writer.write_all(&[SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
928 writer.write_all(&[MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
930 // Set in initial Channel-object creation, so should always be set by now:
931 U48(self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor).write(writer)?;
933 macro_rules! write_option {
940 &None => 0u8.write(writer)?,
945 match self.key_storage {
946 Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref payment_base_key, ref shutdown_pubkey, ref prev_latest_per_commitment_point, ref latest_per_commitment_point, ref funding_info, ref current_remote_commitment_txid, ref prev_remote_commitment_txid } => {
947 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
948 writer.write_all(&revocation_base_key[..])?;
949 writer.write_all(&htlc_base_key[..])?;
950 writer.write_all(&delayed_payment_base_key[..])?;
951 writer.write_all(&payment_base_key[..])?;
952 writer.write_all(&shutdown_pubkey.serialize())?;
953 prev_latest_per_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
954 latest_per_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
956 &Some((ref outpoint, ref script)) => {
957 writer.write_all(&outpoint.txid[..])?;
958 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(outpoint.index))?;
959 script.write(writer)?;
962 debug_assert!(false, "Try to serialize a useless Local monitor !");
965 current_remote_commitment_txid.write(writer)?;
966 prev_remote_commitment_txid.write(writer)?;
968 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => unimplemented!(),
971 writer.write_all(&self.their_htlc_base_key.as_ref().unwrap().serialize())?;
972 writer.write_all(&self.their_delayed_payment_base_key.as_ref().unwrap().serialize())?;
974 match self.their_cur_revocation_points {
975 Some((idx, pubkey, second_option)) => {
976 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(idx))?;
977 writer.write_all(&pubkey.serialize())?;
978 match second_option {
979 Some(second_pubkey) => {
980 writer.write_all(&second_pubkey.serialize())?;
983 writer.write_all(&[0; 33])?;
988 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(0))?;
992 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.our_to_self_delay))?;
993 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap()))?;
995 for &(ref secret, ref idx) in self.old_secrets.iter() {
996 writer.write_all(secret)?;
997 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*idx))?;
1000 macro_rules! serialize_htlc_in_commitment {
1001 ($htlc_output: expr) => {
1002 writer.write_all(&[$htlc_output.offered as u8; 1])?;
1003 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc_output.amount_msat))?;
1004 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array($htlc_output.cltv_expiry))?;
1005 writer.write_all(&$htlc_output.payment_hash.0[..])?;
1006 $htlc_output.transaction_output_index.write(writer)?;
1010 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_claimable_outpoints.len() as u64))?;
1011 for (ref txid, ref htlc_infos) in self.remote_claimable_outpoints.iter() {
1012 writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
1013 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc_infos.len() as u64))?;
1014 for &(ref htlc_output, ref htlc_source) in htlc_infos.iter() {
1015 serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output);
1016 write_option!(htlc_source);
1020 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.len() as u64))?;
1021 for (ref txid, &(commitment_number, ref txouts)) in self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
1022 writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
1023 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(commitment_number))?;
1024 (txouts.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
1025 for script in txouts.iter() {
1026 script.write(writer)?;
1030 if for_local_storage {
1031 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_hash_commitment_number.len() as u64))?;
1032 for (ref payment_hash, commitment_number) in self.remote_hash_commitment_number.iter() {
1033 writer.write_all(&payment_hash.0[..])?;
1034 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(*commitment_number))?;
1037 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(0))?;
1040 macro_rules! serialize_local_tx {
1041 ($local_tx: expr) => {
1042 if let Err(e) = $local_tx.tx.consensus_encode(&mut WriterWriteAdaptor(writer)) {
1044 encode::Error::Io(e) => return Err(e),
1045 _ => panic!("local tx must have been well-formed!"),
1049 writer.write_all(&$local_tx.revocation_key.serialize())?;
1050 writer.write_all(&$local_tx.a_htlc_key.serialize())?;
1051 writer.write_all(&$local_tx.b_htlc_key.serialize())?;
1052 writer.write_all(&$local_tx.delayed_payment_key.serialize())?;
1054 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($local_tx.feerate_per_kw))?;
1055 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($local_tx.htlc_outputs.len() as u64))?;
1056 for &(ref htlc_output, ref sigs, ref htlc_source) in $local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1057 serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output);
1058 if let &Some((ref their_sig, ref our_sig)) = sigs {
1060 writer.write_all(&their_sig.serialize_compact())?;
1061 writer.write_all(&our_sig.serialize_compact())?;
1065 write_option!(htlc_source);
1070 if let Some(ref prev_local_tx) = self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1071 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
1072 serialize_local_tx!(prev_local_tx);
1074 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
1077 if let Some(ref cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1078 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
1079 serialize_local_tx!(cur_local_tx);
1081 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
1084 if for_local_storage {
1085 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(self.current_remote_commitment_number))?;
1087 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(0))?;
1090 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.payment_preimages.len() as u64))?;
1091 for payment_preimage in self.payment_preimages.values() {
1092 writer.write_all(&payment_preimage.0[..])?;
1095 self.last_block_hash.write(writer)?;
1096 self.destination_script.write(writer)?;
1098 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf.len() as u64))?;
1099 for (ref outpoint, claim_tx_data) in self.our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf.iter() {
1100 outpoint.write(writer)?;
1101 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(claim_tx_data.0))?;
1102 match claim_tx_data.1 {
1103 TxMaterial::Revoked { ref script, ref pubkey, ref key, ref is_htlc, ref amount} => {
1104 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
1105 script.write(writer)?;
1106 pubkey.write(writer)?;
1107 writer.write_all(&key[..])?;
1109 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
1111 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
1113 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*amount))?;
1115 TxMaterial::RemoteHTLC { ref script, ref key, ref preimage, ref amount } => {
1116 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
1117 script.write(writer)?;
1119 preimage.write(writer)?;
1120 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*amount))?;
1122 TxMaterial::LocalHTLC { ref script, ref sigs, ref preimage, ref amount } => {
1123 writer.write_all(&[2; 1])?;
1124 script.write(writer)?;
1125 sigs.0.write(writer)?;
1126 sigs.1.write(writer)?;
1127 preimage.write(writer)?;
1128 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*amount))?;
1131 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(claim_tx_data.2))?;
1134 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.len() as u64))?;
1135 for (ref target, ref events) in self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.iter() {
1136 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(**target))?;
1137 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(events.len() as u64))?;
1138 for ev in events.iter() {
1140 OnchainEvent::Claim { ref outpoint } => {
1141 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
1142 outpoint.write(writer)?;
1144 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
1145 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
1146 htlc_update.0.write(writer)?;
1147 htlc_update.1.write(writer)?;
1156 /// Writes this monitor into the given writer, suitable for writing to disk.
1158 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor), which
1159 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
1160 /// the "reorg path" (ie not just starting at the same height but starting at the highest
1161 /// common block that appears on your best chain as well as on the chain which contains the
1162 /// last block hash returned) upon deserializing the object!
1163 pub fn write_for_disk<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
1164 self.write(writer, true)
1167 /// Encodes this monitor into the given writer, suitable for sending to a remote watchtower
1169 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor), which
1170 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
1171 /// the "reorg path" (ie not just starting at the same height but starting at the highest
1172 /// common block that appears on your best chain as well as on the chain which contains the
1173 /// last block hash returned) upon deserializing the object!
1174 pub fn write_for_watchtower<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
1175 self.write(writer, false)
1178 /// Can only fail if idx is < get_min_seen_secret
1179 pub(super) fn get_secret(&self, idx: u64) -> Option<[u8; 32]> {
1180 for i in 0..self.old_secrets.len() {
1181 if (idx & (!((1 << i) - 1))) == self.old_secrets[i].1 {
1182 return Some(ChannelMonitor::derive_secret(self.old_secrets[i].0, i as u8, idx))
1185 assert!(idx < self.get_min_seen_secret());
1189 pub(super) fn get_min_seen_secret(&self) -> u64 {
1190 //TODO This can be optimized?
1191 let mut min = 1 << 48;
1192 for &(_, idx) in self.old_secrets.iter() {
1200 pub(super) fn get_cur_remote_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
1201 self.current_remote_commitment_number
1204 pub(super) fn get_cur_local_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
1205 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1206 0xffff_ffff_ffff - ((((local_tx.tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (local_tx.tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor)
1207 } else { 0xffff_ffff_ffff }
1210 /// Attempts to claim a remote commitment transaction's outputs using the revocation key and
1211 /// data in remote_claimable_outpoints. Will directly claim any HTLC outputs which expire at a
1212 /// height > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER. In any case, will install monitoring for
1213 /// HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions.
1214 /// Return updates for HTLC pending in the channel and failed automatically by the broadcast of
1215 /// revoked remote commitment tx
1216 fn check_spend_remote_transaction(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator) -> (Vec<Transaction>, (Sha256dHash, Vec<TxOut>), Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>) {
1217 // Most secp and related errors trying to create keys means we have no hope of constructing
1218 // a spend transaction...so we return no transactions to broadcast
1219 let mut txn_to_broadcast = Vec::new();
1220 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
1221 let mut spendable_outputs = Vec::new();
1223 let commitment_txid = tx.txid(); //TODO: This is gonna be a performance bottleneck for watchtowers!
1224 let per_commitment_option = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(&commitment_txid);
1226 macro_rules! ignore_error {
1227 ( $thing : expr ) => {
1230 Err(_) => return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs)
1235 let commitment_number = 0xffffffffffff - ((((tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor);
1236 if commitment_number >= self.get_min_seen_secret() {
1237 let secret = self.get_secret(commitment_number).unwrap();
1238 let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secret));
1239 let (revocation_pubkey, b_htlc_key, local_payment_key) = match self.key_storage {
1240 Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, ref payment_base_key, .. } => {
1241 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
1242 (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_base_key))),
1243 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &htlc_base_key))),
1244 Some(ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &payment_base_key))))
1246 Storage::Watchtower { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
1247 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
1248 (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &revocation_base_key)),
1249 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &htlc_base_key)),
1253 let delayed_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key), &self.their_delayed_payment_base_key.unwrap()));
1254 let a_htlc_key = match self.their_htlc_base_key {
1255 None => return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs),
1256 Some(their_htlc_base_key) => ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key), &their_htlc_base_key)),
1259 let revokeable_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey, self.our_to_self_delay, &delayed_key);
1260 let revokeable_p2wsh = revokeable_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
1262 let local_payment_p2wpkh = if let Some(payment_key) = local_payment_key {
1263 // Note that the Network here is ignored as we immediately drop the address for the
1264 // script_pubkey version.
1265 let payment_hash160 = Hash160::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &payment_key).serialize());
1266 Some(Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&payment_hash160[..]).into_script())
1269 let mut total_value = 0;
1270 let mut inputs = Vec::new();
1271 let mut inputs_info = Vec::new();
1272 let mut inputs_desc = Vec::new();
1274 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
1275 if outp.script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh {
1277 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
1278 txid: commitment_txid,
1281 script_sig: Script::new(),
1282 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
1283 witness: Vec::new(),
1285 inputs_desc.push(InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput);
1286 inputs_info.push((None, outp.value));
1287 total_value += outp.value;
1288 } else if Some(&outp.script_pubkey) == local_payment_p2wpkh.as_ref() {
1289 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WPKH {
1290 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: commitment_txid, vout: idx as u32 },
1291 key: local_payment_key.unwrap(),
1292 output: outp.clone(),
1297 macro_rules! sign_input {
1298 ($sighash_parts: expr, $input: expr, $htlc_idx: expr, $amount: expr) => {
1300 let (sig, redeemscript, revocation_key) = match self.key_storage {
1301 Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
1302 let redeemscript = if $htlc_idx.is_none() { revokeable_redeemscript.clone() } else {
1303 let htlc = &per_commitment_option.unwrap()[$htlc_idx.unwrap()].0;
1304 chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey)
1306 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&$sighash_parts.sighash_all(&$input, &redeemscript, $amount)[..]);
1307 let revocation_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key, &revocation_base_key));
1308 (self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &revocation_key), redeemscript, revocation_key)
1310 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
1314 $input.witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
1315 $input.witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1316 if $htlc_idx.is_none() {
1317 $input.witness.push(vec!(1));
1319 $input.witness.push(revocation_pubkey.serialize().to_vec());
1321 $input.witness.push(redeemscript.clone().into_bytes());
1322 (redeemscript, revocation_key)
1327 if let Some(ref per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
1328 inputs.reserve_exact(per_commitment_data.len());
1330 for (idx, &(ref htlc, _)) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() {
1331 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
1332 let expected_script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey);
1333 if transaction_output_index as usize >= tx.output.len() ||
1334 tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 ||
1335 tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].script_pubkey != expected_script.to_v0_p2wsh() {
1336 return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs); // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user
1339 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
1340 txid: commitment_txid,
1341 vout: transaction_output_index,
1343 script_sig: Script::new(),
1344 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
1345 witness: Vec::new(),
1347 if htlc.cltv_expiry > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER {
1349 inputs_desc.push(if htlc.offered { InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC } else { InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC });
1350 inputs_info.push((Some(idx), tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value));
1351 total_value += tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value;
1353 let mut single_htlc_tx = Transaction {
1357 output: vec!(TxOut {
1358 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1359 value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1362 let predicted_weight = single_htlc_tx.get_weight() + Self::get_witnesses_weight(&[if htlc.offered { InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC } else { InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC }]);
1363 let mut used_feerate;
1364 if subtract_high_prio_fee!(self, fee_estimator, single_htlc_tx.output[0].value, predicted_weight, tx.txid(), used_feerate) {
1365 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&single_htlc_tx);
1366 let (redeemscript, revocation_key) = sign_input!(sighash_parts, single_htlc_tx.input[0], Some(idx), htlc.amount_msat / 1000);
1367 assert!(predicted_weight >= single_htlc_tx.get_weight());
1368 match self.our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf.entry(single_htlc_tx.input[0].previous_output.clone()) {
1369 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
1370 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert((height + 3, TxMaterial::Revoked { script: redeemscript, pubkey: Some(revocation_pubkey), key: revocation_key, is_htlc: true, amount: htlc.amount_msat / 1000 }, used_feerate)); }
1372 txn_to_broadcast.push(single_htlc_tx);
1379 if !inputs.is_empty() || !txn_to_broadcast.is_empty() || per_commitment_option.is_some() { // ie we're confident this is actually ours
1380 // We're definitely a remote commitment transaction!
1381 log_trace!(self, "Got broadcast of revoked remote commitment transaction, generating general spend tx with {} inputs and {} other txn to broadcast", inputs.len(), txn_to_broadcast.len());
1382 watch_outputs.append(&mut tx.output.clone());
1383 self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, (commitment_number, tx.output.iter().map(|output| { output.script_pubkey.clone() }).collect()));
1385 macro_rules! check_htlc_fails {
1386 ($txid: expr, $commitment_tx: expr) => {
1387 if let Some(ref outpoints) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get($txid) {
1388 for &(ref htlc, ref source_option) in outpoints.iter() {
1389 if let &Some(ref source) = source_option {
1390 log_info!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} remote commitment tx due to broadcast of revoked remote commitment transaction, waiting for confirmation (at height {})", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx, height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
1391 match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
1392 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
1393 let e = entry.get_mut();
1394 e.retain(|ref event| {
1396 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
1397 return htlc_update.0 != **source
1402 e.push(OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ((**source).clone(), htlc.payment_hash.clone())});
1404 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1405 entry.insert(vec![OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ((**source).clone(), htlc.payment_hash.clone())}]);
1413 if let Storage::Local { ref current_remote_commitment_txid, ref prev_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage {
1414 if let &Some(ref txid) = current_remote_commitment_txid {
1415 check_htlc_fails!(txid, "current");
1417 if let &Some(ref txid) = prev_remote_commitment_txid {
1418 check_htlc_fails!(txid, "remote");
1421 // No need to check local commitment txn, symmetric HTLCSource must be present as per-htlc data on remote commitment tx
1423 if inputs.is_empty() { return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs); } // Nothing to be done...probably a false positive/local tx
1425 let outputs = vec!(TxOut {
1426 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1429 let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
1436 let predicted_weight = spend_tx.get_weight() + Self::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_desc[..]);
1438 let mut used_feerate;
1439 if !subtract_high_prio_fee!(self, fee_estimator, spend_tx.output[0].value, predicted_weight, tx.txid(), used_feerate) {
1440 return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs);
1443 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx);
1445 for (input, info) in spend_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(inputs_info.iter()) {
1446 let (redeemscript, revocation_key) = sign_input!(sighash_parts, input, info.0, info.1);
1447 match self.our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf.entry(input.previous_output.clone()) {
1448 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
1449 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert((height + 3, TxMaterial::Revoked { script: redeemscript, pubkey: if info.0.is_some() { Some(revocation_pubkey) } else { None }, key: revocation_key, is_htlc: if info.0.is_some() { true } else { false }, amount: info.1 }, used_feerate)); }
1452 assert!(predicted_weight >= spend_tx.get_weight());
1454 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
1455 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: spend_tx.txid(), vout: 0 },
1456 output: spend_tx.output[0].clone(),
1458 txn_to_broadcast.push(spend_tx);
1459 } else if let Some(per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
1460 // While this isn't useful yet, there is a potential race where if a counterparty
1461 // revokes a state at the same time as the commitment transaction for that state is
1462 // confirmed, and the watchtower receives the block before the user, the user could
1463 // upload a new ChannelMonitor with the revocation secret but the watchtower has
1464 // already processed the block, resulting in the remote_commitment_txn_on_chain entry
1465 // not being generated by the above conditional. Thus, to be safe, we go ahead and
1467 watch_outputs.append(&mut tx.output.clone());
1468 self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, (commitment_number, tx.output.iter().map(|output| { output.script_pubkey.clone() }).collect()));
1470 log_trace!(self, "Got broadcast of non-revoked remote commitment transaction {}", commitment_txid);
1472 macro_rules! check_htlc_fails {
1473 ($txid: expr, $commitment_tx: expr, $id: tt) => {
1474 if let Some(ref latest_outpoints) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get($txid) {
1475 $id: for &(ref htlc, ref source_option) in latest_outpoints.iter() {
1476 if let &Some(ref source) = source_option {
1477 // Check if the HTLC is present in the commitment transaction that was
1478 // broadcast, but not if it was below the dust limit, which we should
1479 // fail backwards immediately as there is no way for us to learn the
1480 // payment_preimage.
1481 // Note that if the dust limit were allowed to change between
1482 // commitment transactions we'd want to be check whether *any*
1483 // broadcastable commitment transaction has the HTLC in it, but it
1484 // cannot currently change after channel initialization, so we don't
1486 for &(ref broadcast_htlc, ref broadcast_source) in per_commitment_data.iter() {
1487 if broadcast_htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() && Some(source) == broadcast_source.as_ref() {
1491 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} remote commitment tx due to broadcast of remote commitment transaction", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx);
1492 match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
1493 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
1494 let e = entry.get_mut();
1495 e.retain(|ref event| {
1497 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
1498 return htlc_update.0 != **source
1503 e.push(OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ((**source).clone(), htlc.payment_hash.clone())});
1505 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1506 entry.insert(vec![OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ((**source).clone(), htlc.payment_hash.clone())}]);
1514 if let Storage::Local { ref current_remote_commitment_txid, ref prev_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage {
1515 if let &Some(ref txid) = current_remote_commitment_txid {
1516 check_htlc_fails!(txid, "current", 'current_loop);
1518 if let &Some(ref txid) = prev_remote_commitment_txid {
1519 check_htlc_fails!(txid, "previous", 'prev_loop);
1523 if let Some(revocation_points) = self.their_cur_revocation_points {
1524 let revocation_point_option =
1525 if revocation_points.0 == commitment_number { Some(&revocation_points.1) }
1526 else if let Some(point) = revocation_points.2.as_ref() {
1527 if revocation_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 { Some(point) } else { None }
1529 if let Some(revocation_point) = revocation_point_option {
1530 let (revocation_pubkey, b_htlc_key) = match self.key_storage {
1531 Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
1532 (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_base_key))),
1533 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &htlc_base_key))))
1535 Storage::Watchtower { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
1536 (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &revocation_base_key)),
1537 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &htlc_base_key)))
1540 let a_htlc_key = match self.their_htlc_base_key {
1541 None => return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs),
1542 Some(their_htlc_base_key) => ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &their_htlc_base_key)),
1545 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
1546 if outp.script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh() {
1547 match self.key_storage {
1548 Storage::Local { ref payment_base_key, .. } => {
1549 if let Ok(local_key) = chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_point, &payment_base_key) {
1550 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WPKH {
1551 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: commitment_txid, vout: idx as u32 },
1553 output: outp.clone(),
1557 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {}
1559 break; // Only to_remote ouput is claimable
1563 let mut total_value = 0;
1564 let mut inputs = Vec::new();
1565 let mut inputs_desc = Vec::new();
1566 let mut inputs_info = Vec::new();
1568 macro_rules! sign_input {
1569 ($sighash_parts: expr, $input: expr, $amount: expr, $preimage: expr) => {
1571 let (sig, redeemscript, htlc_key) = match self.key_storage {
1572 Storage::Local { ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
1573 let htlc = &per_commitment_option.unwrap()[$input.sequence as usize].0;
1574 let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey);
1575 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&$sighash_parts.sighash_all(&$input, &redeemscript, $amount)[..]);
1576 let htlc_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &htlc_base_key));
1577 (self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &htlc_key), redeemscript, htlc_key)
1579 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
1583 $input.witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
1584 $input.witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1585 $input.witness.push($preimage);
1586 $input.witness.push(redeemscript.clone().into_bytes());
1587 (redeemscript, htlc_key)
1592 for (idx, &(ref htlc, _)) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() {
1593 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
1594 let expected_script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey);
1595 if transaction_output_index as usize >= tx.output.len() ||
1596 tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 ||
1597 tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].script_pubkey != expected_script.to_v0_p2wsh() {
1598 return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs); // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user
1600 if let Some(payment_preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
1602 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
1603 txid: commitment_txid,
1604 vout: transaction_output_index,
1606 script_sig: Script::new(),
1607 sequence: idx as u32, // reset to 0xfffffffd in sign_input
1608 witness: Vec::new(),
1610 if htlc.cltv_expiry > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER {
1612 inputs_desc.push(if htlc.offered { InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC } else { InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC });
1613 inputs_info.push((payment_preimage, tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value));
1614 total_value += tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value;
1616 let mut single_htlc_tx = Transaction {
1620 output: vec!(TxOut {
1621 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1622 value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1625 let predicted_weight = single_htlc_tx.get_weight() + Self::get_witnesses_weight(&[if htlc.offered { InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC } else { InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC }]);
1626 let mut used_feerate;
1627 if subtract_high_prio_fee!(self, fee_estimator, single_htlc_tx.output[0].value, predicted_weight, tx.txid(), used_feerate) {
1628 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&single_htlc_tx);
1629 let (redeemscript, htlc_key) = sign_input!(sighash_parts, single_htlc_tx.input[0], htlc.amount_msat / 1000, payment_preimage.0.to_vec());
1630 assert!(predicted_weight >= single_htlc_tx.get_weight());
1631 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
1632 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: single_htlc_tx.txid(), vout: 0 },
1633 output: single_htlc_tx.output[0].clone(),
1635 match self.our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf.entry(single_htlc_tx.input[0].previous_output.clone()) {
1636 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
1637 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert((height + 3, TxMaterial::RemoteHTLC { script: redeemscript, key: htlc_key, preimage: Some(*payment_preimage), amount: htlc.amount_msat / 1000 }, used_feerate)); }
1639 txn_to_broadcast.push(single_htlc_tx);
1644 // TODO: If the HTLC has already expired, potentially merge it with the
1645 // rest of the claim transaction, as above.
1647 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
1648 txid: commitment_txid,
1649 vout: transaction_output_index,
1651 script_sig: Script::new(),
1652 sequence: idx as u32,
1653 witness: Vec::new(),
1655 let mut timeout_tx = Transaction {
1657 lock_time: htlc.cltv_expiry,
1659 output: vec!(TxOut {
1660 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1661 value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1664 let predicted_weight = timeout_tx.get_weight() + Self::get_witnesses_weight(&[InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC]);
1665 let mut used_feerate;
1666 if subtract_high_prio_fee!(self, fee_estimator, timeout_tx.output[0].value, predicted_weight, tx.txid(), used_feerate) {
1667 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&timeout_tx);
1668 let (redeemscript, htlc_key) = sign_input!(sighash_parts, timeout_tx.input[0], htlc.amount_msat / 1000, vec![0]);
1669 assert!(predicted_weight >= timeout_tx.get_weight());
1670 //TODO: track SpendableOutputDescriptor
1671 match self.our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf.entry(timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.clone()) {
1672 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
1673 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert((height + 3, TxMaterial::RemoteHTLC { script : redeemscript, key: htlc_key, preimage: None, amount: htlc.amount_msat / 1000 }, used_feerate)); }
1676 txn_to_broadcast.push(timeout_tx);
1681 if inputs.is_empty() { return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs); } // Nothing to be done...probably a false positive/local tx
1683 let outputs = vec!(TxOut {
1684 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1687 let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
1694 let mut predicted_weight = spend_tx.get_weight() + Self::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_desc[..]);
1696 let mut used_feerate;
1697 if !subtract_high_prio_fee!(self, fee_estimator, spend_tx.output[0].value, predicted_weight, tx.txid(), used_feerate) {
1698 return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs);
1701 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx);
1703 for (input, info) in spend_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(inputs_info.iter()) {
1704 let (redeemscript, htlc_key) = sign_input!(sighash_parts, input, info.1, (info.0).0.to_vec());
1705 match self.our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf.entry(input.previous_output.clone()) {
1706 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
1707 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert((height + 3, TxMaterial::RemoteHTLC { script: redeemscript, key: htlc_key, preimage: Some(*(info.0)), amount: info.1}, used_feerate)); }
1710 assert!(predicted_weight >= spend_tx.get_weight());
1711 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
1712 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: spend_tx.txid(), vout: 0 },
1713 output: spend_tx.output[0].clone(),
1715 txn_to_broadcast.push(spend_tx);
1720 (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs)
1723 /// Attempts to claim a remote HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout's outputs using the revocation key
1724 fn check_spend_remote_htlc(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, commitment_number: u64, height: u32, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator) -> (Option<Transaction>, Option<SpendableOutputDescriptor>) {
1725 if tx.input.len() != 1 || tx.output.len() != 1 {
1729 macro_rules! ignore_error {
1730 ( $thing : expr ) => {
1733 Err(_) => return (None, None)
1738 let secret = if let Some(secret) = self.get_secret(commitment_number) { secret } else { return (None, None); };
1739 let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secret));
1740 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
1741 let revocation_pubkey = match self.key_storage {
1742 Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
1743 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_base_key)))
1745 Storage::Watchtower { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
1746 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &revocation_base_key))
1749 let delayed_key = match self.their_delayed_payment_base_key {
1750 None => return (None, None),
1751 Some(their_delayed_payment_base_key) => ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &their_delayed_payment_base_key)),
1753 let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), &delayed_key);
1754 let revokeable_p2wsh = redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
1755 let htlc_txid = tx.txid(); //TODO: This is gonna be a performance bottleneck for watchtowers!
1757 let mut inputs = Vec::new();
1760 if tx.output[0].script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh { //HTLC transactions have one txin, one txout
1762 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
1766 script_sig: Script::new(),
1767 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
1768 witness: Vec::new(),
1770 amount = tx.output[0].value;
1773 if !inputs.is_empty() {
1774 let outputs = vec!(TxOut {
1775 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1779 let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
1785 let predicted_weight = spend_tx.get_weight() + Self::get_witnesses_weight(&[InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput]);
1786 let mut used_feerate;
1787 if !subtract_high_prio_fee!(self, fee_estimator, spend_tx.output[0].value, predicted_weight, tx.txid(), used_feerate) {
1788 return (None, None);
1791 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx);
1793 let (sig, revocation_key) = match self.key_storage {
1794 Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
1795 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash_parts.sighash_all(&spend_tx.input[0], &redeemscript, amount)[..]);
1796 let revocation_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key, &revocation_base_key));
1797 (self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &revocation_key), revocation_key)
1799 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
1803 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
1804 spend_tx.input[0].witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1805 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(vec!(1));
1806 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(redeemscript.clone().into_bytes());
1808 assert!(predicted_weight >= spend_tx.get_weight());
1809 let outpoint = BitcoinOutPoint { txid: spend_tx.txid(), vout: 0 };
1810 let output = spend_tx.output[0].clone();
1811 match self.our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf.entry(spend_tx.input[0].previous_output.clone()) {
1812 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
1813 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert((height + 3, TxMaterial::Revoked { script: redeemscript, pubkey: None, key: revocation_key, is_htlc: false, amount: tx.output[0].value }, used_feerate)); }
1815 (Some(spend_tx), Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput { outpoint, output }))
1816 } else { (None, None) }
1819 fn broadcast_by_local_state(&self, local_tx: &LocalSignedTx, per_commitment_point: &Option<PublicKey>, delayed_payment_base_key: &Option<SecretKey>, height: u32) -> (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>, Vec<TxOut>, Vec<(BitcoinOutPoint, (u32, TxMaterial, u64))>) {
1820 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
1821 let mut spendable_outputs = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
1822 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
1823 let mut pending_claims = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
1825 macro_rules! add_dynamic_output {
1826 ($father_tx: expr, $vout: expr) => {
1827 if let Some(ref per_commitment_point) = *per_commitment_point {
1828 if let Some(ref delayed_payment_base_key) = *delayed_payment_base_key {
1829 if let Ok(local_delayedkey) = chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base_key) {
1830 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WSH {
1831 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: $father_tx.txid(), vout: $vout },
1832 key: local_delayedkey,
1833 witness_script: chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&local_tx.revocation_key, self.our_to_self_delay, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key),
1834 to_self_delay: self.our_to_self_delay,
1835 output: $father_tx.output[$vout as usize].clone(),
1844 let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&local_tx.revocation_key, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), &local_tx.delayed_payment_key);
1845 let revokeable_p2wsh = redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
1846 for (idx, output) in local_tx.tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
1847 if output.script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh {
1848 add_dynamic_output!(local_tx.tx, idx as u32);
1853 for &(ref htlc, ref sigs, _) in local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1854 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
1855 if let &Some((ref their_sig, ref our_sig)) = sigs {
1857 log_trace!(self, "Broadcasting HTLC-Timeout transaction against local commitment transactions");
1858 let mut htlc_timeout_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&local_tx.txid, local_tx.feerate_per_kw, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), htlc, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key, &local_tx.revocation_key);
1860 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
1862 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(their_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
1863 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1864 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
1865 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1867 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new());
1868 let htlc_script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &local_tx.a_htlc_key, &local_tx.b_htlc_key, &local_tx.revocation_key);
1869 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(htlc_script.clone().into_bytes());
1871 add_dynamic_output!(htlc_timeout_tx, 0);
1872 pending_claims.push((htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.clone(), (height + 3, TxMaterial::LocalHTLC { script: htlc_script, sigs: (*their_sig, *our_sig), preimage: None, amount: htlc.amount_msat / 1000}, 0)));
1873 res.push(htlc_timeout_tx);
1875 if let Some(payment_preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
1876 log_trace!(self, "Broadcasting HTLC-Success transaction against local commitment transactions");
1877 let mut htlc_success_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&local_tx.txid, local_tx.feerate_per_kw, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), htlc, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key, &local_tx.revocation_key);
1879 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
1881 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(their_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
1882 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1883 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
1884 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1886 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(payment_preimage.0.to_vec());
1887 let htlc_script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &local_tx.a_htlc_key, &local_tx.b_htlc_key, &local_tx.revocation_key);
1888 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(htlc_script.clone().into_bytes());
1890 add_dynamic_output!(htlc_success_tx, 0);
1891 pending_claims.push((htlc_success_tx.input[0].previous_output.clone(), (height + 3, TxMaterial::LocalHTLC { script: htlc_script, sigs: (*their_sig, *our_sig), preimage: Some(*payment_preimage), amount: htlc.amount_msat / 1000}, 0)));
1892 res.push(htlc_success_tx);
1895 watch_outputs.push(local_tx.tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].clone());
1896 } else { panic!("Should have sigs for non-dust local tx outputs!") }
1900 (res, spendable_outputs, watch_outputs, pending_claims)
1903 /// Attempts to claim any claimable HTLCs in a commitment transaction which was not (yet)
1904 /// revoked using data in local_claimable_outpoints.
1905 /// Should not be used if check_spend_revoked_transaction succeeds.
1906 fn check_spend_local_transaction(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32) -> (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>, (Sha256dHash, Vec<TxOut>)) {
1907 let commitment_txid = tx.txid();
1908 let mut local_txn = Vec::new();
1909 let mut spendable_outputs = Vec::new();
1910 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
1912 macro_rules! wait_threshold_conf {
1913 ($height: expr, $source: expr, $commitment_tx: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
1914 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} local commitment tx due to broadcast of transaction, waiting confirmation (at height{})", log_bytes!($payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx, height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
1915 match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry($height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
1916 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
1917 let e = entry.get_mut();
1918 e.retain(|ref event| {
1920 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
1921 return htlc_update.0 != $source
1926 e.push(OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ($source, $payment_hash)});
1928 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1929 entry.insert(vec![OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ($source, $payment_hash)}]);
1935 macro_rules! append_onchain_update {
1936 ($updates: expr) => {
1937 local_txn.append(&mut $updates.0);
1938 spendable_outputs.append(&mut $updates.1);
1939 watch_outputs.append(&mut $updates.2);
1940 for claim in $updates.3 {
1941 match self.our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf.entry(claim.0) {
1942 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
1943 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(claim.1); }
1949 // HTLCs set may differ between last and previous local commitment txn, in case of one them hitting chain, ensure we cancel all HTLCs backward
1950 let mut is_local_tx = false;
1952 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1953 if local_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
1955 log_trace!(self, "Got latest local commitment tx broadcast, searching for available HTLCs to claim");
1956 match self.key_storage {
1957 Storage::Local { ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref latest_per_commitment_point, .. } => {
1958 append_onchain_update!(self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, latest_per_commitment_point, &Some(*delayed_payment_base_key), height));
1960 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
1961 append_onchain_update!(self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, &None, &None, height));
1966 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1967 if local_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
1969 log_trace!(self, "Got previous local commitment tx broadcast, searching for available HTLCs to claim");
1970 match self.key_storage {
1971 Storage::Local { ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref prev_latest_per_commitment_point, .. } => {
1972 append_onchain_update!(self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, prev_latest_per_commitment_point, &Some(*delayed_payment_base_key), height));
1974 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
1975 append_onchain_update!(self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, &None, &None, height));
1981 macro_rules! fail_dust_htlcs_after_threshold_conf {
1982 ($local_tx: expr) => {
1983 for &(ref htlc, _, ref source) in &$local_tx.htlc_outputs {
1984 if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_none() {
1985 if let &Some(ref source) = source {
1986 wait_threshold_conf!(height, source.clone(), "lastest", htlc.payment_hash.clone());
1994 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1995 fail_dust_htlcs_after_threshold_conf!(local_tx);
1997 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1998 fail_dust_htlcs_after_threshold_conf!(local_tx);
2002 (local_txn, spendable_outputs, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs))
2005 /// Generate a spendable output event when closing_transaction get registered onchain.
2006 fn check_spend_closing_transaction(&self, tx: &Transaction) -> Option<SpendableOutputDescriptor> {
2007 if tx.input[0].sequence == 0xFFFFFFFF && !tx.input[0].witness.is_empty() && tx.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len() == 71 {
2008 match self.key_storage {
2009 Storage::Local { ref shutdown_pubkey, .. } => {
2010 let our_channel_close_key_hash = Hash160::hash(&shutdown_pubkey.serialize());
2011 let shutdown_script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&our_channel_close_key_hash[..]).into_script();
2012 for (idx, output) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
2013 if shutdown_script == output.script_pubkey {
2014 return Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
2015 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), vout: idx as u32 },
2016 output: output.clone(),
2021 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
2022 //TODO: we need to ensure an offline client will generate the event when it
2023 // comes back online after only the watchtower saw the transaction
2030 /// Used by ChannelManager deserialization to broadcast the latest local state if it's copy of
2031 /// the Channel was out-of-date.
2032 pub(super) fn get_latest_local_commitment_txn(&self) -> Vec<Transaction> {
2033 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
2034 let mut res = vec![local_tx.tx.clone()];
2035 match self.key_storage {
2036 Storage::Local { ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref prev_latest_per_commitment_point, .. } => {
2037 res.append(&mut self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, prev_latest_per_commitment_point, &Some(*delayed_payment_base_key), 0).0);
2038 // We throw away the generated waiting_first_conf data as we aren't (yet) confirmed and we don't actually know what the caller wants to do.
2039 // The data will be re-generated and tracked in check_spend_local_transaction if we get a confirmation.
2041 _ => panic!("Can only broadcast by local channelmonitor"),
2049 fn block_connected(&mut self, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], height: u32, block_hash: &Sha256dHash, broadcaster: &BroadcasterInterface, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator)-> (Vec<(Sha256dHash, Vec<TxOut>)>, Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>, Vec<(HTLCSource, Option<PaymentPreimage>, PaymentHash)>) {
2050 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
2051 let mut spendable_outputs = Vec::new();
2052 let mut htlc_updated = Vec::new();
2053 for tx in txn_matched {
2054 if tx.input.len() == 1 {
2055 // Assuming our keys were not leaked (in which case we're screwed no matter what),
2056 // commitment transactions and HTLC transactions will all only ever have one input,
2057 // which is an easy way to filter out any potential non-matching txn for lazy
2059 let prevout = &tx.input[0].previous_output;
2060 let mut txn: Vec<Transaction> = Vec::new();
2061 let funding_txo = match self.key_storage {
2062 Storage::Local { ref funding_info, .. } => {
2063 funding_info.clone()
2065 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
2069 if funding_txo.is_none() || (prevout.txid == funding_txo.as_ref().unwrap().0.txid && prevout.vout == funding_txo.as_ref().unwrap().0.index as u32) {
2070 let (remote_txn, new_outputs, mut spendable_output) = self.check_spend_remote_transaction(tx, height, fee_estimator);
2072 spendable_outputs.append(&mut spendable_output);
2073 if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() {
2074 watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
2077 let (local_txn, mut spendable_output, new_outputs) = self.check_spend_local_transaction(tx, height);
2078 spendable_outputs.append(&mut spendable_output);
2080 if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() {
2081 watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
2084 if !funding_txo.is_none() && txn.is_empty() {
2085 if let Some(spendable_output) = self.check_spend_closing_transaction(tx) {
2086 spendable_outputs.push(spendable_output);
2090 if let Some(&(commitment_number, _)) = self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.get(&prevout.txid) {
2091 let (tx, spendable_output) = self.check_spend_remote_htlc(tx, commitment_number, height, fee_estimator);
2092 if let Some(tx) = tx {
2095 if let Some(spendable_output) = spendable_output {
2096 spendable_outputs.push(spendable_output);
2100 for tx in txn.iter() {
2101 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(tx);
2104 // While all commitment/HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions have one input, HTLCs
2105 // can also be resolved in a few other ways which can have more than one output. Thus,
2106 // we call is_resolving_htlc_output here outside of the tx.input.len() == 1 check.
2107 let mut updated = self.is_resolving_htlc_output(tx, height);
2108 if updated.len() > 0 {
2109 htlc_updated.append(&mut updated);
2111 for inp in &tx.input {
2112 if self.our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf.contains_key(&inp.previous_output) {
2113 match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
2114 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
2115 let e = entry.get_mut();
2116 e.retain(|ref event| {
2118 OnchainEvent::Claim { outpoint } => {
2119 return outpoint != inp.previous_output
2124 e.push(OnchainEvent::Claim { outpoint: inp.previous_output.clone()});
2126 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2127 entry.insert(vec![OnchainEvent::Claim { outpoint: inp.previous_output.clone()}]);
2133 let mut pending_claims = Vec::new();
2134 if let Some(ref cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
2135 if self.would_broadcast_at_height(height) {
2136 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&cur_local_tx.tx);
2137 match self.key_storage {
2138 Storage::Local { ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref latest_per_commitment_point, .. } => {
2139 let (txs, mut spendable_output, new_outputs, mut pending_txn) = self.broadcast_by_local_state(&cur_local_tx, latest_per_commitment_point, &Some(*delayed_payment_base_key), height);
2140 spendable_outputs.append(&mut spendable_output);
2141 pending_claims.append(&mut pending_txn);
2142 if !new_outputs.is_empty() {
2143 watch_outputs.push((cur_local_tx.txid.clone(), new_outputs));
2146 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
2149 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
2150 let (txs, mut spendable_output, new_outputs, mut pending_txn) = self.broadcast_by_local_state(&cur_local_tx, &None, &None, height);
2151 spendable_outputs.append(&mut spendable_output);
2152 pending_claims.append(&mut pending_txn);
2153 if !new_outputs.is_empty() {
2154 watch_outputs.push((cur_local_tx.txid.clone(), new_outputs));
2157 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
2163 for claim in pending_claims {
2164 match self.our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf.entry(claim.0) {
2165 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
2166 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(claim.1); }
2169 if let Some(events) = self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.remove(&height) {
2172 OnchainEvent::Claim { outpoint } => {
2173 self.our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf.remove(&outpoint);
2175 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update } => {
2176 log_trace!(self, "HTLC {} failure update has got enough confirmations to be passed upstream", log_bytes!((htlc_update.1).0));
2177 htlc_updated.push((htlc_update.0, None, htlc_update.1));
2182 //TODO: iter on buffered TxMaterial in our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf, if block timer is expired generate a bumped claim tx (RBF or CPFP accordingly)
2183 self.last_block_hash = block_hash.clone();
2184 (watch_outputs, spendable_outputs, htlc_updated)
2187 fn block_disconnected(&mut self, height: u32, block_hash: &Sha256dHash) {
2188 if let Some(_) = self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.remove(&(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1)) {
2190 //- htlc update there as failure-trigger tx (revoked commitment tx, non-revoked commitment tx, HTLC-timeout tx) has been disconnected
2191 //- our claim tx on a commitment tx output
2193 self.our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf.retain(|_, ref mut v| if v.0 == height + 3 { false } else { true });
2194 self.last_block_hash = block_hash.clone();
2197 pub(super) fn would_broadcast_at_height(&self, height: u32) -> bool {
2198 // We need to consider all HTLCs which are:
2199 // * in any unrevoked remote commitment transaction, as they could broadcast said
2200 // transactions and we'd end up in a race, or
2201 // * are in our latest local commitment transaction, as this is the thing we will
2202 // broadcast if we go on-chain.
2203 // Note that we consider HTLCs which were below dust threshold here - while they don't
2204 // strictly imply that we need to fail the channel, we need to go ahead and fail them back
2205 // to the source, and if we don't fail the channel we will have to ensure that the next
2206 // updates that peer sends us are update_fails, failing the channel if not. It's probably
2207 // easier to just fail the channel as this case should be rare enough anyway.
2208 macro_rules! scan_commitment {
2209 ($htlcs: expr, $local_tx: expr) => {
2210 for ref htlc in $htlcs {
2211 // For inbound HTLCs which we know the preimage for, we have to ensure we hit the
2212 // chain with enough room to claim the HTLC without our counterparty being able to
2213 // time out the HTLC first.
2214 // For outbound HTLCs which our counterparty hasn't failed/claimed, our primary
2215 // concern is being able to claim the corresponding inbound HTLC (on another
2216 // channel) before it expires. In fact, we don't even really care if our
2217 // counterparty here claims such an outbound HTLC after it expired as long as we
2218 // can still claim the corresponding HTLC. Thus, to avoid needlessly hitting the
2219 // chain when our counterparty is waiting for expiration to off-chain fail an HTLC
2220 // we give ourselves a few blocks of headroom after expiration before going
2221 // on-chain for an expired HTLC.
2222 // Note that, to avoid a potential attack whereby a node delays claiming an HTLC
2223 // from us until we've reached the point where we go on-chain with the
2224 // corresponding inbound HTLC, we must ensure that outbound HTLCs go on chain at
2225 // least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER blocks prior to the inbound HTLC.
2226 // aka outbound_cltv + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS == height - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
2227 // inbound_cltv == height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
2228 // outbound_cltv + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= inbound_cltv - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
2229 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= inbound_cltv - outbound_cltv
2230 // CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA <= inbound_cltv - outbound_cltv (by check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion)
2231 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA
2232 // The final, above, condition is checked for statically in channelmanager
2233 // with CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2.
2234 let htlc_outbound = $local_tx == htlc.offered;
2235 if ( htlc_outbound && htlc.cltv_expiry + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS <= height) ||
2236 (!htlc_outbound && htlc.cltv_expiry <= height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER && self.payment_preimages.contains_key(&htlc.payment_hash)) {
2237 log_info!(self, "Force-closing channel due to {} HTLC timeout, HTLC expiry is {}", if htlc_outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound "}, htlc.cltv_expiry);
2244 if let Some(ref cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
2245 scan_commitment!(cur_local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, _)| a), true);
2248 if let Storage::Local { ref current_remote_commitment_txid, ref prev_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage {
2249 if let &Some(ref txid) = current_remote_commitment_txid {
2250 if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(txid) {
2251 scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _)| a), false);
2254 if let &Some(ref txid) = prev_remote_commitment_txid {
2255 if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(txid) {
2256 scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _)| a), false);
2264 /// Check if any transaction broadcasted is resolving HTLC output by a success or timeout on a local
2265 /// or remote commitment tx, if so send back the source, preimage if found and payment_hash of resolved HTLC
2266 fn is_resolving_htlc_output(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32) -> Vec<(HTLCSource, Option<PaymentPreimage>, PaymentHash)> {
2267 let mut htlc_updated = Vec::new();
2269 'outer_loop: for input in &tx.input {
2270 let mut payment_data = None;
2271 let revocation_sig_claim = (input.witness.len() == 3 && input.witness[2].len() == OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT && input.witness[1].len() == 33)
2272 || (input.witness.len() == 3 && input.witness[2].len() == ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT && input.witness[1].len() == 33);
2273 let accepted_preimage_claim = input.witness.len() == 5 && input.witness[4].len() == ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT;
2274 let offered_preimage_claim = input.witness.len() == 3 && input.witness[2].len() == OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT;
2276 macro_rules! log_claim {
2277 ($tx_info: expr, $local_tx: expr, $htlc: expr, $source_avail: expr) => {
2278 // We found the output in question, but aren't failing it backwards
2279 // as we have no corresponding source and no valid remote commitment txid
2280 // to try a weak source binding with same-hash, same-value still-valid offered HTLC.
2281 // This implies either it is an inbound HTLC or an outbound HTLC on a revoked transaction.
2282 let outbound_htlc = $local_tx == $htlc.offered;
2283 if ($local_tx && revocation_sig_claim) ||
2284 (outbound_htlc && !$source_avail && (accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim)) {
2285 log_error!(self, "Input spending {} ({}:{}) in {} resolves {} HTLC with payment hash {} with {}!",
2286 $tx_info, input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, tx.txid(),
2287 if outbound_htlc { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0),
2288 if revocation_sig_claim { "revocation sig" } else { "preimage claim after we'd passed the HTLC resolution back" });
2290 log_info!(self, "Input spending {} ({}:{}) in {} resolves {} HTLC with payment hash {} with {}",
2291 $tx_info, input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, tx.txid(),
2292 if outbound_htlc { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0),
2293 if revocation_sig_claim { "revocation sig" } else if accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim { "preimage" } else { "timeout" });
2298 macro_rules! check_htlc_valid_remote {
2299 ($remote_txid: expr, $htlc_output: expr) => {
2300 if let &Some(txid) = $remote_txid {
2301 for &(ref pending_htlc, ref pending_source) in self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(&txid).unwrap() {
2302 if pending_htlc.payment_hash == $htlc_output.payment_hash && pending_htlc.amount_msat == $htlc_output.amount_msat {
2303 if let &Some(ref source) = pending_source {
2304 log_claim!("revoked remote commitment tx", false, pending_htlc, true);
2305 payment_data = Some(((**source).clone(), $htlc_output.payment_hash));
2314 macro_rules! scan_commitment {
2315 ($htlcs: expr, $tx_info: expr, $local_tx: expr) => {
2316 for (ref htlc_output, source_option) in $htlcs {
2317 if Some(input.previous_output.vout) == htlc_output.transaction_output_index {
2318 if let Some(ref source) = source_option {
2319 log_claim!($tx_info, $local_tx, htlc_output, true);
2320 // We have a resolution of an HTLC either from one of our latest
2321 // local commitment transactions or an unrevoked remote commitment
2322 // transaction. This implies we either learned a preimage, the HTLC
2323 // has timed out, or we screwed up. In any case, we should now
2324 // resolve the source HTLC with the original sender.
2325 payment_data = Some(((*source).clone(), htlc_output.payment_hash));
2326 } else if !$local_tx {
2327 if let Storage::Local { ref current_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage {
2328 check_htlc_valid_remote!(current_remote_commitment_txid, htlc_output);
2330 if payment_data.is_none() {
2331 if let Storage::Local { ref prev_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage {
2332 check_htlc_valid_remote!(prev_remote_commitment_txid, htlc_output);
2336 if payment_data.is_none() {
2337 log_claim!($tx_info, $local_tx, htlc_output, false);
2338 continue 'outer_loop;
2345 if let Some(ref current_local_signed_commitment_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
2346 if input.previous_output.txid == current_local_signed_commitment_tx.txid {
2347 scan_commitment!(current_local_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, ref b)| (a, b.as_ref())),
2348 "our latest local commitment tx", true);
2351 if let Some(ref prev_local_signed_commitment_tx) = self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
2352 if input.previous_output.txid == prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.txid {
2353 scan_commitment!(prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, ref b)| (a, b.as_ref())),
2354 "our previous local commitment tx", true);
2357 if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(&input.previous_output.txid) {
2358 scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, ref b)| (a, (b.as_ref().clone()).map(|boxed| &**boxed))),
2359 "remote commitment tx", false);
2362 // Check that scan_commitment, above, decided there is some source worth relaying an
2363 // HTLC resolution backwards to and figure out whether we learned a preimage from it.
2364 if let Some((source, payment_hash)) = payment_data {
2365 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
2366 if accepted_preimage_claim {
2367 payment_preimage.0.copy_from_slice(&input.witness[3]);
2368 htlc_updated.push((source, Some(payment_preimage), payment_hash));
2369 } else if offered_preimage_claim {
2370 payment_preimage.0.copy_from_slice(&input.witness[1]);
2371 htlc_updated.push((source, Some(payment_preimage), payment_hash));
2373 log_info!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} timeout by a spend tx, waiting for confirmation (at height{})", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2374 match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
2375 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
2376 let e = entry.get_mut();
2377 e.retain(|ref event| {
2379 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
2380 return htlc_update.0 != source
2385 e.push(OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: (source, payment_hash)});
2387 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2388 entry.insert(vec![OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: (source, payment_hash)}]);
2398 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
2400 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> ReadableArgs<R, Arc<Logger>> for (Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor) {
2401 fn read(reader: &mut R, logger: Arc<Logger>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
2402 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2403 macro_rules! unwrap_obj {
2407 Err(_) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2412 let _ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2413 let min_ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2414 if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION {
2415 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion);
2418 let commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor = <U48 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.0;
2420 let key_storage = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2422 let revocation_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
2423 let htlc_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
2424 let delayed_payment_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
2425 let payment_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
2426 let shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
2427 let prev_latest_per_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
2428 let latest_per_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
2429 // Technically this can fail and serialize fail a round-trip, but only for serialization of
2430 // barely-init'd ChannelMonitors that we can't do anything with.
2431 let outpoint = OutPoint {
2432 txid: Readable::read(reader)?,
2433 index: Readable::read(reader)?,
2435 let funding_info = Some((outpoint, Readable::read(reader)?));
2436 let current_remote_commitment_txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
2437 let prev_remote_commitment_txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
2439 revocation_base_key,
2441 delayed_payment_base_key,
2444 prev_latest_per_commitment_point,
2445 latest_per_commitment_point,
2447 current_remote_commitment_txid,
2448 prev_remote_commitment_txid,
2451 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2454 let their_htlc_base_key = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
2455 let their_delayed_payment_base_key = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
2457 let their_cur_revocation_points = {
2458 let first_idx = <U48 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.0;
2462 let first_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
2463 let second_point_slice: [u8; 33] = Readable::read(reader)?;
2464 if second_point_slice[0..32] == [0; 32] && second_point_slice[32] == 0 {
2465 Some((first_idx, first_point, None))
2467 Some((first_idx, first_point, Some(unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&second_point_slice)))))
2472 let our_to_self_delay: u16 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2473 let their_to_self_delay: Option<u16> = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
2475 let mut old_secrets = [([0; 32], 1 << 48); 49];
2476 for &mut (ref mut secret, ref mut idx) in old_secrets.iter_mut() {
2477 *secret = Readable::read(reader)?;
2478 *idx = Readable::read(reader)?;
2481 macro_rules! read_htlc_in_commitment {
2484 let offered: bool = Readable::read(reader)?;
2485 let amount_msat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2486 let cltv_expiry: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2487 let payment_hash: PaymentHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
2488 let transaction_output_index: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
2490 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
2491 offered, amount_msat, cltv_expiry, payment_hash, transaction_output_index
2497 let remote_claimable_outpoints_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2498 let mut remote_claimable_outpoints = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(remote_claimable_outpoints_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 64));
2499 for _ in 0..remote_claimable_outpoints_len {
2500 let txid: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
2501 let htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2502 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlcs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
2503 for _ in 0..htlcs_count {
2504 htlcs.push((read_htlc_in_commitment!(), <Option<HTLCSource> as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.map(|o: HTLCSource| Box::new(o))));
2506 if let Some(_) = remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, htlcs) {
2507 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
2511 let remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2512 let mut remote_commitment_txn_on_chain = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
2513 for _ in 0..remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len {
2514 let txid: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
2515 let commitment_number = <U48 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.0;
2516 let outputs_count = <u64 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?;
2517 let mut outputs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 8));
2518 for _ in 0..outputs_count {
2519 outputs.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
2521 if let Some(_) = remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(txid, (commitment_number, outputs)) {
2522 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
2526 let remote_hash_commitment_number_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2527 let mut remote_hash_commitment_number = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(remote_hash_commitment_number_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
2528 for _ in 0..remote_hash_commitment_number_len {
2529 let payment_hash: PaymentHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
2530 let commitment_number = <U48 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.0;
2531 if let Some(_) = remote_hash_commitment_number.insert(payment_hash, commitment_number) {
2532 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
2536 macro_rules! read_local_tx {
2539 let tx = match Transaction::consensus_decode(reader.by_ref()) {
2542 encode::Error::Io(ioe) => return Err(DecodeError::Io(ioe)),
2543 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2547 if tx.input.is_empty() {
2548 // Ensure tx didn't hit the 0-input ambiguity case.
2549 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
2552 let revocation_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
2553 let a_htlc_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
2554 let b_htlc_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
2555 let delayed_payment_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
2556 let feerate_per_kw: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2558 let htlcs_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2559 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlcs_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
2560 for _ in 0..htlcs_len {
2561 let htlc = read_htlc_in_commitment!();
2562 let sigs = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2564 1 => Some((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?)),
2565 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2567 htlcs.push((htlc, sigs, Readable::read(reader)?));
2572 tx, revocation_key, a_htlc_key, b_htlc_key, delayed_payment_key, feerate_per_kw,
2579 let prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2582 Some(read_local_tx!())
2584 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2587 let current_local_signed_commitment_tx = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2590 Some(read_local_tx!())
2592 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2595 let current_remote_commitment_number = <U48 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.0;
2597 let payment_preimages_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2598 let mut payment_preimages = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(payment_preimages_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
2599 for _ in 0..payment_preimages_len {
2600 let preimage: PaymentPreimage = Readable::read(reader)?;
2601 let hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
2602 if let Some(_) = payment_preimages.insert(hash, preimage) {
2603 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
2607 let last_block_hash: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
2608 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
2610 let our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2611 let mut our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
2612 for _ in 0..our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf_len {
2613 let outpoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
2614 let height_target = Readable::read(reader)?;
2615 let tx_material = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2617 let script = Readable::read(reader)?;
2618 let pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
2619 let key = Readable::read(reader)?;
2620 let is_htlc = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2623 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2625 let amount = Readable::read(reader)?;
2626 TxMaterial::Revoked {
2635 let script = Readable::read(reader)?;
2636 let key = Readable::read(reader)?;
2637 let preimage = Readable::read(reader)?;
2638 let amount = Readable::read(reader)?;
2639 TxMaterial::RemoteHTLC {
2647 let script = Readable::read(reader)?;
2648 let their_sig = Readable::read(reader)?;
2649 let our_sig = Readable::read(reader)?;
2650 let preimage = Readable::read(reader)?;
2651 let amount = Readable::read(reader)?;
2652 TxMaterial::LocalHTLC {
2654 sigs: (their_sig, our_sig),
2659 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2661 let last_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
2662 our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf.insert(outpoint, (height_target, tx_material, last_fee));
2665 let waiting_threshold_conf_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2666 let mut onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(waiting_threshold_conf_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
2667 for _ in 0..waiting_threshold_conf_len {
2668 let height_target = Readable::read(reader)?;
2669 let events_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2670 let mut events = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(events_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
2671 for _ in 0..events_len {
2672 let ev = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2674 let outpoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
2675 OnchainEvent::Claim {
2680 let htlc_source = Readable::read(reader)?;
2681 let hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
2682 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate {
2683 htlc_update: (htlc_source, hash)
2686 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2690 onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.insert(height_target, events);
2693 Ok((last_block_hash.clone(), ChannelMonitor {
2694 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor,
2697 their_htlc_base_key,
2698 their_delayed_payment_base_key,
2699 their_cur_revocation_points,
2702 their_to_self_delay,
2705 remote_claimable_outpoints,
2706 remote_commitment_txn_on_chain,
2707 remote_hash_commitment_number,
2709 prev_local_signed_commitment_tx,
2710 current_local_signed_commitment_tx,
2711 current_remote_commitment_number,
2717 our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf,
2719 onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf,
2731 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
2732 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
2733 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxIn, TxOut, SigHashType};
2734 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
2735 use bitcoin::util::bip143;
2736 use bitcoin_hashes::Hash;
2737 use bitcoin_hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
2738 use bitcoin_hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
2739 use bitcoin_hashes::hex::FromHex;
2741 use ln::channelmanager::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
2742 use ln::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, InputDescriptors};
2744 use ln::chan_utils::{HTLCOutputInCommitment, TxCreationKeys};
2745 use util::test_utils::TestLogger;
2746 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
2747 use secp256k1::Secp256k1;
2748 use rand::{thread_rng,Rng};
2752 fn test_per_commitment_storage() {
2753 // Test vectors from BOLT 3:
2754 let mut secrets: Vec<[u8; 32]> = Vec::new();
2755 let mut monitor: ChannelMonitor;
2756 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2757 let logger = Arc::new(TestLogger::new());
2759 macro_rules! test_secrets {
2761 let mut idx = 281474976710655;
2762 for secret in secrets.iter() {
2763 assert_eq!(monitor.get_secret(idx).unwrap(), *secret);
2766 assert_eq!(monitor.get_min_seen_secret(), idx + 1);
2767 assert!(monitor.get_secret(idx).is_none());
2772 // insert_secret correct sequence
2773 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
2776 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2777 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
2778 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2781 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2782 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
2783 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2786 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2787 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
2788 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2791 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2792 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
2793 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2796 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2797 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
2798 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2801 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2802 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
2803 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2806 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2807 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
2808 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2811 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2812 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
2813 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2818 // insert_secret #1 incorrect
2819 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
2822 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2823 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
2824 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2827 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2828 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
2829 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
2830 "Previous secret did not match new one");
2834 // insert_secret #2 incorrect (#1 derived from incorrect)
2835 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
2838 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2839 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
2840 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2843 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2844 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("dddc3a8d14fddf2b68fa8c7fbad2748274937479dd0f8930d5ebb4ab6bd866a3").unwrap());
2845 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2848 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2849 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
2850 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2853 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2854 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
2855 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
2856 "Previous secret did not match new one");
2860 // insert_secret #3 incorrect
2861 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
2864 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2865 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
2866 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2869 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2870 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
2871 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2874 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2875 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c51a18b13e8527e579ec56365482c62f180b7d5760b46e9477dae59e87ed423a").unwrap());
2876 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2879 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2880 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
2881 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
2882 "Previous secret did not match new one");
2886 // insert_secret #4 incorrect (1,2,3 derived from incorrect)
2887 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
2890 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2891 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
2892 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2895 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2896 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("dddc3a8d14fddf2b68fa8c7fbad2748274937479dd0f8930d5ebb4ab6bd866a3").unwrap());
2897 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2900 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2901 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c51a18b13e8527e579ec56365482c62f180b7d5760b46e9477dae59e87ed423a").unwrap());
2902 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2905 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2906 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("ba65d7b0ef55a3ba300d4e87af29868f394f8f138d78a7011669c79b37b936f4").unwrap());
2907 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2910 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2911 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
2912 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2915 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2916 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
2917 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2920 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2921 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
2922 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2925 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2926 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
2927 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
2928 "Previous secret did not match new one");
2932 // insert_secret #5 incorrect
2933 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
2936 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2937 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
2938 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2941 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2942 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
2943 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2946 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2947 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
2948 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2951 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2952 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
2953 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2956 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2957 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("631373ad5f9ef654bb3dade742d09504c567edd24320d2fcd68e3cc47e2ff6a6").unwrap());
2958 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2961 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2962 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
2963 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
2964 "Previous secret did not match new one");
2968 // insert_secret #6 incorrect (5 derived from incorrect)
2969 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
2972 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2973 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
2974 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2977 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2978 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
2979 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2982 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2983 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
2984 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2987 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2988 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
2989 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2992 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2993 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("631373ad5f9ef654bb3dade742d09504c567edd24320d2fcd68e3cc47e2ff6a6").unwrap());
2994 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2997 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2998 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("b7e76a83668bde38b373970155c868a653304308f9896692f904a23731224bb1").unwrap());
2999 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3002 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3003 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
3004 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3007 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3008 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
3009 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
3010 "Previous secret did not match new one");
3014 // insert_secret #7 incorrect
3015 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
3018 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3019 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
3020 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3023 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3024 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
3025 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3028 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3029 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
3030 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3033 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3034 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
3035 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3038 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3039 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
3040 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3043 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3044 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
3045 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3048 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3049 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("e7971de736e01da8ed58b94c2fc216cb1dca9e326f3a96e7194fe8ea8af6c0a3").unwrap());
3050 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3053 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3054 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
3055 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
3056 "Previous secret did not match new one");
3060 // insert_secret #8 incorrect
3061 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
3064 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3065 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
3066 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3069 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3070 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
3071 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3074 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3075 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
3076 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3079 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3080 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
3081 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3084 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3085 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
3086 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3089 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3090 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
3091 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3094 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3095 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
3096 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3099 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3100 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a7efbc61aac46d34f77778bac22c8a20c6a46ca460addc49009bda875ec88fa4").unwrap());
3101 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
3102 "Previous secret did not match new one");
3107 fn test_prune_preimages() {
3108 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3109 let logger = Arc::new(TestLogger::new());
3111 let dummy_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
3112 macro_rules! dummy_keys {
3116 per_commitment_point: dummy_key.clone(),
3117 revocation_key: dummy_key.clone(),
3118 a_htlc_key: dummy_key.clone(),
3119 b_htlc_key: dummy_key.clone(),
3120 a_delayed_payment_key: dummy_key.clone(),
3121 b_payment_key: dummy_key.clone(),
3126 let dummy_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
3128 let mut preimages = Vec::new();
3130 let mut rng = thread_rng();
3132 let mut preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
3133 rng.fill_bytes(&mut preimage.0[..]);
3134 let hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
3135 preimages.push((preimage, hash));
3139 macro_rules! preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs {
3140 ($preimages_slice: expr) => {
3142 let mut res = Vec::new();
3143 for (idx, preimage) in $preimages_slice.iter().enumerate() {
3144 res.push((HTLCOutputInCommitment {
3148 payment_hash: preimage.1.clone(),
3149 transaction_output_index: Some(idx as u32),
3156 macro_rules! preimages_to_local_htlcs {
3157 ($preimages_slice: expr) => {
3159 let mut inp = preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!($preimages_slice);
3160 let res: Vec<_> = inp.drain(..).map(|e| { (e.0, None, e.1) }).collect();
3166 macro_rules! test_preimages_exist {
3167 ($preimages_slice: expr, $monitor: expr) => {
3168 for preimage in $preimages_slice {
3169 assert!($monitor.payment_preimages.contains_key(&preimage.1));
3174 // Prune with one old state and a local commitment tx holding a few overlaps with the
3176 let mut monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
3177 monitor.set_their_to_self_delay(10);
3179 monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(dummy_tx.clone(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..10]));
3180 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[5..15]), 281474976710655, dummy_key);
3181 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[15..20]), 281474976710654, dummy_key);
3182 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[17..20]), 281474976710653, dummy_key);
3183 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[18..20]), 281474976710652, dummy_key);
3184 for &(ref preimage, ref hash) in preimages.iter() {
3185 monitor.provide_payment_preimage(hash, preimage);
3188 // Now provide a secret, pruning preimages 10-15
3189 let mut secret = [0; 32];
3190 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
3191 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secret.clone()).unwrap();
3192 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 15);
3193 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
3194 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[15..20], monitor);
3196 // Now provide a further secret, pruning preimages 15-17
3197 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
3198 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secret.clone()).unwrap();
3199 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 13);
3200 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
3201 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[17..20], monitor);
3203 // Now update local commitment tx info, pruning only element 18 as we still care about the
3204 // previous commitment tx's preimages too
3205 monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(dummy_tx.clone(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..5]));
3206 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
3207 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secret.clone()).unwrap();
3208 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 12);
3209 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
3210 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[18..20], monitor);
3212 // But if we do it again, we'll prune 5-10
3213 monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(dummy_tx.clone(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..3]));
3214 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
3215 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secret.clone()).unwrap();
3216 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 5);
3217 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..5], monitor);
3221 fn test_claim_txn_weight_computation() {
3222 // We test Claim txn weight, knowing that we want expected weigth and
3223 // not actual case to avoid sigs and time-lock delays hell variances.
3225 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3226 let privkey = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
3227 let pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &privkey);
3228 let mut sum_actual_sigs: u64 = 0;
3230 macro_rules! sign_input {
3231 ($sighash_parts: expr, $input: expr, $idx: expr, $amount: expr, $input_type: expr, $sum_actual_sigs: expr) => {
3232 let htlc = HTLCOutputInCommitment {
3233 offered: if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC || *$input_type == InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC { true } else { false },
3235 cltv_expiry: 2 << 16,
3236 payment_hash: PaymentHash([1; 32]),
3237 transaction_output_index: Some($idx),
3239 let redeem_script = if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput { chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&pubkey, 256, &pubkey) } else { chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, &pubkey, &pubkey, &pubkey) };
3240 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&$sighash_parts.sighash_all(&$input, &redeem_script, $amount)[..]);
3241 let sig = secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &privkey);
3242 $input.witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
3243 $input.witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
3244 sum_actual_sigs += $input.witness[0].len() as u64;
3245 if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput {
3246 $input.witness.push(vec!(1));
3247 } else if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC || *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC {
3248 $input.witness.push(pubkey.clone().serialize().to_vec());
3249 } else if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC {
3250 $input.witness.push(vec![0]);
3252 $input.witness.push(PaymentPreimage([1; 32]).0.to_vec());
3254 $input.witness.push(redeem_script.into_bytes());
3255 println!("witness[0] {}", $input.witness[0].len());
3256 println!("witness[1] {}", $input.witness[1].len());
3257 println!("witness[2] {}", $input.witness[2].len());
3261 let script_pubkey = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script();
3262 let txid = Sha256dHash::from_hex("56944c5d3f98413ef45cf54545538103cc9f298e0575820ad3591376e2e0f65d").unwrap();
3264 // Justice tx with 1 to_local, 2 revoked offered HTLCs, 1 revoked received HTLCs
3265 let mut claim_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
3267 claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
3268 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
3272 script_sig: Script::new(),
3273 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
3274 witness: Vec::new(),
3277 claim_tx.output.push(TxOut {
3278 script_pubkey: script_pubkey.clone(),
3281 let base_weight = claim_tx.get_weight();
3282 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&claim_tx);
3283 let inputs_des = vec![InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput, InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC, InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC, InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC];
3284 for (idx, inp) in claim_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(inputs_des.iter()).enumerate() {
3285 sign_input!(sighash_parts, inp.0, idx as u32, 0, inp.1, sum_actual_sigs);
3287 assert_eq!(base_weight + ChannelMonitor::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_des[..]), claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_sig */ (73 * inputs_des.len() as u64 - sum_actual_sigs));
3289 // Claim tx with 1 offered HTLCs, 3 received HTLCs
3290 claim_tx.input.clear();
3291 sum_actual_sigs = 0;
3293 claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
3294 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
3298 script_sig: Script::new(),
3299 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
3300 witness: Vec::new(),
3303 let base_weight = claim_tx.get_weight();
3304 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&claim_tx);
3305 let inputs_des = vec![InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC, InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC, InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC, InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC];
3306 for (idx, inp) in claim_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(inputs_des.iter()).enumerate() {
3307 sign_input!(sighash_parts, inp.0, idx as u32, 0, inp.1, sum_actual_sigs);
3309 assert_eq!(base_weight + ChannelMonitor::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_des[..]), claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_sig */ (73 * inputs_des.len() as u64 - sum_actual_sigs));
3311 // Justice tx with 1 revoked HTLC-Success tx output
3312 claim_tx.input.clear();
3313 sum_actual_sigs = 0;
3314 claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
3315 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
3319 script_sig: Script::new(),
3320 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
3321 witness: Vec::new(),
3323 let base_weight = claim_tx.get_weight();
3324 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&claim_tx);
3325 let inputs_des = vec![InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput];
3326 for (idx, inp) in claim_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(inputs_des.iter()).enumerate() {
3327 sign_input!(sighash_parts, inp.0, idx as u32, 0, inp.1, sum_actual_sigs);
3329 assert_eq!(base_weight + ChannelMonitor::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_des[..]), claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_isg */ (73 * inputs_des.len() as u64 - sum_actual_sigs));
3332 // Further testing is done in the ChannelManager integration tests.