1 //! The logic to monitor for on-chain transactions and create the relevant claim responses lives
4 //! ChannelMonitor objects are generated by ChannelManager in response to relevant
5 //! messages/actions, and MUST be persisted to disk (and, preferably, remotely) before progress can
6 //! be made in responding to certain messages, see ManyChannelMonitor for more.
8 //! Note that ChannelMonitors are an important part of the lightning trust model and a copy of the
9 //! latest ChannelMonitor must always be actively monitoring for chain updates (and no out-of-date
10 //! ChannelMonitors should do so). Thus, if you're building rust-lightning into an HSM or other
11 //! security-domain-separated system design, you should consider having multiple paths for
12 //! ChannelMonitors to get out of the HSM and onto monitoring devices.
14 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
15 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxIn,TxOut,SigHashType,Transaction};
16 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
17 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Script;
18 use bitcoin::network::serialize;
19 use bitcoin::util::hash::Sha256dHash;
20 use bitcoin::util::bip143;
22 use crypto::digest::Digest;
24 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Message,Signature};
25 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
28 use ln::msgs::{DecodeError, HandleError};
30 use ln::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment;
31 use chain::chaininterface::{ChainListener, ChainWatchInterface, BroadcasterInterface};
32 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
33 use chain::keysinterface::SpendableOutputDescriptor;
34 use util::logger::Logger;
35 use util::ser::{ReadableArgs, Writer};
36 use util::sha2::Sha256;
37 use util::{byte_utils, events};
39 use std::collections::HashMap;
40 use std::sync::{Arc,Mutex};
41 use std::{hash,cmp, mem};
43 /// An error enum representing a failure to persist a channel monitor update.
45 pub enum ChannelMonitorUpdateErr {
46 /// Used to indicate a temporary failure (eg connection to a watchtower failed, but is expected
47 /// to succeed at some point in the future).
49 /// Such a failure will "freeze" a channel, preventing us from revoking old states or
50 /// submitting new commitment transactions to the remote party.
51 /// ChannelManager::test_restore_channel_monitor can be used to retry the update(s) and restore
52 /// the channel to an operational state.
54 /// Note that continuing to operate when no copy of the updated ChannelMonitor could be
55 /// persisted is unsafe - if you failed to store the update on your own local disk you should
56 /// instead return PermanentFailure to force closure of the channel ASAP.
58 /// Even when a channel has been "frozen" updates to the ChannelMonitor can continue to occur
59 /// (eg if an inbound HTLC which we forwarded was claimed upstream resulting in us attempting
60 /// to claim it on this channel) and those updates must be applied wherever they can be. At
61 /// least one such updated ChannelMonitor must be persisted otherwise PermanentFailure should
62 /// be returned to get things on-chain ASAP using only the in-memory copy. Obviously updates to
63 /// the channel which would invalidate previous ChannelMonitors are not made when a channel has
66 /// Note that even if updates made after TemporaryFailure succeed you must still call
67 /// test_restore_channel_monitor to ensure you have the latest monitor and re-enable normal
68 /// channel operation.
70 /// Used to indicate no further channel monitor updates will be allowed (eg we've moved on to a
71 /// different watchtower and cannot update with all watchtowers that were previously informed
72 /// of this channel). This will force-close the channel in question.
76 /// Simple trait indicating ability to track a set of ChannelMonitors and multiplex events between
77 /// them. Generally should be implemented by keeping a local SimpleManyChannelMonitor and passing
78 /// events to it, while also taking any add_update_monitor events and passing them to some remote
81 /// Note that any updates to a channel's monitor *must* be applied to each instance of the
82 /// channel's monitor everywhere (including remote watchtowers) *before* this function returns. If
83 /// an update occurs and a remote watchtower is left with old state, it may broadcast transactions
84 /// which we have revoked, allowing our counterparty to claim all funds in the channel!
85 pub trait ManyChannelMonitor: Send + Sync {
86 /// Adds or updates a monitor for the given `funding_txo`.
88 /// Implementor must also ensure that the funding_txo outpoint is registered with any relevant
89 /// ChainWatchInterfaces such that the provided monitor receives block_connected callbacks with
91 fn add_update_monitor(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr>;
94 /// A simple implementation of a ManyChannelMonitor and ChainListener. Can be used to create a
95 /// watchtower or watch our own channels.
97 /// Note that you must provide your own key by which to refer to channels.
99 /// If you're accepting remote monitors (ie are implementing a watchtower), you must verify that
100 /// users cannot overwrite a given channel by providing a duplicate key. ie you should probably
101 /// index by a PublicKey which is required to sign any updates.
103 /// If you're using this for local monitoring of your own channels, you probably want to use
104 /// `OutPoint` as the key, which will give you a ManyChannelMonitor implementation.
105 pub struct SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
106 #[cfg(test)] // Used in ChannelManager tests to manipulate channels directly
107 pub monitors: Mutex<HashMap<Key, ChannelMonitor>>,
109 monitors: Mutex<HashMap<Key, ChannelMonitor>>,
110 chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>,
111 broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>,
112 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
115 impl<Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash> ChainListener for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
116 fn block_connected(&self, _header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], _indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) {
117 let mut new_events: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(0);
119 let monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
120 for monitor in monitors.values() {
121 let (txn_outputs, spendable_outputs) = monitor.block_connected(txn_matched, height, &*self.broadcaster);
122 if spendable_outputs.len() > 0 {
123 new_events.push(events::Event::SpendableOutputs {
124 outputs: spendable_outputs,
127 for (ref txid, ref outputs) in txn_outputs {
128 for (idx, output) in outputs.iter().enumerate() {
129 self.chain_monitor.install_watch_outpoint((txid.clone(), idx as u32), &output.script_pubkey);
134 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
135 pending_events.append(&mut new_events);
138 fn block_disconnected(&self, _: &BlockHeader) { }
141 impl<Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash + 'static> SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
142 /// Creates a new object which can be used to monitor several channels given the chain
143 /// interface with which to register to receive notifications.
144 pub fn new(chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>, broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>) -> Arc<SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key>> {
145 let res = Arc::new(SimpleManyChannelMonitor {
146 monitors: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
149 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
151 let weak_res = Arc::downgrade(&res);
152 res.chain_monitor.register_listener(weak_res);
156 /// Adds or udpates the monitor which monitors the channel referred to by the given key.
157 pub fn add_update_monitor_by_key(&self, key: Key, monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
158 let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
159 match monitors.get_mut(&key) {
160 Some(orig_monitor) => return orig_monitor.insert_combine(monitor),
163 match &monitor.funding_txo {
164 &None => self.chain_monitor.watch_all_txn(),
165 &Some((ref outpoint, ref script)) => {
166 self.chain_monitor.install_watch_tx(&outpoint.txid, script);
167 self.chain_monitor.install_watch_outpoint((outpoint.txid, outpoint.index as u32), script);
170 monitors.insert(key, monitor);
175 impl ManyChannelMonitor for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<OutPoint> {
176 fn add_update_monitor(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr> {
177 match self.add_update_monitor_by_key(funding_txo, monitor) {
179 Err(_) => Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure),
184 impl<Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash> events::EventsProvider for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
185 fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
186 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
187 let mut ret = Vec::new();
188 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut *pending_events);
193 /// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, don't try to claim it in a shared transaction,
194 /// instead claiming it in its own individual transaction.
195 const CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 12;
196 /// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, force-close the channel to broadcast the
197 /// HTLC-Success transaction.
198 /// In other words, this is an upper bound on how many blocks we think it can take us to get a
199 /// transaction confirmed (and we use it in a few more, equivalent, places).
200 pub(crate) const CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 6;
201 /// Number of blocks by which point we expect our counterparty to have seen new blocks on the
202 /// network and done a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance (+ we've updated all our
203 /// copies of ChannelMonitors, including watchtowers).
204 pub(crate) const HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS: u32 = 3;
206 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
209 revocation_base_key: SecretKey,
210 htlc_base_key: SecretKey,
211 delayed_payment_base_key: SecretKey,
212 prev_latest_per_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
213 latest_per_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
216 revocation_base_key: PublicKey,
217 htlc_base_key: PublicKey,
218 sigs: HashMap<Sha256dHash, Signature>,
222 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
223 struct LocalSignedTx {
224 /// txid of the transaction in tx, just used to make comparison faster
227 revocation_key: PublicKey,
228 a_htlc_key: PublicKey,
229 b_htlc_key: PublicKey,
230 delayed_payment_key: PublicKey,
232 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Signature, Signature)>,
235 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
236 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
238 /// A ChannelMonitor handles chain events (blocks connected and disconnected) and generates
239 /// on-chain transactions to ensure no loss of funds occurs.
241 /// You MUST ensure that no ChannelMonitors for a given channel anywhere contain out-of-date
242 /// information and are actively monitoring the chain.
243 pub struct ChannelMonitor {
244 funding_txo: Option<(OutPoint, Script)>,
245 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64,
247 key_storage: KeyStorage,
248 their_htlc_base_key: Option<PublicKey>,
249 their_delayed_payment_base_key: Option<PublicKey>,
250 // first is the idx of the first of the two revocation points
251 their_cur_revocation_points: Option<(u64, PublicKey, Option<PublicKey>)>,
253 our_to_self_delay: u16,
254 their_to_self_delay: Option<u16>,
256 old_secrets: [([u8; 32], u64); 49],
257 remote_claimable_outpoints: HashMap<Sha256dHash, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>>,
258 /// We cannot identify HTLC-Success or HTLC-Timeout transactions by themselves on the chain.
259 /// Nor can we figure out their commitment numbers without the commitment transaction they are
260 /// spending. Thus, in order to claim them via revocation key, we track all the remote
261 /// commitment transactions which we find on-chain, mapping them to the commitment number which
262 /// can be used to derive the revocation key and claim the transactions.
263 remote_commitment_txn_on_chain: Mutex<HashMap<Sha256dHash, u64>>,
264 /// Cache used to make pruning of payment_preimages faster.
265 /// Maps payment_hash values to commitment numbers for remote transactions for non-revoked
266 /// remote transactions (ie should remain pretty small).
267 /// Serialized to disk but should generally not be sent to Watchtowers.
268 remote_hash_commitment_number: HashMap<[u8; 32], u64>,
270 // We store two local commitment transactions to avoid any race conditions where we may update
271 // some monitors (potentially on watchtowers) but then fail to update others, resulting in the
272 // various monitors for one channel being out of sync, and us broadcasting a local
273 // transaction for which we have deleted claim information on some watchtowers.
274 prev_local_signed_commitment_tx: Option<LocalSignedTx>,
275 current_local_signed_commitment_tx: Option<LocalSignedTx>,
277 payment_preimages: HashMap<[u8; 32], [u8; 32]>,
279 destination_script: Script,
281 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>, //TODO: dedup this a bit...
284 impl Clone for ChannelMonitor {
285 fn clone(&self) -> Self {
287 funding_txo: self.funding_txo.clone(),
288 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor.clone(),
290 key_storage: self.key_storage.clone(),
291 their_htlc_base_key: self.their_htlc_base_key.clone(),
292 their_delayed_payment_base_key: self.their_delayed_payment_base_key.clone(),
293 their_cur_revocation_points: self.their_cur_revocation_points.clone(),
295 our_to_self_delay: self.our_to_self_delay,
296 their_to_self_delay: self.their_to_self_delay,
298 old_secrets: self.old_secrets.clone(),
299 remote_claimable_outpoints: self.remote_claimable_outpoints.clone(),
300 remote_commitment_txn_on_chain: Mutex::new((*self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.lock().unwrap()).clone()),
301 remote_hash_commitment_number: self.remote_hash_commitment_number.clone(),
303 prev_local_signed_commitment_tx: self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.clone(),
304 current_local_signed_commitment_tx: self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx.clone(),
306 payment_preimages: self.payment_preimages.clone(),
308 destination_script: self.destination_script.clone(),
309 secp_ctx: self.secp_ctx.clone(),
310 logger: self.logger.clone(),
315 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
316 /// Used only in testing and fuzztarget to check serialization roundtrips don't change the
317 /// underlying object
318 impl PartialEq for ChannelMonitor {
319 fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
320 if self.funding_txo != other.funding_txo ||
321 self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor != other.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor ||
322 self.key_storage != other.key_storage ||
323 self.their_htlc_base_key != other.their_htlc_base_key ||
324 self.their_delayed_payment_base_key != other.their_delayed_payment_base_key ||
325 self.their_cur_revocation_points != other.their_cur_revocation_points ||
326 self.our_to_self_delay != other.our_to_self_delay ||
327 self.their_to_self_delay != other.their_to_self_delay ||
328 self.remote_claimable_outpoints != other.remote_claimable_outpoints ||
329 self.remote_hash_commitment_number != other.remote_hash_commitment_number ||
330 self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx != other.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx ||
331 self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx != other.current_local_signed_commitment_tx ||
332 self.payment_preimages != other.payment_preimages ||
333 self.destination_script != other.destination_script
337 for (&(ref secret, ref idx), &(ref o_secret, ref o_idx)) in self.old_secrets.iter().zip(other.old_secrets.iter()) {
338 if secret != o_secret || idx != o_idx {
342 let us = self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.lock().unwrap();
343 let them = other.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.lock().unwrap();
349 impl ChannelMonitor {
350 pub(super) fn new(revocation_base_key: &SecretKey, delayed_payment_base_key: &SecretKey, htlc_base_key: &SecretKey, our_to_self_delay: u16, destination_script: Script, logger: Arc<Logger>) -> ChannelMonitor {
353 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: 0,
355 key_storage: KeyStorage::PrivMode {
356 revocation_base_key: revocation_base_key.clone(),
357 htlc_base_key: htlc_base_key.clone(),
358 delayed_payment_base_key: delayed_payment_base_key.clone(),
359 prev_latest_per_commitment_point: None,
360 latest_per_commitment_point: None,
362 their_htlc_base_key: None,
363 their_delayed_payment_base_key: None,
364 their_cur_revocation_points: None,
366 our_to_self_delay: our_to_self_delay,
367 their_to_self_delay: None,
369 old_secrets: [([0; 32], 1 << 48); 49],
370 remote_claimable_outpoints: HashMap::new(),
371 remote_commitment_txn_on_chain: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
372 remote_hash_commitment_number: HashMap::new(),
374 prev_local_signed_commitment_tx: None,
375 current_local_signed_commitment_tx: None,
377 payment_preimages: HashMap::new(),
378 destination_script: destination_script,
380 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
386 fn place_secret(idx: u64) -> u8 {
388 if idx & (1 << i) == (1 << i) {
396 fn derive_secret(secret: [u8; 32], bits: u8, idx: u64) -> [u8; 32] {
397 let mut res: [u8; 32] = secret;
399 let bitpos = bits - 1 - i;
400 if idx & (1 << bitpos) == (1 << bitpos) {
401 res[(bitpos / 8) as usize] ^= 1 << (bitpos & 7);
402 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
404 sha.result(&mut res);
410 /// Inserts a revocation secret into this channel monitor. Also optionally tracks the next
411 /// revocation point which may be required to claim HTLC outputs which we know the preimage of
412 /// in case the remote end force-closes using their latest state. Prunes old preimages if neither
413 /// needed by local commitment transactions HTCLs nor by remote ones. Unless we haven't already seen remote
414 /// commitment transaction's secret, they are de facto pruned (we can use revocation key).
415 pub(super) fn provide_secret(&mut self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32], their_next_revocation_point: Option<(u64, PublicKey)>) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
416 let pos = ChannelMonitor::place_secret(idx);
418 let (old_secret, old_idx) = self.old_secrets[i as usize];
419 if ChannelMonitor::derive_secret(secret, pos, old_idx) != old_secret {
420 return Err(HandleError{err: "Previous secret did not match new one", action: None})
423 self.old_secrets[pos as usize] = (secret, idx);
425 if let Some(new_revocation_point) = their_next_revocation_point {
426 match self.their_cur_revocation_points {
427 Some(old_points) => {
428 if old_points.0 == new_revocation_point.0 + 1 {
429 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0, old_points.1, Some(new_revocation_point.1)));
430 } else if old_points.0 == new_revocation_point.0 + 2 {
431 if let Some(old_second_point) = old_points.2 {
432 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0 - 1, old_second_point, Some(new_revocation_point.1)));
434 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((new_revocation_point.0, new_revocation_point.1, None));
437 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((new_revocation_point.0, new_revocation_point.1, None));
441 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((new_revocation_point.0, new_revocation_point.1, None));
446 if !self.payment_preimages.is_empty() {
447 let local_signed_commitment_tx = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx.as_ref().expect("Channel needs at least an initial commitment tx !");
448 let prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.as_ref();
449 let min_idx = self.get_min_seen_secret();
450 let remote_hash_commitment_number = &mut self.remote_hash_commitment_number;
452 self.payment_preimages.retain(|&k, _| {
453 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in &local_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs {
454 if k == htlc.payment_hash {
458 if let Some(prev_local_commitment_tx) = prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
459 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in prev_local_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
460 if k == htlc.payment_hash {
465 let contains = if let Some(cn) = remote_hash_commitment_number.get(&k) {
472 remote_hash_commitment_number.remove(&k);
481 /// Informs this monitor of the latest remote (ie non-broadcastable) commitment transaction.
482 /// The monitor watches for it to be broadcasted and then uses the HTLC information (and
483 /// possibly future revocation/preimage information) to claim outputs where possible.
484 /// We cache also the mapping hash:commitment number to lighten pruning of old preimages by watchtowers.
485 pub(super) fn provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, unsigned_commitment_tx: &Transaction, htlc_outputs: Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>, commitment_number: u64) {
486 // TODO: Encrypt the htlc_outputs data with the single-hash of the commitment transaction
487 // so that a remote monitor doesn't learn anything unless there is a malicious close.
488 // (only maybe, sadly we cant do the same for local info, as we need to be aware of
490 for htlc in &htlc_outputs {
491 self.remote_hash_commitment_number.insert(htlc.payment_hash, commitment_number);
493 self.remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(unsigned_commitment_tx.txid(), htlc_outputs);
496 /// Informs this monitor of the latest local (ie broadcastable) commitment transaction. The
497 /// monitor watches for timeouts and may broadcast it if we approach such a timeout. Thus, it
498 /// is important that any clones of this channel monitor (including remote clones) by kept
499 /// up-to-date as our local commitment transaction is updated.
500 /// Panics if set_their_to_self_delay has never been called.
501 /// Also update KeyStorage with latest local per_commitment_point to derive local_delayedkey in
502 /// case of onchain HTLC tx
503 pub(super) fn provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, signed_commitment_tx: Transaction, local_keys: chan_utils::TxCreationKeys, feerate_per_kw: u64, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Signature, Signature)>) {
504 assert!(self.their_to_self_delay.is_some());
505 self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx.take();
506 self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(LocalSignedTx {
507 txid: signed_commitment_tx.txid(),
508 tx: signed_commitment_tx,
509 revocation_key: local_keys.revocation_key,
510 a_htlc_key: local_keys.a_htlc_key,
511 b_htlc_key: local_keys.b_htlc_key,
512 delayed_payment_key: local_keys.a_delayed_payment_key,
516 self.key_storage = if let KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, ref delayed_payment_base_key, prev_latest_per_commitment_point: _, ref latest_per_commitment_point } = self.key_storage {
517 KeyStorage::PrivMode {
518 revocation_base_key: *revocation_base_key,
519 htlc_base_key: *htlc_base_key,
520 delayed_payment_base_key: *delayed_payment_base_key,
521 prev_latest_per_commitment_point: *latest_per_commitment_point,
522 latest_per_commitment_point: Some(local_keys.per_commitment_point),
524 } else { unimplemented!(); };
527 /// Provides a payment_hash->payment_preimage mapping. Will be automatically pruned when all
528 /// commitment_tx_infos which contain the payment hash have been revoked.
529 pub(super) fn provide_payment_preimage(&mut self, payment_hash: &[u8; 32], payment_preimage: &[u8; 32]) {
530 self.payment_preimages.insert(payment_hash.clone(), payment_preimage.clone());
533 /// Combines this ChannelMonitor with the information contained in the other ChannelMonitor.
534 /// After a successful call this ChannelMonitor is up-to-date and is safe to use to monitor the
535 /// chain for new blocks/transactions.
536 pub fn insert_combine(&mut self, mut other: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
537 if self.funding_txo.is_some() {
538 // We should be able to compare the entire funding_txo, but in fuzztarget its trivially
539 // easy to collide the funding_txo hash and have a different scriptPubKey.
540 if other.funding_txo.is_some() && other.funding_txo.as_ref().unwrap().0 != self.funding_txo.as_ref().unwrap().0 {
541 return Err(HandleError{err: "Funding transaction outputs are not identical!", action: None});
544 self.funding_txo = other.funding_txo.take();
546 let other_min_secret = other.get_min_seen_secret();
547 let our_min_secret = self.get_min_seen_secret();
548 if our_min_secret > other_min_secret {
549 self.provide_secret(other_min_secret, other.get_secret(other_min_secret).unwrap(), None)?;
551 if our_min_secret >= other_min_secret {
552 self.their_cur_revocation_points = other.their_cur_revocation_points;
553 for (txid, htlcs) in other.remote_claimable_outpoints.drain() {
554 self.remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, htlcs);
556 if let Some(local_tx) = other.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
557 self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(local_tx);
559 if let Some(local_tx) = other.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
560 self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(local_tx);
562 self.payment_preimages = other.payment_preimages;
567 /// Panics if commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor doesn't fit in 48 bits
568 pub(super) fn set_commitment_obscure_factor(&mut self, commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64) {
569 assert!(commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor < (1 << 48));
570 self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor = commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor;
573 /// Allows this monitor to scan only for transactions which are applicable. Note that this is
574 /// optional, without it this monitor cannot be used in an SPV client, but you may wish to
575 /// avoid this (or call unset_funding_info) on a monitor you wish to send to a watchtower as it
576 /// provides slightly better privacy.
577 /// It's the responsibility of the caller to register outpoint and script with passing the former
578 /// value as key to add_update_monitor.
579 pub(super) fn set_funding_info(&mut self, funding_info: (OutPoint, Script)) {
580 self.funding_txo = Some(funding_info);
583 /// We log these base keys at channel opening to being able to rebuild redeemscript in case of leaked revoked commit tx
584 pub(super) fn set_their_base_keys(&mut self, their_htlc_base_key: &PublicKey, their_delayed_payment_base_key: &PublicKey) {
585 self.their_htlc_base_key = Some(their_htlc_base_key.clone());
586 self.their_delayed_payment_base_key = Some(their_delayed_payment_base_key.clone());
589 pub(super) fn set_their_to_self_delay(&mut self, their_to_self_delay: u16) {
590 self.their_to_self_delay = Some(their_to_self_delay);
593 pub(super) fn unset_funding_info(&mut self) {
594 self.funding_txo = None;
597 /// Gets the funding transaction outpoint of the channel this ChannelMonitor is monitoring for.
598 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
599 match self.funding_txo {
600 Some((outpoint, _)) => Some(outpoint),
605 /// Serializes into a vec, with various modes for the exposed pub fns
606 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W, for_local_storage: bool) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
607 //TODO: We still write out all the serialization here manually instead of using the fancy
608 //serialization framework we have, we should migrate things over to it.
609 writer.write_all(&[SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
610 writer.write_all(&[MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
612 match &self.funding_txo {
613 &Some((ref outpoint, ref script)) => {
614 writer.write_all(&outpoint.txid[..])?;
615 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(outpoint.index))?;
616 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(script.len() as u64))?;
617 writer.write_all(&script[..])?;
620 // We haven't even been initialized...not sure why anyone is serializing us, but
621 // not much to give them.
626 // Set in initial Channel-object creation, so should always be set by now:
627 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor))?;
629 match self.key_storage {
630 KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref prev_latest_per_commitment_point, ref latest_per_commitment_point } => {
631 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
632 writer.write_all(&revocation_base_key[..])?;
633 writer.write_all(&htlc_base_key[..])?;
634 writer.write_all(&delayed_payment_base_key[..])?;
635 if let Some(ref prev_latest_per_commitment_point) = *prev_latest_per_commitment_point {
636 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
637 writer.write_all(&prev_latest_per_commitment_point.serialize())?;
639 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
641 if let Some(ref latest_per_commitment_point) = *latest_per_commitment_point {
642 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
643 writer.write_all(&latest_per_commitment_point.serialize())?;
645 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
649 KeyStorage::SigsMode { .. } => unimplemented!(),
652 writer.write_all(&self.their_htlc_base_key.as_ref().unwrap().serialize())?;
653 writer.write_all(&self.their_delayed_payment_base_key.as_ref().unwrap().serialize())?;
655 match self.their_cur_revocation_points {
656 Some((idx, pubkey, second_option)) => {
657 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(idx))?;
658 writer.write_all(&pubkey.serialize())?;
659 match second_option {
660 Some(second_pubkey) => {
661 writer.write_all(&second_pubkey.serialize())?;
664 writer.write_all(&[0; 33])?;
669 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(0))?;
673 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.our_to_self_delay))?;
674 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap()))?;
676 for &(ref secret, ref idx) in self.old_secrets.iter() {
677 writer.write_all(secret)?;
678 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*idx))?;
681 macro_rules! serialize_htlc_in_commitment {
682 ($htlc_output: expr) => {
683 writer.write_all(&[$htlc_output.offered as u8; 1])?;
684 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc_output.amount_msat))?;
685 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array($htlc_output.cltv_expiry))?;
686 writer.write_all(&$htlc_output.payment_hash)?;
687 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array($htlc_output.transaction_output_index))?;
691 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_claimable_outpoints.len() as u64))?;
692 for (txid, htlc_outputs) in self.remote_claimable_outpoints.iter() {
693 writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
694 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc_outputs.len() as u64))?;
695 for htlc_output in htlc_outputs.iter() {
696 serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output);
701 let remote_commitment_txn_on_chain = self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.lock().unwrap();
702 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.len() as u64))?;
703 for (txid, commitment_number) in remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
704 writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
705 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(*commitment_number))?;
709 if for_local_storage {
710 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_hash_commitment_number.len() as u64))?;
711 for (payment_hash, commitment_number) in self.remote_hash_commitment_number.iter() {
712 writer.write_all(payment_hash)?;
713 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(*commitment_number))?;
716 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(0))?;
719 macro_rules! serialize_local_tx {
720 ($local_tx: expr) => {
721 let tx_ser = serialize::serialize(&$local_tx.tx).unwrap();
722 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(tx_ser.len() as u64))?;
723 writer.write_all(&tx_ser)?;
725 writer.write_all(&$local_tx.revocation_key.serialize())?;
726 writer.write_all(&$local_tx.a_htlc_key.serialize())?;
727 writer.write_all(&$local_tx.b_htlc_key.serialize())?;
728 writer.write_all(&$local_tx.delayed_payment_key.serialize())?;
730 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($local_tx.feerate_per_kw))?;
731 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($local_tx.htlc_outputs.len() as u64))?;
732 for &(ref htlc_output, ref their_sig, ref our_sig) in $local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
733 serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output);
734 writer.write_all(&their_sig.serialize_compact(&self.secp_ctx))?;
735 writer.write_all(&our_sig.serialize_compact(&self.secp_ctx))?;
740 if let Some(ref prev_local_tx) = self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
741 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
742 serialize_local_tx!(prev_local_tx);
744 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
747 if let Some(ref cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
748 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
749 serialize_local_tx!(cur_local_tx);
751 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
754 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.payment_preimages.len() as u64))?;
755 for payment_preimage in self.payment_preimages.values() {
756 writer.write_all(payment_preimage)?;
759 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.destination_script.len() as u64))?;
760 writer.write_all(&self.destination_script[..])?;
765 /// Writes this monitor into the given writer, suitable for writing to disk.
766 pub fn write_for_disk<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
767 self.write(writer, true)
770 /// Encodes this monitor into the given writer, suitable for sending to a remote watchtower
771 pub fn write_for_watchtower<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
772 self.write(writer, false)
775 //TODO: Functions to serialize/deserialize (with different forms depending on which information
776 //we want to leave out (eg funding_txo, etc).
778 /// Can only fail if idx is < get_min_seen_secret
779 pub(super) fn get_secret(&self, idx: u64) -> Result<[u8; 32], HandleError> {
780 for i in 0..self.old_secrets.len() {
781 if (idx & (!((1 << i) - 1))) == self.old_secrets[i].1 {
782 return Ok(ChannelMonitor::derive_secret(self.old_secrets[i].0, i as u8, idx))
785 assert!(idx < self.get_min_seen_secret());
786 Err(HandleError{err: "idx too low", action: None})
789 pub(super) fn get_min_seen_secret(&self) -> u64 {
790 //TODO This can be optimized?
791 let mut min = 1 << 48;
792 for &(_, idx) in self.old_secrets.iter() {
800 /// Attempts to claim a remote commitment transaction's outputs using the revocation key and
801 /// data in remote_claimable_outpoints. Will directly claim any HTLC outputs which expire at a
802 /// height > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER. In any case, will install monitoring for
803 /// HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions.
804 fn check_spend_remote_transaction(&self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32) -> (Vec<Transaction>, (Sha256dHash, Vec<TxOut>), Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>) {
805 // Most secp and related errors trying to create keys means we have no hope of constructing
806 // a spend transaction...so we return no transactions to broadcast
807 let mut txn_to_broadcast = Vec::new();
808 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
809 let mut spendable_outputs = Vec::new();
811 let commitment_txid = tx.txid(); //TODO: This is gonna be a performance bottleneck for watchtowers!
812 let per_commitment_option = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(&commitment_txid);
814 macro_rules! ignore_error {
815 ( $thing : expr ) => {
818 Err(_) => return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs)
823 let commitment_number = 0xffffffffffff - ((((tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor);
824 if commitment_number >= self.get_min_seen_secret() {
825 let secret = self.get_secret(commitment_number).unwrap();
826 let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &secret));
827 let (revocation_pubkey, b_htlc_key) = match self.key_storage {
828 KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
829 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
830 (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_base_key))),
831 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &htlc_base_key))))
833 KeyStorage::SigsMode { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
834 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
835 (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &revocation_base_key)),
836 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &htlc_base_key)))
839 let delayed_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key), &self.their_delayed_payment_base_key.unwrap()));
840 let a_htlc_key = match self.their_htlc_base_key {
841 None => return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs),
842 Some(their_htlc_base_key) => ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key), &their_htlc_base_key)),
845 let revokeable_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey, self.our_to_self_delay, &delayed_key);
846 let revokeable_p2wsh = revokeable_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
848 let mut total_value = 0;
849 let mut values = Vec::new();
850 let mut inputs = Vec::new();
851 let mut htlc_idxs = Vec::new();
853 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
854 if outp.script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh {
856 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
857 txid: commitment_txid,
860 script_sig: Script::new(),
861 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
864 htlc_idxs.push(None);
865 values.push(outp.value);
866 total_value += outp.value;
867 break; // There can only be one of these
871 macro_rules! sign_input {
872 ($sighash_parts: expr, $input: expr, $htlc_idx: expr, $amount: expr) => {
874 let (sig, redeemscript) = match self.key_storage {
875 KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
876 let redeemscript = if $htlc_idx.is_none() { revokeable_redeemscript.clone() } else {
877 let htlc = &per_commitment_option.unwrap()[$htlc_idx.unwrap()];
878 chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey)
880 let sighash = ignore_error!(Message::from_slice(&$sighash_parts.sighash_all(&$input, &redeemscript, $amount)[..]));
881 let revocation_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key, &revocation_base_key));
882 (self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &revocation_key), redeemscript)
884 KeyStorage::SigsMode { .. } => {
888 $input.witness.push(sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
889 $input.witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
890 if $htlc_idx.is_none() {
891 $input.witness.push(vec!(1));
893 $input.witness.push(revocation_pubkey.serialize().to_vec());
895 $input.witness.push(redeemscript.into_bytes());
900 if let Some(per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
901 inputs.reserve_exact(per_commitment_data.len());
903 for (idx, htlc) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() {
904 let expected_script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey);
905 if htlc.transaction_output_index as usize >= tx.output.len() ||
906 tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 ||
907 tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].script_pubkey != expected_script.to_v0_p2wsh() {
908 return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs); // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user
911 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
912 txid: commitment_txid,
913 vout: htlc.transaction_output_index,
915 script_sig: Script::new(),
916 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
919 if htlc.cltv_expiry > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER {
921 htlc_idxs.push(Some(idx));
922 values.push(tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].value);
923 total_value += htlc.amount_msat / 1000;
925 let mut single_htlc_tx = Transaction {
930 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
931 value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000, //TODO: - fee
934 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&single_htlc_tx);
935 sign_input!(sighash_parts, single_htlc_tx.input[0], Some(idx), htlc.amount_msat / 1000);
936 txn_to_broadcast.push(single_htlc_tx);
941 if !inputs.is_empty() || !txn_to_broadcast.is_empty() { // ie we're confident this is actually ours
942 // We're definitely a remote commitment transaction!
943 watch_outputs.append(&mut tx.output.clone());
944 self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.lock().unwrap().insert(commitment_txid, commitment_number);
946 if inputs.is_empty() { return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs); } // Nothing to be done...probably a false positive/local tx
948 let outputs = vec!(TxOut {
949 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
950 value: total_value, //TODO: - fee
952 let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
959 let mut values_drain = values.drain(..);
960 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx);
962 for (input, htlc_idx) in spend_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(htlc_idxs.iter()) {
963 let value = values_drain.next().unwrap();
964 sign_input!(sighash_parts, input, htlc_idx, value);
967 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
968 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: spend_tx.txid(), vout: 0 },
969 output: spend_tx.output[0].clone(),
971 txn_to_broadcast.push(spend_tx);
972 } else if let Some(per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
973 // While this isn't useful yet, there is a potential race where if a counterparty
974 // revokes a state at the same time as the commitment transaction for that state is
975 // confirmed, and the watchtower receives the block before the user, the user could
976 // upload a new ChannelMonitor with the revocation secret but the watchtower has
977 // already processed the block, resulting in the remote_commitment_txn_on_chain entry
978 // not being generated by the above conditional. Thus, to be safe, we go ahead and
980 watch_outputs.append(&mut tx.output.clone());
981 self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.lock().unwrap().insert(commitment_txid, commitment_number);
983 if let Some(revocation_points) = self.their_cur_revocation_points {
984 let revocation_point_option =
985 if revocation_points.0 == commitment_number { Some(&revocation_points.1) }
986 else if let Some(point) = revocation_points.2.as_ref() {
987 if revocation_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 { Some(point) } else { None }
989 if let Some(revocation_point) = revocation_point_option {
990 let (revocation_pubkey, b_htlc_key) = match self.key_storage {
991 KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
992 (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_base_key))),
993 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &htlc_base_key))))
995 KeyStorage::SigsMode { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
996 (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &revocation_base_key)),
997 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &htlc_base_key)))
1000 let a_htlc_key = match self.their_htlc_base_key {
1001 None => return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs),
1002 Some(their_htlc_base_key) => ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &their_htlc_base_key)),
1005 let mut total_value = 0;
1006 let mut values = Vec::new();
1007 let mut inputs = Vec::new();
1009 macro_rules! sign_input {
1010 ($sighash_parts: expr, $input: expr, $amount: expr, $preimage: expr) => {
1012 let (sig, redeemscript) = match self.key_storage {
1013 KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
1014 let htlc = &per_commitment_option.unwrap()[$input.sequence as usize];
1015 let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey);
1016 let sighash = ignore_error!(Message::from_slice(&$sighash_parts.sighash_all(&$input, &redeemscript, $amount)[..]));
1017 let htlc_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &htlc_base_key));
1018 (self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &htlc_key), redeemscript)
1020 KeyStorage::SigsMode { .. } => {
1024 $input.witness.push(sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
1025 $input.witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1026 $input.witness.push($preimage);
1027 $input.witness.push(redeemscript.into_bytes());
1032 for (idx, htlc) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() {
1033 if let Some(payment_preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
1035 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
1036 txid: commitment_txid,
1037 vout: htlc.transaction_output_index,
1039 script_sig: Script::new(),
1040 sequence: idx as u32, // reset to 0xfffffffd in sign_input
1041 witness: Vec::new(),
1043 if htlc.cltv_expiry > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER {
1045 values.push((tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].value, payment_preimage));
1046 total_value += htlc.amount_msat / 1000;
1048 let mut single_htlc_tx = Transaction {
1052 output: vec!(TxOut {
1053 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1054 value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000, //TODO: - fee
1057 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&single_htlc_tx);
1058 sign_input!(sighash_parts, single_htlc_tx.input[0], htlc.amount_msat / 1000, payment_preimage.to_vec());
1059 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
1060 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: single_htlc_tx.txid(), vout: 0 },
1061 output: single_htlc_tx.output[0].clone(),
1063 txn_to_broadcast.push(single_htlc_tx);
1068 if inputs.is_empty() { return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs); } // Nothing to be done...probably a false positive/local tx
1070 let outputs = vec!(TxOut {
1071 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1072 value: total_value, //TODO: - fee
1074 let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
1081 let mut values_drain = values.drain(..);
1082 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx);
1084 for input in spend_tx.input.iter_mut() {
1085 let value = values_drain.next().unwrap();
1086 sign_input!(sighash_parts, input, value.0, value.1.to_vec());
1089 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
1090 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: spend_tx.txid(), vout: 0 },
1091 output: spend_tx.output[0].clone(),
1093 txn_to_broadcast.push(spend_tx);
1098 (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs)
1101 /// Attempst to claim a remote HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout s outputs using the revocation key
1102 fn check_spend_remote_htlc(&self, tx: &Transaction, commitment_number: u64) -> (Option<Transaction>, Option<SpendableOutputDescriptor>) {
1103 if tx.input.len() != 1 || tx.output.len() != 1 {
1107 macro_rules! ignore_error {
1108 ( $thing : expr ) => {
1111 Err(_) => return (None, None)
1116 let secret = ignore_error!(self.get_secret(commitment_number));
1117 let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &secret));
1118 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
1119 let revocation_pubkey = match self.key_storage {
1120 KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
1121 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_base_key)))
1123 KeyStorage::SigsMode { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
1124 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &revocation_base_key))
1127 let delayed_key = match self.their_delayed_payment_base_key {
1128 None => return (None, None),
1129 Some(their_delayed_payment_base_key) => ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &their_delayed_payment_base_key)),
1131 let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), &delayed_key);
1132 let revokeable_p2wsh = redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
1133 let htlc_txid = tx.txid(); //TODO: This is gonna be a performance bottleneck for watchtowers!
1135 let mut inputs = Vec::new();
1138 if tx.output[0].script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh { //HTLC transactions have one txin, one txout
1140 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
1144 script_sig: Script::new(),
1145 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
1146 witness: Vec::new(),
1148 amount = tx.output[0].value;
1151 if !inputs.is_empty() {
1152 let outputs = vec!(TxOut {
1153 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1154 value: amount, //TODO: - fee
1157 let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
1164 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx);
1166 let sig = match self.key_storage {
1167 KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
1168 let sighash = ignore_error!(Message::from_slice(&sighash_parts.sighash_all(&spend_tx.input[0], &redeemscript, amount)[..]));
1169 let revocation_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key, &revocation_base_key));
1170 self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &revocation_key)
1172 KeyStorage::SigsMode { .. } => {
1176 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
1177 spend_tx.input[0].witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1178 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(vec!(1));
1179 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(redeemscript.into_bytes());
1181 let outpoint = BitcoinOutPoint { txid: spend_tx.txid(), vout: 0 };
1182 let output = spend_tx.output[0].clone();
1183 (Some(spend_tx), Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput { outpoint, output }))
1184 } else { (None, None) }
1187 fn broadcast_by_local_state(&self, local_tx: &LocalSignedTx, per_commitment_point: &Option<PublicKey>, delayed_payment_base_key: &Option<SecretKey>) -> (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>) {
1188 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
1189 let mut spendable_outputs = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
1191 for &(ref htlc, ref their_sig, ref our_sig) in local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1193 let mut htlc_timeout_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&local_tx.txid, local_tx.feerate_per_kw, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), htlc, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key, &local_tx.revocation_key);
1195 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
1197 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(their_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
1198 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1199 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
1200 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1202 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new());
1203 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &local_tx.a_htlc_key, &local_tx.b_htlc_key, &local_tx.revocation_key).into_bytes());
1205 if let Some(ref per_commitment_point) = *per_commitment_point {
1206 if let Some(ref delayed_payment_base_key) = *delayed_payment_base_key {
1207 if let Ok(local_delayedkey) = chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base_key) {
1208 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutput {
1209 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: htlc_timeout_tx.txid(), vout: 0 },
1211 witness_script: chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&local_tx.revocation_key, self.our_to_self_delay, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key),
1212 to_self_delay: self.our_to_self_delay
1217 res.push(htlc_timeout_tx);
1219 if let Some(payment_preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
1220 let mut htlc_success_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&local_tx.txid, local_tx.feerate_per_kw, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), htlc, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key, &local_tx.revocation_key);
1222 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
1224 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(their_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
1225 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1226 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
1227 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1229 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(payment_preimage.to_vec());
1230 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &local_tx.a_htlc_key, &local_tx.b_htlc_key, &local_tx.revocation_key).into_bytes());
1232 if let Some(ref per_commitment_point) = *per_commitment_point {
1233 if let Some(ref delayed_payment_base_key) = *delayed_payment_base_key {
1234 if let Ok(local_delayedkey) = chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base_key) {
1235 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutput {
1236 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: htlc_success_tx.txid(), vout: 0 },
1238 witness_script: chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&local_tx.revocation_key, self.our_to_self_delay, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key),
1239 to_self_delay: self.our_to_self_delay
1244 res.push(htlc_success_tx);
1249 (res, spendable_outputs)
1252 /// Attempts to claim any claimable HTLCs in a commitment transaction which was not (yet)
1253 /// revoked using data in local_claimable_outpoints.
1254 /// Should not be used if check_spend_revoked_transaction succeeds.
1255 fn check_spend_local_transaction(&self, tx: &Transaction, _height: u32) -> (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>) {
1256 let commitment_txid = tx.txid();
1257 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1258 if local_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
1259 match self.key_storage {
1260 KeyStorage::PrivMode { revocation_base_key: _, htlc_base_key: _, ref delayed_payment_base_key, prev_latest_per_commitment_point: _, ref latest_per_commitment_point } => {
1261 return self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, latest_per_commitment_point, &Some(*delayed_payment_base_key));
1263 KeyStorage::SigsMode { .. } => {
1264 return self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, &None, &None);
1269 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1270 if local_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
1271 match self.key_storage {
1272 KeyStorage::PrivMode { revocation_base_key: _, htlc_base_key: _, ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref prev_latest_per_commitment_point, .. } => {
1273 return self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, prev_latest_per_commitment_point, &Some(*delayed_payment_base_key));
1275 KeyStorage::SigsMode { .. } => {
1276 return self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, &None, &None);
1281 (Vec::new(), Vec::new())
1284 fn block_connected(&self, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], height: u32, broadcaster: &BroadcasterInterface)-> (Vec<(Sha256dHash, Vec<TxOut>)>, Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>) {
1285 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
1286 let mut spendable_outputs = Vec::new();
1287 for tx in txn_matched {
1288 if tx.input.len() == 1 {
1289 // Assuming our keys were not leaked (in which case we're screwed no matter what),
1290 // commitment transactions and HTLC transactions will all only ever have one input,
1291 // which is an easy way to filter out any potential non-matching txn for lazy
1293 let prevout = &tx.input[0].previous_output;
1294 let mut txn: Vec<Transaction> = Vec::new();
1295 if self.funding_txo.is_none() || (prevout.txid == self.funding_txo.as_ref().unwrap().0.txid && prevout.vout == self.funding_txo.as_ref().unwrap().0.index as u32) {
1296 let (remote_txn, new_outputs, mut spendable_output) = self.check_spend_remote_transaction(tx, height);
1298 spendable_outputs.append(&mut spendable_output);
1299 if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() {
1300 watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
1303 let (remote_txn, mut outputs) = self.check_spend_local_transaction(tx, height);
1304 spendable_outputs.append(&mut outputs);
1308 let remote_commitment_txn_on_chain = self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.lock().unwrap();
1309 if let Some(commitment_number) = remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.get(&prevout.txid) {
1310 let (tx, spendable_output) = self.check_spend_remote_htlc(tx, *commitment_number);
1311 if let Some(tx) = tx {
1314 if let Some(spendable_output) = spendable_output {
1315 spendable_outputs.push(spendable_output);
1319 for tx in txn.iter() {
1320 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(tx);
1324 if let Some(ref cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1325 if self.would_broadcast_at_height(height) {
1326 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&cur_local_tx.tx);
1327 match self.key_storage {
1328 KeyStorage::PrivMode { revocation_base_key: _, htlc_base_key: _, ref delayed_payment_base_key, prev_latest_per_commitment_point: _, ref latest_per_commitment_point } => {
1329 let (txs, mut outputs) = self.broadcast_by_local_state(&cur_local_tx, latest_per_commitment_point, &Some(*delayed_payment_base_key));
1330 spendable_outputs.append(&mut outputs);
1332 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
1335 KeyStorage::SigsMode { .. } => {
1336 let (txs, mut outputs) = self.broadcast_by_local_state(&cur_local_tx, &None, &None);
1337 spendable_outputs.append(&mut outputs);
1339 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
1345 (watch_outputs, spendable_outputs)
1348 pub(super) fn would_broadcast_at_height(&self, height: u32) -> bool {
1349 if let Some(ref cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1350 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in cur_local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1351 // For inbound HTLCs which we know the preimage for, we have to ensure we hit the
1352 // chain with enough room to claim the HTLC without our counterparty being able to
1353 // time out the HTLC first.
1354 // For outbound HTLCs which our counterparty hasn't failed/claimed, our primary
1355 // concern is being able to claim the corresponding inbound HTLC (on another
1356 // channel) before it expires. In fact, we don't even really care if our
1357 // counterparty here claims such an outbound HTLC after it expired as long as we
1358 // can still claim the corresponding HTLC. Thus, to avoid needlessly hitting the
1359 // chain when our counterparty is waiting for expiration to off-chain fail an HTLC
1360 // we give ourselves a few blocks of headroom after expiration before going
1361 // on-chain for an expired HTLC.
1362 // Note that, to avoid a potential attack whereby a node delays claiming an HTLC
1363 // from us until we've reached the point where we go on-chain with the
1364 // corresponding inbound HTLC, we must ensure that outbound HTLCs go on chain at
1365 // least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER blocks prior to the inbound HTLC.
1366 // aka outbound_cltv + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS == height - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
1367 // inbound_cltv == height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
1368 // outbound_cltv + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFER <= inbound_cltv - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
1369 // HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS + 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFER <= inbound_cltv - outbound_cltv
1370 // HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS + 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFER <= CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA
1371 if ( htlc.offered && htlc.cltv_expiry + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS <= height) ||
1372 (!htlc.offered && htlc.cltv_expiry <= height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER && self.payment_preimages.contains_key(&htlc.payment_hash)) {
1381 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> ReadableArgs<R, Arc<Logger>> for ChannelMonitor {
1382 fn read(reader: &mut R, logger: Arc<Logger>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1383 // TODO: read_to_end and then deserializing from that vector is really dumb, we should
1384 // actually use the fancy serialization framework we have instead of hacking around it.
1385 let mut datavec = Vec::new();
1386 reader.read_to_end(&mut datavec)?;
1387 let data = &datavec;
1389 let mut read_pos = 0;
1390 macro_rules! read_bytes {
1391 ($byte_count: expr) => {
1393 if ($byte_count as usize) > data.len() - read_pos {
1394 return Err(DecodeError::ShortRead);
1396 read_pos += $byte_count as usize;
1397 &data[read_pos - $byte_count as usize..read_pos]
1402 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1403 macro_rules! unwrap_obj {
1407 Err(_) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
1412 let _ver = read_bytes!(1)[0];
1413 let min_ver = read_bytes!(1)[0];
1414 if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION {
1415 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion);
1418 // Technically this can fail and serialize fail a round-trip, but only for serialization of
1419 // barely-init'd ChannelMonitors that we can't do anything with.
1420 let outpoint = OutPoint {
1421 txid: Sha256dHash::from(read_bytes!(32)),
1422 index: byte_utils::slice_to_be16(read_bytes!(2)),
1424 let script_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8));
1425 let funding_txo = Some((outpoint, Script::from(read_bytes!(script_len).to_vec())));
1426 let commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor = byte_utils::slice_to_be48(read_bytes!(6));
1428 let key_storage = match read_bytes!(1)[0] {
1430 let revocation_base_key = unwrap_obj!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(32)));
1431 let htlc_base_key = unwrap_obj!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(32)));
1432 let delayed_payment_base_key = unwrap_obj!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(32)));
1433 let prev_latest_per_commitment_point = match read_bytes!(1)[0] {
1436 Some(unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(33))))
1438 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
1440 let latest_per_commitment_point = match read_bytes!(1)[0] {
1443 Some(unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(33))))
1445 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
1447 KeyStorage::PrivMode {
1448 revocation_base_key,
1450 delayed_payment_base_key,
1451 prev_latest_per_commitment_point,
1452 latest_per_commitment_point,
1455 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
1458 let their_htlc_base_key = Some(unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(33))));
1459 let their_delayed_payment_base_key = Some(unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(33))));
1461 let their_cur_revocation_points = {
1462 let first_idx = byte_utils::slice_to_be48(read_bytes!(6));
1466 let first_point = unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(33)));
1467 let second_point_slice = read_bytes!(33);
1468 if second_point_slice[0..32] == [0; 32] && second_point_slice[32] == 0 {
1469 Some((first_idx, first_point, None))
1471 Some((first_idx, first_point, Some(unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, second_point_slice)))))
1476 let our_to_self_delay = byte_utils::slice_to_be16(read_bytes!(2));
1477 let their_to_self_delay = Some(byte_utils::slice_to_be16(read_bytes!(2)));
1479 let mut old_secrets = [([0; 32], 1 << 48); 49];
1480 for &mut (ref mut secret, ref mut idx) in old_secrets.iter_mut() {
1481 secret.copy_from_slice(read_bytes!(32));
1482 *idx = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8));
1485 macro_rules! read_htlc_in_commitment {
1488 let offered = match read_bytes!(1)[0] {
1489 0 => false, 1 => true,
1490 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
1492 let amount_msat = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8));
1493 let cltv_expiry = byte_utils::slice_to_be32(read_bytes!(4));
1494 let mut payment_hash = [0; 32];
1495 payment_hash[..].copy_from_slice(read_bytes!(32));
1496 let transaction_output_index = byte_utils::slice_to_be32(read_bytes!(4));
1498 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1499 offered, amount_msat, cltv_expiry, payment_hash, transaction_output_index
1505 let remote_claimable_outpoints_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8));
1506 if remote_claimable_outpoints_len > data.len() as u64 / 64 { return Err(DecodeError::BadLengthDescriptor); }
1507 let mut remote_claimable_outpoints = HashMap::with_capacity(remote_claimable_outpoints_len as usize);
1508 for _ in 0..remote_claimable_outpoints_len {
1509 let txid = Sha256dHash::from(read_bytes!(32));
1510 let outputs_count = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8));
1511 if outputs_count > data.len() as u64 / 32 { return Err(DecodeError::BadLengthDescriptor); }
1512 let mut outputs = Vec::with_capacity(outputs_count as usize);
1513 for _ in 0..outputs_count {
1514 outputs.push(read_htlc_in_commitment!());
1516 if let Some(_) = remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, outputs) {
1517 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
1521 let remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8));
1522 if remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len > data.len() as u64 / 32 { return Err(DecodeError::BadLengthDescriptor); }
1523 let mut remote_commitment_txn_on_chain = HashMap::with_capacity(remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len as usize);
1524 for _ in 0..remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len {
1525 let txid = Sha256dHash::from(read_bytes!(32));
1526 let commitment_number = byte_utils::slice_to_be48(read_bytes!(6));
1527 if let Some(_) = remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(txid, commitment_number) {
1528 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
1532 let remote_hash_commitment_number_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8));
1533 if remote_hash_commitment_number_len > data.len() as u64 / 32 { return Err(DecodeError::BadLengthDescriptor); }
1534 let mut remote_hash_commitment_number = HashMap::with_capacity(remote_hash_commitment_number_len as usize);
1535 for _ in 0..remote_hash_commitment_number_len {
1536 let mut txid = [0; 32];
1537 txid[..].copy_from_slice(read_bytes!(32));
1538 let commitment_number = byte_utils::slice_to_be48(read_bytes!(6));
1539 if let Some(_) = remote_hash_commitment_number.insert(txid, commitment_number) {
1540 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
1544 macro_rules! read_local_tx {
1547 let tx_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8));
1548 let tx_ser = read_bytes!(tx_len);
1549 let tx: Transaction = unwrap_obj!(serialize::deserialize(tx_ser));
1550 if serialize::serialize(&tx).unwrap() != tx_ser {
1551 // We check that the tx re-serializes to the same form to ensure there is
1552 // no extra data, and as rust-bitcoin doesn't handle the 0-input ambiguity
1554 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
1557 let revocation_key = unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(33)));
1558 let a_htlc_key = unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(33)));
1559 let b_htlc_key = unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(33)));
1560 let delayed_payment_key = unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(33)));
1561 let feerate_per_kw = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8));
1563 let htlc_outputs_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8));
1564 if htlc_outputs_len > data.len() as u64 / 128 { return Err(DecodeError::BadLengthDescriptor); }
1565 let mut htlc_outputs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_outputs_len as usize);
1566 for _ in 0..htlc_outputs_len {
1567 htlc_outputs.push((read_htlc_in_commitment!(),
1568 unwrap_obj!(Signature::from_compact(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(64))),
1569 unwrap_obj!(Signature::from_compact(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(64)))));
1574 tx, revocation_key, a_htlc_key, b_htlc_key, delayed_payment_key, feerate_per_kw, htlc_outputs
1580 let prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = match read_bytes!(1)[0] {
1583 Some(read_local_tx!())
1585 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
1588 let current_local_signed_commitment_tx = match read_bytes!(1)[0] {
1591 Some(read_local_tx!())
1593 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
1596 let payment_preimages_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8));
1597 if payment_preimages_len > data.len() as u64 / 32 { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
1598 let mut payment_preimages = HashMap::with_capacity(payment_preimages_len as usize);
1599 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
1600 for _ in 0..payment_preimages_len {
1601 let mut preimage = [0; 32];
1602 preimage[..].copy_from_slice(read_bytes!(32));
1604 sha.input(&preimage);
1605 let mut hash = [0; 32];
1606 sha.result(&mut hash);
1607 if let Some(_) = payment_preimages.insert(hash, preimage) {
1608 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
1612 let destination_script_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8));
1613 let destination_script = Script::from(read_bytes!(destination_script_len).to_vec());
1617 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor,
1620 their_htlc_base_key,
1621 their_delayed_payment_base_key,
1622 their_cur_revocation_points,
1625 their_to_self_delay,
1628 remote_claimable_outpoints,
1629 remote_commitment_txn_on_chain: Mutex::new(remote_commitment_txn_on_chain),
1630 remote_hash_commitment_number,
1632 prev_local_signed_commitment_tx,
1633 current_local_signed_commitment_tx,
1647 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Script;
1648 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
1649 use crypto::digest::Digest;
1651 use ln::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor;
1652 use ln::chan_utils::{HTLCOutputInCommitment, TxCreationKeys};
1653 use util::sha2::Sha256;
1654 use util::test_utils::TestLogger;
1655 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
1656 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1, Signature};
1657 use rand::{thread_rng,Rng};
1661 fn test_per_commitment_storage() {
1662 // Test vectors from BOLT 3:
1663 let mut secrets: Vec<[u8; 32]> = Vec::new();
1664 let mut monitor: ChannelMonitor;
1665 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1666 let logger = Arc::new(TestLogger::new());
1668 macro_rules! test_secrets {
1670 let mut idx = 281474976710655;
1671 for secret in secrets.iter() {
1672 assert_eq!(monitor.get_secret(idx).unwrap(), *secret);
1675 assert_eq!(monitor.get_min_seen_secret(), idx + 1);
1676 assert!(monitor.get_secret(idx).is_err());
1681 // insert_secret correct sequence
1682 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
1685 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1686 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1687 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1690 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1691 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1692 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1695 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1696 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1697 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1700 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1701 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1702 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1705 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1706 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
1707 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1710 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1711 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
1712 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1715 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1716 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
1717 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1720 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1721 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
1722 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1727 // insert_secret #1 incorrect
1728 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
1731 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1732 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
1733 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1736 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1737 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1738 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err,
1739 "Previous secret did not match new one");
1743 // insert_secret #2 incorrect (#1 derived from incorrect)
1744 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
1747 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1748 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
1749 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1752 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1753 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("dddc3a8d14fddf2b68fa8c7fbad2748274937479dd0f8930d5ebb4ab6bd866a3").unwrap());
1754 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1757 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1758 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1759 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1762 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1763 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1764 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err,
1765 "Previous secret did not match new one");
1769 // insert_secret #3 incorrect
1770 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
1773 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1774 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1775 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1778 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1779 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1780 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1783 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1784 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c51a18b13e8527e579ec56365482c62f180b7d5760b46e9477dae59e87ed423a").unwrap());
1785 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1788 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1789 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1790 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err,
1791 "Previous secret did not match new one");
1795 // insert_secret #4 incorrect (1,2,3 derived from incorrect)
1796 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
1799 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1800 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
1801 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1804 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1805 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("dddc3a8d14fddf2b68fa8c7fbad2748274937479dd0f8930d5ebb4ab6bd866a3").unwrap());
1806 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1809 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1810 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c51a18b13e8527e579ec56365482c62f180b7d5760b46e9477dae59e87ed423a").unwrap());
1811 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1814 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1815 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("ba65d7b0ef55a3ba300d4e87af29868f394f8f138d78a7011669c79b37b936f4").unwrap());
1816 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1819 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1820 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
1821 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1824 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1825 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
1826 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1829 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1830 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
1831 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1834 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1835 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
1836 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err,
1837 "Previous secret did not match new one");
1841 // insert_secret #5 incorrect
1842 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
1845 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1846 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1847 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1850 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1851 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1852 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1855 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1856 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1857 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1860 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1861 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1862 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1865 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1866 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("631373ad5f9ef654bb3dade742d09504c567edd24320d2fcd68e3cc47e2ff6a6").unwrap());
1867 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1870 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1871 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
1872 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err,
1873 "Previous secret did not match new one");
1877 // insert_secret #6 incorrect (5 derived from incorrect)
1878 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
1881 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1882 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1883 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1886 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1887 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1888 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1891 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1892 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1893 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1896 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1897 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1898 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1901 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1902 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("631373ad5f9ef654bb3dade742d09504c567edd24320d2fcd68e3cc47e2ff6a6").unwrap());
1903 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1906 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1907 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("b7e76a83668bde38b373970155c868a653304308f9896692f904a23731224bb1").unwrap());
1908 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1911 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1912 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
1913 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1916 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1917 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
1918 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err,
1919 "Previous secret did not match new one");
1923 // insert_secret #7 incorrect
1924 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
1927 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1928 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1929 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1932 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1933 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1934 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1937 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1938 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1939 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1942 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1943 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1944 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1947 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1948 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
1949 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1952 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1953 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
1954 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1957 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1958 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("e7971de736e01da8ed58b94c2fc216cb1dca9e326f3a96e7194fe8ea8af6c0a3").unwrap());
1959 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1962 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1963 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
1964 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err,
1965 "Previous secret did not match new one");
1969 // insert_secret #8 incorrect
1970 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
1973 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1974 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1975 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1978 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1979 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1980 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1983 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1984 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1985 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1988 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1989 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1990 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1993 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1994 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
1995 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1998 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1999 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
2000 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
2003 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2004 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
2005 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
2008 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2009 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a7efbc61aac46d34f77778bac22c8a20c6a46ca460addc49009bda875ec88fa4").unwrap());
2010 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err,
2011 "Previous secret did not match new one");
2016 fn test_prune_preimages() {
2017 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2018 let logger = Arc::new(TestLogger::new());
2019 let dummy_sig = Signature::from_der(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("3045022100fa86fa9a36a8cd6a7bb8f06a541787d51371d067951a9461d5404de6b928782e02201c8b7c334c10aed8976a3a465be9a28abff4cb23acbf00022295b378ce1fa3cd").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
2021 macro_rules! dummy_keys {
2024 let dummy_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap());
2026 per_commitment_point: dummy_key.clone(),
2027 revocation_key: dummy_key.clone(),
2028 a_htlc_key: dummy_key.clone(),
2029 b_htlc_key: dummy_key.clone(),
2030 a_delayed_payment_key: dummy_key.clone(),
2031 b_payment_key: dummy_key.clone(),
2036 let dummy_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
2038 let mut preimages = Vec::new();
2040 let mut rng = thread_rng();
2042 let mut preimage = [0; 32];
2043 rng.fill_bytes(&mut preimage);
2044 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
2045 sha.input(&preimage);
2046 let mut hash = [0; 32];
2047 sha.result(&mut hash);
2048 preimages.push((preimage, hash));
2052 macro_rules! preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs {
2053 ($preimages_slice: expr) => {
2055 let mut res = Vec::new();
2056 for (idx, preimage) in $preimages_slice.iter().enumerate() {
2057 res.push(HTLCOutputInCommitment {
2061 payment_hash: preimage.1.clone(),
2062 transaction_output_index: idx as u32,
2069 macro_rules! preimages_to_local_htlcs {
2070 ($preimages_slice: expr) => {
2072 let mut inp = preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!($preimages_slice);
2073 let res: Vec<_> = inp.drain(..).map(|e| { (e, dummy_sig.clone(), dummy_sig.clone()) }).collect();
2079 macro_rules! test_preimages_exist {
2080 ($preimages_slice: expr, $monitor: expr) => {
2081 for preimage in $preimages_slice {
2082 assert!($monitor.payment_preimages.contains_key(&preimage.1));
2087 // Prune with one old state and a local commitment tx holding a few overlaps with the
2089 let mut monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
2090 monitor.set_their_to_self_delay(10);
2092 monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(dummy_tx.clone(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..10]));
2093 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[5..15]), 281474976710655);
2094 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[15..20]), 281474976710654);
2095 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[17..20]), 281474976710653);
2096 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[18..20]), 281474976710652);
2097 for &(ref preimage, ref hash) in preimages.iter() {
2098 monitor.provide_payment_preimage(hash, preimage);
2101 // Now provide a secret, pruning preimages 10-15
2102 let mut secret = [0; 32];
2103 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
2104 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secret.clone(), None).unwrap();
2105 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 15);
2106 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
2107 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[15..20], monitor);
2109 // Now provide a further secret, pruning preimages 15-17
2110 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
2111 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secret.clone(), None).unwrap();
2112 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 13);
2113 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
2114 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[17..20], monitor);
2116 // Now update local commitment tx info, pruning only element 18 as we still care about the
2117 // previous commitment tx's preimages too
2118 monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(dummy_tx.clone(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..5]));
2119 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
2120 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secret.clone(), None).unwrap();
2121 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 12);
2122 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
2123 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[18..20], monitor);
2125 // But if we do it again, we'll prune 5-10
2126 monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(dummy_tx.clone(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..3]));
2127 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
2128 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secret.clone(), None).unwrap();
2129 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 5);
2130 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..5], monitor);
2133 // Further testing is done in the ChannelManager integration tests.