1 //! The logic to monitor for on-chain transactions and create the relevant claim responses lives
4 //! ChannelMonitor objects are generated by ChannelManager in response to relevant
5 //! messages/actions, and MUST be persisted to disk (and, preferably, remotely) before progress can
6 //! be made in responding to certain messages, see ManyChannelMonitor for more.
8 //! Note that ChannelMonitors are an important part of the lightning trust model and a copy of the
9 //! latest ChannelMonitor must always be actively monitoring for chain updates (and no out-of-date
10 //! ChannelMonitors should do so). Thus, if you're building rust-lightning into an HSM or other
11 //! security-domain-separated system design, you should consider having multiple paths for
12 //! ChannelMonitors to get out of the HSM and onto monitoring devices.
14 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
15 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxIn,TxOut,SigHashType,Transaction};
16 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
17 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
18 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
19 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::{self, Decodable, Encodable};
20 use bitcoin::util::hash::{Hash160, BitcoinHash,Sha256dHash};
21 use bitcoin::util::bip143;
23 use crypto::digest::Digest;
25 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Message,Signature};
26 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
29 use ln::msgs::DecodeError;
31 use ln::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment;
32 use chain::chaininterface::{ChainListener, ChainWatchInterface, BroadcasterInterface};
33 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
34 use chain::keysinterface::SpendableOutputDescriptor;
35 use util::logger::Logger;
36 use util::ser::{ReadableArgs, Readable, Writer, Writeable, WriterWriteAdaptor, U48};
37 use util::sha2::Sha256;
38 use util::{byte_utils, events};
40 use std::collections::HashMap;
41 use std::sync::{Arc,Mutex};
42 use std::{hash,cmp, mem};
44 /// An error enum representing a failure to persist a channel monitor update.
46 pub enum ChannelMonitorUpdateErr {
47 /// Used to indicate a temporary failure (eg connection to a watchtower failed, but is expected
48 /// to succeed at some point in the future).
50 /// Such a failure will "freeze" a channel, preventing us from revoking old states or
51 /// submitting new commitment transactions to the remote party.
52 /// ChannelManager::test_restore_channel_monitor can be used to retry the update(s) and restore
53 /// the channel to an operational state.
55 /// Note that continuing to operate when no copy of the updated ChannelMonitor could be
56 /// persisted is unsafe - if you failed to store the update on your own local disk you should
57 /// instead return PermanentFailure to force closure of the channel ASAP.
59 /// Even when a channel has been "frozen" updates to the ChannelMonitor can continue to occur
60 /// (eg if an inbound HTLC which we forwarded was claimed upstream resulting in us attempting
61 /// to claim it on this channel) and those updates must be applied wherever they can be. At
62 /// least one such updated ChannelMonitor must be persisted otherwise PermanentFailure should
63 /// be returned to get things on-chain ASAP using only the in-memory copy. Obviously updates to
64 /// the channel which would invalidate previous ChannelMonitors are not made when a channel has
67 /// Note that even if updates made after TemporaryFailure succeed you must still call
68 /// test_restore_channel_monitor to ensure you have the latest monitor and re-enable normal
69 /// channel operation.
71 /// Used to indicate no further channel monitor updates will be allowed (eg we've moved on to a
72 /// different watchtower and cannot update with all watchtowers that were previously informed
73 /// of this channel). This will force-close the channel in question.
77 /// General Err type for ChannelMonitor actions. Generally, this implies that the data provided is
78 /// inconsistent with the ChannelMonitor being called. eg for ChannelMonitor::insert_combine this
79 /// means you tried to merge two monitors for different channels or for a channel which was
80 /// restored from a backup and then generated new commitment updates.
81 /// Contains a human-readable error message.
83 pub struct MonitorUpdateError(pub &'static str);
85 /// Simple trait indicating ability to track a set of ChannelMonitors and multiplex events between
86 /// them. Generally should be implemented by keeping a local SimpleManyChannelMonitor and passing
87 /// events to it, while also taking any add_update_monitor events and passing them to some remote
90 /// Note that any updates to a channel's monitor *must* be applied to each instance of the
91 /// channel's monitor everywhere (including remote watchtowers) *before* this function returns. If
92 /// an update occurs and a remote watchtower is left with old state, it may broadcast transactions
93 /// which we have revoked, allowing our counterparty to claim all funds in the channel!
94 pub trait ManyChannelMonitor: Send + Sync {
95 /// Adds or updates a monitor for the given `funding_txo`.
97 /// Implementor must also ensure that the funding_txo outpoint is registered with any relevant
98 /// ChainWatchInterfaces such that the provided monitor receives block_connected callbacks with
100 fn add_update_monitor(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr>;
103 /// A simple implementation of a ManyChannelMonitor and ChainListener. Can be used to create a
104 /// watchtower or watch our own channels.
106 /// Note that you must provide your own key by which to refer to channels.
108 /// If you're accepting remote monitors (ie are implementing a watchtower), you must verify that
109 /// users cannot overwrite a given channel by providing a duplicate key. ie you should probably
110 /// index by a PublicKey which is required to sign any updates.
112 /// If you're using this for local monitoring of your own channels, you probably want to use
113 /// `OutPoint` as the key, which will give you a ManyChannelMonitor implementation.
114 pub struct SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
115 #[cfg(test)] // Used in ChannelManager tests to manipulate channels directly
116 pub monitors: Mutex<HashMap<Key, ChannelMonitor>>,
118 monitors: Mutex<HashMap<Key, ChannelMonitor>>,
119 chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>,
120 broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>,
121 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
125 impl<Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash> ChainListener for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
126 fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], _indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) {
127 let block_hash = header.bitcoin_hash();
128 let mut new_events: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(0);
130 let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
131 for monitor in monitors.values_mut() {
132 let (txn_outputs, spendable_outputs) = monitor.block_connected(txn_matched, height, &block_hash, &*self.broadcaster);
133 if spendable_outputs.len() > 0 {
134 new_events.push(events::Event::SpendableOutputs {
135 outputs: spendable_outputs,
138 for (ref txid, ref outputs) in txn_outputs {
139 for (idx, output) in outputs.iter().enumerate() {
140 self.chain_monitor.install_watch_outpoint((txid.clone(), idx as u32), &output.script_pubkey);
145 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
146 pending_events.append(&mut new_events);
149 fn block_disconnected(&self, _: &BlockHeader) { }
152 impl<Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash + 'static> SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
153 /// Creates a new object which can be used to monitor several channels given the chain
154 /// interface with which to register to receive notifications.
155 pub fn new(chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>, broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>, logger: Arc<Logger>) -> Arc<SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key>> {
156 let res = Arc::new(SimpleManyChannelMonitor {
157 monitors: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
160 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
163 let weak_res = Arc::downgrade(&res);
164 res.chain_monitor.register_listener(weak_res);
168 /// Adds or udpates the monitor which monitors the channel referred to by the given key.
169 pub fn add_update_monitor_by_key(&self, key: Key, monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
170 let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
171 match monitors.get_mut(&key) {
172 Some(orig_monitor) => {
173 log_trace!(self, "Updating Channel Monitor for channel {}", log_funding_info!(monitor.key_storage));
174 return orig_monitor.insert_combine(monitor);
178 match monitor.key_storage {
179 Storage::Local { ref funding_info, .. } => {
182 return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Try to update a useless monitor without funding_txo !"));
184 &Some((ref outpoint, ref script)) => {
185 log_trace!(self, "Got new Channel Monitor for channel {}", log_bytes!(outpoint.to_channel_id()[..]));
186 self.chain_monitor.install_watch_tx(&outpoint.txid, script);
187 self.chain_monitor.install_watch_outpoint((outpoint.txid, outpoint.index as u32), script);
191 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
192 self.chain_monitor.watch_all_txn();
195 monitors.insert(key, monitor);
200 impl ManyChannelMonitor for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<OutPoint> {
201 fn add_update_monitor(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr> {
202 match self.add_update_monitor_by_key(funding_txo, monitor) {
204 Err(_) => Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure),
209 impl<Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash> events::EventsProvider for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
210 fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
211 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
212 let mut ret = Vec::new();
213 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut *pending_events);
218 /// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, don't try to claim it in a shared transaction,
219 /// instead claiming it in its own individual transaction.
220 const CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 12;
221 /// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, force-close the channel to broadcast the
222 /// HTLC-Success transaction.
223 /// In other words, this is an upper bound on how many blocks we think it can take us to get a
224 /// transaction confirmed (and we use it in a few more, equivalent, places).
225 pub(crate) const CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 6;
226 /// Number of blocks by which point we expect our counterparty to have seen new blocks on the
227 /// network and done a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance (+ we've updated all our
228 /// copies of ChannelMonitors, including watchtowers).
229 pub(crate) const HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS: u32 = 3;
231 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
234 revocation_base_key: SecretKey,
235 htlc_base_key: SecretKey,
236 delayed_payment_base_key: SecretKey,
237 payment_base_key: SecretKey,
238 shutdown_pubkey: PublicKey,
239 prev_latest_per_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
240 latest_per_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
241 funding_info: Option<(OutPoint, Script)>,
244 revocation_base_key: PublicKey,
245 htlc_base_key: PublicKey,
246 sigs: HashMap<Sha256dHash, Signature>,
250 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
251 struct LocalSignedTx {
252 /// txid of the transaction in tx, just used to make comparison faster
255 revocation_key: PublicKey,
256 a_htlc_key: PublicKey,
257 b_htlc_key: PublicKey,
258 delayed_payment_key: PublicKey,
260 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Signature, Signature)>,
263 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
264 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
266 /// A ChannelMonitor handles chain events (blocks connected and disconnected) and generates
267 /// on-chain transactions to ensure no loss of funds occurs.
269 /// You MUST ensure that no ChannelMonitors for a given channel anywhere contain out-of-date
270 /// information and are actively monitoring the chain.
272 pub struct ChannelMonitor {
273 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64,
275 key_storage: Storage,
276 their_htlc_base_key: Option<PublicKey>,
277 their_delayed_payment_base_key: Option<PublicKey>,
278 // first is the idx of the first of the two revocation points
279 their_cur_revocation_points: Option<(u64, PublicKey, Option<PublicKey>)>,
281 our_to_self_delay: u16,
282 their_to_self_delay: Option<u16>,
284 old_secrets: [([u8; 32], u64); 49],
285 remote_claimable_outpoints: HashMap<Sha256dHash, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>>,
286 /// We cannot identify HTLC-Success or HTLC-Timeout transactions by themselves on the chain.
287 /// Nor can we figure out their commitment numbers without the commitment transaction they are
288 /// spending. Thus, in order to claim them via revocation key, we track all the remote
289 /// commitment transactions which we find on-chain, mapping them to the commitment number which
290 /// can be used to derive the revocation key and claim the transactions.
291 remote_commitment_txn_on_chain: HashMap<Sha256dHash, (u64, Vec<Script>)>,
292 /// Cache used to make pruning of payment_preimages faster.
293 /// Maps payment_hash values to commitment numbers for remote transactions for non-revoked
294 /// remote transactions (ie should remain pretty small).
295 /// Serialized to disk but should generally not be sent to Watchtowers.
296 remote_hash_commitment_number: HashMap<[u8; 32], u64>,
298 // We store two local commitment transactions to avoid any race conditions where we may update
299 // some monitors (potentially on watchtowers) but then fail to update others, resulting in the
300 // various monitors for one channel being out of sync, and us broadcasting a local
301 // transaction for which we have deleted claim information on some watchtowers.
302 prev_local_signed_commitment_tx: Option<LocalSignedTx>,
303 current_local_signed_commitment_tx: Option<LocalSignedTx>,
305 // Used just for ChannelManager to make sure it has the latest channel data during
307 current_remote_commitment_number: u64,
309 payment_preimages: HashMap<[u8; 32], [u8; 32]>,
311 destination_script: Script,
313 // We simply modify last_block_hash in Channel's block_connected so that serialization is
314 // consistent but hopefully the users' copy handles block_connected in a consistent way.
315 // (we do *not*, however, update them in insert_combine to ensure any local user copies keep
316 // their last_block_hash from its state and not based on updated copies that didn't run through
317 // the full block_connected).
318 pub(crate) last_block_hash: Sha256dHash,
319 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>, //TODO: dedup this a bit...
323 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
324 /// Used only in testing and fuzztarget to check serialization roundtrips don't change the
325 /// underlying object
326 impl PartialEq for ChannelMonitor {
327 fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
328 if self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor != other.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor ||
329 self.key_storage != other.key_storage ||
330 self.their_htlc_base_key != other.their_htlc_base_key ||
331 self.their_delayed_payment_base_key != other.their_delayed_payment_base_key ||
332 self.their_cur_revocation_points != other.their_cur_revocation_points ||
333 self.our_to_self_delay != other.our_to_self_delay ||
334 self.their_to_self_delay != other.their_to_self_delay ||
335 self.remote_claimable_outpoints != other.remote_claimable_outpoints ||
336 self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain != other.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain ||
337 self.remote_hash_commitment_number != other.remote_hash_commitment_number ||
338 self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx != other.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx ||
339 self.current_remote_commitment_number != other.current_remote_commitment_number ||
340 self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx != other.current_local_signed_commitment_tx ||
341 self.payment_preimages != other.payment_preimages ||
342 self.destination_script != other.destination_script
346 for (&(ref secret, ref idx), &(ref o_secret, ref o_idx)) in self.old_secrets.iter().zip(other.old_secrets.iter()) {
347 if secret != o_secret || idx != o_idx {
356 impl ChannelMonitor {
357 pub(super) fn new(revocation_base_key: &SecretKey, delayed_payment_base_key: &SecretKey, htlc_base_key: &SecretKey, payment_base_key: &SecretKey, shutdown_pubkey: &PublicKey, our_to_self_delay: u16, destination_script: Script, logger: Arc<Logger>) -> ChannelMonitor {
359 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: 0,
361 key_storage: Storage::Local {
362 revocation_base_key: revocation_base_key.clone(),
363 htlc_base_key: htlc_base_key.clone(),
364 delayed_payment_base_key: delayed_payment_base_key.clone(),
365 payment_base_key: payment_base_key.clone(),
366 shutdown_pubkey: shutdown_pubkey.clone(),
367 prev_latest_per_commitment_point: None,
368 latest_per_commitment_point: None,
371 their_htlc_base_key: None,
372 their_delayed_payment_base_key: None,
373 their_cur_revocation_points: None,
375 our_to_self_delay: our_to_self_delay,
376 their_to_self_delay: None,
378 old_secrets: [([0; 32], 1 << 48); 49],
379 remote_claimable_outpoints: HashMap::new(),
380 remote_commitment_txn_on_chain: HashMap::new(),
381 remote_hash_commitment_number: HashMap::new(),
383 prev_local_signed_commitment_tx: None,
384 current_local_signed_commitment_tx: None,
385 current_remote_commitment_number: 1 << 48,
387 payment_preimages: HashMap::new(),
388 destination_script: destination_script,
390 last_block_hash: Default::default(),
391 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
397 fn place_secret(idx: u64) -> u8 {
399 if idx & (1 << i) == (1 << i) {
407 fn derive_secret(secret: [u8; 32], bits: u8, idx: u64) -> [u8; 32] {
408 let mut res: [u8; 32] = secret;
410 let bitpos = bits - 1 - i;
411 if idx & (1 << bitpos) == (1 << bitpos) {
412 res[(bitpos / 8) as usize] ^= 1 << (bitpos & 7);
413 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
415 sha.result(&mut res);
421 /// Inserts a revocation secret into this channel monitor. Prunes old preimages if neither
422 /// needed by local commitment transactions HTCLs nor by remote ones. Unless we haven't already seen remote
423 /// commitment transaction's secret, they are de facto pruned (we can use revocation key).
424 pub(super) fn provide_secret(&mut self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
425 let pos = ChannelMonitor::place_secret(idx);
427 let (old_secret, old_idx) = self.old_secrets[i as usize];
428 if ChannelMonitor::derive_secret(secret, pos, old_idx) != old_secret {
429 return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Previous secret did not match new one"));
432 self.old_secrets[pos as usize] = (secret, idx);
434 if !self.payment_preimages.is_empty() {
435 let local_signed_commitment_tx = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx.as_ref().expect("Channel needs at least an initial commitment tx !");
436 let prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.as_ref();
437 let min_idx = self.get_min_seen_secret();
438 let remote_hash_commitment_number = &mut self.remote_hash_commitment_number;
440 self.payment_preimages.retain(|&k, _| {
441 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in &local_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs {
442 if k == htlc.payment_hash {
446 if let Some(prev_local_commitment_tx) = prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
447 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in prev_local_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
448 if k == htlc.payment_hash {
453 let contains = if let Some(cn) = remote_hash_commitment_number.get(&k) {
460 remote_hash_commitment_number.remove(&k);
469 /// Informs this monitor of the latest remote (ie non-broadcastable) commitment transaction.
470 /// The monitor watches for it to be broadcasted and then uses the HTLC information (and
471 /// possibly future revocation/preimage information) to claim outputs where possible.
472 /// We cache also the mapping hash:commitment number to lighten pruning of old preimages by watchtowers.
473 pub(super) fn provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, unsigned_commitment_tx: &Transaction, htlc_outputs: Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>, commitment_number: u64, their_revocation_point: PublicKey) {
474 // TODO: Encrypt the htlc_outputs data with the single-hash of the commitment transaction
475 // so that a remote monitor doesn't learn anything unless there is a malicious close.
476 // (only maybe, sadly we cant do the same for local info, as we need to be aware of
478 for htlc in &htlc_outputs {
479 self.remote_hash_commitment_number.insert(htlc.payment_hash, commitment_number);
481 self.remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(unsigned_commitment_tx.txid(), htlc_outputs);
482 self.current_remote_commitment_number = commitment_number;
483 //TODO: Merge this into the other per-remote-transaction output storage stuff
484 match self.their_cur_revocation_points {
485 Some(old_points) => {
486 if old_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 {
487 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0, old_points.1, Some(their_revocation_point)));
488 } else if old_points.0 == commitment_number + 2 {
489 if let Some(old_second_point) = old_points.2 {
490 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0 - 1, old_second_point, Some(their_revocation_point)));
492 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None));
495 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None));
499 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None));
504 /// Informs this monitor of the latest local (ie broadcastable) commitment transaction. The
505 /// monitor watches for timeouts and may broadcast it if we approach such a timeout. Thus, it
506 /// is important that any clones of this channel monitor (including remote clones) by kept
507 /// up-to-date as our local commitment transaction is updated.
508 /// Panics if set_their_to_self_delay has never been called.
509 /// Also update Storage with latest local per_commitment_point to derive local_delayedkey in
510 /// case of onchain HTLC tx
511 pub(super) fn provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, signed_commitment_tx: Transaction, local_keys: chan_utils::TxCreationKeys, feerate_per_kw: u64, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Signature, Signature)>) {
512 assert!(self.their_to_self_delay.is_some());
513 self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx.take();
514 self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(LocalSignedTx {
515 txid: signed_commitment_tx.txid(),
516 tx: signed_commitment_tx,
517 revocation_key: local_keys.revocation_key,
518 a_htlc_key: local_keys.a_htlc_key,
519 b_htlc_key: local_keys.b_htlc_key,
520 delayed_payment_key: local_keys.a_delayed_payment_key,
524 self.key_storage = if let Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref payment_base_key, ref shutdown_pubkey, ref latest_per_commitment_point, ref mut funding_info, .. } = self.key_storage {
526 revocation_base_key: *revocation_base_key,
527 htlc_base_key: *htlc_base_key,
528 delayed_payment_base_key: *delayed_payment_base_key,
529 payment_base_key: *payment_base_key,
530 shutdown_pubkey: *shutdown_pubkey,
531 prev_latest_per_commitment_point: *latest_per_commitment_point,
532 latest_per_commitment_point: Some(local_keys.per_commitment_point),
533 funding_info: funding_info.take(),
535 } else { unimplemented!(); };
538 /// Provides a payment_hash->payment_preimage mapping. Will be automatically pruned when all
539 /// commitment_tx_infos which contain the payment hash have been revoked.
540 pub(super) fn provide_payment_preimage(&mut self, payment_hash: &[u8; 32], payment_preimage: &[u8; 32]) {
541 self.payment_preimages.insert(payment_hash.clone(), payment_preimage.clone());
544 /// Combines this ChannelMonitor with the information contained in the other ChannelMonitor.
545 /// After a successful call this ChannelMonitor is up-to-date and is safe to use to monitor the
546 /// chain for new blocks/transactions.
547 pub fn insert_combine(&mut self, mut other: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
549 self.key_storage = match self.key_storage {
550 Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref payment_base_key, ref shutdown_pubkey, ref prev_latest_per_commitment_point, ref latest_per_commitment_point, ref mut funding_info, .. } => {
552 macro_rules! new_storage_local {
553 ($funding_info: expr) => {
555 revocation_base_key: *revocation_base_key,
556 htlc_base_key: *htlc_base_key,
557 delayed_payment_base_key: *delayed_payment_base_key,
558 payment_base_key: *payment_base_key,
559 shutdown_pubkey: *shutdown_pubkey,
560 prev_latest_per_commitment_point: *prev_latest_per_commitment_point,
561 latest_per_commitment_point: *latest_per_commitment_point,
562 funding_info: $funding_info,
567 let our_funding_info = funding_info;
568 if let Storage::Local { ref mut funding_info, .. } = other.key_storage {
569 if our_funding_info.is_some() {
570 // We should be able to compare the entire funding_txo, but in fuzztarget its trivially
571 // easy to collide the funding_txo hash and have a different scriptPubKey.
572 if funding_info.is_some() && our_funding_info.is_some() && funding_info.as_ref().unwrap().0 != our_funding_info.as_ref().unwrap().0 {
573 return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Funding transaction outputs are not identical!"));
575 new_storage_local!(our_funding_info.take())
578 return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Try to combine a Local monitor without funding_info"));
581 return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Try to combine a Local monitor with a Watchtower one !"));
584 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
585 if let Storage::Watchtower { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, ref mut sigs } = other.key_storage {
586 Storage::Watchtower {
587 revocation_base_key: *revocation_base_key,
588 htlc_base_key: *htlc_base_key,
589 sigs: sigs.drain().collect(),
592 return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Try to combine a Watchtower monitor with a Local one !"));
596 let other_min_secret = other.get_min_seen_secret();
597 let our_min_secret = self.get_min_seen_secret();
598 if our_min_secret > other_min_secret {
599 self.provide_secret(other_min_secret, other.get_secret(other_min_secret).unwrap())?;
601 if let Some(ref local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
602 if let Some(ref other_local_tx) = other.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
603 let our_commitment_number = 0xffffffffffff - ((((local_tx.tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (local_tx.tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor);
604 let other_commitment_number = 0xffffffffffff - ((((other_local_tx.tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (other_local_tx.tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ other.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor);
605 if our_commitment_number >= other_commitment_number {
606 self.key_storage = other.key_storage;
610 // TODO: We should use current_remote_commitment_number and the commitment number out of
611 // local transactions to decide how to merge
612 if our_min_secret >= other_min_secret {
613 self.their_cur_revocation_points = other.their_cur_revocation_points;
614 for (txid, htlcs) in other.remote_claimable_outpoints.drain() {
615 self.remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, htlcs);
617 if let Some(local_tx) = other.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
618 self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(local_tx);
620 if let Some(local_tx) = other.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
621 self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(local_tx);
623 self.payment_preimages = other.payment_preimages;
626 self.current_remote_commitment_number = cmp::min(self.current_remote_commitment_number, other.current_remote_commitment_number);
630 /// Panics if commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor doesn't fit in 48 bits
631 pub(super) fn set_commitment_obscure_factor(&mut self, commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64) {
632 assert!(commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor < (1 << 48));
633 self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor = commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor;
636 /// Allows this monitor to scan only for transactions which are applicable. Note that this is
637 /// optional, without it this monitor cannot be used in an SPV client, but you may wish to
638 /// avoid this (or call unset_funding_info) on a monitor you wish to send to a watchtower as it
639 /// provides slightly better privacy.
640 /// It's the responsibility of the caller to register outpoint and script with passing the former
641 /// value as key to add_update_monitor.
642 pub(super) fn set_funding_info(&mut self, funding_info: (OutPoint, Script)) {
643 self.key_storage = match self.key_storage {
644 Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref payment_base_key, ref shutdown_pubkey, ref prev_latest_per_commitment_point, ref latest_per_commitment_point, .. } => {
646 revocation_base_key: *revocation_base_key,
647 htlc_base_key: *htlc_base_key,
648 delayed_payment_base_key: *delayed_payment_base_key,
649 payment_base_key: *payment_base_key,
650 shutdown_pubkey: *shutdown_pubkey,
651 prev_latest_per_commitment_point: *prev_latest_per_commitment_point,
652 latest_per_commitment_point: *latest_per_commitment_point,
653 funding_info: Some(funding_info.clone()),
656 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
662 /// We log these base keys at channel opening to being able to rebuild redeemscript in case of leaked revoked commit tx
663 pub(super) fn set_their_base_keys(&mut self, their_htlc_base_key: &PublicKey, their_delayed_payment_base_key: &PublicKey) {
664 self.their_htlc_base_key = Some(their_htlc_base_key.clone());
665 self.their_delayed_payment_base_key = Some(their_delayed_payment_base_key.clone());
668 pub(super) fn set_their_to_self_delay(&mut self, their_to_self_delay: u16) {
669 self.their_to_self_delay = Some(their_to_self_delay);
672 pub(super) fn unset_funding_info(&mut self) {
673 self.key_storage = match self.key_storage {
674 Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref payment_base_key, ref shutdown_pubkey, ref prev_latest_per_commitment_point, ref latest_per_commitment_point, .. } => {
676 revocation_base_key: *revocation_base_key,
677 htlc_base_key: *htlc_base_key,
678 delayed_payment_base_key: *delayed_payment_base_key,
679 payment_base_key: *payment_base_key,
680 shutdown_pubkey: *shutdown_pubkey,
681 prev_latest_per_commitment_point: *prev_latest_per_commitment_point,
682 latest_per_commitment_point: *latest_per_commitment_point,
686 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
692 /// Gets the funding transaction outpoint of the channel this ChannelMonitor is monitoring for.
693 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
694 match self.key_storage {
695 Storage::Local { ref funding_info, .. } => {
697 &Some((outpoint, _)) => Some(outpoint),
701 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
707 /// Gets the sets of all outpoints which this ChannelMonitor expects to hear about spends of.
708 /// Generally useful when deserializing as during normal operation the return values of
709 /// block_connected are sufficient to ensure all relevant outpoints are being monitored (note
710 /// that the get_funding_txo outpoint and transaction must also be monitored for!).
711 pub fn get_monitored_outpoints(&self) -> Vec<(Sha256dHash, u32, &Script)> {
712 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.len() * 2);
713 for (ref txid, &(_, ref outputs)) in self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
714 for (idx, output) in outputs.iter().enumerate() {
715 res.push(((*txid).clone(), idx as u32, output));
721 /// Serializes into a vec, with various modes for the exposed pub fns
722 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W, for_local_storage: bool) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
723 //TODO: We still write out all the serialization here manually instead of using the fancy
724 //serialization framework we have, we should migrate things over to it.
725 writer.write_all(&[SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
726 writer.write_all(&[MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
728 // Set in initial Channel-object creation, so should always be set by now:
729 U48(self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor).write(writer)?;
731 match self.key_storage {
732 Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref payment_base_key, ref shutdown_pubkey, ref prev_latest_per_commitment_point, ref latest_per_commitment_point, ref funding_info } => {
733 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
734 writer.write_all(&revocation_base_key[..])?;
735 writer.write_all(&htlc_base_key[..])?;
736 writer.write_all(&delayed_payment_base_key[..])?;
737 writer.write_all(&payment_base_key[..])?;
738 writer.write_all(&shutdown_pubkey.serialize())?;
739 if let Some(ref prev_latest_per_commitment_point) = *prev_latest_per_commitment_point {
740 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
741 writer.write_all(&prev_latest_per_commitment_point.serialize())?;
743 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
745 if let Some(ref latest_per_commitment_point) = *latest_per_commitment_point {
746 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
747 writer.write_all(&latest_per_commitment_point.serialize())?;
749 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
752 &Some((ref outpoint, ref script)) => {
753 writer.write_all(&outpoint.txid[..])?;
754 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(outpoint.index))?;
755 script.write(writer)?;
758 debug_assert!(false, "Try to serialize a useless Local monitor !");
762 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => unimplemented!(),
765 writer.write_all(&self.their_htlc_base_key.as_ref().unwrap().serialize())?;
766 writer.write_all(&self.their_delayed_payment_base_key.as_ref().unwrap().serialize())?;
768 match self.their_cur_revocation_points {
769 Some((idx, pubkey, second_option)) => {
770 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(idx))?;
771 writer.write_all(&pubkey.serialize())?;
772 match second_option {
773 Some(second_pubkey) => {
774 writer.write_all(&second_pubkey.serialize())?;
777 writer.write_all(&[0; 33])?;
782 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(0))?;
786 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.our_to_self_delay))?;
787 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap()))?;
789 for &(ref secret, ref idx) in self.old_secrets.iter() {
790 writer.write_all(secret)?;
791 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*idx))?;
794 macro_rules! serialize_htlc_in_commitment {
795 ($htlc_output: expr) => {
796 writer.write_all(&[$htlc_output.offered as u8; 1])?;
797 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc_output.amount_msat))?;
798 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array($htlc_output.cltv_expiry))?;
799 writer.write_all(&$htlc_output.payment_hash)?;
800 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array($htlc_output.transaction_output_index))?;
804 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_claimable_outpoints.len() as u64))?;
805 for (ref txid, ref htlc_outputs) in self.remote_claimable_outpoints.iter() {
806 writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
807 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc_outputs.len() as u64))?;
808 for htlc_output in htlc_outputs.iter() {
809 serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output);
813 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.len() as u64))?;
814 for (ref txid, &(commitment_number, ref txouts)) in self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
815 writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
816 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(commitment_number))?;
817 (txouts.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
818 for script in txouts.iter() {
819 script.write(writer)?;
823 if for_local_storage {
824 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_hash_commitment_number.len() as u64))?;
825 for (ref payment_hash, commitment_number) in self.remote_hash_commitment_number.iter() {
826 writer.write_all(*payment_hash)?;
827 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(*commitment_number))?;
830 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(0))?;
833 macro_rules! serialize_local_tx {
834 ($local_tx: expr) => {
835 if let Err(e) = $local_tx.tx.consensus_encode(&mut WriterWriteAdaptor(writer)) {
837 encode::Error::Io(e) => return Err(e),
838 _ => panic!("local tx must have been well-formed!"),
842 writer.write_all(&$local_tx.revocation_key.serialize())?;
843 writer.write_all(&$local_tx.a_htlc_key.serialize())?;
844 writer.write_all(&$local_tx.b_htlc_key.serialize())?;
845 writer.write_all(&$local_tx.delayed_payment_key.serialize())?;
847 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($local_tx.feerate_per_kw))?;
848 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($local_tx.htlc_outputs.len() as u64))?;
849 for &(ref htlc_output, ref their_sig, ref our_sig) in $local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
850 serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output);
851 writer.write_all(&their_sig.serialize_compact(&self.secp_ctx))?;
852 writer.write_all(&our_sig.serialize_compact(&self.secp_ctx))?;
857 if let Some(ref prev_local_tx) = self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
858 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
859 serialize_local_tx!(prev_local_tx);
861 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
864 if let Some(ref cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
865 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
866 serialize_local_tx!(cur_local_tx);
868 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
871 if for_local_storage {
872 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(self.current_remote_commitment_number))?;
874 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(0))?;
877 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.payment_preimages.len() as u64))?;
878 for payment_preimage in self.payment_preimages.values() {
879 writer.write_all(payment_preimage)?;
882 self.last_block_hash.write(writer)?;
883 self.destination_script.write(writer)?;
888 /// Writes this monitor into the given writer, suitable for writing to disk.
890 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor), which
891 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
892 /// the "reorg path" (ie not just starting at the same height but starting at the highest
893 /// common block that appears on your best chain as well as on the chain which contains the
894 /// last block hash returned) upon deserializing the object!
895 pub fn write_for_disk<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
896 self.write(writer, true)
899 /// Encodes this monitor into the given writer, suitable for sending to a remote watchtower
901 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor), which
902 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
903 /// the "reorg path" (ie not just starting at the same height but starting at the highest
904 /// common block that appears on your best chain as well as on the chain which contains the
905 /// last block hash returned) upon deserializing the object!
906 pub fn write_for_watchtower<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
907 self.write(writer, false)
910 //TODO: Functions to serialize/deserialize (with different forms depending on which information
911 //we want to leave out (eg funding_txo, etc).
913 /// Can only fail if idx is < get_min_seen_secret
914 pub(super) fn get_secret(&self, idx: u64) -> Option<[u8; 32]> {
915 for i in 0..self.old_secrets.len() {
916 if (idx & (!((1 << i) - 1))) == self.old_secrets[i].1 {
917 return Some(ChannelMonitor::derive_secret(self.old_secrets[i].0, i as u8, idx))
920 assert!(idx < self.get_min_seen_secret());
924 pub(super) fn get_min_seen_secret(&self) -> u64 {
925 //TODO This can be optimized?
926 let mut min = 1 << 48;
927 for &(_, idx) in self.old_secrets.iter() {
935 pub(super) fn get_cur_remote_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
936 self.current_remote_commitment_number
939 pub(super) fn get_cur_local_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
940 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
941 0xffff_ffff_ffff - ((((local_tx.tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (local_tx.tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor)
942 } else { 0xffff_ffff_ffff }
945 /// Attempts to claim a remote commitment transaction's outputs using the revocation key and
946 /// data in remote_claimable_outpoints. Will directly claim any HTLC outputs which expire at a
947 /// height > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER. In any case, will install monitoring for
948 /// HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions.
949 fn check_spend_remote_transaction(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32) -> (Vec<Transaction>, (Sha256dHash, Vec<TxOut>), Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>) {
950 // Most secp and related errors trying to create keys means we have no hope of constructing
951 // a spend transaction...so we return no transactions to broadcast
952 let mut txn_to_broadcast = Vec::new();
953 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
954 let mut spendable_outputs = Vec::new();
956 let commitment_txid = tx.txid(); //TODO: This is gonna be a performance bottleneck for watchtowers!
957 let per_commitment_option = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(&commitment_txid);
959 macro_rules! ignore_error {
960 ( $thing : expr ) => {
963 Err(_) => return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs)
968 let commitment_number = 0xffffffffffff - ((((tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor);
969 if commitment_number >= self.get_min_seen_secret() {
970 let secret = self.get_secret(commitment_number).unwrap();
971 let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &secret));
972 let (revocation_pubkey, b_htlc_key, local_payment_key) = match self.key_storage {
973 Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, ref payment_base_key, .. } => {
974 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
975 (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_base_key))),
976 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &htlc_base_key))),
977 Some(ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &payment_base_key))))
979 Storage::Watchtower { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
980 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
981 (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &revocation_base_key)),
982 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &htlc_base_key)),
986 let delayed_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key), &self.their_delayed_payment_base_key.unwrap()));
987 let a_htlc_key = match self.their_htlc_base_key {
988 None => return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs),
989 Some(their_htlc_base_key) => ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key), &their_htlc_base_key)),
992 let revokeable_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey, self.our_to_self_delay, &delayed_key);
993 let revokeable_p2wsh = revokeable_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
995 let local_payment_p2wpkh = if let Some(payment_key) = local_payment_key {
996 // Note that the Network here is ignored as we immediately drop the address for the
997 // script_pubkey version.
998 let payment_hash160 = Hash160::from_data(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &payment_key).serialize());
999 Some(Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::All::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&payment_hash160[..]).into_script())
1002 let mut total_value = 0;
1003 let mut values = Vec::new();
1004 let mut inputs = Vec::new();
1005 let mut htlc_idxs = Vec::new();
1007 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
1008 if outp.script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh {
1010 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
1011 txid: commitment_txid,
1014 script_sig: Script::new(),
1015 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
1016 witness: Vec::new(),
1018 htlc_idxs.push(None);
1019 values.push(outp.value);
1020 total_value += outp.value;
1021 } else if Some(&outp.script_pubkey) == local_payment_p2wpkh.as_ref() {
1022 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WPKH {
1023 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: commitment_txid, vout: idx as u32 },
1024 key: local_payment_key.unwrap(),
1025 output: outp.clone(),
1030 macro_rules! sign_input {
1031 ($sighash_parts: expr, $input: expr, $htlc_idx: expr, $amount: expr) => {
1033 let (sig, redeemscript) = match self.key_storage {
1034 Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
1035 let redeemscript = if $htlc_idx.is_none() { revokeable_redeemscript.clone() } else {
1036 let htlc = &per_commitment_option.unwrap()[$htlc_idx.unwrap()];
1037 chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey)
1039 let sighash = ignore_error!(Message::from_slice(&$sighash_parts.sighash_all(&$input, &redeemscript, $amount)[..]));
1040 let revocation_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key, &revocation_base_key));
1041 (self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &revocation_key), redeemscript)
1043 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
1047 $input.witness.push(sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
1048 $input.witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1049 if $htlc_idx.is_none() {
1050 $input.witness.push(vec!(1));
1052 $input.witness.push(revocation_pubkey.serialize().to_vec());
1054 $input.witness.push(redeemscript.into_bytes());
1059 if let Some(per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
1060 inputs.reserve_exact(per_commitment_data.len());
1062 for (idx, htlc) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() {
1063 let expected_script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey);
1064 if htlc.transaction_output_index as usize >= tx.output.len() ||
1065 tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 ||
1066 tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].script_pubkey != expected_script.to_v0_p2wsh() {
1067 return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs); // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user
1070 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
1071 txid: commitment_txid,
1072 vout: htlc.transaction_output_index,
1074 script_sig: Script::new(),
1075 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
1076 witness: Vec::new(),
1078 if htlc.cltv_expiry > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER {
1080 htlc_idxs.push(Some(idx));
1081 values.push(tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].value);
1082 total_value += htlc.amount_msat / 1000;
1084 let mut single_htlc_tx = Transaction {
1088 output: vec!(TxOut {
1089 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1090 value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000, //TODO: - fee
1093 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&single_htlc_tx);
1094 sign_input!(sighash_parts, single_htlc_tx.input[0], Some(idx), htlc.amount_msat / 1000);
1095 txn_to_broadcast.push(single_htlc_tx);
1100 if !inputs.is_empty() || !txn_to_broadcast.is_empty() { // ie we're confident this is actually ours
1101 // We're definitely a remote commitment transaction!
1102 watch_outputs.append(&mut tx.output.clone());
1103 self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, (commitment_number, tx.output.iter().map(|output| { output.script_pubkey.clone() }).collect()));
1105 if inputs.is_empty() { return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs); } // Nothing to be done...probably a false positive/local tx
1107 let outputs = vec!(TxOut {
1108 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1109 value: total_value, //TODO: - fee
1111 let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
1118 let mut values_drain = values.drain(..);
1119 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx);
1121 for (input, htlc_idx) in spend_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(htlc_idxs.iter()) {
1122 let value = values_drain.next().unwrap();
1123 sign_input!(sighash_parts, input, htlc_idx, value);
1126 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
1127 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: spend_tx.txid(), vout: 0 },
1128 output: spend_tx.output[0].clone(),
1130 txn_to_broadcast.push(spend_tx);
1131 } else if let Some(per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
1132 // While this isn't useful yet, there is a potential race where if a counterparty
1133 // revokes a state at the same time as the commitment transaction for that state is
1134 // confirmed, and the watchtower receives the block before the user, the user could
1135 // upload a new ChannelMonitor with the revocation secret but the watchtower has
1136 // already processed the block, resulting in the remote_commitment_txn_on_chain entry
1137 // not being generated by the above conditional. Thus, to be safe, we go ahead and
1139 watch_outputs.append(&mut tx.output.clone());
1140 self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, (commitment_number, tx.output.iter().map(|output| { output.script_pubkey.clone() }).collect()));
1142 if let Some(revocation_points) = self.their_cur_revocation_points {
1143 let revocation_point_option =
1144 if revocation_points.0 == commitment_number { Some(&revocation_points.1) }
1145 else if let Some(point) = revocation_points.2.as_ref() {
1146 if revocation_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 { Some(point) } else { None }
1148 if let Some(revocation_point) = revocation_point_option {
1149 let (revocation_pubkey, b_htlc_key) = match self.key_storage {
1150 Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
1151 (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_base_key))),
1152 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &htlc_base_key))))
1154 Storage::Watchtower { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
1155 (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &revocation_base_key)),
1156 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &htlc_base_key)))
1159 let a_htlc_key = match self.their_htlc_base_key {
1160 None => return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs),
1161 Some(their_htlc_base_key) => ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &their_htlc_base_key)),
1164 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
1165 if outp.script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh() {
1166 match self.key_storage {
1167 Storage::Local { ref payment_base_key, .. } => {
1168 if let Ok(local_key) = chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_point, &payment_base_key) {
1169 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WPKH {
1170 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: commitment_txid, vout: idx as u32 },
1172 output: outp.clone(),
1176 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {}
1178 break; // Only to_remote ouput is claimable
1182 let mut total_value = 0;
1183 let mut values = Vec::new();
1184 let mut inputs = Vec::new();
1186 macro_rules! sign_input {
1187 ($sighash_parts: expr, $input: expr, $amount: expr, $preimage: expr) => {
1189 let (sig, redeemscript) = match self.key_storage {
1190 Storage::Local { ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
1191 let htlc = &per_commitment_option.unwrap()[$input.sequence as usize];
1192 let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey);
1193 let sighash = ignore_error!(Message::from_slice(&$sighash_parts.sighash_all(&$input, &redeemscript, $amount)[..]));
1194 let htlc_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &htlc_base_key));
1195 (self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &htlc_key), redeemscript)
1197 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
1201 $input.witness.push(sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
1202 $input.witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1203 $input.witness.push($preimage);
1204 $input.witness.push(redeemscript.into_bytes());
1209 for (idx, htlc) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() {
1210 if let Some(payment_preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
1212 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
1213 txid: commitment_txid,
1214 vout: htlc.transaction_output_index,
1216 script_sig: Script::new(),
1217 sequence: idx as u32, // reset to 0xfffffffd in sign_input
1218 witness: Vec::new(),
1220 if htlc.cltv_expiry > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER {
1222 values.push((tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].value, payment_preimage));
1223 total_value += htlc.amount_msat / 1000;
1225 let mut single_htlc_tx = Transaction {
1229 output: vec!(TxOut {
1230 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1231 value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000, //TODO: - fee
1234 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&single_htlc_tx);
1235 sign_input!(sighash_parts, single_htlc_tx.input[0], htlc.amount_msat / 1000, payment_preimage.to_vec());
1236 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
1237 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: single_htlc_tx.txid(), vout: 0 },
1238 output: single_htlc_tx.output[0].clone(),
1240 txn_to_broadcast.push(single_htlc_tx);
1245 if inputs.is_empty() { return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs); } // Nothing to be done...probably a false positive/local tx
1247 let outputs = vec!(TxOut {
1248 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1249 value: total_value, //TODO: - fee
1251 let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
1258 let mut values_drain = values.drain(..);
1259 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx);
1261 for input in spend_tx.input.iter_mut() {
1262 let value = values_drain.next().unwrap();
1263 sign_input!(sighash_parts, input, value.0, value.1.to_vec());
1266 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
1267 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: spend_tx.txid(), vout: 0 },
1268 output: spend_tx.output[0].clone(),
1270 txn_to_broadcast.push(spend_tx);
1275 (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs)
1278 /// Attempst to claim a remote HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout s outputs using the revocation key
1279 fn check_spend_remote_htlc(&self, tx: &Transaction, commitment_number: u64) -> (Option<Transaction>, Option<SpendableOutputDescriptor>) {
1280 if tx.input.len() != 1 || tx.output.len() != 1 {
1284 macro_rules! ignore_error {
1285 ( $thing : expr ) => {
1288 Err(_) => return (None, None)
1293 let secret = if let Some(secret) = self.get_secret(commitment_number) { secret } else { return (None, None); };
1294 let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &secret));
1295 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
1296 let revocation_pubkey = match self.key_storage {
1297 Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
1298 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_base_key)))
1300 Storage::Watchtower { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
1301 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &revocation_base_key))
1304 let delayed_key = match self.their_delayed_payment_base_key {
1305 None => return (None, None),
1306 Some(their_delayed_payment_base_key) => ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &their_delayed_payment_base_key)),
1308 let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), &delayed_key);
1309 let revokeable_p2wsh = redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
1310 let htlc_txid = tx.txid(); //TODO: This is gonna be a performance bottleneck for watchtowers!
1312 let mut inputs = Vec::new();
1315 if tx.output[0].script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh { //HTLC transactions have one txin, one txout
1317 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
1321 script_sig: Script::new(),
1322 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
1323 witness: Vec::new(),
1325 amount = tx.output[0].value;
1328 if !inputs.is_empty() {
1329 let outputs = vec!(TxOut {
1330 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1331 value: amount, //TODO: - fee
1334 let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
1341 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx);
1343 let sig = match self.key_storage {
1344 Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
1345 let sighash = ignore_error!(Message::from_slice(&sighash_parts.sighash_all(&spend_tx.input[0], &redeemscript, amount)[..]));
1346 let revocation_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key, &revocation_base_key));
1347 self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &revocation_key)
1349 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
1353 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
1354 spend_tx.input[0].witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1355 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(vec!(1));
1356 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(redeemscript.into_bytes());
1358 let outpoint = BitcoinOutPoint { txid: spend_tx.txid(), vout: 0 };
1359 let output = spend_tx.output[0].clone();
1360 (Some(spend_tx), Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput { outpoint, output }))
1361 } else { (None, None) }
1364 fn broadcast_by_local_state(&self, local_tx: &LocalSignedTx, per_commitment_point: &Option<PublicKey>, delayed_payment_base_key: &Option<SecretKey>) -> (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>) {
1365 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
1366 let mut spendable_outputs = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
1368 macro_rules! add_dynamic_output {
1369 ($father_tx: expr, $vout: expr) => {
1370 if let Some(ref per_commitment_point) = *per_commitment_point {
1371 if let Some(ref delayed_payment_base_key) = *delayed_payment_base_key {
1372 if let Ok(local_delayedkey) = chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base_key) {
1373 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WSH {
1374 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: $father_tx.txid(), vout: $vout },
1375 key: local_delayedkey,
1376 witness_script: chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&local_tx.revocation_key, self.our_to_self_delay, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key),
1377 to_self_delay: self.our_to_self_delay,
1378 output: $father_tx.output[$vout as usize].clone(),
1387 let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&local_tx.revocation_key, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), &local_tx.delayed_payment_key);
1388 let revokeable_p2wsh = redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
1389 for (idx, output) in local_tx.tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
1390 if output.script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh {
1391 add_dynamic_output!(local_tx.tx, idx as u32);
1396 for &(ref htlc, ref their_sig, ref our_sig) in local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1398 let mut htlc_timeout_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&local_tx.txid, local_tx.feerate_per_kw, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), htlc, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key, &local_tx.revocation_key);
1400 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
1402 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(their_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
1403 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1404 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
1405 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1407 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new());
1408 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &local_tx.a_htlc_key, &local_tx.b_htlc_key, &local_tx.revocation_key).into_bytes());
1410 add_dynamic_output!(htlc_timeout_tx, 0);
1411 res.push(htlc_timeout_tx);
1413 if let Some(payment_preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
1414 let mut htlc_success_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&local_tx.txid, local_tx.feerate_per_kw, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), htlc, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key, &local_tx.revocation_key);
1416 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
1418 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(their_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
1419 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1420 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
1421 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1423 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(payment_preimage.to_vec());
1424 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &local_tx.a_htlc_key, &local_tx.b_htlc_key, &local_tx.revocation_key).into_bytes());
1426 add_dynamic_output!(htlc_success_tx, 0);
1427 res.push(htlc_success_tx);
1432 (res, spendable_outputs)
1435 /// Attempts to claim any claimable HTLCs in a commitment transaction which was not (yet)
1436 /// revoked using data in local_claimable_outpoints.
1437 /// Should not be used if check_spend_revoked_transaction succeeds.
1438 fn check_spend_local_transaction(&self, tx: &Transaction, _height: u32) -> (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>) {
1439 let commitment_txid = tx.txid();
1440 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1441 if local_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
1442 match self.key_storage {
1443 Storage::Local { ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref latest_per_commitment_point, .. } => {
1444 return self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, latest_per_commitment_point, &Some(*delayed_payment_base_key));
1446 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
1447 return self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, &None, &None);
1452 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1453 if local_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
1454 match self.key_storage {
1455 Storage::Local { ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref prev_latest_per_commitment_point, .. } => {
1456 return self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, prev_latest_per_commitment_point, &Some(*delayed_payment_base_key));
1458 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
1459 return self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, &None, &None);
1464 (Vec::new(), Vec::new())
1467 /// Generate a spendable output event when closing_transaction get registered onchain.
1468 fn check_spend_closing_transaction(&self, tx: &Transaction) -> Option<SpendableOutputDescriptor> {
1469 if tx.input[0].sequence == 0xFFFFFFFF && !tx.input[0].witness.is_empty() && tx.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len() == 71 {
1470 match self.key_storage {
1471 Storage::Local { ref shutdown_pubkey, .. } => {
1472 let our_channel_close_key_hash = Hash160::from_data(&shutdown_pubkey.serialize());
1473 let shutdown_script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::All::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&our_channel_close_key_hash[..]).into_script();
1474 for (idx, output) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
1475 if shutdown_script == output.script_pubkey {
1476 return Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
1477 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), vout: idx as u32 },
1478 output: output.clone(),
1483 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
1484 //TODO: we need to ensure an offline client will generate the event when it
1485 // cames back online after only the watchtower saw the transaction
1492 /// Used by ChannelManager deserialization to broadcast the latest local state if it's copy of
1493 /// the Channel was out-of-date.
1494 pub(super) fn get_latest_local_commitment_txn(&self) -> Vec<Transaction> {
1495 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1496 let mut res = vec![local_tx.tx.clone()];
1497 match self.key_storage {
1498 Storage::Local { ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref prev_latest_per_commitment_point, .. } => {
1499 res.append(&mut self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, prev_latest_per_commitment_point, &Some(*delayed_payment_base_key)).0);
1501 _ => panic!("Can only broadcast by local channelmonitor"),
1509 fn block_connected(&mut self, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], height: u32, block_hash: &Sha256dHash, broadcaster: &BroadcasterInterface)-> (Vec<(Sha256dHash, Vec<TxOut>)>, Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>) {
1510 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
1511 let mut spendable_outputs = Vec::new();
1512 for tx in txn_matched {
1513 if tx.input.len() == 1 {
1514 // Assuming our keys were not leaked (in which case we're screwed no matter what),
1515 // commitment transactions and HTLC transactions will all only ever have one input,
1516 // which is an easy way to filter out any potential non-matching txn for lazy
1518 let prevout = &tx.input[0].previous_output;
1519 let mut txn: Vec<Transaction> = Vec::new();
1520 let funding_txo = match self.key_storage {
1521 Storage::Local { ref funding_info, .. } => {
1522 funding_info.clone()
1524 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
1528 if funding_txo.is_none() || (prevout.txid == funding_txo.as_ref().unwrap().0.txid && prevout.vout == funding_txo.as_ref().unwrap().0.index as u32) {
1529 let (remote_txn, new_outputs, mut spendable_output) = self.check_spend_remote_transaction(tx, height);
1531 spendable_outputs.append(&mut spendable_output);
1532 if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() {
1533 watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
1536 let (remote_txn, mut outputs) = self.check_spend_local_transaction(tx, height);
1537 spendable_outputs.append(&mut outputs);
1540 if !funding_txo.is_none() && txn.is_empty() {
1541 if let Some(spendable_output) = self.check_spend_closing_transaction(tx) {
1542 spendable_outputs.push(spendable_output);
1546 if let Some(&(commitment_number, _)) = self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.get(&prevout.txid) {
1547 let (tx, spendable_output) = self.check_spend_remote_htlc(tx, commitment_number);
1548 if let Some(tx) = tx {
1551 if let Some(spendable_output) = spendable_output {
1552 spendable_outputs.push(spendable_output);
1556 for tx in txn.iter() {
1557 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(tx);
1561 if let Some(ref cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1562 if self.would_broadcast_at_height(height) {
1563 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&cur_local_tx.tx);
1564 match self.key_storage {
1565 Storage::Local { ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref latest_per_commitment_point, .. } => {
1566 let (txs, mut outputs) = self.broadcast_by_local_state(&cur_local_tx, latest_per_commitment_point, &Some(*delayed_payment_base_key));
1567 spendable_outputs.append(&mut outputs);
1569 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
1572 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
1573 let (txs, mut outputs) = self.broadcast_by_local_state(&cur_local_tx, &None, &None);
1574 spendable_outputs.append(&mut outputs);
1576 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
1582 self.last_block_hash = block_hash.clone();
1583 (watch_outputs, spendable_outputs)
1586 pub(super) fn would_broadcast_at_height(&self, height: u32) -> bool {
1587 if let Some(ref cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1588 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in cur_local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1589 // For inbound HTLCs which we know the preimage for, we have to ensure we hit the
1590 // chain with enough room to claim the HTLC without our counterparty being able to
1591 // time out the HTLC first.
1592 // For outbound HTLCs which our counterparty hasn't failed/claimed, our primary
1593 // concern is being able to claim the corresponding inbound HTLC (on another
1594 // channel) before it expires. In fact, we don't even really care if our
1595 // counterparty here claims such an outbound HTLC after it expired as long as we
1596 // can still claim the corresponding HTLC. Thus, to avoid needlessly hitting the
1597 // chain when our counterparty is waiting for expiration to off-chain fail an HTLC
1598 // we give ourselves a few blocks of headroom after expiration before going
1599 // on-chain for an expired HTLC.
1600 // Note that, to avoid a potential attack whereby a node delays claiming an HTLC
1601 // from us until we've reached the point where we go on-chain with the
1602 // corresponding inbound HTLC, we must ensure that outbound HTLCs go on chain at
1603 // least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER blocks prior to the inbound HTLC.
1604 // aka outbound_cltv + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS == height - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
1605 // inbound_cltv == height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
1606 // outbound_cltv + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFER <= inbound_cltv - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
1607 // HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS + 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFER <= inbound_cltv - outbound_cltv
1608 // HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS + 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFER <= CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA
1609 if ( htlc.offered && htlc.cltv_expiry + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS <= height) ||
1610 (!htlc.offered && htlc.cltv_expiry <= height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER && self.payment_preimages.contains_key(&htlc.payment_hash)) {
1619 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
1621 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> ReadableArgs<R, Arc<Logger>> for (Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor) {
1622 fn read(reader: &mut R, logger: Arc<Logger>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1623 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1624 macro_rules! unwrap_obj {
1628 Err(_) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
1633 let _ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1634 let min_ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1635 if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION {
1636 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion);
1639 let commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor = <U48 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.0;
1641 let key_storage = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
1643 let revocation_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
1644 let htlc_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
1645 let delayed_payment_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
1646 let payment_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
1647 let shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
1648 let prev_latest_per_commitment_point = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
1650 1 => Some(Readable::read(reader)?),
1651 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
1653 let latest_per_commitment_point = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
1655 1 => Some(Readable::read(reader)?),
1656 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
1658 // Technically this can fail and serialize fail a round-trip, but only for serialization of
1659 // barely-init'd ChannelMonitors that we can't do anything with.
1660 let outpoint = OutPoint {
1661 txid: Readable::read(reader)?,
1662 index: Readable::read(reader)?,
1664 let funding_info = Some((outpoint, Readable::read(reader)?));
1666 revocation_base_key,
1668 delayed_payment_base_key,
1671 prev_latest_per_commitment_point,
1672 latest_per_commitment_point,
1676 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
1679 let their_htlc_base_key = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
1680 let their_delayed_payment_base_key = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
1682 let their_cur_revocation_points = {
1683 let first_idx = <U48 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.0;
1687 let first_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
1688 let second_point_slice: [u8; 33] = Readable::read(reader)?;
1689 if second_point_slice[0..32] == [0; 32] && second_point_slice[32] == 0 {
1690 Some((first_idx, first_point, None))
1692 Some((first_idx, first_point, Some(unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &second_point_slice)))))
1697 let our_to_self_delay: u16 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1698 let their_to_self_delay: Option<u16> = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
1700 let mut old_secrets = [([0; 32], 1 << 48); 49];
1701 for &mut (ref mut secret, ref mut idx) in old_secrets.iter_mut() {
1702 *secret = Readable::read(reader)?;
1703 *idx = Readable::read(reader)?;
1706 macro_rules! read_htlc_in_commitment {
1709 let offered: bool = Readable::read(reader)?;
1710 let amount_msat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1711 let cltv_expiry: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1712 let payment_hash: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(reader)?;
1713 let transaction_output_index: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1715 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1716 offered, amount_msat, cltv_expiry, payment_hash, transaction_output_index
1722 let remote_claimable_outpoints_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1723 let mut remote_claimable_outpoints = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(remote_claimable_outpoints_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 64));
1724 for _ in 0..remote_claimable_outpoints_len {
1725 let txid: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
1726 let outputs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1727 let mut outputs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
1728 for _ in 0..outputs_count {
1729 outputs.push(read_htlc_in_commitment!());
1731 if let Some(_) = remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, outputs) {
1732 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
1736 let remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1737 let mut remote_commitment_txn_on_chain = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
1738 for _ in 0..remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len {
1739 let txid: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
1740 let commitment_number = <U48 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.0;
1741 let outputs_count = <u64 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?;
1742 let mut outputs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 8));
1743 for _ in 0..outputs_count {
1744 outputs.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
1746 if let Some(_) = remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(txid, (commitment_number, outputs)) {
1747 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
1751 let remote_hash_commitment_number_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1752 let mut remote_hash_commitment_number = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(remote_hash_commitment_number_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
1753 for _ in 0..remote_hash_commitment_number_len {
1754 let txid: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(reader)?;
1755 let commitment_number = <U48 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.0;
1756 if let Some(_) = remote_hash_commitment_number.insert(txid, commitment_number) {
1757 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
1761 macro_rules! read_local_tx {
1764 let tx = match Transaction::consensus_decode(reader.by_ref()) {
1767 encode::Error::Io(ioe) => return Err(DecodeError::Io(ioe)),
1768 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
1772 if tx.input.is_empty() {
1773 // Ensure tx didn't hit the 0-input ambiguity case.
1774 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
1777 let revocation_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
1778 let a_htlc_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
1779 let b_htlc_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
1780 let delayed_payment_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
1781 let feerate_per_kw: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1783 let htlc_outputs_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1784 let mut htlc_outputs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlc_outputs_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
1785 for _ in 0..htlc_outputs_len {
1786 htlc_outputs.push((read_htlc_in_commitment!(), Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
1791 tx, revocation_key, a_htlc_key, b_htlc_key, delayed_payment_key, feerate_per_kw, htlc_outputs
1797 let prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
1800 Some(read_local_tx!())
1802 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
1805 let current_local_signed_commitment_tx = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
1808 Some(read_local_tx!())
1810 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
1813 let current_remote_commitment_number = <U48 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.0;
1815 let payment_preimages_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1816 let mut payment_preimages = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(payment_preimages_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
1817 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
1818 for _ in 0..payment_preimages_len {
1819 let preimage: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(reader)?;
1821 sha.input(&preimage);
1822 let mut hash = [0; 32];
1823 sha.result(&mut hash);
1824 if let Some(_) = payment_preimages.insert(hash, preimage) {
1825 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
1829 let last_block_hash: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
1830 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
1832 Ok((last_block_hash.clone(), ChannelMonitor {
1833 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor,
1836 their_htlc_base_key,
1837 their_delayed_payment_base_key,
1838 their_cur_revocation_points,
1841 their_to_self_delay,
1844 remote_claimable_outpoints,
1845 remote_commitment_txn_on_chain,
1846 remote_hash_commitment_number,
1848 prev_local_signed_commitment_tx,
1849 current_local_signed_commitment_tx,
1850 current_remote_commitment_number,
1865 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Script;
1866 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
1867 use crypto::digest::Digest;
1869 use ln::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor;
1870 use ln::chan_utils::{HTLCOutputInCommitment, TxCreationKeys};
1871 use util::sha2::Sha256;
1872 use util::test_utils::TestLogger;
1873 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
1874 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1, Signature};
1875 use rand::{thread_rng,Rng};
1879 fn test_per_commitment_storage() {
1880 // Test vectors from BOLT 3:
1881 let mut secrets: Vec<[u8; 32]> = Vec::new();
1882 let mut monitor: ChannelMonitor;
1883 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1884 let logger = Arc::new(TestLogger::new());
1886 macro_rules! test_secrets {
1888 let mut idx = 281474976710655;
1889 for secret in secrets.iter() {
1890 assert_eq!(monitor.get_secret(idx).unwrap(), *secret);
1893 assert_eq!(monitor.get_min_seen_secret(), idx + 1);
1894 assert!(monitor.get_secret(idx).is_none());
1899 // insert_secret correct sequence
1900 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
1903 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1904 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1905 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1908 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1909 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1910 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1913 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1914 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1915 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1918 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1919 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1920 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1923 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1924 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
1925 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1928 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1929 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
1930 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1933 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1934 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
1935 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1938 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1939 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
1940 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1945 // insert_secret #1 incorrect
1946 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
1949 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1950 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
1951 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1954 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1955 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1956 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
1957 "Previous secret did not match new one");
1961 // insert_secret #2 incorrect (#1 derived from incorrect)
1962 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
1965 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1966 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
1967 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1970 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1971 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("dddc3a8d14fddf2b68fa8c7fbad2748274937479dd0f8930d5ebb4ab6bd866a3").unwrap());
1972 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1975 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1976 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1977 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1980 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1981 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1982 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
1983 "Previous secret did not match new one");
1987 // insert_secret #3 incorrect
1988 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
1991 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1992 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1993 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1996 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1997 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1998 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2001 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2002 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c51a18b13e8527e579ec56365482c62f180b7d5760b46e9477dae59e87ed423a").unwrap());
2003 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2006 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2007 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
2008 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
2009 "Previous secret did not match new one");
2013 // insert_secret #4 incorrect (1,2,3 derived from incorrect)
2014 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
2017 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2018 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
2019 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2022 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2023 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("dddc3a8d14fddf2b68fa8c7fbad2748274937479dd0f8930d5ebb4ab6bd866a3").unwrap());
2024 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2027 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2028 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c51a18b13e8527e579ec56365482c62f180b7d5760b46e9477dae59e87ed423a").unwrap());
2029 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2032 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2033 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("ba65d7b0ef55a3ba300d4e87af29868f394f8f138d78a7011669c79b37b936f4").unwrap());
2034 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2037 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2038 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
2039 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2042 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2043 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
2044 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2047 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2048 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
2049 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2052 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2053 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
2054 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
2055 "Previous secret did not match new one");
2059 // insert_secret #5 incorrect
2060 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
2063 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2064 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
2065 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2068 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2069 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
2070 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2073 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2074 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
2075 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2078 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2079 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
2080 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2083 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2084 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("631373ad5f9ef654bb3dade742d09504c567edd24320d2fcd68e3cc47e2ff6a6").unwrap());
2085 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2088 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2089 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
2090 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
2091 "Previous secret did not match new one");
2095 // insert_secret #6 incorrect (5 derived from incorrect)
2096 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
2099 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2100 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
2101 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2104 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2105 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
2106 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2109 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2110 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
2111 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2114 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2115 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
2116 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2119 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2120 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("631373ad5f9ef654bb3dade742d09504c567edd24320d2fcd68e3cc47e2ff6a6").unwrap());
2121 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2124 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2125 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("b7e76a83668bde38b373970155c868a653304308f9896692f904a23731224bb1").unwrap());
2126 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2129 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2130 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
2131 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2134 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2135 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
2136 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
2137 "Previous secret did not match new one");
2141 // insert_secret #7 incorrect
2142 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
2145 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2146 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
2147 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2150 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2151 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
2152 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2155 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2156 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
2157 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2160 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2161 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
2162 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2165 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2166 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
2167 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2170 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2171 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
2172 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2175 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2176 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("e7971de736e01da8ed58b94c2fc216cb1dca9e326f3a96e7194fe8ea8af6c0a3").unwrap());
2177 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2180 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2181 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
2182 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
2183 "Previous secret did not match new one");
2187 // insert_secret #8 incorrect
2188 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
2191 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2192 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
2193 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2196 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2197 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
2198 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2201 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2202 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
2203 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2206 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2207 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
2208 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2211 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2212 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
2213 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2216 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2217 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
2218 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2221 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2222 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
2223 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2226 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2227 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a7efbc61aac46d34f77778bac22c8a20c6a46ca460addc49009bda875ec88fa4").unwrap());
2228 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
2229 "Previous secret did not match new one");
2234 fn test_prune_preimages() {
2235 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2236 let logger = Arc::new(TestLogger::new());
2237 let dummy_sig = Signature::from_der(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("3045022100fa86fa9a36a8cd6a7bb8f06a541787d51371d067951a9461d5404de6b928782e02201c8b7c334c10aed8976a3a465be9a28abff4cb23acbf00022295b378ce1fa3cd").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
2239 let dummy_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap());
2240 macro_rules! dummy_keys {
2244 per_commitment_point: dummy_key.clone(),
2245 revocation_key: dummy_key.clone(),
2246 a_htlc_key: dummy_key.clone(),
2247 b_htlc_key: dummy_key.clone(),
2248 a_delayed_payment_key: dummy_key.clone(),
2249 b_payment_key: dummy_key.clone(),
2254 let dummy_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
2256 let mut preimages = Vec::new();
2258 let mut rng = thread_rng();
2260 let mut preimage = [0; 32];
2261 rng.fill_bytes(&mut preimage);
2262 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
2263 sha.input(&preimage);
2264 let mut hash = [0; 32];
2265 sha.result(&mut hash);
2266 preimages.push((preimage, hash));
2270 macro_rules! preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs {
2271 ($preimages_slice: expr) => {
2273 let mut res = Vec::new();
2274 for (idx, preimage) in $preimages_slice.iter().enumerate() {
2275 res.push(HTLCOutputInCommitment {
2279 payment_hash: preimage.1.clone(),
2280 transaction_output_index: idx as u32,
2287 macro_rules! preimages_to_local_htlcs {
2288 ($preimages_slice: expr) => {
2290 let mut inp = preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!($preimages_slice);
2291 let res: Vec<_> = inp.drain(..).map(|e| { (e, dummy_sig.clone(), dummy_sig.clone()) }).collect();
2297 macro_rules! test_preimages_exist {
2298 ($preimages_slice: expr, $monitor: expr) => {
2299 for preimage in $preimages_slice {
2300 assert!($monitor.payment_preimages.contains_key(&preimage.1));
2305 // Prune with one old state and a local commitment tx holding a few overlaps with the
2307 let mut monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
2308 monitor.set_their_to_self_delay(10);
2310 monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(dummy_tx.clone(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..10]));
2311 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[5..15]), 281474976710655, dummy_key);
2312 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[15..20]), 281474976710654, dummy_key);
2313 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[17..20]), 281474976710653, dummy_key);
2314 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[18..20]), 281474976710652, dummy_key);
2315 for &(ref preimage, ref hash) in preimages.iter() {
2316 monitor.provide_payment_preimage(hash, preimage);
2319 // Now provide a secret, pruning preimages 10-15
2320 let mut secret = [0; 32];
2321 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
2322 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secret.clone()).unwrap();
2323 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 15);
2324 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
2325 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[15..20], monitor);
2327 // Now provide a further secret, pruning preimages 15-17
2328 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
2329 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secret.clone()).unwrap();
2330 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 13);
2331 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
2332 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[17..20], monitor);
2334 // Now update local commitment tx info, pruning only element 18 as we still care about the
2335 // previous commitment tx's preimages too
2336 monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(dummy_tx.clone(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..5]));
2337 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
2338 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secret.clone()).unwrap();
2339 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 12);
2340 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
2341 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[18..20], monitor);
2343 // But if we do it again, we'll prune 5-10
2344 monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(dummy_tx.clone(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..3]));
2345 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
2346 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secret.clone()).unwrap();
2347 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 5);
2348 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..5], monitor);
2351 // Further testing is done in the ChannelManager integration tests.