1 //! The logic to monitor for on-chain transactions and create the relevant claim responses lives
4 //! ChannelMonitor objects are generated by ChannelManager in response to relevant
5 //! messages/actions, and MUST be persisted to disk (and, preferably, remotely) before progress can
6 //! be made in responding to certain messages, see ManyChannelMonitor for more.
8 //! Note that ChannelMonitors are an important part of the lightning trust model and a copy of the
9 //! latest ChannelMonitor must always be actively monitoring for chain updates (and no out-of-date
10 //! ChannelMonitors should do so). Thus, if you're building rust-lightning into an HSM or other
11 //! security-domain-separated system design, you should consider having multiple paths for
12 //! ChannelMonitors to get out of the HSM and onto monitoring devices.
14 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
15 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxIn,TxOut,SigHashType,Transaction};
16 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
17 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
18 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
19 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::{self, Decodable, Encodable};
20 use bitcoin::util::hash::{Hash160, BitcoinHash,Sha256dHash};
21 use bitcoin::util::bip143;
23 use crypto::digest::Digest;
25 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Message,Signature};
26 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
29 use ln::msgs::DecodeError;
31 use ln::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment;
32 use ln::channelmanager::{HTLCSource, HTLCPreviousHopData};
33 use ln::router::{Route, RouteHop};
34 use chain::chaininterface::{ChainListener, ChainWatchInterface, BroadcasterInterface};
35 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
36 use chain::keysinterface::SpendableOutputDescriptor;
37 use util::logger::Logger;
38 use util::ser::{ReadableArgs, Readable, Writer, Writeable, WriterWriteAdaptor, U48};
39 use util::sha2::Sha256;
40 use util::{byte_utils, events};
42 use std::collections::{HashMap, hash_map};
43 use std::sync::{Arc,Mutex};
44 use std::{hash,cmp, mem};
46 /// An error enum representing a failure to persist a channel monitor update.
48 pub enum ChannelMonitorUpdateErr {
49 /// Used to indicate a temporary failure (eg connection to a watchtower failed, but is expected
50 /// to succeed at some point in the future).
52 /// Such a failure will "freeze" a channel, preventing us from revoking old states or
53 /// submitting new commitment transactions to the remote party.
54 /// ChannelManager::test_restore_channel_monitor can be used to retry the update(s) and restore
55 /// the channel to an operational state.
57 /// Note that continuing to operate when no copy of the updated ChannelMonitor could be
58 /// persisted is unsafe - if you failed to store the update on your own local disk you should
59 /// instead return PermanentFailure to force closure of the channel ASAP.
61 /// Even when a channel has been "frozen" updates to the ChannelMonitor can continue to occur
62 /// (eg if an inbound HTLC which we forwarded was claimed upstream resulting in us attempting
63 /// to claim it on this channel) and those updates must be applied wherever they can be. At
64 /// least one such updated ChannelMonitor must be persisted otherwise PermanentFailure should
65 /// be returned to get things on-chain ASAP using only the in-memory copy. Obviously updates to
66 /// the channel which would invalidate previous ChannelMonitors are not made when a channel has
69 /// Note that even if updates made after TemporaryFailure succeed you must still call
70 /// test_restore_channel_monitor to ensure you have the latest monitor and re-enable normal
71 /// channel operation.
73 /// Used to indicate no further channel monitor updates will be allowed (eg we've moved on to a
74 /// different watchtower and cannot update with all watchtowers that were previously informed
75 /// of this channel). This will force-close the channel in question.
79 /// General Err type for ChannelMonitor actions. Generally, this implies that the data provided is
80 /// inconsistent with the ChannelMonitor being called. eg for ChannelMonitor::insert_combine this
81 /// means you tried to merge two monitors for different channels or for a channel which was
82 /// restored from a backup and then generated new commitment updates.
83 /// Contains a human-readable error message.
85 pub struct MonitorUpdateError(pub &'static str);
87 /// Simple trait indicating ability to track a set of ChannelMonitors and multiplex events between
88 /// them. Generally should be implemented by keeping a local SimpleManyChannelMonitor and passing
89 /// events to it, while also taking any add_update_monitor events and passing them to some remote
92 /// Note that any updates to a channel's monitor *must* be applied to each instance of the
93 /// channel's monitor everywhere (including remote watchtowers) *before* this function returns. If
94 /// an update occurs and a remote watchtower is left with old state, it may broadcast transactions
95 /// which we have revoked, allowing our counterparty to claim all funds in the channel!
96 pub trait ManyChannelMonitor: Send + Sync {
97 /// Adds or updates a monitor for the given `funding_txo`.
99 /// Implementor must also ensure that the funding_txo outpoint is registered with any relevant
100 /// ChainWatchInterfaces such that the provided monitor receives block_connected callbacks with
101 /// any spends of it.
102 fn add_update_monitor(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr>;
104 /// Used by ChannelManager to get list of HTLC resolved onchain and which needed to be updated
105 /// with success or failure backward
106 fn fetch_pending_htlc_updated(&self) -> Vec<([u8; 32], Option<[u8; 32]>, Option<HTLCSource>)>;
109 /// A simple implementation of a ManyChannelMonitor and ChainListener. Can be used to create a
110 /// watchtower or watch our own channels.
112 /// Note that you must provide your own key by which to refer to channels.
114 /// If you're accepting remote monitors (ie are implementing a watchtower), you must verify that
115 /// users cannot overwrite a given channel by providing a duplicate key. ie you should probably
116 /// index by a PublicKey which is required to sign any updates.
118 /// If you're using this for local monitoring of your own channels, you probably want to use
119 /// `OutPoint` as the key, which will give you a ManyChannelMonitor implementation.
120 pub struct SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
121 #[cfg(test)] // Used in ChannelManager tests to manipulate channels directly
122 pub monitors: Mutex<HashMap<Key, ChannelMonitor>>,
124 monitors: Mutex<HashMap<Key, ChannelMonitor>>,
125 chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>,
126 broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>,
127 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
128 pending_htlc_updated: Mutex<HashMap<[u8; 32], Vec<(Option<[u8; 32]>, Option<HTLCSource>)>>>,
132 impl<Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash> ChainListener for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
133 fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], _indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) {
134 let block_hash = header.bitcoin_hash();
135 let mut new_events: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(0);
136 let mut htlc_updated_infos = Vec::new();
138 let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
139 for monitor in monitors.values_mut() {
140 let (txn_outputs, spendable_outputs, mut htlc_updated) = monitor.block_connected(txn_matched, height, &block_hash, &*self.broadcaster);
141 if spendable_outputs.len() > 0 {
142 new_events.push(events::Event::SpendableOutputs {
143 outputs: spendable_outputs,
147 for (ref txid, ref outputs) in txn_outputs {
148 for (idx, output) in outputs.iter().enumerate() {
149 self.chain_monitor.install_watch_outpoint((txid.clone(), idx as u32), &output.script_pubkey);
152 htlc_updated_infos.append(&mut htlc_updated);
156 let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
157 for htlc in &htlc_updated_infos {
158 if htlc.1.is_some() {
159 for monitor in monitors.values_mut() {
160 let our_short_channel_id;
161 match monitor.key_storage {
162 Storage::Local { ref short_channel_id, .. } => {
163 our_short_channel_id = *short_channel_id.as_ref().unwrap();
165 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
169 if let Some(ref htlc_source) = htlc.0 {
171 &HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref source) => {
172 if source.short_channel_id == our_short_channel_id {
173 monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&htlc.2, &htlc.1.unwrap());
174 // We maybe call again same monitor, to be sure that in case of 2 remote commitment tx from different channels
175 // in same block we claim well HTLCs on downstream one
176 // txn_outputs and htlc_data are there irrelevant
177 let (_, spendable_outputs, _) = monitor.block_connected(txn_matched, height, &block_hash, &*self.broadcaster);
178 if spendable_outputs.len() > 0 {
179 new_events.push(events::Event::SpendableOutputs {
180 outputs: spendable_outputs,
186 &HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
196 // ChannelManager will just need to fetch pending_htlc_updated and pass state backward
197 let mut pending_htlc_updated = self.pending_htlc_updated.lock().unwrap();
198 for htlc in htlc_updated_infos.drain(..) {
199 match pending_htlc_updated.entry(htlc.2) {
200 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut e) => {
201 // In case of reorg we may have htlc outputs solved in a different way so
202 // Vacant or Occupied we update key-value with last state of tx resolvation
203 // We need also to keep only one state per-htlc so prune old one in case of
205 e.get_mut().retain(|htlc_data| {
206 if let Some(ref new_htlc_source) = htlc.0 {
207 if let Some(ref old_htlc_source) = htlc_data.1 {
208 if new_htlc_source == old_htlc_source{
215 e.get_mut().push((htlc.1, htlc.0));
217 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
218 e.insert(vec![(htlc.1, htlc.0)]);
223 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
224 pending_events.append(&mut new_events);
227 fn block_disconnected(&self, _: &BlockHeader) { }
230 impl<Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash + 'static> SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
231 /// Creates a new object which can be used to monitor several channels given the chain
232 /// interface with which to register to receive notifications.
233 pub fn new(chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>, broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>, logger: Arc<Logger>) -> Arc<SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key>> {
234 let res = Arc::new(SimpleManyChannelMonitor {
235 monitors: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
238 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
239 pending_htlc_updated: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
242 let weak_res = Arc::downgrade(&res);
243 res.chain_monitor.register_listener(weak_res);
247 /// Adds or udpates the monitor which monitors the channel referred to by the given key.
248 pub fn add_update_monitor_by_key(&self, key: Key, monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
249 let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
250 match monitors.get_mut(&key) {
251 Some(orig_monitor) => {
252 log_trace!(self, "Updating Channel Monitor for channel {}", log_funding_info!(monitor.key_storage));
253 return orig_monitor.insert_combine(monitor);
257 match monitor.key_storage {
258 Storage::Local { ref funding_info, .. } => {
261 return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Try to update a useless monitor without funding_txo !"));
263 &Some((ref outpoint, ref script)) => {
264 log_trace!(self, "Got new Channel Monitor for channel {}", log_bytes!(outpoint.to_channel_id()[..]));
265 self.chain_monitor.install_watch_tx(&outpoint.txid, script);
266 self.chain_monitor.install_watch_outpoint((outpoint.txid, outpoint.index as u32), script);
270 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
271 self.chain_monitor.watch_all_txn();
274 monitors.insert(key, monitor);
279 impl ManyChannelMonitor for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<OutPoint> {
280 fn add_update_monitor(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr> {
281 match self.add_update_monitor_by_key(funding_txo, monitor) {
283 Err(_) => Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure),
287 fn fetch_pending_htlc_updated(&self) -> Vec<([u8; 32], Option<[u8; 32]>, Option<HTLCSource>)> {
288 let mut updated = self.pending_htlc_updated.lock().unwrap();
289 let mut pending_htlcs_updated = Vec::with_capacity(updated.len());
290 for (k, v) in updated.drain() {
292 pending_htlcs_updated.push((k, htlc_data.0, htlc_data.1));
295 pending_htlcs_updated
299 impl<Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash> events::EventsProvider for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
300 fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
301 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
302 let mut ret = Vec::new();
303 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut *pending_events);
308 /// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, don't try to claim it in a shared transaction,
309 /// instead claiming it in its own individual transaction.
310 const CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 12;
311 /// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, force-close the channel to broadcast the
312 /// HTLC-Success transaction.
313 /// In other words, this is an upper bound on how many blocks we think it can take us to get a
314 /// transaction confirmed (and we use it in a few more, equivalent, places).
315 pub(crate) const CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 6;
316 /// Number of blocks by which point we expect our counterparty to have seen new blocks on the
317 /// network and done a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance (+ we've updated all our
318 /// copies of ChannelMonitors, including watchtowers).
319 pub(crate) const HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS: u32 = 3;
321 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
324 revocation_base_key: SecretKey,
325 htlc_base_key: SecretKey,
326 delayed_payment_base_key: SecretKey,
327 payment_base_key: SecretKey,
328 shutdown_pubkey: PublicKey,
329 prev_latest_per_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
330 latest_per_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
331 funding_info: Option<(OutPoint, Script)>,
332 short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
335 revocation_base_key: PublicKey,
336 htlc_base_key: PublicKey,
337 sigs: HashMap<Sha256dHash, Signature>,
341 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
342 struct LocalSignedTx {
343 /// txid of the transaction in tx, just used to make comparison faster
346 revocation_key: PublicKey,
347 a_htlc_key: PublicKey,
348 b_htlc_key: PublicKey,
349 delayed_payment_key: PublicKey,
351 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Signature, Signature, Option<HTLCSource>)>,
354 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
355 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
357 /// A ChannelMonitor handles chain events (blocks connected and disconnected) and generates
358 /// on-chain transactions to ensure no loss of funds occurs.
360 /// You MUST ensure that no ChannelMonitors for a given channel anywhere contain out-of-date
361 /// information and are actively monitoring the chain.
363 pub struct ChannelMonitor {
364 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64,
366 key_storage: Storage,
367 their_htlc_base_key: Option<PublicKey>,
368 their_delayed_payment_base_key: Option<PublicKey>,
369 // first is the idx of the first of the two revocation points
370 their_cur_revocation_points: Option<(u64, PublicKey, Option<PublicKey>)>,
372 our_to_self_delay: u16,
373 their_to_self_delay: Option<u16>,
375 old_secrets: [([u8; 32], u64); 49],
376 remote_claimable_outpoints: HashMap<Sha256dHash, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<HTLCSource>)>>,
377 /// We cannot identify HTLC-Success or HTLC-Timeout transactions by themselves on the chain.
378 /// Nor can we figure out their commitment numbers without the commitment transaction they are
379 /// spending. Thus, in order to claim them via revocation key, we track all the remote
380 /// commitment transactions which we find on-chain, mapping them to the commitment number which
381 /// can be used to derive the revocation key and claim the transactions.
382 remote_commitment_txn_on_chain: HashMap<Sha256dHash, (u64, Vec<Script>)>,
383 /// Cache used to make pruning of payment_preimages faster.
384 /// Maps payment_hash values to commitment numbers for remote transactions for non-revoked
385 /// remote transactions (ie should remain pretty small).
386 /// Serialized to disk but should generally not be sent to Watchtowers.
387 remote_hash_commitment_number: HashMap<[u8; 32], u64>,
389 // We store two local commitment transactions to avoid any race conditions where we may update
390 // some monitors (potentially on watchtowers) but then fail to update others, resulting in the
391 // various monitors for one channel being out of sync, and us broadcasting a local
392 // transaction for which we have deleted claim information on some watchtowers.
393 prev_local_signed_commitment_tx: Option<LocalSignedTx>,
394 current_local_signed_commitment_tx: Option<LocalSignedTx>,
396 // Used just for ChannelManager to make sure it has the latest channel data during
398 current_remote_commitment_number: u64,
400 payment_preimages: HashMap<[u8; 32], [u8; 32]>,
402 destination_script: Script,
404 // We simply modify last_block_hash in Channel's block_connected so that serialization is
405 // consistent but hopefully the users' copy handles block_connected in a consistent way.
406 // (we do *not*, however, update them in insert_combine to ensure any local user copies keep
407 // their last_block_hash from its state and not based on updated copies that didn't run through
408 // the full block_connected).
409 pub(crate) last_block_hash: Sha256dHash,
410 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>, //TODO: dedup this a bit...
414 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
415 /// Used only in testing and fuzztarget to check serialization roundtrips don't change the
416 /// underlying object
417 impl PartialEq for ChannelMonitor {
418 fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
419 if self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor != other.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor ||
420 self.key_storage != other.key_storage ||
421 self.their_htlc_base_key != other.their_htlc_base_key ||
422 self.their_delayed_payment_base_key != other.their_delayed_payment_base_key ||
423 self.their_cur_revocation_points != other.their_cur_revocation_points ||
424 self.our_to_self_delay != other.our_to_self_delay ||
425 self.their_to_self_delay != other.their_to_self_delay ||
426 self.remote_claimable_outpoints != other.remote_claimable_outpoints ||
427 self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain != other.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain ||
428 self.remote_hash_commitment_number != other.remote_hash_commitment_number ||
429 self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx != other.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx ||
430 self.current_remote_commitment_number != other.current_remote_commitment_number ||
431 self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx != other.current_local_signed_commitment_tx ||
432 self.payment_preimages != other.payment_preimages ||
433 self.destination_script != other.destination_script
437 for (&(ref secret, ref idx), &(ref o_secret, ref o_idx)) in self.old_secrets.iter().zip(other.old_secrets.iter()) {
438 if secret != o_secret || idx != o_idx {
447 impl ChannelMonitor {
448 pub(super) fn new(revocation_base_key: &SecretKey, delayed_payment_base_key: &SecretKey, htlc_base_key: &SecretKey, payment_base_key: &SecretKey, shutdown_pubkey: &PublicKey, our_to_self_delay: u16, destination_script: Script, logger: Arc<Logger>) -> ChannelMonitor {
450 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: 0,
452 key_storage: Storage::Local {
453 revocation_base_key: revocation_base_key.clone(),
454 htlc_base_key: htlc_base_key.clone(),
455 delayed_payment_base_key: delayed_payment_base_key.clone(),
456 payment_base_key: payment_base_key.clone(),
457 shutdown_pubkey: shutdown_pubkey.clone(),
458 prev_latest_per_commitment_point: None,
459 latest_per_commitment_point: None,
461 short_channel_id: None,
463 their_htlc_base_key: None,
464 their_delayed_payment_base_key: None,
465 their_cur_revocation_points: None,
467 our_to_self_delay: our_to_self_delay,
468 their_to_self_delay: None,
470 old_secrets: [([0; 32], 1 << 48); 49],
471 remote_claimable_outpoints: HashMap::new(),
472 remote_commitment_txn_on_chain: HashMap::new(),
473 remote_hash_commitment_number: HashMap::new(),
475 prev_local_signed_commitment_tx: None,
476 current_local_signed_commitment_tx: None,
477 current_remote_commitment_number: 1 << 48,
479 payment_preimages: HashMap::new(),
480 destination_script: destination_script,
482 last_block_hash: Default::default(),
483 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
489 fn place_secret(idx: u64) -> u8 {
491 if idx & (1 << i) == (1 << i) {
499 fn derive_secret(secret: [u8; 32], bits: u8, idx: u64) -> [u8; 32] {
500 let mut res: [u8; 32] = secret;
502 let bitpos = bits - 1 - i;
503 if idx & (1 << bitpos) == (1 << bitpos) {
504 res[(bitpos / 8) as usize] ^= 1 << (bitpos & 7);
505 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
507 sha.result(&mut res);
513 /// Inserts a revocation secret into this channel monitor. Prunes old preimages if neither
514 /// needed by local commitment transactions HTCLs nor by remote ones. Unless we haven't already seen remote
515 /// commitment transaction's secret, they are de facto pruned (we can use revocation key).
516 pub(super) fn provide_secret(&mut self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
517 let pos = ChannelMonitor::place_secret(idx);
519 let (old_secret, old_idx) = self.old_secrets[i as usize];
520 if ChannelMonitor::derive_secret(secret, pos, old_idx) != old_secret {
521 return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Previous secret did not match new one"));
524 self.old_secrets[pos as usize] = (secret, idx);
526 if !self.payment_preimages.is_empty() {
527 let local_signed_commitment_tx = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx.as_ref().expect("Channel needs at least an initial commitment tx !");
528 let prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.as_ref();
529 let min_idx = self.get_min_seen_secret();
530 let remote_hash_commitment_number = &mut self.remote_hash_commitment_number;
532 self.payment_preimages.retain(|&k, _| {
533 for &(ref htlc, _, _, _) in &local_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs {
534 if k == htlc.payment_hash {
538 if let Some(prev_local_commitment_tx) = prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
539 for &(ref htlc, _, _, _) in prev_local_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
540 if k == htlc.payment_hash {
545 let contains = if let Some(cn) = remote_hash_commitment_number.get(&k) {
552 remote_hash_commitment_number.remove(&k);
561 /// Informs this monitor of the latest remote (ie non-broadcastable) commitment transaction.
562 /// The monitor watches for it to be broadcasted and then uses the HTLC information (and
563 /// possibly future revocation/preimage information) to claim outputs where possible.
564 /// We cache also the mapping hash:commitment number to lighten pruning of old preimages by watchtowers.
565 pub(super) fn provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, unsigned_commitment_tx: &Transaction, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<HTLCSource>)>, commitment_number: u64, their_revocation_point: PublicKey) {
566 // TODO: Encrypt the htlc_outputs data with the single-hash of the commitment transaction
567 // so that a remote monitor doesn't learn anything unless there is a malicious close.
568 // (only maybe, sadly we cant do the same for local info, as we need to be aware of
570 for &(ref htlc, _) in &htlc_outputs {
571 self.remote_hash_commitment_number.insert(htlc.payment_hash, commitment_number);
573 // We prune old claimable outpoints, useless to pass backward state when remote commitment
574 // tx get revoked, optimize for storage
575 for (_, htlc_data) in self.remote_claimable_outpoints.iter_mut() {
576 for &mut(_, ref mut source) in htlc_data.iter_mut() {
580 self.remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(unsigned_commitment_tx.txid(), htlc_outputs);
581 self.current_remote_commitment_number = commitment_number;
582 //TODO: Merge this into the other per-remote-transaction output storage stuff
583 match self.their_cur_revocation_points {
584 Some(old_points) => {
585 if old_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 {
586 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0, old_points.1, Some(their_revocation_point)));
587 } else if old_points.0 == commitment_number + 2 {
588 if let Some(old_second_point) = old_points.2 {
589 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0 - 1, old_second_point, Some(their_revocation_point)));
591 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None));
594 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None));
598 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None));
603 /// Informs this monitor of the latest local (ie broadcastable) commitment transaction. The
604 /// monitor watches for timeouts and may broadcast it if we approach such a timeout. Thus, it
605 /// is important that any clones of this channel monitor (including remote clones) by kept
606 /// up-to-date as our local commitment transaction is updated.
607 /// Panics if set_their_to_self_delay has never been called.
608 /// Also update Storage with latest local per_commitment_point to derive local_delayedkey in
609 /// case of onchain HTLC tx
610 pub(super) fn provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, signed_commitment_tx: Transaction, local_keys: chan_utils::TxCreationKeys, feerate_per_kw: u64, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Signature, Signature, Option<HTLCSource>)>) {
611 assert!(self.their_to_self_delay.is_some());
612 self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx.take();
613 self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(LocalSignedTx {
614 txid: signed_commitment_tx.txid(),
615 tx: signed_commitment_tx,
616 revocation_key: local_keys.revocation_key,
617 a_htlc_key: local_keys.a_htlc_key,
618 b_htlc_key: local_keys.b_htlc_key,
619 delayed_payment_key: local_keys.a_delayed_payment_key,
623 self.key_storage = if let Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref payment_base_key, ref shutdown_pubkey, ref latest_per_commitment_point, ref mut funding_info, ref short_channel_id, .. } = self.key_storage {
625 revocation_base_key: *revocation_base_key,
626 htlc_base_key: *htlc_base_key,
627 delayed_payment_base_key: *delayed_payment_base_key,
628 payment_base_key: *payment_base_key,
629 shutdown_pubkey: *shutdown_pubkey,
630 prev_latest_per_commitment_point: *latest_per_commitment_point,
631 latest_per_commitment_point: Some(local_keys.per_commitment_point),
632 funding_info: funding_info.take(),
633 short_channel_id: *short_channel_id,
635 } else { unimplemented!(); };
638 /// Provides a payment_hash->payment_preimage mapping. Will be automatically pruned when all
639 /// commitment_tx_infos which contain the payment hash have been revoked.
640 pub(super) fn provide_payment_preimage(&mut self, payment_hash: &[u8; 32], payment_preimage: &[u8; 32]) {
641 self.payment_preimages.insert(payment_hash.clone(), payment_preimage.clone());
644 /// Combines this ChannelMonitor with the information contained in the other ChannelMonitor.
645 /// After a successful call this ChannelMonitor is up-to-date and is safe to use to monitor the
646 /// chain for new blocks/transactions.
647 pub fn insert_combine(&mut self, mut other: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
649 self.key_storage = match self.key_storage {
650 Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref payment_base_key, ref shutdown_pubkey, ref prev_latest_per_commitment_point, ref latest_per_commitment_point, ref mut funding_info, ref mut short_channel_id, .. } => {
652 macro_rules! new_storage_local {
653 ($funding_info: expr, $short_channel_id: expr) => {
655 revocation_base_key: *revocation_base_key,
656 htlc_base_key: *htlc_base_key,
657 delayed_payment_base_key: *delayed_payment_base_key,
658 payment_base_key: *payment_base_key,
659 shutdown_pubkey: *shutdown_pubkey,
660 prev_latest_per_commitment_point: *prev_latest_per_commitment_point,
661 latest_per_commitment_point: *latest_per_commitment_point,
662 funding_info: $funding_info,
663 short_channel_id: $short_channel_id,
668 let our_funding_info = funding_info;
669 let our_short_channel_id = short_channel_id;
670 if let Storage::Local { ref mut funding_info, ref mut short_channel_id, .. } = other.key_storage {
671 if our_funding_info.is_some() {
672 // We should be able to compare the entire funding_txo, but in fuzztarget its trivially
673 // easy to collide the funding_txo hash and have a different scriptPubKey.
674 if funding_info.is_some() && our_funding_info.is_some() && funding_info.as_ref().unwrap().0 != our_funding_info.as_ref().unwrap().0 {
675 return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Funding transaction outputs are not identical!"));
677 new_storage_local!(our_funding_info.take(), our_short_channel_id.take())
680 new_storage_local!(funding_info.take(), short_channel_id.take())
683 return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Try to combine a Local monitor with a Watchtower one !"));
686 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
687 if let Storage::Watchtower { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, ref mut sigs } = other.key_storage {
688 Storage::Watchtower {
689 revocation_base_key: *revocation_base_key,
690 htlc_base_key: *htlc_base_key,
691 sigs: sigs.drain().collect(),
694 return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Try to combine a Watchtower monitor with a Local one !"));
698 let other_min_secret = other.get_min_seen_secret();
699 let our_min_secret = self.get_min_seen_secret();
700 if our_min_secret > other_min_secret {
701 self.provide_secret(other_min_secret, other.get_secret(other_min_secret).unwrap())?;
703 if let Some(ref local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
704 if let Some(ref other_local_tx) = other.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
705 let our_commitment_number = 0xffffffffffff - ((((local_tx.tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (local_tx.tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor);
706 let other_commitment_number = 0xffffffffffff - ((((other_local_tx.tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (other_local_tx.tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ other.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor);
707 if our_commitment_number >= other_commitment_number {
708 self.key_storage = other.key_storage;
712 // TODO: We should use current_remote_commitment_number and the commitment number out of
713 // local transactions to decide how to merge
714 if our_min_secret >= other_min_secret {
715 self.their_cur_revocation_points = other.their_cur_revocation_points;
716 for (txid, htlcs) in other.remote_claimable_outpoints.drain() {
717 self.remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, htlcs);
719 if let Some(local_tx) = other.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
720 self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(local_tx);
722 if let Some(local_tx) = other.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
723 self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(local_tx);
725 self.payment_preimages = other.payment_preimages;
728 self.current_remote_commitment_number = cmp::min(self.current_remote_commitment_number, other.current_remote_commitment_number);
732 /// Panics if commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor doesn't fit in 48 bits
733 pub(super) fn set_commitment_obscure_factor(&mut self, commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64) {
734 assert!(commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor < (1 << 48));
735 self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor = commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor;
738 /// Allows this monitor to scan only for transactions which are applicable. Note that this is
739 /// optional, without it this monitor cannot be used in an SPV client, but you may wish to
740 /// avoid this (or call unset_funding_info) on a monitor you wish to send to a watchtower as it
741 /// provides slightly better privacy.
742 /// It's the responsibility of the caller to register outpoint and script with passing the former
743 /// value as key to add_update_monitor.
744 pub(super) fn set_funding_info(&mut self, funding_info: (OutPoint, Script)) {
745 self.key_storage = match self.key_storage {
746 Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref payment_base_key, ref shutdown_pubkey, ref prev_latest_per_commitment_point, ref latest_per_commitment_point, short_channel_id, .. } => {
748 revocation_base_key: *revocation_base_key,
749 htlc_base_key: *htlc_base_key,
750 delayed_payment_base_key: *delayed_payment_base_key,
751 payment_base_key: *payment_base_key,
752 shutdown_pubkey: *shutdown_pubkey,
753 prev_latest_per_commitment_point: *prev_latest_per_commitment_point,
754 latest_per_commitment_point: *latest_per_commitment_point,
755 funding_info: Some(funding_info.clone()),
756 short_channel_id: short_channel_id,
759 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
765 /// Allows this monitor to get preimages from upstream ChannelMonitor (linked by ManyChannelMonitor)
766 /// in cas of onchain remote commitment tx resolved by a HTLC-Succes one but you may wish to
767 /// avoid this (or call unset_funding_info) on a monitor you wish to send to a watchtower as it
768 /// provides slightly better privacy.
769 pub(super) fn set_short_channel_id(&mut self, short_channel_id: u64) {
770 self.key_storage = match self.key_storage {
771 Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref payment_base_key, ref shutdown_pubkey, ref prev_latest_per_commitment_point, ref latest_per_commitment_point, ref mut funding_info, .. } => {
773 revocation_base_key: *revocation_base_key,
774 htlc_base_key: *htlc_base_key,
775 delayed_payment_base_key: *delayed_payment_base_key,
776 payment_base_key: *payment_base_key,
777 shutdown_pubkey: *shutdown_pubkey,
778 prev_latest_per_commitment_point: *prev_latest_per_commitment_point,
779 latest_per_commitment_point: *latest_per_commitment_point,
780 funding_info: funding_info.take(),
781 short_channel_id: Some(short_channel_id),
784 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
790 /// We log these base keys at channel opening to being able to rebuild redeemscript in case of leaked revoked commit tx
791 pub(super) fn set_their_base_keys(&mut self, their_htlc_base_key: &PublicKey, their_delayed_payment_base_key: &PublicKey) {
792 self.their_htlc_base_key = Some(their_htlc_base_key.clone());
793 self.their_delayed_payment_base_key = Some(their_delayed_payment_base_key.clone());
796 pub(super) fn set_their_to_self_delay(&mut self, their_to_self_delay: u16) {
797 self.their_to_self_delay = Some(their_to_self_delay);
800 pub(super) fn unset_funding_info(&mut self) {
801 self.key_storage = match self.key_storage {
802 Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref payment_base_key, ref shutdown_pubkey, ref prev_latest_per_commitment_point, ref latest_per_commitment_point, short_channel_id, .. } => {
804 revocation_base_key: *revocation_base_key,
805 htlc_base_key: *htlc_base_key,
806 delayed_payment_base_key: *delayed_payment_base_key,
807 payment_base_key: *payment_base_key,
808 shutdown_pubkey: *shutdown_pubkey,
809 prev_latest_per_commitment_point: *prev_latest_per_commitment_point,
810 latest_per_commitment_point: *latest_per_commitment_point,
812 short_channel_id: short_channel_id,
815 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
821 /// Gets the funding transaction outpoint of the channel this ChannelMonitor is monitoring for.
822 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
823 match self.key_storage {
824 Storage::Local { ref funding_info, .. } => {
826 &Some((outpoint, _)) => Some(outpoint),
830 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
836 /// Gets the sets of all outpoints which this ChannelMonitor expects to hear about spends of.
837 /// Generally useful when deserializing as during normal operation the return values of
838 /// block_connected are sufficient to ensure all relevant outpoints are being monitored (note
839 /// that the get_funding_txo outpoint and transaction must also be monitored for!).
840 pub fn get_monitored_outpoints(&self) -> Vec<(Sha256dHash, u32, &Script)> {
841 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.len() * 2);
842 for (ref txid, &(_, ref outputs)) in self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
843 for (idx, output) in outputs.iter().enumerate() {
844 res.push(((*txid).clone(), idx as u32, output));
850 /// Serializes into a vec, with various modes for the exposed pub fns
851 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W, for_local_storage: bool) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
852 //TODO: We still write out all the serialization here manually instead of using the fancy
853 //serialization framework we have, we should migrate things over to it.
854 writer.write_all(&[SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
855 writer.write_all(&[MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
857 // Set in initial Channel-object creation, so should always be set by now:
858 U48(self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor).write(writer)?;
860 match self.key_storage {
861 Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref payment_base_key, ref shutdown_pubkey, ref prev_latest_per_commitment_point, ref latest_per_commitment_point, ref funding_info, ref short_channel_id } => {
862 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
863 writer.write_all(&revocation_base_key[..])?;
864 writer.write_all(&htlc_base_key[..])?;
865 writer.write_all(&delayed_payment_base_key[..])?;
866 writer.write_all(&payment_base_key[..])?;
867 writer.write_all(&shutdown_pubkey.serialize())?;
868 if let Some(ref prev_latest_per_commitment_point) = *prev_latest_per_commitment_point {
869 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
870 writer.write_all(&prev_latest_per_commitment_point.serialize())?;
872 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
874 if let Some(ref latest_per_commitment_point) = *latest_per_commitment_point {
875 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
876 writer.write_all(&latest_per_commitment_point.serialize())?;
878 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
881 &Some((ref outpoint, ref script)) => {
882 writer.write_all(&outpoint.txid[..])?;
883 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(outpoint.index))?;
884 script.write(writer)?;
887 debug_assert!(false, "Try to serialize a useless Local monitor !");
890 match short_channel_id {
891 &Some(short_channel_id) => {
892 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
893 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(short_channel_id))?;
896 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
900 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => unimplemented!(),
903 writer.write_all(&self.their_htlc_base_key.as_ref().unwrap().serialize())?;
904 writer.write_all(&self.their_delayed_payment_base_key.as_ref().unwrap().serialize())?;
906 match self.their_cur_revocation_points {
907 Some((idx, pubkey, second_option)) => {
908 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(idx))?;
909 writer.write_all(&pubkey.serialize())?;
910 match second_option {
911 Some(second_pubkey) => {
912 writer.write_all(&second_pubkey.serialize())?;
915 writer.write_all(&[0; 33])?;
920 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(0))?;
924 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.our_to_self_delay))?;
925 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap()))?;
927 for &(ref secret, ref idx) in self.old_secrets.iter() {
928 writer.write_all(secret)?;
929 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*idx))?;
932 macro_rules! serialize_htlc_in_commitment {
933 ($htlc_output: expr) => {
934 writer.write_all(&[$htlc_output.offered as u8; 1])?;
935 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc_output.amount_msat))?;
936 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array($htlc_output.cltv_expiry))?;
937 writer.write_all(&$htlc_output.payment_hash)?;
938 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array($htlc_output.transaction_output_index))?;
942 macro_rules! serialize_htlc_source {
943 ($htlc_source: expr) => {
944 if let &Some(ref source) = $htlc_source {
945 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
947 &HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref source) => { serialize_htlc_previous_hop_data!(source); },
948 &HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref route, ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat } => { serialize_htlc_outbound_route!(route, session_priv, *first_hop_htlc_msat); },
951 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
956 macro_rules! serialize_htlc_previous_hop_data {
957 ($htlc_source: expr) => {
958 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
959 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc_source.short_channel_id))?;
960 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc_source.htlc_id))?;
961 writer.write_all(&$htlc_source.incoming_packet_shared_secret[..])?;
965 macro_rules! serialize_htlc_outbound_route {
966 ($route: expr, $session_priv: expr, $first_hop_htlc_msat: expr) => {
967 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
968 serialize_route!($route);
969 writer.write_all(&$session_priv[..])?;
970 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($first_hop_htlc_msat))?;
974 macro_rules! serialize_route {
976 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($route.hops.len() as u64))?;
977 for hop in &$route.hops {
978 writer.write_all(&hop.pubkey.serialize())?;
979 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(hop.short_channel_id))?;
980 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(hop.fee_msat))?;
981 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(hop.cltv_expiry_delta))?;
986 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_claimable_outpoints.len() as u64))?;
987 for (ref txid, ref htlc_infos) in self.remote_claimable_outpoints.iter() {
988 writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
989 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc_infos.len() as u64))?;
990 for &(ref htlc_output, ref htlc_source) in htlc_infos.iter() {
991 serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output);
992 serialize_htlc_source!(htlc_source);
996 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.len() as u64))?;
997 for (ref txid, &(commitment_number, ref txouts)) in self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
998 writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
999 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(commitment_number))?;
1000 (txouts.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
1001 for script in txouts.iter() {
1002 script.write(writer)?;
1006 if for_local_storage {
1007 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_hash_commitment_number.len() as u64))?;
1008 for (ref payment_hash, commitment_number) in self.remote_hash_commitment_number.iter() {
1009 writer.write_all(*payment_hash)?;
1010 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(*commitment_number))?;
1013 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(0))?;
1016 macro_rules! serialize_local_tx {
1017 ($local_tx: expr) => {
1018 if let Err(e) = $local_tx.tx.consensus_encode(&mut WriterWriteAdaptor(writer)) {
1020 encode::Error::Io(e) => return Err(e),
1021 _ => panic!("local tx must have been well-formed!"),
1025 writer.write_all(&$local_tx.revocation_key.serialize())?;
1026 writer.write_all(&$local_tx.a_htlc_key.serialize())?;
1027 writer.write_all(&$local_tx.b_htlc_key.serialize())?;
1028 writer.write_all(&$local_tx.delayed_payment_key.serialize())?;
1030 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($local_tx.feerate_per_kw))?;
1031 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($local_tx.htlc_outputs.len() as u64))?;
1032 for &(ref htlc_output, ref their_sig, ref our_sig, ref htlc_source) in $local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1033 serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output);
1034 writer.write_all(&their_sig.serialize_compact(&self.secp_ctx))?;
1035 writer.write_all(&our_sig.serialize_compact(&self.secp_ctx))?;
1036 serialize_htlc_source!(htlc_source);
1041 if let Some(ref prev_local_tx) = self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1042 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
1043 serialize_local_tx!(prev_local_tx);
1045 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
1048 if let Some(ref cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1049 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
1050 serialize_local_tx!(cur_local_tx);
1052 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
1055 if for_local_storage {
1056 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(self.current_remote_commitment_number))?;
1058 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(0))?;
1061 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.payment_preimages.len() as u64))?;
1062 for payment_preimage in self.payment_preimages.values() {
1063 writer.write_all(payment_preimage)?;
1066 self.last_block_hash.write(writer)?;
1067 self.destination_script.write(writer)?;
1072 /// Writes this monitor into the given writer, suitable for writing to disk.
1074 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor), which
1075 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
1076 /// the "reorg path" (ie not just starting at the same height but starting at the highest
1077 /// common block that appears on your best chain as well as on the chain which contains the
1078 /// last block hash returned) upon deserializing the object!
1079 pub fn write_for_disk<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
1080 self.write(writer, true)
1083 /// Encodes this monitor into the given writer, suitable for sending to a remote watchtower
1085 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor), which
1086 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
1087 /// the "reorg path" (ie not just starting at the same height but starting at the highest
1088 /// common block that appears on your best chain as well as on the chain which contains the
1089 /// last block hash returned) upon deserializing the object!
1090 pub fn write_for_watchtower<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
1091 self.write(writer, false)
1094 //TODO: Functions to serialize/deserialize (with different forms depending on which information
1095 //we want to leave out (eg funding_txo, etc).
1097 /// Can only fail if idx is < get_min_seen_secret
1098 pub(super) fn get_secret(&self, idx: u64) -> Option<[u8; 32]> {
1099 for i in 0..self.old_secrets.len() {
1100 if (idx & (!((1 << i) - 1))) == self.old_secrets[i].1 {
1101 return Some(ChannelMonitor::derive_secret(self.old_secrets[i].0, i as u8, idx))
1104 assert!(idx < self.get_min_seen_secret());
1108 pub(super) fn get_min_seen_secret(&self) -> u64 {
1109 //TODO This can be optimized?
1110 let mut min = 1 << 48;
1111 for &(_, idx) in self.old_secrets.iter() {
1119 pub(super) fn get_cur_remote_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
1120 self.current_remote_commitment_number
1123 pub(super) fn get_cur_local_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
1124 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1125 0xffff_ffff_ffff - ((((local_tx.tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (local_tx.tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor)
1126 } else { 0xffff_ffff_ffff }
1129 /// Attempts to claim a remote commitment transaction's outputs using the revocation key and
1130 /// data in remote_claimable_outpoints. Will directly claim any HTLC outputs which expire at a
1131 /// height > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER. In any case, will install monitoring for
1132 /// HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions.
1133 fn check_spend_remote_transaction(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32) -> (Vec<Transaction>, (Sha256dHash, Vec<TxOut>), Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>) {
1134 // Most secp and related errors trying to create keys means we have no hope of constructing
1135 // a spend transaction...so we return no transactions to broadcast
1136 let mut txn_to_broadcast = Vec::new();
1137 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
1138 let mut spendable_outputs = Vec::new();
1140 let commitment_txid = tx.txid(); //TODO: This is gonna be a performance bottleneck for watchtowers!
1141 let per_commitment_option = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(&commitment_txid);
1143 macro_rules! ignore_error {
1144 ( $thing : expr ) => {
1147 Err(_) => return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs)
1152 let commitment_number = 0xffffffffffff - ((((tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor);
1153 if commitment_number >= self.get_min_seen_secret() {
1154 let secret = self.get_secret(commitment_number).unwrap();
1155 let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &secret));
1156 let (revocation_pubkey, b_htlc_key, local_payment_key) = match self.key_storage {
1157 Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, ref payment_base_key, .. } => {
1158 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
1159 (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_base_key))),
1160 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &htlc_base_key))),
1161 Some(ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &payment_base_key))))
1163 Storage::Watchtower { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
1164 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
1165 (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &revocation_base_key)),
1166 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &htlc_base_key)),
1170 let delayed_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key), &self.their_delayed_payment_base_key.unwrap()));
1171 let a_htlc_key = match self.their_htlc_base_key {
1172 None => return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs),
1173 Some(their_htlc_base_key) => ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key), &their_htlc_base_key)),
1176 let revokeable_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey, self.our_to_self_delay, &delayed_key);
1177 let revokeable_p2wsh = revokeable_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
1179 let local_payment_p2wpkh = if let Some(payment_key) = local_payment_key {
1180 // Note that the Network here is ignored as we immediately drop the address for the
1181 // script_pubkey version.
1182 let payment_hash160 = Hash160::from_data(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &payment_key).serialize());
1183 Some(Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::All::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&payment_hash160[..]).into_script())
1186 let mut total_value = 0;
1187 let mut values = Vec::new();
1188 let mut inputs = Vec::new();
1189 let mut htlc_idxs = Vec::new();
1191 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
1192 if outp.script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh {
1194 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
1195 txid: commitment_txid,
1198 script_sig: Script::new(),
1199 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
1200 witness: Vec::new(),
1202 htlc_idxs.push(None);
1203 values.push(outp.value);
1204 total_value += outp.value;
1205 } else if Some(&outp.script_pubkey) == local_payment_p2wpkh.as_ref() {
1206 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WPKH {
1207 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: commitment_txid, vout: idx as u32 },
1208 key: local_payment_key.unwrap(),
1209 output: outp.clone(),
1214 macro_rules! sign_input {
1215 ($sighash_parts: expr, $input: expr, $htlc_idx: expr, $amount: expr) => {
1217 let (sig, redeemscript) = match self.key_storage {
1218 Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
1219 let redeemscript = if $htlc_idx.is_none() { revokeable_redeemscript.clone() } else {
1220 let htlc = &per_commitment_option.unwrap()[$htlc_idx.unwrap()].0;
1221 chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey)
1223 let sighash = ignore_error!(Message::from_slice(&$sighash_parts.sighash_all(&$input, &redeemscript, $amount)[..]));
1224 let revocation_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key, &revocation_base_key));
1225 (self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &revocation_key), redeemscript)
1227 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
1231 $input.witness.push(sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
1232 $input.witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1233 if $htlc_idx.is_none() {
1234 $input.witness.push(vec!(1));
1236 $input.witness.push(revocation_pubkey.serialize().to_vec());
1238 $input.witness.push(redeemscript.into_bytes());
1243 if let Some(per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
1244 inputs.reserve_exact(per_commitment_data.len());
1246 for (idx, &(ref htlc, _)) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() {
1247 let expected_script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey);
1248 if htlc.transaction_output_index as usize >= tx.output.len() ||
1249 tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 ||
1250 tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].script_pubkey != expected_script.to_v0_p2wsh() {
1251 return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs); // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user
1254 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
1255 txid: commitment_txid,
1256 vout: htlc.transaction_output_index,
1258 script_sig: Script::new(),
1259 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
1260 witness: Vec::new(),
1262 if htlc.cltv_expiry > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER {
1264 htlc_idxs.push(Some(idx));
1265 values.push(tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].value);
1266 total_value += htlc.amount_msat / 1000;
1268 let mut single_htlc_tx = Transaction {
1272 output: vec!(TxOut {
1273 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1274 value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000, //TODO: - fee
1277 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&single_htlc_tx);
1278 sign_input!(sighash_parts, single_htlc_tx.input[0], Some(idx), htlc.amount_msat / 1000);
1279 txn_to_broadcast.push(single_htlc_tx);
1284 if !inputs.is_empty() || !txn_to_broadcast.is_empty() { // ie we're confident this is actually ours
1285 // We're definitely a remote commitment transaction!
1286 watch_outputs.append(&mut tx.output.clone());
1287 self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, (commitment_number, tx.output.iter().map(|output| { output.script_pubkey.clone() }).collect()));
1289 if inputs.is_empty() { return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs); } // Nothing to be done...probably a false positive/local tx
1291 let outputs = vec!(TxOut {
1292 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1293 value: total_value, //TODO: - fee
1295 let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
1302 let mut values_drain = values.drain(..);
1303 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx);
1305 for (input, htlc_idx) in spend_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(htlc_idxs.iter()) {
1306 let value = values_drain.next().unwrap();
1307 sign_input!(sighash_parts, input, htlc_idx, value);
1310 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
1311 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: spend_tx.txid(), vout: 0 },
1312 output: spend_tx.output[0].clone(),
1314 txn_to_broadcast.push(spend_tx);
1315 } else if let Some(per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
1316 // While this isn't useful yet, there is a potential race where if a counterparty
1317 // revokes a state at the same time as the commitment transaction for that state is
1318 // confirmed, and the watchtower receives the block before the user, the user could
1319 // upload a new ChannelMonitor with the revocation secret but the watchtower has
1320 // already processed the block, resulting in the remote_commitment_txn_on_chain entry
1321 // not being generated by the above conditional. Thus, to be safe, we go ahead and
1323 watch_outputs.append(&mut tx.output.clone());
1324 self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, (commitment_number, tx.output.iter().map(|output| { output.script_pubkey.clone() }).collect()));
1326 if let Some(revocation_points) = self.their_cur_revocation_points {
1327 let revocation_point_option =
1328 if revocation_points.0 == commitment_number { Some(&revocation_points.1) }
1329 else if let Some(point) = revocation_points.2.as_ref() {
1330 if revocation_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 { Some(point) } else { None }
1332 if let Some(revocation_point) = revocation_point_option {
1333 let (revocation_pubkey, b_htlc_key) = match self.key_storage {
1334 Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
1335 (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_base_key))),
1336 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &htlc_base_key))))
1338 Storage::Watchtower { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
1339 (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &revocation_base_key)),
1340 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &htlc_base_key)))
1343 let a_htlc_key = match self.their_htlc_base_key {
1344 None => return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs),
1345 Some(their_htlc_base_key) => ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &their_htlc_base_key)),
1348 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
1349 if outp.script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh() {
1350 match self.key_storage {
1351 Storage::Local { ref payment_base_key, .. } => {
1352 if let Ok(local_key) = chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_point, &payment_base_key) {
1353 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WPKH {
1354 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: commitment_txid, vout: idx as u32 },
1356 output: outp.clone(),
1360 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {}
1362 break; // Only to_remote ouput is claimable
1366 let mut total_value = 0;
1367 let mut values = Vec::new();
1368 let mut inputs = Vec::new();
1370 macro_rules! sign_input {
1371 ($sighash_parts: expr, $input: expr, $amount: expr, $preimage: expr) => {
1373 let (sig, redeemscript) = match self.key_storage {
1374 Storage::Local { ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
1375 let htlc = &per_commitment_option.unwrap()[$input.sequence as usize].0;
1376 let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey);
1377 let sighash = ignore_error!(Message::from_slice(&$sighash_parts.sighash_all(&$input, &redeemscript, $amount)[..]));
1378 let htlc_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &htlc_base_key));
1379 (self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &htlc_key), redeemscript)
1381 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
1385 $input.witness.push(sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
1386 $input.witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1387 $input.witness.push($preimage);
1388 $input.witness.push(redeemscript.into_bytes());
1393 macro_rules! sign_input_timeout {
1394 ($sighash_parts: expr, $input: expr, $amount: expr) => {
1396 let (sig, redeemscript) = match self.key_storage {
1397 Storage::Local { ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
1398 let htlc = &per_commitment_option.unwrap()[$input.sequence as usize].0;
1399 let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey);
1400 let sighash = ignore_error!(Message::from_slice(&$sighash_parts.sighash_all(&$input, &redeemscript, $amount)[..]));
1401 let htlc_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &htlc_base_key));
1402 (self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &htlc_key), redeemscript)
1404 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
1408 $input.witness.push(sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
1409 $input.witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1410 $input.witness.push(vec![0]);
1411 $input.witness.push(redeemscript.into_bytes());
1416 for (idx, &(ref htlc, _)) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() {
1417 if let Some(payment_preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
1419 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
1420 txid: commitment_txid,
1421 vout: htlc.transaction_output_index,
1423 script_sig: Script::new(),
1424 sequence: idx as u32, // reset to 0xfffffffd in sign_input
1425 witness: Vec::new(),
1427 if htlc.cltv_expiry > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER {
1429 values.push((tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].value, payment_preimage));
1430 total_value += htlc.amount_msat / 1000;
1432 let mut single_htlc_tx = Transaction {
1436 output: vec!(TxOut {
1437 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1438 value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000, //TODO: - fee
1441 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&single_htlc_tx);
1442 sign_input!(sighash_parts, single_htlc_tx.input[0], htlc.amount_msat / 1000, payment_preimage.to_vec());
1443 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
1444 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: single_htlc_tx.txid(), vout: 0 },
1445 output: single_htlc_tx.output[0].clone(),
1447 txn_to_broadcast.push(single_htlc_tx);
1452 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
1453 txid: commitment_txid,
1454 vout: htlc.transaction_output_index,
1456 script_sig: Script::new(),
1457 sequence: idx as u32,
1458 witness: Vec::new(),
1460 let mut timeout_tx = Transaction {
1462 lock_time: htlc.cltv_expiry,
1464 output: vec!(TxOut {
1465 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1466 value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1469 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&timeout_tx);
1470 sign_input_timeout!(sighash_parts, timeout_tx.input[0], htlc.amount_msat / 1000);
1471 txn_to_broadcast.push(timeout_tx);
1475 if inputs.is_empty() { return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs); } // Nothing to be done...probably a false positive/local tx
1477 let outputs = vec!(TxOut {
1478 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1479 value: total_value, //TODO: - fee
1481 let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
1488 let mut values_drain = values.drain(..);
1489 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx);
1491 for input in spend_tx.input.iter_mut() {
1492 let value = values_drain.next().unwrap();
1493 sign_input!(sighash_parts, input, value.0, value.1.to_vec());
1496 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
1497 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: spend_tx.txid(), vout: 0 },
1498 output: spend_tx.output[0].clone(),
1500 txn_to_broadcast.push(spend_tx);
1505 (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs)
1508 /// Attempst to claim a remote HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout s outputs using the revocation key
1509 fn check_spend_remote_htlc(&self, tx: &Transaction, commitment_number: u64) -> (Option<Transaction>, Option<SpendableOutputDescriptor>) {
1510 if tx.input.len() != 1 || tx.output.len() != 1 {
1514 macro_rules! ignore_error {
1515 ( $thing : expr ) => {
1518 Err(_) => return (None, None)
1523 let secret = if let Some(secret) = self.get_secret(commitment_number) { secret } else { return (None, None); };
1524 let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &secret));
1525 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
1526 let revocation_pubkey = match self.key_storage {
1527 Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
1528 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_base_key)))
1530 Storage::Watchtower { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
1531 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &revocation_base_key))
1534 let delayed_key = match self.their_delayed_payment_base_key {
1535 None => return (None, None),
1536 Some(their_delayed_payment_base_key) => ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &their_delayed_payment_base_key)),
1538 let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), &delayed_key);
1539 let revokeable_p2wsh = redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
1540 let htlc_txid = tx.txid(); //TODO: This is gonna be a performance bottleneck for watchtowers!
1542 let mut inputs = Vec::new();
1545 if tx.output[0].script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh { //HTLC transactions have one txin, one txout
1547 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
1551 script_sig: Script::new(),
1552 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
1553 witness: Vec::new(),
1555 amount = tx.output[0].value;
1558 if !inputs.is_empty() {
1559 let outputs = vec!(TxOut {
1560 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1561 value: amount, //TODO: - fee
1564 let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
1571 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx);
1573 let sig = match self.key_storage {
1574 Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
1575 let sighash = ignore_error!(Message::from_slice(&sighash_parts.sighash_all(&spend_tx.input[0], &redeemscript, amount)[..]));
1576 let revocation_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key, &revocation_base_key));
1577 self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &revocation_key)
1579 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
1583 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
1584 spend_tx.input[0].witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1585 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(vec!(1));
1586 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(redeemscript.into_bytes());
1588 let outpoint = BitcoinOutPoint { txid: spend_tx.txid(), vout: 0 };
1589 let output = spend_tx.output[0].clone();
1590 (Some(spend_tx), Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput { outpoint, output }))
1591 } else { (None, None) }
1594 fn broadcast_by_local_state(&self, local_tx: &LocalSignedTx, per_commitment_point: &Option<PublicKey>, delayed_payment_base_key: &Option<SecretKey>) -> (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>, Vec<TxOut>) {
1595 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
1596 let mut spendable_outputs = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
1597 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
1599 macro_rules! add_dynamic_output {
1600 ($father_tx: expr, $vout: expr) => {
1601 if let Some(ref per_commitment_point) = *per_commitment_point {
1602 if let Some(ref delayed_payment_base_key) = *delayed_payment_base_key {
1603 if let Ok(local_delayedkey) = chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base_key) {
1604 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WSH {
1605 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: $father_tx.txid(), vout: $vout },
1606 key: local_delayedkey,
1607 witness_script: chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&local_tx.revocation_key, self.our_to_self_delay, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key),
1608 to_self_delay: self.our_to_self_delay,
1609 output: $father_tx.output[$vout as usize].clone(),
1618 let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&local_tx.revocation_key, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), &local_tx.delayed_payment_key);
1619 let revokeable_p2wsh = redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
1620 for (idx, output) in local_tx.tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
1621 if output.script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh {
1622 add_dynamic_output!(local_tx.tx, idx as u32);
1627 for &(ref htlc, ref their_sig, ref our_sig, _) in local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1629 let mut htlc_timeout_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&local_tx.txid, local_tx.feerate_per_kw, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), htlc, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key, &local_tx.revocation_key);
1631 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
1633 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(their_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
1634 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1635 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
1636 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1638 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new());
1639 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &local_tx.a_htlc_key, &local_tx.b_htlc_key, &local_tx.revocation_key).into_bytes());
1641 add_dynamic_output!(htlc_timeout_tx, 0);
1642 res.push(htlc_timeout_tx);
1644 if let Some(payment_preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
1645 let mut htlc_success_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&local_tx.txid, local_tx.feerate_per_kw, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), htlc, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key, &local_tx.revocation_key);
1647 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
1649 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(their_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
1650 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1651 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
1652 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1654 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(payment_preimage.to_vec());
1655 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &local_tx.a_htlc_key, &local_tx.b_htlc_key, &local_tx.revocation_key).into_bytes());
1657 add_dynamic_output!(htlc_success_tx, 0);
1658 res.push(htlc_success_tx);
1661 watch_outputs.push(local_tx.tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].clone());
1664 (res, spendable_outputs, watch_outputs)
1667 /// Attempts to claim any claimable HTLCs in a commitment transaction which was not (yet)
1668 /// revoked using data in local_claimable_outpoints.
1669 /// Should not be used if check_spend_revoked_transaction succeeds.
1670 fn check_spend_local_transaction(&self, tx: &Transaction, _height: u32) -> (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>, (Sha256dHash, Vec<TxOut>)) {
1671 let commitment_txid = tx.txid();
1672 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1673 if local_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
1674 match self.key_storage {
1675 Storage::Local { ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref latest_per_commitment_point, .. } => {
1676 let (local_txn, spendable_outputs, watch_outputs) = self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, latest_per_commitment_point, &Some(*delayed_payment_base_key));
1677 return (local_txn, spendable_outputs, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs));
1679 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
1680 let (local_txn, spendable_outputs, watch_outputs) = self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, &None, &None);
1681 return (local_txn, spendable_outputs, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs));
1686 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1687 if local_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
1688 match self.key_storage {
1689 Storage::Local { ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref prev_latest_per_commitment_point, .. } => {
1690 let (local_txn, spendable_outputs, watch_outputs) = self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, prev_latest_per_commitment_point, &Some(*delayed_payment_base_key));
1691 return (local_txn, spendable_outputs, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs));
1693 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
1694 let (local_txn, spendable_outputs, watch_outputs) = self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, &None, &None);
1695 return (local_txn, spendable_outputs, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs));
1700 (Vec::new(), Vec::new(), (commitment_txid, Vec::new()))
1703 /// Generate a spendable output event when closing_transaction get registered onchain.
1704 fn check_spend_closing_transaction(&self, tx: &Transaction) -> Option<SpendableOutputDescriptor> {
1705 if tx.input[0].sequence == 0xFFFFFFFF && tx.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len() == 71 {
1706 match self.key_storage {
1707 Storage::Local { ref shutdown_pubkey, .. } => {
1708 let our_channel_close_key_hash = Hash160::from_data(&shutdown_pubkey.serialize());
1709 let shutdown_script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::All::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&our_channel_close_key_hash[..]).into_script();
1710 for (idx, output) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
1711 if shutdown_script == output.script_pubkey {
1712 return Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
1713 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), vout: idx as u32 },
1714 output: output.clone(),
1719 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
1720 //TODO: we need to ensure an offline client will generate the event when it
1721 // cames back online after only the watchtower saw the transaction
1728 /// Used by ChannelManager deserialization to broadcast the latest local state if it's copy of
1729 /// the Channel was out-of-date.
1730 pub(super) fn get_latest_local_commitment_txn(&self) -> Vec<Transaction> {
1731 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1732 let mut res = vec![local_tx.tx.clone()];
1733 match self.key_storage {
1734 Storage::Local { ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref prev_latest_per_commitment_point, .. } => {
1735 res.append(&mut self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, prev_latest_per_commitment_point, &Some(*delayed_payment_base_key)).0);
1737 _ => panic!("Can only broadcast by local channelmonitor"),
1745 fn block_connected(&mut self, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], height: u32, block_hash: &Sha256dHash, broadcaster: &BroadcasterInterface)-> (Vec<(Sha256dHash, Vec<TxOut>)>, Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>, Vec<(Option<HTLCSource>, Option<[u8 ; 32]>, [u8; 32])>) {
1746 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
1747 let mut spendable_outputs = Vec::new();
1748 let mut htlc_updated = Vec::new();
1749 for tx in txn_matched {
1750 if tx.input.len() == 1 {
1751 // Assuming our keys were not leaked (in which case we're screwed no matter what),
1752 // commitment transactions and HTLC transactions will all only ever have one input,
1753 // which is an easy way to filter out any potential non-matching txn for lazy
1755 let prevout = &tx.input[0].previous_output;
1756 let mut txn: Vec<Transaction> = Vec::new();
1757 let funding_txo = match self.key_storage {
1758 Storage::Local { ref funding_info, .. } => {
1759 funding_info.clone()
1761 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
1765 if funding_txo.is_none() || (prevout.txid == funding_txo.as_ref().unwrap().0.txid && prevout.vout == funding_txo.as_ref().unwrap().0.index as u32) {
1766 let (remote_txn, new_outputs, mut spendable_output) = self.check_spend_remote_transaction(tx, height);
1768 spendable_outputs.append(&mut spendable_output);
1769 if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() {
1770 watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
1773 let (local_txn, mut spendable_output, new_outputs) = self.check_spend_local_transaction(tx, height);
1774 spendable_outputs.append(&mut spendable_output);
1776 if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() {
1777 watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
1780 if !funding_txo.is_none() && txn.is_empty() {
1781 if let Some(spendable_output) = self.check_spend_closing_transaction(tx) {
1782 spendable_outputs.push(spendable_output);
1786 if let Some(&(commitment_number, _)) = self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.get(&prevout.txid) {
1787 let (tx, spendable_output) = self.check_spend_remote_htlc(tx, commitment_number);
1788 if let Some(tx) = tx {
1791 if let Some(spendable_output) = spendable_output {
1792 spendable_outputs.push(spendable_output);
1796 for tx in txn.iter() {
1797 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(tx);
1799 let mut updated = self.is_resolving_output(tx);
1800 if updated.len() > 0 {
1801 htlc_updated.append(&mut updated);
1805 if let Some(ref cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1806 if self.would_broadcast_at_height(height) {
1807 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&cur_local_tx.tx);
1808 match self.key_storage {
1809 Storage::Local { ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref latest_per_commitment_point, .. } => {
1810 let (txs, mut spendable_output, new_outputs) = self.broadcast_by_local_state(&cur_local_tx, latest_per_commitment_point, &Some(*delayed_payment_base_key));
1811 spendable_outputs.append(&mut spendable_output);
1812 if !new_outputs.is_empty() {
1813 watch_outputs.push((cur_local_tx.txid.clone(), new_outputs));
1816 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
1819 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
1820 let (txs, mut spendable_output, new_outputs) = self.broadcast_by_local_state(&cur_local_tx, &None, &None);
1821 spendable_outputs.append(&mut spendable_output);
1822 if !new_outputs.is_empty() {
1823 watch_outputs.push((cur_local_tx.txid.clone(), new_outputs));
1826 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
1832 self.last_block_hash = block_hash.clone();
1833 (watch_outputs, spendable_outputs, htlc_updated)
1836 pub(super) fn would_broadcast_at_height(&self, height: u32) -> bool {
1837 if let Some(ref cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1838 for &(ref htlc, _, _, _) in cur_local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1839 // For inbound HTLCs which we know the preimage for, we have to ensure we hit the
1840 // chain with enough room to claim the HTLC without our counterparty being able to
1841 // time out the HTLC first.
1842 // For outbound HTLCs which our counterparty hasn't failed/claimed, our primary
1843 // concern is being able to claim the corresponding inbound HTLC (on another
1844 // channel) before it expires. In fact, we don't even really care if our
1845 // counterparty here claims such an outbound HTLC after it expired as long as we
1846 // can still claim the corresponding HTLC. Thus, to avoid needlessly hitting the
1847 // chain when our counterparty is waiting for expiration to off-chain fail an HTLC
1848 // we give ourselves a few blocks of headroom after expiration before going
1849 // on-chain for an expired HTLC.
1850 // Note that, to avoid a potential attack whereby a node delays claiming an HTLC
1851 // from us until we've reached the point where we go on-chain with the
1852 // corresponding inbound HTLC, we must ensure that outbound HTLCs go on chain at
1853 // least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER blocks prior to the inbound HTLC.
1854 // aka outbound_cltv + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS == height - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
1855 // inbound_cltv == height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
1856 // outbound_cltv + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFER <= inbound_cltv - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
1857 // HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS + 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFER <= inbound_cltv - outbound_cltv
1858 // HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS + 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFER <= CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA
1859 if ( htlc.offered && htlc.cltv_expiry + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS <= height) ||
1860 (!htlc.offered && htlc.cltv_expiry <= height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER && self.payment_preimages.contains_key(&htlc.payment_hash)) {
1868 pub(crate) fn is_resolving_output(&mut self, tx: &Transaction) -> Vec<(Option<HTLCSource>, Option<[u8;32]>, [u8;32])> {
1869 let mut htlc_updated = Vec::new();
1871 let commitment_number = 0xffffffffffff - ((((tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor);
1872 if commitment_number >= self.get_min_seen_secret() {
1873 if let Some(ref current_local_signed_commitment_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1874 for htlc_output in ¤t_local_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs {
1875 htlc_updated.push((htlc_output.3.clone(), None, htlc_output.0.payment_hash.clone()))
1878 if let Some(ref prev_local_signed_commitment_tx) = self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1879 for htlc_output in &prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs {
1880 htlc_updated.push((htlc_output.3.clone(), None, htlc_output.0.payment_hash.clone()))
1883 // No need to check remote_claimabe_outpoints, symmetric HTLCSource must be present as per-htlc data on local commitment tx
1884 } else if tx.input.len() > 0{
1885 for input in &tx.input {
1886 let mut payment_data: (Option<HTLCSource>, Option<[u8;32]>, Option<[u8;32]>) = (None, None, None);
1887 if let Some(ref current_local_signed_commitment_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1888 if input.previous_output.txid == current_local_signed_commitment_tx.txid {
1889 for htlc_output in ¤t_local_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs {
1890 if input.previous_output.vout == htlc_output.0.transaction_output_index {
1891 payment_data = (htlc_output.3.clone(), None, Some(htlc_output.0.payment_hash.clone()));
1896 if let Some(ref prev_local_signed_commitment_tx) = self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1897 if input.previous_output.txid == prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.txid {
1898 for htlc_output in &prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs {
1899 if input.previous_output.vout == htlc_output.0.transaction_output_index {
1900 payment_data = (htlc_output.3.clone(), None, Some(htlc_output.0.payment_hash.clone()));
1905 if let Some(htlc_outputs) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(&input.previous_output.txid) {
1906 for htlc_output in htlc_outputs {
1907 if input.previous_output.vout == htlc_output.0.transaction_output_index {
1908 payment_data = (htlc_output.1.clone(), None, Some(htlc_output.0.payment_hash.clone()));
1912 // If tx isn't solving htlc output from local/remote commitment tx and htlc isn't outbound we don't need
1913 // to broadcast solving backward
1914 if payment_data.0.is_some() && payment_data.2.is_some() {
1915 let mut payment_preimage = [0; 32];
1916 let mut preimage = None;
1917 if input.witness.len() == 5 && input.witness[4].len() == 138 {
1918 for (arr, vec) in payment_preimage.iter_mut().zip(tx.input[0].witness[3].iter()) {
1921 preimage = Some(payment_preimage);
1922 } else if input.witness.len() == 3 && input.witness[2].len() == 133 {
1923 for (arr, vec) in payment_preimage.iter_mut().zip(tx.input[0].witness[1].iter()) {
1926 preimage = Some(payment_preimage);
1928 htlc_updated.push((payment_data.0, preimage, payment_data.2.unwrap()));
1936 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
1938 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> ReadableArgs<R, Arc<Logger>> for (Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor) {
1939 fn read(reader: &mut R, logger: Arc<Logger>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1940 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1941 macro_rules! unwrap_obj {
1945 Err(_) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
1950 let _ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1951 let min_ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1952 if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION {
1953 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion);
1956 let commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor = <U48 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.0;
1958 let key_storage = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
1960 let revocation_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
1961 let htlc_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
1962 let delayed_payment_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
1963 let payment_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
1964 let shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
1965 let prev_latest_per_commitment_point = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
1967 1 => Some(Readable::read(reader)?),
1968 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
1970 let latest_per_commitment_point = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
1972 1 => Some(Readable::read(reader)?),
1973 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
1975 // Technically this can fail and serialize fail a round-trip, but only for serialization of
1976 // barely-init'd ChannelMonitors that we can't do anything with.
1977 let outpoint = OutPoint {
1978 txid: Readable::read(reader)?,
1979 index: Readable::read(reader)?,
1981 let funding_info = Some((outpoint, Readable::read(reader)?));
1982 let short_channel_id = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
1984 1 => Some(Readable::read(reader)?),
1985 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
1988 revocation_base_key,
1990 delayed_payment_base_key,
1993 prev_latest_per_commitment_point,
1994 latest_per_commitment_point,
1999 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2002 let their_htlc_base_key = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
2003 let their_delayed_payment_base_key = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
2005 let their_cur_revocation_points = {
2006 let first_idx = <U48 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.0;
2010 let first_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
2011 let second_point_slice: [u8; 33] = Readable::read(reader)?;
2012 if second_point_slice[0..32] == [0; 32] && second_point_slice[32] == 0 {
2013 Some((first_idx, first_point, None))
2015 Some((first_idx, first_point, Some(unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &second_point_slice)))))
2020 let our_to_self_delay: u16 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2021 let their_to_self_delay: Option<u16> = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
2023 let mut old_secrets = [([0; 32], 1 << 48); 49];
2024 for &mut (ref mut secret, ref mut idx) in old_secrets.iter_mut() {
2025 *secret = Readable::read(reader)?;
2026 *idx = Readable::read(reader)?;
2029 macro_rules! read_htlc_in_commitment {
2032 let offered: bool = Readable::read(reader)?;
2033 let amount_msat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2034 let cltv_expiry: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2035 let payment_hash: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(reader)?;
2036 let transaction_output_index: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2038 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
2039 offered, amount_msat, cltv_expiry, payment_hash, transaction_output_index
2045 macro_rules! read_htlc_source {
2048 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2051 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2052 0 => Some(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(read_htlc_previous_hop_data!())),
2053 1 => Some(read_htlc_outbound_route!()),
2054 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2057 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2063 macro_rules! read_htlc_previous_hop_data {
2066 let short_channel_id: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2067 let htlc_id: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2068 let incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(reader)?;
2070 HTLCPreviousHopData {
2071 short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret
2077 macro_rules! read_htlc_outbound_route {
2080 let route = read_route!();
2081 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
2082 let first_hop_htlc_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
2084 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
2085 route, session_priv, first_hop_htlc_msat
2091 macro_rules! read_route {
2094 let route_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2095 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(route_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 64));
2096 for _ in 0..route_len {
2097 let pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
2098 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
2099 let fee_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
2100 let cltv_expiry_delta = Readable::read(reader)?;
2102 hops.push(RouteHop { pubkey, short_channel_id, fee_msat, cltv_expiry_delta });
2111 let remote_claimable_outpoints_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2112 let mut remote_claimable_outpoints = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(remote_claimable_outpoints_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 64));
2113 for _ in 0..remote_claimable_outpoints_len {
2114 let txid: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
2115 let outputs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2116 let mut outputs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
2117 for _ in 0..outputs_count {
2118 let out = read_htlc_in_commitment!();
2119 let source = read_htlc_source!();
2120 outputs.push((out, source));
2122 if let Some(_) = remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, outputs) {
2123 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
2127 let remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2128 let mut remote_commitment_txn_on_chain = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
2129 for _ in 0..remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len {
2130 let txid: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
2131 let commitment_number = <U48 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.0;
2132 let outputs_count = <u64 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?;
2133 let mut outputs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 8));
2134 for _ in 0..outputs_count {
2135 outputs.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
2137 if let Some(_) = remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(txid, (commitment_number, outputs)) {
2138 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
2142 let remote_hash_commitment_number_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2143 let mut remote_hash_commitment_number = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(remote_hash_commitment_number_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
2144 for _ in 0..remote_hash_commitment_number_len {
2145 let txid: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(reader)?;
2146 let commitment_number = <U48 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.0;
2147 if let Some(_) = remote_hash_commitment_number.insert(txid, commitment_number) {
2148 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
2152 macro_rules! read_local_tx {
2155 let tx = match Transaction::consensus_decode(reader.by_ref()) {
2158 encode::Error::Io(ioe) => return Err(DecodeError::Io(ioe)),
2159 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2163 if tx.input.is_empty() {
2164 // Ensure tx didn't hit the 0-input ambiguity case.
2165 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
2168 let revocation_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
2169 let a_htlc_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
2170 let b_htlc_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
2171 let delayed_payment_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
2172 let feerate_per_kw: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2174 let htlc_outputs_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2175 let mut htlc_outputs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlc_outputs_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
2176 for _ in 0..htlc_outputs_len {
2177 let out = read_htlc_in_commitment!();
2178 let sigs = (Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?);
2179 let source = read_htlc_source!();
2180 htlc_outputs.push((out, sigs.0, sigs.1, source));
2185 tx, revocation_key, a_htlc_key, b_htlc_key, delayed_payment_key, feerate_per_kw, htlc_outputs
2191 let prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2194 Some(read_local_tx!())
2196 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2199 let current_local_signed_commitment_tx = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2202 Some(read_local_tx!())
2204 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2207 let current_remote_commitment_number = <U48 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.0;
2209 let payment_preimages_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2210 let mut payment_preimages = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(payment_preimages_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
2211 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
2212 for _ in 0..payment_preimages_len {
2213 let preimage: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(reader)?;
2215 sha.input(&preimage);
2216 let mut hash = [0; 32];
2217 sha.result(&mut hash);
2218 if let Some(_) = payment_preimages.insert(hash, preimage) {
2219 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
2223 let last_block_hash: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
2224 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
2226 Ok((last_block_hash.clone(), ChannelMonitor {
2227 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor,
2230 their_htlc_base_key,
2231 their_delayed_payment_base_key,
2232 their_cur_revocation_points,
2235 their_to_self_delay,
2238 remote_claimable_outpoints,
2239 remote_commitment_txn_on_chain,
2240 remote_hash_commitment_number,
2242 prev_local_signed_commitment_tx,
2243 current_local_signed_commitment_tx,
2244 current_remote_commitment_number,
2259 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Script;
2260 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
2261 use crypto::digest::Digest;
2263 use ln::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor;
2264 use ln::chan_utils::{HTLCOutputInCommitment, TxCreationKeys};
2265 use ln::channelmanager::{HTLCSource, HTLCPreviousHopData};
2266 use util::sha2::Sha256;
2267 use util::test_utils::TestLogger;
2268 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
2269 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1, Signature};
2270 use rand::{thread_rng,Rng};
2274 fn test_per_commitment_storage() {
2275 // Test vectors from BOLT 3:
2276 let mut secrets: Vec<[u8; 32]> = Vec::new();
2277 let mut monitor: ChannelMonitor;
2278 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2279 let logger = Arc::new(TestLogger::new());
2281 macro_rules! test_secrets {
2283 let mut idx = 281474976710655;
2284 for secret in secrets.iter() {
2285 assert_eq!(monitor.get_secret(idx).unwrap(), *secret);
2288 assert_eq!(monitor.get_min_seen_secret(), idx + 1);
2289 assert!(monitor.get_secret(idx).is_none());
2294 // insert_secret correct sequence
2295 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
2298 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2299 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
2300 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2303 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2304 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
2305 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2308 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2309 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
2310 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2313 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2314 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
2315 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2318 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2319 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
2320 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2323 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2324 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
2325 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2328 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2329 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
2330 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2333 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2334 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
2335 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2340 // insert_secret #1 incorrect
2341 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
2344 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2345 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
2346 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2349 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2350 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
2351 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
2352 "Previous secret did not match new one");
2356 // insert_secret #2 incorrect (#1 derived from incorrect)
2357 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
2360 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2361 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
2362 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2365 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2366 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("dddc3a8d14fddf2b68fa8c7fbad2748274937479dd0f8930d5ebb4ab6bd866a3").unwrap());
2367 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2370 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2371 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
2372 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2375 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2376 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
2377 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
2378 "Previous secret did not match new one");
2382 // insert_secret #3 incorrect
2383 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
2386 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2387 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
2388 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2391 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2392 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
2393 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2396 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2397 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c51a18b13e8527e579ec56365482c62f180b7d5760b46e9477dae59e87ed423a").unwrap());
2398 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2401 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2402 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
2403 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
2404 "Previous secret did not match new one");
2408 // insert_secret #4 incorrect (1,2,3 derived from incorrect)
2409 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
2412 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2413 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
2414 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2417 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2418 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("dddc3a8d14fddf2b68fa8c7fbad2748274937479dd0f8930d5ebb4ab6bd866a3").unwrap());
2419 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2422 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2423 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c51a18b13e8527e579ec56365482c62f180b7d5760b46e9477dae59e87ed423a").unwrap());
2424 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2427 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2428 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("ba65d7b0ef55a3ba300d4e87af29868f394f8f138d78a7011669c79b37b936f4").unwrap());
2429 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2432 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2433 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
2434 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2437 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2438 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
2439 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2442 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2443 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
2444 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2447 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2448 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
2449 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
2450 "Previous secret did not match new one");
2454 // insert_secret #5 incorrect
2455 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
2458 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2459 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
2460 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2463 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2464 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
2465 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2468 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2469 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
2470 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2473 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2474 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
2475 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2478 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2479 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("631373ad5f9ef654bb3dade742d09504c567edd24320d2fcd68e3cc47e2ff6a6").unwrap());
2480 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2483 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2484 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
2485 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
2486 "Previous secret did not match new one");
2490 // insert_secret #6 incorrect (5 derived from incorrect)
2491 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
2494 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2495 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
2496 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2499 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2500 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
2501 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2504 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2505 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
2506 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2509 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2510 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
2511 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2514 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2515 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("631373ad5f9ef654bb3dade742d09504c567edd24320d2fcd68e3cc47e2ff6a6").unwrap());
2516 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2519 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2520 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("b7e76a83668bde38b373970155c868a653304308f9896692f904a23731224bb1").unwrap());
2521 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2524 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2525 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
2526 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2529 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2530 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
2531 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
2532 "Previous secret did not match new one");
2536 // insert_secret #7 incorrect
2537 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
2540 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2541 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
2542 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2545 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2546 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
2547 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2550 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2551 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
2552 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2555 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2556 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
2557 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2560 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2561 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
2562 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2565 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2566 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
2567 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2570 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2571 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("e7971de736e01da8ed58b94c2fc216cb1dca9e326f3a96e7194fe8ea8af6c0a3").unwrap());
2572 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2575 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2576 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
2577 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
2578 "Previous secret did not match new one");
2582 // insert_secret #8 incorrect
2583 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
2586 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2587 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
2588 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2591 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2592 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
2593 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2596 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2597 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
2598 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2601 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2602 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
2603 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2606 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2607 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
2608 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2611 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2612 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
2613 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2616 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2617 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
2618 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2621 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2622 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a7efbc61aac46d34f77778bac22c8a20c6a46ca460addc49009bda875ec88fa4").unwrap());
2623 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
2624 "Previous secret did not match new one");
2629 fn test_prune_preimages() {
2630 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2631 let logger = Arc::new(TestLogger::new());
2632 let dummy_sig = Signature::from_der(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("3045022100fa86fa9a36a8cd6a7bb8f06a541787d51371d067951a9461d5404de6b928782e02201c8b7c334c10aed8976a3a465be9a28abff4cb23acbf00022295b378ce1fa3cd").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
2634 let dummy_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap());
2635 macro_rules! dummy_keys {
2639 per_commitment_point: dummy_key.clone(),
2640 revocation_key: dummy_key.clone(),
2641 a_htlc_key: dummy_key.clone(),
2642 b_htlc_key: dummy_key.clone(),
2643 a_delayed_payment_key: dummy_key.clone(),
2644 b_payment_key: dummy_key.clone(),
2649 let dummy_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
2650 let dummy_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id: 0, htlc_id: 0, incoming_packet_shared_secret: [0; 32]});
2652 let mut preimages = Vec::new();
2654 let mut rng = thread_rng();
2656 let mut preimage = [0; 32];
2657 rng.fill_bytes(&mut preimage);
2658 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
2659 sha.input(&preimage);
2660 let mut hash = [0; 32];
2661 sha.result(&mut hash);
2662 preimages.push((preimage, hash));
2666 macro_rules! preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs {
2667 ($preimages_slice: expr) => {
2669 let mut res = Vec::new();
2670 for (idx, preimage) in $preimages_slice.iter().enumerate() {
2671 res.push((HTLCOutputInCommitment {
2675 payment_hash: preimage.1.clone(),
2676 transaction_output_index: idx as u32,
2677 }, Some(dummy_source.clone())));
2683 macro_rules! preimages_to_local_htlcs {
2684 ($preimages_slice: expr) => {
2686 let mut inp = preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!($preimages_slice);
2687 let res: Vec<_> = inp.drain(..).map(|e| { (e.0, dummy_sig.clone(), dummy_sig.clone(), e.1) }).collect();
2693 macro_rules! test_preimages_exist {
2694 ($preimages_slice: expr, $monitor: expr) => {
2695 for preimage in $preimages_slice {
2696 assert!($monitor.payment_preimages.contains_key(&preimage.1));
2701 // Prune with one old state and a local commitment tx holding a few overlaps with the
2703 let mut monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
2704 monitor.set_their_to_self_delay(10);
2706 monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(dummy_tx.clone(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..10]));
2707 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[5..15]), 281474976710655, dummy_key);
2708 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[15..20]), 281474976710654, dummy_key);
2709 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[17..20]), 281474976710653, dummy_key);
2710 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[18..20]), 281474976710652, dummy_key);
2711 for &(ref preimage, ref hash) in preimages.iter() {
2712 monitor.provide_payment_preimage(hash, preimage);
2715 // Now provide a secret, pruning preimages 10-15
2716 let mut secret = [0; 32];
2717 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
2718 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secret.clone()).unwrap();
2719 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 15);
2720 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
2721 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[15..20], monitor);
2723 // Now provide a further secret, pruning preimages 15-17
2724 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
2725 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secret.clone()).unwrap();
2726 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 13);
2727 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
2728 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[17..20], monitor);
2730 // Now update local commitment tx info, pruning only element 18 as we still care about the
2731 // previous commitment tx's preimages too
2732 monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(dummy_tx.clone(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..5]));
2733 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
2734 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secret.clone()).unwrap();
2735 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 12);
2736 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
2737 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[18..20], monitor);
2739 // But if we do it again, we'll prune 5-10
2740 monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(dummy_tx.clone(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..3]));
2741 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
2742 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secret.clone()).unwrap();
2743 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 5);
2744 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..5], monitor);
2747 // Further testing is done in the ChannelManager integration tests.