1 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
2 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxIn,TxOut,SigHashType,Transaction};
3 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Script;
4 use bitcoin::network::serialize;
5 use bitcoin::util::hash::Sha256dHash;
6 use bitcoin::util::bip143;
8 use crypto::digest::Digest;
10 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Message,Signature};
11 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
13 use ln::msgs::HandleError;
15 use ln::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment;
16 use chain::chaininterface::{ChainListener, ChainWatchInterface, BroadcasterInterface};
17 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
18 use util::sha2::Sha256;
21 use std::collections::HashMap;
22 use std::sync::{Arc,Mutex};
25 pub enum ChannelMonitorUpdateErr {
26 /// Used to indicate a temporary failure (eg connection to a watchtower failed, but is expected
27 /// to succeed at some point in the future).
28 /// Such a failure will "freeze" a channel, preventing us from revoking old states or
29 /// submitting new commitment transactions to the remote party.
30 /// ChannelManager::test_restore_channel_monitor can be used to retry the update(s) and restore
31 /// the channel to an operational state.
33 /// Used to indicate no further channel monitor updates will be allowed (eg we've moved on to a
34 /// different watchtower and cannot update with all watchtowers that were previously informed
35 /// of this channel). This will force-close the channel in question.
39 /// Simple trait indicating ability to track a set of ChannelMonitors and multiplex events between
40 /// them. Generally should be implemented by keeping a local SimpleManyChannelMonitor and passing
41 /// events to it, while also taking any add_update_monitor events and passing them to some remote
43 /// Note that any updates to a channel's monitor *must* be applied to each instance of the
44 /// channel's monitor everywhere (including remote watchtowers) *before* this function returns. If
45 /// an update occurs and a remote watchtower is left with old state, it may broadcast transactions
46 /// which we have revoked, allowing our counterparty to claim all funds in the channel!
47 pub trait ManyChannelMonitor: Send + Sync {
48 /// Adds or updates a monitor for the given `funding_txo`.
49 fn add_update_monitor(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr>;
52 /// A simple implementation of a ManyChannelMonitor and ChainListener. Can be used to create a
53 /// watchtower or watch our own channels.
54 /// Note that you must provide your own key by which to refer to channels.
55 /// If you're accepting remote monitors (ie are implementing a watchtower), you must verify that
56 /// users cannot overwrite a given channel by providing a duplicate key. ie you should probably
57 /// index by a PublicKey which is required to sign any updates.
58 /// If you're using this for local monitoring of your own channels, you probably want to use
59 /// `OutPoint` as the key, which will give you a ManyChannelMonitor implementation.
60 pub struct SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
61 monitors: Mutex<HashMap<Key, ChannelMonitor>>,
62 chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>,
63 broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>
66 impl<Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash> ChainListener for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
67 fn block_connected(&self, _header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], _indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) {
68 let monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
69 for monitor in monitors.values() {
70 monitor.block_connected(txn_matched, height, &*self.broadcaster);
74 fn block_disconnected(&self, _: &BlockHeader) { }
77 impl<Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash + 'static> SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
78 pub fn new(chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>, broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>) -> Arc<SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key>> {
79 let res = Arc::new(SimpleManyChannelMonitor {
80 monitors: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
84 let weak_res = Arc::downgrade(&res);
85 res.chain_monitor.register_listener(weak_res);
89 pub fn add_update_monitor_by_key(&self, key: Key, monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
90 let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
91 match monitors.get_mut(&key) {
92 Some(orig_monitor) => return orig_monitor.insert_combine(monitor),
95 match &monitor.funding_txo {
96 &None => self.chain_monitor.watch_all_txn(),
97 &Some((ref outpoint, ref script)) => {
98 self.chain_monitor.install_watch_script(script);
99 self.chain_monitor.install_watch_outpoint((outpoint.txid, outpoint.index as u32), script);
102 monitors.insert(key, monitor);
107 impl ManyChannelMonitor for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<OutPoint> {
108 fn add_update_monitor(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr> {
109 match self.add_update_monitor_by_key(funding_txo, monitor) {
111 Err(_) => Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure),
116 /// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, don't try to claim it in a shared transaction,
117 /// instead claiming it in its own individual transaction.
118 const CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 12;
119 /// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, force-close the channel to broadcast the
120 /// HTLC-Success transaction.
121 const CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 6;
123 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
126 revocation_base_key: SecretKey,
127 htlc_base_key: SecretKey,
130 revocation_base_key: PublicKey,
131 htlc_base_key: PublicKey,
132 sigs: HashMap<Sha256dHash, Signature>,
136 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
137 struct LocalSignedTx {
138 /// txid of the transaction in tx, just used to make comparison faster
141 revocation_key: PublicKey,
142 a_htlc_key: PublicKey,
143 b_htlc_key: PublicKey,
144 delayed_payment_key: PublicKey,
146 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Signature, Signature)>,
149 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
150 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
152 pub struct ChannelMonitor {
153 funding_txo: Option<(OutPoint, Script)>,
154 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64,
156 key_storage: KeyStorage,
157 delayed_payment_base_key: PublicKey,
158 their_htlc_base_key: Option<PublicKey>,
159 // first is the idx of the first of the two revocation points
160 their_cur_revocation_points: Option<(u64, PublicKey, Option<PublicKey>)>,
162 our_to_self_delay: u16,
163 their_to_self_delay: Option<u16>,
165 old_secrets: [([u8; 32], u64); 49],
166 remote_claimable_outpoints: HashMap<Sha256dHash, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>>,
167 /// We cannot identify HTLC-Success or HTLC-Timeout transactions by themselves on the chain.
168 /// Nor can we figure out their commitment numbers without the commitment transaction they are
169 /// spending. Thus, in order to claim them via revocation key, we track all the remote
170 /// commitment transactions which we find on-chain, mapping them to the commitment number which
171 /// can be used to derive the revocation key and claim the transactions.
172 remote_commitment_txn_on_chain: Mutex<HashMap<Sha256dHash, u64>>,
173 /// Cache used to make pruning of payment_preimages faster.
174 /// Maps payment_hash values to commitment numbers for remote transactions for non-revoked
175 /// remote transactions (ie should remain pretty small).
176 /// Serialized to disk but should generally not be sent to Watchtowers.
177 remote_hash_commitment_number: HashMap<[u8; 32], u64>,
179 // We store two local commitment transactions to avoid any race conditions where we may update
180 // some monitors (potentially on watchtowers) but then fail to update others, resulting in the
181 // various monitors for one channel being out of sync, and us broadcasting a local
182 // transaction for which we have deleted claim information on some watchtowers.
183 prev_local_signed_commitment_tx: Option<LocalSignedTx>,
184 current_local_signed_commitment_tx: Option<LocalSignedTx>,
186 payment_preimages: HashMap<[u8; 32], [u8; 32]>,
188 destination_script: Script,
189 secp_ctx: Secp256k1, //TODO: dedup this a bit...
191 impl Clone for ChannelMonitor {
192 fn clone(&self) -> Self {
194 funding_txo: self.funding_txo.clone(),
195 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor.clone(),
197 key_storage: self.key_storage.clone(),
198 delayed_payment_base_key: self.delayed_payment_base_key.clone(),
199 their_htlc_base_key: self.their_htlc_base_key.clone(),
200 their_cur_revocation_points: self.their_cur_revocation_points.clone(),
202 our_to_self_delay: self.our_to_self_delay,
203 their_to_self_delay: self.their_to_self_delay,
205 old_secrets: self.old_secrets.clone(),
206 remote_claimable_outpoints: self.remote_claimable_outpoints.clone(),
207 remote_commitment_txn_on_chain: Mutex::new((*self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.lock().unwrap()).clone()),
208 remote_hash_commitment_number: self.remote_hash_commitment_number.clone(),
210 prev_local_signed_commitment_tx: self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.clone(),
211 current_local_signed_commitment_tx: self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx.clone(),
213 payment_preimages: self.payment_preimages.clone(),
215 destination_script: self.destination_script.clone(),
216 secp_ctx: self.secp_ctx.clone(),
221 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
222 /// Used only in testing and fuzztarget to check serialization roundtrips don't change the
223 /// underlying object
224 impl PartialEq for ChannelMonitor {
225 fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
226 if self.funding_txo != other.funding_txo ||
227 self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor != other.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor ||
228 self.key_storage != other.key_storage ||
229 self.delayed_payment_base_key != other.delayed_payment_base_key ||
230 self.their_htlc_base_key != other.their_htlc_base_key ||
231 self.their_cur_revocation_points != other.their_cur_revocation_points ||
232 self.our_to_self_delay != other.our_to_self_delay ||
233 self.their_to_self_delay != other.their_to_self_delay ||
234 self.remote_claimable_outpoints != other.remote_claimable_outpoints ||
235 self.remote_hash_commitment_number != other.remote_hash_commitment_number ||
236 self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx != other.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx ||
237 self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx != other.current_local_signed_commitment_tx ||
238 self.payment_preimages != other.payment_preimages ||
239 self.destination_script != other.destination_script
243 for (&(ref secret, ref idx), &(ref o_secret, ref o_idx)) in self.old_secrets.iter().zip(other.old_secrets.iter()) {
244 if secret != o_secret || idx != o_idx {
248 let us = self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.lock().unwrap();
249 let them = other.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.lock().unwrap();
255 impl ChannelMonitor {
256 pub fn new(revocation_base_key: &SecretKey, delayed_payment_base_key: &PublicKey, htlc_base_key: &SecretKey, our_to_self_delay: u16, destination_script: Script) -> ChannelMonitor {
259 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: 0,
261 key_storage: KeyStorage::PrivMode {
262 revocation_base_key: revocation_base_key.clone(),
263 htlc_base_key: htlc_base_key.clone(),
265 delayed_payment_base_key: delayed_payment_base_key.clone(),
266 their_htlc_base_key: None,
267 their_cur_revocation_points: None,
269 our_to_self_delay: our_to_self_delay,
270 their_to_self_delay: None,
272 old_secrets: [([0; 32], 1 << 48); 49],
273 remote_claimable_outpoints: HashMap::new(),
274 remote_commitment_txn_on_chain: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
275 remote_hash_commitment_number: HashMap::new(),
277 prev_local_signed_commitment_tx: None,
278 current_local_signed_commitment_tx: None,
280 payment_preimages: HashMap::new(),
282 destination_script: destination_script,
283 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
288 fn place_secret(idx: u64) -> u8 {
290 if idx & (1 << i) == (1 << i) {
298 fn derive_secret(secret: [u8; 32], bits: u8, idx: u64) -> [u8; 32] {
299 let mut res: [u8; 32] = secret;
301 let bitpos = bits - 1 - i;
302 if idx & (1 << bitpos) == (1 << bitpos) {
303 res[(bitpos / 8) as usize] ^= 1 << (bitpos & 7);
304 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
306 sha.result(&mut res);
312 /// Inserts a revocation secret into this channel monitor. Also optionally tracks the next
313 /// revocation point which may be required to claim HTLC outputs which we know the preimage of
314 /// in case the remote end force-closes using their latest state. Prunes old preimages if neither
315 /// needed by local commitment transactions HTCLs nor by remote ones. Unless we haven't already seen remote
316 /// commitment transaction's secret, they are de facto pruned (we can use revocation key).
317 pub(super) fn provide_secret(&mut self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32], their_next_revocation_point: Option<(u64, PublicKey)>) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
318 let pos = ChannelMonitor::place_secret(idx);
320 let (old_secret, old_idx) = self.old_secrets[i as usize];
321 if ChannelMonitor::derive_secret(secret, pos, old_idx) != old_secret {
322 return Err(HandleError{err: "Previous secret did not match new one", action: None})
325 self.old_secrets[pos as usize] = (secret, idx);
327 if let Some(new_revocation_point) = their_next_revocation_point {
328 match self.their_cur_revocation_points {
329 Some(old_points) => {
330 if old_points.0 == new_revocation_point.0 + 1 {
331 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0, old_points.1, Some(new_revocation_point.1)));
332 } else if old_points.0 == new_revocation_point.0 + 2 {
333 if let Some(old_second_point) = old_points.2 {
334 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0 - 1, old_second_point, Some(new_revocation_point.1)));
336 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((new_revocation_point.0, new_revocation_point.1, None));
339 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((new_revocation_point.0, new_revocation_point.1, None));
343 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((new_revocation_point.0, new_revocation_point.1, None));
348 if !self.payment_preimages.is_empty() {
349 let local_signed_commitment_tx = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx.as_ref().expect("Channel needs at least an initial commitment tx !");
350 let prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.as_ref();
351 let min_idx = self.get_min_seen_secret();
352 let remote_hash_commitment_number = &mut self.remote_hash_commitment_number;
354 self.payment_preimages.retain(|&k, _| {
355 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in &local_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs {
356 if k == htlc.payment_hash {
360 if let Some(prev_local_commitment_tx) = prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
361 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in prev_local_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
362 if k == htlc.payment_hash {
367 let contains = if let Some(cn) = remote_hash_commitment_number.get(&k) {
374 remote_hash_commitment_number.remove(&k);
383 /// Informs this monitor of the latest remote (ie non-broadcastable) commitment transaction.
384 /// The monitor watches for it to be broadcasted and then uses the HTLC information (and
385 /// possibly future revocation/preimage information) to claim outputs where possible.
386 /// We cache also the mapping hash:commitment number to lighten pruning of old preimages by watchtowers.
387 pub(super) fn provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, unsigned_commitment_tx: &Transaction, htlc_outputs: Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>, commitment_number: u64) {
388 // TODO: Encrypt the htlc_outputs data with the single-hash of the commitment transaction
389 // so that a remote monitor doesn't learn anything unless there is a malicious close.
390 // (only maybe, sadly we cant do the same for local info, as we need to be aware of
392 for htlc in &htlc_outputs {
393 self.remote_hash_commitment_number.insert(htlc.payment_hash, commitment_number);
395 self.remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(unsigned_commitment_tx.txid(), htlc_outputs);
398 /// Informs this monitor of the latest local (ie broadcastable) commitment transaction. The
399 /// monitor watches for timeouts and may broadcast it if we approach such a timeout. Thus, it
400 /// is important that any clones of this channel monitor (including remote clones) by kept
401 /// up-to-date as our local commitment transaction is updated.
402 /// Panics if set_their_to_self_delay has never been called.
403 pub(super) fn provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, signed_commitment_tx: Transaction, local_keys: chan_utils::TxCreationKeys, feerate_per_kw: u64, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Signature, Signature)>) {
404 assert!(self.their_to_self_delay.is_some());
405 self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx.take();
406 self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(LocalSignedTx {
407 txid: signed_commitment_tx.txid(),
408 tx: signed_commitment_tx,
409 revocation_key: local_keys.revocation_key,
410 a_htlc_key: local_keys.a_htlc_key,
411 b_htlc_key: local_keys.b_htlc_key,
412 delayed_payment_key: local_keys.a_delayed_payment_key,
418 /// Provides a payment_hash->payment_preimage mapping. Will be automatically pruned when all
419 /// commitment_tx_infos which contain the payment hash have been revoked.
420 pub(super) fn provide_payment_preimage(&mut self, payment_hash: &[u8; 32], payment_preimage: &[u8; 32]) {
421 self.payment_preimages.insert(payment_hash.clone(), payment_preimage.clone());
424 pub fn insert_combine(&mut self, mut other: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
425 if self.funding_txo.is_some() {
426 // We should be able to compare the entire funding_txo, but in fuzztarget its trivially
427 // easy to collide the funding_txo hash and have a different scriptPubKey.
428 if other.funding_txo.is_some() && other.funding_txo.as_ref().unwrap().0 != self.funding_txo.as_ref().unwrap().0 {
429 return Err(HandleError{err: "Funding transaction outputs are not identical!", action: None});
432 self.funding_txo = other.funding_txo.take();
434 let other_min_secret = other.get_min_seen_secret();
435 let our_min_secret = self.get_min_seen_secret();
436 if our_min_secret > other_min_secret {
437 self.provide_secret(other_min_secret, other.get_secret(other_min_secret).unwrap(), None)?;
439 if our_min_secret >= other_min_secret {
440 self.their_cur_revocation_points = other.their_cur_revocation_points;
441 for (txid, htlcs) in other.remote_claimable_outpoints.drain() {
442 self.remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, htlcs);
444 if let Some(local_tx) = other.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
445 self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(local_tx);
447 if let Some(local_tx) = other.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
448 self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(local_tx);
450 self.payment_preimages = other.payment_preimages;
455 /// Panics if commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor doesn't fit in 48 bits
456 pub(super) fn set_commitment_obscure_factor(&mut self, commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64) {
457 assert!(commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor < (1 << 48));
458 self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor = commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor;
461 /// Allows this monitor to scan only for transactions which are applicable. Note that this is
462 /// optional, without it this monitor cannot be used in an SPV client, but you may wish to
463 /// avoid this (or call unset_funding_info) on a monitor you wish to send to a watchtower as it
464 /// provides slightly better privacy.
465 pub(super) fn set_funding_info(&mut self, funding_info: (OutPoint, Script)) {
466 //TODO: Need to register the given script here with a chain_monitor
467 self.funding_txo = Some(funding_info);
470 pub(super) fn set_their_htlc_base_key(&mut self, their_htlc_base_key: &PublicKey) {
471 self.their_htlc_base_key = Some(their_htlc_base_key.clone());
474 pub(super) fn set_their_to_self_delay(&mut self, their_to_self_delay: u16) {
475 self.their_to_self_delay = Some(their_to_self_delay);
478 pub(super) fn unset_funding_info(&mut self) {
479 self.funding_txo = None;
482 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
483 match self.funding_txo {
484 Some((outpoint, _)) => Some(outpoint),
489 /// Serializes into a vec, with various modes for the exposed pub fns
490 fn serialize(&self, for_local_storage: bool) -> Vec<u8> {
491 let mut res = Vec::new();
492 res.push(SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
493 res.push(MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
495 match &self.funding_txo {
496 &Some((ref outpoint, ref script)) => {
497 res.extend_from_slice(&outpoint.txid[..]);
498 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(outpoint.index));
499 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(script.len() as u64));
500 res.extend_from_slice(&script[..]);
503 // We haven't even been initialized...not sure why anyone is serializing us, but
504 // not much to give them.
509 // Set in initial Channel-object creation, so should always be set by now:
510 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor));
512 match self.key_storage {
513 KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key } => {
515 res.extend_from_slice(&revocation_base_key[..]);
516 res.extend_from_slice(&htlc_base_key[..]);
518 KeyStorage::SigsMode { .. } => unimplemented!(),
521 res.extend_from_slice(&self.delayed_payment_base_key.serialize());
522 res.extend_from_slice(&self.their_htlc_base_key.as_ref().unwrap().serialize());
524 match self.their_cur_revocation_points {
525 Some((idx, pubkey, second_option)) => {
526 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(idx));
527 res.extend_from_slice(&pubkey.serialize());
528 match second_option {
529 Some(second_pubkey) => {
530 res.extend_from_slice(&second_pubkey.serialize());
533 res.extend_from_slice(&[0; 33]);
538 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(0));
542 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.our_to_self_delay));
543 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap()));
545 for &(ref secret, ref idx) in self.old_secrets.iter() {
546 res.extend_from_slice(secret);
547 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*idx));
550 macro_rules! serialize_htlc_in_commitment {
551 ($htlc_output: expr) => {
552 res.push($htlc_output.offered as u8);
553 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc_output.amount_msat));
554 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array($htlc_output.cltv_expiry));
555 res.extend_from_slice(&$htlc_output.payment_hash);
556 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array($htlc_output.transaction_output_index));
560 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_claimable_outpoints.len() as u64));
561 for (txid, htlc_outputs) in self.remote_claimable_outpoints.iter() {
562 res.extend_from_slice(&txid[..]);
563 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc_outputs.len() as u64));
564 for htlc_output in htlc_outputs.iter() {
565 serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output);
570 let remote_commitment_txn_on_chain = self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.lock().unwrap();
571 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.len() as u64));
572 for (txid, commitment_number) in remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
573 res.extend_from_slice(&txid[..]);
574 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(*commitment_number));
578 if for_local_storage {
579 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_hash_commitment_number.len() as u64));
580 for (payment_hash, commitment_number) in self.remote_hash_commitment_number.iter() {
581 res.extend_from_slice(payment_hash);
582 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(*commitment_number));
585 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(0));
588 macro_rules! serialize_local_tx {
589 ($local_tx: expr) => {
590 let tx_ser = serialize::serialize(&$local_tx.tx).unwrap();
591 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(tx_ser.len() as u64));
592 res.extend_from_slice(&tx_ser);
594 res.extend_from_slice(&$local_tx.revocation_key.serialize());
595 res.extend_from_slice(&$local_tx.a_htlc_key.serialize());
596 res.extend_from_slice(&$local_tx.b_htlc_key.serialize());
597 res.extend_from_slice(&$local_tx.delayed_payment_key.serialize());
599 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($local_tx.feerate_per_kw));
600 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($local_tx.htlc_outputs.len() as u64));
601 for &(ref htlc_output, ref their_sig, ref our_sig) in $local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
602 serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output);
603 res.extend_from_slice(&their_sig.serialize_compact(&self.secp_ctx));
604 res.extend_from_slice(&our_sig.serialize_compact(&self.secp_ctx));
609 if let Some(ref prev_local_tx) = self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
611 serialize_local_tx!(prev_local_tx);
616 if let Some(ref cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
618 serialize_local_tx!(cur_local_tx);
623 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.payment_preimages.len() as u64));
624 for payment_preimage in self.payment_preimages.values() {
625 res.extend_from_slice(payment_preimage);
628 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.destination_script.len() as u64));
629 res.extend_from_slice(&self.destination_script[..]);
634 /// Encodes this monitor into a byte array, suitable for writing to disk.
635 pub fn serialize_for_disk(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
639 /// Encodes this monitor into a byte array, suitable for sending to a remote watchtower
640 pub fn serialize_for_watchtower(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
641 self.serialize(false)
644 /// Attempts to decode a serialized monitor
645 pub fn deserialize(data: &[u8]) -> Option<Self> {
646 let mut read_pos = 0;
647 macro_rules! read_bytes {
648 ($byte_count: expr) => {
650 if ($byte_count as usize) > data.len() - read_pos {
653 read_pos += $byte_count as usize;
654 &data[read_pos - $byte_count as usize..read_pos]
659 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
660 macro_rules! unwrap_obj {
664 Err(_) => return None,
669 let _ver = read_bytes!(1)[0];
670 let min_ver = read_bytes!(1)[0];
671 if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION {
675 // Technically this can fail and serialize fail a round-trip, but only for serialization of
676 // barely-init'd ChannelMonitors that we can't do anything with.
677 let outpoint = OutPoint {
678 txid: Sha256dHash::from(read_bytes!(32)),
679 index: byte_utils::slice_to_be16(read_bytes!(2)),
681 let script_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8));
682 let funding_txo = Some((outpoint, Script::from(read_bytes!(script_len).to_vec())));
683 let commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor = byte_utils::slice_to_be48(read_bytes!(6));
685 let key_storage = match read_bytes!(1)[0] {
687 KeyStorage::PrivMode {
688 revocation_base_key: unwrap_obj!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(32))),
689 htlc_base_key: unwrap_obj!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(32))),
695 let delayed_payment_base_key = unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(33)));
696 let their_htlc_base_key = Some(unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(33))));
698 let their_cur_revocation_points = {
699 let first_idx = byte_utils::slice_to_be48(read_bytes!(6));
703 let first_point = unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(33)));
704 let second_point_slice = read_bytes!(33);
705 if second_point_slice[0..32] == [0; 32] && second_point_slice[32] == 0 {
706 Some((first_idx, first_point, None))
708 Some((first_idx, first_point, Some(unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, second_point_slice)))))
713 let our_to_self_delay = byte_utils::slice_to_be16(read_bytes!(2));
714 let their_to_self_delay = Some(byte_utils::slice_to_be16(read_bytes!(2)));
716 let mut old_secrets = [([0; 32], 1 << 48); 49];
717 for &mut (ref mut secret, ref mut idx) in old_secrets.iter_mut() {
718 secret.copy_from_slice(read_bytes!(32));
719 *idx = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8));
722 macro_rules! read_htlc_in_commitment {
725 let offered = match read_bytes!(1)[0] {
726 0 => false, 1 => true,
729 let amount_msat = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8));
730 let cltv_expiry = byte_utils::slice_to_be32(read_bytes!(4));
731 let mut payment_hash = [0; 32];
732 payment_hash[..].copy_from_slice(read_bytes!(32));
733 let transaction_output_index = byte_utils::slice_to_be32(read_bytes!(4));
735 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
736 offered, amount_msat, cltv_expiry, payment_hash, transaction_output_index
742 let remote_claimable_outpoints_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8));
743 if remote_claimable_outpoints_len > data.len() as u64 / 64 { return None; }
744 let mut remote_claimable_outpoints = HashMap::with_capacity(remote_claimable_outpoints_len as usize);
745 for _ in 0..remote_claimable_outpoints_len {
746 let txid = Sha256dHash::from(read_bytes!(32));
747 let outputs_count = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8));
748 if outputs_count > data.len() as u64 / 32 { return None; }
749 let mut outputs = Vec::with_capacity(outputs_count as usize);
750 for _ in 0..outputs_count {
751 outputs.push(read_htlc_in_commitment!());
753 if let Some(_) = remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, outputs) {
758 let remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8));
759 if remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len > data.len() as u64 / 32 { return None; }
760 let mut remote_commitment_txn_on_chain = HashMap::with_capacity(remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len as usize);
761 for _ in 0..remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len {
762 let txid = Sha256dHash::from(read_bytes!(32));
763 let commitment_number = byte_utils::slice_to_be48(read_bytes!(6));
764 if let Some(_) = remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(txid, commitment_number) {
769 let remote_hash_commitment_number_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8));
770 if remote_hash_commitment_number_len > data.len() as u64 / 32 { return None; }
771 let mut remote_hash_commitment_number = HashMap::with_capacity(remote_hash_commitment_number_len as usize);
772 for _ in 0..remote_hash_commitment_number_len {
773 let mut txid = [0; 32];
774 txid[..].copy_from_slice(read_bytes!(32));
775 let commitment_number = byte_utils::slice_to_be48(read_bytes!(6));
776 if let Some(_) = remote_hash_commitment_number.insert(txid, commitment_number) {
781 macro_rules! read_local_tx {
784 let tx_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8));
785 let tx_ser = read_bytes!(tx_len);
786 let tx: Transaction = unwrap_obj!(serialize::deserialize(tx_ser));
787 if serialize::serialize(&tx).unwrap() != tx_ser {
788 // We check that the tx re-serializes to the same form to ensure there is
789 // no extra data, and as rust-bitcoin doesn't handle the 0-input ambiguity
794 let revocation_key = unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(33)));
795 let a_htlc_key = unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(33)));
796 let b_htlc_key = unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(33)));
797 let delayed_payment_key = unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(33)));
798 let feerate_per_kw = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8));
800 let htlc_outputs_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8));
801 if htlc_outputs_len > data.len() as u64 / 128 { return None; }
802 let mut htlc_outputs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_outputs_len as usize);
803 for _ in 0..htlc_outputs_len {
804 htlc_outputs.push((read_htlc_in_commitment!(),
805 unwrap_obj!(Signature::from_compact(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(64))),
806 unwrap_obj!(Signature::from_compact(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(64)))));
811 tx, revocation_key, a_htlc_key, b_htlc_key, delayed_payment_key, feerate_per_kw, htlc_outputs
817 let prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = match read_bytes!(1)[0] {
820 Some(read_local_tx!())
825 let current_local_signed_commitment_tx = match read_bytes!(1)[0] {
828 Some(read_local_tx!())
833 let payment_preimages_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8));
834 if payment_preimages_len > data.len() as u64 / 32 { return None; }
835 let mut payment_preimages = HashMap::with_capacity(payment_preimages_len as usize);
836 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
837 for _ in 0..payment_preimages_len {
838 let mut preimage = [0; 32];
839 preimage[..].copy_from_slice(read_bytes!(32));
841 sha.input(&preimage);
842 let mut hash = [0; 32];
843 sha.result(&mut hash);
844 if let Some(_) = payment_preimages.insert(hash, preimage) {
849 let destination_script_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8));
850 let destination_script = Script::from(read_bytes!(destination_script_len).to_vec());
852 Some(ChannelMonitor {
854 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor,
857 delayed_payment_base_key,
859 their_cur_revocation_points,
865 remote_claimable_outpoints,
866 remote_commitment_txn_on_chain: Mutex::new(remote_commitment_txn_on_chain),
867 remote_hash_commitment_number,
869 prev_local_signed_commitment_tx,
870 current_local_signed_commitment_tx,
879 //TODO: Functions to serialize/deserialize (with different forms depending on which information
880 //we want to leave out (eg funding_txo, etc).
882 /// Can only fail if idx is < get_min_seen_secret
883 pub fn get_secret(&self, idx: u64) -> Result<[u8; 32], HandleError> {
884 for i in 0..self.old_secrets.len() {
885 if (idx & (!((1 << i) - 1))) == self.old_secrets[i].1 {
886 return Ok(ChannelMonitor::derive_secret(self.old_secrets[i].0, i as u8, idx))
889 assert!(idx < self.get_min_seen_secret());
890 Err(HandleError{err: "idx too low", action: None})
893 pub fn get_min_seen_secret(&self) -> u64 {
894 //TODO This can be optimized?
895 let mut min = 1 << 48;
896 for &(_, idx) in self.old_secrets.iter() {
904 /// Attempts to claim a remote commitment transaction's outputs using the revocation key and
905 /// data in remote_claimable_outpoints. Will directly claim any HTLC outputs which expire at a
906 /// height > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER. In any case, will install monitoring for
907 /// HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions, and claim them using the revocation key (if
908 /// applicable) as well.
909 fn check_spend_remote_transaction(&self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32) -> Vec<Transaction> {
910 // Most secp and related errors trying to create keys means we have no hope of constructing
911 // a spend transaction...so we return no transactions to broadcast
912 let mut txn_to_broadcast = Vec::new();
913 macro_rules! ignore_error {
914 ( $thing : expr ) => {
917 Err(_) => return txn_to_broadcast
922 let commitment_txid = tx.txid(); //TODO: This is gonna be a performance bottleneck for watchtowers!
923 let per_commitment_option = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(&commitment_txid);
925 let commitment_number = 0xffffffffffff - ((((tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor);
926 if commitment_number >= self.get_min_seen_secret() {
927 let secret = self.get_secret(commitment_number).unwrap();
928 let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &secret));
929 let (revocation_pubkey, b_htlc_key) = match self.key_storage {
930 KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key } => {
931 let per_commitment_point = ignore_error!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key));
932 (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &ignore_error!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_base_key)))),
933 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &ignore_error!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &htlc_base_key)))))
935 KeyStorage::SigsMode { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
936 let per_commitment_point = ignore_error!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key));
937 (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &revocation_base_key)),
938 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &htlc_base_key)))
941 let delayed_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &ignore_error!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key)), &self.delayed_payment_base_key));
942 let a_htlc_key = match self.their_htlc_base_key {
943 None => return txn_to_broadcast,
944 Some(their_htlc_base_key) => ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &ignore_error!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key)), &their_htlc_base_key)),
947 let revokeable_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey, self.our_to_self_delay, &delayed_key);
948 let revokeable_p2wsh = revokeable_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
950 let mut total_value = 0;
951 let mut values = Vec::new();
952 let mut inputs = Vec::new();
953 let mut htlc_idxs = Vec::new();
955 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
956 if outp.script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh {
958 prev_hash: commitment_txid,
959 prev_index: idx as u32,
960 script_sig: Script::new(),
961 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
964 htlc_idxs.push(None);
965 values.push(outp.value);
966 total_value += outp.value;
967 break; // There can only be one of these
971 macro_rules! sign_input {
972 ($sighash_parts: expr, $input: expr, $htlc_idx: expr, $amount: expr) => {
974 let (sig, redeemscript) = match self.key_storage {
975 KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
976 let redeemscript = if $htlc_idx.is_none() { revokeable_redeemscript.clone() } else {
977 let htlc = &per_commitment_option.unwrap()[$htlc_idx.unwrap()];
978 chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey)
980 let sighash = ignore_error!(Message::from_slice(&$sighash_parts.sighash_all(&$input, &redeemscript, $amount)[..]));
981 let revocation_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key, &revocation_base_key));
982 (ignore_error!(self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &revocation_key)), redeemscript)
984 KeyStorage::SigsMode { .. } => {
988 $input.witness.push(sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
989 $input.witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
990 if $htlc_idx.is_none() {
991 $input.witness.push(vec!(1));
993 $input.witness.push(revocation_pubkey.serialize().to_vec());
995 $input.witness.push(redeemscript.into_vec());
1000 if let Some(per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
1001 inputs.reserve_exact(per_commitment_data.len());
1003 for (idx, htlc) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() {
1004 let expected_script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey);
1005 if htlc.transaction_output_index as usize >= tx.output.len() ||
1006 tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 ||
1007 tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].script_pubkey != expected_script.to_v0_p2wsh() {
1008 return txn_to_broadcast; // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user
1011 prev_hash: commitment_txid,
1012 prev_index: htlc.transaction_output_index,
1013 script_sig: Script::new(),
1014 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
1015 witness: Vec::new(),
1017 if htlc.cltv_expiry > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER {
1019 htlc_idxs.push(Some(idx));
1020 values.push(tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].value);
1021 total_value += htlc.amount_msat / 1000;
1023 let mut single_htlc_tx = Transaction {
1027 output: vec!(TxOut {
1028 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1029 value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000, //TODO: - fee
1032 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&single_htlc_tx);
1033 sign_input!(sighash_parts, single_htlc_tx.input[0], Some(idx), htlc.amount_msat / 1000);
1034 txn_to_broadcast.push(single_htlc_tx); // TODO: This is not yet tested in ChannelManager!
1039 if !inputs.is_empty() || !txn_to_broadcast.is_empty() { // ie we're confident this is actually ours
1040 // We're definitely a remote commitment transaction!
1041 // TODO: Register all outputs in commitment_tx with the ChainWatchInterface!
1042 self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.lock().unwrap().insert(commitment_txid, commitment_number);
1044 if inputs.is_empty() { return txn_to_broadcast; } // Nothing to be done...probably a false positive/local tx
1046 let outputs = vec!(TxOut {
1047 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1048 value: total_value, //TODO: - fee
1050 let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
1057 let mut values_drain = values.drain(..);
1058 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx);
1060 for (input, htlc_idx) in spend_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(htlc_idxs.iter()) {
1061 let value = values_drain.next().unwrap();
1062 sign_input!(sighash_parts, input, htlc_idx, value);
1065 txn_to_broadcast.push(spend_tx);
1066 } else if let Some(per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
1067 // While this isn't useful yet, there is a potential race where if a counterparty
1068 // revokes a state at the same time as the commitment transaction for that state is
1069 // confirmed, and the watchtower receives the block before the user, the user could
1070 // upload a new ChannelMonitor with the revocation secret but the watchtower has
1071 // already processed the block, resulting in the remote_commitment_txn_on_chain entry
1072 // not being generated by the above conditional. Thus, to be safe, we go ahead and
1074 // TODO: Register all outputs in commitment_tx with the ChainWatchInterface!
1075 self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.lock().unwrap().insert(commitment_txid, commitment_number);
1077 if let Some(revocation_points) = self.their_cur_revocation_points {
1078 let revocation_point_option =
1079 if revocation_points.0 == commitment_number { Some(&revocation_points.1) }
1080 else if let Some(point) = revocation_points.2.as_ref() {
1081 if revocation_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 { Some(point) } else { None }
1083 if let Some(revocation_point) = revocation_point_option {
1084 let (revocation_pubkey, b_htlc_key) = match self.key_storage {
1085 KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key } => {
1086 (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &ignore_error!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_base_key)))),
1087 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &ignore_error!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &htlc_base_key)))))
1089 KeyStorage::SigsMode { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
1090 (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &revocation_base_key)),
1091 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &htlc_base_key)))
1094 let a_htlc_key = match self.their_htlc_base_key {
1095 None => return txn_to_broadcast,
1096 Some(their_htlc_base_key) => ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &their_htlc_base_key)),
1099 let mut total_value = 0;
1100 let mut values = Vec::new();
1101 let mut inputs = Vec::new();
1103 macro_rules! sign_input {
1104 ($sighash_parts: expr, $input: expr, $amount: expr, $preimage: expr) => {
1106 let (sig, redeemscript) = match self.key_storage {
1107 KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
1108 let htlc = &per_commitment_option.unwrap()[$input.sequence as usize];
1109 let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey);
1110 let sighash = ignore_error!(Message::from_slice(&$sighash_parts.sighash_all(&$input, &redeemscript, $amount)[..]));
1111 let htlc_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &htlc_base_key));
1112 (ignore_error!(self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &htlc_key)), redeemscript)
1114 KeyStorage::SigsMode { .. } => {
1118 $input.witness.push(sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
1119 $input.witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1120 $input.witness.push($preimage);
1121 $input.witness.push(redeemscript.into_vec());
1126 for (idx, htlc) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() {
1127 if let Some(payment_preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
1129 prev_hash: commitment_txid,
1130 prev_index: htlc.transaction_output_index,
1131 script_sig: Script::new(),
1132 sequence: idx as u32, // reset to 0xfffffffd in sign_input
1133 witness: Vec::new(),
1135 if htlc.cltv_expiry > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER {
1137 values.push((tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].value, payment_preimage));
1138 total_value += htlc.amount_msat / 1000;
1140 let mut single_htlc_tx = Transaction {
1144 output: vec!(TxOut {
1145 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1146 value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000, //TODO: - fee
1149 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&single_htlc_tx);
1150 sign_input!(sighash_parts, single_htlc_tx.input[0], htlc.amount_msat / 1000, payment_preimage.to_vec());
1151 txn_to_broadcast.push(single_htlc_tx);
1156 if inputs.is_empty() { return txn_to_broadcast; } // Nothing to be done...probably a false positive/local tx
1158 let outputs = vec!(TxOut {
1159 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1160 value: total_value, //TODO: - fee
1162 let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
1169 let mut values_drain = values.drain(..);
1170 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx);
1172 for input in spend_tx.input.iter_mut() {
1173 let value = values_drain.next().unwrap();
1174 sign_input!(sighash_parts, input, value.0, value.1.to_vec());
1177 txn_to_broadcast.push(spend_tx);
1181 //TODO: For each input check if its in our remote_commitment_txn_on_chain map!
1187 fn broadcast_by_local_state(&self, local_tx: &LocalSignedTx) -> Vec<Transaction> {
1188 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
1190 for &(ref htlc, ref their_sig, ref our_sig) in local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1192 let mut htlc_timeout_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&local_tx.txid, local_tx.feerate_per_kw, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), htlc, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key, &local_tx.revocation_key);
1194 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
1196 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(their_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
1197 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1198 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
1199 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1201 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new());
1202 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &local_tx.a_htlc_key, &local_tx.b_htlc_key, &local_tx.revocation_key).into_vec());
1204 res.push(htlc_timeout_tx);
1206 if let Some(payment_preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
1207 let mut htlc_success_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&local_tx.txid, local_tx.feerate_per_kw, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), htlc, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key, &local_tx.revocation_key);
1209 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
1211 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(their_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
1212 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1213 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
1214 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1216 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(payment_preimage.to_vec());
1217 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &local_tx.a_htlc_key, &local_tx.b_htlc_key, &local_tx.revocation_key).into_vec());
1219 res.push(htlc_success_tx);
1227 /// Attempts to claim any claimable HTLCs in a commitment transaction which was not (yet)
1228 /// revoked using data in local_claimable_outpoints.
1229 /// Should not be used if check_spend_revoked_transaction succeeds.
1230 fn check_spend_local_transaction(&self, tx: &Transaction, _height: u32) -> Vec<Transaction> {
1231 let commitment_txid = tx.txid();
1232 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1233 if local_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
1234 return self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx);
1237 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1238 if local_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
1239 return self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx);
1245 fn block_connected(&self, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], height: u32, broadcaster: &BroadcasterInterface) {
1246 for tx in txn_matched {
1247 for txin in tx.input.iter() {
1248 if self.funding_txo.is_none() || (txin.prev_hash == self.funding_txo.as_ref().unwrap().0.txid && txin.prev_index == self.funding_txo.as_ref().unwrap().0.index as u32) {
1249 let mut txn = self.check_spend_remote_transaction(tx, height);
1251 txn = self.check_spend_local_transaction(tx, height);
1253 for tx in txn.iter() {
1254 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(tx);
1259 if let Some(ref cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1260 let mut needs_broadcast = false;
1261 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in cur_local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1262 if htlc.cltv_expiry <= height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER {
1263 if htlc.offered || self.payment_preimages.contains_key(&htlc.payment_hash) {
1264 needs_broadcast = true;
1269 if needs_broadcast {
1270 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&cur_local_tx.tx);
1271 for tx in self.broadcast_by_local_state(&cur_local_tx) {
1272 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
1278 pub fn would_broadcast_at_height(&self, height: u32) -> bool {
1279 if let Some(ref cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1280 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in cur_local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1281 if htlc.cltv_expiry <= height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER {
1282 if htlc.offered || self.payment_preimages.contains_key(&htlc.payment_hash) {
1294 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Script;
1295 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
1296 use crypto::digest::Digest;
1298 use ln::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor;
1299 use ln::chan_utils::{HTLCOutputInCommitment, TxCreationKeys};
1300 use util::sha2::Sha256;
1301 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
1302 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1, Signature};
1303 use rand::{thread_rng,Rng};
1306 fn test_per_commitment_storage() {
1307 // Test vectors from BOLT 3:
1308 let mut secrets: Vec<[u8; 32]> = Vec::new();
1309 let mut monitor: ChannelMonitor;
1310 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1312 macro_rules! test_secrets {
1314 let mut idx = 281474976710655;
1315 for secret in secrets.iter() {
1316 assert_eq!(monitor.get_secret(idx).unwrap(), *secret);
1319 assert_eq!(monitor.get_min_seen_secret(), idx + 1);
1320 assert!(monitor.get_secret(idx).is_err());
1325 // insert_secret correct sequence
1326 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::new(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
1329 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1330 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1331 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1334 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1335 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1336 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1339 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1340 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1341 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1344 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1345 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1346 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1349 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1350 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
1351 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1354 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1355 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
1356 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1359 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1360 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
1361 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1364 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1365 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
1366 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1371 // insert_secret #1 incorrect
1372 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::new(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
1375 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1376 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
1377 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1380 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1381 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1382 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err,
1383 "Previous secret did not match new one");
1387 // insert_secret #2 incorrect (#1 derived from incorrect)
1388 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::new(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
1391 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1392 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
1393 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1396 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1397 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("dddc3a8d14fddf2b68fa8c7fbad2748274937479dd0f8930d5ebb4ab6bd866a3").unwrap());
1398 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1401 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1402 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1403 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1406 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1407 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1408 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err,
1409 "Previous secret did not match new one");
1413 // insert_secret #3 incorrect
1414 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::new(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
1417 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1418 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1419 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1422 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1423 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1424 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1427 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1428 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c51a18b13e8527e579ec56365482c62f180b7d5760b46e9477dae59e87ed423a").unwrap());
1429 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1432 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1433 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1434 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err,
1435 "Previous secret did not match new one");
1439 // insert_secret #4 incorrect (1,2,3 derived from incorrect)
1440 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::new(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
1443 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1444 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
1445 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1448 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1449 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("dddc3a8d14fddf2b68fa8c7fbad2748274937479dd0f8930d5ebb4ab6bd866a3").unwrap());
1450 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1453 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1454 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c51a18b13e8527e579ec56365482c62f180b7d5760b46e9477dae59e87ed423a").unwrap());
1455 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1458 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1459 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("ba65d7b0ef55a3ba300d4e87af29868f394f8f138d78a7011669c79b37b936f4").unwrap());
1460 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1463 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1464 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
1465 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1468 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1469 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
1470 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1473 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1474 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
1475 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1478 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1479 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
1480 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err,
1481 "Previous secret did not match new one");
1485 // insert_secret #5 incorrect
1486 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::new(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
1489 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1490 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1491 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1494 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1495 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1496 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1499 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1500 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1501 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1504 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1505 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1506 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1509 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1510 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("631373ad5f9ef654bb3dade742d09504c567edd24320d2fcd68e3cc47e2ff6a6").unwrap());
1511 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1514 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1515 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
1516 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err,
1517 "Previous secret did not match new one");
1521 // insert_secret #6 incorrect (5 derived from incorrect)
1522 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::new(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
1525 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1526 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1527 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1530 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1531 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1532 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1535 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1536 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1537 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1540 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1541 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1542 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1545 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1546 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("631373ad5f9ef654bb3dade742d09504c567edd24320d2fcd68e3cc47e2ff6a6").unwrap());
1547 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1550 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1551 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("b7e76a83668bde38b373970155c868a653304308f9896692f904a23731224bb1").unwrap());
1552 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1555 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1556 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
1557 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1560 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1561 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
1562 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err,
1563 "Previous secret did not match new one");
1567 // insert_secret #7 incorrect
1568 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::new(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
1571 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1572 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1573 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1576 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1577 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1578 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1581 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1582 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1583 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1586 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1587 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1588 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1591 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1592 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
1593 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1596 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1597 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
1598 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1601 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1602 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("e7971de736e01da8ed58b94c2fc216cb1dca9e326f3a96e7194fe8ea8af6c0a3").unwrap());
1603 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1606 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1607 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
1608 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err,
1609 "Previous secret did not match new one");
1613 // insert_secret #8 incorrect
1614 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::new(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
1617 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1618 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1619 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1622 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1623 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1624 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1627 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1628 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1629 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1632 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1633 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1634 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1637 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1638 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
1639 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1642 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1643 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
1644 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1647 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1648 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
1649 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1652 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1653 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a7efbc61aac46d34f77778bac22c8a20c6a46ca460addc49009bda875ec88fa4").unwrap());
1654 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err,
1655 "Previous secret did not match new one");
1660 fn test_prune_preimages() {
1661 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1662 let dummy_sig = Signature::from_der(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("3045022100fa86fa9a36a8cd6a7bb8f06a541787d51371d067951a9461d5404de6b928782e02201c8b7c334c10aed8976a3a465be9a28abff4cb23acbf00022295b378ce1fa3cd").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
1664 macro_rules! dummy_keys {
1667 per_commitment_point: PublicKey::new(),
1668 revocation_key: PublicKey::new(),
1669 a_htlc_key: PublicKey::new(),
1670 b_htlc_key: PublicKey::new(),
1671 a_delayed_payment_key: PublicKey::new(),
1672 b_payment_key: PublicKey::new(),
1676 let dummy_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
1678 let mut preimages = Vec::new();
1680 let mut rng = thread_rng();
1682 let mut preimage = [0; 32];
1683 rng.fill_bytes(&mut preimage);
1684 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
1685 sha.input(&preimage);
1686 let mut hash = [0; 32];
1687 sha.result(&mut hash);
1688 preimages.push((preimage, hash));
1692 macro_rules! preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs {
1693 ($preimages_slice: expr) => {
1695 let mut res = Vec::new();
1696 for (idx, preimage) in $preimages_slice.iter().enumerate() {
1697 res.push(HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1701 payment_hash: preimage.1.clone(),
1702 transaction_output_index: idx as u32,
1709 macro_rules! preimages_to_local_htlcs {
1710 ($preimages_slice: expr) => {
1712 let mut inp = preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!($preimages_slice);
1713 let res: Vec<_> = inp.drain(..).map(|e| { (e, dummy_sig.clone(), dummy_sig.clone()) }).collect();
1719 macro_rules! test_preimages_exist {
1720 ($preimages_slice: expr, $monitor: expr) => {
1721 for preimage in $preimages_slice {
1722 assert!($monitor.payment_preimages.contains_key(&preimage.1));
1727 // Prune with one old state and a local commitment tx holding a few overlaps with the
1729 let mut monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::new(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
1730 monitor.set_their_to_self_delay(10);
1732 monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(dummy_tx.clone(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..10]));
1733 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[5..15]), 281474976710655);
1734 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[15..20]), 281474976710654);
1735 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[17..20]), 281474976710653);
1736 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[18..20]), 281474976710652);
1737 for &(ref preimage, ref hash) in preimages.iter() {
1738 monitor.provide_payment_preimage(hash, preimage);
1741 // Now provide a secret, pruning preimages 10-15
1742 let mut secret = [0; 32];
1743 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1744 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secret.clone(), None).unwrap();
1745 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 15);
1746 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
1747 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[15..20], monitor);
1749 // Now provide a further secret, pruning preimages 15-17
1750 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1751 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secret.clone(), None).unwrap();
1752 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 13);
1753 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
1754 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[17..20], monitor);
1756 // Now update local commitment tx info, pruning only element 18 as we still care about the
1757 // previous commitment tx's preimages too
1758 monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(dummy_tx.clone(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..5]));
1759 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1760 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secret.clone(), None).unwrap();
1761 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 12);
1762 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
1763 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[18..20], monitor);
1765 // But if we do it again, we'll prune 5-10
1766 monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(dummy_tx.clone(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..3]));
1767 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1768 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secret.clone(), None).unwrap();
1769 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 5);
1770 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..5], monitor);
1773 // Further testing is done in the ChannelManager integration tests.