1 //! The logic to monitor for on-chain transactions and create the relevant claim responses lives
4 //! ChannelMonitor objects are generated by ChannelManager in response to relevant
5 //! messages/actions, and MUST be persisted to disk (and, preferably, remotely) before progress can
6 //! be made in responding to certain messages, see ManyChannelMonitor for more.
8 //! Note that ChannelMonitors are an important part of the lightning trust model and a copy of the
9 //! latest ChannelMonitor must always be actively monitoring for chain updates (and no out-of-date
10 //! ChannelMonitors should do so). Thus, if you're building rust-lightning into an HSM or other
11 //! security-domain-separated system design, you should consider having multiple paths for
12 //! ChannelMonitors to get out of the HSM and onto monitoring devices.
14 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
15 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxIn,TxOut,SigHashType,Transaction};
16 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
17 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
18 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
19 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::{self, Decodable, Encodable};
20 use bitcoin::util::hash::{Hash160, BitcoinHash,Sha256dHash};
21 use bitcoin::util::bip143;
23 use crypto::digest::Digest;
25 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Message,Signature};
26 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
29 use ln::msgs::DecodeError;
31 use ln::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment;
32 use ln::channelmanager::HTLCSource;
33 use chain::chaininterface::{ChainListener, ChainWatchInterface, BroadcasterInterface};
34 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
35 use chain::keysinterface::SpendableOutputDescriptor;
36 use util::logger::Logger;
37 use util::ser::{ReadableArgs, Readable, Writer, Writeable, WriterWriteAdaptor, U48};
38 use util::sha2::Sha256;
39 use util::{byte_utils, events};
41 use std::collections::HashMap;
42 use std::sync::{Arc,Mutex};
43 use std::{hash,cmp, mem};
45 /// An error enum representing a failure to persist a channel monitor update.
47 pub enum ChannelMonitorUpdateErr {
48 /// Used to indicate a temporary failure (eg connection to a watchtower failed, but is expected
49 /// to succeed at some point in the future).
51 /// Such a failure will "freeze" a channel, preventing us from revoking old states or
52 /// submitting new commitment transactions to the remote party.
53 /// ChannelManager::test_restore_channel_monitor can be used to retry the update(s) and restore
54 /// the channel to an operational state.
56 /// Note that continuing to operate when no copy of the updated ChannelMonitor could be
57 /// persisted is unsafe - if you failed to store the update on your own local disk you should
58 /// instead return PermanentFailure to force closure of the channel ASAP.
60 /// Even when a channel has been "frozen" updates to the ChannelMonitor can continue to occur
61 /// (eg if an inbound HTLC which we forwarded was claimed upstream resulting in us attempting
62 /// to claim it on this channel) and those updates must be applied wherever they can be. At
63 /// least one such updated ChannelMonitor must be persisted otherwise PermanentFailure should
64 /// be returned to get things on-chain ASAP using only the in-memory copy. Obviously updates to
65 /// the channel which would invalidate previous ChannelMonitors are not made when a channel has
68 /// Note that even if updates made after TemporaryFailure succeed you must still call
69 /// test_restore_channel_monitor to ensure you have the latest monitor and re-enable normal
70 /// channel operation.
72 /// Used to indicate no further channel monitor updates will be allowed (eg we've moved on to a
73 /// different watchtower and cannot update with all watchtowers that were previously informed
74 /// of this channel). This will force-close the channel in question.
76 /// Should also be used to indicate a failure to update the local copy of the channel monitor.
80 /// General Err type for ChannelMonitor actions. Generally, this implies that the data provided is
81 /// inconsistent with the ChannelMonitor being called. eg for ChannelMonitor::insert_combine this
82 /// means you tried to merge two monitors for different channels or for a channel which was
83 /// restored from a backup and then generated new commitment updates.
84 /// Contains a human-readable error message.
86 pub struct MonitorUpdateError(pub &'static str);
88 /// Simple trait indicating ability to track a set of ChannelMonitors and multiplex events between
89 /// them. Generally should be implemented by keeping a local SimpleManyChannelMonitor and passing
90 /// events to it, while also taking any add_update_monitor events and passing them to some remote
93 /// Note that any updates to a channel's monitor *must* be applied to each instance of the
94 /// channel's monitor everywhere (including remote watchtowers) *before* this function returns. If
95 /// an update occurs and a remote watchtower is left with old state, it may broadcast transactions
96 /// which we have revoked, allowing our counterparty to claim all funds in the channel!
97 pub trait ManyChannelMonitor: Send + Sync {
98 /// Adds or updates a monitor for the given `funding_txo`.
100 /// Implementor must also ensure that the funding_txo outpoint is registered with any relevant
101 /// ChainWatchInterfaces such that the provided monitor receives block_connected callbacks with
102 /// any spends of it.
103 fn add_update_monitor(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr>;
106 /// A simple implementation of a ManyChannelMonitor and ChainListener. Can be used to create a
107 /// watchtower or watch our own channels.
109 /// Note that you must provide your own key by which to refer to channels.
111 /// If you're accepting remote monitors (ie are implementing a watchtower), you must verify that
112 /// users cannot overwrite a given channel by providing a duplicate key. ie you should probably
113 /// index by a PublicKey which is required to sign any updates.
115 /// If you're using this for local monitoring of your own channels, you probably want to use
116 /// `OutPoint` as the key, which will give you a ManyChannelMonitor implementation.
117 pub struct SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
118 #[cfg(test)] // Used in ChannelManager tests to manipulate channels directly
119 pub monitors: Mutex<HashMap<Key, ChannelMonitor>>,
121 monitors: Mutex<HashMap<Key, ChannelMonitor>>,
122 chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>,
123 broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>,
124 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
128 impl<Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash> ChainListener for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
129 fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], _indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) {
130 let block_hash = header.bitcoin_hash();
131 let mut new_events: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(0);
133 let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
134 for monitor in monitors.values_mut() {
135 let (txn_outputs, spendable_outputs) = monitor.block_connected(txn_matched, height, &block_hash, &*self.broadcaster);
136 if spendable_outputs.len() > 0 {
137 new_events.push(events::Event::SpendableOutputs {
138 outputs: spendable_outputs,
141 for (ref txid, ref outputs) in txn_outputs {
142 for (idx, output) in outputs.iter().enumerate() {
143 self.chain_monitor.install_watch_outpoint((txid.clone(), idx as u32), &output.script_pubkey);
148 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
149 pending_events.append(&mut new_events);
152 fn block_disconnected(&self, _: &BlockHeader) { }
155 impl<Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash + 'static> SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
156 /// Creates a new object which can be used to monitor several channels given the chain
157 /// interface with which to register to receive notifications.
158 pub fn new(chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>, broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>, logger: Arc<Logger>) -> Arc<SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key>> {
159 let res = Arc::new(SimpleManyChannelMonitor {
160 monitors: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
163 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
166 let weak_res = Arc::downgrade(&res);
167 res.chain_monitor.register_listener(weak_res);
171 /// Adds or udpates the monitor which monitors the channel referred to by the given key.
172 pub fn add_update_monitor_by_key(&self, key: Key, monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
173 let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
174 match monitors.get_mut(&key) {
175 Some(orig_monitor) => {
176 log_trace!(self, "Updating Channel Monitor for channel {}", log_funding_info!(monitor.key_storage));
177 return orig_monitor.insert_combine(monitor);
181 match monitor.key_storage {
182 Storage::Local { ref funding_info, .. } => {
185 return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Try to update a useless monitor without funding_txo !"));
187 &Some((ref outpoint, ref script)) => {
188 log_trace!(self, "Got new Channel Monitor for channel {}", log_bytes!(outpoint.to_channel_id()[..]));
189 self.chain_monitor.install_watch_tx(&outpoint.txid, script);
190 self.chain_monitor.install_watch_outpoint((outpoint.txid, outpoint.index as u32), script);
194 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
195 self.chain_monitor.watch_all_txn();
198 monitors.insert(key, monitor);
203 impl ManyChannelMonitor for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<OutPoint> {
204 fn add_update_monitor(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr> {
205 match self.add_update_monitor_by_key(funding_txo, monitor) {
207 Err(_) => Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure),
212 impl<Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash> events::EventsProvider for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
213 fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
214 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
215 let mut ret = Vec::new();
216 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut *pending_events);
221 /// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, don't try to claim it in a shared transaction,
222 /// instead claiming it in its own individual transaction.
223 const CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 12;
224 /// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, force-close the channel to broadcast the
225 /// HTLC-Success transaction.
226 /// In other words, this is an upper bound on how many blocks we think it can take us to get a
227 /// transaction confirmed (and we use it in a few more, equivalent, places).
228 pub(crate) const CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 6;
229 /// Number of blocks by which point we expect our counterparty to have seen new blocks on the
230 /// network and done a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance (+ we've updated all our
231 /// copies of ChannelMonitors, including watchtowers).
232 pub(crate) const HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS: u32 = 3;
234 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
237 revocation_base_key: SecretKey,
238 htlc_base_key: SecretKey,
239 delayed_payment_base_key: SecretKey,
240 payment_base_key: SecretKey,
241 shutdown_pubkey: PublicKey,
242 prev_latest_per_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
243 latest_per_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
244 funding_info: Option<(OutPoint, Script)>,
247 revocation_base_key: PublicKey,
248 htlc_base_key: PublicKey,
252 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
253 struct LocalSignedTx {
254 /// txid of the transaction in tx, just used to make comparison faster
257 revocation_key: PublicKey,
258 a_htlc_key: PublicKey,
259 b_htlc_key: PublicKey,
260 delayed_payment_key: PublicKey,
262 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Signature, Signature)>,
263 htlc_sources: Vec<([u8; 32], HTLCSource, Option<u32>)>,
266 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
267 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
269 /// A ChannelMonitor handles chain events (blocks connected and disconnected) and generates
270 /// on-chain transactions to ensure no loss of funds occurs.
272 /// You MUST ensure that no ChannelMonitors for a given channel anywhere contain out-of-date
273 /// information and are actively monitoring the chain.
275 pub struct ChannelMonitor {
276 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64,
278 key_storage: Storage,
279 their_htlc_base_key: Option<PublicKey>,
280 their_delayed_payment_base_key: Option<PublicKey>,
281 // first is the idx of the first of the two revocation points
282 their_cur_revocation_points: Option<(u64, PublicKey, Option<PublicKey>)>,
284 our_to_self_delay: u16,
285 their_to_self_delay: Option<u16>,
287 old_secrets: [([u8; 32], u64); 49],
288 remote_claimable_outpoints: HashMap<Sha256dHash, (Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>, Vec<([u8; 32], HTLCSource, Option<u32>)>)>,
289 /// We cannot identify HTLC-Success or HTLC-Timeout transactions by themselves on the chain.
290 /// Nor can we figure out their commitment numbers without the commitment transaction they are
291 /// spending. Thus, in order to claim them via revocation key, we track all the remote
292 /// commitment transactions which we find on-chain, mapping them to the commitment number which
293 /// can be used to derive the revocation key and claim the transactions.
294 remote_commitment_txn_on_chain: HashMap<Sha256dHash, (u64, Vec<Script>)>,
295 /// Cache used to make pruning of payment_preimages faster.
296 /// Maps payment_hash values to commitment numbers for remote transactions for non-revoked
297 /// remote transactions (ie should remain pretty small).
298 /// Serialized to disk but should generally not be sent to Watchtowers.
299 remote_hash_commitment_number: HashMap<[u8; 32], u64>,
301 // We store two local commitment transactions to avoid any race conditions where we may update
302 // some monitors (potentially on watchtowers) but then fail to update others, resulting in the
303 // various monitors for one channel being out of sync, and us broadcasting a local
304 // transaction for which we have deleted claim information on some watchtowers.
305 prev_local_signed_commitment_tx: Option<LocalSignedTx>,
306 current_local_signed_commitment_tx: Option<LocalSignedTx>,
308 // Used just for ChannelManager to make sure it has the latest channel data during
310 current_remote_commitment_number: u64,
312 payment_preimages: HashMap<[u8; 32], [u8; 32]>,
314 destination_script: Script,
316 // We simply modify last_block_hash in Channel's block_connected so that serialization is
317 // consistent but hopefully the users' copy handles block_connected in a consistent way.
318 // (we do *not*, however, update them in insert_combine to ensure any local user copies keep
319 // their last_block_hash from its state and not based on updated copies that didn't run through
320 // the full block_connected).
321 pub(crate) last_block_hash: Sha256dHash,
322 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>, //TODO: dedup this a bit...
326 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
327 /// Used only in testing and fuzztarget to check serialization roundtrips don't change the
328 /// underlying object
329 impl PartialEq for ChannelMonitor {
330 fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
331 if self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor != other.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor ||
332 self.key_storage != other.key_storage ||
333 self.their_htlc_base_key != other.their_htlc_base_key ||
334 self.their_delayed_payment_base_key != other.their_delayed_payment_base_key ||
335 self.their_cur_revocation_points != other.their_cur_revocation_points ||
336 self.our_to_self_delay != other.our_to_self_delay ||
337 self.their_to_self_delay != other.their_to_self_delay ||
338 self.remote_claimable_outpoints != other.remote_claimable_outpoints ||
339 self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain != other.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain ||
340 self.remote_hash_commitment_number != other.remote_hash_commitment_number ||
341 self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx != other.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx ||
342 self.current_remote_commitment_number != other.current_remote_commitment_number ||
343 self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx != other.current_local_signed_commitment_tx ||
344 self.payment_preimages != other.payment_preimages ||
345 self.destination_script != other.destination_script
349 for (&(ref secret, ref idx), &(ref o_secret, ref o_idx)) in self.old_secrets.iter().zip(other.old_secrets.iter()) {
350 if secret != o_secret || idx != o_idx {
359 impl ChannelMonitor {
360 pub(super) fn new(revocation_base_key: &SecretKey, delayed_payment_base_key: &SecretKey, htlc_base_key: &SecretKey, payment_base_key: &SecretKey, shutdown_pubkey: &PublicKey, our_to_self_delay: u16, destination_script: Script, logger: Arc<Logger>) -> ChannelMonitor {
362 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: 0,
364 key_storage: Storage::Local {
365 revocation_base_key: revocation_base_key.clone(),
366 htlc_base_key: htlc_base_key.clone(),
367 delayed_payment_base_key: delayed_payment_base_key.clone(),
368 payment_base_key: payment_base_key.clone(),
369 shutdown_pubkey: shutdown_pubkey.clone(),
370 prev_latest_per_commitment_point: None,
371 latest_per_commitment_point: None,
374 their_htlc_base_key: None,
375 their_delayed_payment_base_key: None,
376 their_cur_revocation_points: None,
378 our_to_self_delay: our_to_self_delay,
379 their_to_self_delay: None,
381 old_secrets: [([0; 32], 1 << 48); 49],
382 remote_claimable_outpoints: HashMap::new(),
383 remote_commitment_txn_on_chain: HashMap::new(),
384 remote_hash_commitment_number: HashMap::new(),
386 prev_local_signed_commitment_tx: None,
387 current_local_signed_commitment_tx: None,
388 current_remote_commitment_number: 1 << 48,
390 payment_preimages: HashMap::new(),
391 destination_script: destination_script,
393 last_block_hash: Default::default(),
394 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
400 fn place_secret(idx: u64) -> u8 {
402 if idx & (1 << i) == (1 << i) {
410 fn derive_secret(secret: [u8; 32], bits: u8, idx: u64) -> [u8; 32] {
411 let mut res: [u8; 32] = secret;
413 let bitpos = bits - 1 - i;
414 if idx & (1 << bitpos) == (1 << bitpos) {
415 res[(bitpos / 8) as usize] ^= 1 << (bitpos & 7);
416 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
418 sha.result(&mut res);
424 /// Inserts a revocation secret into this channel monitor. Prunes old preimages if neither
425 /// needed by local commitment transactions HTCLs nor by remote ones. Unless we haven't already seen remote
426 /// commitment transaction's secret, they are de facto pruned (we can use revocation key).
427 pub(super) fn provide_secret(&mut self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
428 let pos = ChannelMonitor::place_secret(idx);
430 let (old_secret, old_idx) = self.old_secrets[i as usize];
431 if ChannelMonitor::derive_secret(secret, pos, old_idx) != old_secret {
432 return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Previous secret did not match new one"));
435 self.old_secrets[pos as usize] = (secret, idx);
437 if !self.payment_preimages.is_empty() {
438 let local_signed_commitment_tx = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx.as_ref().expect("Channel needs at least an initial commitment tx !");
439 let prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.as_ref();
440 let min_idx = self.get_min_seen_secret();
441 let remote_hash_commitment_number = &mut self.remote_hash_commitment_number;
443 self.payment_preimages.retain(|&k, _| {
444 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in &local_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs {
445 if k == htlc.payment_hash {
449 if let Some(prev_local_commitment_tx) = prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
450 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in prev_local_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
451 if k == htlc.payment_hash {
456 let contains = if let Some(cn) = remote_hash_commitment_number.get(&k) {
463 remote_hash_commitment_number.remove(&k);
472 /// Informs this monitor of the latest remote (ie non-broadcastable) commitment transaction.
473 /// The monitor watches for it to be broadcasted and then uses the HTLC information (and
474 /// possibly future revocation/preimage information) to claim outputs where possible.
475 /// We cache also the mapping hash:commitment number to lighten pruning of old preimages by watchtowers.
476 pub(super) fn provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, unsigned_commitment_tx: &Transaction, htlc_outputs: Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>, htlc_sources: Vec<([u8; 32], HTLCSource, Option<u32>)>, commitment_number: u64, their_revocation_point: PublicKey) {
477 // TODO: Encrypt the htlc_outputs data with the single-hash of the commitment transaction
478 // so that a remote monitor doesn't learn anything unless there is a malicious close.
479 // (only maybe, sadly we cant do the same for local info, as we need to be aware of
481 for ref htlc in &htlc_outputs {
482 self.remote_hash_commitment_number.insert(htlc.payment_hash, commitment_number);
484 // We prune old claimable outpoints, useless to pass backward state when remote commitment
485 // tx get revoked, optimize for storage
486 for (_, htlc_data) in self.remote_claimable_outpoints.iter_mut() {
487 htlc_data.1 = Vec::new();
489 self.remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(unsigned_commitment_tx.txid(), (htlc_outputs, htlc_sources));
490 self.current_remote_commitment_number = commitment_number;
491 //TODO: Merge this into the other per-remote-transaction output storage stuff
492 match self.their_cur_revocation_points {
493 Some(old_points) => {
494 if old_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 {
495 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0, old_points.1, Some(their_revocation_point)));
496 } else if old_points.0 == commitment_number + 2 {
497 if let Some(old_second_point) = old_points.2 {
498 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0 - 1, old_second_point, Some(their_revocation_point)));
500 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None));
503 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None));
507 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None));
512 /// Informs this monitor of the latest local (ie broadcastable) commitment transaction. The
513 /// monitor watches for timeouts and may broadcast it if we approach such a timeout. Thus, it
514 /// is important that any clones of this channel monitor (including remote clones) by kept
515 /// up-to-date as our local commitment transaction is updated.
516 /// Panics if set_their_to_self_delay has never been called.
517 /// Also update Storage with latest local per_commitment_point to derive local_delayedkey in
518 /// case of onchain HTLC tx
519 pub(super) fn provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, signed_commitment_tx: Transaction, local_keys: chan_utils::TxCreationKeys, feerate_per_kw: u64, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Signature, Signature)>, htlc_sources: Vec<([u8; 32], HTLCSource, Option<u32>)>) {
520 assert!(self.their_to_self_delay.is_some());
521 self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx.take();
522 self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(LocalSignedTx {
523 txid: signed_commitment_tx.txid(),
524 tx: signed_commitment_tx,
525 revocation_key: local_keys.revocation_key,
526 a_htlc_key: local_keys.a_htlc_key,
527 b_htlc_key: local_keys.b_htlc_key,
528 delayed_payment_key: local_keys.a_delayed_payment_key,
534 if let Storage::Local { ref mut latest_per_commitment_point, .. } = self.key_storage {
535 *latest_per_commitment_point = Some(local_keys.per_commitment_point);
537 panic!("Channel somehow ended up with its internal ChannelMonitor being in Watchtower mode?");
541 /// Provides a payment_hash->payment_preimage mapping. Will be automatically pruned when all
542 /// commitment_tx_infos which contain the payment hash have been revoked.
543 pub(super) fn provide_payment_preimage(&mut self, payment_hash: &[u8; 32], payment_preimage: &[u8; 32]) {
544 self.payment_preimages.insert(payment_hash.clone(), payment_preimage.clone());
547 /// Combines this ChannelMonitor with the information contained in the other ChannelMonitor.
548 /// After a successful call this ChannelMonitor is up-to-date and is safe to use to monitor the
549 /// chain for new blocks/transactions.
550 pub fn insert_combine(&mut self, mut other: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
551 match self.key_storage {
552 Storage::Local { ref funding_info, .. } => {
553 if funding_info.is_none() { return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Try to combine a Local monitor without funding_info")); }
554 let our_funding_info = funding_info;
555 if let Storage::Local { ref funding_info, .. } = other.key_storage {
556 if funding_info.is_none() { return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Try to combine a Local monitor without funding_info")); }
557 // We should be able to compare the entire funding_txo, but in fuzztarget its trivially
558 // easy to collide the funding_txo hash and have a different scriptPubKey.
559 if funding_info.as_ref().unwrap().0 != our_funding_info.as_ref().unwrap().0 {
560 return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Funding transaction outputs are not identical!"));
563 return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Try to combine a Local monitor with a Watchtower one !"));
566 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
567 if let Storage::Watchtower { .. } = other.key_storage {
570 return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Try to combine a Watchtower monitor with a Local one !"));
574 let other_min_secret = other.get_min_seen_secret();
575 let our_min_secret = self.get_min_seen_secret();
576 if our_min_secret > other_min_secret {
577 self.provide_secret(other_min_secret, other.get_secret(other_min_secret).unwrap())?;
579 if let Some(ref local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
580 if let Some(ref other_local_tx) = other.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
581 let our_commitment_number = 0xffffffffffff - ((((local_tx.tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (local_tx.tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor);
582 let other_commitment_number = 0xffffffffffff - ((((other_local_tx.tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (other_local_tx.tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ other.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor);
583 if our_commitment_number >= other_commitment_number {
584 self.key_storage = other.key_storage;
588 // TODO: We should use current_remote_commitment_number and the commitment number out of
589 // local transactions to decide how to merge
590 if our_min_secret >= other_min_secret {
591 self.their_cur_revocation_points = other.their_cur_revocation_points;
592 for (txid, htlcs) in other.remote_claimable_outpoints.drain() {
593 self.remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, htlcs);
595 if let Some(local_tx) = other.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
596 self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(local_tx);
598 if let Some(local_tx) = other.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
599 self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(local_tx);
601 self.payment_preimages = other.payment_preimages;
604 self.current_remote_commitment_number = cmp::min(self.current_remote_commitment_number, other.current_remote_commitment_number);
608 /// Panics if commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor doesn't fit in 48 bits
609 pub(super) fn set_commitment_obscure_factor(&mut self, commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64) {
610 assert!(commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor < (1 << 48));
611 self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor = commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor;
614 /// Allows this monitor to scan only for transactions which are applicable. Note that this is
615 /// optional, without it this monitor cannot be used in an SPV client, but you may wish to
616 /// avoid this (or call unset_funding_info) on a monitor you wish to send to a watchtower as it
617 /// provides slightly better privacy.
618 /// It's the responsibility of the caller to register outpoint and script with passing the former
619 /// value as key to add_update_monitor.
620 pub(super) fn set_funding_info(&mut self, new_funding_info: (OutPoint, Script)) {
621 match self.key_storage {
622 Storage::Local { ref mut funding_info, .. } => {
623 *funding_info = Some(new_funding_info);
625 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
626 panic!("Channel somehow ended up with its internal ChannelMonitor being in Watchtower mode?");
631 /// We log these base keys at channel opening to being able to rebuild redeemscript in case of leaked revoked commit tx
632 pub(super) fn set_their_base_keys(&mut self, their_htlc_base_key: &PublicKey, their_delayed_payment_base_key: &PublicKey) {
633 self.their_htlc_base_key = Some(their_htlc_base_key.clone());
634 self.their_delayed_payment_base_key = Some(their_delayed_payment_base_key.clone());
637 pub(super) fn set_their_to_self_delay(&mut self, their_to_self_delay: u16) {
638 self.their_to_self_delay = Some(their_to_self_delay);
641 pub(super) fn unset_funding_info(&mut self) {
642 match self.key_storage {
643 Storage::Local { ref mut funding_info, .. } => {
644 *funding_info = None;
646 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
647 panic!("Channel somehow ended up with its internal ChannelMonitor being in Watchtower mode?");
652 /// Gets the funding transaction outpoint of the channel this ChannelMonitor is monitoring for.
653 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
654 match self.key_storage {
655 Storage::Local { ref funding_info, .. } => {
657 &Some((outpoint, _)) => Some(outpoint),
661 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
667 /// Gets the sets of all outpoints which this ChannelMonitor expects to hear about spends of.
668 /// Generally useful when deserializing as during normal operation the return values of
669 /// block_connected are sufficient to ensure all relevant outpoints are being monitored (note
670 /// that the get_funding_txo outpoint and transaction must also be monitored for!).
671 pub fn get_monitored_outpoints(&self) -> Vec<(Sha256dHash, u32, &Script)> {
672 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.len() * 2);
673 for (ref txid, &(_, ref outputs)) in self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
674 for (idx, output) in outputs.iter().enumerate() {
675 res.push(((*txid).clone(), idx as u32, output));
681 /// Serializes into a vec, with various modes for the exposed pub fns
682 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W, for_local_storage: bool) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
683 //TODO: We still write out all the serialization here manually instead of using the fancy
684 //serialization framework we have, we should migrate things over to it.
685 writer.write_all(&[SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
686 writer.write_all(&[MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
688 // Set in initial Channel-object creation, so should always be set by now:
689 U48(self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor).write(writer)?;
691 match self.key_storage {
692 Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref payment_base_key, ref shutdown_pubkey, ref prev_latest_per_commitment_point, ref latest_per_commitment_point, ref funding_info } => {
693 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
694 writer.write_all(&revocation_base_key[..])?;
695 writer.write_all(&htlc_base_key[..])?;
696 writer.write_all(&delayed_payment_base_key[..])?;
697 writer.write_all(&payment_base_key[..])?;
698 writer.write_all(&shutdown_pubkey.serialize())?;
699 if let Some(ref prev_latest_per_commitment_point) = *prev_latest_per_commitment_point {
700 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
701 writer.write_all(&prev_latest_per_commitment_point.serialize())?;
703 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
705 if let Some(ref latest_per_commitment_point) = *latest_per_commitment_point {
706 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
707 writer.write_all(&latest_per_commitment_point.serialize())?;
709 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
712 &Some((ref outpoint, ref script)) => {
713 writer.write_all(&outpoint.txid[..])?;
714 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(outpoint.index))?;
715 script.write(writer)?;
718 debug_assert!(false, "Try to serialize a useless Local monitor !");
722 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => unimplemented!(),
725 writer.write_all(&self.their_htlc_base_key.as_ref().unwrap().serialize())?;
726 writer.write_all(&self.their_delayed_payment_base_key.as_ref().unwrap().serialize())?;
728 match self.their_cur_revocation_points {
729 Some((idx, pubkey, second_option)) => {
730 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(idx))?;
731 writer.write_all(&pubkey.serialize())?;
732 match second_option {
733 Some(second_pubkey) => {
734 writer.write_all(&second_pubkey.serialize())?;
737 writer.write_all(&[0; 33])?;
742 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(0))?;
746 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.our_to_self_delay))?;
747 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap()))?;
749 for &(ref secret, ref idx) in self.old_secrets.iter() {
750 writer.write_all(secret)?;
751 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*idx))?;
754 macro_rules! serialize_htlc_in_commitment {
755 ($htlc_output: expr) => {
756 writer.write_all(&[$htlc_output.offered as u8; 1])?;
757 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc_output.amount_msat))?;
758 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array($htlc_output.cltv_expiry))?;
759 writer.write_all(&$htlc_output.payment_hash)?;
760 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array($htlc_output.transaction_output_index))?;
764 macro_rules! serialize_htlc_source {
765 ($htlc_source: expr) => {
766 $htlc_source.0.write(writer)?;
767 $htlc_source.1.write(writer)?;
768 if let &Some(ref txo) = &$htlc_source.2 {
769 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
772 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
778 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_claimable_outpoints.len() as u64))?;
779 for (ref txid, &(ref htlc_infos, ref htlc_sources)) in self.remote_claimable_outpoints.iter() {
780 writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
781 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc_infos.len() as u64))?;
782 for ref htlc_output in htlc_infos.iter() {
783 serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output);
785 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc_sources.len() as u64))?;
786 for ref htlc_source in htlc_sources.iter() {
787 serialize_htlc_source!(htlc_source);
791 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.len() as u64))?;
792 for (ref txid, &(commitment_number, ref txouts)) in self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
793 writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
794 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(commitment_number))?;
795 (txouts.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
796 for script in txouts.iter() {
797 script.write(writer)?;
801 if for_local_storage {
802 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_hash_commitment_number.len() as u64))?;
803 for (ref payment_hash, commitment_number) in self.remote_hash_commitment_number.iter() {
804 writer.write_all(*payment_hash)?;
805 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(*commitment_number))?;
808 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(0))?;
811 macro_rules! serialize_local_tx {
812 ($local_tx: expr) => {
813 if let Err(e) = $local_tx.tx.consensus_encode(&mut WriterWriteAdaptor(writer)) {
815 encode::Error::Io(e) => return Err(e),
816 _ => panic!("local tx must have been well-formed!"),
820 writer.write_all(&$local_tx.revocation_key.serialize())?;
821 writer.write_all(&$local_tx.a_htlc_key.serialize())?;
822 writer.write_all(&$local_tx.b_htlc_key.serialize())?;
823 writer.write_all(&$local_tx.delayed_payment_key.serialize())?;
825 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($local_tx.feerate_per_kw))?;
826 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($local_tx.htlc_outputs.len() as u64))?;
827 for &(ref htlc_output, ref their_sig, ref our_sig) in $local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
828 serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output);
829 writer.write_all(&their_sig.serialize_compact(&self.secp_ctx))?;
830 writer.write_all(&our_sig.serialize_compact(&self.secp_ctx))?;
832 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($local_tx.htlc_sources.len() as u64))?;
833 for ref htlc_source in $local_tx.htlc_sources.iter() {
834 serialize_htlc_source!(htlc_source);
839 if let Some(ref prev_local_tx) = self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
840 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
841 serialize_local_tx!(prev_local_tx);
843 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
846 if let Some(ref cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
847 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
848 serialize_local_tx!(cur_local_tx);
850 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
853 if for_local_storage {
854 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(self.current_remote_commitment_number))?;
856 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(0))?;
859 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.payment_preimages.len() as u64))?;
860 for payment_preimage in self.payment_preimages.values() {
861 writer.write_all(payment_preimage)?;
864 self.last_block_hash.write(writer)?;
865 self.destination_script.write(writer)?;
870 /// Writes this monitor into the given writer, suitable for writing to disk.
872 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor), which
873 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
874 /// the "reorg path" (ie not just starting at the same height but starting at the highest
875 /// common block that appears on your best chain as well as on the chain which contains the
876 /// last block hash returned) upon deserializing the object!
877 pub fn write_for_disk<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
878 self.write(writer, true)
881 /// Encodes this monitor into the given writer, suitable for sending to a remote watchtower
883 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor), which
884 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
885 /// the "reorg path" (ie not just starting at the same height but starting at the highest
886 /// common block that appears on your best chain as well as on the chain which contains the
887 /// last block hash returned) upon deserializing the object!
888 pub fn write_for_watchtower<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
889 self.write(writer, false)
892 //TODO: Functions to serialize/deserialize (with different forms depending on which information
893 //we want to leave out (eg funding_txo, etc).
895 /// Can only fail if idx is < get_min_seen_secret
896 pub(super) fn get_secret(&self, idx: u64) -> Option<[u8; 32]> {
897 for i in 0..self.old_secrets.len() {
898 if (idx & (!((1 << i) - 1))) == self.old_secrets[i].1 {
899 return Some(ChannelMonitor::derive_secret(self.old_secrets[i].0, i as u8, idx))
902 assert!(idx < self.get_min_seen_secret());
906 pub(super) fn get_min_seen_secret(&self) -> u64 {
907 //TODO This can be optimized?
908 let mut min = 1 << 48;
909 for &(_, idx) in self.old_secrets.iter() {
917 pub(super) fn get_cur_remote_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
918 self.current_remote_commitment_number
921 pub(super) fn get_cur_local_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
922 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
923 0xffff_ffff_ffff - ((((local_tx.tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (local_tx.tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor)
924 } else { 0xffff_ffff_ffff }
927 /// Attempts to claim a remote commitment transaction's outputs using the revocation key and
928 /// data in remote_claimable_outpoints. Will directly claim any HTLC outputs which expire at a
929 /// height > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER. In any case, will install monitoring for
930 /// HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions.
931 fn check_spend_remote_transaction(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32) -> (Vec<Transaction>, (Sha256dHash, Vec<TxOut>), Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>) {
932 // Most secp and related errors trying to create keys means we have no hope of constructing
933 // a spend transaction...so we return no transactions to broadcast
934 let mut txn_to_broadcast = Vec::new();
935 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
936 let mut spendable_outputs = Vec::new();
938 let commitment_txid = tx.txid(); //TODO: This is gonna be a performance bottleneck for watchtowers!
939 let per_commitment_option = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(&commitment_txid);
941 macro_rules! ignore_error {
942 ( $thing : expr ) => {
945 Err(_) => return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs)
950 let commitment_number = 0xffffffffffff - ((((tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor);
951 if commitment_number >= self.get_min_seen_secret() {
952 let secret = self.get_secret(commitment_number).unwrap();
953 let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &secret));
954 let (revocation_pubkey, b_htlc_key, local_payment_key) = match self.key_storage {
955 Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, ref payment_base_key, .. } => {
956 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
957 (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_base_key))),
958 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &htlc_base_key))),
959 Some(ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &payment_base_key))))
961 Storage::Watchtower { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
962 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
963 (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &revocation_base_key)),
964 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &htlc_base_key)),
968 let delayed_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key), &self.their_delayed_payment_base_key.unwrap()));
969 let a_htlc_key = match self.their_htlc_base_key {
970 None => return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs),
971 Some(their_htlc_base_key) => ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key), &their_htlc_base_key)),
974 let revokeable_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey, self.our_to_self_delay, &delayed_key);
975 let revokeable_p2wsh = revokeable_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
977 let local_payment_p2wpkh = if let Some(payment_key) = local_payment_key {
978 // Note that the Network here is ignored as we immediately drop the address for the
979 // script_pubkey version.
980 let payment_hash160 = Hash160::from_data(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &payment_key).serialize());
981 Some(Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::All::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&payment_hash160[..]).into_script())
984 let mut total_value = 0;
985 let mut values = Vec::new();
986 let mut inputs = Vec::new();
987 let mut htlc_idxs = Vec::new();
989 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
990 if outp.script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh {
992 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
993 txid: commitment_txid,
996 script_sig: Script::new(),
997 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
1000 htlc_idxs.push(None);
1001 values.push(outp.value);
1002 total_value += outp.value;
1003 } else if Some(&outp.script_pubkey) == local_payment_p2wpkh.as_ref() {
1004 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WPKH {
1005 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: commitment_txid, vout: idx as u32 },
1006 key: local_payment_key.unwrap(),
1007 output: outp.clone(),
1012 macro_rules! sign_input {
1013 ($sighash_parts: expr, $input: expr, $htlc_idx: expr, $amount: expr) => {
1015 let (sig, redeemscript) = match self.key_storage {
1016 Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
1017 let redeemscript = if $htlc_idx.is_none() { revokeable_redeemscript.clone() } else {
1018 let htlc = &per_commitment_option.unwrap().0[$htlc_idx.unwrap()];
1019 chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey)
1021 let sighash = ignore_error!(Message::from_slice(&$sighash_parts.sighash_all(&$input, &redeemscript, $amount)[..]));
1022 let revocation_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key, &revocation_base_key));
1023 (self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &revocation_key), redeemscript)
1025 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
1029 $input.witness.push(sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
1030 $input.witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1031 if $htlc_idx.is_none() {
1032 $input.witness.push(vec!(1));
1034 $input.witness.push(revocation_pubkey.serialize().to_vec());
1036 $input.witness.push(redeemscript.into_bytes());
1041 if let Some(&(ref per_commitment_data, _)) = per_commitment_option {
1042 inputs.reserve_exact(per_commitment_data.len());
1044 for (idx, ref htlc) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() {
1045 let expected_script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey);
1046 if htlc.transaction_output_index as usize >= tx.output.len() ||
1047 tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 ||
1048 tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].script_pubkey != expected_script.to_v0_p2wsh() {
1049 return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs); // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user
1052 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
1053 txid: commitment_txid,
1054 vout: htlc.transaction_output_index,
1056 script_sig: Script::new(),
1057 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
1058 witness: Vec::new(),
1060 if htlc.cltv_expiry > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER {
1062 htlc_idxs.push(Some(idx));
1063 values.push(tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].value);
1064 total_value += htlc.amount_msat / 1000;
1066 let mut single_htlc_tx = Transaction {
1070 output: vec!(TxOut {
1071 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1072 value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000, //TODO: - fee
1075 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&single_htlc_tx);
1076 sign_input!(sighash_parts, single_htlc_tx.input[0], Some(idx), htlc.amount_msat / 1000);
1077 txn_to_broadcast.push(single_htlc_tx);
1082 if !inputs.is_empty() || !txn_to_broadcast.is_empty() { // ie we're confident this is actually ours
1083 // We're definitely a remote commitment transaction!
1084 watch_outputs.append(&mut tx.output.clone());
1085 self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, (commitment_number, tx.output.iter().map(|output| { output.script_pubkey.clone() }).collect()));
1087 if inputs.is_empty() { return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs); } // Nothing to be done...probably a false positive/local tx
1089 let outputs = vec!(TxOut {
1090 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1091 value: total_value, //TODO: - fee
1093 let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
1100 let mut values_drain = values.drain(..);
1101 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx);
1103 for (input, htlc_idx) in spend_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(htlc_idxs.iter()) {
1104 let value = values_drain.next().unwrap();
1105 sign_input!(sighash_parts, input, htlc_idx, value);
1108 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
1109 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: spend_tx.txid(), vout: 0 },
1110 output: spend_tx.output[0].clone(),
1112 txn_to_broadcast.push(spend_tx);
1113 } else if let Some(per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
1114 // While this isn't useful yet, there is a potential race where if a counterparty
1115 // revokes a state at the same time as the commitment transaction for that state is
1116 // confirmed, and the watchtower receives the block before the user, the user could
1117 // upload a new ChannelMonitor with the revocation secret but the watchtower has
1118 // already processed the block, resulting in the remote_commitment_txn_on_chain entry
1119 // not being generated by the above conditional. Thus, to be safe, we go ahead and
1121 watch_outputs.append(&mut tx.output.clone());
1122 self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, (commitment_number, tx.output.iter().map(|output| { output.script_pubkey.clone() }).collect()));
1124 if let Some(revocation_points) = self.their_cur_revocation_points {
1125 let revocation_point_option =
1126 if revocation_points.0 == commitment_number { Some(&revocation_points.1) }
1127 else if let Some(point) = revocation_points.2.as_ref() {
1128 if revocation_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 { Some(point) } else { None }
1130 if let Some(revocation_point) = revocation_point_option {
1131 let (revocation_pubkey, b_htlc_key) = match self.key_storage {
1132 Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
1133 (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_base_key))),
1134 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &htlc_base_key))))
1136 Storage::Watchtower { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
1137 (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &revocation_base_key)),
1138 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &htlc_base_key)))
1141 let a_htlc_key = match self.their_htlc_base_key {
1142 None => return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs),
1143 Some(their_htlc_base_key) => ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &their_htlc_base_key)),
1146 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
1147 if outp.script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh() {
1148 match self.key_storage {
1149 Storage::Local { ref payment_base_key, .. } => {
1150 if let Ok(local_key) = chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_point, &payment_base_key) {
1151 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WPKH {
1152 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: commitment_txid, vout: idx as u32 },
1154 output: outp.clone(),
1158 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {}
1160 break; // Only to_remote ouput is claimable
1164 let mut total_value = 0;
1165 let mut values = Vec::new();
1166 let mut inputs = Vec::new();
1168 macro_rules! sign_input {
1169 ($sighash_parts: expr, $input: expr, $amount: expr, $preimage: expr) => {
1171 let (sig, redeemscript) = match self.key_storage {
1172 Storage::Local { ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
1173 let htlc = &per_commitment_option.unwrap().0[$input.sequence as usize];
1174 let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey);
1175 let sighash = ignore_error!(Message::from_slice(&$sighash_parts.sighash_all(&$input, &redeemscript, $amount)[..]));
1176 let htlc_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &htlc_base_key));
1177 (self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &htlc_key), redeemscript)
1179 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
1183 $input.witness.push(sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
1184 $input.witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1185 $input.witness.push($preimage);
1186 $input.witness.push(redeemscript.into_bytes());
1191 for (idx, ref htlc) in per_commitment_data.0.iter().enumerate() {
1192 let expected_script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey);
1193 if htlc.transaction_output_index as usize >= tx.output.len() ||
1194 tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 ||
1195 tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].script_pubkey != expected_script.to_v0_p2wsh() {
1196 return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs); // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user
1198 if let Some(payment_preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
1200 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
1201 txid: commitment_txid,
1202 vout: htlc.transaction_output_index,
1204 script_sig: Script::new(),
1205 sequence: idx as u32, // reset to 0xfffffffd in sign_input
1206 witness: Vec::new(),
1208 if htlc.cltv_expiry > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER {
1210 values.push((tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].value, payment_preimage));
1211 total_value += htlc.amount_msat / 1000;
1213 let mut single_htlc_tx = Transaction {
1217 output: vec!(TxOut {
1218 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1219 value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000, //TODO: - fee
1222 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&single_htlc_tx);
1223 sign_input!(sighash_parts, single_htlc_tx.input[0], htlc.amount_msat / 1000, payment_preimage.to_vec());
1224 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
1225 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: single_htlc_tx.txid(), vout: 0 },
1226 output: single_htlc_tx.output[0].clone(),
1228 txn_to_broadcast.push(single_htlc_tx);
1233 if inputs.is_empty() { return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs); } // Nothing to be done...probably a false positive/local tx
1235 let outputs = vec!(TxOut {
1236 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1237 value: total_value, //TODO: - fee
1239 let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
1246 let mut values_drain = values.drain(..);
1247 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx);
1249 for input in spend_tx.input.iter_mut() {
1250 let value = values_drain.next().unwrap();
1251 sign_input!(sighash_parts, input, value.0, value.1.to_vec());
1254 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
1255 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: spend_tx.txid(), vout: 0 },
1256 output: spend_tx.output[0].clone(),
1258 txn_to_broadcast.push(spend_tx);
1263 (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs)
1266 /// Attempst to claim a remote HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout s outputs using the revocation key
1267 fn check_spend_remote_htlc(&self, tx: &Transaction, commitment_number: u64) -> (Option<Transaction>, Option<SpendableOutputDescriptor>) {
1268 if tx.input.len() != 1 || tx.output.len() != 1 {
1272 macro_rules! ignore_error {
1273 ( $thing : expr ) => {
1276 Err(_) => return (None, None)
1281 let secret = if let Some(secret) = self.get_secret(commitment_number) { secret } else { return (None, None); };
1282 let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &secret));
1283 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
1284 let revocation_pubkey = match self.key_storage {
1285 Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
1286 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_base_key)))
1288 Storage::Watchtower { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
1289 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &revocation_base_key))
1292 let delayed_key = match self.their_delayed_payment_base_key {
1293 None => return (None, None),
1294 Some(their_delayed_payment_base_key) => ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &their_delayed_payment_base_key)),
1296 let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), &delayed_key);
1297 let revokeable_p2wsh = redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
1298 let htlc_txid = tx.txid(); //TODO: This is gonna be a performance bottleneck for watchtowers!
1300 let mut inputs = Vec::new();
1303 if tx.output[0].script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh { //HTLC transactions have one txin, one txout
1305 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
1309 script_sig: Script::new(),
1310 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
1311 witness: Vec::new(),
1313 amount = tx.output[0].value;
1316 if !inputs.is_empty() {
1317 let outputs = vec!(TxOut {
1318 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1319 value: amount, //TODO: - fee
1322 let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
1329 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx);
1331 let sig = match self.key_storage {
1332 Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
1333 let sighash = ignore_error!(Message::from_slice(&sighash_parts.sighash_all(&spend_tx.input[0], &redeemscript, amount)[..]));
1334 let revocation_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key, &revocation_base_key));
1335 self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &revocation_key)
1337 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
1341 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
1342 spend_tx.input[0].witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1343 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(vec!(1));
1344 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(redeemscript.into_bytes());
1346 let outpoint = BitcoinOutPoint { txid: spend_tx.txid(), vout: 0 };
1347 let output = spend_tx.output[0].clone();
1348 (Some(spend_tx), Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput { outpoint, output }))
1349 } else { (None, None) }
1352 fn broadcast_by_local_state(&self, local_tx: &LocalSignedTx, per_commitment_point: &Option<PublicKey>, delayed_payment_base_key: &Option<SecretKey>) -> (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>, Vec<TxOut>) {
1353 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
1354 let mut spendable_outputs = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
1355 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
1357 macro_rules! add_dynamic_output {
1358 ($father_tx: expr, $vout: expr) => {
1359 if let Some(ref per_commitment_point) = *per_commitment_point {
1360 if let Some(ref delayed_payment_base_key) = *delayed_payment_base_key {
1361 if let Ok(local_delayedkey) = chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base_key) {
1362 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WSH {
1363 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: $father_tx.txid(), vout: $vout },
1364 key: local_delayedkey,
1365 witness_script: chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&local_tx.revocation_key, self.our_to_self_delay, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key),
1366 to_self_delay: self.our_to_self_delay,
1367 output: $father_tx.output[$vout as usize].clone(),
1376 let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&local_tx.revocation_key, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), &local_tx.delayed_payment_key);
1377 let revokeable_p2wsh = redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
1378 for (idx, output) in local_tx.tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
1379 if output.script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh {
1380 add_dynamic_output!(local_tx.tx, idx as u32);
1385 for &(ref htlc, ref their_sig, ref our_sig) in local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1387 let mut htlc_timeout_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&local_tx.txid, local_tx.feerate_per_kw, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), htlc, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key, &local_tx.revocation_key);
1389 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
1391 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(their_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
1392 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1393 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
1394 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1396 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new());
1397 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &local_tx.a_htlc_key, &local_tx.b_htlc_key, &local_tx.revocation_key).into_bytes());
1399 add_dynamic_output!(htlc_timeout_tx, 0);
1400 res.push(htlc_timeout_tx);
1402 if let Some(payment_preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
1403 let mut htlc_success_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&local_tx.txid, local_tx.feerate_per_kw, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), htlc, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key, &local_tx.revocation_key);
1405 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
1407 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(their_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
1408 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1409 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
1410 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1412 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(payment_preimage.to_vec());
1413 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &local_tx.a_htlc_key, &local_tx.b_htlc_key, &local_tx.revocation_key).into_bytes());
1415 add_dynamic_output!(htlc_success_tx, 0);
1416 res.push(htlc_success_tx);
1419 watch_outputs.push(local_tx.tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].clone());
1422 (res, spendable_outputs, watch_outputs)
1425 /// Attempts to claim any claimable HTLCs in a commitment transaction which was not (yet)
1426 /// revoked using data in local_claimable_outpoints.
1427 /// Should not be used if check_spend_revoked_transaction succeeds.
1428 fn check_spend_local_transaction(&self, tx: &Transaction, _height: u32) -> (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>, (Sha256dHash, Vec<TxOut>)) {
1429 let commitment_txid = tx.txid();
1430 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1431 if local_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
1432 match self.key_storage {
1433 Storage::Local { ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref latest_per_commitment_point, .. } => {
1434 let (local_txn, spendable_outputs, watch_outputs) = self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, latest_per_commitment_point, &Some(*delayed_payment_base_key));
1435 return (local_txn, spendable_outputs, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs));
1437 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
1438 let (local_txn, spendable_outputs, watch_outputs) = self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, &None, &None);
1439 return (local_txn, spendable_outputs, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs));
1444 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1445 if local_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
1446 match self.key_storage {
1447 Storage::Local { ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref prev_latest_per_commitment_point, .. } => {
1448 let (local_txn, spendable_outputs, watch_outputs) = self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, prev_latest_per_commitment_point, &Some(*delayed_payment_base_key));
1449 return (local_txn, spendable_outputs, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs));
1451 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
1452 let (local_txn, spendable_outputs, watch_outputs) = self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, &None, &None);
1453 return (local_txn, spendable_outputs, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs));
1458 (Vec::new(), Vec::new(), (commitment_txid, Vec::new()))
1461 /// Generate a spendable output event when closing_transaction get registered onchain.
1462 fn check_spend_closing_transaction(&self, tx: &Transaction) -> Option<SpendableOutputDescriptor> {
1463 if tx.input[0].sequence == 0xFFFFFFFF && !tx.input[0].witness.is_empty() && tx.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len() == 71 {
1464 match self.key_storage {
1465 Storage::Local { ref shutdown_pubkey, .. } => {
1466 let our_channel_close_key_hash = Hash160::from_data(&shutdown_pubkey.serialize());
1467 let shutdown_script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::All::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&our_channel_close_key_hash[..]).into_script();
1468 for (idx, output) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
1469 if shutdown_script == output.script_pubkey {
1470 return Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
1471 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), vout: idx as u32 },
1472 output: output.clone(),
1477 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
1478 //TODO: we need to ensure an offline client will generate the event when it
1479 // cames back online after only the watchtower saw the transaction
1486 /// Used by ChannelManager deserialization to broadcast the latest local state if it's copy of
1487 /// the Channel was out-of-date.
1488 pub(super) fn get_latest_local_commitment_txn(&self) -> Vec<Transaction> {
1489 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1490 let mut res = vec![local_tx.tx.clone()];
1491 match self.key_storage {
1492 Storage::Local { ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref prev_latest_per_commitment_point, .. } => {
1493 res.append(&mut self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, prev_latest_per_commitment_point, &Some(*delayed_payment_base_key)).0);
1495 _ => panic!("Can only broadcast by local channelmonitor"),
1503 fn block_connected(&mut self, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], height: u32, block_hash: &Sha256dHash, broadcaster: &BroadcasterInterface)-> (Vec<(Sha256dHash, Vec<TxOut>)>, Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>) {
1504 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
1505 let mut spendable_outputs = Vec::new();
1506 for tx in txn_matched {
1507 if tx.input.len() == 1 {
1508 // Assuming our keys were not leaked (in which case we're screwed no matter what),
1509 // commitment transactions and HTLC transactions will all only ever have one input,
1510 // which is an easy way to filter out any potential non-matching txn for lazy
1512 let prevout = &tx.input[0].previous_output;
1513 let mut txn: Vec<Transaction> = Vec::new();
1514 let funding_txo = match self.key_storage {
1515 Storage::Local { ref funding_info, .. } => {
1516 funding_info.clone()
1518 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
1522 if funding_txo.is_none() || (prevout.txid == funding_txo.as_ref().unwrap().0.txid && prevout.vout == funding_txo.as_ref().unwrap().0.index as u32) {
1523 let (remote_txn, new_outputs, mut spendable_output) = self.check_spend_remote_transaction(tx, height);
1525 spendable_outputs.append(&mut spendable_output);
1526 if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() {
1527 watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
1530 let (local_txn, mut spendable_output, new_outputs) = self.check_spend_local_transaction(tx, height);
1531 spendable_outputs.append(&mut spendable_output);
1533 if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() {
1534 watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
1537 if !funding_txo.is_none() && txn.is_empty() {
1538 if let Some(spendable_output) = self.check_spend_closing_transaction(tx) {
1539 spendable_outputs.push(spendable_output);
1543 if let Some(&(commitment_number, _)) = self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.get(&prevout.txid) {
1544 let (tx, spendable_output) = self.check_spend_remote_htlc(tx, commitment_number);
1545 if let Some(tx) = tx {
1548 if let Some(spendable_output) = spendable_output {
1549 spendable_outputs.push(spendable_output);
1553 for tx in txn.iter() {
1554 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(tx);
1558 if let Some(ref cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1559 if self.would_broadcast_at_height(height) {
1560 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&cur_local_tx.tx);
1561 match self.key_storage {
1562 Storage::Local { ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref latest_per_commitment_point, .. } => {
1563 let (txs, mut spendable_output, new_outputs) = self.broadcast_by_local_state(&cur_local_tx, latest_per_commitment_point, &Some(*delayed_payment_base_key));
1564 spendable_outputs.append(&mut spendable_output);
1565 if !new_outputs.is_empty() {
1566 watch_outputs.push((cur_local_tx.txid.clone(), new_outputs));
1569 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
1572 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
1573 let (txs, mut spendable_output, new_outputs) = self.broadcast_by_local_state(&cur_local_tx, &None, &None);
1574 spendable_outputs.append(&mut spendable_output);
1575 if !new_outputs.is_empty() {
1576 watch_outputs.push((cur_local_tx.txid.clone(), new_outputs));
1579 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
1585 self.last_block_hash = block_hash.clone();
1586 (watch_outputs, spendable_outputs)
1589 pub(super) fn would_broadcast_at_height(&self, height: u32) -> bool {
1590 if let Some(ref cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1591 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in cur_local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1592 // For inbound HTLCs which we know the preimage for, we have to ensure we hit the
1593 // chain with enough room to claim the HTLC without our counterparty being able to
1594 // time out the HTLC first.
1595 // For outbound HTLCs which our counterparty hasn't failed/claimed, our primary
1596 // concern is being able to claim the corresponding inbound HTLC (on another
1597 // channel) before it expires. In fact, we don't even really care if our
1598 // counterparty here claims such an outbound HTLC after it expired as long as we
1599 // can still claim the corresponding HTLC. Thus, to avoid needlessly hitting the
1600 // chain when our counterparty is waiting for expiration to off-chain fail an HTLC
1601 // we give ourselves a few blocks of headroom after expiration before going
1602 // on-chain for an expired HTLC.
1603 // Note that, to avoid a potential attack whereby a node delays claiming an HTLC
1604 // from us until we've reached the point where we go on-chain with the
1605 // corresponding inbound HTLC, we must ensure that outbound HTLCs go on chain at
1606 // least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER blocks prior to the inbound HTLC.
1607 // aka outbound_cltv + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS == height - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
1608 // inbound_cltv == height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
1609 // outbound_cltv + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFER <= inbound_cltv - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
1610 // HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS + 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFER <= inbound_cltv - outbound_cltv
1611 // HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS + 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFER <= CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA
1612 if ( htlc.offered && htlc.cltv_expiry + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS <= height) ||
1613 (!htlc.offered && htlc.cltv_expiry <= height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER && self.payment_preimages.contains_key(&htlc.payment_hash)) {
1622 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
1624 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> ReadableArgs<R, Arc<Logger>> for (Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor) {
1625 fn read(reader: &mut R, logger: Arc<Logger>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1626 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1627 macro_rules! unwrap_obj {
1631 Err(_) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
1636 let _ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1637 let min_ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1638 if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION {
1639 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion);
1642 let commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor = <U48 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.0;
1644 let key_storage = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
1646 let revocation_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
1647 let htlc_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
1648 let delayed_payment_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
1649 let payment_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
1650 let shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
1651 let prev_latest_per_commitment_point = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
1653 1 => Some(Readable::read(reader)?),
1654 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
1656 let latest_per_commitment_point = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
1658 1 => Some(Readable::read(reader)?),
1659 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
1661 // Technically this can fail and serialize fail a round-trip, but only for serialization of
1662 // barely-init'd ChannelMonitors that we can't do anything with.
1663 let outpoint = OutPoint {
1664 txid: Readable::read(reader)?,
1665 index: Readable::read(reader)?,
1667 let funding_info = Some((outpoint, Readable::read(reader)?));
1669 revocation_base_key,
1671 delayed_payment_base_key,
1674 prev_latest_per_commitment_point,
1675 latest_per_commitment_point,
1679 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
1682 let their_htlc_base_key = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
1683 let their_delayed_payment_base_key = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
1685 let their_cur_revocation_points = {
1686 let first_idx = <U48 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.0;
1690 let first_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
1691 let second_point_slice: [u8; 33] = Readable::read(reader)?;
1692 if second_point_slice[0..32] == [0; 32] && second_point_slice[32] == 0 {
1693 Some((first_idx, first_point, None))
1695 Some((first_idx, first_point, Some(unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &second_point_slice)))))
1700 let our_to_self_delay: u16 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1701 let their_to_self_delay: Option<u16> = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
1703 let mut old_secrets = [([0; 32], 1 << 48); 49];
1704 for &mut (ref mut secret, ref mut idx) in old_secrets.iter_mut() {
1705 *secret = Readable::read(reader)?;
1706 *idx = Readable::read(reader)?;
1709 macro_rules! read_htlc_in_commitment {
1712 let offered: bool = Readable::read(reader)?;
1713 let amount_msat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1714 let cltv_expiry: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1715 let payment_hash: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(reader)?;
1716 let transaction_output_index: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1718 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1719 offered, amount_msat, cltv_expiry, payment_hash, transaction_output_index
1725 macro_rules! read_htlc_source {
1728 (Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?,
1729 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
1731 1 => Some(Readable::read(reader)?),
1732 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
1739 let remote_claimable_outpoints_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1740 let mut remote_claimable_outpoints = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(remote_claimable_outpoints_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 64));
1741 for _ in 0..remote_claimable_outpoints_len {
1742 let txid: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
1743 let outputs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1744 let mut outputs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
1745 for _ in 0..outputs_count {
1746 outputs.push(read_htlc_in_commitment!());
1748 let sources_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1749 let mut sources = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(sources_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
1750 for _ in 0..sources_count {
1751 sources.push(read_htlc_source!());
1753 if let Some(_) = remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, (outputs, sources)) {
1754 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
1758 let remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1759 let mut remote_commitment_txn_on_chain = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
1760 for _ in 0..remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len {
1761 let txid: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
1762 let commitment_number = <U48 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.0;
1763 let outputs_count = <u64 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?;
1764 let mut outputs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 8));
1765 for _ in 0..outputs_count {
1766 outputs.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
1768 if let Some(_) = remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(txid, (commitment_number, outputs)) {
1769 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
1773 let remote_hash_commitment_number_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1774 let mut remote_hash_commitment_number = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(remote_hash_commitment_number_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
1775 for _ in 0..remote_hash_commitment_number_len {
1776 let txid: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(reader)?;
1777 let commitment_number = <U48 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.0;
1778 if let Some(_) = remote_hash_commitment_number.insert(txid, commitment_number) {
1779 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
1783 macro_rules! read_local_tx {
1786 let tx = match Transaction::consensus_decode(reader.by_ref()) {
1789 encode::Error::Io(ioe) => return Err(DecodeError::Io(ioe)),
1790 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
1794 if tx.input.is_empty() {
1795 // Ensure tx didn't hit the 0-input ambiguity case.
1796 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
1799 let revocation_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
1800 let a_htlc_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
1801 let b_htlc_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
1802 let delayed_payment_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
1803 let feerate_per_kw: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1805 let htlc_outputs_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1806 let mut htlc_outputs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlc_outputs_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
1807 for _ in 0..htlc_outputs_len {
1808 let out = read_htlc_in_commitment!();
1809 let sigs = (Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?);
1810 htlc_outputs.push((out, sigs.0, sigs.1));
1813 let htlc_sources_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1814 let mut htlc_sources = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlc_outputs_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
1815 for _ in 0..htlc_sources_len {
1816 htlc_sources.push(read_htlc_source!());
1821 tx, revocation_key, a_htlc_key, b_htlc_key, delayed_payment_key, feerate_per_kw, htlc_outputs, htlc_sources
1827 let prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
1830 Some(read_local_tx!())
1832 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
1835 let current_local_signed_commitment_tx = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
1838 Some(read_local_tx!())
1840 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
1843 let current_remote_commitment_number = <U48 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.0;
1845 let payment_preimages_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1846 let mut payment_preimages = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(payment_preimages_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
1847 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
1848 for _ in 0..payment_preimages_len {
1849 let preimage: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(reader)?;
1851 sha.input(&preimage);
1852 let mut hash = [0; 32];
1853 sha.result(&mut hash);
1854 if let Some(_) = payment_preimages.insert(hash, preimage) {
1855 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
1859 let last_block_hash: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
1860 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
1862 Ok((last_block_hash.clone(), ChannelMonitor {
1863 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor,
1866 their_htlc_base_key,
1867 their_delayed_payment_base_key,
1868 their_cur_revocation_points,
1871 their_to_self_delay,
1874 remote_claimable_outpoints,
1875 remote_commitment_txn_on_chain,
1876 remote_hash_commitment_number,
1878 prev_local_signed_commitment_tx,
1879 current_local_signed_commitment_tx,
1880 current_remote_commitment_number,
1895 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Script;
1896 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
1897 use crypto::digest::Digest;
1899 use ln::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor;
1900 use ln::chan_utils::{HTLCOutputInCommitment, TxCreationKeys};
1901 use util::sha2::Sha256;
1902 use util::test_utils::TestLogger;
1903 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
1904 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1, Signature};
1905 use rand::{thread_rng,Rng};
1909 fn test_per_commitment_storage() {
1910 // Test vectors from BOLT 3:
1911 let mut secrets: Vec<[u8; 32]> = Vec::new();
1912 let mut monitor: ChannelMonitor;
1913 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1914 let logger = Arc::new(TestLogger::new());
1916 macro_rules! test_secrets {
1918 let mut idx = 281474976710655;
1919 for secret in secrets.iter() {
1920 assert_eq!(monitor.get_secret(idx).unwrap(), *secret);
1923 assert_eq!(monitor.get_min_seen_secret(), idx + 1);
1924 assert!(monitor.get_secret(idx).is_none());
1929 // insert_secret correct sequence
1930 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
1933 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1934 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1935 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1938 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1939 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1940 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1943 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1944 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1945 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1948 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1949 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1950 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1953 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1954 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
1955 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1958 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1959 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
1960 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1963 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1964 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
1965 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1968 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1969 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
1970 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1975 // insert_secret #1 incorrect
1976 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
1979 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1980 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
1981 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1984 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1985 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1986 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
1987 "Previous secret did not match new one");
1991 // insert_secret #2 incorrect (#1 derived from incorrect)
1992 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
1995 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1996 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
1997 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2000 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2001 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("dddc3a8d14fddf2b68fa8c7fbad2748274937479dd0f8930d5ebb4ab6bd866a3").unwrap());
2002 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2005 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2006 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
2007 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2010 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2011 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
2012 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
2013 "Previous secret did not match new one");
2017 // insert_secret #3 incorrect
2018 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
2021 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2022 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
2023 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2026 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2027 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
2028 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2031 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2032 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c51a18b13e8527e579ec56365482c62f180b7d5760b46e9477dae59e87ed423a").unwrap());
2033 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2036 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2037 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
2038 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
2039 "Previous secret did not match new one");
2043 // insert_secret #4 incorrect (1,2,3 derived from incorrect)
2044 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
2047 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2048 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
2049 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2052 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2053 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("dddc3a8d14fddf2b68fa8c7fbad2748274937479dd0f8930d5ebb4ab6bd866a3").unwrap());
2054 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2057 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2058 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c51a18b13e8527e579ec56365482c62f180b7d5760b46e9477dae59e87ed423a").unwrap());
2059 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2062 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2063 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("ba65d7b0ef55a3ba300d4e87af29868f394f8f138d78a7011669c79b37b936f4").unwrap());
2064 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2067 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2068 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
2069 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2072 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2073 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
2074 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2077 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2078 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
2079 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2082 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2083 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
2084 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
2085 "Previous secret did not match new one");
2089 // insert_secret #5 incorrect
2090 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
2093 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2094 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
2095 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2098 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2099 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
2100 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2103 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2104 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
2105 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2108 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2109 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
2110 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2113 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2114 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("631373ad5f9ef654bb3dade742d09504c567edd24320d2fcd68e3cc47e2ff6a6").unwrap());
2115 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2118 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2119 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
2120 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
2121 "Previous secret did not match new one");
2125 // insert_secret #6 incorrect (5 derived from incorrect)
2126 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
2129 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2130 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
2131 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2134 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2135 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
2136 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2139 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2140 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
2141 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2144 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2145 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
2146 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2149 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2150 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("631373ad5f9ef654bb3dade742d09504c567edd24320d2fcd68e3cc47e2ff6a6").unwrap());
2151 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2154 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2155 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("b7e76a83668bde38b373970155c868a653304308f9896692f904a23731224bb1").unwrap());
2156 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2159 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2160 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
2161 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2164 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2165 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
2166 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
2167 "Previous secret did not match new one");
2171 // insert_secret #7 incorrect
2172 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
2175 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2176 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
2177 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2180 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2181 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
2182 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2185 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2186 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
2187 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2190 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2191 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
2192 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2195 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2196 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
2197 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2200 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2201 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
2202 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2205 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2206 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("e7971de736e01da8ed58b94c2fc216cb1dca9e326f3a96e7194fe8ea8af6c0a3").unwrap());
2207 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2210 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2211 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
2212 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
2213 "Previous secret did not match new one");
2217 // insert_secret #8 incorrect
2218 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
2221 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2222 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
2223 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2226 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2227 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
2228 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2231 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2232 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
2233 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2236 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2237 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
2238 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2241 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2242 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
2243 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2246 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2247 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
2248 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2251 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2252 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
2253 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2256 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2257 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a7efbc61aac46d34f77778bac22c8a20c6a46ca460addc49009bda875ec88fa4").unwrap());
2258 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
2259 "Previous secret did not match new one");
2264 fn test_prune_preimages() {
2265 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2266 let logger = Arc::new(TestLogger::new());
2267 let dummy_sig = Signature::from_der(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("3045022100fa86fa9a36a8cd6a7bb8f06a541787d51371d067951a9461d5404de6b928782e02201c8b7c334c10aed8976a3a465be9a28abff4cb23acbf00022295b378ce1fa3cd").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
2269 let dummy_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap());
2270 macro_rules! dummy_keys {
2274 per_commitment_point: dummy_key.clone(),
2275 revocation_key: dummy_key.clone(),
2276 a_htlc_key: dummy_key.clone(),
2277 b_htlc_key: dummy_key.clone(),
2278 a_delayed_payment_key: dummy_key.clone(),
2279 b_payment_key: dummy_key.clone(),
2284 let dummy_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
2286 let mut preimages = Vec::new();
2288 let mut rng = thread_rng();
2290 let mut preimage = [0; 32];
2291 rng.fill_bytes(&mut preimage);
2292 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
2293 sha.input(&preimage);
2294 let mut hash = [0; 32];
2295 sha.result(&mut hash);
2296 preimages.push((preimage, hash));
2300 macro_rules! preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs {
2301 ($preimages_slice: expr) => {
2303 let mut res = Vec::new();
2304 for (idx, preimage) in $preimages_slice.iter().enumerate() {
2305 res.push(HTLCOutputInCommitment {
2309 payment_hash: preimage.1.clone(),
2310 transaction_output_index: idx as u32,
2317 macro_rules! preimages_to_local_htlcs {
2318 ($preimages_slice: expr) => {
2320 let mut inp = preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!($preimages_slice);
2321 let res: Vec<_> = inp.drain(..).map(|e| { (e, dummy_sig.clone(), dummy_sig.clone()) }).collect();
2327 macro_rules! test_preimages_exist {
2328 ($preimages_slice: expr, $monitor: expr) => {
2329 for preimage in $preimages_slice {
2330 assert!($monitor.payment_preimages.contains_key(&preimage.1));
2335 // Prune with one old state and a local commitment tx holding a few overlaps with the
2337 let mut monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
2338 monitor.set_their_to_self_delay(10);
2340 monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(dummy_tx.clone(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..10]), Vec::new());
2341 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[5..15]), Vec::new(), 281474976710655, dummy_key);
2342 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[15..20]), Vec::new(), 281474976710654, dummy_key);
2343 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[17..20]), Vec::new(), 281474976710653, dummy_key);
2344 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[18..20]), Vec::new(), 281474976710652, dummy_key);
2345 for &(ref preimage, ref hash) in preimages.iter() {
2346 monitor.provide_payment_preimage(hash, preimage);
2349 // Now provide a secret, pruning preimages 10-15
2350 let mut secret = [0; 32];
2351 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
2352 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secret.clone()).unwrap();
2353 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 15);
2354 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
2355 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[15..20], monitor);
2357 // Now provide a further secret, pruning preimages 15-17
2358 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
2359 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secret.clone()).unwrap();
2360 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 13);
2361 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
2362 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[17..20], monitor);
2364 // Now update local commitment tx info, pruning only element 18 as we still care about the
2365 // previous commitment tx's preimages too
2366 monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(dummy_tx.clone(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..5]), Vec::new());
2367 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
2368 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secret.clone()).unwrap();
2369 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 12);
2370 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
2371 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[18..20], monitor);
2373 // But if we do it again, we'll prune 5-10
2374 monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(dummy_tx.clone(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..3]), Vec::new());
2375 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
2376 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secret.clone()).unwrap();
2377 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 5);
2378 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..5], monitor);
2381 // Further testing is done in the ChannelManager integration tests.