_ Git - rust-lightning/blob - src/ln/channelmonitor.rs

   1 //! The logic to monitor for on-chain transactions and create the relevant claim responses lives
   2 //! here.
   3 //!
   4 //! ChannelMonitor objects are generated by ChannelManager in response to relevant
   5 //! messages/actions, and MUST be persisted to disk (and, preferably, remotely) before progress can
   6 //! be made in responding to certain messages, see ManyChannelMonitor for more.
   7 //!
   8 //! Note that ChannelMonitors are an important part of the lightning trust model and a copy of the
   9 //! latest ChannelMonitor must always be actively monitoring for chain updates (and no out-of-date
  10 //! ChannelMonitors should do so). Thus, if you're building rust-lightning into an HSM or other
  11 //! security-domain-separated system design, you should consider having multiple paths for
  12 //! ChannelMonitors to get out of the HSM and onto monitoring devices.
  13
  14 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
  15 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxIn,TxOut,SigHashType,Transaction};
  16 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
  17 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
  18 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
  19 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::{self, Decodable, Encodable};
  20 use bitcoin::util::hash::{Hash160, BitcoinHash,Sha256dHash};
  21 use bitcoin::util::bip143;
  22
  23 use crypto::digest::Digest;
  24
  25 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Message,Signature};
  26 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
  27 use secp256k1;
  28
  29 use ln::msgs::DecodeError;
  30 use ln::chan_utils;
  31 use ln::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment;
  32 use chain::chaininterface::{ChainListener, ChainWatchInterface, BroadcasterInterface};
  33 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
  34 use chain::keysinterface::SpendableOutputDescriptor;
  35 use util::logger::Logger;
  36 use util::ser::{ReadableArgs, Readable, Writer, Writeable, WriterWriteAdaptor, U48};
  37 use util::sha2::Sha256;
  38 use util::{byte_utils, events};
  39
  40 use std::collections::HashMap;
  41 use std::sync::{Arc,Mutex};
  42 use std::{hash,cmp, mem};
  43
  44 /// An error enum representing a failure to persist a channel monitor update.
  45 #[derive(Clone)]
  46 pub enum ChannelMonitorUpdateErr {
  47         /// Used to indicate a temporary failure (eg connection to a watchtower failed, but is expected
  48         /// to succeed at some point in the future).
  49         ///
  50         /// Such a failure will "freeze" a channel, preventing us from revoking old states or
  51         /// submitting new commitment transactions to the remote party.
  52         /// ChannelManager::test_restore_channel_monitor can be used to retry the update(s) and restore
  53         /// the channel to an operational state.
  54         ///
  55         /// Note that continuing to operate when no copy of the updated ChannelMonitor could be
  56         /// persisted is unsafe - if you failed to store the update on your own local disk you should
  57         /// instead return PermanentFailure to force closure of the channel ASAP.
  58         ///
  59         /// Even when a channel has been "frozen" updates to the ChannelMonitor can continue to occur
  60         /// (eg if an inbound HTLC which we forwarded was claimed upstream resulting in us attempting
  61         /// to claim it on this channel) and those updates must be applied wherever they can be. At
  62         /// least one such updated ChannelMonitor must be persisted otherwise PermanentFailure should
  63         /// be returned to get things on-chain ASAP using only the in-memory copy. Obviously updates to
  64         /// the channel which would invalidate previous ChannelMonitors are not made when a channel has
  65         /// been "frozen".
  66         ///
  67         /// Note that even if updates made after TemporaryFailure succeed you must still call
  68         /// test_restore_channel_monitor to ensure you have the latest monitor and re-enable normal
  69         /// channel operation.
  70         TemporaryFailure,
  71         /// Used to indicate no further channel monitor updates will be allowed (eg we've moved on to a
  72         /// different watchtower and cannot update with all watchtowers that were previously informed
  73         /// of this channel). This will force-close the channel in question.
  74         PermanentFailure,
  75 }
  76
  77 /// General Err type for ChannelMonitor actions. Generally, this implies that the data provided is
  78 /// inconsistent with the ChannelMonitor being called. eg for ChannelMonitor::insert_combine this
  79 /// means you tried to merge two monitors for different channels or for a channel which was
  80 /// restored from a backup and then generated new commitment updates.
  81 /// Contains a human-readable error message.
  82 #[derive(Debug)]
  83 pub struct MonitorUpdateError(pub &'static str);
  84
  85 /// Simple trait indicating ability to track a set of ChannelMonitors and multiplex events between
  86 /// them. Generally should be implemented by keeping a local SimpleManyChannelMonitor and passing
  87 /// events to it, while also taking any add_update_monitor events and passing them to some remote
  88 /// server(s).
  89 ///
  90 /// Note that any updates to a channel's monitor *must* be applied to each instance of the
  91 /// channel's monitor everywhere (including remote watchtowers) *before* this function returns. If
  92 /// an update occurs and a remote watchtower is left with old state, it may broadcast transactions
  93 /// which we have revoked, allowing our counterparty to claim all funds in the channel!
  94 pub trait ManyChannelMonitor: Send + Sync {
  95         /// Adds or updates a monitor for the given `funding_txo`.
  96         ///
  97         /// Implementor must also ensure that the funding_txo outpoint is registered with any relevant
  98         /// ChainWatchInterfaces such that the provided monitor receives block_connected callbacks with
  99         /// any spends of it.
 100         fn add_update_monitor(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr>;
 101 }
 102
 103 /// A simple implementation of a ManyChannelMonitor and ChainListener. Can be used to create a
 104 /// watchtower or watch our own channels.
 105 ///
 106 /// Note that you must provide your own key by which to refer to channels.
 107 ///
 108 /// If you're accepting remote monitors (ie are implementing a watchtower), you must verify that
 109 /// users cannot overwrite a given channel by providing a duplicate key. ie you should probably
 110 /// index by a PublicKey which is required to sign any updates.
 111 ///
 112 /// If you're using this for local monitoring of your own channels, you probably want to use
 113 /// `OutPoint` as the key, which will give you a ManyChannelMonitor implementation.
 114 pub struct SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
 115         #[cfg(test)] // Used in ChannelManager tests to manipulate channels directly
 116         pub monitors: Mutex<HashMap<Key, ChannelMonitor>>,
 117         #[cfg(not(test))]
 118         monitors: Mutex<HashMap<Key, ChannelMonitor>>,
 119         chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>,
 120         broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>,
 121         pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
 122         logger: Arc<Logger>,
 123 }
 124
 125 impl<Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash> ChainListener for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
 126         fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], _indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) {
 127                 let block_hash = header.bitcoin_hash();
 128                 let mut new_events: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(0);
 129                 {
 130                         let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
 131                         for monitor in monitors.values_mut() {
 132                                 let (txn_outputs, spendable_outputs) = monitor.block_connected(txn_matched, height, &block_hash, &*self.broadcaster);
 133                                 if spendable_outputs.len() > 0 {
 134                                         new_events.push(events::Event::SpendableOutputs {
 135                                                 outputs: spendable_outputs,
 136                                         });
 137                                 }
 138                                 for (ref txid, ref outputs) in txn_outputs {
 139                                         for (idx, output) in outputs.iter().enumerate() {
 140                                                 self.chain_monitor.install_watch_outpoint((txid.clone(), idx as u32), &output.script_pubkey);
 141                                         }
 142                                 }
 143                         }
 144                 }
 145                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
 146                 pending_events.append(&mut new_events);
 147         }
 148
 149         fn block_disconnected(&self, _: &BlockHeader) { }
 150 }
 151
 152 impl<Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash + 'static> SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
 153         /// Creates a new object which can be used to monitor several channels given the chain
 154         /// interface with which to register to receive notifications.
 155         pub fn new(chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>, broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>, logger: Arc<Logger>) -> Arc<SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key>> {
 156                 let res = Arc::new(SimpleManyChannelMonitor {
 157                         monitors: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
 158                         chain_monitor,
 159                         broadcaster,
 160                         pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
 161                         logger,
 162                 });
 163                 let weak_res = Arc::downgrade(&res);
 164                 res.chain_monitor.register_listener(weak_res);
 165                 res
 166         }
 167
 168         /// Adds or udpates the monitor which monitors the channel referred to by the given key.
 169         pub fn add_update_monitor_by_key(&self, key: Key, monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
 170                 let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
 171                 match monitors.get_mut(&key) {
 172                         Some(orig_monitor) => {
 173                                 log_trace!(self, "Updating Channel Monitor for channel {}", log_funding_option!(monitor.funding_txo));
 174                                 return orig_monitor.insert_combine(monitor);
 175                         },
 176                         None => {}
 177                 };
 178                 match &monitor.funding_txo {
 179                         &None => {
 180                                 log_trace!(self, "Got new Channel Monitor for no-funding-set channel (monitoring all txn!)");
 181                                 self.chain_monitor.watch_all_txn()
 182                         },
 183                         &Some((ref outpoint, ref script)) => {
 184                                 log_trace!(self, "Got new Channel Monitor for channel {}", log_bytes!(outpoint.to_channel_id()[..]));
 185                                 self.chain_monitor.install_watch_tx(&outpoint.txid, script);
 186                                 self.chain_monitor.install_watch_outpoint((outpoint.txid, outpoint.index as u32), script);
 187                         },
 188                 }
 189                 monitors.insert(key, monitor);
 190                 Ok(())
 191         }
 192 }
 193
 194 impl ManyChannelMonitor for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<OutPoint> {
 195         fn add_update_monitor(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr> {
 196                 match self.add_update_monitor_by_key(funding_txo, monitor) {
 197                         Ok(_) => Ok(()),
 198                         Err(_) => Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure),
 199                 }
 200         }
 201 }
 202
 203 impl<Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash> events::EventsProvider for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
 204         fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
 205                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
 206                 let mut ret = Vec::new();
 207                 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut *pending_events);
 208                 ret
 209         }
 210 }
 211
 212 /// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, don't try to claim it in a shared transaction,
 213 /// instead claiming it in its own individual transaction.
 214 const CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 12;
 215 /// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, force-close the channel to broadcast the
 216 /// HTLC-Success transaction.
 217 /// In other words, this is an upper bound on how many blocks we think it can take us to get a
 218 /// transaction confirmed (and we use it in a few more, equivalent, places).
 219 pub(crate) const CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 6;
 220 /// Number of blocks by which point we expect our counterparty to have seen new blocks on the
 221 /// network and done a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance (+ we've updated all our
 222 /// copies of ChannelMonitors, including watchtowers).
 223 pub(crate) const HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS: u32 = 3;
 224
 225 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
 226 enum KeyStorage {
 227         PrivMode {
 228                 revocation_base_key: SecretKey,
 229                 htlc_base_key: SecretKey,
 230                 delayed_payment_base_key: SecretKey,
 231                 payment_base_key: SecretKey,
 232                 shutdown_pubkey: PublicKey,
 233                 prev_latest_per_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
 234                 latest_per_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
 235         },
 236         SigsMode {
 237                 revocation_base_key: PublicKey,
 238                 htlc_base_key: PublicKey,
 239                 sigs: HashMap<Sha256dHash, Signature>,
 240         }
 241 }
 242
 243 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
 244 struct LocalSignedTx {
 245         /// txid of the transaction in tx, just used to make comparison faster
 246         txid: Sha256dHash,
 247         tx: Transaction,
 248         revocation_key: PublicKey,
 249         a_htlc_key: PublicKey,
 250         b_htlc_key: PublicKey,
 251         delayed_payment_key: PublicKey,
 252         feerate_per_kw: u64,
 253         htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Signature, Signature)>,
 254 }
 255
 256 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
 257 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
 258
 259 /// A ChannelMonitor handles chain events (blocks connected and disconnected) and generates
 260 /// on-chain transactions to ensure no loss of funds occurs.
 261 ///
 262 /// You MUST ensure that no ChannelMonitors for a given channel anywhere contain out-of-date
 263 /// information and are actively monitoring the chain.
 264 #[derive(Clone)]
 265 pub struct ChannelMonitor {
 266         funding_txo: Option<(OutPoint, Script)>,
 267         commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64,
 268
 269         key_storage: KeyStorage,
 270         their_htlc_base_key: Option<PublicKey>,
 271         their_delayed_payment_base_key: Option<PublicKey>,
 272         // first is the idx of the first of the two revocation points
 273         their_cur_revocation_points: Option<(u64, PublicKey, Option<PublicKey>)>,
 274
 275         our_to_self_delay: u16,
 276         their_to_self_delay: Option<u16>,
 277
 278         old_secrets: [([u8; 32], u64); 49],
 279         remote_claimable_outpoints: HashMap<Sha256dHash, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>>,
 280         /// We cannot identify HTLC-Success or HTLC-Timeout transactions by themselves on the chain.
 281         /// Nor can we figure out their commitment numbers without the commitment transaction they are
 282         /// spending. Thus, in order to claim them via revocation key, we track all the remote
 283         /// commitment transactions which we find on-chain, mapping them to the commitment number which
 284         /// can be used to derive the revocation key and claim the transactions.
 285         remote_commitment_txn_on_chain: HashMap<Sha256dHash, (u64, Vec<Script>)>,
 286         /// Cache used to make pruning of payment_preimages faster.
 287         /// Maps payment_hash values to commitment numbers for remote transactions for non-revoked
 288         /// remote transactions (ie should remain pretty small).
 289         /// Serialized to disk but should generally not be sent to Watchtowers.
 290         remote_hash_commitment_number: HashMap<[u8; 32], u64>,
 291
 292         // We store two local commitment transactions to avoid any race conditions where we may update
 293         // some monitors (potentially on watchtowers) but then fail to update others, resulting in the
 294         // various monitors for one channel being out of sync, and us broadcasting a local
 295         // transaction for which we have deleted claim information on some watchtowers.
 296         prev_local_signed_commitment_tx: Option<LocalSignedTx>,
 297         current_local_signed_commitment_tx: Option<LocalSignedTx>,
 298
 299         // Used just for ChannelManager to make sure it has the latest channel data during
 300         // deserialization
 301         current_remote_commitment_number: u64,
 302
 303         payment_preimages: HashMap<[u8; 32], [u8; 32]>,
 304
 305         destination_script: Script,
 306
 307         // We simply modify last_block_hash in Channel's block_connected so that serialization is
 308         // consistent but hopefully the users' copy handles block_connected in a consistent way.
 309         // (we do *not*, however, update them in insert_combine to ensure any local user copies keep
 310         // their last_block_hash from its state and not based on updated copies that didn't run through
 311         // the full block_connected).
 312         pub(crate) last_block_hash: Sha256dHash,
 313         secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>, //TODO: dedup this a bit...
 314         logger: Arc<Logger>,
 315 }
 316
 317 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
 318 /// Used only in testing and fuzztarget to check serialization roundtrips don't change the
 319 /// underlying object
 320 impl PartialEq for ChannelMonitor {
 321         fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
 322                 if self.funding_txo != other.funding_txo ||
 323                         self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor != other.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor ||
 324                         self.key_storage != other.key_storage ||
 325                         self.their_htlc_base_key != other.their_htlc_base_key ||
 326                         self.their_delayed_payment_base_key != other.their_delayed_payment_base_key ||
 327                         self.their_cur_revocation_points != other.their_cur_revocation_points ||
 328                         self.our_to_self_delay != other.our_to_self_delay ||
 329                         self.their_to_self_delay != other.their_to_self_delay ||
 330                         self.remote_claimable_outpoints != other.remote_claimable_outpoints ||
 331                         self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain != other.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain ||
 332                         self.remote_hash_commitment_number != other.remote_hash_commitment_number ||
 333                         self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx != other.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx ||
 334                         self.current_remote_commitment_number != other.current_remote_commitment_number ||
 335                         self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx != other.current_local_signed_commitment_tx ||
 336                         self.payment_preimages != other.payment_preimages ||
 337                         self.destination_script != other.destination_script
 338                 {
 339                         false
 340                 } else {
 341                         for (&(ref secret, ref idx), &(ref o_secret, ref o_idx)) in self.old_secrets.iter().zip(other.old_secrets.iter()) {
 342                                 if secret != o_secret || idx != o_idx {
 343                                         return false
 344                                 }
 345                         }
 346                         true
 347                 }
 348         }
 349 }
 350
 351 impl ChannelMonitor {
 352         pub(super) fn new(revocation_base_key: &SecretKey, delayed_payment_base_key: &SecretKey, htlc_base_key: &SecretKey, payment_base_key: &SecretKey, shutdown_pubkey: &PublicKey, our_to_self_delay: u16, destination_script: Script, logger: Arc<Logger>) -> ChannelMonitor {
 353                 ChannelMonitor {
 354                         funding_txo: None,
 355                         commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: 0,
 356
 357                         key_storage: KeyStorage::PrivMode {
 358                                 revocation_base_key: revocation_base_key.clone(),
 359                                 htlc_base_key: htlc_base_key.clone(),
 360                                 delayed_payment_base_key: delayed_payment_base_key.clone(),
 361                                 payment_base_key: payment_base_key.clone(),
 362                                 shutdown_pubkey: shutdown_pubkey.clone(),
 363                                 prev_latest_per_commitment_point: None,
 364                                 latest_per_commitment_point: None,
 365                         },
 366                         their_htlc_base_key: None,
 367                         their_delayed_payment_base_key: None,
 368                         their_cur_revocation_points: None,
 369
 370                         our_to_self_delay: our_to_self_delay,
 371                         their_to_self_delay: None,
 372
 373                         old_secrets: [([0; 32], 1 << 48); 49],
 374                         remote_claimable_outpoints: HashMap::new(),
 375                         remote_commitment_txn_on_chain: HashMap::new(),
 376                         remote_hash_commitment_number: HashMap::new(),
 377
 378                         prev_local_signed_commitment_tx: None,
 379                         current_local_signed_commitment_tx: None,
 380                         current_remote_commitment_number: 1 << 48,
 381
 382                         payment_preimages: HashMap::new(),
 383                         destination_script: destination_script,
 384
 385                         last_block_hash: Default::default(),
 386                         secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
 387                         logger,
 388                 }
 389         }
 390
 391         #[inline]
 392         fn place_secret(idx: u64) -> u8 {
 393                 for i in 0..48 {
 394                         if idx & (1 << i) == (1 << i) {
 395                                 return i
 396                         }
 397                 }
 398                 48
 399         }
 400
 401         #[inline]
 402         fn derive_secret(secret: [u8; 32], bits: u8, idx: u64) -> [u8; 32] {
 403                 let mut res: [u8; 32] = secret;
 404                 for i in 0..bits {
 405                         let bitpos = bits - 1 - i;
 406                         if idx & (1 << bitpos) == (1 << bitpos) {
 407                                 res[(bitpos / 8) as usize] ^= 1 << (bitpos & 7);
 408                                 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
 409                                 sha.input(&res);
 410                                 sha.result(&mut res);
 411                         }
 412                 }
 413                 res
 414         }
 415
 416         /// Inserts a revocation secret into this channel monitor. Prunes old preimages if neither
 417         /// needed by local commitment transactions HTCLs nor by remote ones. Unless we haven't already seen remote
 418         /// commitment transaction's secret, they are de facto pruned (we can use revocation key).
 419         pub(super) fn provide_secret(&mut self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
 420                 let pos = ChannelMonitor::place_secret(idx);
 421                 for i in 0..pos {
 422                         let (old_secret, old_idx) = self.old_secrets[i as usize];
 423                         if ChannelMonitor::derive_secret(secret, pos, old_idx) != old_secret {
 424                                 return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Previous secret did not match new one"));
 425                         }
 426                 }
 427                 self.old_secrets[pos as usize] = (secret, idx);
 428
 429                 if !self.payment_preimages.is_empty() {
 430                         let local_signed_commitment_tx = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx.as_ref().expect("Channel needs at least an initial commitment tx !");
 431                         let prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.as_ref();
 432                         let min_idx = self.get_min_seen_secret();
 433                         let remote_hash_commitment_number = &mut self.remote_hash_commitment_number;
 434
 435                         self.payment_preimages.retain(|&k, _| {
 436                                 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in &local_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs {
 437                                         if k == htlc.payment_hash {
 438                                                 return true
 439                                         }
 440                                 }
 441                                 if let Some(prev_local_commitment_tx) = prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
 442                                         for &(ref htlc, _, _) in prev_local_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
 443                                                 if k == htlc.payment_hash {
 444                                                         return true
 445                                                 }
 446                                         }
 447                                 }
 448                                 let contains = if let Some(cn) = remote_hash_commitment_number.get(&k) {
 449                                         if *cn < min_idx {
 450                                                 return true
 451                                         }
 452                                         true
 453                                 } else { false };
 454                                 if contains {
 455                                         remote_hash_commitment_number.remove(&k);
 456                                 }
 457                                 false
 458                         });
 459                 }
 460
 461                 Ok(())
 462         }
 463
 464         /// Informs this monitor of the latest remote (ie non-broadcastable) commitment transaction.
 465         /// The monitor watches for it to be broadcasted and then uses the HTLC information (and
 466         /// possibly future revocation/preimage information) to claim outputs where possible.
 467         /// We cache also the mapping hash:commitment number to lighten pruning of old preimages by watchtowers.
 468         pub(super) fn provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, unsigned_commitment_tx: &Transaction, htlc_outputs: Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>, commitment_number: u64, their_revocation_point: PublicKey) {
 469                 // TODO: Encrypt the htlc_outputs data with the single-hash of the commitment transaction
 470                 // so that a remote monitor doesn't learn anything unless there is a malicious close.
 471                 // (only maybe, sadly we cant do the same for local info, as we need to be aware of
 472                 // timeouts)
 473                 for htlc in &htlc_outputs {
 474                         self.remote_hash_commitment_number.insert(htlc.payment_hash, commitment_number);
 475                 }
 476                 self.remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(unsigned_commitment_tx.txid(), htlc_outputs);
 477                 self.current_remote_commitment_number = commitment_number;
 478                 //TODO: Merge this into the other per-remote-transaction output storage stuff
 479                 match self.their_cur_revocation_points {
 480                         Some(old_points) => {
 481                                 if old_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 {
 482                                         self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0, old_points.1, Some(their_revocation_point)));
 483                                 } else if old_points.0 == commitment_number + 2 {
 484                                         if let Some(old_second_point) = old_points.2 {
 485                                                 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0 - 1, old_second_point, Some(their_revocation_point)));
 486                                         } else {
 487                                                 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None));
 488                                         }
 489                                 } else {
 490                                         self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None));
 491                                 }
 492                         },
 493                         None => {
 494                                 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None));
 495                         }
 496                 }
 497         }
 498
 499         /// Informs this monitor of the latest local (ie broadcastable) commitment transaction. The
 500         /// monitor watches for timeouts and may broadcast it if we approach such a timeout. Thus, it
 501         /// is important that any clones of this channel monitor (including remote clones) by kept
 502         /// up-to-date as our local commitment transaction is updated.
 503         /// Panics if set_their_to_self_delay has never been called.
 504         /// Also update KeyStorage with latest local per_commitment_point to derive local_delayedkey in
 505         /// case of onchain HTLC tx
 506         pub(super) fn provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, signed_commitment_tx: Transaction, local_keys: chan_utils::TxCreationKeys, feerate_per_kw: u64, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Signature, Signature)>) {
 507                 assert!(self.their_to_self_delay.is_some());
 508                 self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx.take();
 509                 self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(LocalSignedTx {
 510                         txid: signed_commitment_tx.txid(),
 511                         tx: signed_commitment_tx,
 512                         revocation_key: local_keys.revocation_key,
 513                         a_htlc_key: local_keys.a_htlc_key,
 514                         b_htlc_key: local_keys.b_htlc_key,
 515                         delayed_payment_key: local_keys.a_delayed_payment_key,
 516                         feerate_per_kw,
 517                         htlc_outputs,
 518                 });
 519                 self.key_storage = if let KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref payment_base_key, ref shutdown_pubkey, ref latest_per_commitment_point, .. } = self.key_storage {
 520                         KeyStorage::PrivMode {
 521                                 revocation_base_key: *revocation_base_key,
 522                                 htlc_base_key: *htlc_base_key,
 523                                 delayed_payment_base_key: *delayed_payment_base_key,
 524                                 payment_base_key: *payment_base_key,
 525                                 shutdown_pubkey: *shutdown_pubkey,
 526                                 prev_latest_per_commitment_point: *latest_per_commitment_point,
 527                                 latest_per_commitment_point: Some(local_keys.per_commitment_point),
 528                         }
 529                 } else { unimplemented!(); };
 530         }
 531
 532         /// Provides a payment_hash->payment_preimage mapping. Will be automatically pruned when all
 533         /// commitment_tx_infos which contain the payment hash have been revoked.
 534         pub(super) fn provide_payment_preimage(&mut self, payment_hash: &[u8; 32], payment_preimage: &[u8; 32]) {
 535                 self.payment_preimages.insert(payment_hash.clone(), payment_preimage.clone());
 536         }
 537
 538         /// Combines this ChannelMonitor with the information contained in the other ChannelMonitor.
 539         /// After a successful call this ChannelMonitor is up-to-date and is safe to use to monitor the
 540         /// chain for new blocks/transactions.
 541         pub fn insert_combine(&mut self, mut other: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
 542                 if self.funding_txo.is_some() {
 543                         // We should be able to compare the entire funding_txo, but in fuzztarget its trivially
 544                         // easy to collide the funding_txo hash and have a different scriptPubKey.
 545                         if other.funding_txo.is_some() && other.funding_txo.as_ref().unwrap().0 != self.funding_txo.as_ref().unwrap().0 {
 546                                 return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Funding transaction outputs are not identical!"));
 547                         }
 548                 } else {
 549                         self.funding_txo = other.funding_txo.take();
 550                 }
 551                 let other_min_secret = other.get_min_seen_secret();
 552                 let our_min_secret = self.get_min_seen_secret();
 553                 if our_min_secret > other_min_secret {
 554                         self.provide_secret(other_min_secret, other.get_secret(other_min_secret).unwrap())?;
 555                 }
 556                 if let Some(ref local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
 557                         if let Some(ref other_local_tx) = other.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
 558                                 let our_commitment_number = 0xffffffffffff - ((((local_tx.tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (local_tx.tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor);
 559                                 let other_commitment_number = 0xffffffffffff - ((((other_local_tx.tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (other_local_tx.tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ other.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor);
 560                                 if our_commitment_number >= other_commitment_number {
 561                                         self.key_storage = other.key_storage;
 562                                 }
 563                         }
 564                 }
 565                 // TODO: We should use current_remote_commitment_number and the commitment number out of
 566                 // local transactions to decide how to merge
 567                 if our_min_secret >= other_min_secret {
 568                         self.their_cur_revocation_points = other.their_cur_revocation_points;
 569                         for (txid, htlcs) in other.remote_claimable_outpoints.drain() {
 570                                 self.remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, htlcs);
 571                         }
 572                         if let Some(local_tx) = other.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
 573                                 self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(local_tx);
 574                         }
 575                         if let Some(local_tx) = other.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
 576                                 self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(local_tx);
 577                         }
 578                         self.payment_preimages = other.payment_preimages;
 579                 }
 580
 581                 self.current_remote_commitment_number = cmp::min(self.current_remote_commitment_number, other.current_remote_commitment_number);
 582                 Ok(())
 583         }
 584
 585         /// Panics if commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor doesn't fit in 48 bits
 586         pub(super) fn set_commitment_obscure_factor(&mut self, commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64) {
 587                 assert!(commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor < (1 << 48));
 588                 self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor = commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor;
 589         }
 590
 591         /// Allows this monitor to scan only for transactions which are applicable. Note that this is
 592         /// optional, without it this monitor cannot be used in an SPV client, but you may wish to
 593         /// avoid this (or call unset_funding_info) on a monitor you wish to send to a watchtower as it
 594         /// provides slightly better privacy.
 595         /// It's the responsibility of the caller to register outpoint and script with passing the former
 596         /// value as key to add_update_monitor.
 597         pub(super) fn set_funding_info(&mut self, funding_info: (OutPoint, Script)) {
 598                 self.funding_txo = Some(funding_info);
 599         }
 600
 601         /// We log these base keys at channel opening to being able to rebuild redeemscript in case of leaked revoked commit tx
 602         pub(super) fn set_their_base_keys(&mut self, their_htlc_base_key: &PublicKey, their_delayed_payment_base_key: &PublicKey) {
 603                 self.their_htlc_base_key = Some(their_htlc_base_key.clone());
 604                 self.their_delayed_payment_base_key = Some(their_delayed_payment_base_key.clone());
 605         }
 606
 607         pub(super) fn set_their_to_self_delay(&mut self, their_to_self_delay: u16) {
 608                 self.their_to_self_delay = Some(their_to_self_delay);
 609         }
 610
 611         pub(super) fn unset_funding_info(&mut self) {
 612                 self.funding_txo = None;
 613         }
 614
 615         /// Gets the funding transaction outpoint of the channel this ChannelMonitor is monitoring for.
 616         pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
 617                 match self.funding_txo {
 618                         Some((outpoint, _)) => Some(outpoint),
 619                         None => None
 620                 }
 621         }
 622
 623         /// Gets the sets of all outpoints which this ChannelMonitor expects to hear about spends of.
 624         /// Generally useful when deserializing as during normal operation the return values of
 625         /// block_connected are sufficient to ensure all relevant outpoints are being monitored (note
 626         /// that the get_funding_txo outpoint and transaction must also be monitored for!).
 627         pub fn get_monitored_outpoints(&self) -> Vec<(Sha256dHash, u32, &Script)> {
 628                 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.len() * 2);
 629                 for (ref txid, &(_, ref outputs)) in self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
 630                         for (idx, output) in outputs.iter().enumerate() {
 631                                 res.push(((*txid).clone(), idx as u32, output));
 632                         }
 633                 }
 634                 res
 635         }
 636
 637         /// Serializes into a vec, with various modes for the exposed pub fns
 638         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W, for_local_storage: bool) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
 639                 //TODO: We still write out all the serialization here manually instead of using the fancy
 640                 //serialization framework we have, we should migrate things over to it.
 641                 writer.write_all(&[SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
 642                 writer.write_all(&[MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
 643
 644                 match &self.funding_txo {
 645                         &Some((ref outpoint, ref script)) => {
 646                                 writer.write_all(&outpoint.txid[..])?;
 647                                 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(outpoint.index))?;
 648                                 script.write(writer)?;
 649                         },
 650                         &None => {
 651                                 // We haven't even been initialized...not sure why anyone is serializing us, but
 652                                 // not much to give them.
 653                                 return Ok(());
 654                         },
 655                 }
 656
 657                 // Set in initial Channel-object creation, so should always be set by now:
 658                 U48(self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor).write(writer)?;
 659
 660                 match self.key_storage {
 661                         KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref payment_base_key, ref shutdown_pubkey, ref prev_latest_per_commitment_point, ref latest_per_commitment_point } => {
 662                                 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
 663                                 writer.write_all(&revocation_base_key[..])?;
 664                                 writer.write_all(&htlc_base_key[..])?;
 665                                 writer.write_all(&delayed_payment_base_key[..])?;
 666                                 writer.write_all(&payment_base_key[..])?;
 667                                 writer.write_all(&shutdown_pubkey.serialize())?;
 668                                 if let Some(ref prev_latest_per_commitment_point) = *prev_latest_per_commitment_point {
 669                                         writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
 670                                         writer.write_all(&prev_latest_per_commitment_point.serialize())?;
 671                                 } else {
 672                                         writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
 673                                 }
 674                                 if let Some(ref latest_per_commitment_point) = *latest_per_commitment_point {
 675                                         writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
 676                                         writer.write_all(&latest_per_commitment_point.serialize())?;
 677                                 } else {
 678                                         writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
 679                                 }
 680
 681                         },
 682                         KeyStorage::SigsMode { .. } => unimplemented!(),
 683                 }
 684
 685                 writer.write_all(&self.their_htlc_base_key.as_ref().unwrap().serialize())?;
 686                 writer.write_all(&self.their_delayed_payment_base_key.as_ref().unwrap().serialize())?;
 687
 688                 match self.their_cur_revocation_points {
 689                         Some((idx, pubkey, second_option)) => {
 690                                 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(idx))?;
 691                                 writer.write_all(&pubkey.serialize())?;
 692                                 match second_option {
 693                                         Some(second_pubkey) => {
 694                                                 writer.write_all(&second_pubkey.serialize())?;
 695                                         },
 696                                         None => {
 697                                                 writer.write_all(&[0; 33])?;
 698                                         },
 699                                 }
 700                         },
 701                         None => {
 702                                 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(0))?;
 703                         },
 704                 }
 705
 706                 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.our_to_self_delay))?;
 707                 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap()))?;
 708
 709                 for &(ref secret, ref idx) in self.old_secrets.iter() {
 710                         writer.write_all(secret)?;
 711                         writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*idx))?;
 712                 }
 713
 714                 macro_rules! serialize_htlc_in_commitment {
 715                         ($htlc_output: expr) => {
 716                                 writer.write_all(&[$htlc_output.offered as u8; 1])?;
 717                                 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc_output.amount_msat))?;
 718                                 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array($htlc_output.cltv_expiry))?;
 719                                 writer.write_all(&$htlc_output.payment_hash)?;
 720                                 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array($htlc_output.transaction_output_index))?;
 721                         }
 722                 }
 723
 724                 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_claimable_outpoints.len() as u64))?;
 725                 for (ref txid, ref htlc_outputs) in self.remote_claimable_outpoints.iter() {
 726                         writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
 727                         writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc_outputs.len() as u64))?;
 728                         for htlc_output in htlc_outputs.iter() {
 729                                 serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output);
 730                         }
 731                 }
 732
 733                 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.len() as u64))?;
 734                 for (ref txid, &(commitment_number, ref txouts)) in self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
 735                         writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
 736                         writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(commitment_number))?;
 737                         (txouts.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
 738                         for script in txouts.iter() {
 739                                 script.write(writer)?;
 740                         }
 741                 }
 742
 743                 if for_local_storage {
 744                         writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_hash_commitment_number.len() as u64))?;
 745                         for (ref payment_hash, commitment_number) in self.remote_hash_commitment_number.iter() {
 746                                 writer.write_all(*payment_hash)?;
 747                                 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(*commitment_number))?;
 748                         }
 749                 } else {
 750                         writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(0))?;
 751                 }
 752
 753                 macro_rules! serialize_local_tx {
 754                         ($local_tx: expr) => {
 755                                 if let Err(e) = $local_tx.tx.consensus_encode(&mut WriterWriteAdaptor(writer)) {
 756                                         match e {
 757                                                 encode::Error::Io(e) => return Err(e),
 758                                                 _ => panic!("local tx must have been well-formed!"),
 759                                         }
 760                                 }
 761
 762                                 writer.write_all(&$local_tx.revocation_key.serialize())?;
 763                                 writer.write_all(&$local_tx.a_htlc_key.serialize())?;
 764                                 writer.write_all(&$local_tx.b_htlc_key.serialize())?;
 765                                 writer.write_all(&$local_tx.delayed_payment_key.serialize())?;
 766
 767                                 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($local_tx.feerate_per_kw))?;
 768                                 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($local_tx.htlc_outputs.len() as u64))?;
 769                                 for &(ref htlc_output, ref their_sig, ref our_sig) in $local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
 770                                         serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output);
 771                                         writer.write_all(&their_sig.serialize_compact(&self.secp_ctx))?;
 772                                         writer.write_all(&our_sig.serialize_compact(&self.secp_ctx))?;
 773                                 }
 774                         }
 775                 }
 776
 777                 if let Some(ref prev_local_tx) = self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
 778                         writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
 779                         serialize_local_tx!(prev_local_tx);
 780                 } else {
 781                         writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
 782                 }
 783
 784                 if let Some(ref cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
 785                         writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
 786                         serialize_local_tx!(cur_local_tx);
 787                 } else {
 788                         writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
 789                 }
 790
 791                 if for_local_storage {
 792                         writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(self.current_remote_commitment_number))?;
 793                 } else {
 794                         writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(0))?;
 795                 }
 796
 797                 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.payment_preimages.len() as u64))?;
 798                 for payment_preimage in self.payment_preimages.values() {
 799                         writer.write_all(payment_preimage)?;
 800                 }
 801
 802                 self.last_block_hash.write(writer)?;
 803                 self.destination_script.write(writer)?;
 804
 805                 Ok(())
 806         }
 807
 808         /// Writes this monitor into the given writer, suitable for writing to disk.
 809         ///
 810         /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor), which
 811         /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
 812         /// the "reorg path" (ie not just starting at the same height but starting at the highest
 813         /// common block that appears on your best chain as well as on the chain which contains the
 814         /// last block hash returned) upon deserializing the object!
 815         pub fn write_for_disk<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
 816                 self.write(writer, true)
 817         }
 818
 819         /// Encodes this monitor into the given writer, suitable for sending to a remote watchtower
 820         ///
 821         /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor), which
 822         /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
 823         /// the "reorg path" (ie not just starting at the same height but starting at the highest
 824         /// common block that appears on your best chain as well as on the chain which contains the
 825         /// last block hash returned) upon deserializing the object!
 826         pub fn write_for_watchtower<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
 827                 self.write(writer, false)
 828         }
 829
 830         //TODO: Functions to serialize/deserialize (with different forms depending on which information
 831         //we want to leave out (eg funding_txo, etc).
 832
 833         /// Can only fail if idx is < get_min_seen_secret
 834         pub(super) fn get_secret(&self, idx: u64) -> Option<[u8; 32]> {
 835                 for i in 0..self.old_secrets.len() {
 836                         if (idx & (!((1 << i) - 1))) == self.old_secrets[i].1 {
 837                                 return Some(ChannelMonitor::derive_secret(self.old_secrets[i].0, i as u8, idx))
 838                         }
 839                 }
 840                 assert!(idx < self.get_min_seen_secret());
 841                 None
 842         }
 843
 844         pub(super) fn get_min_seen_secret(&self) -> u64 {
 845                 //TODO This can be optimized?
 846                 let mut min = 1 << 48;
 847                 for &(_, idx) in self.old_secrets.iter() {
 848                         if idx < min {
 849                                 min = idx;
 850                         }
 851                 }
 852                 min
 853         }
 854
 855         pub(super) fn get_cur_remote_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
 856                 self.current_remote_commitment_number
 857         }
 858
 859         pub(super) fn get_cur_local_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
 860                 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
 861                         0xffff_ffff_ffff - ((((local_tx.tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (local_tx.tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor)
 862                 } else { 0xffff_ffff_ffff }
 863         }
 864
 865         /// Attempts to claim a remote commitment transaction's outputs using the revocation key and
 866         /// data in remote_claimable_outpoints. Will directly claim any HTLC outputs which expire at a
 867         /// height > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER. In any case, will install monitoring for
 868         /// HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions.
 869         fn check_spend_remote_transaction(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32) -> (Vec<Transaction>, (Sha256dHash, Vec<TxOut>), Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>) {
 870                 // Most secp and related errors trying to create keys means we have no hope of constructing
 871                 // a spend transaction...so we return no transactions to broadcast
 872                 let mut txn_to_broadcast = Vec::new();
 873                 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
 874                 let mut spendable_outputs = Vec::new();
 875
 876                 let commitment_txid = tx.txid(); //TODO: This is gonna be a performance bottleneck for watchtowers!
 877                 let per_commitment_option = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(&commitment_txid);
 878
 879                 macro_rules! ignore_error {
 880                         ( $thing : expr ) => {
 881                                 match $thing {
 882                                         Ok(a) => a,
 883                                         Err(_) => return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs)
 884                                 }
 885                         };
 886                 }
 887
 888                 let commitment_number = 0xffffffffffff - ((((tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor);
 889                 if commitment_number >= self.get_min_seen_secret() {
 890                         let secret = self.get_secret(commitment_number).unwrap();
 891                         let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &secret));
 892                         let (revocation_pubkey, b_htlc_key) = match self.key_storage {
 893                                 KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
 894                                         let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
 895                                         (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_base_key))),
 896                                         ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &htlc_base_key))))
 897                                 },
 898                                 KeyStorage::SigsMode { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
 899                                         let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
 900                                         (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &revocation_base_key)),
 901                                         ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &htlc_base_key)))
 902                                 },
 903                         };
 904                         let delayed_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key), &self.their_delayed_payment_base_key.unwrap()));
 905                         let a_htlc_key = match self.their_htlc_base_key {
 906                                 None => return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs),
 907                                 Some(their_htlc_base_key) => ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key), &their_htlc_base_key)),
 908                         };
 909
 910                         let revokeable_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey, self.our_to_self_delay, &delayed_key);
 911                         let revokeable_p2wsh = revokeable_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
 912
 913                         let mut total_value = 0;
 914                         let mut values = Vec::new();
 915                         let mut inputs = Vec::new();
 916                         let mut htlc_idxs = Vec::new();
 917
 918                         for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
 919                                 if outp.script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh {
 920                                         inputs.push(TxIn {
 921                                                 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
 922                                                         txid: commitment_txid,
 923                                                         vout: idx as u32,
 924                                                 },
 925                                                 script_sig: Script::new(),
 926                                                 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
 927                                                 witness: Vec::new(),
 928                                         });
 929                                         htlc_idxs.push(None);
 930                                         values.push(outp.value);
 931                                         total_value += outp.value;
 932                                 } else if outp.script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh() {
 933                                         match self.key_storage {
 934                                                 KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref payment_base_key, .. } => {
 935                                                         let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
 936                                                         if let Ok(local_key) = chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &payment_base_key) {
 937                                                                 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WPKH {
 938                                                                         outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: commitment_txid, vout: idx as u32 },
 939                                                                         key: local_key,
 940                                                                         output: outp.clone(),
 941                                                                 });
 942                                                         }
 943                                                 }
 944                                                 KeyStorage::SigsMode { .. } => {
 945                                                         //TODO: we need to ensure an offline client will generate the event when it
 946                                                         // cames back online after only the watchtower saw the transaction
 947                                                 }
 948                                         }
 949                                 }
 950                         }
 951
 952                         macro_rules! sign_input {
 953                                 ($sighash_parts: expr, $input: expr, $htlc_idx: expr, $amount: expr) => {
 954                                         {
 955                                                 let (sig, redeemscript) = match self.key_storage {
 956                                                         KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
 957                                                                 let redeemscript = if $htlc_idx.is_none() { revokeable_redeemscript.clone() } else {
 958                                                                         let htlc = &per_commitment_option.unwrap()[$htlc_idx.unwrap()];
 959                                                                         chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey)
 960                                                                 };
 961                                                                 let sighash = ignore_error!(Message::from_slice(&$sighash_parts.sighash_all(&$input, &redeemscript, $amount)[..]));
 962                                                                 let revocation_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key, &revocation_base_key));
 963                                                                 (self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &revocation_key), redeemscript)
 964                                                         },
 965                                                         KeyStorage::SigsMode { .. } => {
 966                                                                 unimplemented!();
 967                                                         }
 968                                                 };
 969                                                 $input.witness.push(sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
 970                                                 $input.witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
 971                                                 if $htlc_idx.is_none() {
 972                                                         $input.witness.push(vec!(1));
 973                                                 } else {
 974                                                         $input.witness.push(revocation_pubkey.serialize().to_vec());
 975                                                 }
 976                                                 $input.witness.push(redeemscript.into_bytes());
 977                                         }
 978                                 }
 979                         }
 980
 981                         if let Some(per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
 982                                 inputs.reserve_exact(per_commitment_data.len());
 983
 984                                 for (idx, htlc) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() {
 985                                         let expected_script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey);
 986                                         if htlc.transaction_output_index as usize >= tx.output.len() ||
 987                                                         tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 ||
 988                                                         tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].script_pubkey != expected_script.to_v0_p2wsh() {
 989                                                 return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs); // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user
 990                                         }
 991                                         let input = TxIn {
 992                                                 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
 993                                                         txid: commitment_txid,
 994                                                         vout: htlc.transaction_output_index,
 995                                                 },
 996                                                 script_sig: Script::new(),
 997                                                 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
 998                                                 witness: Vec::new(),
 999                                         };
1000                                         if htlc.cltv_expiry > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER {
1001                                                 inputs.push(input);
1002                                                 htlc_idxs.push(Some(idx));
1003                                                 values.push(tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].value);
1004                                                 total_value += htlc.amount_msat / 1000;
1005                                         } else {
1006                                                 let mut single_htlc_tx = Transaction {
1007                                                         version: 2,
1008                                                         lock_time: 0,
1009                                                         input: vec![input],
1010                                                         output: vec!(TxOut {
1011                                                                 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1012                                                                 value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000, //TODO: - fee
1013                                                         }),
1014                                                 };
1015                                                 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&single_htlc_tx);
1016                                                 sign_input!(sighash_parts, single_htlc_tx.input[0], Some(idx), htlc.amount_msat / 1000);
1017                                                 txn_to_broadcast.push(single_htlc_tx);
1018                                         }
1019                                 }
1020                         }
1021
1022                         if !inputs.is_empty() || !txn_to_broadcast.is_empty() { // ie we're confident this is actually ours
1023                                 // We're definitely a remote commitment transaction!
1024                                 watch_outputs.append(&mut tx.output.clone());
1025                                 self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, (commitment_number, tx.output.iter().map(|output| { output.script_pubkey.clone() }).collect()));
1026                         }
1027                         if inputs.is_empty() { return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs); } // Nothing to be done...probably a false positive/local tx
1028
1029                         let outputs = vec!(TxOut {
1030                                 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1031                                 value: total_value, //TODO: - fee
1032                         });
1033                         let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
1034                                 version: 2,
1035                                 lock_time: 0,
1036                                 input: inputs,
1037                                 output: outputs,
1038                         };
1039
1040                         let mut values_drain = values.drain(..);
1041                         let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx);
1042
1043                         for (input, htlc_idx) in spend_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(htlc_idxs.iter()) {
1044                                 let value = values_drain.next().unwrap();
1045                                 sign_input!(sighash_parts, input, htlc_idx, value);
1046                         }
1047
1048                         spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
1049                                 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: spend_tx.txid(), vout: 0 },
1050                                 output: spend_tx.output[0].clone(),
1051                         });
1052                         txn_to_broadcast.push(spend_tx);
1053                 } else if let Some(per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
1054                         // While this isn't useful yet, there is a potential race where if a counterparty
1055                         // revokes a state at the same time as the commitment transaction for that state is
1056                         // confirmed, and the watchtower receives the block before the user, the user could
1057                         // upload a new ChannelMonitor with the revocation secret but the watchtower has
1058                         // already processed the block, resulting in the remote_commitment_txn_on_chain entry
1059                         // not being generated by the above conditional. Thus, to be safe, we go ahead and
1060                         // insert it here.
1061                         watch_outputs.append(&mut tx.output.clone());
1062                         self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, (commitment_number, tx.output.iter().map(|output| { output.script_pubkey.clone() }).collect()));
1063
1064                         if let Some(revocation_points) = self.their_cur_revocation_points {
1065                                 let revocation_point_option =
1066                                         if revocation_points.0 == commitment_number { Some(&revocation_points.1) }
1067                                         else if let Some(point) = revocation_points.2.as_ref() {
1068                                                 if revocation_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 { Some(point) } else { None }
1069                                         } else { None };
1070                                 if let Some(revocation_point) = revocation_point_option {
1071                                         let (revocation_pubkey, b_htlc_key) = match self.key_storage {
1072                                                 KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
1073                                                         (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_base_key))),
1074                                                         ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &htlc_base_key))))
1075                                                 },
1076                                                 KeyStorage::SigsMode { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
1077                                                         (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &revocation_base_key)),
1078                                                         ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &htlc_base_key)))
1079                                                 },
1080                                         };
1081                                         let a_htlc_key = match self.their_htlc_base_key {
1082                                                 None => return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs),
1083                                                 Some(their_htlc_base_key) => ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &their_htlc_base_key)),
1084                                         };
1085
1086
1087                                         for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
1088                                                 if outp.script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh() {
1089                                                         match self.key_storage {
1090                                                                 KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref payment_base_key, .. } => {
1091                                                                         if let Ok(local_key) = chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_point, &payment_base_key) {
1092                                                                                 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WPKH {
1093                                                                                         outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: commitment_txid, vout: idx as u32 },
1094                                                                                         key: local_key,
1095                                                                                         output: outp.clone(),
1096                                                                                 });
1097                                                                         }
1098                                                                 }
1099                                                                 KeyStorage::SigsMode { .. } => {
1100                                                                         //TODO: we need to ensure an offline client will generate the event when it
1101                                                                         // cames back online after only the watchtower saw the transaction
1102                                                                 }
1103                                                         }
1104                                                         break; // Only to_remote ouput is claimable
1105                                                 }
1106                                         }
1107
1108                                         let mut total_value = 0;
1109                                         let mut values = Vec::new();
1110                                         let mut inputs = Vec::new();
1111
1112                                         macro_rules! sign_input {
1113                                                 ($sighash_parts: expr, $input: expr, $amount: expr, $preimage: expr) => {
1114                                                         {
1115                                                                 let (sig, redeemscript) = match self.key_storage {
1116                                                                         KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
1117                                                                                 let htlc = &per_commitment_option.unwrap()[$input.sequence as usize];
1118                                                                                 let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey);
1119                                                                                 let sighash = ignore_error!(Message::from_slice(&$sighash_parts.sighash_all(&$input, &redeemscript, $amount)[..]));
1120                                                                                 let htlc_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &htlc_base_key));
1121                                                                                 (self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &htlc_key), redeemscript)
1122                                                                         },
1123                                                                         KeyStorage::SigsMode { .. } => {
1124                                                                                 unimplemented!();
1125                                                                         }
1126                                                                 };
1127                                                                 $input.witness.push(sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
1128                                                                 $input.witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1129                                                                 $input.witness.push($preimage);
1130                                                                 $input.witness.push(redeemscript.into_bytes());
1131                                                         }
1132                                                 }
1133                                         }
1134
1135                                         for (idx, htlc) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() {
1136                                                 if let Some(payment_preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
1137                                                         let input = TxIn {
1138                                                                 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
1139                                                                         txid: commitment_txid,
1140                                                                         vout: htlc.transaction_output_index,
1141                                                                 },
1142                                                                 script_sig: Script::new(),
1143                                                                 sequence: idx as u32, // reset to 0xfffffffd in sign_input
1144                                                                 witness: Vec::new(),
1145                                                         };
1146                                                         if htlc.cltv_expiry > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER {
1147                                                                 inputs.push(input);
1148                                                                 values.push((tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].value, payment_preimage));
1149                                                                 total_value += htlc.amount_msat / 1000;
1150                                                         } else {
1151                                                                 let mut single_htlc_tx = Transaction {
1152                                                                         version: 2,
1153                                                                         lock_time: 0,
1154                                                                         input: vec![input],
1155                                                                         output: vec!(TxOut {
1156                                                                                 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1157                                                                                 value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000, //TODO: - fee
1158                                                                         }),
1159                                                                 };
1160                                                                 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&single_htlc_tx);
1161                                                                 sign_input!(sighash_parts, single_htlc_tx.input[0], htlc.amount_msat / 1000, payment_preimage.to_vec());
1162                                                                 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
1163                                                                         outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: single_htlc_tx.txid(), vout: 0 },
1164                                                                         output: single_htlc_tx.output[0].clone(),
1165                                                                 });
1166                                                                 txn_to_broadcast.push(single_htlc_tx);
1167                                                         }
1168                                                 }
1169                                         }
1170
1171                                         if inputs.is_empty() { return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs); } // Nothing to be done...probably a false positive/local tx
1172
1173                                         let outputs = vec!(TxOut {
1174                                                 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1175                                                 value: total_value, //TODO: - fee
1176                                         });
1177                                         let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
1178                                                 version: 2,
1179                                                 lock_time: 0,
1180                                                 input: inputs,
1181                                                 output: outputs,
1182                                         };
1183
1184                                         let mut values_drain = values.drain(..);
1185                                         let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx);
1186
1187                                         for input in spend_tx.input.iter_mut() {
1188                                                 let value = values_drain.next().unwrap();
1189                                                 sign_input!(sighash_parts, input, value.0, value.1.to_vec());
1190                                         }
1191
1192                                         spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
1193                                                 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: spend_tx.txid(), vout: 0 },
1194                                                 output: spend_tx.output[0].clone(),
1195                                         });
1196                                         txn_to_broadcast.push(spend_tx);
1197                                 }
1198                         }
1199                 }
1200
1201                 (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs)
1202         }
1203
1204         /// Attempst to claim a remote HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout s outputs using the revocation key
1205         fn check_spend_remote_htlc(&self, tx: &Transaction, commitment_number: u64) -> (Option<Transaction>, Option<SpendableOutputDescriptor>) {
1206                 if tx.input.len() != 1 || tx.output.len() != 1 {
1207                         return (None, None)
1208                 }
1209
1210                 macro_rules! ignore_error {
1211                         ( $thing : expr ) => {
1212                                 match $thing {
1213                                         Ok(a) => a,
1214                                         Err(_) => return (None, None)
1215                                 }
1216                         };
1217                 }
1218
1219                 let secret = if let Some(secret) = self.get_secret(commitment_number) { secret } else { return (None, None); };
1220                 let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &secret));
1221                 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
1222                 let revocation_pubkey = match self.key_storage {
1223                         KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
1224                                 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_base_key)))
1225                         },
1226                         KeyStorage::SigsMode { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
1227                                 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &revocation_base_key))
1228                         },
1229                 };
1230                 let delayed_key = match self.their_delayed_payment_base_key {
1231                         None => return (None, None),
1232                         Some(their_delayed_payment_base_key) => ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &their_delayed_payment_base_key)),
1233                 };
1234                 let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), &delayed_key);
1235                 let revokeable_p2wsh = redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
1236                 let htlc_txid = tx.txid(); //TODO: This is gonna be a performance bottleneck for watchtowers!
1237
1238                 let mut inputs = Vec::new();
1239                 let mut amount = 0;
1240
1241                 if tx.output[0].script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh { //HTLC transactions have one txin, one txout
1242                         inputs.push(TxIn {
1243                                 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
1244                                         txid: htlc_txid,
1245                                         vout: 0,
1246                                 },
1247                                 script_sig: Script::new(),
1248                                 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
1249                                 witness: Vec::new(),
1250                         });
1251                         amount = tx.output[0].value;
1252                 }
1253
1254                 if !inputs.is_empty() {
1255                         let outputs = vec!(TxOut {
1256                                 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1257                                 value: amount, //TODO: - fee
1258                         });
1259
1260                         let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
1261                                 version: 2,
1262                                 lock_time: 0,
1263                                 input: inputs,
1264                                 output: outputs,
1265                         };
1266
1267                         let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx);
1268
1269                         let sig = match self.key_storage {
1270                                 KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
1271                                         let sighash = ignore_error!(Message::from_slice(&sighash_parts.sighash_all(&spend_tx.input[0], &redeemscript, amount)[..]));
1272                                         let revocation_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key, &revocation_base_key));
1273                                         self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &revocation_key)
1274                                 }
1275                                 KeyStorage::SigsMode { .. } => {
1276                                         unimplemented!();
1277                                 }
1278                         };
1279                         spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
1280                         spend_tx.input[0].witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1281                         spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(vec!(1));
1282                         spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(redeemscript.into_bytes());
1283
1284                         let outpoint = BitcoinOutPoint { txid: spend_tx.txid(), vout: 0 };
1285                         let output = spend_tx.output[0].clone();
1286                         (Some(spend_tx), Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput { outpoint, output }))
1287                 } else { (None, None) }
1288         }
1289
1290         fn broadcast_by_local_state(&self, local_tx: &LocalSignedTx, per_commitment_point: &Option<PublicKey>, delayed_payment_base_key: &Option<SecretKey>) -> (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>) {
1291                 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
1292                 let mut spendable_outputs = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
1293
1294                 macro_rules! add_dynamic_output {
1295                         ($father_tx: expr, $vout: expr) => {
1296                                 if let Some(ref per_commitment_point) = *per_commitment_point {
1297                                         if let Some(ref delayed_payment_base_key) = *delayed_payment_base_key {
1298                                                 if let Ok(local_delayedkey) = chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base_key) {
1299                                                         spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WSH {
1300                                                                 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: $father_tx.txid(), vout: $vout },
1301                                                                 key: local_delayedkey,
1302                                                                 witness_script: chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&local_tx.revocation_key, self.our_to_self_delay, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key),
1303                                                                 to_self_delay: self.our_to_self_delay,
1304                                                                 output: $father_tx.output[$vout as usize].clone(),
1305                                                         });
1306                                                 }
1307                                         }
1308                                 }
1309                         }
1310                 }
1311
1312
1313                 let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&local_tx.revocation_key, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), &local_tx.delayed_payment_key);
1314                 let revokeable_p2wsh = redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
1315                 for (idx, output) in local_tx.tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
1316                         if output.script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh {
1317                                 add_dynamic_output!(local_tx.tx, idx as u32);
1318                                 break;
1319                         }
1320                 }
1321
1322                 for &(ref htlc, ref their_sig, ref our_sig) in local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1323                         if htlc.offered {
1324                                 let mut htlc_timeout_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&local_tx.txid, local_tx.feerate_per_kw, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), htlc, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key, &local_tx.revocation_key);
1325
1326                                 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
1327
1328                                 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(their_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
1329                                 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1330                                 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
1331                                 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1332
1333                                 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new());
1334                                 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &local_tx.a_htlc_key, &local_tx.b_htlc_key, &local_tx.revocation_key).into_bytes());
1335
1336                                 add_dynamic_output!(htlc_timeout_tx, 0);
1337                                 res.push(htlc_timeout_tx);
1338                         } else {
1339                                 if let Some(payment_preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
1340                                         let mut htlc_success_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&local_tx.txid, local_tx.feerate_per_kw, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), htlc, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key, &local_tx.revocation_key);
1341
1342                                         htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
1343
1344                                         htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(their_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
1345                                         htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1346                                         htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
1347                                         htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1348
1349                                         htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(payment_preimage.to_vec());
1350                                         htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &local_tx.a_htlc_key, &local_tx.b_htlc_key, &local_tx.revocation_key).into_bytes());
1351
1352                                         add_dynamic_output!(htlc_success_tx, 0);
1353                                         res.push(htlc_success_tx);
1354                                 }
1355                         }
1356                 }
1357
1358                 (res, spendable_outputs)
1359         }
1360
1361         /// Attempts to claim any claimable HTLCs in a commitment transaction which was not (yet)
1362         /// revoked using data in local_claimable_outpoints.
1363         /// Should not be used if check_spend_revoked_transaction succeeds.
1364         fn check_spend_local_transaction(&self, tx: &Transaction, _height: u32) -> (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>) {
1365                 let commitment_txid = tx.txid();
1366                 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1367                         if local_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
1368                                 match self.key_storage {
1369                                         KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref latest_per_commitment_point, .. } => {
1370                                                 return self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, latest_per_commitment_point, &Some(*delayed_payment_base_key));
1371                                         },
1372                                         KeyStorage::SigsMode { .. } => {
1373                                                 return self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, &None, &None);
1374                                         }
1375                                 }
1376                         }
1377                 }
1378                 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1379                         if local_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
1380                                 match self.key_storage {
1381                                         KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref prev_latest_per_commitment_point, .. } => {
1382                                                 return self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, prev_latest_per_commitment_point, &Some(*delayed_payment_base_key));
1383                                         },
1384                                         KeyStorage::SigsMode { .. } => {
1385                                                 return self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, &None, &None);
1386                                         }
1387                                 }
1388                         }
1389                 }
1390                 (Vec::new(), Vec::new())
1391         }
1392
1393         /// Generate a spendable output event when closing_transaction get registered onchain.
1394         fn check_spend_closing_transaction(&self, tx: &Transaction) -> Option<SpendableOutputDescriptor> {
1395                 if tx.input[0].sequence == 0xFFFFFFFF && tx.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len() == 71 {
1396                         match self.key_storage {
1397                                 KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref shutdown_pubkey, .. } =>  {
1398                                         let our_channel_close_key_hash = Hash160::from_data(&shutdown_pubkey.serialize());
1399                                         let shutdown_script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::All::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&our_channel_close_key_hash[..]).into_script();
1400                                         for (idx, output) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
1401                                                 if shutdown_script == output.script_pubkey {
1402                                                         return Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
1403                                                                 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), vout: idx as u32 },
1404                                                                 output: output.clone(),
1405                                                         });
1406                                                 }
1407                                         }
1408                                 }
1409                                 KeyStorage::SigsMode { .. } => {
1410                                         //TODO: we need to ensure an offline client will generate the event when it
1411                                         // cames back online after only the watchtower saw the transaction
1412                                 }
1413                         }
1414                 }
1415                 None
1416         }
1417
1418         /// Used by ChannelManager deserialization to broadcast the latest local state if it's copy of
1419         /// the Channel was out-of-date.
1420         pub(super) fn get_latest_local_commitment_txn(&self) -> Vec<Transaction> {
1421                 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1422                         let mut res = vec![local_tx.tx.clone()];
1423                         match self.key_storage {
1424                                 KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref prev_latest_per_commitment_point, .. } => {
1425                                         res.append(&mut self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, prev_latest_per_commitment_point, &Some(*delayed_payment_base_key)).0);
1426                                 },
1427                                 _ => panic!("Can only broadcast by local channelmonitor"),
1428                         };
1429                         res
1430                 } else {
1431                         Vec::new()
1432                 }
1433         }
1434
1435         fn block_connected(&mut self, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], height: u32, block_hash: &Sha256dHash, broadcaster: &BroadcasterInterface)-> (Vec<(Sha256dHash, Vec<TxOut>)>, Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>) {
1436                 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
1437                 let mut spendable_outputs = Vec::new();
1438                 for tx in txn_matched {
1439                         if tx.input.len() == 1 {
1440                                 // Assuming our keys were not leaked (in which case we're screwed no matter what),
1441                                 // commitment transactions and HTLC transactions will all only ever have one input,
1442                                 // which is an easy way to filter out any potential non-matching txn for lazy
1443                                 // filters.
1444                                 let prevout = &tx.input[0].previous_output;
1445                                 let mut txn: Vec<Transaction> = Vec::new();
1446                                 if self.funding_txo.is_none() || (prevout.txid == self.funding_txo.as_ref().unwrap().0.txid && prevout.vout == self.funding_txo.as_ref().unwrap().0.index as u32) {
1447                                         let (remote_txn, new_outputs, mut spendable_output) = self.check_spend_remote_transaction(tx, height);
1448                                         txn = remote_txn;
1449                                         spendable_outputs.append(&mut spendable_output);
1450                                         if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() {
1451                                                 watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
1452                                         }
1453                                         if txn.is_empty() {
1454                                                 let (remote_txn, mut outputs) = self.check_spend_local_transaction(tx, height);
1455                                                 spendable_outputs.append(&mut outputs);
1456                                                 txn = remote_txn;
1457                                         }
1458                                         if !self.funding_txo.is_none() && txn.is_empty() {
1459                                                 if let Some(spendable_output) = self.check_spend_closing_transaction(tx) {
1460                                                         spendable_outputs.push(spendable_output);
1461                                                 }
1462                                         }
1463                                 } else {
1464                                         if let Some(&(commitment_number, _)) = self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.get(&prevout.txid) {
1465                                                 let (tx, spendable_output) = self.check_spend_remote_htlc(tx, commitment_number);
1466                                                 if let Some(tx) = tx {
1467                                                         txn.push(tx);
1468                                                 }
1469                                                 if let Some(spendable_output) = spendable_output {
1470                                                         spendable_outputs.push(spendable_output);
1471                                                 }
1472                                         }
1473                                 }
1474                                 for tx in txn.iter() {
1475                                         broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(tx);
1476                                 }
1477                         }
1478                 }
1479                 if let Some(ref cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1480                         if self.would_broadcast_at_height(height) {
1481                                 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&cur_local_tx.tx);
1482                                 match self.key_storage {
1483                                         KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref latest_per_commitment_point, .. } => {
1484                                                 let (txs, mut outputs) = self.broadcast_by_local_state(&cur_local_tx, latest_per_commitment_point, &Some(*delayed_payment_base_key));
1485                                                 spendable_outputs.append(&mut outputs);
1486                                                 for tx in txs {
1487                                                         broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
1488                                                 }
1489                                         },
1490                                         KeyStorage::SigsMode { .. } => {
1491                                                 let (txs, mut outputs) = self.broadcast_by_local_state(&cur_local_tx, &None, &None);
1492                                                 spendable_outputs.append(&mut outputs);
1493                                                 for tx in txs {
1494                                                         broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
1495                                                 }
1496                                         }
1497                                 }
1498                         }
1499                 }
1500                 self.last_block_hash = block_hash.clone();
1501                 (watch_outputs, spendable_outputs)
1502         }
1503
1504         pub(super) fn would_broadcast_at_height(&self, height: u32) -> bool {
1505                 if let Some(ref cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1506                         for &(ref htlc, _, _) in cur_local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1507                                 // For inbound HTLCs which we know the preimage for, we have to ensure we hit the
1508                                 // chain with enough room to claim the HTLC without our counterparty being able to
1509                                 // time out the HTLC first.
1510                                 // For outbound HTLCs which our counterparty hasn't failed/claimed, our primary
1511                                 // concern is being able to claim the corresponding inbound HTLC (on another
1512                                 // channel) before it expires. In fact, we don't even really care if our
1513                                 // counterparty here claims such an outbound HTLC after it expired as long as we
1514                                 // can still claim the corresponding HTLC. Thus, to avoid needlessly hitting the
1515                                 // chain when our counterparty is waiting for expiration to off-chain fail an HTLC
1516                                 // we give ourselves a few blocks of headroom after expiration before going
1517                                 // on-chain for an expired HTLC.
1518                                 // Note that, to avoid a potential attack whereby a node delays claiming an HTLC
1519                                 // from us until we've reached the point where we go on-chain with the
1520                                 // corresponding inbound HTLC, we must ensure that outbound HTLCs go on chain at
1521                                 // least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER blocks prior to the inbound HTLC.
1522                                 //  aka outbound_cltv + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS == height - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
1523                                 //      inbound_cltv == height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
1524                                 //      outbound_cltv + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFER <= inbound_cltv - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
1525                                 //      HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS + 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFER <= inbound_cltv - outbound_cltv
1526                                 //      HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS + 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFER <= CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA
1527                                 if ( htlc.offered && htlc.cltv_expiry + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS <= height) ||
1528                                    (!htlc.offered && htlc.cltv_expiry <= height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER && self.payment_preimages.contains_key(&htlc.payment_hash)) {
1529                                         return true;
1530                                 }
1531                         }
1532                 }
1533                 false
1534         }
1535 }
1536
1537 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
1538
1539 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> ReadableArgs<R, Arc<Logger>> for (Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor) {
1540         fn read(reader: &mut R, logger: Arc<Logger>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1541                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1542                 macro_rules! unwrap_obj {
1543                         ($key: expr) => {
1544                                 match $key {
1545                                         Ok(res) => res,
1546                                         Err(_) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
1547                                 }
1548                         }
1549                 }
1550
1551                 let _ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1552                 let min_ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1553                 if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION {
1554                         return Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion);
1555                 }
1556
1557                 // Technically this can fail and serialize fail a round-trip, but only for serialization of
1558                 // barely-init'd ChannelMonitors that we can't do anything with.
1559                 let outpoint = OutPoint {
1560                         txid: Readable::read(reader)?,
1561                         index: Readable::read(reader)?,
1562                 };
1563                 let funding_txo = Some((outpoint, Readable::read(reader)?));
1564                 let commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor = <U48 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.0;
1565
1566                 let key_storage = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
1567                         0 => {
1568                                 let revocation_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
1569                                 let htlc_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
1570                                 let delayed_payment_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
1571                                 let payment_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
1572                                 let shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
1573                                 let prev_latest_per_commitment_point = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
1574                                         0 => None,
1575                                         1 => Some(Readable::read(reader)?),
1576                                         _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
1577                                 };
1578                                 let latest_per_commitment_point = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
1579                                         0 => None,
1580                                         1 => Some(Readable::read(reader)?),
1581                                         _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
1582                                 };
1583                                 KeyStorage::PrivMode {
1584                                         revocation_base_key,
1585                                         htlc_base_key,
1586                                         delayed_payment_base_key,
1587                                         payment_base_key,
1588                                         shutdown_pubkey,
1589                                         prev_latest_per_commitment_point,
1590                                         latest_per_commitment_point,
1591                                 }
1592                         },
1593                         _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
1594                 };
1595
1596                 let their_htlc_base_key = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
1597                 let their_delayed_payment_base_key = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
1598
1599                 let their_cur_revocation_points = {
1600                         let first_idx = <U48 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.0;
1601                         if first_idx == 0 {
1602                                 None
1603                         } else {
1604                                 let first_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
1605                                 let second_point_slice: [u8; 33] = Readable::read(reader)?;
1606                                 if second_point_slice[0..32] == [0; 32] && second_point_slice[32] == 0 {
1607                                         Some((first_idx, first_point, None))
1608                                 } else {
1609                                         Some((first_idx, first_point, Some(unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &second_point_slice)))))
1610                                 }
1611                         }
1612                 };
1613
1614                 let our_to_self_delay: u16 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1615                 let their_to_self_delay: Option<u16> = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
1616
1617                 let mut old_secrets = [([0; 32], 1 << 48); 49];
1618                 for &mut (ref mut secret, ref mut idx) in old_secrets.iter_mut() {
1619                         *secret = Readable::read(reader)?;
1620                         *idx = Readable::read(reader)?;
1621                 }
1622
1623                 macro_rules! read_htlc_in_commitment {
1624                         () => {
1625                                 {
1626                                         let offered: bool = Readable::read(reader)?;
1627                                         let amount_msat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1628                                         let cltv_expiry: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1629                                         let payment_hash: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(reader)?;
1630                                         let transaction_output_index: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1631
1632                                         HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1633                                                 offered, amount_msat, cltv_expiry, payment_hash, transaction_output_index
1634                                         }
1635                                 }
1636                         }
1637                 }
1638
1639                 let remote_claimable_outpoints_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1640                 let mut remote_claimable_outpoints = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(remote_claimable_outpoints_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 64));
1641                 for _ in 0..remote_claimable_outpoints_len {
1642                         let txid: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
1643                         let outputs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1644                         let mut outputs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
1645                         for _ in 0..outputs_count {
1646                                 outputs.push(read_htlc_in_commitment!());
1647                         }
1648                         if let Some(_) = remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, outputs) {
1649                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
1650                         }
1651                 }
1652
1653                 let remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1654                 let mut remote_commitment_txn_on_chain = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
1655                 for _ in 0..remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len {
1656                         let txid: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
1657                         let commitment_number = <U48 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.0;
1658                         let outputs_count = <u64 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?;
1659                         let mut outputs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 8));
1660                         for _ in 0..outputs_count {
1661                                 outputs.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
1662                         }
1663                         if let Some(_) = remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(txid, (commitment_number, outputs)) {
1664                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
1665                         }
1666                 }
1667
1668                 let remote_hash_commitment_number_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1669                 let mut remote_hash_commitment_number = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(remote_hash_commitment_number_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
1670                 for _ in 0..remote_hash_commitment_number_len {
1671                         let txid: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(reader)?;
1672                         let commitment_number = <U48 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.0;
1673                         if let Some(_) = remote_hash_commitment_number.insert(txid, commitment_number) {
1674                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
1675                         }
1676                 }
1677
1678                 macro_rules! read_local_tx {
1679                         () => {
1680                                 {
1681                                         let tx = match Transaction::consensus_decode(reader.by_ref()) {
1682                                                 Ok(tx) => tx,
1683                                                 Err(e) => match e {
1684                                                         encode::Error::Io(ioe) => return Err(DecodeError::Io(ioe)),
1685                                                         _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
1686                                                 },
1687                                         };
1688
1689                                         if tx.input.is_empty() {
1690                                                 // Ensure tx didn't hit the 0-input ambiguity case.
1691                                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
1692                                         }
1693
1694                                         let revocation_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
1695                                         let a_htlc_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
1696                                         let b_htlc_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
1697                                         let delayed_payment_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
1698                                         let feerate_per_kw: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1699
1700                                         let htlc_outputs_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1701                                         let mut htlc_outputs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlc_outputs_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
1702                                         for _ in 0..htlc_outputs_len {
1703                                                 htlc_outputs.push((read_htlc_in_commitment!(), Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
1704                                         }
1705
1706                                         LocalSignedTx {
1707                                                 txid: tx.txid(),
1708                                                 tx, revocation_key, a_htlc_key, b_htlc_key, delayed_payment_key, feerate_per_kw, htlc_outputs
1709                                         }
1710                                 }
1711                         }
1712                 }
1713
1714                 let prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
1715                         0 => None,
1716                         1 => {
1717                                 Some(read_local_tx!())
1718                         },
1719                         _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
1720                 };
1721
1722                 let current_local_signed_commitment_tx = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
1723                         0 => None,
1724                         1 => {
1725                                 Some(read_local_tx!())
1726                         },
1727                         _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
1728                 };
1729
1730                 let current_remote_commitment_number = <U48 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.0;
1731
1732                 let payment_preimages_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1733                 let mut payment_preimages = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(payment_preimages_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
1734                 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
1735                 for _ in 0..payment_preimages_len {
1736                         let preimage: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(reader)?;
1737                         sha.reset();
1738                         sha.input(&preimage);
1739                         let mut hash = [0; 32];
1740                         sha.result(&mut hash);
1741                         if let Some(_) = payment_preimages.insert(hash, preimage) {
1742                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
1743                         }
1744                 }
1745
1746                 let last_block_hash: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
1747                 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
1748
1749                 Ok((last_block_hash.clone(), ChannelMonitor {
1750                         funding_txo,
1751                         commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor,
1752
1753                         key_storage,
1754                         their_htlc_base_key,
1755                         their_delayed_payment_base_key,
1756                         their_cur_revocation_points,
1757
1758                         our_to_self_delay,
1759                         their_to_self_delay,
1760
1761                         old_secrets,
1762                         remote_claimable_outpoints,
1763                         remote_commitment_txn_on_chain,
1764                         remote_hash_commitment_number,
1765
1766                         prev_local_signed_commitment_tx,
1767                         current_local_signed_commitment_tx,
1768                         current_remote_commitment_number,
1769
1770                         payment_preimages,
1771
1772                         destination_script,
1773                         last_block_hash,
1774                         secp_ctx,
1775                         logger,
1776                 }))
1777         }
1778
1779 }
1780
1781 #[cfg(test)]
1782 mod tests {
1783         use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Script;
1784         use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
1785         use crypto::digest::Digest;
1786         use hex;
1787         use ln::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor;
1788         use ln::chan_utils::{HTLCOutputInCommitment, TxCreationKeys};
1789         use util::sha2::Sha256;
1790         use util::test_utils::TestLogger;
1791         use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
1792         use secp256k1::{Secp256k1, Signature};
1793         use rand::{thread_rng,Rng};
1794         use std::sync::Arc;
1795
1796         #[test]
1797         fn test_per_commitment_storage() {
1798                 // Test vectors from BOLT 3:
1799                 let mut secrets: Vec<[u8; 32]> = Vec::new();
1800                 let mut monitor: ChannelMonitor;
1801                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1802                 let logger = Arc::new(TestLogger::new());
1803
1804                 macro_rules! test_secrets {
1805                         () => {
1806                                 let mut idx = 281474976710655;
1807                                 for secret in secrets.iter() {
1808                                         assert_eq!(monitor.get_secret(idx).unwrap(), *secret);
1809                                         idx -= 1;
1810                                 }
1811                                 assert_eq!(monitor.get_min_seen_secret(), idx + 1);
1812                                 assert!(monitor.get_secret(idx).is_none());
1813                         };
1814                 }
1815
1816                 {
1817                         // insert_secret correct sequence
1818                         monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
1819                         secrets.clear();
1820
1821                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1822                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1823                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1824                         test_secrets!();
1825
1826                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1827                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1828                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1829                         test_secrets!();
1830
1831                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1832                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1833                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1834                         test_secrets!();
1835
1836                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1837                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1838                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1839                         test_secrets!();
1840
1841                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1842                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
1843                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1844                         test_secrets!();
1845
1846                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1847                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
1848                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1849                         test_secrets!();
1850
1851                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1852                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
1853                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1854                         test_secrets!();
1855
1856                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1857                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
1858                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1859                         test_secrets!();
1860                 }
1861
1862                 {
1863                         // insert_secret #1 incorrect
1864                         monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
1865                         secrets.clear();
1866
1867                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1868                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
1869                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1870                         test_secrets!();
1871
1872                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1873                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1874                         assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
1875                                         "Previous secret did not match new one");
1876                 }
1877
1878                 {
1879                         // insert_secret #2 incorrect (#1 derived from incorrect)
1880                         monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
1881                         secrets.clear();
1882
1883                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1884                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
1885                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1886                         test_secrets!();
1887
1888                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1889                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("dddc3a8d14fddf2b68fa8c7fbad2748274937479dd0f8930d5ebb4ab6bd866a3").unwrap());
1890                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1891                         test_secrets!();
1892
1893                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1894                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1895                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1896                         test_secrets!();
1897
1898                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1899                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1900                         assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
1901                                         "Previous secret did not match new one");
1902                 }
1903
1904                 {
1905                         // insert_secret #3 incorrect
1906                         monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
1907                         secrets.clear();
1908
1909                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1910                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1911                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1912                         test_secrets!();
1913
1914                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1915                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1916                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1917                         test_secrets!();
1918
1919                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1920                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c51a18b13e8527e579ec56365482c62f180b7d5760b46e9477dae59e87ed423a").unwrap());
1921                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1922                         test_secrets!();
1923
1924                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1925                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1926                         assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
1927                                         "Previous secret did not match new one");
1928                 }
1929
1930                 {
1931                         // insert_secret #4 incorrect (1,2,3 derived from incorrect)
1932                         monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
1933                         secrets.clear();
1934
1935                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1936                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
1937                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1938                         test_secrets!();
1939
1940                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1941                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("dddc3a8d14fddf2b68fa8c7fbad2748274937479dd0f8930d5ebb4ab6bd866a3").unwrap());
1942                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1943                         test_secrets!();
1944
1945                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1946                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c51a18b13e8527e579ec56365482c62f180b7d5760b46e9477dae59e87ed423a").unwrap());
1947                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1948                         test_secrets!();
1949
1950                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1951                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("ba65d7b0ef55a3ba300d4e87af29868f394f8f138d78a7011669c79b37b936f4").unwrap());
1952                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1953                         test_secrets!();
1954
1955                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1956                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
1957                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1958                         test_secrets!();
1959
1960                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1961                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
1962                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1963                         test_secrets!();
1964
1965                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1966                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
1967                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1968                         test_secrets!();
1969
1970                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1971                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
1972                         assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
1973                                         "Previous secret did not match new one");
1974                 }
1975
1976                 {
1977                         // insert_secret #5 incorrect
1978                         monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
1979                         secrets.clear();
1980
1981                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1982                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1983                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1984                         test_secrets!();
1985
1986                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1987                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1988                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1989                         test_secrets!();
1990
1991                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1992                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1993                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1994                         test_secrets!();
1995
1996                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1997                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1998                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1999                         test_secrets!();
2000
2001                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
2002                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("631373ad5f9ef654bb3dade742d09504c567edd24320d2fcd68e3cc47e2ff6a6").unwrap());
2003                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2004                         test_secrets!();
2005
2006                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
2007                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
2008                         assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
2009                                         "Previous secret did not match new one");
2010                 }
2011
2012                 {
2013                         // insert_secret #6 incorrect (5 derived from incorrect)
2014                         monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
2015                         secrets.clear();
2016
2017                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
2018                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
2019                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2020                         test_secrets!();
2021
2022                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
2023                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
2024                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2025                         test_secrets!();
2026
2027                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
2028                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
2029                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2030                         test_secrets!();
2031
2032                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
2033                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
2034                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2035                         test_secrets!();
2036
2037                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
2038                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("631373ad5f9ef654bb3dade742d09504c567edd24320d2fcd68e3cc47e2ff6a6").unwrap());
2039                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2040                         test_secrets!();
2041
2042                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
2043                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("b7e76a83668bde38b373970155c868a653304308f9896692f904a23731224bb1").unwrap());
2044                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2045                         test_secrets!();
2046
2047                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
2048                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
2049                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2050                         test_secrets!();
2051
2052                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
2053                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
2054                         assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
2055                                         "Previous secret did not match new one");
2056                 }
2057
2058                 {
2059                         // insert_secret #7 incorrect
2060                         monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
2061                         secrets.clear();
2062
2063                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
2064                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
2065                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2066                         test_secrets!();
2067
2068                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
2069                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
2070                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2071                         test_secrets!();
2072
2073                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
2074                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
2075                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2076                         test_secrets!();
2077
2078                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
2079                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
2080                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2081                         test_secrets!();
2082
2083                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
2084                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
2085                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2086                         test_secrets!();
2087
2088                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
2089                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
2090                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2091                         test_secrets!();
2092
2093                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
2094                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("e7971de736e01da8ed58b94c2fc216cb1dca9e326f3a96e7194fe8ea8af6c0a3").unwrap());
2095                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2096                         test_secrets!();
2097
2098                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
2099                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
2100                         assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
2101                                         "Previous secret did not match new one");
2102                 }
2103
2104                 {
2105                         // insert_secret #8 incorrect
2106                         monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
2107                         secrets.clear();
2108
2109                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
2110                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
2111                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2112                         test_secrets!();
2113
2114                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
2115                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
2116                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2117                         test_secrets!();
2118
2119                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
2120                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
2121                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2122                         test_secrets!();
2123
2124                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
2125                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
2126                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2127                         test_secrets!();
2128
2129                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
2130                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
2131                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2132                         test_secrets!();
2133
2134                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
2135                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
2136                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2137                         test_secrets!();
2138
2139                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
2140                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
2141                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2142                         test_secrets!();
2143
2144                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
2145                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a7efbc61aac46d34f77778bac22c8a20c6a46ca460addc49009bda875ec88fa4").unwrap());
2146                         assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
2147                                         "Previous secret did not match new one");
2148                 }
2149         }
2150
2151         #[test]
2152         fn test_prune_preimages() {
2153                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2154                 let logger = Arc::new(TestLogger::new());
2155                 let dummy_sig = Signature::from_der(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("3045022100fa86fa9a36a8cd6a7bb8f06a541787d51371d067951a9461d5404de6b928782e02201c8b7c334c10aed8976a3a465be9a28abff4cb23acbf00022295b378ce1fa3cd").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
2156
2157                 let dummy_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap());
2158                 macro_rules! dummy_keys {
2159                         () => {
2160                                 {
2161                                         TxCreationKeys {
2162                                                 per_commitment_point: dummy_key.clone(),
2163                                                 revocation_key: dummy_key.clone(),
2164                                                 a_htlc_key: dummy_key.clone(),
2165                                                 b_htlc_key: dummy_key.clone(),
2166                                                 a_delayed_payment_key: dummy_key.clone(),
2167                                                 b_payment_key: dummy_key.clone(),
2168                                         }
2169                                 }
2170                         }
2171                 }
2172                 let dummy_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
2173
2174                 let mut preimages = Vec::new();
2175                 {
2176                         let mut rng  = thread_rng();
2177                         for _ in 0..20 {
2178                                 let mut preimage = [0; 32];
2179                                 rng.fill_bytes(&mut preimage);
2180                                 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
2181                                 sha.input(&preimage);
2182                                 let mut hash = [0; 32];
2183                                 sha.result(&mut hash);
2184                                 preimages.push((preimage, hash));
2185                         }
2186                 }
2187
2188                 macro_rules! preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs {
2189                         ($preimages_slice: expr) => {
2190                                 {
2191                                         let mut res = Vec::new();
2192                                         for (idx, preimage) in $preimages_slice.iter().enumerate() {
2193                                                 res.push(HTLCOutputInCommitment {
2194                                                         offered: true,
2195                                                         amount_msat: 0,
2196                                                         cltv_expiry: 0,
2197                                                         payment_hash: preimage.1.clone(),
2198                                                         transaction_output_index: idx as u32,
2199                                                 });
2200                                         }
2201                                         res
2202                                 }
2203                         }
2204                 }
2205                 macro_rules! preimages_to_local_htlcs {
2206                         ($preimages_slice: expr) => {
2207                                 {
2208                                         let mut inp = preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!($preimages_slice);
2209                                         let res: Vec<_> = inp.drain(..).map(|e| { (e, dummy_sig.clone(), dummy_sig.clone()) }).collect();
2210                                         res
2211                                 }
2212                         }
2213                 }
2214
2215                 macro_rules! test_preimages_exist {
2216                         ($preimages_slice: expr, $monitor: expr) => {
2217                                 for preimage in $preimages_slice {
2218                                         assert!($monitor.payment_preimages.contains_key(&preimage.1));
2219                                 }
2220                         }
2221                 }
2222
2223                 // Prune with one old state and a local commitment tx holding a few overlaps with the
2224                 // old state.
2225                 let mut monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
2226                 monitor.set_their_to_self_delay(10);
2227
2228                 monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(dummy_tx.clone(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..10]));
2229                 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[5..15]), 281474976710655, dummy_key);
2230                 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[15..20]), 281474976710654, dummy_key);
2231                 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[17..20]), 281474976710653, dummy_key);
2232                 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[18..20]), 281474976710652, dummy_key);
2233                 for &(ref preimage, ref hash) in preimages.iter() {
2234                         monitor.provide_payment_preimage(hash, preimage);
2235                 }
2236
2237                 // Now provide a secret, pruning preimages 10-15
2238                 let mut secret = [0; 32];
2239                 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
2240                 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secret.clone()).unwrap();
2241                 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 15);
2242                 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
2243                 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[15..20], monitor);
2244
2245                 // Now provide a further secret, pruning preimages 15-17
2246                 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
2247                 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secret.clone()).unwrap();
2248                 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 13);
2249                 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
2250                 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[17..20], monitor);
2251
2252                 // Now update local commitment tx info, pruning only element 18 as we still care about the
2253                 // previous commitment tx's preimages too
2254                 monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(dummy_tx.clone(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..5]));
2255                 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
2256                 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secret.clone()).unwrap();
2257                 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 12);
2258                 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
2259                 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[18..20], monitor);
2260
2261                 // But if we do it again, we'll prune 5-10
2262                 monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(dummy_tx.clone(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..3]));
2263                 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
2264                 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secret.clone()).unwrap();
2265                 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 5);
2266                 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..5], monitor);
2267         }
2268
2269         // Further testing is done in the ChannelManager integration tests.
2270 }