_ Git - rust-lightning/blob - src/ln/channelmonitor.rs

   1 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
   2 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxIn,TxOut,SigHashType,Transaction};
   3 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Script;
   4 use bitcoin::util::hash::Sha256dHash;
   5 use bitcoin::util::bip143;
   6
   7 use crypto::digest::Digest;
   8
   9 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Message,Signature};
  10 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
  11
  12 use ln::msgs::HandleError;
  13 use ln::chan_utils;
  14 use ln::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment;
  15 use chain::chaininterface::{ChainListener, ChainWatchInterface, BroadcasterInterface};
  16 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
  17 use util::sha2::Sha256;
  18
  19 use std::collections::HashMap;
  20 use std::sync::{Arc,Mutex};
  21 use std::{hash,cmp};
  22
  23 pub enum ChannelMonitorUpdateErr {
  24         /// Used to indicate a temporary failure (eg connection to a watchtower failed, but is expected
  25         /// to succeed at some point in the future).
  26         /// Such a failure will "freeze" a channel, preventing us from revoking old states or
  27         /// submitting new commitment transactions to the remote party.
  28         /// ChannelManager::test_restore_channel_monitor can be used to retry the update(s) and restore
  29         /// the channel to an operational state.
  30         TemporaryFailure,
  31         /// Used to indicate no further channel monitor updates will be allowed (eg we've moved on to a
  32         /// different watchtower and cannot update with all watchtowers that were previously informed
  33         /// of this channel). This will force-close the channel in question.
  34         PermanentFailure,
  35 }
  36
  37 /// Simple trait indicating ability to track a set of ChannelMonitors and multiplex events between
  38 /// them. Generally should be implemented by keeping a local SimpleManyChannelMonitor and passing
  39 /// events to it, while also taking any add_update_monitor events and passing them to some remote
  40 /// server(s).
  41 /// Note that any updates to a channel's monitor *must* be applied to each instance of the
  42 /// channel's monitor everywhere (including remote watchtowers) *before* this function returns. If
  43 /// an update occurs and a remote watchtower is left with old state, it may broadcast transactions
  44 /// which we have revoked, allowing our counterparty to claim all funds in the channel!
  45 pub trait ManyChannelMonitor: Send + Sync {
  46         /// Adds or updates a monitor for the given `funding_txo`.
  47         fn add_update_monitor(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr>;
  48 }
  49
  50 /// A simple implementation of a ManyChannelMonitor and ChainListener. Can be used to create a
  51 /// watchtower or watch our own channels.
  52 /// Note that you must provide your own key by which to refer to channels.
  53 /// If you're accepting remote monitors (ie are implementing a watchtower), you must verify that
  54 /// users cannot overwrite a given channel by providing a duplicate key. ie you should probably
  55 /// index by a PublicKey which is required to sign any updates.
  56 /// If you're using this for local monitoring of your own channels, you probably want to use
  57 /// `OutPoint` as the key, which will give you a ManyChannelMonitor implementation.
  58 pub struct SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
  59         monitors: Mutex<HashMap<Key, ChannelMonitor>>,
  60         chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>,
  61         broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>
  62 }
  63
  64 impl<Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash> ChainListener for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
  65         fn block_connected(&self, _header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], _indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) {
  66                 let monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
  67                 for monitor in monitors.values() {
  68                         monitor.block_connected(txn_matched, height, &*self.broadcaster);
  69                 }
  70         }
  71
  72         fn block_disconnected(&self, _: &BlockHeader) { }
  73 }
  74
  75 impl<Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash + 'static> SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
  76         pub fn new(chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>, broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>) -> Arc<SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key>> {
  77                 let res = Arc::new(SimpleManyChannelMonitor {
  78                         monitors: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
  79                         chain_monitor,
  80                         broadcaster
  81                 });
  82                 let weak_res = Arc::downgrade(&res);
  83                 res.chain_monitor.register_listener(weak_res);
  84                 res
  85         }
  86
  87         pub fn add_update_monitor_by_key(&self, key: Key, monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
  88                 let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
  89                 match monitors.get_mut(&key) {
  90                         Some(orig_monitor) => return orig_monitor.insert_combine(monitor),
  91                         None => {}
  92                 };
  93                 match monitor.funding_txo {
  94                         None => self.chain_monitor.watch_all_txn(),
  95                         Some(outpoint) => self.chain_monitor.install_watch_outpoint((outpoint.txid, outpoint.index as u32)),
  96                 }
  97                 monitors.insert(key, monitor);
  98                 Ok(())
  99         }
 100 }
 101
 102 impl ManyChannelMonitor for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<OutPoint> {
 103         fn add_update_monitor(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr> {
 104                 match self.add_update_monitor_by_key(funding_txo, monitor) {
 105                         Ok(_) => Ok(()),
 106                         Err(_) => Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure),
 107                 }
 108         }
 109 }
 110
 111 /// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, don't try to claim it in a shared transaction,
 112 /// instead claiming it in its own individual transaction.
 113 const CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 12;
 114 /// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, force-close the channel to broadcast the
 115 /// HTLC-Success transaction.
 116 const CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 6;
 117
 118 #[derive(Clone)]
 119 enum KeyStorage {
 120         PrivMode {
 121                 revocation_base_key: SecretKey,
 122                 htlc_base_key: SecretKey,
 123         },
 124         SigsMode {
 125                 revocation_base_key: PublicKey,
 126                 htlc_base_key: PublicKey,
 127                 sigs: HashMap<Sha256dHash, Signature>,
 128         }
 129 }
 130
 131 #[derive(Clone)]
 132 struct LocalSignedTx {
 133         txid: Sha256dHash,
 134         tx: Transaction,
 135         revocation_key: PublicKey,
 136         a_htlc_key: PublicKey,
 137         b_htlc_key: PublicKey,
 138         delayed_payment_key: PublicKey,
 139         feerate_per_kw: u64,
 140         htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Signature, Signature)>,
 141 }
 142
 143 pub struct ChannelMonitor {
 144         funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
 145         commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64,
 146
 147         key_storage: KeyStorage,
 148         delayed_payment_base_key: PublicKey,
 149         their_htlc_base_key: Option<PublicKey>,
 150         // first is the idx of the first of the two revocation points
 151         their_cur_revocation_points: Option<(u64, PublicKey, Option<PublicKey>)>,
 152
 153         our_to_self_delay: u16,
 154         their_to_self_delay: Option<u16>,
 155
 156         old_secrets: [([u8; 32], u64); 49],
 157         remote_claimable_outpoints: HashMap<Sha256dHash, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>>,
 158         remote_htlc_outputs_on_chain: Mutex<HashMap<Sha256dHash, u64>>,
 159         //hash to commitment number mapping use to determine the state of transaction owning it
 160         // (revoked/non-revoked) and so lightnen pruning
 161         remote_hash_commitment_number: HashMap<[u8; 32], u64>,
 162
 163         // We store two local commitment transactions to avoid any race conditions where we may update
 164         // some monitors (potentially on watchtowers) but then fail to update others, resulting in the
 165         // various monitors for one channel being out of sync, and us broadcasting a local
 166         // transaction for which we have deleted claim information on some watchtowers.
 167         prev_local_signed_commitment_tx: Option<LocalSignedTx>,
 168         current_local_signed_commitment_tx: Option<LocalSignedTx>,
 169
 170         payment_preimages: HashMap<[u8; 32], [u8; 32]>,
 171
 172         destination_script: Script,
 173         secp_ctx: Secp256k1, //TODO: dedup this a bit...
 174 }
 175 impl Clone for ChannelMonitor {
 176         fn clone(&self) -> Self {
 177                 ChannelMonitor {
 178                         funding_txo: self.funding_txo.clone(),
 179                         commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor.clone(),
 180
 181                         key_storage: self.key_storage.clone(),
 182                         delayed_payment_base_key: self.delayed_payment_base_key.clone(),
 183                         their_htlc_base_key: self.their_htlc_base_key.clone(),
 184                         their_cur_revocation_points: self.their_cur_revocation_points.clone(),
 185
 186                         our_to_self_delay: self.our_to_self_delay,
 187                         their_to_self_delay: self.their_to_self_delay,
 188
 189                         old_secrets: self.old_secrets.clone(),
 190                         remote_claimable_outpoints: self.remote_claimable_outpoints.clone(),
 191                         remote_htlc_outputs_on_chain: Mutex::new((*self.remote_htlc_outputs_on_chain.lock().unwrap()).clone()),
 192                         remote_hash_commitment_number: self.remote_hash_commitment_number.clone(),
 193
 194                         prev_local_signed_commitment_tx: self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.clone(),
 195                         current_local_signed_commitment_tx: self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx.clone(),
 196
 197                         payment_preimages: self.payment_preimages.clone(),
 198
 199                         destination_script: self.destination_script.clone(),
 200                         secp_ctx: self.secp_ctx.clone(),
 201                 }
 202         }
 203 }
 204
 205 impl ChannelMonitor {
 206         pub fn new(revocation_base_key: &SecretKey, delayed_payment_base_key: &PublicKey, htlc_base_key: &SecretKey, our_to_self_delay: u16, destination_script: Script) -> ChannelMonitor {
 207                 ChannelMonitor {
 208                         funding_txo: None,
 209                         commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: 0,
 210
 211                         key_storage: KeyStorage::PrivMode {
 212                                 revocation_base_key: revocation_base_key.clone(),
 213                                 htlc_base_key: htlc_base_key.clone(),
 214                         },
 215                         delayed_payment_base_key: delayed_payment_base_key.clone(),
 216                         their_htlc_base_key: None,
 217                         their_cur_revocation_points: None,
 218
 219                         our_to_self_delay: our_to_self_delay,
 220                         their_to_self_delay: None,
 221
 222                         old_secrets: [([0; 32], 1 << 48); 49],
 223                         remote_claimable_outpoints: HashMap::new(),
 224                         remote_htlc_outputs_on_chain: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
 225                         remote_hash_commitment_number: HashMap::new(),
 226
 227                         prev_local_signed_commitment_tx: None,
 228                         current_local_signed_commitment_tx: None,
 229
 230                         payment_preimages: HashMap::new(),
 231
 232                         destination_script: destination_script,
 233                         secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
 234                 }
 235         }
 236
 237         #[inline]
 238         fn place_secret(idx: u64) -> u8 {
 239                 for i in 0..48 {
 240                         if idx & (1 << i) == (1 << i) {
 241                                 return i
 242                         }
 243                 }
 244                 48
 245         }
 246
 247         #[inline]
 248         fn derive_secret(secret: [u8; 32], bits: u8, idx: u64) -> [u8; 32] {
 249                 let mut res: [u8; 32] = secret;
 250                 for i in 0..bits {
 251                         let bitpos = bits - 1 - i;
 252                         if idx & (1 << bitpos) == (1 << bitpos) {
 253                                 res[(bitpos / 8) as usize] ^= 1 << (bitpos & 7);
 254                                 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
 255                                 sha.input(&res);
 256                                 sha.result(&mut res);
 257                         }
 258                 }
 259                 res
 260         }
 261
 262         /// Inserts a revocation secret into this channel monitor. Also optionally tracks the next
 263         /// revocation point which may be required to claim HTLC outputs which we know the preimage of
 264         /// in case the remote end force-closes using their latest state. Prunes old preimages if neither
 265         /// needed by local commitment transactions HTCLs nor by remote ones. Unless we haven't already seen remote
 266         /// commitment transaction's secret, they are de facto pruned (we can use revocation key).
 267         pub fn provide_secret(&mut self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32], their_next_revocation_point: Option<(u64, PublicKey)>) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
 268                 let pos = ChannelMonitor::place_secret(idx);
 269                 for i in 0..pos {
 270                         let (old_secret, old_idx) = self.old_secrets[i as usize];
 271                         if ChannelMonitor::derive_secret(secret, pos, old_idx) != old_secret {
 272                                 return Err(HandleError{err: "Previous secret did not match new one", msg: None})
 273                         }
 274                 }
 275                 self.old_secrets[pos as usize] = (secret, idx);
 276
 277                 if let Some(new_revocation_point) = their_next_revocation_point {
 278                         match self.their_cur_revocation_points {
 279                                 Some(old_points) => {
 280                                         if old_points.0 == new_revocation_point.0 + 1 {
 281                                                 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0, old_points.1, Some(new_revocation_point.1)));
 282                                         } else if old_points.0 == new_revocation_point.0 + 2 {
 283                                                 if let Some(old_second_point) = old_points.2 {
 284                                                         self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0 - 1, old_second_point, Some(new_revocation_point.1)));
 285                                                 } else {
 286                                                         self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((new_revocation_point.0, new_revocation_point.1, None));
 287                                                 }
 288                                         } else {
 289                                                 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((new_revocation_point.0, new_revocation_point.1, None));
 290                                         }
 291                                 },
 292                                 None => {
 293                                         self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((new_revocation_point.0, new_revocation_point.1, None));
 294                                 }
 295                         }
 296                 }
 297
 298                 if !self.payment_preimages.is_empty() {
 299                         let local_signed_commitment_tx = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx.as_ref().expect("Channel needs at least an initial commitment tx !");
 300                         let prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.as_ref();
 301                         let min_idx = self.get_min_seen_secret();
 302                         let remote_hash_commitment_number = &mut self.remote_hash_commitment_number;
 303
 304                         self.payment_preimages.retain(|&k, _| {
 305                                 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in &local_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs {
 306                                         if k == htlc.payment_hash {
 307                                                 return true
 308                                         }
 309                                 }
 310                                 if let Some(prev_local_commitment_tx) = prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
 311                                         for &(ref htlc, _, _) in prev_local_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
 312                                                 if k == htlc.payment_hash {
 313                                                         return true
 314                                                 }
 315                                         }
 316                                 }
 317                                 let contains = if let Some(cn) = remote_hash_commitment_number.get(&k) {
 318                                         if *cn < min_idx {
 319                                                 return true
 320                                         }
 321                                         true
 322                                 } else { false };
 323                                 if contains {
 324                                         remote_hash_commitment_number.remove(&k);
 325                                 }
 326                                 false
 327                         });
 328                 }
 329
 330                 Ok(())
 331         }
 332
 333         /// Informs this monitor of the latest remote (ie non-broadcastable) commitment transaction.
 334         /// The monitor watches for it to be broadcasted and then uses the HTLC information (and
 335         /// possibly future revocation/preimage information) to claim outputs where possible.
 336         /// We cache also the mapping hash:commitment number to lighten pruning of old preimages by watchtowers.
 337         pub fn provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, unsigned_commitment_tx: &Transaction, htlc_outputs: Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>, commitment_number: u64) {
 338                 // TODO: Encrypt the htlc_outputs data with the single-hash of the commitment transaction
 339                 // so that a remote monitor doesn't learn anything unless there is a malicious close.
 340                 // (only maybe, sadly we cant do the same for local info, as we need to be aware of
 341                 // timeouts)
 342                 for htlc in &htlc_outputs {
 343                         self.remote_hash_commitment_number.insert(htlc.payment_hash, commitment_number);
 344                 }
 345                 self.remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(unsigned_commitment_tx.txid(), htlc_outputs);
 346         }
 347
 348         /// Informs this monitor of the latest local (ie broadcastable) commitment transaction. The
 349         /// monitor watches for timeouts and may broadcast it if we approach such a timeout. Thus, it
 350         /// is important that any clones of this channel monitor (including remote clones) by kept
 351         /// up-to-date as our local commitment transaction is updated.
 352         /// Panics if set_their_to_self_delay has never been called.
 353         pub fn provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, signed_commitment_tx: Transaction, local_keys: chan_utils::TxCreationKeys, feerate_per_kw: u64, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Signature, Signature)>) {
 354                 assert!(self.their_to_self_delay.is_some());
 355                 self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx.take();
 356                 self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(LocalSignedTx {
 357                         txid: signed_commitment_tx.txid(),
 358                         tx: signed_commitment_tx,
 359                         revocation_key: local_keys.revocation_key,
 360                         a_htlc_key: local_keys.a_htlc_key,
 361                         b_htlc_key: local_keys.b_htlc_key,
 362                         delayed_payment_key: local_keys.a_delayed_payment_key,
 363                         feerate_per_kw,
 364                         htlc_outputs,
 365                 });
 366         }
 367
 368         /// Provides a payment_hash->payment_preimage mapping. Will be automatically pruned when all
 369         /// commitment_tx_infos which contain the payment hash have been revoked.
 370         pub fn provide_payment_preimage(&mut self, payment_hash: &[u8; 32], payment_preimage: &[u8; 32]) {
 371                 self.payment_preimages.insert(payment_hash.clone(), payment_preimage.clone());
 372         }
 373
 374         pub fn insert_combine(&mut self, mut other: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
 375                 match self.funding_txo {
 376                         Some(txo) => if other.funding_txo.is_some() && other.funding_txo.unwrap() != txo {
 377                                 return Err(HandleError{err: "Funding transaction outputs are not identical!", msg: None});
 378                         },
 379                         None => if other.funding_txo.is_some() {
 380                                 self.funding_txo = other.funding_txo;
 381                         }
 382                 }
 383                 let other_min_secret = other.get_min_seen_secret();
 384                 let our_min_secret = self.get_min_seen_secret();
 385                 if our_min_secret > other_min_secret {
 386                         self.provide_secret(other_min_secret, other.get_secret(other_min_secret).unwrap(), None)?;
 387                 }
 388                 if our_min_secret >= other_min_secret {
 389                         self.their_cur_revocation_points = other.their_cur_revocation_points;
 390                         for (txid, htlcs) in other.remote_claimable_outpoints.drain() {
 391                                 self.remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, htlcs);
 392                         }
 393                         if let Some(local_tx) = other.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
 394                                 self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(local_tx);
 395                         }
 396                         if let Some(local_tx) = other.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
 397                                 self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(local_tx);
 398                         }
 399                         self.payment_preimages = other.payment_preimages;
 400                 }
 401                 Ok(())
 402         }
 403
 404         /// Panics if commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor doesn't fit in 48 bits
 405         pub fn set_commitment_obscure_factor(&mut self, commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64) {
 406                 assert!(commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor < (1 << 48));
 407                 self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor = commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor;
 408         }
 409
 410         /// Allows this monitor to scan only for transactions which are applicable. Note that this is
 411         /// optional, without it this monitor cannot be used in an SPV client, but you may wish to
 412         /// avoid this (or call unset_funding_info) on a monitor you wish to send to a watchtower as it
 413         /// provides slightly better privacy.
 414         pub fn set_funding_info(&mut self, funding_info: OutPoint) {
 415                 self.funding_txo = Some(funding_info);
 416         }
 417
 418         pub fn set_their_htlc_base_key(&mut self, their_htlc_base_key: &PublicKey) {
 419                 self.their_htlc_base_key = Some(their_htlc_base_key.clone());
 420         }
 421
 422         pub fn set_their_to_self_delay(&mut self, their_to_self_delay: u16) {
 423                 self.their_to_self_delay = Some(their_to_self_delay);
 424         }
 425
 426         pub fn unset_funding_info(&mut self) {
 427                 self.funding_txo = None;
 428         }
 429
 430         pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
 431                 self.funding_txo
 432         }
 433
 434         //TODO: Functions to serialize/deserialize (with different forms depending on which information
 435         //we want to leave out (eg funding_txo, etc).
 436
 437         /// Can only fail if idx is < get_min_seen_secret
 438         pub fn get_secret(&self, idx: u64) -> Result<[u8; 32], HandleError> {
 439                 for i in 0..self.old_secrets.len() {
 440                         if (idx & (!((1 << i) - 1))) == self.old_secrets[i].1 {
 441                                 return Ok(ChannelMonitor::derive_secret(self.old_secrets[i].0, i as u8, idx))
 442                         }
 443                 }
 444                 assert!(idx < self.get_min_seen_secret());
 445                 Err(HandleError{err: "idx too low", msg: None})
 446         }
 447
 448         pub fn get_min_seen_secret(&self) -> u64 {
 449                 //TODO This can be optimized?
 450                 let mut min = 1 << 48;
 451                 for &(_, idx) in self.old_secrets.iter() {
 452                         if idx < min {
 453                                 min = idx;
 454                         }
 455                 }
 456                 min
 457         }
 458
 459         /// Attempts to claim a remote commitment transaction's outputs using the revocation key and
 460         /// data in remote_claimable_outpoints. Will directly claim any HTLC outputs which expire at a
 461         /// height > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER. In any case, will install monitoring for
 462         /// HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions, and claim them using the revocation key (if
 463         /// applicable) as well.
 464         fn check_spend_remote_transaction(&self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32) -> Vec<Transaction> {
 465                 // Most secp and related errors trying to create keys means we have no hope of constructing
 466                 // a spend transaction...so we return no transactions to broadcast
 467                 let mut txn_to_broadcast = Vec::new();
 468                 macro_rules! ignore_error {
 469                         ( $thing : expr ) => {
 470                                 match $thing {
 471                                         Ok(a) => a,
 472                                         Err(_) => return txn_to_broadcast
 473                                 }
 474                         };
 475                 }
 476
 477                 let commitment_txid = tx.txid(); //TODO: This is gonna be a performance bottleneck for watchtowers!
 478                 let per_commitment_option = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(&commitment_txid);
 479
 480                 let commitment_number = (((tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor;
 481                 if commitment_number >= self.get_min_seen_secret() {
 482                         let secret = self.get_secret(commitment_number).unwrap();
 483                         let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &secret));
 484                         let (revocation_pubkey, b_htlc_key) = match self.key_storage {
 485                                 KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key } => {
 486                                         let per_commitment_point = ignore_error!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key));
 487                                         (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &ignore_error!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_base_key)))),
 488                                         ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &ignore_error!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &htlc_base_key)))))
 489                                 },
 490                                 KeyStorage::SigsMode { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
 491                                         let per_commitment_point = ignore_error!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key));
 492                                         (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &revocation_base_key)),
 493                                         ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &htlc_base_key)))
 494                                 },
 495                         };
 496                         let delayed_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &ignore_error!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key)), &self.delayed_payment_base_key));
 497                         let a_htlc_key = match self.their_htlc_base_key {
 498                                 None => return txn_to_broadcast,
 499                                 Some(their_htlc_base_key) => ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &ignore_error!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key)), &their_htlc_base_key)),
 500                         };
 501
 502                         let revokeable_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey, self.our_to_self_delay, &delayed_key);
 503                         let revokeable_p2wsh = revokeable_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
 504
 505                         let mut total_value = 0;
 506                         let mut values = Vec::new();
 507                         let mut inputs = Vec::new();
 508                         let mut htlc_idxs = Vec::new();
 509
 510                         for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
 511                                 if outp.script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh {
 512                                         inputs.push(TxIn {
 513                                                 prev_hash: commitment_txid,
 514                                                 prev_index: idx as u32,
 515                                                 script_sig: Script::new(),
 516                                                 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
 517                                                 witness: Vec::new(),
 518                                         });
 519                                         htlc_idxs.push(None);
 520                                         values.push(outp.value);
 521                                         total_value += outp.value;
 522                                         break; // There can only be one of these
 523                                 }
 524                         }
 525
 526                         macro_rules! sign_input {
 527                                 ($sighash_parts: expr, $input: expr, $htlc_idx: expr, $amount: expr) => {
 528                                         {
 529                                                 let (sig, redeemscript) = match self.key_storage {
 530                                                         KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
 531                                                                 let redeemscript = if $htlc_idx.is_none() { revokeable_redeemscript.clone() } else {
 532                                                                         let htlc = &per_commitment_option.unwrap()[$htlc_idx.unwrap()];
 533                                                                         chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey)
 534                                                                 };
 535                                                                 let sighash = ignore_error!(Message::from_slice(&$sighash_parts.sighash_all(&$input, &redeemscript, $amount)[..]));
 536                                                                 let revocation_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key, &revocation_base_key));
 537                                                                 (ignore_error!(self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &revocation_key)), redeemscript)
 538                                                         },
 539                                                         KeyStorage::SigsMode { .. } => {
 540                                                                 unimplemented!();
 541                                                         }
 542                                                 };
 543                                                 $input.witness.push(sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
 544                                                 $input.witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
 545                                                 if $htlc_idx.is_none() {
 546                                                         $input.witness.push(vec!(1));
 547                                                 } else {
 548                                                         $input.witness.push(revocation_pubkey.serialize().to_vec());
 549                                                 }
 550                                                 $input.witness.push(redeemscript.into_vec());
 551                                         }
 552                                 }
 553                         }
 554
 555                         if let Some(per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
 556                                 inputs.reserve_exact(per_commitment_data.len());
 557
 558                                 for (idx, htlc) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() {
 559                                         let expected_script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey);
 560                                         if htlc.transaction_output_index as usize >= tx.output.len() ||
 561                                                         tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 ||
 562                                                         tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].script_pubkey != expected_script.to_v0_p2wsh() {
 563                                                 return txn_to_broadcast; // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user
 564                                         }
 565                                         let input = TxIn {
 566                                                 prev_hash: commitment_txid,
 567                                                 prev_index: htlc.transaction_output_index,
 568                                                 script_sig: Script::new(),
 569                                                 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
 570                                                 witness: Vec::new(),
 571                                         };
 572                                         if htlc.cltv_expiry > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER {
 573                                                 inputs.push(input);
 574                                                 htlc_idxs.push(Some(idx));
 575                                                 values.push(tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].value);
 576                                                 total_value += htlc.amount_msat / 1000;
 577                                         } else {
 578                                                 let mut single_htlc_tx = Transaction {
 579                                                         version: 2,
 580                                                         lock_time: 0,
 581                                                         input: vec![input],
 582                                                         output: vec!(TxOut {
 583                                                                 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
 584                                                                 value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000, //TODO: - fee
 585                                                         }),
 586                                                 };
 587                                                 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&single_htlc_tx);
 588                                                 sign_input!(sighash_parts, single_htlc_tx.input[0], Some(idx), htlc.amount_msat / 1000);
 589                                                 txn_to_broadcast.push(single_htlc_tx); // TODO: This is not yet tested in ChannelManager!
 590                                         }
 591                                 }
 592                         }
 593
 594                         if !inputs.is_empty() || !txn_to_broadcast.is_empty() {
 595                                 // We're definitely a remote commitment transaction!
 596                                 // TODO: Register commitment_txid with the ChainWatchInterface!
 597                                 self.remote_htlc_outputs_on_chain.lock().unwrap().insert(commitment_txid, commitment_number);
 598                         }
 599                         if inputs.is_empty() { return txn_to_broadcast; } // Nothing to be done...probably a false positive/local tx
 600
 601                         let outputs = vec!(TxOut {
 602                                 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
 603                                 value: total_value, //TODO: - fee
 604                         });
 605                         let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
 606                                 version: 2,
 607                                 lock_time: 0,
 608                                 input: inputs,
 609                                 output: outputs,
 610                         };
 611
 612                         let mut values_drain = values.drain(..);
 613                         let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx);
 614
 615                         for (input, htlc_idx) in spend_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(htlc_idxs.iter()) {
 616                                 let value = values_drain.next().unwrap();
 617                                 sign_input!(sighash_parts, input, htlc_idx, value);
 618                         }
 619
 620                         txn_to_broadcast.push(spend_tx);
 621                 } else if let Some(per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
 622                         if let Some(revocation_points) = self.their_cur_revocation_points {
 623                                 let revocation_point_option =
 624                                         if revocation_points.0 == commitment_number { Some(&revocation_points.1) }
 625                                         else if let Some(point) = revocation_points.2.as_ref() {
 626                                                 if revocation_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 { Some(point) } else { None }
 627                                         } else { None };
 628                                 if let Some(revocation_point) = revocation_point_option {
 629                                         let (revocation_pubkey, b_htlc_key) = match self.key_storage {
 630                                                 KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key } => {
 631                                                         (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &ignore_error!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_base_key)))),
 632                                                         ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &ignore_error!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &htlc_base_key)))))
 633                                                 },
 634                                                 KeyStorage::SigsMode { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
 635                                                         (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &revocation_base_key)),
 636                                                         ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &htlc_base_key)))
 637                                                 },
 638                                         };
 639                                         let a_htlc_key = match self.their_htlc_base_key {
 640                                                 None => return txn_to_broadcast,
 641                                                 Some(their_htlc_base_key) => ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &their_htlc_base_key)),
 642                                         };
 643
 644                                         let mut total_value = 0;
 645                                         let mut values = Vec::new();
 646                                         let mut inputs = Vec::new();
 647
 648                                         macro_rules! sign_input {
 649                                                 ($sighash_parts: expr, $input: expr, $amount: expr, $preimage: expr) => {
 650                                                         {
 651                                                                 let (sig, redeemscript) = match self.key_storage {
 652                                                                         KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
 653                                                                                 let htlc = &per_commitment_option.unwrap()[$input.sequence as usize];
 654                                                                                 let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey);
 655                                                                                 let sighash = ignore_error!(Message::from_slice(&$sighash_parts.sighash_all(&$input, &redeemscript, $amount)[..]));
 656                                                                                 let htlc_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &htlc_base_key));
 657                                                                                 (ignore_error!(self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &htlc_key)), redeemscript)
 658                                                                         },
 659                                                                         KeyStorage::SigsMode { .. } => {
 660                                                                                 unimplemented!();
 661                                                                         }
 662                                                                 };
 663                                                                 $input.witness.push(sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
 664                                                                 $input.witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
 665                                                                 $input.witness.push($preimage);
 666                                                                 $input.witness.push(redeemscript.into_vec());
 667                                                         }
 668                                                 }
 669                                         }
 670
 671                                         for (idx, htlc) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() {
 672                                                 if let Some(payment_preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
 673                                                         let input = TxIn {
 674                                                                 prev_hash: commitment_txid,
 675                                                                 prev_index: htlc.transaction_output_index,
 676                                                                 script_sig: Script::new(),
 677                                                                 sequence: idx as u32, // reset to 0xfffffffd in sign_input
 678                                                                 witness: Vec::new(),
 679                                                         };
 680                                                         if htlc.cltv_expiry > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER {
 681                                                                 inputs.push(input);
 682                                                                 values.push((tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].value, payment_preimage));
 683                                                                 total_value += htlc.amount_msat / 1000;
 684                                                         } else {
 685                                                                 let mut single_htlc_tx = Transaction {
 686                                                                         version: 2,
 687                                                                         lock_time: 0,
 688                                                                         input: vec![input],
 689                                                                         output: vec!(TxOut {
 690                                                                                 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
 691                                                                                 value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000, //TODO: - fee
 692                                                                         }),
 693                                                                 };
 694                                                                 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&single_htlc_tx);
 695                                                                 sign_input!(sighash_parts, single_htlc_tx.input[0], htlc.amount_msat / 1000, payment_preimage.to_vec());
 696                                                                 txn_to_broadcast.push(single_htlc_tx);
 697                                                         }
 698                                                 }
 699                                         }
 700
 701                                         if inputs.is_empty() { return txn_to_broadcast; } // Nothing to be done...probably a false positive/local tx
 702
 703                                         let outputs = vec!(TxOut {
 704                                                 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
 705                                                 value: total_value, //TODO: - fee
 706                                         });
 707                                         let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
 708                                                 version: 2,
 709                                                 lock_time: 0,
 710                                                 input: inputs,
 711                                                 output: outputs,
 712                                         };
 713
 714                                         let mut values_drain = values.drain(..);
 715                                         let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx);
 716
 717                                         for input in spend_tx.input.iter_mut() {
 718                                                 let value = values_drain.next().unwrap();
 719                                                 sign_input!(sighash_parts, input, value.0, value.1.to_vec());
 720                                         }
 721
 722                                         txn_to_broadcast.push(spend_tx);
 723                                 }
 724                         }
 725                 } else {
 726                         //TODO: For each input check if its in our remote_htlc_outputs_on_chain map!
 727                 }
 728
 729                 txn_to_broadcast
 730         }
 731
 732         fn broadcast_by_local_state(&self, local_tx: &LocalSignedTx) -> Vec<Transaction> {
 733                 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
 734
 735                 for &(ref htlc, ref their_sig, ref our_sig) in local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
 736                         if htlc.offered {
 737                                 let mut htlc_timeout_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&local_tx.txid, local_tx.feerate_per_kw, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), htlc, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key, &local_tx.revocation_key);
 738
 739                                 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
 740
 741                                 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(their_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
 742                                 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
 743                                 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
 744                                 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
 745
 746                                 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new());
 747                                 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &local_tx.a_htlc_key, &local_tx.b_htlc_key, &local_tx.revocation_key).into_vec());
 748
 749                                 res.push(htlc_timeout_tx);
 750                         } else {
 751                                 if let Some(payment_preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
 752                                         let mut htlc_success_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&local_tx.txid, local_tx.feerate_per_kw, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), htlc, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key, &local_tx.revocation_key);
 753
 754                                         htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
 755
 756                                         htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(their_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
 757                                         htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
 758                                         htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
 759                                         htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
 760
 761                                         htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(payment_preimage.to_vec());
 762                                         htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &local_tx.a_htlc_key, &local_tx.b_htlc_key, &local_tx.revocation_key).into_vec());
 763
 764                                         res.push(htlc_success_tx);
 765                                 }
 766                         }
 767                 }
 768
 769                 res
 770         }
 771
 772         /// Attempts to claim any claimable HTLCs in a commitment transaction which was not (yet)
 773         /// revoked using data in local_claimable_outpoints.
 774         /// Should not be used if check_spend_revoked_transaction succeeds.
 775         fn check_spend_local_transaction(&self, tx: &Transaction, _height: u32) -> Vec<Transaction> {
 776                 let commitment_txid = tx.txid();
 777                 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
 778                         if local_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
 779                                 return self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx);
 780                         }
 781                 }
 782                 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
 783                         if local_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
 784                                 return self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx);
 785                         }
 786                 }
 787                 Vec::new()
 788         }
 789
 790         fn block_connected(&self, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], height: u32, broadcaster: &BroadcasterInterface) {
 791                 for tx in txn_matched {
 792                         for txin in tx.input.iter() {
 793                                 if self.funding_txo.is_none() || (txin.prev_hash == self.funding_txo.unwrap().txid && txin.prev_index == self.funding_txo.unwrap().index as u32) {
 794                                         let mut txn = self.check_spend_remote_transaction(tx, height);
 795                                         if txn.is_empty() {
 796                                                 txn = self.check_spend_local_transaction(tx, height);
 797                                         }
 798                                         for tx in txn.iter() {
 799                                                 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(tx);
 800                                         }
 801                                 }
 802                         }
 803                 }
 804                 if let Some(ref cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
 805                         let mut needs_broadcast = false;
 806                         for &(ref htlc, _, _) in cur_local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
 807                                 if htlc.cltv_expiry <= height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER {
 808                                         if htlc.offered || self.payment_preimages.contains_key(&htlc.payment_hash) {
 809                                                 needs_broadcast = true;
 810                                         }
 811                                 }
 812                         }
 813
 814                         if needs_broadcast {
 815                                 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&cur_local_tx.tx);
 816                                 for tx in self.broadcast_by_local_state(&cur_local_tx) {
 817                                         broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
 818                                 }
 819                         }
 820                 }
 821         }
 822
 823         pub fn would_broadcast_at_height(&self, height: u32) -> bool {
 824                 if let Some(ref cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
 825                         for &(ref htlc, _, _) in cur_local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
 826                                 if htlc.cltv_expiry <= height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER {
 827                                         if htlc.offered || self.payment_preimages.contains_key(&htlc.payment_hash) {
 828                                                 return true;
 829                                         }
 830                                 }
 831                         }
 832                 }
 833                 false
 834         }
 835 }
 836
 837 #[cfg(test)]
 838 mod tests {
 839         use bitcoin::util::misc::hex_bytes;
 840         use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Script;
 841         use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
 842         use crypto::digest::Digest;
 843         use ln::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor;
 844         use ln::chan_utils::{HTLCOutputInCommitment, TxCreationKeys};
 845         use util::sha2::Sha256;
 846         use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
 847         use secp256k1::{Secp256k1, Signature};
 848         use rand::{thread_rng,Rng};
 849
 850         #[test]
 851         fn test_per_commitment_storage() {
 852                 // Test vectors from BOLT 3:
 853                 let mut secrets: Vec<[u8; 32]> = Vec::new();
 854                 let mut monitor: ChannelMonitor;
 855                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
 856
 857                 macro_rules! test_secrets {
 858                         () => {
 859                                 let mut idx = 281474976710655;
 860                                 for secret in secrets.iter() {
 861                                         assert_eq!(monitor.get_secret(idx).unwrap(), *secret);
 862                                         idx -= 1;
 863                                 }
 864                                 assert_eq!(monitor.get_min_seen_secret(), idx + 1);
 865                                 assert!(monitor.get_secret(idx).is_err());
 866                         };
 867                 }
 868
 869                 {
 870                         // insert_secret correct sequence
 871                         monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::new(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
 872                         secrets.clear();
 873
 874                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 875                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
 876                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
 877                         test_secrets!();
 878
 879                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 880                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
 881                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
 882                         test_secrets!();
 883
 884                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 885                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
 886                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
 887                         test_secrets!();
 888
 889                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 890                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
 891                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
 892                         test_secrets!();
 893
 894                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 895                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
 896                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
 897                         test_secrets!();
 898
 899                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 900                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
 901                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
 902                         test_secrets!();
 903
 904                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 905                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
 906                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
 907                         test_secrets!();
 908
 909                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 910                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
 911                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
 912                         test_secrets!();
 913                 }
 914
 915                 {
 916                         // insert_secret #1 incorrect
 917                         monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::new(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
 918                         secrets.clear();
 919
 920                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 921                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
 922                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
 923                         test_secrets!();
 924
 925                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 926                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
 927                         assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err,
 928                                         "Previous secret did not match new one");
 929                 }
 930
 931                 {
 932                         // insert_secret #2 incorrect (#1 derived from incorrect)
 933                         monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::new(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
 934                         secrets.clear();
 935
 936                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 937                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
 938                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
 939                         test_secrets!();
 940
 941                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 942                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("dddc3a8d14fddf2b68fa8c7fbad2748274937479dd0f8930d5ebb4ab6bd866a3").unwrap());
 943                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
 944                         test_secrets!();
 945
 946                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 947                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
 948                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
 949                         test_secrets!();
 950
 951                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 952                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
 953                         assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err,
 954                                         "Previous secret did not match new one");
 955                 }
 956
 957                 {
 958                         // insert_secret #3 incorrect
 959                         monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::new(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
 960                         secrets.clear();
 961
 962                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 963                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
 964                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
 965                         test_secrets!();
 966
 967                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 968                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
 969                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
 970                         test_secrets!();
 971
 972                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 973                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("c51a18b13e8527e579ec56365482c62f180b7d5760b46e9477dae59e87ed423a").unwrap());
 974                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
 975                         test_secrets!();
 976
 977                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 978                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
 979                         assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err,
 980                                         "Previous secret did not match new one");
 981                 }
 982
 983                 {
 984                         // insert_secret #4 incorrect (1,2,3 derived from incorrect)
 985                         monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::new(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
 986                         secrets.clear();
 987
 988                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 989                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
 990                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
 991                         test_secrets!();
 992
 993                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 994                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("dddc3a8d14fddf2b68fa8c7fbad2748274937479dd0f8930d5ebb4ab6bd866a3").unwrap());
 995                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
 996                         test_secrets!();
 997
 998                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 999                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("c51a18b13e8527e579ec56365482c62f180b7d5760b46e9477dae59e87ed423a").unwrap());
1000                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1001                         test_secrets!();
1002
1003                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1004                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("ba65d7b0ef55a3ba300d4e87af29868f394f8f138d78a7011669c79b37b936f4").unwrap());
1005                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1006                         test_secrets!();
1007
1008                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1009                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
1010                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1011                         test_secrets!();
1012
1013                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1014                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
1015                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1016                         test_secrets!();
1017
1018                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1019                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
1020                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1021                         test_secrets!();
1022
1023                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1024                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
1025                         assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err,
1026                                         "Previous secret did not match new one");
1027                 }
1028
1029                 {
1030                         // insert_secret #5 incorrect
1031                         monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::new(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
1032                         secrets.clear();
1033
1034                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1035                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1036                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1037                         test_secrets!();
1038
1039                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1040                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1041                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1042                         test_secrets!();
1043
1044                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1045                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1046                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1047                         test_secrets!();
1048
1049                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1050                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1051                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1052                         test_secrets!();
1053
1054                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1055                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("631373ad5f9ef654bb3dade742d09504c567edd24320d2fcd68e3cc47e2ff6a6").unwrap());
1056                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1057                         test_secrets!();
1058
1059                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1060                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
1061                         assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err,
1062                                         "Previous secret did not match new one");
1063                 }
1064
1065                 {
1066                         // insert_secret #6 incorrect (5 derived from incorrect)
1067                         monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::new(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
1068                         secrets.clear();
1069
1070                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1071                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1072                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1073                         test_secrets!();
1074
1075                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1076                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1077                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1078                         test_secrets!();
1079
1080                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1081                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1082                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1083                         test_secrets!();
1084
1085                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1086                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1087                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1088                         test_secrets!();
1089
1090                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1091                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("631373ad5f9ef654bb3dade742d09504c567edd24320d2fcd68e3cc47e2ff6a6").unwrap());
1092                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1093                         test_secrets!();
1094
1095                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1096                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("b7e76a83668bde38b373970155c868a653304308f9896692f904a23731224bb1").unwrap());
1097                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1098                         test_secrets!();
1099
1100                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1101                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
1102                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1103                         test_secrets!();
1104
1105                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1106                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
1107                         assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err,
1108                                         "Previous secret did not match new one");
1109                 }
1110
1111                 {
1112                         // insert_secret #7 incorrect
1113                         monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::new(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
1114                         secrets.clear();
1115
1116                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1117                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1118                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1119                         test_secrets!();
1120
1121                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1122                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1123                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1124                         test_secrets!();
1125
1126                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1127                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1128                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1129                         test_secrets!();
1130
1131                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1132                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1133                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1134                         test_secrets!();
1135
1136                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1137                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
1138                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1139                         test_secrets!();
1140
1141                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1142                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
1143                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1144                         test_secrets!();
1145
1146                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1147                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("e7971de736e01da8ed58b94c2fc216cb1dca9e326f3a96e7194fe8ea8af6c0a3").unwrap());
1148                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1149                         test_secrets!();
1150
1151                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1152                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
1153                         assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err,
1154                                         "Previous secret did not match new one");
1155                 }
1156
1157                 {
1158                         // insert_secret #8 incorrect
1159                         monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::new(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
1160                         secrets.clear();
1161
1162                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1163                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1164                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1165                         test_secrets!();
1166
1167                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1168                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1169                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1170                         test_secrets!();
1171
1172                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1173                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1174                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1175                         test_secrets!();
1176
1177                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1178                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1179                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1180                         test_secrets!();
1181
1182                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1183                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
1184                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1185                         test_secrets!();
1186
1187                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1188                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
1189                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1190                         test_secrets!();
1191
1192                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1193                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
1194                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1195                         test_secrets!();
1196
1197                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1198                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("a7efbc61aac46d34f77778bac22c8a20c6a46ca460addc49009bda875ec88fa4").unwrap());
1199                         assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err,
1200                                         "Previous secret did not match new one");
1201                 }
1202         }
1203
1204         #[test]
1205         fn test_prune_preimages() {
1206                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1207                 let dummy_sig = Signature::from_der(&secp_ctx, &hex_bytes("3045022100fa86fa9a36a8cd6a7bb8f06a541787d51371d067951a9461d5404de6b928782e02201c8b7c334c10aed8976a3a465be9a28abff4cb23acbf00022295b378ce1fa3cd").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
1208
1209                 macro_rules! dummy_keys {
1210                         () => {
1211                                 TxCreationKeys {
1212                                         per_commitment_point: PublicKey::new(),
1213                                         revocation_key: PublicKey::new(),
1214                                         a_htlc_key: PublicKey::new(),
1215                                         b_htlc_key: PublicKey::new(),
1216                                         a_delayed_payment_key: PublicKey::new(),
1217                                         b_payment_key: PublicKey::new(),
1218                                 }
1219                         }
1220                 }
1221                 let dummy_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
1222
1223                 let mut preimages = Vec::new();
1224                 {
1225                         let mut rng  = thread_rng();
1226                         for _ in 0..20 {
1227                                 let mut preimage = [0; 32];
1228                                 rng.fill_bytes(&mut preimage);
1229                                 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
1230                                 sha.input(&preimage);
1231                                 let mut hash = [0; 32];
1232                                 sha.result(&mut hash);
1233                                 preimages.push((preimage, hash));
1234                         }
1235                 }
1236
1237                 macro_rules! preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs {
1238                         ($preimages_slice: expr) => {
1239                                 {
1240                                         let mut res = Vec::new();
1241                                         for (idx, preimage) in $preimages_slice.iter().enumerate() {
1242                                                 res.push(HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1243                                                         offered: true,
1244                                                         amount_msat: 0,
1245                                                         cltv_expiry: 0,
1246                                                         payment_hash: preimage.1.clone(),
1247                                                         transaction_output_index: idx as u32,
1248                                                 });
1249                                         }
1250                                         res
1251                                 }
1252                         }
1253                 }
1254                 macro_rules! preimages_to_local_htlcs {
1255                         ($preimages_slice: expr) => {
1256                                 {
1257                                         let mut inp = preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!($preimages_slice);
1258                                         let res: Vec<_> = inp.drain(..).map(|e| { (e, dummy_sig.clone(), dummy_sig.clone()) }).collect();
1259                                         res
1260                                 }
1261                         }
1262                 }
1263
1264                 macro_rules! test_preimages_exist {
1265                         ($preimages_slice: expr, $monitor: expr) => {
1266                                 for preimage in $preimages_slice {
1267                                         assert!($monitor.payment_preimages.contains_key(&preimage.1));
1268                                 }
1269                         }
1270                 }
1271
1272                 // Prune with one old state and a local commitment tx holding a few overlaps with the
1273                 // old state.
1274                 let mut monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::new(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
1275                 monitor.set_their_to_self_delay(10);
1276
1277                 monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(dummy_tx.clone(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..10]));
1278                 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[5..15]), 281474976710655);
1279                 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[15..20]), 281474976710654);
1280                 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[17..20]), 281474976710653);
1281                 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[18..20]), 281474976710652);
1282                 for &(ref preimage, ref hash) in preimages.iter() {
1283                         monitor.provide_payment_preimage(hash, preimage);
1284                 }
1285
1286                 // Now provide a secret, pruning preimages 10-15
1287                 let mut secret = [0; 32];
1288                 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1289                 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secret.clone(), None).unwrap();
1290                 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 15);
1291                 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
1292                 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[15..20], monitor);
1293
1294                 // Now provide a further secret, pruning preimages 15-17
1295                 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1296                 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secret.clone(), None).unwrap();
1297                 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 13);
1298                 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
1299                 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[17..20], monitor);
1300
1301                 // Now update local commitment tx info, pruning only element 18 as we still care about the
1302                 // previous commitment tx's preimages too
1303                 monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(dummy_tx.clone(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..5]));
1304                 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1305                 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secret.clone(), None).unwrap();
1306                 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 12);
1307                 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
1308                 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[18..20], monitor);
1309
1310                 // But if we do it again, we'll prune 5-10
1311                 monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(dummy_tx.clone(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..3]));
1312                 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1313                 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secret.clone(), None).unwrap();
1314                 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 5);
1315                 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..5], monitor);
1316         }
1317
1318         // Further testing is done in the ChannelManager integration tests.
1319 }