1 //! The logic to monitor for on-chain transactions and create the relevant claim responses lives
4 //! ChannelMonitor objects are generated by ChannelManager in response to relevant
5 //! messages/actions, and MUST be persisted to disk (and, preferably, remotely) before progress can
6 //! be made in responding to certain messages, see ManyChannelMonitor for more.
8 //! Note that ChannelMonitors are an important part of the lightning trust model and a copy of the
9 //! latest ChannelMonitor must always be actively monitoring for chain updates (and no out-of-date
10 //! ChannelMonitors should do so). Thus, if you're building rust-lightning into an HSM or other
11 //! security-domain-separated system design, you should consider having multiple paths for
12 //! ChannelMonitors to get out of the HSM and onto monitoring devices.
14 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
15 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxIn,TxOut,SigHashType,Transaction};
16 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
17 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
18 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
19 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::{self, Decodable, Encodable};
20 use bitcoin::util::hash::BitcoinHash;
21 use bitcoin::util::bip143;
23 use bitcoin_hashes::Hash;
24 use bitcoin_hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
25 use bitcoin_hashes::hash160::Hash as Hash160;
26 use bitcoin_hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
28 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Signature};
29 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
32 use ln::msgs::DecodeError;
34 use ln::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment;
35 use ln::channelmanager::{HTLCSource, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
36 use ln::channel::{ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT, OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT};
37 use chain::chaininterface::{ChainListener, ChainWatchInterface, BroadcasterInterface};
38 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
39 use chain::keysinterface::SpendableOutputDescriptor;
40 use util::logger::Logger;
41 use util::ser::{ReadableArgs, Readable, Writer, Writeable, WriterWriteAdaptor, U48};
42 use util::{byte_utils, events};
44 use std::collections::{HashMap, hash_map};
45 use std::sync::{Arc,Mutex};
46 use std::{hash,cmp, mem};
48 /// An error enum representing a failure to persist a channel monitor update.
50 pub enum ChannelMonitorUpdateErr {
51 /// Used to indicate a temporary failure (eg connection to a watchtower or remote backup of
52 /// our state failed, but is expected to succeed at some point in the future).
54 /// Such a failure will "freeze" a channel, preventing us from revoking old states or
55 /// submitting new commitment transactions to the remote party.
56 /// ChannelManager::test_restore_channel_monitor can be used to retry the update(s) and restore
57 /// the channel to an operational state.
59 /// Note that continuing to operate when no copy of the updated ChannelMonitor could be
60 /// persisted is unsafe - if you failed to store the update on your own local disk you should
61 /// instead return PermanentFailure to force closure of the channel ASAP.
63 /// Even when a channel has been "frozen" updates to the ChannelMonitor can continue to occur
64 /// (eg if an inbound HTLC which we forwarded was claimed upstream resulting in us attempting
65 /// to claim it on this channel) and those updates must be applied wherever they can be. At
66 /// least one such updated ChannelMonitor must be persisted otherwise PermanentFailure should
67 /// be returned to get things on-chain ASAP using only the in-memory copy. Obviously updates to
68 /// the channel which would invalidate previous ChannelMonitors are not made when a channel has
71 /// Note that even if updates made after TemporaryFailure succeed you must still call
72 /// test_restore_channel_monitor to ensure you have the latest monitor and re-enable normal
73 /// channel operation.
75 /// For deployments where a copy of ChannelMonitors and other local state are backed up in a
76 /// remote location (with local copies persisted immediately), it is anticipated that all
77 /// updates will return TemporaryFailure until the remote copies could be updated.
79 /// Used to indicate no further channel monitor updates will be allowed (eg we've moved on to a
80 /// different watchtower and cannot update with all watchtowers that were previously informed
81 /// of this channel). This will force-close the channel in question.
83 /// Should also be used to indicate a failure to update the local copy of the channel monitor.
87 /// General Err type for ChannelMonitor actions. Generally, this implies that the data provided is
88 /// inconsistent with the ChannelMonitor being called. eg for ChannelMonitor::insert_combine this
89 /// means you tried to merge two monitors for different channels or for a channel which was
90 /// restored from a backup and then generated new commitment updates.
91 /// Contains a human-readable error message.
93 pub struct MonitorUpdateError(pub &'static str);
95 /// Simple structure send back by ManyChannelMonitor in case of HTLC detected onchain from a
96 /// forward channel and from which info are needed to update HTLC in a backward channel.
97 pub struct HTLCUpdate {
98 pub(super) payment_hash: PaymentHash,
99 pub(super) payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
100 pub(super) source: HTLCSource
103 /// Simple trait indicating ability to track a set of ChannelMonitors and multiplex events between
104 /// them. Generally should be implemented by keeping a local SimpleManyChannelMonitor and passing
105 /// events to it, while also taking any add_update_monitor events and passing them to some remote
108 /// Note that any updates to a channel's monitor *must* be applied to each instance of the
109 /// channel's monitor everywhere (including remote watchtowers) *before* this function returns. If
110 /// an update occurs and a remote watchtower is left with old state, it may broadcast transactions
111 /// which we have revoked, allowing our counterparty to claim all funds in the channel!
112 pub trait ManyChannelMonitor: Send + Sync {
113 /// Adds or updates a monitor for the given `funding_txo`.
115 /// Implementor must also ensure that the funding_txo outpoint is registered with any relevant
116 /// ChainWatchInterfaces such that the provided monitor receives block_connected callbacks with
117 /// any spends of it.
118 fn add_update_monitor(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr>;
120 /// Used by ChannelManager to get list of HTLC resolved onchain and which needed to be updated
121 /// with success or failure backward
122 fn fetch_pending_htlc_updated(&self) -> Vec<HTLCUpdate>;
125 /// A simple implementation of a ManyChannelMonitor and ChainListener. Can be used to create a
126 /// watchtower or watch our own channels.
128 /// Note that you must provide your own key by which to refer to channels.
130 /// If you're accepting remote monitors (ie are implementing a watchtower), you must verify that
131 /// users cannot overwrite a given channel by providing a duplicate key. ie you should probably
132 /// index by a PublicKey which is required to sign any updates.
134 /// If you're using this for local monitoring of your own channels, you probably want to use
135 /// `OutPoint` as the key, which will give you a ManyChannelMonitor implementation.
136 pub struct SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
137 #[cfg(test)] // Used in ChannelManager tests to manipulate channels directly
138 pub monitors: Mutex<HashMap<Key, ChannelMonitor>>,
140 monitors: Mutex<HashMap<Key, ChannelMonitor>>,
141 chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>,
142 broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>,
143 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
144 pending_htlc_updated: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, Vec<(HTLCSource, Option<PaymentPreimage>)>>>,
148 impl<Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash> ChainListener for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
149 fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], _indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) {
150 let block_hash = header.bitcoin_hash();
151 let mut new_events: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(0);
152 let mut htlc_updated_infos = Vec::new();
154 let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
155 for monitor in monitors.values_mut() {
156 let (txn_outputs, spendable_outputs, mut htlc_updated) = monitor.block_connected(txn_matched, height, &block_hash, &*self.broadcaster);
157 if spendable_outputs.len() > 0 {
158 new_events.push(events::Event::SpendableOutputs {
159 outputs: spendable_outputs,
163 for (ref txid, ref outputs) in txn_outputs {
164 for (idx, output) in outputs.iter().enumerate() {
165 self.chain_monitor.install_watch_outpoint((txid.clone(), idx as u32), &output.script_pubkey);
168 htlc_updated_infos.append(&mut htlc_updated);
172 // ChannelManager will just need to fetch pending_htlc_updated and pass state backward
173 let mut pending_htlc_updated = self.pending_htlc_updated.lock().unwrap();
174 for htlc in htlc_updated_infos.drain(..) {
175 match pending_htlc_updated.entry(htlc.2) {
176 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut e) => {
177 // In case of reorg we may have htlc outputs solved in a different way so
178 // we prefer to keep claims but don't store duplicate updates for a given
179 // (payment_hash, HTLCSource) pair.
180 // TODO: Note that we currently don't really use this as ChannelManager
181 // will fail/claim backwards after the first block. We really should delay
182 // a few blocks before failing backwards (but can claim backwards
183 // immediately) as long as we have a few blocks of headroom.
184 let mut existing_claim = false;
185 e.get_mut().retain(|htlc_data| {
186 if htlc.0 == htlc_data.0 {
187 if htlc_data.1.is_some() {
188 existing_claim = true;
194 e.get_mut().push((htlc.0, htlc.1));
197 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
198 e.insert(vec![(htlc.0, htlc.1)]);
203 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
204 pending_events.append(&mut new_events);
207 fn block_disconnected(&self, _: &BlockHeader) { }
210 impl<Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash + 'static> SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
211 /// Creates a new object which can be used to monitor several channels given the chain
212 /// interface with which to register to receive notifications.
213 pub fn new(chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>, broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>, logger: Arc<Logger>) -> Arc<SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key>> {
214 let res = Arc::new(SimpleManyChannelMonitor {
215 monitors: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
218 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
219 pending_htlc_updated: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
222 let weak_res = Arc::downgrade(&res);
223 res.chain_monitor.register_listener(weak_res);
227 /// Adds or updates the monitor which monitors the channel referred to by the given key.
228 pub fn add_update_monitor_by_key(&self, key: Key, monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
229 let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
230 match monitors.get_mut(&key) {
231 Some(orig_monitor) => {
232 log_trace!(self, "Updating Channel Monitor for channel {}", log_funding_info!(monitor.key_storage));
233 return orig_monitor.insert_combine(monitor);
237 match monitor.key_storage {
238 Storage::Local { ref funding_info, .. } => {
241 return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Try to update a useless monitor without funding_txo !"));
243 &Some((ref outpoint, ref script)) => {
244 log_trace!(self, "Got new Channel Monitor for channel {}", log_bytes!(outpoint.to_channel_id()[..]));
245 self.chain_monitor.install_watch_tx(&outpoint.txid, script);
246 self.chain_monitor.install_watch_outpoint((outpoint.txid, outpoint.index as u32), script);
250 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
251 self.chain_monitor.watch_all_txn();
254 monitors.insert(key, monitor);
259 impl ManyChannelMonitor for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<OutPoint> {
260 fn add_update_monitor(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr> {
261 match self.add_update_monitor_by_key(funding_txo, monitor) {
263 Err(_) => Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure),
267 fn fetch_pending_htlc_updated(&self) -> Vec<HTLCUpdate> {
268 let mut updated = self.pending_htlc_updated.lock().unwrap();
269 let mut pending_htlcs_updated = Vec::with_capacity(updated.len());
270 for (k, v) in updated.drain() {
272 pending_htlcs_updated.push(HTLCUpdate {
274 payment_preimage: htlc_data.1,
279 pending_htlcs_updated
283 impl<Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash> events::EventsProvider for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
284 fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
285 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
286 let mut ret = Vec::new();
287 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut *pending_events);
292 /// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, don't try to claim it in a shared transaction,
293 /// instead claiming it in its own individual transaction.
294 const CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 12;
295 /// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, force-close the channel to broadcast the
296 /// HTLC-Success transaction.
297 /// In other words, this is an upper bound on how many blocks we think it can take us to get a
298 /// transaction confirmed (and we use it in a few more, equivalent, places).
299 pub(crate) const CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 6;
300 /// Number of blocks by which point we expect our counterparty to have seen new blocks on the
301 /// network and done a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance (+ we've updated all our
302 /// copies of ChannelMonitors, including watchtowers).
303 pub(crate) const HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS: u32 = 3;
304 /// Number of blocks we wait on seeing a confirmed HTLC-Timeout or previous revoked commitment
305 /// transaction before we fail corresponding inbound HTLCs. This prevents us from failing backwards
306 /// and then getting a reorg resulting in us losing money.
307 //TODO: We currently don't actually use this...we should
308 pub(crate) const HTLC_FAIL_ANTI_REORG_DELAY: u32 = 6;
310 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
313 revocation_base_key: SecretKey,
314 htlc_base_key: SecretKey,
315 delayed_payment_base_key: SecretKey,
316 payment_base_key: SecretKey,
317 shutdown_pubkey: PublicKey,
318 prev_latest_per_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
319 latest_per_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
320 funding_info: Option<(OutPoint, Script)>,
321 current_remote_commitment_txid: Option<Sha256dHash>,
322 prev_remote_commitment_txid: Option<Sha256dHash>,
325 revocation_base_key: PublicKey,
326 htlc_base_key: PublicKey,
330 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
331 struct LocalSignedTx {
332 /// txid of the transaction in tx, just used to make comparison faster
335 revocation_key: PublicKey,
336 a_htlc_key: PublicKey,
337 b_htlc_key: PublicKey,
338 delayed_payment_key: PublicKey,
340 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<(Signature, Signature)>, Option<HTLCSource>)>,
343 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
344 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
346 /// A ChannelMonitor handles chain events (blocks connected and disconnected) and generates
347 /// on-chain transactions to ensure no loss of funds occurs.
349 /// You MUST ensure that no ChannelMonitors for a given channel anywhere contain out-of-date
350 /// information and are actively monitoring the chain.
352 pub struct ChannelMonitor {
353 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64,
355 key_storage: Storage,
356 their_htlc_base_key: Option<PublicKey>,
357 their_delayed_payment_base_key: Option<PublicKey>,
358 // first is the idx of the first of the two revocation points
359 their_cur_revocation_points: Option<(u64, PublicKey, Option<PublicKey>)>,
361 our_to_self_delay: u16,
362 their_to_self_delay: Option<u16>,
364 old_secrets: [([u8; 32], u64); 49],
365 remote_claimable_outpoints: HashMap<Sha256dHash, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>>,
366 /// We cannot identify HTLC-Success or HTLC-Timeout transactions by themselves on the chain.
367 /// Nor can we figure out their commitment numbers without the commitment transaction they are
368 /// spending. Thus, in order to claim them via revocation key, we track all the remote
369 /// commitment transactions which we find on-chain, mapping them to the commitment number which
370 /// can be used to derive the revocation key and claim the transactions.
371 remote_commitment_txn_on_chain: HashMap<Sha256dHash, (u64, Vec<Script>)>,
372 /// Cache used to make pruning of payment_preimages faster.
373 /// Maps payment_hash values to commitment numbers for remote transactions for non-revoked
374 /// remote transactions (ie should remain pretty small).
375 /// Serialized to disk but should generally not be sent to Watchtowers.
376 remote_hash_commitment_number: HashMap<PaymentHash, u64>,
378 // We store two local commitment transactions to avoid any race conditions where we may update
379 // some monitors (potentially on watchtowers) but then fail to update others, resulting in the
380 // various monitors for one channel being out of sync, and us broadcasting a local
381 // transaction for which we have deleted claim information on some watchtowers.
382 prev_local_signed_commitment_tx: Option<LocalSignedTx>,
383 current_local_signed_commitment_tx: Option<LocalSignedTx>,
385 // Used just for ChannelManager to make sure it has the latest channel data during
387 current_remote_commitment_number: u64,
389 payment_preimages: HashMap<PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage>,
391 destination_script: Script,
393 // We simply modify last_block_hash in Channel's block_connected so that serialization is
394 // consistent but hopefully the users' copy handles block_connected in a consistent way.
395 // (we do *not*, however, update them in insert_combine to ensure any local user copies keep
396 // their last_block_hash from its state and not based on updated copies that didn't run through
397 // the full block_connected).
398 pub(crate) last_block_hash: Sha256dHash,
399 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>, //TODO: dedup this a bit...
403 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
404 /// Used only in testing and fuzztarget to check serialization roundtrips don't change the
405 /// underlying object
406 impl PartialEq for ChannelMonitor {
407 fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
408 if self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor != other.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor ||
409 self.key_storage != other.key_storage ||
410 self.their_htlc_base_key != other.their_htlc_base_key ||
411 self.their_delayed_payment_base_key != other.their_delayed_payment_base_key ||
412 self.their_cur_revocation_points != other.their_cur_revocation_points ||
413 self.our_to_self_delay != other.our_to_self_delay ||
414 self.their_to_self_delay != other.their_to_self_delay ||
415 self.remote_claimable_outpoints != other.remote_claimable_outpoints ||
416 self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain != other.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain ||
417 self.remote_hash_commitment_number != other.remote_hash_commitment_number ||
418 self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx != other.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx ||
419 self.current_remote_commitment_number != other.current_remote_commitment_number ||
420 self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx != other.current_local_signed_commitment_tx ||
421 self.payment_preimages != other.payment_preimages ||
422 self.destination_script != other.destination_script
426 for (&(ref secret, ref idx), &(ref o_secret, ref o_idx)) in self.old_secrets.iter().zip(other.old_secrets.iter()) {
427 if secret != o_secret || idx != o_idx {
436 impl ChannelMonitor {
437 pub(super) fn new(revocation_base_key: &SecretKey, delayed_payment_base_key: &SecretKey, htlc_base_key: &SecretKey, payment_base_key: &SecretKey, shutdown_pubkey: &PublicKey, our_to_self_delay: u16, destination_script: Script, logger: Arc<Logger>) -> ChannelMonitor {
439 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: 0,
441 key_storage: Storage::Local {
442 revocation_base_key: revocation_base_key.clone(),
443 htlc_base_key: htlc_base_key.clone(),
444 delayed_payment_base_key: delayed_payment_base_key.clone(),
445 payment_base_key: payment_base_key.clone(),
446 shutdown_pubkey: shutdown_pubkey.clone(),
447 prev_latest_per_commitment_point: None,
448 latest_per_commitment_point: None,
450 current_remote_commitment_txid: None,
451 prev_remote_commitment_txid: None,
453 their_htlc_base_key: None,
454 their_delayed_payment_base_key: None,
455 their_cur_revocation_points: None,
457 our_to_self_delay: our_to_self_delay,
458 their_to_self_delay: None,
460 old_secrets: [([0; 32], 1 << 48); 49],
461 remote_claimable_outpoints: HashMap::new(),
462 remote_commitment_txn_on_chain: HashMap::new(),
463 remote_hash_commitment_number: HashMap::new(),
465 prev_local_signed_commitment_tx: None,
466 current_local_signed_commitment_tx: None,
467 current_remote_commitment_number: 1 << 48,
469 payment_preimages: HashMap::new(),
470 destination_script: destination_script,
472 last_block_hash: Default::default(),
473 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
479 fn place_secret(idx: u64) -> u8 {
481 if idx & (1 << i) == (1 << i) {
489 fn derive_secret(secret: [u8; 32], bits: u8, idx: u64) -> [u8; 32] {
490 let mut res: [u8; 32] = secret;
492 let bitpos = bits - 1 - i;
493 if idx & (1 << bitpos) == (1 << bitpos) {
494 res[(bitpos / 8) as usize] ^= 1 << (bitpos & 7);
495 res = Sha256::hash(&res).into_inner();
501 /// Inserts a revocation secret into this channel monitor. Prunes old preimages if neither
502 /// needed by local commitment transactions HTCLs nor by remote ones. Unless we haven't already seen remote
503 /// commitment transaction's secret, they are de facto pruned (we can use revocation key).
504 pub(super) fn provide_secret(&mut self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
505 let pos = ChannelMonitor::place_secret(idx);
507 let (old_secret, old_idx) = self.old_secrets[i as usize];
508 if ChannelMonitor::derive_secret(secret, pos, old_idx) != old_secret {
509 return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Previous secret did not match new one"));
512 if self.get_min_seen_secret() <= idx {
515 self.old_secrets[pos as usize] = (secret, idx);
517 // Prune HTLCs from the previous remote commitment tx so we don't generate failure/fulfill
518 // events for now-revoked/fulfilled HTLCs.
519 // TODO: We should probably consider whether we're really getting the next secret here.
520 if let Storage::Local { ref mut prev_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage {
521 if let Some(txid) = prev_remote_commitment_txid.take() {
522 for &mut (_, ref mut source) in self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get_mut(&txid).unwrap() {
528 if !self.payment_preimages.is_empty() {
529 let local_signed_commitment_tx = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx.as_ref().expect("Channel needs at least an initial commitment tx !");
530 let prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.as_ref();
531 let min_idx = self.get_min_seen_secret();
532 let remote_hash_commitment_number = &mut self.remote_hash_commitment_number;
534 self.payment_preimages.retain(|&k, _| {
535 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in &local_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs {
536 if k == htlc.payment_hash {
540 if let Some(prev_local_commitment_tx) = prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
541 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in prev_local_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
542 if k == htlc.payment_hash {
547 let contains = if let Some(cn) = remote_hash_commitment_number.get(&k) {
554 remote_hash_commitment_number.remove(&k);
563 /// Informs this monitor of the latest remote (ie non-broadcastable) commitment transaction.
564 /// The monitor watches for it to be broadcasted and then uses the HTLC information (and
565 /// possibly future revocation/preimage information) to claim outputs where possible.
566 /// We cache also the mapping hash:commitment number to lighten pruning of old preimages by watchtowers.
567 pub(super) fn provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, unsigned_commitment_tx: &Transaction, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>, commitment_number: u64, their_revocation_point: PublicKey) {
568 // TODO: Encrypt the htlc_outputs data with the single-hash of the commitment transaction
569 // so that a remote monitor doesn't learn anything unless there is a malicious close.
570 // (only maybe, sadly we cant do the same for local info, as we need to be aware of
572 for &(ref htlc, _) in &htlc_outputs {
573 self.remote_hash_commitment_number.insert(htlc.payment_hash, commitment_number);
576 let new_txid = unsigned_commitment_tx.txid();
577 log_trace!(self, "Tracking new remote commitment transaction with txid {} at commitment number {} with {} HTLC outputs", new_txid, commitment_number, htlc_outputs.len());
578 log_trace!(self, "New potential remote commitment transaction: {}", encode::serialize_hex(unsigned_commitment_tx));
579 if let Storage::Local { ref mut current_remote_commitment_txid, ref mut prev_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage {
580 *prev_remote_commitment_txid = current_remote_commitment_txid.take();
581 *current_remote_commitment_txid = Some(new_txid);
583 self.remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(new_txid, htlc_outputs);
584 self.current_remote_commitment_number = commitment_number;
585 //TODO: Merge this into the other per-remote-transaction output storage stuff
586 match self.their_cur_revocation_points {
587 Some(old_points) => {
588 if old_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 {
589 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0, old_points.1, Some(their_revocation_point)));
590 } else if old_points.0 == commitment_number + 2 {
591 if let Some(old_second_point) = old_points.2 {
592 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0 - 1, old_second_point, Some(their_revocation_point)));
594 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None));
597 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None));
601 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None));
606 /// Informs this monitor of the latest local (ie broadcastable) commitment transaction. The
607 /// monitor watches for timeouts and may broadcast it if we approach such a timeout. Thus, it
608 /// is important that any clones of this channel monitor (including remote clones) by kept
609 /// up-to-date as our local commitment transaction is updated.
610 /// Panics if set_their_to_self_delay has never been called.
611 /// Also update Storage with latest local per_commitment_point to derive local_delayedkey in
612 /// case of onchain HTLC tx
613 pub(super) fn provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, signed_commitment_tx: Transaction, local_keys: chan_utils::TxCreationKeys, feerate_per_kw: u64, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<(Signature, Signature)>, Option<HTLCSource>)>) {
614 assert!(self.their_to_self_delay.is_some());
615 self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx.take();
616 self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(LocalSignedTx {
617 txid: signed_commitment_tx.txid(),
618 tx: signed_commitment_tx,
619 revocation_key: local_keys.revocation_key,
620 a_htlc_key: local_keys.a_htlc_key,
621 b_htlc_key: local_keys.b_htlc_key,
622 delayed_payment_key: local_keys.a_delayed_payment_key,
627 if let Storage::Local { ref mut latest_per_commitment_point, .. } = self.key_storage {
628 *latest_per_commitment_point = Some(local_keys.per_commitment_point);
630 panic!("Channel somehow ended up with its internal ChannelMonitor being in Watchtower mode?");
634 /// Provides a payment_hash->payment_preimage mapping. Will be automatically pruned when all
635 /// commitment_tx_infos which contain the payment hash have been revoked.
636 pub(super) fn provide_payment_preimage(&mut self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_preimage: &PaymentPreimage) {
637 self.payment_preimages.insert(payment_hash.clone(), payment_preimage.clone());
640 /// Combines this ChannelMonitor with the information contained in the other ChannelMonitor.
641 /// After a successful call this ChannelMonitor is up-to-date and is safe to use to monitor the
642 /// chain for new blocks/transactions.
643 pub fn insert_combine(&mut self, mut other: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
644 match self.key_storage {
645 Storage::Local { ref funding_info, .. } => {
646 if funding_info.is_none() { return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Try to combine a Local monitor without funding_info")); }
647 let our_funding_info = funding_info;
648 if let Storage::Local { ref funding_info, .. } = other.key_storage {
649 if funding_info.is_none() { return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Try to combine a Local monitor without funding_info")); }
650 // We should be able to compare the entire funding_txo, but in fuzztarget it's trivially
651 // easy to collide the funding_txo hash and have a different scriptPubKey.
652 if funding_info.as_ref().unwrap().0 != our_funding_info.as_ref().unwrap().0 {
653 return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Funding transaction outputs are not identical!"));
656 return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Try to combine a Local monitor with a Watchtower one !"));
659 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
660 if let Storage::Watchtower { .. } = other.key_storage {
663 return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Try to combine a Watchtower monitor with a Local one !"));
667 let other_min_secret = other.get_min_seen_secret();
668 let our_min_secret = self.get_min_seen_secret();
669 if our_min_secret > other_min_secret {
670 self.provide_secret(other_min_secret, other.get_secret(other_min_secret).unwrap())?;
672 if let Some(ref local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
673 if let Some(ref other_local_tx) = other.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
674 let our_commitment_number = 0xffffffffffff - ((((local_tx.tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (local_tx.tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor);
675 let other_commitment_number = 0xffffffffffff - ((((other_local_tx.tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (other_local_tx.tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ other.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor);
676 if our_commitment_number >= other_commitment_number {
677 self.key_storage = other.key_storage;
681 // TODO: We should use current_remote_commitment_number and the commitment number out of
682 // local transactions to decide how to merge
683 if our_min_secret >= other_min_secret {
684 self.their_cur_revocation_points = other.their_cur_revocation_points;
685 for (txid, htlcs) in other.remote_claimable_outpoints.drain() {
686 self.remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, htlcs);
688 if let Some(local_tx) = other.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
689 self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(local_tx);
691 if let Some(local_tx) = other.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
692 self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(local_tx);
694 self.payment_preimages = other.payment_preimages;
697 self.current_remote_commitment_number = cmp::min(self.current_remote_commitment_number, other.current_remote_commitment_number);
701 /// Panics if commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor doesn't fit in 48 bits
702 pub(super) fn set_commitment_obscure_factor(&mut self, commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64) {
703 assert!(commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor < (1 << 48));
704 self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor = commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor;
707 /// Allows this monitor to scan only for transactions which are applicable. Note that this is
708 /// optional, without it this monitor cannot be used in an SPV client, but you may wish to
709 /// avoid this (or call unset_funding_info) on a monitor you wish to send to a watchtower as it
710 /// provides slightly better privacy.
711 /// It's the responsibility of the caller to register outpoint and script with passing the former
712 /// value as key to add_update_monitor.
713 pub(super) fn set_funding_info(&mut self, new_funding_info: (OutPoint, Script)) {
714 match self.key_storage {
715 Storage::Local { ref mut funding_info, .. } => {
716 *funding_info = Some(new_funding_info);
718 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
719 panic!("Channel somehow ended up with its internal ChannelMonitor being in Watchtower mode?");
724 /// We log these base keys at channel opening to being able to rebuild redeemscript in case of leaked revoked commit tx
725 pub(super) fn set_their_base_keys(&mut self, their_htlc_base_key: &PublicKey, their_delayed_payment_base_key: &PublicKey) {
726 self.their_htlc_base_key = Some(their_htlc_base_key.clone());
727 self.their_delayed_payment_base_key = Some(their_delayed_payment_base_key.clone());
730 pub(super) fn set_their_to_self_delay(&mut self, their_to_self_delay: u16) {
731 self.their_to_self_delay = Some(their_to_self_delay);
734 pub(super) fn unset_funding_info(&mut self) {
735 match self.key_storage {
736 Storage::Local { ref mut funding_info, .. } => {
737 *funding_info = None;
739 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
740 panic!("Channel somehow ended up with its internal ChannelMonitor being in Watchtower mode?");
745 /// Gets the funding transaction outpoint of the channel this ChannelMonitor is monitoring for.
746 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
747 match self.key_storage {
748 Storage::Local { ref funding_info, .. } => {
750 &Some((outpoint, _)) => Some(outpoint),
754 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
760 /// Gets the sets of all outpoints which this ChannelMonitor expects to hear about spends of.
761 /// Generally useful when deserializing as during normal operation the return values of
762 /// block_connected are sufficient to ensure all relevant outpoints are being monitored (note
763 /// that the get_funding_txo outpoint and transaction must also be monitored for!).
764 pub fn get_monitored_outpoints(&self) -> Vec<(Sha256dHash, u32, &Script)> {
765 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.len() * 2);
766 for (ref txid, &(_, ref outputs)) in self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
767 for (idx, output) in outputs.iter().enumerate() {
768 res.push(((*txid).clone(), idx as u32, output));
774 /// Serializes into a vec, with various modes for the exposed pub fns
775 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W, for_local_storage: bool) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
776 //TODO: We still write out all the serialization here manually instead of using the fancy
777 //serialization framework we have, we should migrate things over to it.
778 writer.write_all(&[SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
779 writer.write_all(&[MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
781 // Set in initial Channel-object creation, so should always be set by now:
782 U48(self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor).write(writer)?;
784 macro_rules! write_option {
791 &None => 0u8.write(writer)?,
796 match self.key_storage {
797 Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref payment_base_key, ref shutdown_pubkey, ref prev_latest_per_commitment_point, ref latest_per_commitment_point, ref funding_info, ref current_remote_commitment_txid, ref prev_remote_commitment_txid } => {
798 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
799 writer.write_all(&revocation_base_key[..])?;
800 writer.write_all(&htlc_base_key[..])?;
801 writer.write_all(&delayed_payment_base_key[..])?;
802 writer.write_all(&payment_base_key[..])?;
803 writer.write_all(&shutdown_pubkey.serialize())?;
804 prev_latest_per_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
805 latest_per_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
807 &Some((ref outpoint, ref script)) => {
808 writer.write_all(&outpoint.txid[..])?;
809 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(outpoint.index))?;
810 script.write(writer)?;
813 debug_assert!(false, "Try to serialize a useless Local monitor !");
816 current_remote_commitment_txid.write(writer)?;
817 prev_remote_commitment_txid.write(writer)?;
819 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => unimplemented!(),
822 writer.write_all(&self.their_htlc_base_key.as_ref().unwrap().serialize())?;
823 writer.write_all(&self.their_delayed_payment_base_key.as_ref().unwrap().serialize())?;
825 match self.their_cur_revocation_points {
826 Some((idx, pubkey, second_option)) => {
827 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(idx))?;
828 writer.write_all(&pubkey.serialize())?;
829 match second_option {
830 Some(second_pubkey) => {
831 writer.write_all(&second_pubkey.serialize())?;
834 writer.write_all(&[0; 33])?;
839 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(0))?;
843 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.our_to_self_delay))?;
844 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap()))?;
846 for &(ref secret, ref idx) in self.old_secrets.iter() {
847 writer.write_all(secret)?;
848 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*idx))?;
851 macro_rules! serialize_htlc_in_commitment {
852 ($htlc_output: expr) => {
853 writer.write_all(&[$htlc_output.offered as u8; 1])?;
854 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc_output.amount_msat))?;
855 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array($htlc_output.cltv_expiry))?;
856 writer.write_all(&$htlc_output.payment_hash.0[..])?;
857 $htlc_output.transaction_output_index.write(writer)?;
861 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_claimable_outpoints.len() as u64))?;
862 for (ref txid, ref htlc_infos) in self.remote_claimable_outpoints.iter() {
863 writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
864 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc_infos.len() as u64))?;
865 for &(ref htlc_output, ref htlc_source) in htlc_infos.iter() {
866 serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output);
867 write_option!(htlc_source);
871 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.len() as u64))?;
872 for (ref txid, &(commitment_number, ref txouts)) in self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
873 writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
874 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(commitment_number))?;
875 (txouts.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
876 for script in txouts.iter() {
877 script.write(writer)?;
881 if for_local_storage {
882 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_hash_commitment_number.len() as u64))?;
883 for (ref payment_hash, commitment_number) in self.remote_hash_commitment_number.iter() {
884 writer.write_all(&payment_hash.0[..])?;
885 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(*commitment_number))?;
888 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(0))?;
891 macro_rules! serialize_local_tx {
892 ($local_tx: expr) => {
893 if let Err(e) = $local_tx.tx.consensus_encode(&mut WriterWriteAdaptor(writer)) {
895 encode::Error::Io(e) => return Err(e),
896 _ => panic!("local tx must have been well-formed!"),
900 writer.write_all(&$local_tx.revocation_key.serialize())?;
901 writer.write_all(&$local_tx.a_htlc_key.serialize())?;
902 writer.write_all(&$local_tx.b_htlc_key.serialize())?;
903 writer.write_all(&$local_tx.delayed_payment_key.serialize())?;
905 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($local_tx.feerate_per_kw))?;
906 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($local_tx.htlc_outputs.len() as u64))?;
907 for &(ref htlc_output, ref sigs, ref htlc_source) in $local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
908 serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output);
909 if let &Some((ref their_sig, ref our_sig)) = sigs {
911 writer.write_all(&their_sig.serialize_compact())?;
912 writer.write_all(&our_sig.serialize_compact())?;
916 write_option!(htlc_source);
921 if let Some(ref prev_local_tx) = self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
922 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
923 serialize_local_tx!(prev_local_tx);
925 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
928 if let Some(ref cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
929 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
930 serialize_local_tx!(cur_local_tx);
932 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
935 if for_local_storage {
936 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(self.current_remote_commitment_number))?;
938 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(0))?;
941 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.payment_preimages.len() as u64))?;
942 for payment_preimage in self.payment_preimages.values() {
943 writer.write_all(&payment_preimage.0[..])?;
946 self.last_block_hash.write(writer)?;
947 self.destination_script.write(writer)?;
952 /// Writes this monitor into the given writer, suitable for writing to disk.
954 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor), which
955 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
956 /// the "reorg path" (ie not just starting at the same height but starting at the highest
957 /// common block that appears on your best chain as well as on the chain which contains the
958 /// last block hash returned) upon deserializing the object!
959 pub fn write_for_disk<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
960 self.write(writer, true)
963 /// Encodes this monitor into the given writer, suitable for sending to a remote watchtower
965 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor), which
966 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
967 /// the "reorg path" (ie not just starting at the same height but starting at the highest
968 /// common block that appears on your best chain as well as on the chain which contains the
969 /// last block hash returned) upon deserializing the object!
970 pub fn write_for_watchtower<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
971 self.write(writer, false)
974 /// Can only fail if idx is < get_min_seen_secret
975 pub(super) fn get_secret(&self, idx: u64) -> Option<[u8; 32]> {
976 for i in 0..self.old_secrets.len() {
977 if (idx & (!((1 << i) - 1))) == self.old_secrets[i].1 {
978 return Some(ChannelMonitor::derive_secret(self.old_secrets[i].0, i as u8, idx))
981 assert!(idx < self.get_min_seen_secret());
985 pub(super) fn get_min_seen_secret(&self) -> u64 {
986 //TODO This can be optimized?
987 let mut min = 1 << 48;
988 for &(_, idx) in self.old_secrets.iter() {
996 pub(super) fn get_cur_remote_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
997 self.current_remote_commitment_number
1000 pub(super) fn get_cur_local_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
1001 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1002 0xffff_ffff_ffff - ((((local_tx.tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (local_tx.tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor)
1003 } else { 0xffff_ffff_ffff }
1006 /// Attempts to claim a remote commitment transaction's outputs using the revocation key and
1007 /// data in remote_claimable_outpoints. Will directly claim any HTLC outputs which expire at a
1008 /// height > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER. In any case, will install monitoring for
1009 /// HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions.
1010 /// Return updates for HTLC pending in the channel and failed automatically by the broadcast of
1011 /// revoked remote commitment tx
1012 fn check_spend_remote_transaction(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32) -> (Vec<Transaction>, (Sha256dHash, Vec<TxOut>), Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>, Vec<(HTLCSource, Option<PaymentPreimage>, PaymentHash)>) {
1013 // Most secp and related errors trying to create keys means we have no hope of constructing
1014 // a spend transaction...so we return no transactions to broadcast
1015 let mut txn_to_broadcast = Vec::new();
1016 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
1017 let mut spendable_outputs = Vec::new();
1018 let mut htlc_updated = Vec::new();
1020 let commitment_txid = tx.txid(); //TODO: This is gonna be a performance bottleneck for watchtowers!
1021 let per_commitment_option = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(&commitment_txid);
1023 macro_rules! ignore_error {
1024 ( $thing : expr ) => {
1027 Err(_) => return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs, htlc_updated)
1032 let commitment_number = 0xffffffffffff - ((((tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor);
1033 if commitment_number >= self.get_min_seen_secret() {
1034 let secret = self.get_secret(commitment_number).unwrap();
1035 let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secret));
1036 let (revocation_pubkey, b_htlc_key, local_payment_key) = match self.key_storage {
1037 Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, ref payment_base_key, .. } => {
1038 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
1039 (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_base_key))),
1040 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &htlc_base_key))),
1041 Some(ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &payment_base_key))))
1043 Storage::Watchtower { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
1044 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
1045 (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &revocation_base_key)),
1046 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &htlc_base_key)),
1050 let delayed_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key), &self.their_delayed_payment_base_key.unwrap()));
1051 let a_htlc_key = match self.their_htlc_base_key {
1052 None => return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs, htlc_updated),
1053 Some(their_htlc_base_key) => ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key), &their_htlc_base_key)),
1056 let revokeable_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey, self.our_to_self_delay, &delayed_key);
1057 let revokeable_p2wsh = revokeable_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
1059 let local_payment_p2wpkh = if let Some(payment_key) = local_payment_key {
1060 // Note that the Network here is ignored as we immediately drop the address for the
1061 // script_pubkey version.
1062 let payment_hash160 = Hash160::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &payment_key).serialize());
1063 Some(Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&payment_hash160[..]).into_script())
1066 let mut total_value = 0;
1067 let mut values = Vec::new();
1068 let mut inputs = Vec::new();
1069 let mut htlc_idxs = Vec::new();
1071 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
1072 if outp.script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh {
1074 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
1075 txid: commitment_txid,
1078 script_sig: Script::new(),
1079 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
1080 witness: Vec::new(),
1082 htlc_idxs.push(None);
1083 values.push(outp.value);
1084 total_value += outp.value;
1085 } else if Some(&outp.script_pubkey) == local_payment_p2wpkh.as_ref() {
1086 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WPKH {
1087 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: commitment_txid, vout: idx as u32 },
1088 key: local_payment_key.unwrap(),
1089 output: outp.clone(),
1094 macro_rules! sign_input {
1095 ($sighash_parts: expr, $input: expr, $htlc_idx: expr, $amount: expr) => {
1097 let (sig, redeemscript) = match self.key_storage {
1098 Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
1099 let redeemscript = if $htlc_idx.is_none() { revokeable_redeemscript.clone() } else {
1100 let htlc = &per_commitment_option.unwrap()[$htlc_idx.unwrap()].0;
1101 chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey)
1103 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&$sighash_parts.sighash_all(&$input, &redeemscript, $amount)[..]);
1104 let revocation_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key, &revocation_base_key));
1105 (self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &revocation_key), redeemscript)
1107 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
1111 $input.witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
1112 $input.witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1113 if $htlc_idx.is_none() {
1114 $input.witness.push(vec!(1));
1116 $input.witness.push(revocation_pubkey.serialize().to_vec());
1118 $input.witness.push(redeemscript.into_bytes());
1123 if let Some(ref per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
1124 inputs.reserve_exact(per_commitment_data.len());
1126 for (idx, &(ref htlc, _)) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() {
1127 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
1128 let expected_script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey);
1129 if transaction_output_index as usize >= tx.output.len() ||
1130 tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 ||
1131 tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].script_pubkey != expected_script.to_v0_p2wsh() {
1132 return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs, htlc_updated); // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user
1135 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
1136 txid: commitment_txid,
1137 vout: transaction_output_index,
1139 script_sig: Script::new(),
1140 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
1141 witness: Vec::new(),
1143 if htlc.cltv_expiry > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER {
1145 htlc_idxs.push(Some(idx));
1146 values.push(tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value);
1147 total_value += htlc.amount_msat / 1000;
1149 let mut single_htlc_tx = Transaction {
1153 output: vec!(TxOut {
1154 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1155 value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000, //TODO: - fee
1158 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&single_htlc_tx);
1159 sign_input!(sighash_parts, single_htlc_tx.input[0], Some(idx), htlc.amount_msat / 1000);
1160 txn_to_broadcast.push(single_htlc_tx);
1166 if !inputs.is_empty() || !txn_to_broadcast.is_empty() || per_commitment_option.is_some() { // ie we're confident this is actually ours
1167 // We're definitely a remote commitment transaction!
1168 log_trace!(self, "Got broadcast of revoked remote commitment transaction, generating general spend tx with {} inputs and {} other txn to broadcast", inputs.len(), txn_to_broadcast.len());
1169 watch_outputs.append(&mut tx.output.clone());
1170 self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, (commitment_number, tx.output.iter().map(|output| { output.script_pubkey.clone() }).collect()));
1172 // TODO: We really should only fail backwards after our revocation claims have been
1173 // confirmed, but we also need to do more other tracking of in-flight pre-confirm
1174 // on-chain claims, so we can do that at the same time.
1175 macro_rules! check_htlc_fails {
1176 ($txid: expr, $commitment_tx: expr) => {
1177 if let Some(ref outpoints) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get($txid) {
1178 for &(ref htlc, ref source_option) in outpoints.iter() {
1179 if let &Some(ref source) = source_option {
1180 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} remote commitment tx due to broadcast of revoked remote commitment transaction", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx);
1181 htlc_updated.push(((**source).clone(), None, htlc.payment_hash.clone()));
1187 if let Storage::Local { ref current_remote_commitment_txid, ref prev_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage {
1188 if let &Some(ref txid) = current_remote_commitment_txid {
1189 check_htlc_fails!(txid, "current");
1191 if let &Some(ref txid) = prev_remote_commitment_txid {
1192 check_htlc_fails!(txid, "remote");
1195 // No need to check local commitment txn, symmetric HTLCSource must be present as per-htlc data on remote commitment tx
1197 if inputs.is_empty() { return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs, htlc_updated); } // Nothing to be done...probably a false positive/local tx
1199 let outputs = vec!(TxOut {
1200 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1201 value: total_value, //TODO: - fee
1203 let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
1210 let mut values_drain = values.drain(..);
1211 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx);
1213 for (input, htlc_idx) in spend_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(htlc_idxs.iter()) {
1214 let value = values_drain.next().unwrap();
1215 sign_input!(sighash_parts, input, htlc_idx, value);
1218 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
1219 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: spend_tx.txid(), vout: 0 },
1220 output: spend_tx.output[0].clone(),
1222 txn_to_broadcast.push(spend_tx);
1223 } else if let Some(per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
1224 // While this isn't useful yet, there is a potential race where if a counterparty
1225 // revokes a state at the same time as the commitment transaction for that state is
1226 // confirmed, and the watchtower receives the block before the user, the user could
1227 // upload a new ChannelMonitor with the revocation secret but the watchtower has
1228 // already processed the block, resulting in the remote_commitment_txn_on_chain entry
1229 // not being generated by the above conditional. Thus, to be safe, we go ahead and
1231 watch_outputs.append(&mut tx.output.clone());
1232 self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, (commitment_number, tx.output.iter().map(|output| { output.script_pubkey.clone() }).collect()));
1234 log_trace!(self, "Got broadcast of non-revoked remote commitment transaction {}", commitment_txid);
1236 // TODO: We really should only fail backwards after our revocation claims have been
1237 // confirmed, but we also need to do more other tracking of in-flight pre-confirm
1238 // on-chain claims, so we can do that at the same time.
1239 macro_rules! check_htlc_fails {
1240 ($txid: expr, $commitment_tx: expr, $id: tt) => {
1241 if let Some(ref latest_outpoints) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get($txid) {
1242 $id: for &(ref htlc, ref source_option) in latest_outpoints.iter() {
1243 if let &Some(ref source) = source_option {
1244 // Check if the HTLC is present in the commitment transaction that was
1245 // broadcast, but not if it was below the dust limit, which we should
1246 // fail backwards immediately as there is no way for us to learn the
1247 // payment_preimage.
1248 // Note that if the dust limit were allowed to change between
1249 // commitment transactions we'd want to be check whether *any*
1250 // broadcastable commitment transaction has the HTLC in it, but it
1251 // cannot currently change after channel initialization, so we don't
1253 for &(ref broadcast_htlc, ref broadcast_source) in per_commitment_data.iter() {
1254 if broadcast_htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() && Some(source) == broadcast_source.as_ref() {
1258 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} remote commitment tx due to broadcast of remote commitment transaction", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx);
1259 htlc_updated.push(((**source).clone(), None, htlc.payment_hash.clone()));
1265 if let Storage::Local { ref current_remote_commitment_txid, ref prev_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage {
1266 if let &Some(ref txid) = current_remote_commitment_txid {
1267 check_htlc_fails!(txid, "current", 'current_loop);
1269 if let &Some(ref txid) = prev_remote_commitment_txid {
1270 check_htlc_fails!(txid, "previous", 'prev_loop);
1274 if let Some(revocation_points) = self.their_cur_revocation_points {
1275 let revocation_point_option =
1276 if revocation_points.0 == commitment_number { Some(&revocation_points.1) }
1277 else if let Some(point) = revocation_points.2.as_ref() {
1278 if revocation_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 { Some(point) } else { None }
1280 if let Some(revocation_point) = revocation_point_option {
1281 let (revocation_pubkey, b_htlc_key) = match self.key_storage {
1282 Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
1283 (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_base_key))),
1284 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &htlc_base_key))))
1286 Storage::Watchtower { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
1287 (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &revocation_base_key)),
1288 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &htlc_base_key)))
1291 let a_htlc_key = match self.their_htlc_base_key {
1292 None => return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs, htlc_updated),
1293 Some(their_htlc_base_key) => ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &their_htlc_base_key)),
1296 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
1297 if outp.script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh() {
1298 match self.key_storage {
1299 Storage::Local { ref payment_base_key, .. } => {
1300 if let Ok(local_key) = chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_point, &payment_base_key) {
1301 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WPKH {
1302 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: commitment_txid, vout: idx as u32 },
1304 output: outp.clone(),
1308 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {}
1310 break; // Only to_remote ouput is claimable
1314 let mut total_value = 0;
1315 let mut values = Vec::new();
1316 let mut inputs = Vec::new();
1318 macro_rules! sign_input {
1319 ($sighash_parts: expr, $input: expr, $amount: expr, $preimage: expr) => {
1321 let (sig, redeemscript) = match self.key_storage {
1322 Storage::Local { ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
1323 let htlc = &per_commitment_option.unwrap()[$input.sequence as usize].0;
1324 let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey);
1325 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&$sighash_parts.sighash_all(&$input, &redeemscript, $amount)[..]);
1326 let htlc_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &htlc_base_key));
1327 (self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &htlc_key), redeemscript)
1329 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
1333 $input.witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
1334 $input.witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1335 $input.witness.push($preimage);
1336 $input.witness.push(redeemscript.into_bytes());
1341 for (idx, &(ref htlc, _)) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() {
1342 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
1343 let expected_script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey);
1344 if transaction_output_index as usize >= tx.output.len() ||
1345 tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 ||
1346 tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].script_pubkey != expected_script.to_v0_p2wsh() {
1347 return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs, htlc_updated); // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user
1349 if let Some(payment_preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
1351 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
1352 txid: commitment_txid,
1353 vout: transaction_output_index,
1355 script_sig: Script::new(),
1356 sequence: idx as u32, // reset to 0xfffffffd in sign_input
1357 witness: Vec::new(),
1359 if htlc.cltv_expiry > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER {
1361 values.push((tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value, payment_preimage));
1362 total_value += htlc.amount_msat / 1000;
1364 let mut single_htlc_tx = Transaction {
1368 output: vec!(TxOut {
1369 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1370 value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000, //TODO: - fee
1373 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&single_htlc_tx);
1374 sign_input!(sighash_parts, single_htlc_tx.input[0], htlc.amount_msat / 1000, payment_preimage.0.to_vec());
1375 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
1376 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: single_htlc_tx.txid(), vout: 0 },
1377 output: single_htlc_tx.output[0].clone(),
1379 txn_to_broadcast.push(single_htlc_tx);
1383 // TODO: If the HTLC has already expired, potentially merge it with the
1384 // rest of the claim transaction, as above.
1386 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
1387 txid: commitment_txid,
1388 vout: transaction_output_index,
1390 script_sig: Script::new(),
1391 sequence: idx as u32,
1392 witness: Vec::new(),
1394 let mut timeout_tx = Transaction {
1396 lock_time: htlc.cltv_expiry,
1398 output: vec!(TxOut {
1399 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1400 value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1403 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&timeout_tx);
1404 sign_input!(sighash_parts, timeout_tx.input[0], htlc.amount_msat / 1000, vec![0]);
1405 txn_to_broadcast.push(timeout_tx);
1410 if inputs.is_empty() { return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs, htlc_updated); } // Nothing to be done...probably a false positive/local tx
1412 let outputs = vec!(TxOut {
1413 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1414 value: total_value, //TODO: - fee
1416 let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
1423 let mut values_drain = values.drain(..);
1424 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx);
1426 for input in spend_tx.input.iter_mut() {
1427 let value = values_drain.next().unwrap();
1428 sign_input!(sighash_parts, input, value.0, (value.1).0.to_vec());
1431 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
1432 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: spend_tx.txid(), vout: 0 },
1433 output: spend_tx.output[0].clone(),
1435 txn_to_broadcast.push(spend_tx);
1440 (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs, htlc_updated)
1443 /// Attempts to claim a remote HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout's outputs using the revocation key
1444 fn check_spend_remote_htlc(&self, tx: &Transaction, commitment_number: u64) -> (Option<Transaction>, Option<SpendableOutputDescriptor>) {
1445 if tx.input.len() != 1 || tx.output.len() != 1 {
1449 macro_rules! ignore_error {
1450 ( $thing : expr ) => {
1453 Err(_) => return (None, None)
1458 let secret = if let Some(secret) = self.get_secret(commitment_number) { secret } else { return (None, None); };
1459 let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secret));
1460 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
1461 let revocation_pubkey = match self.key_storage {
1462 Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
1463 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_base_key)))
1465 Storage::Watchtower { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
1466 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &revocation_base_key))
1469 let delayed_key = match self.their_delayed_payment_base_key {
1470 None => return (None, None),
1471 Some(their_delayed_payment_base_key) => ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &their_delayed_payment_base_key)),
1473 let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), &delayed_key);
1474 let revokeable_p2wsh = redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
1475 let htlc_txid = tx.txid(); //TODO: This is gonna be a performance bottleneck for watchtowers!
1477 let mut inputs = Vec::new();
1480 if tx.output[0].script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh { //HTLC transactions have one txin, one txout
1482 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
1486 script_sig: Script::new(),
1487 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
1488 witness: Vec::new(),
1490 amount = tx.output[0].value;
1493 if !inputs.is_empty() {
1494 let outputs = vec!(TxOut {
1495 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1496 value: amount, //TODO: - fee
1499 let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
1506 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx);
1508 let sig = match self.key_storage {
1509 Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
1510 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash_parts.sighash_all(&spend_tx.input[0], &redeemscript, amount)[..]);
1511 let revocation_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key, &revocation_base_key));
1512 self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &revocation_key)
1514 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
1518 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
1519 spend_tx.input[0].witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1520 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(vec!(1));
1521 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(redeemscript.into_bytes());
1523 let outpoint = BitcoinOutPoint { txid: spend_tx.txid(), vout: 0 };
1524 let output = spend_tx.output[0].clone();
1525 (Some(spend_tx), Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput { outpoint, output }))
1526 } else { (None, None) }
1529 fn broadcast_by_local_state(&self, local_tx: &LocalSignedTx, per_commitment_point: &Option<PublicKey>, delayed_payment_base_key: &Option<SecretKey>) -> (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>, Vec<TxOut>) {
1530 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
1531 let mut spendable_outputs = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
1532 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
1534 macro_rules! add_dynamic_output {
1535 ($father_tx: expr, $vout: expr) => {
1536 if let Some(ref per_commitment_point) = *per_commitment_point {
1537 if let Some(ref delayed_payment_base_key) = *delayed_payment_base_key {
1538 if let Ok(local_delayedkey) = chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base_key) {
1539 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WSH {
1540 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: $father_tx.txid(), vout: $vout },
1541 key: local_delayedkey,
1542 witness_script: chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&local_tx.revocation_key, self.our_to_self_delay, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key),
1543 to_self_delay: self.our_to_self_delay,
1544 output: $father_tx.output[$vout as usize].clone(),
1553 let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&local_tx.revocation_key, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), &local_tx.delayed_payment_key);
1554 let revokeable_p2wsh = redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
1555 for (idx, output) in local_tx.tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
1556 if output.script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh {
1557 add_dynamic_output!(local_tx.tx, idx as u32);
1562 for &(ref htlc, ref sigs, _) in local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1563 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
1564 if let &Some((ref their_sig, ref our_sig)) = sigs {
1566 log_trace!(self, "Broadcasting HTLC-Timeout transaction against local commitment transactions");
1567 let mut htlc_timeout_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&local_tx.txid, local_tx.feerate_per_kw, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), htlc, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key, &local_tx.revocation_key);
1569 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
1571 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(their_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
1572 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1573 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
1574 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1576 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new());
1577 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &local_tx.a_htlc_key, &local_tx.b_htlc_key, &local_tx.revocation_key).into_bytes());
1579 add_dynamic_output!(htlc_timeout_tx, 0);
1580 res.push(htlc_timeout_tx);
1582 if let Some(payment_preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
1583 log_trace!(self, "Broadcasting HTLC-Success transaction against local commitment transactions");
1584 let mut htlc_success_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&local_tx.txid, local_tx.feerate_per_kw, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), htlc, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key, &local_tx.revocation_key);
1586 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
1588 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(their_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
1589 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1590 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
1591 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1593 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(payment_preimage.0.to_vec());
1594 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &local_tx.a_htlc_key, &local_tx.b_htlc_key, &local_tx.revocation_key).into_bytes());
1596 add_dynamic_output!(htlc_success_tx, 0);
1597 res.push(htlc_success_tx);
1600 watch_outputs.push(local_tx.tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].clone());
1601 } else { panic!("Should have sigs for non-dust local tx outputs!") }
1605 (res, spendable_outputs, watch_outputs)
1608 /// Attempts to claim any claimable HTLCs in a commitment transaction which was not (yet)
1609 /// revoked using data in local_claimable_outpoints.
1610 /// Should not be used if check_spend_revoked_transaction succeeds.
1611 fn check_spend_local_transaction(&self, tx: &Transaction, _height: u32) -> (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>, (Sha256dHash, Vec<TxOut>)) {
1612 let commitment_txid = tx.txid();
1613 // TODO: If we find a match here we need to fail back HTLCs that weren't included in the
1614 // broadcast commitment transaction, either because they didn't meet dust or because they
1615 // weren't yet included in our commitment transaction(s).
1616 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1617 if local_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
1618 log_trace!(self, "Got latest local commitment tx broadcast, searching for available HTLCs to claim");
1619 match self.key_storage {
1620 Storage::Local { ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref latest_per_commitment_point, .. } => {
1621 let (local_txn, spendable_outputs, watch_outputs) = self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, latest_per_commitment_point, &Some(*delayed_payment_base_key));
1622 return (local_txn, spendable_outputs, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs));
1624 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
1625 let (local_txn, spendable_outputs, watch_outputs) = self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, &None, &None);
1626 return (local_txn, spendable_outputs, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs));
1631 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1632 if local_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
1633 log_trace!(self, "Got previous local commitment tx broadcast, searching for available HTLCs to claim");
1634 match self.key_storage {
1635 Storage::Local { ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref prev_latest_per_commitment_point, .. } => {
1636 let (local_txn, spendable_outputs, watch_outputs) = self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, prev_latest_per_commitment_point, &Some(*delayed_payment_base_key));
1637 return (local_txn, spendable_outputs, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs));
1639 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
1640 let (local_txn, spendable_outputs, watch_outputs) = self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, &None, &None);
1641 return (local_txn, spendable_outputs, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs));
1646 (Vec::new(), Vec::new(), (commitment_txid, Vec::new()))
1649 /// Generate a spendable output event when closing_transaction get registered onchain.
1650 fn check_spend_closing_transaction(&self, tx: &Transaction) -> Option<SpendableOutputDescriptor> {
1651 if tx.input[0].sequence == 0xFFFFFFFF && !tx.input[0].witness.is_empty() && tx.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len() == 71 {
1652 match self.key_storage {
1653 Storage::Local { ref shutdown_pubkey, .. } => {
1654 let our_channel_close_key_hash = Hash160::hash(&shutdown_pubkey.serialize());
1655 let shutdown_script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&our_channel_close_key_hash[..]).into_script();
1656 for (idx, output) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
1657 if shutdown_script == output.script_pubkey {
1658 return Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
1659 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), vout: idx as u32 },
1660 output: output.clone(),
1665 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
1666 //TODO: we need to ensure an offline client will generate the event when it
1667 // comes back online after only the watchtower saw the transaction
1674 /// Used by ChannelManager deserialization to broadcast the latest local state if it's copy of
1675 /// the Channel was out-of-date.
1676 pub(super) fn get_latest_local_commitment_txn(&self) -> Vec<Transaction> {
1677 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1678 let mut res = vec![local_tx.tx.clone()];
1679 match self.key_storage {
1680 Storage::Local { ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref prev_latest_per_commitment_point, .. } => {
1681 res.append(&mut self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, prev_latest_per_commitment_point, &Some(*delayed_payment_base_key)).0);
1683 _ => panic!("Can only broadcast by local channelmonitor"),
1691 fn block_connected(&mut self, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], height: u32, block_hash: &Sha256dHash, broadcaster: &BroadcasterInterface)-> (Vec<(Sha256dHash, Vec<TxOut>)>, Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>, Vec<(HTLCSource, Option<PaymentPreimage>, PaymentHash)>) {
1692 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
1693 let mut spendable_outputs = Vec::new();
1694 let mut htlc_updated = Vec::new();
1695 for tx in txn_matched {
1696 if tx.input.len() == 1 {
1697 // Assuming our keys were not leaked (in which case we're screwed no matter what),
1698 // commitment transactions and HTLC transactions will all only ever have one input,
1699 // which is an easy way to filter out any potential non-matching txn for lazy
1701 let prevout = &tx.input[0].previous_output;
1702 let mut txn: Vec<Transaction> = Vec::new();
1703 let funding_txo = match self.key_storage {
1704 Storage::Local { ref funding_info, .. } => {
1705 funding_info.clone()
1707 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
1711 if funding_txo.is_none() || (prevout.txid == funding_txo.as_ref().unwrap().0.txid && prevout.vout == funding_txo.as_ref().unwrap().0.index as u32) {
1712 let (remote_txn, new_outputs, mut spendable_output, mut updated) = self.check_spend_remote_transaction(tx, height);
1714 spendable_outputs.append(&mut spendable_output);
1715 if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() {
1716 watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
1719 let (local_txn, mut spendable_output, new_outputs) = self.check_spend_local_transaction(tx, height);
1720 spendable_outputs.append(&mut spendable_output);
1722 if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() {
1723 watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
1726 if !funding_txo.is_none() && txn.is_empty() {
1727 if let Some(spendable_output) = self.check_spend_closing_transaction(tx) {
1728 spendable_outputs.push(spendable_output);
1731 if updated.len() > 0 {
1732 htlc_updated.append(&mut updated);
1735 if let Some(&(commitment_number, _)) = self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.get(&prevout.txid) {
1736 let (tx, spendable_output) = self.check_spend_remote_htlc(tx, commitment_number);
1737 if let Some(tx) = tx {
1740 if let Some(spendable_output) = spendable_output {
1741 spendable_outputs.push(spendable_output);
1745 for tx in txn.iter() {
1746 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(tx);
1749 // While all commitment/HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions have one input, HTLCs
1750 // can also be resolved in a few other ways which can have more than one output. Thus,
1751 // we call is_resolving_htlc_output here outside of the tx.input.len() == 1 check.
1752 let mut updated = self.is_resolving_htlc_output(tx);
1753 if updated.len() > 0 {
1754 htlc_updated.append(&mut updated);
1757 if let Some(ref cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1758 if self.would_broadcast_at_height(height) {
1759 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&cur_local_tx.tx);
1760 match self.key_storage {
1761 Storage::Local { ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref latest_per_commitment_point, .. } => {
1762 let (txs, mut spendable_output, new_outputs) = self.broadcast_by_local_state(&cur_local_tx, latest_per_commitment_point, &Some(*delayed_payment_base_key));
1763 spendable_outputs.append(&mut spendable_output);
1764 if !new_outputs.is_empty() {
1765 watch_outputs.push((cur_local_tx.txid.clone(), new_outputs));
1768 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
1771 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
1772 let (txs, mut spendable_output, new_outputs) = self.broadcast_by_local_state(&cur_local_tx, &None, &None);
1773 spendable_outputs.append(&mut spendable_output);
1774 if !new_outputs.is_empty() {
1775 watch_outputs.push((cur_local_tx.txid.clone(), new_outputs));
1778 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
1784 self.last_block_hash = block_hash.clone();
1785 (watch_outputs, spendable_outputs, htlc_updated)
1788 pub(super) fn would_broadcast_at_height(&self, height: u32) -> bool {
1789 // We need to consider all HTLCs which are:
1790 // * in any unrevoked remote commitment transaction, as they could broadcast said
1791 // transactions and we'd end up in a race, or
1792 // * are in our latest local commitment transaction, as this is the thing we will
1793 // broadcast if we go on-chain.
1794 // Note that we consider HTLCs which were below dust threshold here - while they don't
1795 // strictly imply that we need to fail the channel, we need to go ahead and fail them back
1796 // to the source, and if we don't fail the channel we will have to ensure that the next
1797 // updates that peer sends us are update_fails, failing the channel if not. It's probably
1798 // easier to just fail the channel as this case should be rare enough anyway.
1799 macro_rules! scan_commitment {
1800 ($htlcs: expr, $local_tx: expr) => {
1801 for ref htlc in $htlcs {
1802 // For inbound HTLCs which we know the preimage for, we have to ensure we hit the
1803 // chain with enough room to claim the HTLC without our counterparty being able to
1804 // time out the HTLC first.
1805 // For outbound HTLCs which our counterparty hasn't failed/claimed, our primary
1806 // concern is being able to claim the corresponding inbound HTLC (on another
1807 // channel) before it expires. In fact, we don't even really care if our
1808 // counterparty here claims such an outbound HTLC after it expired as long as we
1809 // can still claim the corresponding HTLC. Thus, to avoid needlessly hitting the
1810 // chain when our counterparty is waiting for expiration to off-chain fail an HTLC
1811 // we give ourselves a few blocks of headroom after expiration before going
1812 // on-chain for an expired HTLC.
1813 // Note that, to avoid a potential attack whereby a node delays claiming an HTLC
1814 // from us until we've reached the point where we go on-chain with the
1815 // corresponding inbound HTLC, we must ensure that outbound HTLCs go on chain at
1816 // least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER blocks prior to the inbound HTLC.
1817 // aka outbound_cltv + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS == height - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
1818 // inbound_cltv == height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
1819 // outbound_cltv + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= inbound_cltv - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
1820 // HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS + 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= inbound_cltv - outbound_cltv
1821 // CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA <= inbound_cltv - outbound_cltv (by check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion)
1822 // HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS + 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA
1823 // The final, above, condition is checked for statically in channelmanager
1824 // with CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2.
1825 let htlc_outbound = $local_tx == htlc.offered;
1826 if ( htlc_outbound && htlc.cltv_expiry + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS <= height) ||
1827 (!htlc_outbound && htlc.cltv_expiry <= height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER && self.payment_preimages.contains_key(&htlc.payment_hash)) {
1828 log_info!(self, "Force-closing channel due to {} HTLC timeout, HTLC expiry is {}", if htlc_outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound "}, htlc.cltv_expiry);
1835 if let Some(ref cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1836 scan_commitment!(cur_local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, _)| a), true);
1839 if let Storage::Local { ref current_remote_commitment_txid, ref prev_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage {
1840 if let &Some(ref txid) = current_remote_commitment_txid {
1841 if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(txid) {
1842 scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _)| a), false);
1845 if let &Some(ref txid) = prev_remote_commitment_txid {
1846 if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(txid) {
1847 scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _)| a), false);
1855 /// Check if any transaction broadcasted is resolving HTLC output by a success or timeout on a local
1856 /// or remote commitment tx, if so send back the source, preimage if found and payment_hash of resolved HTLC
1857 fn is_resolving_htlc_output(&mut self, tx: &Transaction) -> Vec<(HTLCSource, Option<PaymentPreimage>, PaymentHash)> {
1858 let mut htlc_updated = Vec::new();
1860 'outer_loop: for input in &tx.input {
1861 let mut payment_data = None;
1862 let revocation_sig_claim = (input.witness.len() == 3 && input.witness[2].len() == OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT && input.witness[1].len() == 33)
1863 || (input.witness.len() == 3 && input.witness[2].len() == ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT && input.witness[1].len() == 33);
1864 let accepted_preimage_claim = input.witness.len() == 5 && input.witness[4].len() == ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT;
1865 let offered_preimage_claim = input.witness.len() == 3 && input.witness[2].len() == OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT;
1867 macro_rules! log_claim {
1868 ($tx_info: expr, $local_tx: expr, $htlc: expr, $source_avail: expr) => {
1869 // We found the output in question, but aren't failing it backwards
1870 // as we have no corresponding source and no valid remote commitment txid
1871 // to try a weak source binding with same-hash, same-value still-valid offered HTLC.
1872 // This implies either it is an inbound HTLC or an outbound HTLC on a revoked transaction.
1873 let outbound_htlc = $local_tx == $htlc.offered;
1874 if ($local_tx && revocation_sig_claim) ||
1875 (outbound_htlc && !$source_avail && (accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim)) {
1876 log_error!(self, "Input spending {} ({}:{}) in {} resolves {} HTLC with payment hash {} with {}!",
1877 $tx_info, input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, tx.txid(),
1878 if outbound_htlc { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0),
1879 if revocation_sig_claim { "revocation sig" } else { "preimage claim after we'd passed the HTLC resolution back" });
1881 log_info!(self, "Input spending {} ({}:{}) in {} resolves {} HTLC with payment hash {} with {}",
1882 $tx_info, input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, tx.txid(),
1883 if outbound_htlc { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0),
1884 if revocation_sig_claim { "revocation sig" } else if accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim { "preimage" } else { "timeout" });
1889 macro_rules! check_htlc_valid_remote {
1890 ($remote_txid: expr, $htlc_output: expr) => {
1891 if let &Some(txid) = $remote_txid {
1892 for &(ref pending_htlc, ref pending_source) in self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(&txid).unwrap() {
1893 if pending_htlc.payment_hash == $htlc_output.payment_hash && pending_htlc.amount_msat == $htlc_output.amount_msat {
1894 if let &Some(ref source) = pending_source {
1895 log_claim!("revoked remote commitment tx", false, pending_htlc, true);
1896 payment_data = Some(((**source).clone(), $htlc_output.payment_hash));
1905 macro_rules! scan_commitment {
1906 ($htlcs: expr, $tx_info: expr, $local_tx: expr) => {
1907 for (ref htlc_output, source_option) in $htlcs {
1908 if Some(input.previous_output.vout) == htlc_output.transaction_output_index {
1909 if let Some(ref source) = source_option {
1910 log_claim!($tx_info, $local_tx, htlc_output, true);
1911 // We have a resolution of an HTLC either from one of our latest
1912 // local commitment transactions or an unrevoked remote commitment
1913 // transaction. This implies we either learned a preimage, the HTLC
1914 // has timed out, or we screwed up. In any case, we should now
1915 // resolve the source HTLC with the original sender.
1916 payment_data = Some(((*source).clone(), htlc_output.payment_hash));
1917 } else if !$local_tx {
1918 if let Storage::Local { ref current_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage {
1919 check_htlc_valid_remote!(current_remote_commitment_txid, htlc_output);
1921 if payment_data.is_none() {
1922 if let Storage::Local { ref prev_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage {
1923 check_htlc_valid_remote!(prev_remote_commitment_txid, htlc_output);
1927 if payment_data.is_none() {
1928 log_claim!($tx_info, $local_tx, htlc_output, false);
1929 continue 'outer_loop;
1936 if let Some(ref current_local_signed_commitment_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1937 if input.previous_output.txid == current_local_signed_commitment_tx.txid {
1938 scan_commitment!(current_local_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, ref b)| (a, b.as_ref())),
1939 "our latest local commitment tx", true);
1942 if let Some(ref prev_local_signed_commitment_tx) = self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1943 if input.previous_output.txid == prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.txid {
1944 scan_commitment!(prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, ref b)| (a, b.as_ref())),
1945 "our previous local commitment tx", true);
1948 if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(&input.previous_output.txid) {
1949 scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, ref b)| (a, (b.as_ref().clone()).map(|boxed| &**boxed))),
1950 "remote commitment tx", false);
1953 // Check that scan_commitment, above, decided there is some source worth relaying an
1954 // HTLC resolution backwards to and figure out whether we learned a preimage from it.
1955 if let Some((source, payment_hash)) = payment_data {
1956 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
1957 if accepted_preimage_claim {
1958 payment_preimage.0.copy_from_slice(&input.witness[3]);
1959 htlc_updated.push((source, Some(payment_preimage), payment_hash));
1960 } else if offered_preimage_claim {
1961 payment_preimage.0.copy_from_slice(&input.witness[1]);
1962 htlc_updated.push((source, Some(payment_preimage), payment_hash));
1964 htlc_updated.push((source, None, payment_hash));
1972 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
1974 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> ReadableArgs<R, Arc<Logger>> for (Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor) {
1975 fn read(reader: &mut R, logger: Arc<Logger>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1976 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1977 macro_rules! unwrap_obj {
1981 Err(_) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
1986 let _ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1987 let min_ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1988 if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION {
1989 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion);
1992 let commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor = <U48 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.0;
1994 let key_storage = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
1996 let revocation_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
1997 let htlc_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
1998 let delayed_payment_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
1999 let payment_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
2000 let shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
2001 let prev_latest_per_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
2002 let latest_per_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
2003 // Technically this can fail and serialize fail a round-trip, but only for serialization of
2004 // barely-init'd ChannelMonitors that we can't do anything with.
2005 let outpoint = OutPoint {
2006 txid: Readable::read(reader)?,
2007 index: Readable::read(reader)?,
2009 let funding_info = Some((outpoint, Readable::read(reader)?));
2010 let current_remote_commitment_txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
2011 let prev_remote_commitment_txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
2013 revocation_base_key,
2015 delayed_payment_base_key,
2018 prev_latest_per_commitment_point,
2019 latest_per_commitment_point,
2021 current_remote_commitment_txid,
2022 prev_remote_commitment_txid,
2025 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2028 let their_htlc_base_key = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
2029 let their_delayed_payment_base_key = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
2031 let their_cur_revocation_points = {
2032 let first_idx = <U48 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.0;
2036 let first_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
2037 let second_point_slice: [u8; 33] = Readable::read(reader)?;
2038 if second_point_slice[0..32] == [0; 32] && second_point_slice[32] == 0 {
2039 Some((first_idx, first_point, None))
2041 Some((first_idx, first_point, Some(unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&second_point_slice)))))
2046 let our_to_self_delay: u16 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2047 let their_to_self_delay: Option<u16> = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
2049 let mut old_secrets = [([0; 32], 1 << 48); 49];
2050 for &mut (ref mut secret, ref mut idx) in old_secrets.iter_mut() {
2051 *secret = Readable::read(reader)?;
2052 *idx = Readable::read(reader)?;
2055 macro_rules! read_htlc_in_commitment {
2058 let offered: bool = Readable::read(reader)?;
2059 let amount_msat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2060 let cltv_expiry: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2061 let payment_hash: PaymentHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
2062 let transaction_output_index: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
2064 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
2065 offered, amount_msat, cltv_expiry, payment_hash, transaction_output_index
2071 let remote_claimable_outpoints_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2072 let mut remote_claimable_outpoints = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(remote_claimable_outpoints_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 64));
2073 for _ in 0..remote_claimable_outpoints_len {
2074 let txid: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
2075 let htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2076 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlcs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
2077 for _ in 0..htlcs_count {
2078 htlcs.push((read_htlc_in_commitment!(), <Option<HTLCSource> as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.map(|o: HTLCSource| Box::new(o))));
2080 if let Some(_) = remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, htlcs) {
2081 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
2085 let remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2086 let mut remote_commitment_txn_on_chain = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
2087 for _ in 0..remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len {
2088 let txid: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
2089 let commitment_number = <U48 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.0;
2090 let outputs_count = <u64 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?;
2091 let mut outputs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 8));
2092 for _ in 0..outputs_count {
2093 outputs.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
2095 if let Some(_) = remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(txid, (commitment_number, outputs)) {
2096 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
2100 let remote_hash_commitment_number_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2101 let mut remote_hash_commitment_number = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(remote_hash_commitment_number_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
2102 for _ in 0..remote_hash_commitment_number_len {
2103 let payment_hash: PaymentHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
2104 let commitment_number = <U48 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.0;
2105 if let Some(_) = remote_hash_commitment_number.insert(payment_hash, commitment_number) {
2106 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
2110 macro_rules! read_local_tx {
2113 let tx = match Transaction::consensus_decode(reader.by_ref()) {
2116 encode::Error::Io(ioe) => return Err(DecodeError::Io(ioe)),
2117 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2121 if tx.input.is_empty() {
2122 // Ensure tx didn't hit the 0-input ambiguity case.
2123 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
2126 let revocation_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
2127 let a_htlc_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
2128 let b_htlc_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
2129 let delayed_payment_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
2130 let feerate_per_kw: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2132 let htlcs_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2133 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlcs_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
2134 for _ in 0..htlcs_len {
2135 let htlc = read_htlc_in_commitment!();
2136 let sigs = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2138 1 => Some((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?)),
2139 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2141 htlcs.push((htlc, sigs, Readable::read(reader)?));
2146 tx, revocation_key, a_htlc_key, b_htlc_key, delayed_payment_key, feerate_per_kw,
2153 let prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2156 Some(read_local_tx!())
2158 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2161 let current_local_signed_commitment_tx = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2164 Some(read_local_tx!())
2166 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2169 let current_remote_commitment_number = <U48 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.0;
2171 let payment_preimages_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2172 let mut payment_preimages = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(payment_preimages_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
2173 for _ in 0..payment_preimages_len {
2174 let preimage: PaymentPreimage = Readable::read(reader)?;
2175 let hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
2176 if let Some(_) = payment_preimages.insert(hash, preimage) {
2177 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
2181 let last_block_hash: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
2182 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
2184 Ok((last_block_hash.clone(), ChannelMonitor {
2185 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor,
2188 their_htlc_base_key,
2189 their_delayed_payment_base_key,
2190 their_cur_revocation_points,
2193 their_to_self_delay,
2196 remote_claimable_outpoints,
2197 remote_commitment_txn_on_chain,
2198 remote_hash_commitment_number,
2200 prev_local_signed_commitment_tx,
2201 current_local_signed_commitment_tx,
2202 current_remote_commitment_number,
2217 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Script;
2218 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
2219 use bitcoin_hashes::Hash;
2220 use bitcoin_hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
2222 use ln::channelmanager::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
2223 use ln::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor;
2224 use ln::chan_utils::{HTLCOutputInCommitment, TxCreationKeys};
2225 use util::test_utils::TestLogger;
2226 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
2227 use secp256k1::Secp256k1;
2228 use rand::{thread_rng,Rng};
2232 fn test_per_commitment_storage() {
2233 // Test vectors from BOLT 3:
2234 let mut secrets: Vec<[u8; 32]> = Vec::new();
2235 let mut monitor: ChannelMonitor;
2236 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2237 let logger = Arc::new(TestLogger::new());
2239 macro_rules! test_secrets {
2241 let mut idx = 281474976710655;
2242 for secret in secrets.iter() {
2243 assert_eq!(monitor.get_secret(idx).unwrap(), *secret);
2246 assert_eq!(monitor.get_min_seen_secret(), idx + 1);
2247 assert!(monitor.get_secret(idx).is_none());
2252 // insert_secret correct sequence
2253 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
2256 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2257 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
2258 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2261 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2262 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
2263 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2266 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2267 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
2268 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2271 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2272 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
2273 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2276 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2277 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
2278 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2281 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2282 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
2283 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2286 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2287 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
2288 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2291 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2292 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
2293 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2298 // insert_secret #1 incorrect
2299 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
2302 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2303 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
2304 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2307 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2308 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
2309 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
2310 "Previous secret did not match new one");
2314 // insert_secret #2 incorrect (#1 derived from incorrect)
2315 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
2318 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2319 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
2320 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2323 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2324 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("dddc3a8d14fddf2b68fa8c7fbad2748274937479dd0f8930d5ebb4ab6bd866a3").unwrap());
2325 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2328 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2329 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
2330 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2333 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2334 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
2335 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
2336 "Previous secret did not match new one");
2340 // insert_secret #3 incorrect
2341 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
2344 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2345 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
2346 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2349 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2350 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
2351 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2354 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2355 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c51a18b13e8527e579ec56365482c62f180b7d5760b46e9477dae59e87ed423a").unwrap());
2356 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2359 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2360 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
2361 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
2362 "Previous secret did not match new one");
2366 // insert_secret #4 incorrect (1,2,3 derived from incorrect)
2367 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
2370 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2371 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
2372 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2375 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2376 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("dddc3a8d14fddf2b68fa8c7fbad2748274937479dd0f8930d5ebb4ab6bd866a3").unwrap());
2377 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2380 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2381 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c51a18b13e8527e579ec56365482c62f180b7d5760b46e9477dae59e87ed423a").unwrap());
2382 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2385 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2386 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("ba65d7b0ef55a3ba300d4e87af29868f394f8f138d78a7011669c79b37b936f4").unwrap());
2387 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2390 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2391 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
2392 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2395 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2396 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
2397 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2400 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2401 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
2402 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2405 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2406 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
2407 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
2408 "Previous secret did not match new one");
2412 // insert_secret #5 incorrect
2413 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
2416 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2417 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
2418 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2421 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2422 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
2423 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2426 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2427 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
2428 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2431 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2432 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
2433 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2436 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2437 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("631373ad5f9ef654bb3dade742d09504c567edd24320d2fcd68e3cc47e2ff6a6").unwrap());
2438 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2441 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2442 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
2443 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
2444 "Previous secret did not match new one");
2448 // insert_secret #6 incorrect (5 derived from incorrect)
2449 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
2452 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2453 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
2454 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2457 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2458 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
2459 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2462 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2463 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
2464 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2467 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2468 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
2469 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2472 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2473 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("631373ad5f9ef654bb3dade742d09504c567edd24320d2fcd68e3cc47e2ff6a6").unwrap());
2474 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2477 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2478 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("b7e76a83668bde38b373970155c868a653304308f9896692f904a23731224bb1").unwrap());
2479 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2482 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2483 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
2484 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2487 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2488 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
2489 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
2490 "Previous secret did not match new one");
2494 // insert_secret #7 incorrect
2495 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
2498 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2499 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
2500 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2503 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2504 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
2505 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2508 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2509 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
2510 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2513 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2514 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
2515 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2518 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2519 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
2520 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2523 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2524 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
2525 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2528 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2529 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("e7971de736e01da8ed58b94c2fc216cb1dca9e326f3a96e7194fe8ea8af6c0a3").unwrap());
2530 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2533 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2534 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
2535 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
2536 "Previous secret did not match new one");
2540 // insert_secret #8 incorrect
2541 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
2544 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2545 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
2546 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2549 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2550 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
2551 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2554 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2555 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
2556 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2559 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2560 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
2561 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2564 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2565 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
2566 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2569 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2570 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
2571 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2574 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2575 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
2576 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2579 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2580 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a7efbc61aac46d34f77778bac22c8a20c6a46ca460addc49009bda875ec88fa4").unwrap());
2581 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
2582 "Previous secret did not match new one");
2587 fn test_prune_preimages() {
2588 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2589 let logger = Arc::new(TestLogger::new());
2591 let dummy_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
2592 macro_rules! dummy_keys {
2596 per_commitment_point: dummy_key.clone(),
2597 revocation_key: dummy_key.clone(),
2598 a_htlc_key: dummy_key.clone(),
2599 b_htlc_key: dummy_key.clone(),
2600 a_delayed_payment_key: dummy_key.clone(),
2601 b_payment_key: dummy_key.clone(),
2606 let dummy_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
2608 let mut preimages = Vec::new();
2610 let mut rng = thread_rng();
2612 let mut preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
2613 rng.fill_bytes(&mut preimage.0[..]);
2614 let hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
2615 preimages.push((preimage, hash));
2619 macro_rules! preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs {
2620 ($preimages_slice: expr) => {
2622 let mut res = Vec::new();
2623 for (idx, preimage) in $preimages_slice.iter().enumerate() {
2624 res.push((HTLCOutputInCommitment {
2628 payment_hash: preimage.1.clone(),
2629 transaction_output_index: Some(idx as u32),
2636 macro_rules! preimages_to_local_htlcs {
2637 ($preimages_slice: expr) => {
2639 let mut inp = preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!($preimages_slice);
2640 let res: Vec<_> = inp.drain(..).map(|e| { (e.0, None, e.1) }).collect();
2646 macro_rules! test_preimages_exist {
2647 ($preimages_slice: expr, $monitor: expr) => {
2648 for preimage in $preimages_slice {
2649 assert!($monitor.payment_preimages.contains_key(&preimage.1));
2654 // Prune with one old state and a local commitment tx holding a few overlaps with the
2656 let mut monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
2657 monitor.set_their_to_self_delay(10);
2659 monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(dummy_tx.clone(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..10]));
2660 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[5..15]), 281474976710655, dummy_key);
2661 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[15..20]), 281474976710654, dummy_key);
2662 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[17..20]), 281474976710653, dummy_key);
2663 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[18..20]), 281474976710652, dummy_key);
2664 for &(ref preimage, ref hash) in preimages.iter() {
2665 monitor.provide_payment_preimage(hash, preimage);
2668 // Now provide a secret, pruning preimages 10-15
2669 let mut secret = [0; 32];
2670 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
2671 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secret.clone()).unwrap();
2672 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 15);
2673 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
2674 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[15..20], monitor);
2676 // Now provide a further secret, pruning preimages 15-17
2677 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
2678 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secret.clone()).unwrap();
2679 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 13);
2680 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
2681 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[17..20], monitor);
2683 // Now update local commitment tx info, pruning only element 18 as we still care about the
2684 // previous commitment tx's preimages too
2685 monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(dummy_tx.clone(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..5]));
2686 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
2687 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secret.clone()).unwrap();
2688 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 12);
2689 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
2690 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[18..20], monitor);
2692 // But if we do it again, we'll prune 5-10
2693 monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(dummy_tx.clone(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..3]));
2694 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
2695 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secret.clone()).unwrap();
2696 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 5);
2697 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..5], monitor);
2700 // Further testing is done in the ChannelManager integration tests.