_ Git - rust-lightning/blob - src/ln/channelmonitor.rs

   1 //! The logic to monitor for on-chain transactions and create the relevant claim responses lives
   2 //! here.
   3 //!
   4 //! ChannelMonitor objects are generated by ChannelManager in response to relevant
   5 //! messages/actions, and MUST be persisted to disk (and, preferably, remotely) before progress can
   6 //! be made in responding to certain messages, see ManyChannelMonitor for more.
   7 //!
   8 //! Note that ChannelMonitors are an important part of the lightning trust model and a copy of the
   9 //! latest ChannelMonitor must always be actively monitoring for chain updates (and no out-of-date
  10 //! ChannelMonitors should do so). Thus, if you're building rust-lightning into an HSM or other
  11 //! security-domain-separated system design, you should consider having multiple paths for
  12 //! ChannelMonitors to get out of the HSM and onto monitoring devices.
  13
  14 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
  15 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxIn,TxOut,SigHashType,Transaction};
  16 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
  17 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Script;
  18 use bitcoin::network::serialize;
  19 use bitcoin::network::serialize::BitcoinHash;
  20 use bitcoin::network::encodable::{ConsensusDecodable, ConsensusEncodable};
  21 use bitcoin::util::hash::Sha256dHash;
  22 use bitcoin::util::bip143;
  23
  24 use crypto::digest::Digest;
  25
  26 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Message,Signature};
  27 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
  28 use secp256k1;
  29
  30 use ln::msgs::{DecodeError, HandleError};
  31 use ln::chan_utils;
  32 use ln::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment;
  33 use chain::chaininterface::{ChainListener, ChainWatchInterface, BroadcasterInterface};
  34 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
  35 use chain::keysinterface::SpendableOutputDescriptor;
  36 use util::logger::Logger;
  37 use util::ser::{ReadableArgs, Readable, Writer, Writeable, WriterWriteAdaptor, U48};
  38 use util::sha2::Sha256;
  39 use util::{byte_utils, events};
  40
  41 use std::collections::HashMap;
  42 use std::sync::{Arc,Mutex};
  43 use std::{hash,cmp, mem};
  44
  45 /// An error enum representing a failure to persist a channel monitor update.
  46 #[derive(Clone)]
  47 pub enum ChannelMonitorUpdateErr {
  48         /// Used to indicate a temporary failure (eg connection to a watchtower failed, but is expected
  49         /// to succeed at some point in the future).
  50         ///
  51         /// Such a failure will "freeze" a channel, preventing us from revoking old states or
  52         /// submitting new commitment transactions to the remote party.
  53         /// ChannelManager::test_restore_channel_monitor can be used to retry the update(s) and restore
  54         /// the channel to an operational state.
  55         ///
  56         /// Note that continuing to operate when no copy of the updated ChannelMonitor could be
  57         /// persisted is unsafe - if you failed to store the update on your own local disk you should
  58         /// instead return PermanentFailure to force closure of the channel ASAP.
  59         ///
  60         /// Even when a channel has been "frozen" updates to the ChannelMonitor can continue to occur
  61         /// (eg if an inbound HTLC which we forwarded was claimed upstream resulting in us attempting
  62         /// to claim it on this channel) and those updates must be applied wherever they can be. At
  63         /// least one such updated ChannelMonitor must be persisted otherwise PermanentFailure should
  64         /// be returned to get things on-chain ASAP using only the in-memory copy. Obviously updates to
  65         /// the channel which would invalidate previous ChannelMonitors are not made when a channel has
  66         /// been "frozen".
  67         ///
  68         /// Note that even if updates made after TemporaryFailure succeed you must still call
  69         /// test_restore_channel_monitor to ensure you have the latest monitor and re-enable normal
  70         /// channel operation.
  71         TemporaryFailure,
  72         /// Used to indicate no further channel monitor updates will be allowed (eg we've moved on to a
  73         /// different watchtower and cannot update with all watchtowers that were previously informed
  74         /// of this channel). This will force-close the channel in question.
  75         PermanentFailure,
  76 }
  77
  78 /// Simple trait indicating ability to track a set of ChannelMonitors and multiplex events between
  79 /// them. Generally should be implemented by keeping a local SimpleManyChannelMonitor and passing
  80 /// events to it, while also taking any add_update_monitor events and passing them to some remote
  81 /// server(s).
  82 ///
  83 /// Note that any updates to a channel's monitor *must* be applied to each instance of the
  84 /// channel's monitor everywhere (including remote watchtowers) *before* this function returns. If
  85 /// an update occurs and a remote watchtower is left with old state, it may broadcast transactions
  86 /// which we have revoked, allowing our counterparty to claim all funds in the channel!
  87 pub trait ManyChannelMonitor: Send + Sync {
  88         /// Adds or updates a monitor for the given `funding_txo`.
  89         ///
  90         /// Implementor must also ensure that the funding_txo outpoint is registered with any relevant
  91         /// ChainWatchInterfaces such that the provided monitor receives block_connected callbacks with
  92         /// any spends of it.
  93         fn add_update_monitor(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr>;
  94 }
  95
  96 /// A simple implementation of a ManyChannelMonitor and ChainListener. Can be used to create a
  97 /// watchtower or watch our own channels.
  98 ///
  99 /// Note that you must provide your own key by which to refer to channels.
 100 ///
 101 /// If you're accepting remote monitors (ie are implementing a watchtower), you must verify that
 102 /// users cannot overwrite a given channel by providing a duplicate key. ie you should probably
 103 /// index by a PublicKey which is required to sign any updates.
 104 ///
 105 /// If you're using this for local monitoring of your own channels, you probably want to use
 106 /// `OutPoint` as the key, which will give you a ManyChannelMonitor implementation.
 107 pub struct SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
 108         #[cfg(test)] // Used in ChannelManager tests to manipulate channels directly
 109         pub monitors: Mutex<HashMap<Key, ChannelMonitor>>,
 110         #[cfg(not(test))]
 111         monitors: Mutex<HashMap<Key, ChannelMonitor>>,
 112         chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>,
 113         broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>,
 114         pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
 115 }
 116
 117 impl<Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash> ChainListener for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
 118         fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], _indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) {
 119                 let block_hash = header.bitcoin_hash();
 120                 let mut new_events: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(0);
 121                 {
 122                         let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
 123                         for monitor in monitors.values_mut() {
 124                                 let (txn_outputs, spendable_outputs) = monitor.block_connected(txn_matched, height, &block_hash, &*self.broadcaster);
 125                                 if spendable_outputs.len() > 0 {
 126                                         new_events.push(events::Event::SpendableOutputs {
 127                                                 outputs: spendable_outputs,
 128                                         });
 129                                 }
 130                                 for (ref txid, ref outputs) in txn_outputs {
 131                                         for (idx, output) in outputs.iter().enumerate() {
 132                                                 self.chain_monitor.install_watch_outpoint((txid.clone(), idx as u32), &output.script_pubkey);
 133                                         }
 134                                 }
 135                         }
 136                 }
 137                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
 138                 pending_events.append(&mut new_events);
 139         }
 140
 141         fn block_disconnected(&self, _: &BlockHeader) { }
 142 }
 143
 144 impl<Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash + 'static> SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
 145         /// Creates a new object which can be used to monitor several channels given the chain
 146         /// interface with which to register to receive notifications.
 147         pub fn new(chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>, broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>) -> Arc<SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key>> {
 148                 let res = Arc::new(SimpleManyChannelMonitor {
 149                         monitors: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
 150                         chain_monitor,
 151                         broadcaster,
 152                         pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
 153                 });
 154                 let weak_res = Arc::downgrade(&res);
 155                 res.chain_monitor.register_listener(weak_res);
 156                 res
 157         }
 158
 159         /// Adds or udpates the monitor which monitors the channel referred to by the given key.
 160         pub fn add_update_monitor_by_key(&self, key: Key, monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
 161                 let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
 162                 match monitors.get_mut(&key) {
 163                         Some(orig_monitor) => return orig_monitor.insert_combine(monitor),
 164                         None => {}
 165                 };
 166                 match &monitor.funding_txo {
 167                         &None => self.chain_monitor.watch_all_txn(),
 168                         &Some((ref outpoint, ref script)) => {
 169                                 self.chain_monitor.install_watch_tx(&outpoint.txid, script);
 170                                 self.chain_monitor.install_watch_outpoint((outpoint.txid, outpoint.index as u32), script);
 171                         },
 172                 }
 173                 monitors.insert(key, monitor);
 174                 Ok(())
 175         }
 176 }
 177
 178 impl ManyChannelMonitor for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<OutPoint> {
 179         fn add_update_monitor(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr> {
 180                 match self.add_update_monitor_by_key(funding_txo, monitor) {
 181                         Ok(_) => Ok(()),
 182                         Err(_) => Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure),
 183                 }
 184         }
 185 }
 186
 187 impl<Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash> events::EventsProvider for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
 188         fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
 189                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
 190                 let mut ret = Vec::new();
 191                 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut *pending_events);
 192                 ret
 193         }
 194 }
 195
 196 /// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, don't try to claim it in a shared transaction,
 197 /// instead claiming it in its own individual transaction.
 198 const CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 12;
 199 /// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, force-close the channel to broadcast the
 200 /// HTLC-Success transaction.
 201 /// In other words, this is an upper bound on how many blocks we think it can take us to get a
 202 /// transaction confirmed (and we use it in a few more, equivalent, places).
 203 pub(crate) const CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 6;
 204 /// Number of blocks by which point we expect our counterparty to have seen new blocks on the
 205 /// network and done a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance (+ we've updated all our
 206 /// copies of ChannelMonitors, including watchtowers).
 207 pub(crate) const HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS: u32 = 3;
 208
 209 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
 210 enum KeyStorage {
 211         PrivMode {
 212                 revocation_base_key: SecretKey,
 213                 htlc_base_key: SecretKey,
 214                 delayed_payment_base_key: SecretKey,
 215                 prev_latest_per_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
 216                 latest_per_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
 217         },
 218         SigsMode {
 219                 revocation_base_key: PublicKey,
 220                 htlc_base_key: PublicKey,
 221                 sigs: HashMap<Sha256dHash, Signature>,
 222         }
 223 }
 224
 225 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
 226 struct LocalSignedTx {
 227         /// txid of the transaction in tx, just used to make comparison faster
 228         txid: Sha256dHash,
 229         tx: Transaction,
 230         revocation_key: PublicKey,
 231         a_htlc_key: PublicKey,
 232         b_htlc_key: PublicKey,
 233         delayed_payment_key: PublicKey,
 234         feerate_per_kw: u64,
 235         htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Signature, Signature)>,
 236 }
 237
 238 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
 239 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
 240
 241 /// A ChannelMonitor handles chain events (blocks connected and disconnected) and generates
 242 /// on-chain transactions to ensure no loss of funds occurs.
 243 ///
 244 /// You MUST ensure that no ChannelMonitors for a given channel anywhere contain out-of-date
 245 /// information and are actively monitoring the chain.
 246 #[derive(Clone)]
 247 pub struct ChannelMonitor {
 248         funding_txo: Option<(OutPoint, Script)>,
 249         commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64,
 250
 251         key_storage: KeyStorage,
 252         their_htlc_base_key: Option<PublicKey>,
 253         their_delayed_payment_base_key: Option<PublicKey>,
 254         // first is the idx of the first of the two revocation points
 255         their_cur_revocation_points: Option<(u64, PublicKey, Option<PublicKey>)>,
 256
 257         our_to_self_delay: u16,
 258         their_to_self_delay: Option<u16>,
 259
 260         old_secrets: [([u8; 32], u64); 49],
 261         remote_claimable_outpoints: HashMap<Sha256dHash, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>>,
 262         /// We cannot identify HTLC-Success or HTLC-Timeout transactions by themselves on the chain.
 263         /// Nor can we figure out their commitment numbers without the commitment transaction they are
 264         /// spending. Thus, in order to claim them via revocation key, we track all the remote
 265         /// commitment transactions which we find on-chain, mapping them to the commitment number which
 266         /// can be used to derive the revocation key and claim the transactions.
 267         remote_commitment_txn_on_chain: HashMap<Sha256dHash, (u64, Vec<Script>)>,
 268         /// Cache used to make pruning of payment_preimages faster.
 269         /// Maps payment_hash values to commitment numbers for remote transactions for non-revoked
 270         /// remote transactions (ie should remain pretty small).
 271         /// Serialized to disk but should generally not be sent to Watchtowers.
 272         remote_hash_commitment_number: HashMap<[u8; 32], u64>,
 273
 274         // We store two local commitment transactions to avoid any race conditions where we may update
 275         // some monitors (potentially on watchtowers) but then fail to update others, resulting in the
 276         // various monitors for one channel being out of sync, and us broadcasting a local
 277         // transaction for which we have deleted claim information on some watchtowers.
 278         prev_local_signed_commitment_tx: Option<LocalSignedTx>,
 279         current_local_signed_commitment_tx: Option<LocalSignedTx>,
 280
 281         // Used just for ChannelManager to make sure it has the latest channel data during
 282         // deserialization
 283         current_remote_commitment_number: u64,
 284
 285         payment_preimages: HashMap<[u8; 32], [u8; 32]>,
 286
 287         destination_script: Script,
 288
 289         // We simply modify last_block_hash in Channel's block_connected so that serialization is
 290         // consistent but hopefully the users' copy handles block_connected in a consistent way.
 291         // (we do *not*, however, update them in insert_combine to ensure any local user copies keep
 292         // their last_block_hash from its state and not based on updated copies that didn't run through
 293         // the full block_connected).
 294         pub(crate) last_block_hash: Sha256dHash,
 295         secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>, //TODO: dedup this a bit...
 296         logger: Arc<Logger>,
 297 }
 298
 299 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
 300 /// Used only in testing and fuzztarget to check serialization roundtrips don't change the
 301 /// underlying object
 302 impl PartialEq for ChannelMonitor {
 303         fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
 304                 if self.funding_txo != other.funding_txo ||
 305                         self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor != other.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor ||
 306                         self.key_storage != other.key_storage ||
 307                         self.their_htlc_base_key != other.their_htlc_base_key ||
 308                         self.their_delayed_payment_base_key != other.their_delayed_payment_base_key ||
 309                         self.their_cur_revocation_points != other.their_cur_revocation_points ||
 310                         self.our_to_self_delay != other.our_to_self_delay ||
 311                         self.their_to_self_delay != other.their_to_self_delay ||
 312                         self.remote_claimable_outpoints != other.remote_claimable_outpoints ||
 313                         self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain != other.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain ||
 314                         self.remote_hash_commitment_number != other.remote_hash_commitment_number ||
 315                         self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx != other.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx ||
 316                         self.current_remote_commitment_number != other.current_remote_commitment_number ||
 317                         self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx != other.current_local_signed_commitment_tx ||
 318                         self.payment_preimages != other.payment_preimages ||
 319                         self.destination_script != other.destination_script
 320                 {
 321                         false
 322                 } else {
 323                         for (&(ref secret, ref idx), &(ref o_secret, ref o_idx)) in self.old_secrets.iter().zip(other.old_secrets.iter()) {
 324                                 if secret != o_secret || idx != o_idx {
 325                                         return false
 326                                 }
 327                         }
 328                         true
 329                 }
 330         }
 331 }
 332
 333 impl ChannelMonitor {
 334         pub(super) fn new(revocation_base_key: &SecretKey, delayed_payment_base_key: &SecretKey, htlc_base_key: &SecretKey, our_to_self_delay: u16, destination_script: Script, logger: Arc<Logger>) -> ChannelMonitor {
 335                 ChannelMonitor {
 336                         funding_txo: None,
 337                         commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: 0,
 338
 339                         key_storage: KeyStorage::PrivMode {
 340                                 revocation_base_key: revocation_base_key.clone(),
 341                                 htlc_base_key: htlc_base_key.clone(),
 342                                 delayed_payment_base_key: delayed_payment_base_key.clone(),
 343                                 prev_latest_per_commitment_point: None,
 344                                 latest_per_commitment_point: None,
 345                         },
 346                         their_htlc_base_key: None,
 347                         their_delayed_payment_base_key: None,
 348                         their_cur_revocation_points: None,
 349
 350                         our_to_self_delay: our_to_self_delay,
 351                         their_to_self_delay: None,
 352
 353                         old_secrets: [([0; 32], 1 << 48); 49],
 354                         remote_claimable_outpoints: HashMap::new(),
 355                         remote_commitment_txn_on_chain: HashMap::new(),
 356                         remote_hash_commitment_number: HashMap::new(),
 357
 358                         prev_local_signed_commitment_tx: None,
 359                         current_local_signed_commitment_tx: None,
 360                         current_remote_commitment_number: 1 << 48,
 361
 362                         payment_preimages: HashMap::new(),
 363                         destination_script: destination_script,
 364
 365                         last_block_hash: Default::default(),
 366                         secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
 367                         logger,
 368                 }
 369         }
 370
 371         #[inline]
 372         fn place_secret(idx: u64) -> u8 {
 373                 for i in 0..48 {
 374                         if idx & (1 << i) == (1 << i) {
 375                                 return i
 376                         }
 377                 }
 378                 48
 379         }
 380
 381         #[inline]
 382         fn derive_secret(secret: [u8; 32], bits: u8, idx: u64) -> [u8; 32] {
 383                 let mut res: [u8; 32] = secret;
 384                 for i in 0..bits {
 385                         let bitpos = bits - 1 - i;
 386                         if idx & (1 << bitpos) == (1 << bitpos) {
 387                                 res[(bitpos / 8) as usize] ^= 1 << (bitpos & 7);
 388                                 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
 389                                 sha.input(&res);
 390                                 sha.result(&mut res);
 391                         }
 392                 }
 393                 res
 394         }
 395
 396         /// Inserts a revocation secret into this channel monitor. Also optionally tracks the next
 397         /// revocation point which may be required to claim HTLC outputs which we know the preimage of
 398         /// in case the remote end force-closes using their latest state. Prunes old preimages if neither
 399         /// needed by local commitment transactions HTCLs nor by remote ones. Unless we haven't already seen remote
 400         /// commitment transaction's secret, they are de facto pruned (we can use revocation key).
 401         pub(super) fn provide_secret(&mut self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32], their_next_revocation_point: Option<(u64, PublicKey)>) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
 402                 let pos = ChannelMonitor::place_secret(idx);
 403                 for i in 0..pos {
 404                         let (old_secret, old_idx) = self.old_secrets[i as usize];
 405                         if ChannelMonitor::derive_secret(secret, pos, old_idx) != old_secret {
 406                                 return Err(HandleError{err: "Previous secret did not match new one", action: None})
 407                         }
 408                 }
 409                 self.old_secrets[pos as usize] = (secret, idx);
 410
 411                 if let Some(new_revocation_point) = their_next_revocation_point {
 412                         match self.their_cur_revocation_points {
 413                                 Some(old_points) => {
 414                                         if old_points.0 == new_revocation_point.0 + 1 {
 415                                                 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0, old_points.1, Some(new_revocation_point.1)));
 416                                         } else if old_points.0 == new_revocation_point.0 + 2 {
 417                                                 if let Some(old_second_point) = old_points.2 {
 418                                                         self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0 - 1, old_second_point, Some(new_revocation_point.1)));
 419                                                 } else {
 420                                                         self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((new_revocation_point.0, new_revocation_point.1, None));
 421                                                 }
 422                                         } else {
 423                                                 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((new_revocation_point.0, new_revocation_point.1, None));
 424                                         }
 425                                 },
 426                                 None => {
 427                                         self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((new_revocation_point.0, new_revocation_point.1, None));
 428                                 }
 429                         }
 430                 }
 431
 432                 if !self.payment_preimages.is_empty() {
 433                         let local_signed_commitment_tx = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx.as_ref().expect("Channel needs at least an initial commitment tx !");
 434                         let prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.as_ref();
 435                         let min_idx = self.get_min_seen_secret();
 436                         let remote_hash_commitment_number = &mut self.remote_hash_commitment_number;
 437
 438                         self.payment_preimages.retain(|&k, _| {
 439                                 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in &local_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs {
 440                                         if k == htlc.payment_hash {
 441                                                 return true
 442                                         }
 443                                 }
 444                                 if let Some(prev_local_commitment_tx) = prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
 445                                         for &(ref htlc, _, _) in prev_local_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
 446                                                 if k == htlc.payment_hash {
 447                                                         return true
 448                                                 }
 449                                         }
 450                                 }
 451                                 let contains = if let Some(cn) = remote_hash_commitment_number.get(&k) {
 452                                         if *cn < min_idx {
 453                                                 return true
 454                                         }
 455                                         true
 456                                 } else { false };
 457                                 if contains {
 458                                         remote_hash_commitment_number.remove(&k);
 459                                 }
 460                                 false
 461                         });
 462                 }
 463
 464                 Ok(())
 465         }
 466
 467         /// Informs this monitor of the latest remote (ie non-broadcastable) commitment transaction.
 468         /// The monitor watches for it to be broadcasted and then uses the HTLC information (and
 469         /// possibly future revocation/preimage information) to claim outputs where possible.
 470         /// We cache also the mapping hash:commitment number to lighten pruning of old preimages by watchtowers.
 471         pub(super) fn provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, unsigned_commitment_tx: &Transaction, htlc_outputs: Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>, commitment_number: u64) {
 472                 // TODO: Encrypt the htlc_outputs data with the single-hash of the commitment transaction
 473                 // so that a remote monitor doesn't learn anything unless there is a malicious close.
 474                 // (only maybe, sadly we cant do the same for local info, as we need to be aware of
 475                 // timeouts)
 476                 for htlc in &htlc_outputs {
 477                         self.remote_hash_commitment_number.insert(htlc.payment_hash, commitment_number);
 478                 }
 479                 self.remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(unsigned_commitment_tx.txid(), htlc_outputs);
 480                 self.current_remote_commitment_number = commitment_number;
 481         }
 482
 483         /// Informs this monitor of the latest local (ie broadcastable) commitment transaction. The
 484         /// monitor watches for timeouts and may broadcast it if we approach such a timeout. Thus, it
 485         /// is important that any clones of this channel monitor (including remote clones) by kept
 486         /// up-to-date as our local commitment transaction is updated.
 487         /// Panics if set_their_to_self_delay has never been called.
 488         /// Also update KeyStorage with latest local per_commitment_point to derive local_delayedkey in
 489         /// case of onchain HTLC tx
 490         pub(super) fn provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, signed_commitment_tx: Transaction, local_keys: chan_utils::TxCreationKeys, feerate_per_kw: u64, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Signature, Signature)>) {
 491                 assert!(self.their_to_self_delay.is_some());
 492                 self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx.take();
 493                 self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(LocalSignedTx {
 494                         txid: signed_commitment_tx.txid(),
 495                         tx: signed_commitment_tx,
 496                         revocation_key: local_keys.revocation_key,
 497                         a_htlc_key: local_keys.a_htlc_key,
 498                         b_htlc_key: local_keys.b_htlc_key,
 499                         delayed_payment_key: local_keys.a_delayed_payment_key,
 500                         feerate_per_kw,
 501                         htlc_outputs,
 502                 });
 503                 self.key_storage = if let KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, ref delayed_payment_base_key, prev_latest_per_commitment_point: _, ref latest_per_commitment_point } = self.key_storage {
 504                         KeyStorage::PrivMode {
 505                                 revocation_base_key: *revocation_base_key,
 506                                 htlc_base_key: *htlc_base_key,
 507                                 delayed_payment_base_key: *delayed_payment_base_key,
 508                                 prev_latest_per_commitment_point: *latest_per_commitment_point,
 509                                 latest_per_commitment_point: Some(local_keys.per_commitment_point),
 510                         }
 511                 } else { unimplemented!(); };
 512         }
 513
 514         /// Provides a payment_hash->payment_preimage mapping. Will be automatically pruned when all
 515         /// commitment_tx_infos which contain the payment hash have been revoked.
 516         pub(super) fn provide_payment_preimage(&mut self, payment_hash: &[u8; 32], payment_preimage: &[u8; 32]) {
 517                 self.payment_preimages.insert(payment_hash.clone(), payment_preimage.clone());
 518         }
 519
 520         /// Combines this ChannelMonitor with the information contained in the other ChannelMonitor.
 521         /// After a successful call this ChannelMonitor is up-to-date and is safe to use to monitor the
 522         /// chain for new blocks/transactions.
 523         pub fn insert_combine(&mut self, mut other: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
 524                 if self.funding_txo.is_some() {
 525                         // We should be able to compare the entire funding_txo, but in fuzztarget its trivially
 526                         // easy to collide the funding_txo hash and have a different scriptPubKey.
 527                         if other.funding_txo.is_some() && other.funding_txo.as_ref().unwrap().0 != self.funding_txo.as_ref().unwrap().0 {
 528                                 return Err(HandleError{err: "Funding transaction outputs are not identical!", action: None});
 529                         }
 530                 } else {
 531                         self.funding_txo = other.funding_txo.take();
 532                 }
 533                 let other_min_secret = other.get_min_seen_secret();
 534                 let our_min_secret = self.get_min_seen_secret();
 535                 if our_min_secret > other_min_secret {
 536                         self.provide_secret(other_min_secret, other.get_secret(other_min_secret).unwrap(), None)?;
 537                 }
 538                 // TODO: We should use current_remote_commitment_number and the commitment number out of
 539                 // local transactions to decide how to merge
 540                 if our_min_secret >= other_min_secret {
 541                         self.their_cur_revocation_points = other.their_cur_revocation_points;
 542                         for (txid, htlcs) in other.remote_claimable_outpoints.drain() {
 543                                 self.remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, htlcs);
 544                         }
 545                         if let Some(local_tx) = other.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
 546                                 self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(local_tx);
 547                         }
 548                         if let Some(local_tx) = other.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
 549                                 self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(local_tx);
 550                         }
 551                         self.payment_preimages = other.payment_preimages;
 552                 }
 553                 self.current_remote_commitment_number = cmp::min(self.current_remote_commitment_number, other.current_remote_commitment_number);
 554                 Ok(())
 555         }
 556
 557         /// Panics if commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor doesn't fit in 48 bits
 558         pub(super) fn set_commitment_obscure_factor(&mut self, commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64) {
 559                 assert!(commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor < (1 << 48));
 560                 self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor = commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor;
 561         }
 562
 563         /// Allows this monitor to scan only for transactions which are applicable. Note that this is
 564         /// optional, without it this monitor cannot be used in an SPV client, but you may wish to
 565         /// avoid this (or call unset_funding_info) on a monitor you wish to send to a watchtower as it
 566         /// provides slightly better privacy.
 567         /// It's the responsibility of the caller to register outpoint and script with passing the former
 568         /// value as key to add_update_monitor.
 569         pub(super) fn set_funding_info(&mut self, funding_info: (OutPoint, Script)) {
 570                 self.funding_txo = Some(funding_info);
 571         }
 572
 573         /// We log these base keys at channel opening to being able to rebuild redeemscript in case of leaked revoked commit tx
 574         pub(super) fn set_their_base_keys(&mut self, their_htlc_base_key: &PublicKey, their_delayed_payment_base_key: &PublicKey) {
 575                 self.their_htlc_base_key = Some(their_htlc_base_key.clone());
 576                 self.their_delayed_payment_base_key = Some(their_delayed_payment_base_key.clone());
 577         }
 578
 579         pub(super) fn set_their_to_self_delay(&mut self, their_to_self_delay: u16) {
 580                 self.their_to_self_delay = Some(their_to_self_delay);
 581         }
 582
 583         pub(super) fn unset_funding_info(&mut self) {
 584                 self.funding_txo = None;
 585         }
 586
 587         /// Gets the funding transaction outpoint of the channel this ChannelMonitor is monitoring for.
 588         pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
 589                 match self.funding_txo {
 590                         Some((outpoint, _)) => Some(outpoint),
 591                         None => None
 592                 }
 593         }
 594
 595         /// Gets the sets of all outpoints which this ChannelMonitor expects to hear about spends of.
 596         /// Generally useful when deserializing as during normal operation the return values of
 597         /// block_connected are sufficient to ensure all relevant outpoints are being monitored (note
 598         /// that the get_funding_txo outpoint and transaction must also be monitored for!).
 599         pub fn get_monitored_outpoints(&self) -> Vec<(Sha256dHash, u32, &Script)> {
 600                 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.len() * 2);
 601                 for (ref txid, &(_, ref outputs)) in self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
 602                         for (idx, output) in outputs.iter().enumerate() {
 603                                 res.push(((*txid).clone(), idx as u32, output));
 604                         }
 605                 }
 606                 res
 607         }
 608
 609         /// Serializes into a vec, with various modes for the exposed pub fns
 610         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W, for_local_storage: bool) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
 611                 //TODO: We still write out all the serialization here manually instead of using the fancy
 612                 //serialization framework we have, we should migrate things over to it.
 613                 writer.write_all(&[SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
 614                 writer.write_all(&[MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
 615
 616                 match &self.funding_txo {
 617                         &Some((ref outpoint, ref script)) => {
 618                                 writer.write_all(&outpoint.txid[..])?;
 619                                 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(outpoint.index))?;
 620                                 script.write(writer)?;
 621                         },
 622                         &None => {
 623                                 // We haven't even been initialized...not sure why anyone is serializing us, but
 624                                 // not much to give them.
 625                                 return Ok(());
 626                         },
 627                 }
 628
 629                 // Set in initial Channel-object creation, so should always be set by now:
 630                 U48(self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor).write(writer)?;
 631
 632                 match self.key_storage {
 633                         KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref prev_latest_per_commitment_point, ref latest_per_commitment_point } => {
 634                                 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
 635                                 writer.write_all(&revocation_base_key[..])?;
 636                                 writer.write_all(&htlc_base_key[..])?;
 637                                 writer.write_all(&delayed_payment_base_key[..])?;
 638                                 if let Some(ref prev_latest_per_commitment_point) = *prev_latest_per_commitment_point {
 639                                         writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
 640                                         writer.write_all(&prev_latest_per_commitment_point.serialize())?;
 641                                 } else {
 642                                         writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
 643                                 }
 644                                 if let Some(ref latest_per_commitment_point) = *latest_per_commitment_point {
 645                                         writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
 646                                         writer.write_all(&latest_per_commitment_point.serialize())?;
 647                                 } else {
 648                                         writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
 649                                 }
 650
 651                         },
 652                         KeyStorage::SigsMode { .. } => unimplemented!(),
 653                 }
 654
 655                 writer.write_all(&self.their_htlc_base_key.as_ref().unwrap().serialize())?;
 656                 writer.write_all(&self.their_delayed_payment_base_key.as_ref().unwrap().serialize())?;
 657
 658                 match self.their_cur_revocation_points {
 659                         Some((idx, pubkey, second_option)) => {
 660                                 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(idx))?;
 661                                 writer.write_all(&pubkey.serialize())?;
 662                                 match second_option {
 663                                         Some(second_pubkey) => {
 664                                                 writer.write_all(&second_pubkey.serialize())?;
 665                                         },
 666                                         None => {
 667                                                 writer.write_all(&[0; 33])?;
 668                                         },
 669                                 }
 670                         },
 671                         None => {
 672                                 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(0))?;
 673                         },
 674                 }
 675
 676                 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.our_to_self_delay))?;
 677                 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap()))?;
 678
 679                 for &(ref secret, ref idx) in self.old_secrets.iter() {
 680                         writer.write_all(secret)?;
 681                         writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*idx))?;
 682                 }
 683
 684                 macro_rules! serialize_htlc_in_commitment {
 685                         ($htlc_output: expr) => {
 686                                 writer.write_all(&[$htlc_output.offered as u8; 1])?;
 687                                 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc_output.amount_msat))?;
 688                                 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array($htlc_output.cltv_expiry))?;
 689                                 writer.write_all(&$htlc_output.payment_hash)?;
 690                                 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array($htlc_output.transaction_output_index))?;
 691                         }
 692                 }
 693
 694                 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_claimable_outpoints.len() as u64))?;
 695                 for (ref txid, ref htlc_outputs) in self.remote_claimable_outpoints.iter() {
 696                         writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
 697                         writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc_outputs.len() as u64))?;
 698                         for htlc_output in htlc_outputs.iter() {
 699                                 serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output);
 700                         }
 701                 }
 702
 703                 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.len() as u64))?;
 704                 for (ref txid, &(commitment_number, ref txouts)) in self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
 705                         writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
 706                         writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(commitment_number))?;
 707                         (txouts.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
 708                         for script in txouts.iter() {
 709                                 script.write(writer)?;
 710                         }
 711                 }
 712
 713                 if for_local_storage {
 714                         writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_hash_commitment_number.len() as u64))?;
 715                         for (ref payment_hash, commitment_number) in self.remote_hash_commitment_number.iter() {
 716                                 writer.write_all(*payment_hash)?;
 717                                 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(*commitment_number))?;
 718                         }
 719                 } else {
 720                         writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(0))?;
 721                 }
 722
 723                 macro_rules! serialize_local_tx {
 724                         ($local_tx: expr) => {
 725                                 if let Err(e) = $local_tx.tx.consensus_encode(&mut serialize::RawEncoder::new(WriterWriteAdaptor(writer))) {
 726                                         match e {
 727                                                 serialize::Error::Io(e) => return Err(e),
 728                                                 _ => panic!("local tx must have been well-formed!"),
 729                                         }
 730                                 }
 731
 732                                 writer.write_all(&$local_tx.revocation_key.serialize())?;
 733                                 writer.write_all(&$local_tx.a_htlc_key.serialize())?;
 734                                 writer.write_all(&$local_tx.b_htlc_key.serialize())?;
 735                                 writer.write_all(&$local_tx.delayed_payment_key.serialize())?;
 736
 737                                 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($local_tx.feerate_per_kw))?;
 738                                 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($local_tx.htlc_outputs.len() as u64))?;
 739                                 for &(ref htlc_output, ref their_sig, ref our_sig) in $local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
 740                                         serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output);
 741                                         writer.write_all(&their_sig.serialize_compact(&self.secp_ctx))?;
 742                                         writer.write_all(&our_sig.serialize_compact(&self.secp_ctx))?;
 743                                 }
 744                         }
 745                 }
 746
 747                 if let Some(ref prev_local_tx) = self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
 748                         writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
 749                         serialize_local_tx!(prev_local_tx);
 750                 } else {
 751                         writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
 752                 }
 753
 754                 if let Some(ref cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
 755                         writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
 756                         serialize_local_tx!(cur_local_tx);
 757                 } else {
 758                         writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
 759                 }
 760
 761                 if for_local_storage {
 762                         writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(self.current_remote_commitment_number))?;
 763                 } else {
 764                         writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(0))?;
 765                 }
 766
 767                 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.payment_preimages.len() as u64))?;
 768                 for payment_preimage in self.payment_preimages.values() {
 769                         writer.write_all(payment_preimage)?;
 770                 }
 771
 772                 self.last_block_hash.write(writer)?;
 773                 self.destination_script.write(writer)?;
 774
 775                 Ok(())
 776         }
 777
 778         /// Writes this monitor into the given writer, suitable for writing to disk.
 779         ///
 780         /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor), which
 781         /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
 782         /// the "reorg path" (ie not just starting at the same height but starting at the highest
 783         /// common block that appears on your best chain as well as on the chain which contains the
 784         /// last block hash returned) upon deserializing the object!
 785         pub fn write_for_disk<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
 786                 self.write(writer, true)
 787         }
 788
 789         /// Encodes this monitor into the given writer, suitable for sending to a remote watchtower
 790         ///
 791         /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor), which
 792         /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
 793         /// the "reorg path" (ie not just starting at the same height but starting at the highest
 794         /// common block that appears on your best chain as well as on the chain which contains the
 795         /// last block hash returned) upon deserializing the object!
 796         pub fn write_for_watchtower<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
 797                 self.write(writer, false)
 798         }
 799
 800         //TODO: Functions to serialize/deserialize (with different forms depending on which information
 801         //we want to leave out (eg funding_txo, etc).
 802
 803         /// Can only fail if idx is < get_min_seen_secret
 804         pub(super) fn get_secret(&self, idx: u64) -> Result<[u8; 32], HandleError> {
 805                 for i in 0..self.old_secrets.len() {
 806                         if (idx & (!((1 << i) - 1))) == self.old_secrets[i].1 {
 807                                 return Ok(ChannelMonitor::derive_secret(self.old_secrets[i].0, i as u8, idx))
 808                         }
 809                 }
 810                 assert!(idx < self.get_min_seen_secret());
 811                 Err(HandleError{err: "idx too low", action: None})
 812         }
 813
 814         pub(super) fn get_min_seen_secret(&self) -> u64 {
 815                 //TODO This can be optimized?
 816                 let mut min = 1 << 48;
 817                 for &(_, idx) in self.old_secrets.iter() {
 818                         if idx < min {
 819                                 min = idx;
 820                         }
 821                 }
 822                 min
 823         }
 824
 825         pub(super) fn get_cur_remote_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
 826                 self.current_remote_commitment_number
 827         }
 828
 829         pub(super) fn get_cur_local_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
 830                 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
 831                         0xffff_ffff_ffff - ((((local_tx.tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (local_tx.tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor)
 832                 } else { 0xffff_ffff_ffff }
 833         }
 834
 835         /// Attempts to claim a remote commitment transaction's outputs using the revocation key and
 836         /// data in remote_claimable_outpoints. Will directly claim any HTLC outputs which expire at a
 837         /// height > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER. In any case, will install monitoring for
 838         /// HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions.
 839         fn check_spend_remote_transaction(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32) -> (Vec<Transaction>, (Sha256dHash, Vec<TxOut>), Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>) {
 840                 // Most secp and related errors trying to create keys means we have no hope of constructing
 841                 // a spend transaction...so we return no transactions to broadcast
 842                 let mut txn_to_broadcast = Vec::new();
 843                 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
 844                 let mut spendable_outputs = Vec::new();
 845
 846                 let commitment_txid = tx.txid(); //TODO: This is gonna be a performance bottleneck for watchtowers!
 847                 let per_commitment_option = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(&commitment_txid);
 848
 849                 macro_rules! ignore_error {
 850                         ( $thing : expr ) => {
 851                                 match $thing {
 852                                         Ok(a) => a,
 853                                         Err(_) => return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs)
 854                                 }
 855                         };
 856                 }
 857
 858                 let commitment_number = 0xffffffffffff - ((((tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor);
 859                 if commitment_number >= self.get_min_seen_secret() {
 860                         let secret = self.get_secret(commitment_number).unwrap();
 861                         let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &secret));
 862                         let (revocation_pubkey, b_htlc_key) = match self.key_storage {
 863                                 KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
 864                                         let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
 865                                         (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_base_key))),
 866                                         ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &htlc_base_key))))
 867                                 },
 868                                 KeyStorage::SigsMode { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
 869                                         let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
 870                                         (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &revocation_base_key)),
 871                                         ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &htlc_base_key)))
 872                                 },
 873                         };
 874                         let delayed_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key), &self.their_delayed_payment_base_key.unwrap()));
 875                         let a_htlc_key = match self.their_htlc_base_key {
 876                                 None => return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs),
 877                                 Some(their_htlc_base_key) => ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key), &their_htlc_base_key)),
 878                         };
 879
 880                         let revokeable_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey, self.our_to_self_delay, &delayed_key);
 881                         let revokeable_p2wsh = revokeable_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
 882
 883                         let mut total_value = 0;
 884                         let mut values = Vec::new();
 885                         let mut inputs = Vec::new();
 886                         let mut htlc_idxs = Vec::new();
 887
 888                         for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
 889                                 if outp.script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh {
 890                                         inputs.push(TxIn {
 891                                                 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
 892                                                         txid: commitment_txid,
 893                                                         vout: idx as u32,
 894                                                 },
 895                                                 script_sig: Script::new(),
 896                                                 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
 897                                                 witness: Vec::new(),
 898                                         });
 899                                         htlc_idxs.push(None);
 900                                         values.push(outp.value);
 901                                         total_value += outp.value;
 902                                         break; // There can only be one of these
 903                                 }
 904                         }
 905
 906                         macro_rules! sign_input {
 907                                 ($sighash_parts: expr, $input: expr, $htlc_idx: expr, $amount: expr) => {
 908                                         {
 909                                                 let (sig, redeemscript) = match self.key_storage {
 910                                                         KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
 911                                                                 let redeemscript = if $htlc_idx.is_none() { revokeable_redeemscript.clone() } else {
 912                                                                         let htlc = &per_commitment_option.unwrap()[$htlc_idx.unwrap()];
 913                                                                         chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey)
 914                                                                 };
 915                                                                 let sighash = ignore_error!(Message::from_slice(&$sighash_parts.sighash_all(&$input, &redeemscript, $amount)[..]));
 916                                                                 let revocation_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key, &revocation_base_key));
 917                                                                 (self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &revocation_key), redeemscript)
 918                                                         },
 919                                                         KeyStorage::SigsMode { .. } => {
 920                                                                 unimplemented!();
 921                                                         }
 922                                                 };
 923                                                 $input.witness.push(sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
 924                                                 $input.witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
 925                                                 if $htlc_idx.is_none() {
 926                                                         $input.witness.push(vec!(1));
 927                                                 } else {
 928                                                         $input.witness.push(revocation_pubkey.serialize().to_vec());
 929                                                 }
 930                                                 $input.witness.push(redeemscript.into_bytes());
 931                                         }
 932                                 }
 933                         }
 934
 935                         if let Some(per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
 936                                 inputs.reserve_exact(per_commitment_data.len());
 937
 938                                 for (idx, htlc) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() {
 939                                         let expected_script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey);
 940                                         if htlc.transaction_output_index as usize >= tx.output.len() ||
 941                                                         tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 ||
 942                                                         tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].script_pubkey != expected_script.to_v0_p2wsh() {
 943                                                 return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs); // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user
 944                                         }
 945                                         let input = TxIn {
 946                                                 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
 947                                                         txid: commitment_txid,
 948                                                         vout: htlc.transaction_output_index,
 949                                                 },
 950                                                 script_sig: Script::new(),
 951                                                 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
 952                                                 witness: Vec::new(),
 953                                         };
 954                                         if htlc.cltv_expiry > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER {
 955                                                 inputs.push(input);
 956                                                 htlc_idxs.push(Some(idx));
 957                                                 values.push(tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].value);
 958                                                 total_value += htlc.amount_msat / 1000;
 959                                         } else {
 960                                                 let mut single_htlc_tx = Transaction {
 961                                                         version: 2,
 962                                                         lock_time: 0,
 963                                                         input: vec![input],
 964                                                         output: vec!(TxOut {
 965                                                                 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
 966                                                                 value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000, //TODO: - fee
 967                                                         }),
 968                                                 };
 969                                                 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&single_htlc_tx);
 970                                                 sign_input!(sighash_parts, single_htlc_tx.input[0], Some(idx), htlc.amount_msat / 1000);
 971                                                 txn_to_broadcast.push(single_htlc_tx);
 972                                         }
 973                                 }
 974                         }
 975
 976                         if !inputs.is_empty() || !txn_to_broadcast.is_empty() { // ie we're confident this is actually ours
 977                                 // We're definitely a remote commitment transaction!
 978                                 watch_outputs.append(&mut tx.output.clone());
 979                                 self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, (commitment_number, tx.output.iter().map(|output| { output.script_pubkey.clone() }).collect()));
 980                         }
 981                         if inputs.is_empty() { return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs); } // Nothing to be done...probably a false positive/local tx
 982
 983                         let outputs = vec!(TxOut {
 984                                 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
 985                                 value: total_value, //TODO: - fee
 986                         });
 987                         let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
 988                                 version: 2,
 989                                 lock_time: 0,
 990                                 input: inputs,
 991                                 output: outputs,
 992                         };
 993
 994                         let mut values_drain = values.drain(..);
 995                         let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx);
 996
 997                         for (input, htlc_idx) in spend_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(htlc_idxs.iter()) {
 998                                 let value = values_drain.next().unwrap();
 999                                 sign_input!(sighash_parts, input, htlc_idx, value);
1000                         }
1001
1002                         spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
1003                                 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: spend_tx.txid(), vout: 0 },
1004                                 output: spend_tx.output[0].clone(),
1005                         });
1006                         txn_to_broadcast.push(spend_tx);
1007                 } else if let Some(per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
1008                         // While this isn't useful yet, there is a potential race where if a counterparty
1009                         // revokes a state at the same time as the commitment transaction for that state is
1010                         // confirmed, and the watchtower receives the block before the user, the user could
1011                         // upload a new ChannelMonitor with the revocation secret but the watchtower has
1012                         // already processed the block, resulting in the remote_commitment_txn_on_chain entry
1013                         // not being generated by the above conditional. Thus, to be safe, we go ahead and
1014                         // insert it here.
1015                         watch_outputs.append(&mut tx.output.clone());
1016                         self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, (commitment_number, tx.output.iter().map(|output| { output.script_pubkey.clone() }).collect()));
1017
1018                         if let Some(revocation_points) = self.their_cur_revocation_points {
1019                                 let revocation_point_option =
1020                                         if revocation_points.0 == commitment_number { Some(&revocation_points.1) }
1021                                         else if let Some(point) = revocation_points.2.as_ref() {
1022                                                 if revocation_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 { Some(point) } else { None }
1023                                         } else { None };
1024                                 if let Some(revocation_point) = revocation_point_option {
1025                                         let (revocation_pubkey, b_htlc_key) = match self.key_storage {
1026                                                 KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
1027                                                         (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_base_key))),
1028                                                         ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &htlc_base_key))))
1029                                                 },
1030                                                 KeyStorage::SigsMode { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
1031                                                         (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &revocation_base_key)),
1032                                                         ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &htlc_base_key)))
1033                                                 },
1034                                         };
1035                                         let a_htlc_key = match self.their_htlc_base_key {
1036                                                 None => return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs),
1037                                                 Some(their_htlc_base_key) => ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &their_htlc_base_key)),
1038                                         };
1039
1040                                         let mut total_value = 0;
1041                                         let mut values = Vec::new();
1042                                         let mut inputs = Vec::new();
1043
1044                                         macro_rules! sign_input {
1045                                                 ($sighash_parts: expr, $input: expr, $amount: expr, $preimage: expr) => {
1046                                                         {
1047                                                                 let (sig, redeemscript) = match self.key_storage {
1048                                                                         KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
1049                                                                                 let htlc = &per_commitment_option.unwrap()[$input.sequence as usize];
1050                                                                                 let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey);
1051                                                                                 let sighash = ignore_error!(Message::from_slice(&$sighash_parts.sighash_all(&$input, &redeemscript, $amount)[..]));
1052                                                                                 let htlc_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &htlc_base_key));
1053                                                                                 (self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &htlc_key), redeemscript)
1054                                                                         },
1055                                                                         KeyStorage::SigsMode { .. } => {
1056                                                                                 unimplemented!();
1057                                                                         }
1058                                                                 };
1059                                                                 $input.witness.push(sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
1060                                                                 $input.witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1061                                                                 $input.witness.push($preimage);
1062                                                                 $input.witness.push(redeemscript.into_bytes());
1063                                                         }
1064                                                 }
1065                                         }
1066
1067                                         for (idx, htlc) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() {
1068                                                 if let Some(payment_preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
1069                                                         let input = TxIn {
1070                                                                 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
1071                                                                         txid: commitment_txid,
1072                                                                         vout: htlc.transaction_output_index,
1073                                                                 },
1074                                                                 script_sig: Script::new(),
1075                                                                 sequence: idx as u32, // reset to 0xfffffffd in sign_input
1076                                                                 witness: Vec::new(),
1077                                                         };
1078                                                         if htlc.cltv_expiry > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER {
1079                                                                 inputs.push(input);
1080                                                                 values.push((tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].value, payment_preimage));
1081                                                                 total_value += htlc.amount_msat / 1000;
1082                                                         } else {
1083                                                                 let mut single_htlc_tx = Transaction {
1084                                                                         version: 2,
1085                                                                         lock_time: 0,
1086                                                                         input: vec![input],
1087                                                                         output: vec!(TxOut {
1088                                                                                 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1089                                                                                 value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000, //TODO: - fee
1090                                                                         }),
1091                                                                 };
1092                                                                 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&single_htlc_tx);
1093                                                                 sign_input!(sighash_parts, single_htlc_tx.input[0], htlc.amount_msat / 1000, payment_preimage.to_vec());
1094                                                                 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
1095                                                                         outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: single_htlc_tx.txid(), vout: 0 },
1096                                                                         output: single_htlc_tx.output[0].clone(),
1097                                                                 });
1098                                                                 txn_to_broadcast.push(single_htlc_tx);
1099                                                         }
1100                                                 }
1101                                         }
1102
1103                                         if inputs.is_empty() { return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs); } // Nothing to be done...probably a false positive/local tx
1104
1105                                         let outputs = vec!(TxOut {
1106                                                 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1107                                                 value: total_value, //TODO: - fee
1108                                         });
1109                                         let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
1110                                                 version: 2,
1111                                                 lock_time: 0,
1112                                                 input: inputs,
1113                                                 output: outputs,
1114                                         };
1115
1116                                         let mut values_drain = values.drain(..);
1117                                         let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx);
1118
1119                                         for input in spend_tx.input.iter_mut() {
1120                                                 let value = values_drain.next().unwrap();
1121                                                 sign_input!(sighash_parts, input, value.0, value.1.to_vec());
1122                                         }
1123
1124                                         spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
1125                                                 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: spend_tx.txid(), vout: 0 },
1126                                                 output: spend_tx.output[0].clone(),
1127                                         });
1128                                         txn_to_broadcast.push(spend_tx);
1129                                 }
1130                         }
1131                 }
1132
1133                 (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs)
1134         }
1135
1136         /// Attempst to claim a remote HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout s outputs using the revocation key
1137         fn check_spend_remote_htlc(&self, tx: &Transaction, commitment_number: u64) -> (Option<Transaction>, Option<SpendableOutputDescriptor>) {
1138                 if tx.input.len() != 1 || tx.output.len() != 1 {
1139                         return (None, None)
1140                 }
1141
1142                 macro_rules! ignore_error {
1143                         ( $thing : expr ) => {
1144                                 match $thing {
1145                                         Ok(a) => a,
1146                                         Err(_) => return (None, None)
1147                                 }
1148                         };
1149                 }
1150
1151                 let secret = ignore_error!(self.get_secret(commitment_number));
1152                 let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &secret));
1153                 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
1154                 let revocation_pubkey = match self.key_storage {
1155                         KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
1156                                 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_base_key)))
1157                         },
1158                         KeyStorage::SigsMode { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
1159                                 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &revocation_base_key))
1160                         },
1161                 };
1162                 let delayed_key = match self.their_delayed_payment_base_key {
1163                         None => return (None, None),
1164                         Some(their_delayed_payment_base_key) => ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &their_delayed_payment_base_key)),
1165                 };
1166                 let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), &delayed_key);
1167                 let revokeable_p2wsh = redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
1168                 let htlc_txid = tx.txid(); //TODO: This is gonna be a performance bottleneck for watchtowers!
1169
1170                 let mut inputs = Vec::new();
1171                 let mut amount = 0;
1172
1173                 if tx.output[0].script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh { //HTLC transactions have one txin, one txout
1174                         inputs.push(TxIn {
1175                                 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
1176                                         txid: htlc_txid,
1177                                         vout: 0,
1178                                 },
1179                                 script_sig: Script::new(),
1180                                 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
1181                                 witness: Vec::new(),
1182                         });
1183                         amount = tx.output[0].value;
1184                 }
1185
1186                 if !inputs.is_empty() {
1187                         let outputs = vec!(TxOut {
1188                                 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1189                                 value: amount, //TODO: - fee
1190                         });
1191
1192                         let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
1193                                 version: 2,
1194                                 lock_time: 0,
1195                                 input: inputs,
1196                                 output: outputs,
1197                         };
1198
1199                         let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx);
1200
1201                         let sig = match self.key_storage {
1202                                 KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
1203                                         let sighash = ignore_error!(Message::from_slice(&sighash_parts.sighash_all(&spend_tx.input[0], &redeemscript, amount)[..]));
1204                                         let revocation_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key, &revocation_base_key));
1205                                         self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &revocation_key)
1206                                 }
1207                                 KeyStorage::SigsMode { .. } => {
1208                                         unimplemented!();
1209                                 }
1210                         };
1211                         spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
1212                         spend_tx.input[0].witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1213                         spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(vec!(1));
1214                         spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(redeemscript.into_bytes());
1215
1216                         let outpoint = BitcoinOutPoint { txid: spend_tx.txid(), vout: 0 };
1217                         let output = spend_tx.output[0].clone();
1218                         (Some(spend_tx), Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput { outpoint, output }))
1219                 } else { (None, None) }
1220         }
1221
1222         fn broadcast_by_local_state(&self, local_tx: &LocalSignedTx, per_commitment_point: &Option<PublicKey>, delayed_payment_base_key: &Option<SecretKey>) -> (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>) {
1223                 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
1224                 let mut spendable_outputs = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
1225
1226                 for &(ref htlc, ref their_sig, ref our_sig) in local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1227                         if htlc.offered {
1228                                 let mut htlc_timeout_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&local_tx.txid, local_tx.feerate_per_kw, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), htlc, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key, &local_tx.revocation_key);
1229
1230                                 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
1231
1232                                 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(their_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
1233                                 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1234                                 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
1235                                 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1236
1237                                 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new());
1238                                 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &local_tx.a_htlc_key, &local_tx.b_htlc_key, &local_tx.revocation_key).into_bytes());
1239
1240                                 if let Some(ref per_commitment_point) = *per_commitment_point {
1241                                         if let Some(ref delayed_payment_base_key) = *delayed_payment_base_key {
1242                                                 if let Ok(local_delayedkey) = chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base_key) {
1243                                                         spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutput {
1244                                                                 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: htlc_timeout_tx.txid(), vout: 0 },
1245                                                                 local_delayedkey,
1246                                                                 witness_script: chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&local_tx.revocation_key, self.our_to_self_delay, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key),
1247                                                                 to_self_delay: self.our_to_self_delay
1248                                                         });
1249                                                 }
1250                                         }
1251                                 }
1252                                 res.push(htlc_timeout_tx);
1253                         } else {
1254                                 if let Some(payment_preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
1255                                         let mut htlc_success_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&local_tx.txid, local_tx.feerate_per_kw, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), htlc, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key, &local_tx.revocation_key);
1256
1257                                         htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
1258
1259                                         htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(their_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
1260                                         htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1261                                         htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
1262                                         htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1263
1264                                         htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(payment_preimage.to_vec());
1265                                         htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &local_tx.a_htlc_key, &local_tx.b_htlc_key, &local_tx.revocation_key).into_bytes());
1266
1267                                         if let Some(ref per_commitment_point) = *per_commitment_point {
1268                                                 if let Some(ref delayed_payment_base_key) = *delayed_payment_base_key {
1269                                                         if let Ok(local_delayedkey) = chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base_key) {
1270                                                                 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutput {
1271                                                                         outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: htlc_success_tx.txid(), vout: 0 },
1272                                                                         local_delayedkey,
1273                                                                         witness_script: chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&local_tx.revocation_key, self.our_to_self_delay, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key),
1274                                                                         to_self_delay: self.our_to_self_delay
1275                                                                 });
1276                                                         }
1277                                                 }
1278                                         }
1279                                         res.push(htlc_success_tx);
1280                                 }
1281                         }
1282                 }
1283
1284                 (res, spendable_outputs)
1285         }
1286
1287         /// Attempts to claim any claimable HTLCs in a commitment transaction which was not (yet)
1288         /// revoked using data in local_claimable_outpoints.
1289         /// Should not be used if check_spend_revoked_transaction succeeds.
1290         fn check_spend_local_transaction(&self, tx: &Transaction, _height: u32) -> (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>) {
1291                 let commitment_txid = tx.txid();
1292                 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1293                         if local_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
1294                                 match self.key_storage {
1295                                         KeyStorage::PrivMode { revocation_base_key: _, htlc_base_key: _, ref delayed_payment_base_key, prev_latest_per_commitment_point: _, ref latest_per_commitment_point } => {
1296                                                 return self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, latest_per_commitment_point, &Some(*delayed_payment_base_key));
1297                                         },
1298                                         KeyStorage::SigsMode { .. } => {
1299                                                 return self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, &None, &None);
1300                                         }
1301                                 }
1302                         }
1303                 }
1304                 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1305                         if local_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
1306                                 match self.key_storage {
1307                                         KeyStorage::PrivMode { revocation_base_key: _, htlc_base_key: _, ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref prev_latest_per_commitment_point, .. } => {
1308                                                 return self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, prev_latest_per_commitment_point, &Some(*delayed_payment_base_key));
1309                                         },
1310                                         KeyStorage::SigsMode { .. } => {
1311                                                 return self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, &None, &None);
1312                                         }
1313                                 }
1314                         }
1315                 }
1316                 (Vec::new(), Vec::new())
1317         }
1318
1319         /// Used by ChannelManager deserialization to broadcast the latest local state if it's copy of
1320         /// the Channel was out-of-date.
1321         pub(super) fn get_latest_local_commitment_txn(&self) -> Vec<Transaction> {
1322                 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1323                         let mut res = vec![local_tx.tx.clone()];
1324                         match self.key_storage {
1325                                 KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref prev_latest_per_commitment_point, .. } => {
1326                                         res.append(&mut self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, prev_latest_per_commitment_point, &Some(*delayed_payment_base_key)).0);
1327                                 },
1328                                 _ => panic!("Can only broadcast by local channelmonitor"),
1329                         };
1330                         res
1331                 } else {
1332                         Vec::new()
1333                 }
1334         }
1335
1336         fn block_connected(&mut self, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], height: u32, block_hash: &Sha256dHash, broadcaster: &BroadcasterInterface)-> (Vec<(Sha256dHash, Vec<TxOut>)>, Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>) {
1337                 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
1338                 let mut spendable_outputs = Vec::new();
1339                 for tx in txn_matched {
1340                         if tx.input.len() == 1 {
1341                                 // Assuming our keys were not leaked (in which case we're screwed no matter what),
1342                                 // commitment transactions and HTLC transactions will all only ever have one input,
1343                                 // which is an easy way to filter out any potential non-matching txn for lazy
1344                                 // filters.
1345                                 let prevout = &tx.input[0].previous_output;
1346                                 let mut txn: Vec<Transaction> = Vec::new();
1347                                 if self.funding_txo.is_none() || (prevout.txid == self.funding_txo.as_ref().unwrap().0.txid && prevout.vout == self.funding_txo.as_ref().unwrap().0.index as u32) {
1348                                         let (remote_txn, new_outputs, mut spendable_output) = self.check_spend_remote_transaction(tx, height);
1349                                         txn = remote_txn;
1350                                         spendable_outputs.append(&mut spendable_output);
1351                                         if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() {
1352                                                 watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
1353                                         }
1354                                         if txn.is_empty() {
1355                                                 let (remote_txn, mut outputs) = self.check_spend_local_transaction(tx, height);
1356                                                 spendable_outputs.append(&mut outputs);
1357                                                 txn = remote_txn;
1358                                         }
1359                                 } else {
1360                                         if let Some(&(commitment_number, _)) = self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.get(&prevout.txid) {
1361                                                 let (tx, spendable_output) = self.check_spend_remote_htlc(tx, commitment_number);
1362                                                 if let Some(tx) = tx {
1363                                                         txn.push(tx);
1364                                                 }
1365                                                 if let Some(spendable_output) = spendable_output {
1366                                                         spendable_outputs.push(spendable_output);
1367                                                 }
1368                                         }
1369                                 }
1370                                 for tx in txn.iter() {
1371                                         broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(tx);
1372                                 }
1373                         }
1374                 }
1375                 if let Some(ref cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1376                         if self.would_broadcast_at_height(height) {
1377                                 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&cur_local_tx.tx);
1378                                 match self.key_storage {
1379                                         KeyStorage::PrivMode { revocation_base_key: _, htlc_base_key: _, ref delayed_payment_base_key, prev_latest_per_commitment_point: _, ref latest_per_commitment_point } => {
1380                                                 let (txs, mut outputs) = self.broadcast_by_local_state(&cur_local_tx, latest_per_commitment_point, &Some(*delayed_payment_base_key));
1381                                                 spendable_outputs.append(&mut outputs);
1382                                                 for tx in txs {
1383                                                         broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
1384                                                 }
1385                                         },
1386                                         KeyStorage::SigsMode { .. } => {
1387                                                 let (txs, mut outputs) = self.broadcast_by_local_state(&cur_local_tx, &None, &None);
1388                                                 spendable_outputs.append(&mut outputs);
1389                                                 for tx in txs {
1390                                                         broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
1391                                                 }
1392                                         }
1393                                 }
1394                         }
1395                 }
1396                 self.last_block_hash = block_hash.clone();
1397                 (watch_outputs, spendable_outputs)
1398         }
1399
1400         pub(super) fn would_broadcast_at_height(&self, height: u32) -> bool {
1401                 if let Some(ref cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1402                         for &(ref htlc, _, _) in cur_local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1403                                 // For inbound HTLCs which we know the preimage for, we have to ensure we hit the
1404                                 // chain with enough room to claim the HTLC without our counterparty being able to
1405                                 // time out the HTLC first.
1406                                 // For outbound HTLCs which our counterparty hasn't failed/claimed, our primary
1407                                 // concern is being able to claim the corresponding inbound HTLC (on another
1408                                 // channel) before it expires. In fact, we don't even really care if our
1409                                 // counterparty here claims such an outbound HTLC after it expired as long as we
1410                                 // can still claim the corresponding HTLC. Thus, to avoid needlessly hitting the
1411                                 // chain when our counterparty is waiting for expiration to off-chain fail an HTLC
1412                                 // we give ourselves a few blocks of headroom after expiration before going
1413                                 // on-chain for an expired HTLC.
1414                                 // Note that, to avoid a potential attack whereby a node delays claiming an HTLC
1415                                 // from us until we've reached the point where we go on-chain with the
1416                                 // corresponding inbound HTLC, we must ensure that outbound HTLCs go on chain at
1417                                 // least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER blocks prior to the inbound HTLC.
1418                                 //  aka outbound_cltv + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS == height - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
1419                                 //      inbound_cltv == height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
1420                                 //      outbound_cltv + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFER <= inbound_cltv - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
1421                                 //      HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS + 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFER <= inbound_cltv - outbound_cltv
1422                                 //      HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS + 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFER <= CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA
1423                                 if ( htlc.offered && htlc.cltv_expiry + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS <= height) ||
1424                                    (!htlc.offered && htlc.cltv_expiry <= height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER && self.payment_preimages.contains_key(&htlc.payment_hash)) {
1425                                         return true;
1426                                 }
1427                         }
1428                 }
1429                 false
1430         }
1431 }
1432
1433 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
1434
1435 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> ReadableArgs<R, Arc<Logger>> for (Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor) {
1436         fn read(reader: &mut R, logger: Arc<Logger>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1437                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1438                 macro_rules! unwrap_obj {
1439                         ($key: expr) => {
1440                                 match $key {
1441                                         Ok(res) => res,
1442                                         Err(_) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
1443                                 }
1444                         }
1445                 }
1446
1447                 let _ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1448                 let min_ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1449                 if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION {
1450                         return Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion);
1451                 }
1452
1453                 // Technically this can fail and serialize fail a round-trip, but only for serialization of
1454                 // barely-init'd ChannelMonitors that we can't do anything with.
1455                 let outpoint = OutPoint {
1456                         txid: Readable::read(reader)?,
1457                         index: Readable::read(reader)?,
1458                 };
1459                 let funding_txo = Some((outpoint, Readable::read(reader)?));
1460                 let commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor = <U48 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.0;
1461
1462                 let key_storage = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
1463                         0 => {
1464                                 let revocation_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
1465                                 let htlc_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
1466                                 let delayed_payment_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
1467                                 let prev_latest_per_commitment_point = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
1468                                         0 => None,
1469                                         1 => Some(Readable::read(reader)?),
1470                                         _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
1471                                 };
1472                                 let latest_per_commitment_point = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
1473                                         0 => None,
1474                                         1 => Some(Readable::read(reader)?),
1475                                         _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
1476                                 };
1477                                 KeyStorage::PrivMode {
1478                                         revocation_base_key,
1479                                         htlc_base_key,
1480                                         delayed_payment_base_key,
1481                                         prev_latest_per_commitment_point,
1482                                         latest_per_commitment_point,
1483                                 }
1484                         },
1485                         _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
1486                 };
1487
1488                 let their_htlc_base_key = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
1489                 let their_delayed_payment_base_key = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
1490
1491                 let their_cur_revocation_points = {
1492                         let first_idx = <U48 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.0;
1493                         if first_idx == 0 {
1494                                 None
1495                         } else {
1496                                 let first_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
1497                                 let second_point_slice: [u8; 33] = Readable::read(reader)?;
1498                                 if second_point_slice[0..32] == [0; 32] && second_point_slice[32] == 0 {
1499                                         Some((first_idx, first_point, None))
1500                                 } else {
1501                                         Some((first_idx, first_point, Some(unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &second_point_slice)))))
1502                                 }
1503                         }
1504                 };
1505
1506                 let our_to_self_delay: u16 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1507                 let their_to_self_delay: Option<u16> = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
1508
1509                 let mut old_secrets = [([0; 32], 1 << 48); 49];
1510                 for &mut (ref mut secret, ref mut idx) in old_secrets.iter_mut() {
1511                         *secret = Readable::read(reader)?;
1512                         *idx = Readable::read(reader)?;
1513                 }
1514
1515                 macro_rules! read_htlc_in_commitment {
1516                         () => {
1517                                 {
1518                                         let offered: bool = Readable::read(reader)?;
1519                                         let amount_msat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1520                                         let cltv_expiry: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1521                                         let payment_hash: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(reader)?;
1522                                         let transaction_output_index: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1523
1524                                         HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1525                                                 offered, amount_msat, cltv_expiry, payment_hash, transaction_output_index
1526                                         }
1527                                 }
1528                         }
1529                 }
1530
1531                 let remote_claimable_outpoints_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1532                 let mut remote_claimable_outpoints = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(remote_claimable_outpoints_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 64));
1533                 for _ in 0..remote_claimable_outpoints_len {
1534                         let txid: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
1535                         let outputs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1536                         let mut outputs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
1537                         for _ in 0..outputs_count {
1538                                 outputs.push(read_htlc_in_commitment!());
1539                         }
1540                         if let Some(_) = remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, outputs) {
1541                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
1542                         }
1543                 }
1544
1545                 let remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1546                 let mut remote_commitment_txn_on_chain = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
1547                 for _ in 0..remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len {
1548                         let txid: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
1549                         let commitment_number = <U48 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.0;
1550                         let outputs_count = <u64 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?;
1551                         let mut outputs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 8));
1552                         for _ in 0..outputs_count {
1553                                 outputs.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
1554                         }
1555                         if let Some(_) = remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(txid, (commitment_number, outputs)) {
1556                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
1557                         }
1558                 }
1559
1560                 let remote_hash_commitment_number_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1561                 let mut remote_hash_commitment_number = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(remote_hash_commitment_number_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
1562                 for _ in 0..remote_hash_commitment_number_len {
1563                         let txid: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(reader)?;
1564                         let commitment_number = <U48 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.0;
1565                         if let Some(_) = remote_hash_commitment_number.insert(txid, commitment_number) {
1566                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
1567                         }
1568                 }
1569
1570                 macro_rules! read_local_tx {
1571                         () => {
1572                                 {
1573                                         let tx = match Transaction::consensus_decode(&mut serialize::RawDecoder::new(reader.by_ref())) {
1574                                                 Ok(tx) => tx,
1575                                                 Err(e) => match e {
1576                                                         serialize::Error::Io(ioe) => return Err(DecodeError::Io(ioe)),
1577                                                         _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
1578                                                 },
1579                                         };
1580
1581                                         if tx.input.is_empty() {
1582                                                 // Ensure tx didn't hit the 0-input ambiguity case.
1583                                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
1584                                         }
1585
1586                                         let revocation_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
1587                                         let a_htlc_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
1588                                         let b_htlc_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
1589                                         let delayed_payment_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
1590                                         let feerate_per_kw: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1591
1592                                         let htlc_outputs_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1593                                         let mut htlc_outputs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlc_outputs_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
1594                                         for _ in 0..htlc_outputs_len {
1595                                                 htlc_outputs.push((read_htlc_in_commitment!(), Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
1596                                         }
1597
1598                                         LocalSignedTx {
1599                                                 txid: tx.txid(),
1600                                                 tx, revocation_key, a_htlc_key, b_htlc_key, delayed_payment_key, feerate_per_kw, htlc_outputs
1601                                         }
1602                                 }
1603                         }
1604                 }
1605
1606                 let prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
1607                         0 => None,
1608                         1 => {
1609                                 Some(read_local_tx!())
1610                         },
1611                         _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
1612                 };
1613
1614                 let current_local_signed_commitment_tx = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
1615                         0 => None,
1616                         1 => {
1617                                 Some(read_local_tx!())
1618                         },
1619                         _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
1620                 };
1621
1622                 let current_remote_commitment_number = <U48 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.0;
1623
1624                 let payment_preimages_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1625                 let mut payment_preimages = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(payment_preimages_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
1626                 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
1627                 for _ in 0..payment_preimages_len {
1628                         let preimage: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(reader)?;
1629                         sha.reset();
1630                         sha.input(&preimage);
1631                         let mut hash = [0; 32];
1632                         sha.result(&mut hash);
1633                         if let Some(_) = payment_preimages.insert(hash, preimage) {
1634                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
1635                         }
1636                 }
1637
1638                 let last_block_hash: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
1639                 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
1640
1641                 Ok((last_block_hash.clone(), ChannelMonitor {
1642                         funding_txo,
1643                         commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor,
1644
1645                         key_storage,
1646                         their_htlc_base_key,
1647                         their_delayed_payment_base_key,
1648                         their_cur_revocation_points,
1649
1650                         our_to_self_delay,
1651                         their_to_self_delay,
1652
1653                         old_secrets,
1654                         remote_claimable_outpoints,
1655                         remote_commitment_txn_on_chain,
1656                         remote_hash_commitment_number,
1657
1658                         prev_local_signed_commitment_tx,
1659                         current_local_signed_commitment_tx,
1660                         current_remote_commitment_number,
1661
1662                         payment_preimages,
1663
1664                         destination_script,
1665                         last_block_hash,
1666                         secp_ctx,
1667                         logger,
1668                 }))
1669         }
1670
1671 }
1672
1673 #[cfg(test)]
1674 mod tests {
1675         use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Script;
1676         use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
1677         use crypto::digest::Digest;
1678         use hex;
1679         use ln::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor;
1680         use ln::chan_utils::{HTLCOutputInCommitment, TxCreationKeys};
1681         use util::sha2::Sha256;
1682         use util::test_utils::TestLogger;
1683         use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
1684         use secp256k1::{Secp256k1, Signature};
1685         use rand::{thread_rng,Rng};
1686         use std::sync::Arc;
1687
1688         #[test]
1689         fn test_per_commitment_storage() {
1690                 // Test vectors from BOLT 3:
1691                 let mut secrets: Vec<[u8; 32]> = Vec::new();
1692                 let mut monitor: ChannelMonitor;
1693                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1694                 let logger = Arc::new(TestLogger::new());
1695
1696                 macro_rules! test_secrets {
1697                         () => {
1698                                 let mut idx = 281474976710655;
1699                                 for secret in secrets.iter() {
1700                                         assert_eq!(monitor.get_secret(idx).unwrap(), *secret);
1701                                         idx -= 1;
1702                                 }
1703                                 assert_eq!(monitor.get_min_seen_secret(), idx + 1);
1704                                 assert!(monitor.get_secret(idx).is_err());
1705                         };
1706                 }
1707
1708                 {
1709                         // insert_secret correct sequence
1710                         monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
1711                         secrets.clear();
1712
1713                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1714                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1715                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1716                         test_secrets!();
1717
1718                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1719                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1720                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1721                         test_secrets!();
1722
1723                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1724                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1725                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1726                         test_secrets!();
1727
1728                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1729                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1730                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1731                         test_secrets!();
1732
1733                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1734                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
1735                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1736                         test_secrets!();
1737
1738                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1739                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
1740                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1741                         test_secrets!();
1742
1743                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1744                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
1745                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1746                         test_secrets!();
1747
1748                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1749                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
1750                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1751                         test_secrets!();
1752                 }
1753
1754                 {
1755                         // insert_secret #1 incorrect
1756                         monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
1757                         secrets.clear();
1758
1759                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1760                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
1761                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1762                         test_secrets!();
1763
1764                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1765                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1766                         assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err,
1767                                         "Previous secret did not match new one");
1768                 }
1769
1770                 {
1771                         // insert_secret #2 incorrect (#1 derived from incorrect)
1772                         monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
1773                         secrets.clear();
1774
1775                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1776                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
1777                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1778                         test_secrets!();
1779
1780                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1781                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("dddc3a8d14fddf2b68fa8c7fbad2748274937479dd0f8930d5ebb4ab6bd866a3").unwrap());
1782                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1783                         test_secrets!();
1784
1785                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1786                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1787                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1788                         test_secrets!();
1789
1790                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1791                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1792                         assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err,
1793                                         "Previous secret did not match new one");
1794                 }
1795
1796                 {
1797                         // insert_secret #3 incorrect
1798                         monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
1799                         secrets.clear();
1800
1801                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1802                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1803                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1804                         test_secrets!();
1805
1806                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1807                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1808                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1809                         test_secrets!();
1810
1811                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1812                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c51a18b13e8527e579ec56365482c62f180b7d5760b46e9477dae59e87ed423a").unwrap());
1813                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1814                         test_secrets!();
1815
1816                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1817                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1818                         assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err,
1819                                         "Previous secret did not match new one");
1820                 }
1821
1822                 {
1823                         // insert_secret #4 incorrect (1,2,3 derived from incorrect)
1824                         monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
1825                         secrets.clear();
1826
1827                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1828                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
1829                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1830                         test_secrets!();
1831
1832                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1833                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("dddc3a8d14fddf2b68fa8c7fbad2748274937479dd0f8930d5ebb4ab6bd866a3").unwrap());
1834                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1835                         test_secrets!();
1836
1837                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1838                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c51a18b13e8527e579ec56365482c62f180b7d5760b46e9477dae59e87ed423a").unwrap());
1839                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1840                         test_secrets!();
1841
1842                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1843                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("ba65d7b0ef55a3ba300d4e87af29868f394f8f138d78a7011669c79b37b936f4").unwrap());
1844                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1845                         test_secrets!();
1846
1847                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1848                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
1849                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1850                         test_secrets!();
1851
1852                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1853                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
1854                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1855                         test_secrets!();
1856
1857                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1858                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
1859                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1860                         test_secrets!();
1861
1862                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1863                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
1864                         assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err,
1865                                         "Previous secret did not match new one");
1866                 }
1867
1868                 {
1869                         // insert_secret #5 incorrect
1870                         monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
1871                         secrets.clear();
1872
1873                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1874                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1875                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1876                         test_secrets!();
1877
1878                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1879                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1880                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1881                         test_secrets!();
1882
1883                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1884                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1885                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1886                         test_secrets!();
1887
1888                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1889                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1890                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1891                         test_secrets!();
1892
1893                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1894                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("631373ad5f9ef654bb3dade742d09504c567edd24320d2fcd68e3cc47e2ff6a6").unwrap());
1895                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1896                         test_secrets!();
1897
1898                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1899                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
1900                         assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err,
1901                                         "Previous secret did not match new one");
1902                 }
1903
1904                 {
1905                         // insert_secret #6 incorrect (5 derived from incorrect)
1906                         monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
1907                         secrets.clear();
1908
1909                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1910                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1911                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1912                         test_secrets!();
1913
1914                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1915                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1916                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1917                         test_secrets!();
1918
1919                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1920                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1921                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1922                         test_secrets!();
1923
1924                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1925                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1926                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1927                         test_secrets!();
1928
1929                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1930                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("631373ad5f9ef654bb3dade742d09504c567edd24320d2fcd68e3cc47e2ff6a6").unwrap());
1931                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1932                         test_secrets!();
1933
1934                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1935                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("b7e76a83668bde38b373970155c868a653304308f9896692f904a23731224bb1").unwrap());
1936                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1937                         test_secrets!();
1938
1939                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1940                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
1941                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1942                         test_secrets!();
1943
1944                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1945                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
1946                         assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err,
1947                                         "Previous secret did not match new one");
1948                 }
1949
1950                 {
1951                         // insert_secret #7 incorrect
1952                         monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
1953                         secrets.clear();
1954
1955                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1956                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1957                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1958                         test_secrets!();
1959
1960                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1961                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1962                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1963                         test_secrets!();
1964
1965                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1966                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1967                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1968                         test_secrets!();
1969
1970                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1971                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1972                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1973                         test_secrets!();
1974
1975                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1976                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
1977                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1978                         test_secrets!();
1979
1980                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1981                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
1982                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1983                         test_secrets!();
1984
1985                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1986                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("e7971de736e01da8ed58b94c2fc216cb1dca9e326f3a96e7194fe8ea8af6c0a3").unwrap());
1987                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1988                         test_secrets!();
1989
1990                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1991                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
1992                         assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err,
1993                                         "Previous secret did not match new one");
1994                 }
1995
1996                 {
1997                         // insert_secret #8 incorrect
1998                         monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
1999                         secrets.clear();
2000
2001                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
2002                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
2003                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
2004                         test_secrets!();
2005
2006                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
2007                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
2008                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
2009                         test_secrets!();
2010
2011                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
2012                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
2013                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
2014                         test_secrets!();
2015
2016                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
2017                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
2018                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
2019                         test_secrets!();
2020
2021                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
2022                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
2023                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
2024                         test_secrets!();
2025
2026                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
2027                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
2028                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
2029                         test_secrets!();
2030
2031                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
2032                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
2033                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
2034                         test_secrets!();
2035
2036                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
2037                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a7efbc61aac46d34f77778bac22c8a20c6a46ca460addc49009bda875ec88fa4").unwrap());
2038                         assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err,
2039                                         "Previous secret did not match new one");
2040                 }
2041         }
2042
2043         #[test]
2044         fn test_prune_preimages() {
2045                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2046                 let logger = Arc::new(TestLogger::new());
2047                 let dummy_sig = Signature::from_der(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("3045022100fa86fa9a36a8cd6a7bb8f06a541787d51371d067951a9461d5404de6b928782e02201c8b7c334c10aed8976a3a465be9a28abff4cb23acbf00022295b378ce1fa3cd").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
2048
2049                 macro_rules! dummy_keys {
2050                         () => {
2051                                 {
2052                                         let dummy_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap());
2053                                         TxCreationKeys {
2054                                                 per_commitment_point: dummy_key.clone(),
2055                                                 revocation_key: dummy_key.clone(),
2056                                                 a_htlc_key: dummy_key.clone(),
2057                                                 b_htlc_key: dummy_key.clone(),
2058                                                 a_delayed_payment_key: dummy_key.clone(),
2059                                                 b_payment_key: dummy_key.clone(),
2060                                         }
2061                                 }
2062                         }
2063                 }
2064                 let dummy_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
2065
2066                 let mut preimages = Vec::new();
2067                 {
2068                         let mut rng  = thread_rng();
2069                         for _ in 0..20 {
2070                                 let mut preimage = [0; 32];
2071                                 rng.fill_bytes(&mut preimage);
2072                                 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
2073                                 sha.input(&preimage);
2074                                 let mut hash = [0; 32];
2075                                 sha.result(&mut hash);
2076                                 preimages.push((preimage, hash));
2077                         }
2078                 }
2079
2080                 macro_rules! preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs {
2081                         ($preimages_slice: expr) => {
2082                                 {
2083                                         let mut res = Vec::new();
2084                                         for (idx, preimage) in $preimages_slice.iter().enumerate() {
2085                                                 res.push(HTLCOutputInCommitment {
2086                                                         offered: true,
2087                                                         amount_msat: 0,
2088                                                         cltv_expiry: 0,
2089                                                         payment_hash: preimage.1.clone(),
2090                                                         transaction_output_index: idx as u32,
2091                                                 });
2092                                         }
2093                                         res
2094                                 }
2095                         }
2096                 }
2097                 macro_rules! preimages_to_local_htlcs {
2098                         ($preimages_slice: expr) => {
2099                                 {
2100                                         let mut inp = preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!($preimages_slice);
2101                                         let res: Vec<_> = inp.drain(..).map(|e| { (e, dummy_sig.clone(), dummy_sig.clone()) }).collect();
2102                                         res
2103                                 }
2104                         }
2105                 }
2106
2107                 macro_rules! test_preimages_exist {
2108                         ($preimages_slice: expr, $monitor: expr) => {
2109                                 for preimage in $preimages_slice {
2110                                         assert!($monitor.payment_preimages.contains_key(&preimage.1));
2111                                 }
2112                         }
2113                 }
2114
2115                 // Prune with one old state and a local commitment tx holding a few overlaps with the
2116                 // old state.
2117                 let mut monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
2118                 monitor.set_their_to_self_delay(10);
2119
2120                 monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(dummy_tx.clone(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..10]));
2121                 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[5..15]), 281474976710655);
2122                 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[15..20]), 281474976710654);
2123                 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[17..20]), 281474976710653);
2124                 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[18..20]), 281474976710652);
2125                 for &(ref preimage, ref hash) in preimages.iter() {
2126                         monitor.provide_payment_preimage(hash, preimage);
2127                 }
2128
2129                 // Now provide a secret, pruning preimages 10-15
2130                 let mut secret = [0; 32];
2131                 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
2132                 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secret.clone(), None).unwrap();
2133                 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 15);
2134                 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
2135                 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[15..20], monitor);
2136
2137                 // Now provide a further secret, pruning preimages 15-17
2138                 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
2139                 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secret.clone(), None).unwrap();
2140                 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 13);
2141                 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
2142                 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[17..20], monitor);
2143
2144                 // Now update local commitment tx info, pruning only element 18 as we still care about the
2145                 // previous commitment tx's preimages too
2146                 monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(dummy_tx.clone(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..5]));
2147                 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
2148                 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secret.clone(), None).unwrap();
2149                 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 12);
2150                 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
2151                 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[18..20], monitor);
2152
2153                 // But if we do it again, we'll prune 5-10
2154                 monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(dummy_tx.clone(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..3]));
2155                 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
2156                 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secret.clone(), None).unwrap();
2157                 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 5);
2158                 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..5], monitor);
2159         }
2160
2161         // Further testing is done in the ChannelManager integration tests.
2162 }