1 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
2 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxIn,TxOut,SigHashType,Transaction};
3 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Script;
4 use bitcoin::util::hash::Sha256dHash;
5 use bitcoin::util::bip143;
7 use crypto::digest::Digest;
9 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Message,Signature};
10 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
12 use ln::msgs::HandleError;
14 use ln::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment;
15 use chain::chaininterface::{ChainListener, ChainWatchInterface, BroadcasterInterface};
16 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
17 use util::sha2::Sha256;
19 use std::collections::HashMap;
20 use std::sync::{Arc,Mutex};
23 pub enum ChannelMonitorUpdateErr {
24 /// Used to indicate a temporary failure (eg connection to a watchtower failed, but is expected
25 /// to succeed at some point in the future).
26 /// Such a failure will "freeze" a channel, preventing us from revoking old states or
27 /// submitting new commitment transactions to the remote party.
28 /// ChannelManager::test_restore_channel_monitor can be used to retry the update(s) and restore
29 /// the channel to an operational state.
31 /// Used to indicate no further channel monitor updates will be allowed (eg we've moved on to a
32 /// different watchtower and cannot update with all watchtowers that were previously informed
33 /// of this channel). This will force-close the channel in question.
37 /// Simple trait indicating ability to track a set of ChannelMonitors and multiplex events between
38 /// them. Generally should be implemented by keeping a local SimpleManyChannelMonitor and passing
39 /// events to it, while also taking any add_update_monitor events and passing them to some remote
41 /// Note that any updates to a channel's monitor *must* be applied to each instance of the
42 /// channel's monitor everywhere (including remote watchtowers) *before* this function returns. If
43 /// an update occurs and a remote watchtower is left with old state, it may broadcast transactions
44 /// which we have revoked, allowing our counterparty to claim all funds in the channel!
45 pub trait ManyChannelMonitor: Send + Sync {
46 /// Adds or updates a monitor for the given `funding_txo`.
47 fn add_update_monitor(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr>;
50 /// A simple implementation of a ManyChannelMonitor and ChainListener. Can be used to create a
51 /// watchtower or watch our own channels.
52 /// Note that you must provide your own key by which to refer to channels.
53 /// If you're accepting remote monitors (ie are implementing a watchtower), you must verify that
54 /// users cannot overwrite a given channel by providing a duplicate key. ie you should probably
55 /// index by a PublicKey which is required to sign any updates.
56 /// If you're using this for local monitoring of your own channels, you probably want to use
57 /// `OutPoint` as the key, which will give you a ManyChannelMonitor implementation.
58 pub struct SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
59 monitors: Mutex<HashMap<Key, ChannelMonitor>>,
60 chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>,
61 broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>
64 impl<Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash> ChainListener for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
65 fn block_connected(&self, _header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], _indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) {
66 let monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
67 for monitor in monitors.values() {
68 monitor.block_connected(txn_matched, height, &*self.broadcaster);
72 fn block_disconnected(&self, _: &BlockHeader) { }
75 impl<Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash + 'static> SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
76 pub fn new(chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>, broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>) -> Arc<SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key>> {
77 let res = Arc::new(SimpleManyChannelMonitor {
78 monitors: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
82 let weak_res = Arc::downgrade(&res);
83 res.chain_monitor.register_listener(weak_res);
87 pub fn add_update_monitor_by_key(&self, key: Key, monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
88 let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
89 match monitors.get_mut(&key) {
90 Some(orig_monitor) => return orig_monitor.insert_combine(monitor),
93 match monitor.funding_txo {
94 None => self.chain_monitor.watch_all_txn(),
95 Some(outpoint) => self.chain_monitor.install_watch_outpoint((outpoint.txid, outpoint.index as u32)),
97 monitors.insert(key, monitor);
102 impl ManyChannelMonitor for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<OutPoint> {
103 fn add_update_monitor(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr> {
104 match self.add_update_monitor_by_key(funding_txo, monitor) {
106 Err(_) => Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure),
111 /// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, don't try to claim it in a shared transaction,
112 /// instead claiming it in its own individual transaction.
113 const CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 12;
114 /// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, force-close the channel to broadcast the
115 /// HTLC-Success transaction.
116 const CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 6;
121 revocation_base_key: SecretKey,
122 htlc_base_key: SecretKey,
125 revocation_base_key: PublicKey,
126 htlc_base_key: PublicKey,
127 sigs: HashMap<Sha256dHash, Signature>,
132 struct LocalSignedTx {
135 revocation_key: PublicKey,
136 a_htlc_key: PublicKey,
137 b_htlc_key: PublicKey,
138 delayed_payment_key: PublicKey,
140 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Signature, Signature)>,
143 pub struct ChannelMonitor {
144 funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
145 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64,
147 key_storage: KeyStorage,
148 delayed_payment_base_key: PublicKey,
149 their_htlc_base_key: Option<PublicKey>,
150 // first is the idx of the first of the two revocation points
151 their_cur_revocation_points: Option<(u64, PublicKey, Option<PublicKey>)>,
153 our_to_self_delay: u16,
154 their_to_self_delay: Option<u16>,
156 old_secrets: [([u8; 32], u64); 49],
157 remote_claimable_outpoints: HashMap<Sha256dHash, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>>,
158 remote_htlc_outputs_on_chain: Mutex<HashMap<Sha256dHash, u64>>,
159 //hash to commitment number mapping use to determine the state of transaction owning it
160 // (revoked/non-revoked) and so lightnen pruning
161 remote_hash_commitment_number: HashMap<[u8; 32], u64>,
163 // We store two local commitment transactions to avoid any race conditions where we may update
164 // some monitors (potentially on watchtowers) but then fail to update others, resulting in the
165 // various monitors for one channel being out of sync, and us broadcasting a local
166 // transaction for which we have deleted claim information on some watchtowers.
167 prev_local_signed_commitment_tx: Option<LocalSignedTx>,
168 current_local_signed_commitment_tx: Option<LocalSignedTx>,
170 payment_preimages: HashMap<[u8; 32], [u8; 32]>,
172 destination_script: Script,
173 secp_ctx: Secp256k1, //TODO: dedup this a bit...
175 impl Clone for ChannelMonitor {
176 fn clone(&self) -> Self {
178 funding_txo: self.funding_txo.clone(),
179 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor.clone(),
181 key_storage: self.key_storage.clone(),
182 delayed_payment_base_key: self.delayed_payment_base_key.clone(),
183 their_htlc_base_key: self.their_htlc_base_key.clone(),
184 their_cur_revocation_points: self.their_cur_revocation_points.clone(),
186 our_to_self_delay: self.our_to_self_delay,
187 their_to_self_delay: self.their_to_self_delay,
189 old_secrets: self.old_secrets.clone(),
190 remote_claimable_outpoints: self.remote_claimable_outpoints.clone(),
191 remote_htlc_outputs_on_chain: Mutex::new((*self.remote_htlc_outputs_on_chain.lock().unwrap()).clone()),
192 remote_hash_commitment_number: self.remote_hash_commitment_number.clone(),
194 prev_local_signed_commitment_tx: self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.clone(),
195 current_local_signed_commitment_tx: self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx.clone(),
197 payment_preimages: self.payment_preimages.clone(),
199 destination_script: self.destination_script.clone(),
200 secp_ctx: self.secp_ctx.clone(),
205 impl ChannelMonitor {
206 pub fn new(revocation_base_key: &SecretKey, delayed_payment_base_key: &PublicKey, htlc_base_key: &SecretKey, our_to_self_delay: u16, destination_script: Script) -> ChannelMonitor {
209 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: 0,
211 key_storage: KeyStorage::PrivMode {
212 revocation_base_key: revocation_base_key.clone(),
213 htlc_base_key: htlc_base_key.clone(),
215 delayed_payment_base_key: delayed_payment_base_key.clone(),
216 their_htlc_base_key: None,
217 their_cur_revocation_points: None,
219 our_to_self_delay: our_to_self_delay,
220 their_to_self_delay: None,
222 old_secrets: [([0; 32], 1 << 48); 49],
223 remote_claimable_outpoints: HashMap::new(),
224 remote_htlc_outputs_on_chain: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
225 remote_hash_commitment_number: HashMap::new(),
227 prev_local_signed_commitment_tx: None,
228 current_local_signed_commitment_tx: None,
230 payment_preimages: HashMap::new(),
232 destination_script: destination_script,
233 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
238 fn place_secret(idx: u64) -> u8 {
240 if idx & (1 << i) == (1 << i) {
248 fn derive_secret(secret: [u8; 32], bits: u8, idx: u64) -> [u8; 32] {
249 let mut res: [u8; 32] = secret;
251 let bitpos = bits - 1 - i;
252 if idx & (1 << bitpos) == (1 << bitpos) {
253 res[(bitpos / 8) as usize] ^= 1 << (bitpos & 7);
254 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
256 sha.result(&mut res);
262 /// Inserts a revocation secret into this channel monitor. Also optionally tracks the next
263 /// revocation point which may be required to claim HTLC outputs which we know the preimage of
264 /// in case the remote end force-closes using their latest state. Prunes old preimages if neither
265 /// needed by local commitment transactions HTCLs nor by remote ones. Unless we haven't already seen remote
266 /// commitment transaction's secret, they are de facto pruned (we can use revocation key).
267 pub fn provide_secret(&mut self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32], their_next_revocation_point: Option<(u64, PublicKey)>) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
268 let pos = ChannelMonitor::place_secret(idx);
270 let (old_secret, old_idx) = self.old_secrets[i as usize];
271 if ChannelMonitor::derive_secret(secret, pos, old_idx) != old_secret {
272 return Err(HandleError{err: "Previous secret did not match new one", msg: None})
275 self.old_secrets[pos as usize] = (secret, idx);
277 if let Some(new_revocation_point) = their_next_revocation_point {
278 match self.their_cur_revocation_points {
279 Some(old_points) => {
280 if old_points.0 == new_revocation_point.0 + 1 {
281 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0, old_points.1, Some(new_revocation_point.1)));
282 } else if old_points.0 == new_revocation_point.0 + 2 {
283 if let Some(old_second_point) = old_points.2 {
284 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0 - 1, old_second_point, Some(new_revocation_point.1)));
286 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((new_revocation_point.0, new_revocation_point.1, None));
289 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((new_revocation_point.0, new_revocation_point.1, None));
293 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((new_revocation_point.0, new_revocation_point.1, None));
298 let mut waste_hash_state : Vec<[u8;32]> = Vec::new();
300 let local_signed_commitment_tx = &self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx;
301 let remote_hash_commitment_number = &self.remote_hash_commitment_number;
302 let min_idx = self.get_min_seen_secret();
303 self.payment_preimages.retain(|&k, _| {
304 for &(ref htlc, _s1, _s2) in &local_signed_commitment_tx.as_ref().expect("Channel needs at least an initial commitment tx !").htlc_outputs {
305 if k == htlc.payment_hash {
309 if let Some(cn) = remote_hash_commitment_number.get(&k) {
314 waste_hash_state.push(k);
318 for h in waste_hash_state {
319 self.remote_hash_commitment_number.remove(&h);
325 /// Informs this monitor of the latest remote (ie non-broadcastable) commitment transaction.
326 /// The monitor watches for it to be broadcasted and then uses the HTLC information (and
327 /// possibly future revocation/preimage information) to claim outputs where possible.
328 /// We cache also the mapping hash:commitment number to lighten pruning of old preimages by watchtowers.
329 pub fn provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, unsigned_commitment_tx: &Transaction, htlc_outputs: Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>, commitment_number: u64) {
330 // TODO: Encrypt the htlc_outputs data with the single-hash of the commitment transaction
331 // so that a remote monitor doesn't learn anything unless there is a malicious close.
332 // (only maybe, sadly we cant do the same for local info, as we need to be aware of
334 for htlc in &htlc_outputs {
335 self.remote_hash_commitment_number.insert(htlc.payment_hash, commitment_number);
337 self.remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(unsigned_commitment_tx.txid(), htlc_outputs);
340 /// Informs this monitor of the latest local (ie broadcastable) commitment transaction. The
341 /// monitor watches for timeouts and may broadcast it if we approach such a timeout. Thus, it
342 /// is important that any clones of this channel monitor (including remote clones) by kept
343 /// up-to-date as our local commitment transaction is updated.
344 /// Panics if set_their_to_self_delay has never been called.
345 pub fn provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, signed_commitment_tx: Transaction, local_keys: chan_utils::TxCreationKeys, feerate_per_kw: u64, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Signature, Signature)>) {
346 assert!(self.their_to_self_delay.is_some());
347 self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx.take();
348 self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(LocalSignedTx {
349 txid: signed_commitment_tx.txid(),
350 tx: signed_commitment_tx,
351 revocation_key: local_keys.revocation_key,
352 a_htlc_key: local_keys.a_htlc_key,
353 b_htlc_key: local_keys.b_htlc_key,
354 delayed_payment_key: local_keys.a_delayed_payment_key,
360 /// Provides a payment_hash->payment_preimage mapping. Will be automatically pruned when all
361 /// commitment_tx_infos which contain the payment hash have been revoked.
362 pub fn provide_payment_preimage(&mut self, payment_hash: &[u8; 32], payment_preimage: &[u8; 32]) {
363 self.payment_preimages.insert(payment_hash.clone(), payment_preimage.clone());
366 pub fn insert_combine(&mut self, mut other: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
367 match self.funding_txo {
368 Some(txo) => if other.funding_txo.is_some() && other.funding_txo.unwrap() != txo {
369 return Err(HandleError{err: "Funding transaction outputs are not identical!", msg: None});
371 None => if other.funding_txo.is_some() {
372 self.funding_txo = other.funding_txo;
375 let other_min_secret = other.get_min_seen_secret();
376 let our_min_secret = self.get_min_seen_secret();
377 if our_min_secret > other_min_secret {
378 self.provide_secret(other_min_secret, other.get_secret(other_min_secret).unwrap(), None)?;
380 if our_min_secret >= other_min_secret {
381 self.their_cur_revocation_points = other.their_cur_revocation_points;
382 for (txid, htlcs) in other.remote_claimable_outpoints.drain() {
383 self.remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, htlcs);
385 if let Some(local_tx) = other.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
386 self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(local_tx);
388 if let Some(local_tx) = other.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
389 self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(local_tx);
391 self.payment_preimages = other.payment_preimages;
396 /// Panics if commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor doesn't fit in 48 bits
397 pub fn set_commitment_obscure_factor(&mut self, commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64) {
398 assert!(commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor < (1 << 48));
399 self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor = commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor;
402 /// Allows this monitor to scan only for transactions which are applicable. Note that this is
403 /// optional, without it this monitor cannot be used in an SPV client, but you may wish to
404 /// avoid this (or call unset_funding_info) on a monitor you wish to send to a watchtower as it
405 /// provides slightly better privacy.
406 pub fn set_funding_info(&mut self, funding_info: OutPoint) {
407 self.funding_txo = Some(funding_info);
410 pub fn set_their_htlc_base_key(&mut self, their_htlc_base_key: &PublicKey) {
411 self.their_htlc_base_key = Some(their_htlc_base_key.clone());
414 pub fn set_their_to_self_delay(&mut self, their_to_self_delay: u16) {
415 self.their_to_self_delay = Some(their_to_self_delay);
418 pub fn unset_funding_info(&mut self) {
419 self.funding_txo = None;
422 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
426 //TODO: Functions to serialize/deserialize (with different forms depending on which information
427 //we want to leave out (eg funding_txo, etc).
429 /// Can only fail if idx is < get_min_seen_secret
430 pub fn get_secret(&self, idx: u64) -> Result<[u8; 32], HandleError> {
431 for i in 0..self.old_secrets.len() {
432 if (idx & (!((1 << i) - 1))) == self.old_secrets[i].1 {
433 return Ok(ChannelMonitor::derive_secret(self.old_secrets[i].0, i as u8, idx))
436 assert!(idx < self.get_min_seen_secret());
437 Err(HandleError{err: "idx too low", msg: None})
440 pub fn get_min_seen_secret(&self) -> u64 {
441 //TODO This can be optimized?
442 let mut min = 1 << 48;
443 for &(_, idx) in self.old_secrets.iter() {
451 /// Attempts to claim a remote commitment transaction's outputs using the revocation key and
452 /// data in remote_claimable_outpoints. Will directly claim any HTLC outputs which expire at a
453 /// height > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER. In any case, will install monitoring for
454 /// HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions, and claim them using the revocation key (if
455 /// applicable) as well.
456 fn check_spend_remote_transaction(&self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32) -> Vec<Transaction> {
457 // Most secp and related errors trying to create keys means we have no hope of constructing
458 // a spend transaction...so we return no transactions to broadcast
459 let mut txn_to_broadcast = Vec::new();
460 macro_rules! ignore_error {
461 ( $thing : expr ) => {
464 Err(_) => return txn_to_broadcast
469 let commitment_txid = tx.txid(); //TODO: This is gonna be a performance bottleneck for watchtowers!
470 let per_commitment_option = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(&commitment_txid);
472 let commitment_number = (((tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor;
473 if commitment_number >= self.get_min_seen_secret() {
474 let secret = self.get_secret(commitment_number).unwrap();
475 let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &secret));
476 let (revocation_pubkey, b_htlc_key) = match self.key_storage {
477 KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key } => {
478 let per_commitment_point = ignore_error!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key));
479 (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &ignore_error!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_base_key)))),
480 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &ignore_error!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &htlc_base_key)))))
482 KeyStorage::SigsMode { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
483 let per_commitment_point = ignore_error!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key));
484 (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &revocation_base_key)),
485 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &htlc_base_key)))
488 let delayed_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &ignore_error!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key)), &self.delayed_payment_base_key));
489 let a_htlc_key = match self.their_htlc_base_key {
490 None => return txn_to_broadcast,
491 Some(their_htlc_base_key) => ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &ignore_error!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key)), &their_htlc_base_key)),
494 let revokeable_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey, self.our_to_self_delay, &delayed_key);
495 let revokeable_p2wsh = revokeable_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
497 let mut total_value = 0;
498 let mut values = Vec::new();
499 let mut inputs = Vec::new();
500 let mut htlc_idxs = Vec::new();
502 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
503 if outp.script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh {
505 prev_hash: commitment_txid,
506 prev_index: idx as u32,
507 script_sig: Script::new(),
508 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
511 htlc_idxs.push(None);
512 values.push(outp.value);
513 total_value += outp.value;
514 break; // There can only be one of these
518 macro_rules! sign_input {
519 ($sighash_parts: expr, $input: expr, $htlc_idx: expr, $amount: expr) => {
521 let (sig, redeemscript) = match self.key_storage {
522 KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
523 let redeemscript = if $htlc_idx.is_none() { revokeable_redeemscript.clone() } else {
524 let htlc = &per_commitment_option.unwrap()[$htlc_idx.unwrap()];
525 chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey)
527 let sighash = ignore_error!(Message::from_slice(&$sighash_parts.sighash_all(&$input, &redeemscript, $amount)[..]));
528 let revocation_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key, &revocation_base_key));
529 (ignore_error!(self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &revocation_key)), redeemscript)
531 KeyStorage::SigsMode { .. } => {
535 $input.witness.push(sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
536 $input.witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
537 if $htlc_idx.is_none() {
538 $input.witness.push(vec!(1));
540 $input.witness.push(revocation_pubkey.serialize().to_vec());
542 $input.witness.push(redeemscript.into_vec());
547 if let Some(per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
548 inputs.reserve_exact(per_commitment_data.len());
550 for (idx, htlc) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() {
551 let expected_script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey);
552 if htlc.transaction_output_index as usize >= tx.output.len() ||
553 tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 ||
554 tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].script_pubkey != expected_script.to_v0_p2wsh() {
555 return txn_to_broadcast; // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user
558 prev_hash: commitment_txid,
559 prev_index: htlc.transaction_output_index,
560 script_sig: Script::new(),
561 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
564 if htlc.cltv_expiry > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER {
566 htlc_idxs.push(Some(idx));
567 values.push(tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].value);
568 total_value += htlc.amount_msat / 1000;
570 let mut single_htlc_tx = Transaction {
575 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
576 value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000, //TODO: - fee
579 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&single_htlc_tx);
580 sign_input!(sighash_parts, single_htlc_tx.input[0], Some(idx), htlc.amount_msat / 1000);
581 txn_to_broadcast.push(single_htlc_tx); // TODO: This is not yet tested in ChannelManager!
586 if !inputs.is_empty() || !txn_to_broadcast.is_empty() {
587 // We're definitely a remote commitment transaction!
588 // TODO: Register commitment_txid with the ChainWatchInterface!
589 self.remote_htlc_outputs_on_chain.lock().unwrap().insert(commitment_txid, commitment_number);
591 if inputs.is_empty() { return txn_to_broadcast; } // Nothing to be done...probably a false positive/local tx
593 let outputs = vec!(TxOut {
594 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
595 value: total_value, //TODO: - fee
597 let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
604 let mut values_drain = values.drain(..);
605 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx);
607 for (input, htlc_idx) in spend_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(htlc_idxs.iter()) {
608 let value = values_drain.next().unwrap();
609 sign_input!(sighash_parts, input, htlc_idx, value);
612 txn_to_broadcast.push(spend_tx);
613 } else if let Some(per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
614 if let Some(revocation_points) = self.their_cur_revocation_points {
615 let revocation_point_option =
616 if revocation_points.0 == commitment_number { Some(&revocation_points.1) }
617 else if let Some(point) = revocation_points.2.as_ref() {
618 if revocation_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 { Some(point) } else { None }
620 if let Some(revocation_point) = revocation_point_option {
621 let (revocation_pubkey, b_htlc_key) = match self.key_storage {
622 KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key } => {
623 (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &ignore_error!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_base_key)))),
624 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &ignore_error!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &htlc_base_key)))))
626 KeyStorage::SigsMode { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
627 (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &revocation_base_key)),
628 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &htlc_base_key)))
631 let a_htlc_key = match self.their_htlc_base_key {
632 None => return txn_to_broadcast,
633 Some(their_htlc_base_key) => ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &their_htlc_base_key)),
636 let mut total_value = 0;
637 let mut values = Vec::new();
638 let mut inputs = Vec::new();
640 macro_rules! sign_input {
641 ($sighash_parts: expr, $input: expr, $amount: expr, $preimage: expr) => {
643 let (sig, redeemscript) = match self.key_storage {
644 KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
645 let htlc = &per_commitment_option.unwrap()[$input.sequence as usize];
646 let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey);
647 let sighash = ignore_error!(Message::from_slice(&$sighash_parts.sighash_all(&$input, &redeemscript, $amount)[..]));
648 let htlc_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &htlc_base_key));
649 (ignore_error!(self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &htlc_key)), redeemscript)
651 KeyStorage::SigsMode { .. } => {
655 $input.witness.push(sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
656 $input.witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
657 $input.witness.push($preimage);
658 $input.witness.push(redeemscript.into_vec());
663 for (idx, htlc) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() {
664 if let Some(payment_preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
666 prev_hash: commitment_txid,
667 prev_index: htlc.transaction_output_index,
668 script_sig: Script::new(),
669 sequence: idx as u32, // reset to 0xfffffffd in sign_input
672 if htlc.cltv_expiry > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER {
674 values.push((tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].value, payment_preimage));
675 total_value += htlc.amount_msat / 1000;
677 let mut single_htlc_tx = Transaction {
682 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
683 value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000, //TODO: - fee
686 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&single_htlc_tx);
687 sign_input!(sighash_parts, single_htlc_tx.input[0], htlc.amount_msat / 1000, payment_preimage.to_vec());
688 txn_to_broadcast.push(single_htlc_tx);
693 if inputs.is_empty() { return txn_to_broadcast; } // Nothing to be done...probably a false positive/local tx
695 let outputs = vec!(TxOut {
696 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
697 value: total_value, //TODO: - fee
699 let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
706 let mut values_drain = values.drain(..);
707 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx);
709 for input in spend_tx.input.iter_mut() {
710 let value = values_drain.next().unwrap();
711 sign_input!(sighash_parts, input, value.0, value.1.to_vec());
714 txn_to_broadcast.push(spend_tx);
718 //TODO: For each input check if its in our remote_htlc_outputs_on_chain map!
724 fn broadcast_by_local_state(&self, local_tx: &LocalSignedTx) -> Vec<Transaction> {
725 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
727 for &(ref htlc, ref their_sig, ref our_sig) in local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
729 let mut htlc_timeout_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&local_tx.txid, local_tx.feerate_per_kw, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), htlc, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key, &local_tx.revocation_key);
731 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
733 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(their_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
734 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
735 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
736 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
738 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new());
739 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &local_tx.a_htlc_key, &local_tx.b_htlc_key, &local_tx.revocation_key).into_vec());
741 res.push(htlc_timeout_tx);
743 if let Some(payment_preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
744 let mut htlc_success_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&local_tx.txid, local_tx.feerate_per_kw, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), htlc, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key, &local_tx.revocation_key);
746 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
748 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(their_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
749 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
750 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
751 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
753 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(payment_preimage.to_vec());
754 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &local_tx.a_htlc_key, &local_tx.b_htlc_key, &local_tx.revocation_key).into_vec());
756 res.push(htlc_success_tx);
764 /// Attempts to claim any claimable HTLCs in a commitment transaction which was not (yet)
765 /// revoked using data in local_claimable_outpoints.
766 /// Should not be used if check_spend_revoked_transaction succeeds.
767 fn check_spend_local_transaction(&self, tx: &Transaction, _height: u32) -> Vec<Transaction> {
768 let commitment_txid = tx.txid();
769 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
770 if local_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
771 return self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx);
774 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
775 if local_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
776 return self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx);
782 fn block_connected(&self, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], height: u32, broadcaster: &BroadcasterInterface) {
783 for tx in txn_matched {
784 for txin in tx.input.iter() {
785 if self.funding_txo.is_none() || (txin.prev_hash == self.funding_txo.unwrap().txid && txin.prev_index == self.funding_txo.unwrap().index as u32) {
786 let mut txn = self.check_spend_remote_transaction(tx, height);
788 txn = self.check_spend_local_transaction(tx, height);
790 for tx in txn.iter() {
791 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(tx);
796 if let Some(ref cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
797 let mut needs_broadcast = false;
798 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in cur_local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
799 if htlc.cltv_expiry <= height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER {
800 if htlc.offered || self.payment_preimages.contains_key(&htlc.payment_hash) {
801 needs_broadcast = true;
807 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&cur_local_tx.tx);
808 for tx in self.broadcast_by_local_state(&cur_local_tx) {
809 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
815 pub fn would_broadcast_at_height(&self, height: u32) -> bool {
816 if let Some(ref cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
817 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in cur_local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
818 if htlc.cltv_expiry <= height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER {
819 if htlc.offered || self.payment_preimages.contains_key(&htlc.payment_hash) {
831 use bitcoin::util::misc::hex_bytes;
832 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Script;
833 use bitcoin::util::hash::{Hash160,Sha256dHash};
834 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
835 use ln::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor;
836 use ln::channelmonitor::LocalSignedTx;
837 use ln::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment;
838 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
839 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1, Signature};
840 use rand::{thread_rng,Rng};
841 use std::collections::HashMap;
844 fn test_per_commitment_storage() {
845 // Test vectors from BOLT 3:
846 let mut secrets: Vec<[u8; 32]> = Vec::new();
847 let mut monitor: ChannelMonitor;
848 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
850 macro_rules! test_secrets {
852 let mut idx = 281474976710655;
853 for secret in secrets.iter() {
854 assert_eq!(monitor.get_secret(idx).unwrap(), *secret);
857 assert_eq!(monitor.get_min_seen_secret(), idx + 1);
858 assert!(monitor.get_secret(idx).is_err());
863 // insert_secret correct sequence
864 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::new(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
867 secrets.push([0; 32]);
868 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
869 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
872 secrets.push([0; 32]);
873 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
874 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
877 secrets.push([0; 32]);
878 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
879 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
882 secrets.push([0; 32]);
883 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
884 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
887 secrets.push([0; 32]);
888 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
889 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
892 secrets.push([0; 32]);
893 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
894 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
897 secrets.push([0; 32]);
898 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
899 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
902 secrets.push([0; 32]);
903 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
904 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
909 // insert_secret #1 incorrect
910 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::new(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
913 secrets.push([0; 32]);
914 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
915 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
918 secrets.push([0; 32]);
919 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
920 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err,
921 "Previous secret did not match new one");
925 // insert_secret #2 incorrect (#1 derived from incorrect)
926 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::new(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
929 secrets.push([0; 32]);
930 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
931 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
934 secrets.push([0; 32]);
935 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("dddc3a8d14fddf2b68fa8c7fbad2748274937479dd0f8930d5ebb4ab6bd866a3").unwrap());
936 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
939 secrets.push([0; 32]);
940 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
941 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
944 secrets.push([0; 32]);
945 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
946 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err,
947 "Previous secret did not match new one");
951 // insert_secret #3 incorrect
952 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::new(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
955 secrets.push([0; 32]);
956 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
957 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
960 secrets.push([0; 32]);
961 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
962 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
965 secrets.push([0; 32]);
966 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("c51a18b13e8527e579ec56365482c62f180b7d5760b46e9477dae59e87ed423a").unwrap());
967 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
970 secrets.push([0; 32]);
971 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
972 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err,
973 "Previous secret did not match new one");
977 // insert_secret #4 incorrect (1,2,3 derived from incorrect)
978 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::new(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
981 secrets.push([0; 32]);
982 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
983 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
986 secrets.push([0; 32]);
987 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("dddc3a8d14fddf2b68fa8c7fbad2748274937479dd0f8930d5ebb4ab6bd866a3").unwrap());
988 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
991 secrets.push([0; 32]);
992 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("c51a18b13e8527e579ec56365482c62f180b7d5760b46e9477dae59e87ed423a").unwrap());
993 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
996 secrets.push([0; 32]);
997 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("ba65d7b0ef55a3ba300d4e87af29868f394f8f138d78a7011669c79b37b936f4").unwrap());
998 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1001 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1002 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
1003 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1006 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1007 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
1008 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1011 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1012 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
1013 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1016 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1017 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
1018 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err,
1019 "Previous secret did not match new one");
1023 // insert_secret #5 incorrect
1024 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::new(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
1027 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1028 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1029 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1032 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1033 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1034 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1037 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1038 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1039 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1042 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1043 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1044 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1047 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1048 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("631373ad5f9ef654bb3dade742d09504c567edd24320d2fcd68e3cc47e2ff6a6").unwrap());
1049 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1052 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1053 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
1054 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err,
1055 "Previous secret did not match new one");
1059 // insert_secret #6 incorrect (5 derived from incorrect)
1060 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::new(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
1063 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1064 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1065 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1068 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1069 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1070 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1073 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1074 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1075 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1078 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1079 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1080 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1083 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1084 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("631373ad5f9ef654bb3dade742d09504c567edd24320d2fcd68e3cc47e2ff6a6").unwrap());
1085 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1088 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1089 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("b7e76a83668bde38b373970155c868a653304308f9896692f904a23731224bb1").unwrap());
1090 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1093 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1094 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
1095 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1098 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1099 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
1100 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err,
1101 "Previous secret did not match new one");
1105 // insert_secret #7 incorrect
1106 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::new(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
1109 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1110 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1111 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1114 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1115 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1116 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1119 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1120 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1121 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1124 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1125 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1126 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1129 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1130 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
1131 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1134 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1135 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
1136 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1139 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1140 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("e7971de736e01da8ed58b94c2fc216cb1dca9e326f3a96e7194fe8ea8af6c0a3").unwrap());
1141 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1144 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1145 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
1146 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err,
1147 "Previous secret did not match new one");
1151 // insert_secret #8 incorrect
1152 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::new(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
1155 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1156 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1157 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1160 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1161 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1162 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1165 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1166 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1167 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1170 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1171 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1172 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1175 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1176 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
1177 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1180 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1181 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
1182 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1185 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1186 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
1187 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1190 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1191 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("a7efbc61aac46d34f77778bac22c8a20c6a46ca460addc49009bda875ec88fa4").unwrap());
1192 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err,
1193 "Previous secret did not match new one");
1197 macro_rules! gen_local_tx {
1198 ($hex : expr, $monitor : expr, $htlcs : expr, $rng : expr, $preimage : expr, $hash : expr) => {
1201 let mut htlcs = Vec::new();
1203 for _i in 0..$htlcs {
1204 $rng.fill_bytes(&mut $preimage);
1205 $hash[0..20].clone_from_slice(&Hash160::from_data(&$preimage)[0..20]);
1206 $monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&$hash, &$preimage);
1207 htlcs.push((HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1211 payment_hash : $hash.clone(),
1212 transaction_output_index : 0,
1213 }, Signature::from_der(&Secp256k1::new(), $hex).unwrap(),
1214 Signature::from_der(&Secp256k1::new(), $hex).unwrap()))
1217 Some(LocalSignedTx {
1218 txid: Sha256dHash::from_data(&[]),
1225 revocation_key: PublicKey::new(),
1226 a_htlc_key: PublicKey::new(),
1227 b_htlc_key: PublicKey::new(),
1228 delayed_payment_key: PublicKey::new(),
1230 htlc_outputs: htlcs,
1236 macro_rules! gen_remote_outpoints {
1237 ($monitor : expr, $tx : expr, $htlcs : expr, $rng : expr, $preimage : expr, $hash: expr, $number : expr) => {
1239 let mut commitment_number = $number;
1243 let tx_zero = Transaction {
1250 let mut htlcs = Vec::new();
1252 for _i in 0..$htlcs {
1253 $rng.fill_bytes(&mut $preimage);
1254 $hash[0..20].clone_from_slice(&Hash160::from_data(&$preimage)[0..20]);
1255 $monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&$hash, &$preimage);
1256 htlcs.push(HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1260 payment_hash : $hash.clone(),
1261 transaction_output_index : 0,
1264 commitment_number -= 1;
1265 $monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&tx_zero, htlcs, commitment_number);
1272 fn test_prune_preimages() {
1274 let mut monitor: ChannelMonitor;
1275 let mut secrets: Vec<[u8; 32]> = Vec::new();
1276 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1277 let mut preimage: [u8;32] = [0;32];
1278 let mut hash: [u8;32] = [0;32];
1279 let mut rng = thread_rng();
1282 // insert 30 random hash, 10 from local, 10 from remote, prune 30/50
1283 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::new(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
1286 rng.fill_bytes(&mut preimage);
1287 hash[0..20].clone_from_slice(&Hash160::from_data(&preimage)[0..20]);
1288 monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&hash, &preimage);
1290 monitor.current_local_signed_commitment_tx = gen_local_tx!(&hex_bytes("3045022100fa86fa9a36a8cd6a7bb8f06a541787d51371d067951a9461d5404de6b928782e02201c8b7c334c10aed8976a3a465be9a28abff4cb23acbf00022295b378ce1fa3cd").unwrap()[..], monitor, 10, rng, preimage, hash);
1291 gen_remote_outpoints!(monitor, 1, 10, rng, preimage, hash, 281474976710654);
1293 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1294 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1295 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None);
1296 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 20);
1301 // insert 30 random hash, prune 30/30
1302 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::new(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
1305 rng.fill_bytes(&mut preimage);
1306 hash[0..20].clone_from_slice(&Hash160::from_data(&preimage)[0..20]);
1307 monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&hash, &preimage);
1309 monitor.current_local_signed_commitment_tx = gen_local_tx!(&hex_bytes("3045022100fa86fa9a36a8cd6a7bb8f06a541787d51371d067951a9461d5404de6b928782e02201c8b7c334c10aed8976a3a465be9a28abff4cb23acbf00022295b378ce1fa3cd").unwrap()[..], monitor, 0, rng, preimage, hash);
1310 gen_remote_outpoints!(monitor, 0, 0, rng, preimage, hash, 281474976710655);
1312 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1313 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1314 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None);
1315 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 0);
1319 // insert 30 random hash, 25 on 5 remotes, prune 30/55
1320 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::new(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
1323 rng.fill_bytes(&mut preimage);
1324 hash[0..20].clone_from_slice(&Hash160::from_data(&preimage)[0..20]);
1325 monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&hash, &preimage);
1327 monitor.current_local_signed_commitment_tx = gen_local_tx!(&hex_bytes("3045022100fa86fa9a36a8cd6a7bb8f06a541787d51371d067951a9461d5404de6b928782e02201c8b7c334c10aed8976a3a465be9a28abff4cb23acbf00022295b378ce1fa3cd").unwrap()[..], monitor, 0, rng, preimage, hash);
1328 gen_remote_outpoints!(monitor, 5, 5, rng, preimage, hash, 281474976710654);
1330 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1331 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1332 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None);
1333 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 25);
1337 // insert 30 random hash, 25 from local, prune 30/55
1338 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::new(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
1341 rng.fill_bytes(&mut preimage);
1342 hash[0..20].clone_from_slice(&Hash160::from_data(&preimage)[0..20]);
1343 monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&hash, &preimage);
1345 monitor.current_local_signed_commitment_tx = gen_local_tx!(&hex_bytes("3045022100fa86fa9a36a8cd6a7bb8f06a541787d51371d067951a9461d5404de6b928782e02201c8b7c334c10aed8976a3a465be9a28abff4cb23acbf00022295b378ce1fa3cd").unwrap()[..], monitor, 25, rng, preimage, hash);
1346 gen_remote_outpoints!(monitor, 0, 0, rng, preimage, hash, 281474976710655);
1348 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1349 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1350 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None);
1351 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 25);
1355 // Further testing is done in the ChannelManager integration tests.