1 //! The logic to monitor for on-chain transactions and create the relevant claim responses lives
4 //! ChannelMonitor objects are generated by ChannelManager in response to relevant
5 //! messages/actions, and MUST be persisted to disk (and, preferably, remotely) before progress can
6 //! be made in responding to certain messages, see ManyChannelMonitor for more.
8 //! Note that ChannelMonitors are an important part of the lightning trust model and a copy of the
9 //! latest ChannelMonitor must always be actively monitoring for chain updates (and no out-of-date
10 //! ChannelMonitors should do so). Thus, if you're building rust-lightning into an HSM or other
11 //! security-domain-separated system design, you should consider having multiple paths for
12 //! ChannelMonitors to get out of the HSM and onto monitoring devices.
14 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
15 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxIn,TxOut,SigHashType,Transaction};
16 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
17 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
18 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
19 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::{self, Decodable, Encodable};
20 use bitcoin::util::hash::{Hash160, BitcoinHash,Sha256dHash};
21 use bitcoin::util::bip143;
23 use crypto::digest::Digest;
25 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Message,Signature};
26 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
29 use ln::msgs::DecodeError;
31 use ln::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment;
32 use ln::channelmanager::HTLCSource;
33 use chain::chaininterface::{ChainListener, ChainWatchInterface, BroadcasterInterface};
34 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
35 use chain::keysinterface::SpendableOutputDescriptor;
36 use util::logger::Logger;
37 use util::ser::{ReadableArgs, Readable, Writer, Writeable, WriterWriteAdaptor, U48};
38 use util::sha2::Sha256;
39 use util::{byte_utils, events};
41 use std::collections::{HashMap, hash_map};
42 use std::sync::{Arc,Mutex};
43 use std::{hash,cmp, mem};
45 /// An error enum representing a failure to persist a channel monitor update.
47 pub enum ChannelMonitorUpdateErr {
48 /// Used to indicate a temporary failure (eg connection to a watchtower failed, but is expected
49 /// to succeed at some point in the future).
51 /// Such a failure will "freeze" a channel, preventing us from revoking old states or
52 /// submitting new commitment transactions to the remote party.
53 /// ChannelManager::test_restore_channel_monitor can be used to retry the update(s) and restore
54 /// the channel to an operational state.
56 /// Note that continuing to operate when no copy of the updated ChannelMonitor could be
57 /// persisted is unsafe - if you failed to store the update on your own local disk you should
58 /// instead return PermanentFailure to force closure of the channel ASAP.
60 /// Even when a channel has been "frozen" updates to the ChannelMonitor can continue to occur
61 /// (eg if an inbound HTLC which we forwarded was claimed upstream resulting in us attempting
62 /// to claim it on this channel) and those updates must be applied wherever they can be. At
63 /// least one such updated ChannelMonitor must be persisted otherwise PermanentFailure should
64 /// be returned to get things on-chain ASAP using only the in-memory copy. Obviously updates to
65 /// the channel which would invalidate previous ChannelMonitors are not made when a channel has
68 /// Note that even if updates made after TemporaryFailure succeed you must still call
69 /// test_restore_channel_monitor to ensure you have the latest monitor and re-enable normal
70 /// channel operation.
72 /// Used to indicate no further channel monitor updates will be allowed (eg we've moved on to a
73 /// different watchtower and cannot update with all watchtowers that were previously informed
74 /// of this channel). This will force-close the channel in question.
76 /// Should also be used to indicate a failure to update the local copy of the channel monitor.
80 /// General Err type for ChannelMonitor actions. Generally, this implies that the data provided is
81 /// inconsistent with the ChannelMonitor being called. eg for ChannelMonitor::insert_combine this
82 /// means you tried to merge two monitors for different channels or for a channel which was
83 /// restored from a backup and then generated new commitment updates.
84 /// Contains a human-readable error message.
86 pub struct MonitorUpdateError(pub &'static str);
88 /// Simple structure send back by ManyChannelMonitor in case of HTLC detected onchain from a
89 /// forward channel and from which info are needed to update HTLC in a backward channel.
90 pub struct HTLCUpdate {
91 pub(super) payment_hash: [u8; 32],
92 pub(super) payment_preimage: Option<[u8; 32]>,
93 pub(super) source: HTLCSource
96 /// Simple trait indicating ability to track a set of ChannelMonitors and multiplex events between
97 /// them. Generally should be implemented by keeping a local SimpleManyChannelMonitor and passing
98 /// events to it, while also taking any add_update_monitor events and passing them to some remote
101 /// Note that any updates to a channel's monitor *must* be applied to each instance of the
102 /// channel's monitor everywhere (including remote watchtowers) *before* this function returns. If
103 /// an update occurs and a remote watchtower is left with old state, it may broadcast transactions
104 /// which we have revoked, allowing our counterparty to claim all funds in the channel!
105 pub trait ManyChannelMonitor: Send + Sync {
106 /// Adds or updates a monitor for the given `funding_txo`.
108 /// Implementor must also ensure that the funding_txo outpoint is registered with any relevant
109 /// ChainWatchInterfaces such that the provided monitor receives block_connected callbacks with
110 /// any spends of it.
111 fn add_update_monitor(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr>;
113 /// Used by ChannelManager to get list of HTLC resolved onchain and which needed to be updated
114 /// with success or failure backward
115 fn fetch_pending_htlc_updated(&self) -> Vec<HTLCUpdate>;
118 /// A simple implementation of a ManyChannelMonitor and ChainListener. Can be used to create a
119 /// watchtower or watch our own channels.
121 /// Note that you must provide your own key by which to refer to channels.
123 /// If you're accepting remote monitors (ie are implementing a watchtower), you must verify that
124 /// users cannot overwrite a given channel by providing a duplicate key. ie you should probably
125 /// index by a PublicKey which is required to sign any updates.
127 /// If you're using this for local monitoring of your own channels, you probably want to use
128 /// `OutPoint` as the key, which will give you a ManyChannelMonitor implementation.
129 pub struct SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
130 #[cfg(test)] // Used in ChannelManager tests to manipulate channels directly
131 pub monitors: Mutex<HashMap<Key, ChannelMonitor>>,
133 monitors: Mutex<HashMap<Key, ChannelMonitor>>,
134 chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>,
135 broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>,
136 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
137 pending_htlc_updated: Mutex<HashMap<[u8; 32], Vec<(HTLCSource, Option<[u8; 32]>)>>>,
141 impl<Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash> ChainListener for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
142 fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], _indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) {
143 let block_hash = header.bitcoin_hash();
144 let mut new_events: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(0);
145 let mut htlc_updated_infos = Vec::new();
147 let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
148 for monitor in monitors.values_mut() {
149 let (txn_outputs, spendable_outputs, mut htlc_updated) = monitor.block_connected(txn_matched, height, &block_hash, &*self.broadcaster);
150 if spendable_outputs.len() > 0 {
151 new_events.push(events::Event::SpendableOutputs {
152 outputs: spendable_outputs,
156 for (ref txid, ref outputs) in txn_outputs {
157 for (idx, output) in outputs.iter().enumerate() {
158 self.chain_monitor.install_watch_outpoint((txid.clone(), idx as u32), &output.script_pubkey);
161 htlc_updated_infos.append(&mut htlc_updated);
165 // ChannelManager will just need to fetch pending_htlc_updated and pass state backward
166 let mut pending_htlc_updated = self.pending_htlc_updated.lock().unwrap();
167 for htlc in htlc_updated_infos.drain(..) {
168 match pending_htlc_updated.entry(htlc.2) {
169 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut e) => {
170 // In case of reorg we may have htlc outputs solved in a different way so
171 // we prefer to keep claims but don't store duplicate updates for a given
172 // (payment_hash, HTLCSource) pair.
173 // TODO: Note that we currently don't really use this as ChannelManager
174 // will fail/claim backwards after the first block. We really should delay
175 // a few blocks before failing backwards (but can claim backwards
176 // immediately) as long as we have a few blocks of headroom.
177 let mut existing_claim = false;
178 e.get_mut().retain(|htlc_data| {
179 if htlc.0 == htlc_data.0 {
180 if htlc_data.1.is_some() {
181 existing_claim = true;
187 e.get_mut().push((htlc.0, htlc.1));
190 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
191 e.insert(vec![(htlc.0, htlc.1)]);
196 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
197 pending_events.append(&mut new_events);
200 fn block_disconnected(&self, _: &BlockHeader) { }
203 impl<Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash + 'static> SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
204 /// Creates a new object which can be used to monitor several channels given the chain
205 /// interface with which to register to receive notifications.
206 pub fn new(chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>, broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>, logger: Arc<Logger>) -> Arc<SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key>> {
207 let res = Arc::new(SimpleManyChannelMonitor {
208 monitors: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
211 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
212 pending_htlc_updated: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
215 let weak_res = Arc::downgrade(&res);
216 res.chain_monitor.register_listener(weak_res);
220 /// Adds or udpates the monitor which monitors the channel referred to by the given key.
221 pub fn add_update_monitor_by_key(&self, key: Key, monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
222 let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
223 match monitors.get_mut(&key) {
224 Some(orig_monitor) => {
225 log_trace!(self, "Updating Channel Monitor for channel {}", log_funding_info!(monitor.key_storage));
226 return orig_monitor.insert_combine(monitor);
230 match monitor.key_storage {
231 Storage::Local { ref funding_info, .. } => {
234 return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Try to update a useless monitor without funding_txo !"));
236 &Some((ref outpoint, ref script)) => {
237 log_trace!(self, "Got new Channel Monitor for channel {}", log_bytes!(outpoint.to_channel_id()[..]));
238 self.chain_monitor.install_watch_tx(&outpoint.txid, script);
239 self.chain_monitor.install_watch_outpoint((outpoint.txid, outpoint.index as u32), script);
243 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
244 self.chain_monitor.watch_all_txn();
247 monitors.insert(key, monitor);
252 impl ManyChannelMonitor for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<OutPoint> {
253 fn add_update_monitor(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr> {
254 match self.add_update_monitor_by_key(funding_txo, monitor) {
256 Err(_) => Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure),
260 fn fetch_pending_htlc_updated(&self) -> Vec<HTLCUpdate> {
261 let mut updated = self.pending_htlc_updated.lock().unwrap();
262 let mut pending_htlcs_updated = Vec::with_capacity(updated.len());
263 for (k, v) in updated.drain() {
265 pending_htlcs_updated.push(HTLCUpdate {
267 payment_preimage: htlc_data.1,
272 pending_htlcs_updated
276 impl<Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash> events::EventsProvider for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
277 fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
278 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
279 let mut ret = Vec::new();
280 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut *pending_events);
285 /// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, don't try to claim it in a shared transaction,
286 /// instead claiming it in its own individual transaction.
287 const CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 12;
288 /// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, force-close the channel to broadcast the
289 /// HTLC-Success transaction.
290 /// In other words, this is an upper bound on how many blocks we think it can take us to get a
291 /// transaction confirmed (and we use it in a few more, equivalent, places).
292 pub(crate) const CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 6;
293 /// Number of blocks by which point we expect our counterparty to have seen new blocks on the
294 /// network and done a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance (+ we've updated all our
295 /// copies of ChannelMonitors, including watchtowers).
296 pub(crate) const HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS: u32 = 3;
298 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
301 revocation_base_key: SecretKey,
302 htlc_base_key: SecretKey,
303 delayed_payment_base_key: SecretKey,
304 payment_base_key: SecretKey,
305 shutdown_pubkey: PublicKey,
306 prev_latest_per_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
307 latest_per_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
308 funding_info: Option<(OutPoint, Script)>,
309 current_remote_commitment_txid: Option<Sha256dHash>,
310 prev_remote_commitment_txid: Option<Sha256dHash>,
313 revocation_base_key: PublicKey,
314 htlc_base_key: PublicKey,
318 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
319 struct LocalSignedTx {
320 /// txid of the transaction in tx, just used to make comparison faster
323 revocation_key: PublicKey,
324 a_htlc_key: PublicKey,
325 b_htlc_key: PublicKey,
326 delayed_payment_key: PublicKey,
328 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Signature, Signature)>,
329 htlc_sources: Vec<([u8; 32], HTLCSource, Option<u32>)>,
332 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
333 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
335 /// A ChannelMonitor handles chain events (blocks connected and disconnected) and generates
336 /// on-chain transactions to ensure no loss of funds occurs.
338 /// You MUST ensure that no ChannelMonitors for a given channel anywhere contain out-of-date
339 /// information and are actively monitoring the chain.
341 pub struct ChannelMonitor {
342 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64,
344 key_storage: Storage,
345 their_htlc_base_key: Option<PublicKey>,
346 their_delayed_payment_base_key: Option<PublicKey>,
347 // first is the idx of the first of the two revocation points
348 their_cur_revocation_points: Option<(u64, PublicKey, Option<PublicKey>)>,
350 our_to_self_delay: u16,
351 their_to_self_delay: Option<u16>,
353 old_secrets: [([u8; 32], u64); 49],
354 remote_claimable_outpoints: HashMap<Sha256dHash, (Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>, Vec<([u8; 32], HTLCSource, Option<u32>)>)>,
355 /// We cannot identify HTLC-Success or HTLC-Timeout transactions by themselves on the chain.
356 /// Nor can we figure out their commitment numbers without the commitment transaction they are
357 /// spending. Thus, in order to claim them via revocation key, we track all the remote
358 /// commitment transactions which we find on-chain, mapping them to the commitment number which
359 /// can be used to derive the revocation key and claim the transactions.
360 remote_commitment_txn_on_chain: HashMap<Sha256dHash, (u64, Vec<Script>)>,
361 /// Cache used to make pruning of payment_preimages faster.
362 /// Maps payment_hash values to commitment numbers for remote transactions for non-revoked
363 /// remote transactions (ie should remain pretty small).
364 /// Serialized to disk but should generally not be sent to Watchtowers.
365 remote_hash_commitment_number: HashMap<[u8; 32], u64>,
367 // We store two local commitment transactions to avoid any race conditions where we may update
368 // some monitors (potentially on watchtowers) but then fail to update others, resulting in the
369 // various monitors for one channel being out of sync, and us broadcasting a local
370 // transaction for which we have deleted claim information on some watchtowers.
371 prev_local_signed_commitment_tx: Option<LocalSignedTx>,
372 current_local_signed_commitment_tx: Option<LocalSignedTx>,
374 // Used just for ChannelManager to make sure it has the latest channel data during
376 current_remote_commitment_number: u64,
378 payment_preimages: HashMap<[u8; 32], [u8; 32]>,
380 destination_script: Script,
382 // We simply modify last_block_hash in Channel's block_connected so that serialization is
383 // consistent but hopefully the users' copy handles block_connected in a consistent way.
384 // (we do *not*, however, update them in insert_combine to ensure any local user copies keep
385 // their last_block_hash from its state and not based on updated copies that didn't run through
386 // the full block_connected).
387 pub(crate) last_block_hash: Sha256dHash,
388 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>, //TODO: dedup this a bit...
392 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
393 /// Used only in testing and fuzztarget to check serialization roundtrips don't change the
394 /// underlying object
395 impl PartialEq for ChannelMonitor {
396 fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
397 if self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor != other.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor ||
398 self.key_storage != other.key_storage ||
399 self.their_htlc_base_key != other.their_htlc_base_key ||
400 self.their_delayed_payment_base_key != other.their_delayed_payment_base_key ||
401 self.their_cur_revocation_points != other.their_cur_revocation_points ||
402 self.our_to_self_delay != other.our_to_self_delay ||
403 self.their_to_self_delay != other.their_to_self_delay ||
404 self.remote_claimable_outpoints != other.remote_claimable_outpoints ||
405 self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain != other.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain ||
406 self.remote_hash_commitment_number != other.remote_hash_commitment_number ||
407 self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx != other.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx ||
408 self.current_remote_commitment_number != other.current_remote_commitment_number ||
409 self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx != other.current_local_signed_commitment_tx ||
410 self.payment_preimages != other.payment_preimages ||
411 self.destination_script != other.destination_script
415 for (&(ref secret, ref idx), &(ref o_secret, ref o_idx)) in self.old_secrets.iter().zip(other.old_secrets.iter()) {
416 if secret != o_secret || idx != o_idx {
425 impl ChannelMonitor {
426 pub(super) fn new(revocation_base_key: &SecretKey, delayed_payment_base_key: &SecretKey, htlc_base_key: &SecretKey, payment_base_key: &SecretKey, shutdown_pubkey: &PublicKey, our_to_self_delay: u16, destination_script: Script, logger: Arc<Logger>) -> ChannelMonitor {
428 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: 0,
430 key_storage: Storage::Local {
431 revocation_base_key: revocation_base_key.clone(),
432 htlc_base_key: htlc_base_key.clone(),
433 delayed_payment_base_key: delayed_payment_base_key.clone(),
434 payment_base_key: payment_base_key.clone(),
435 shutdown_pubkey: shutdown_pubkey.clone(),
436 prev_latest_per_commitment_point: None,
437 latest_per_commitment_point: None,
439 current_remote_commitment_txid: None,
440 prev_remote_commitment_txid: None,
442 their_htlc_base_key: None,
443 their_delayed_payment_base_key: None,
444 their_cur_revocation_points: None,
446 our_to_self_delay: our_to_self_delay,
447 their_to_self_delay: None,
449 old_secrets: [([0; 32], 1 << 48); 49],
450 remote_claimable_outpoints: HashMap::new(),
451 remote_commitment_txn_on_chain: HashMap::new(),
452 remote_hash_commitment_number: HashMap::new(),
454 prev_local_signed_commitment_tx: None,
455 current_local_signed_commitment_tx: None,
456 current_remote_commitment_number: 1 << 48,
458 payment_preimages: HashMap::new(),
459 destination_script: destination_script,
461 last_block_hash: Default::default(),
462 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
468 fn place_secret(idx: u64) -> u8 {
470 if idx & (1 << i) == (1 << i) {
478 fn derive_secret(secret: [u8; 32], bits: u8, idx: u64) -> [u8; 32] {
479 let mut res: [u8; 32] = secret;
481 let bitpos = bits - 1 - i;
482 if idx & (1 << bitpos) == (1 << bitpos) {
483 res[(bitpos / 8) as usize] ^= 1 << (bitpos & 7);
484 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
486 sha.result(&mut res);
492 /// Inserts a revocation secret into this channel monitor. Prunes old preimages if neither
493 /// needed by local commitment transactions HTCLs nor by remote ones. Unless we haven't already seen remote
494 /// commitment transaction's secret, they are de facto pruned (we can use revocation key).
495 pub(super) fn provide_secret(&mut self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
496 let pos = ChannelMonitor::place_secret(idx);
498 let (old_secret, old_idx) = self.old_secrets[i as usize];
499 if ChannelMonitor::derive_secret(secret, pos, old_idx) != old_secret {
500 return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Previous secret did not match new one"));
503 if self.get_min_seen_secret() <= idx {
506 self.old_secrets[pos as usize] = (secret, idx);
508 // Prune HTLCs from the previous remote commitment tx so we don't generate failure/fulfill
509 // events for now-revoked/fulfilled HTLCs.
510 // TODO: We should probably consider whether we're really getting the next secret here.
511 if let Storage::Local { ref mut prev_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage {
512 if let Some(txid) = prev_remote_commitment_txid.take() {
513 self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get_mut(&txid).unwrap().1 = Vec::new();
517 if !self.payment_preimages.is_empty() {
518 let local_signed_commitment_tx = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx.as_ref().expect("Channel needs at least an initial commitment tx !");
519 let prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.as_ref();
520 let min_idx = self.get_min_seen_secret();
521 let remote_hash_commitment_number = &mut self.remote_hash_commitment_number;
523 self.payment_preimages.retain(|&k, _| {
524 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in &local_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs {
525 if k == htlc.payment_hash {
529 if let Some(prev_local_commitment_tx) = prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
530 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in prev_local_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
531 if k == htlc.payment_hash {
536 let contains = if let Some(cn) = remote_hash_commitment_number.get(&k) {
543 remote_hash_commitment_number.remove(&k);
552 /// Informs this monitor of the latest remote (ie non-broadcastable) commitment transaction.
553 /// The monitor watches for it to be broadcasted and then uses the HTLC information (and
554 /// possibly future revocation/preimage information) to claim outputs where possible.
555 /// We cache also the mapping hash:commitment number to lighten pruning of old preimages by watchtowers.
556 pub(super) fn provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, unsigned_commitment_tx: &Transaction, htlc_outputs: Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>, htlc_sources: Vec<([u8; 32], HTLCSource, Option<u32>)>, commitment_number: u64, their_revocation_point: PublicKey) {
557 // TODO: Encrypt the htlc_outputs data with the single-hash of the commitment transaction
558 // so that a remote monitor doesn't learn anything unless there is a malicious close.
559 // (only maybe, sadly we cant do the same for local info, as we need to be aware of
561 for ref htlc in &htlc_outputs {
562 self.remote_hash_commitment_number.insert(htlc.payment_hash, commitment_number);
565 let new_txid = unsigned_commitment_tx.txid();
566 if let Storage::Local { ref mut current_remote_commitment_txid, ref mut prev_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage {
567 *prev_remote_commitment_txid = current_remote_commitment_txid.take();
568 *current_remote_commitment_txid = Some(new_txid);
570 self.remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(new_txid, (htlc_outputs, htlc_sources));
571 self.current_remote_commitment_number = commitment_number;
572 //TODO: Merge this into the other per-remote-transaction output storage stuff
573 match self.their_cur_revocation_points {
574 Some(old_points) => {
575 if old_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 {
576 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0, old_points.1, Some(their_revocation_point)));
577 } else if old_points.0 == commitment_number + 2 {
578 if let Some(old_second_point) = old_points.2 {
579 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0 - 1, old_second_point, Some(their_revocation_point)));
581 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None));
584 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None));
588 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None));
593 /// Informs this monitor of the latest local (ie broadcastable) commitment transaction. The
594 /// monitor watches for timeouts and may broadcast it if we approach such a timeout. Thus, it
595 /// is important that any clones of this channel monitor (including remote clones) by kept
596 /// up-to-date as our local commitment transaction is updated.
597 /// Panics if set_their_to_self_delay has never been called.
598 /// Also update Storage with latest local per_commitment_point to derive local_delayedkey in
599 /// case of onchain HTLC tx
600 pub(super) fn provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, signed_commitment_tx: Transaction, local_keys: chan_utils::TxCreationKeys, feerate_per_kw: u64, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Signature, Signature)>, htlc_sources: Vec<([u8; 32], HTLCSource, Option<u32>)>) {
601 assert!(self.their_to_self_delay.is_some());
602 self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx.take();
603 self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(LocalSignedTx {
604 txid: signed_commitment_tx.txid(),
605 tx: signed_commitment_tx,
606 revocation_key: local_keys.revocation_key,
607 a_htlc_key: local_keys.a_htlc_key,
608 b_htlc_key: local_keys.b_htlc_key,
609 delayed_payment_key: local_keys.a_delayed_payment_key,
615 if let Storage::Local { ref mut latest_per_commitment_point, .. } = self.key_storage {
616 *latest_per_commitment_point = Some(local_keys.per_commitment_point);
618 panic!("Channel somehow ended up with its internal ChannelMonitor being in Watchtower mode?");
622 /// Provides a payment_hash->payment_preimage mapping. Will be automatically pruned when all
623 /// commitment_tx_infos which contain the payment hash have been revoked.
624 pub(super) fn provide_payment_preimage(&mut self, payment_hash: &[u8; 32], payment_preimage: &[u8; 32]) {
625 self.payment_preimages.insert(payment_hash.clone(), payment_preimage.clone());
628 /// Combines this ChannelMonitor with the information contained in the other ChannelMonitor.
629 /// After a successful call this ChannelMonitor is up-to-date and is safe to use to monitor the
630 /// chain for new blocks/transactions.
631 pub fn insert_combine(&mut self, mut other: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
632 match self.key_storage {
633 Storage::Local { ref funding_info, .. } => {
634 if funding_info.is_none() { return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Try to combine a Local monitor without funding_info")); }
635 let our_funding_info = funding_info;
636 if let Storage::Local { ref funding_info, .. } = other.key_storage {
637 if funding_info.is_none() { return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Try to combine a Local monitor without funding_info")); }
638 // We should be able to compare the entire funding_txo, but in fuzztarget its trivially
639 // easy to collide the funding_txo hash and have a different scriptPubKey.
640 if funding_info.as_ref().unwrap().0 != our_funding_info.as_ref().unwrap().0 {
641 return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Funding transaction outputs are not identical!"));
644 return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Try to combine a Local monitor with a Watchtower one !"));
647 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
648 if let Storage::Watchtower { .. } = other.key_storage {
651 return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Try to combine a Watchtower monitor with a Local one !"));
655 let other_min_secret = other.get_min_seen_secret();
656 let our_min_secret = self.get_min_seen_secret();
657 if our_min_secret > other_min_secret {
658 self.provide_secret(other_min_secret, other.get_secret(other_min_secret).unwrap())?;
660 if let Some(ref local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
661 if let Some(ref other_local_tx) = other.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
662 let our_commitment_number = 0xffffffffffff - ((((local_tx.tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (local_tx.tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor);
663 let other_commitment_number = 0xffffffffffff - ((((other_local_tx.tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (other_local_tx.tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ other.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor);
664 if our_commitment_number >= other_commitment_number {
665 self.key_storage = other.key_storage;
669 // TODO: We should use current_remote_commitment_number and the commitment number out of
670 // local transactions to decide how to merge
671 if our_min_secret >= other_min_secret {
672 self.their_cur_revocation_points = other.their_cur_revocation_points;
673 for (txid, htlcs) in other.remote_claimable_outpoints.drain() {
674 self.remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, htlcs);
676 if let Some(local_tx) = other.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
677 self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(local_tx);
679 if let Some(local_tx) = other.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
680 self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(local_tx);
682 self.payment_preimages = other.payment_preimages;
685 self.current_remote_commitment_number = cmp::min(self.current_remote_commitment_number, other.current_remote_commitment_number);
689 /// Panics if commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor doesn't fit in 48 bits
690 pub(super) fn set_commitment_obscure_factor(&mut self, commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64) {
691 assert!(commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor < (1 << 48));
692 self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor = commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor;
695 /// Allows this monitor to scan only for transactions which are applicable. Note that this is
696 /// optional, without it this monitor cannot be used in an SPV client, but you may wish to
697 /// avoid this (or call unset_funding_info) on a monitor you wish to send to a watchtower as it
698 /// provides slightly better privacy.
699 /// It's the responsibility of the caller to register outpoint and script with passing the former
700 /// value as key to add_update_monitor.
701 pub(super) fn set_funding_info(&mut self, new_funding_info: (OutPoint, Script)) {
702 match self.key_storage {
703 Storage::Local { ref mut funding_info, .. } => {
704 *funding_info = Some(new_funding_info);
706 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
707 panic!("Channel somehow ended up with its internal ChannelMonitor being in Watchtower mode?");
712 /// We log these base keys at channel opening to being able to rebuild redeemscript in case of leaked revoked commit tx
713 pub(super) fn set_their_base_keys(&mut self, their_htlc_base_key: &PublicKey, their_delayed_payment_base_key: &PublicKey) {
714 self.their_htlc_base_key = Some(their_htlc_base_key.clone());
715 self.their_delayed_payment_base_key = Some(their_delayed_payment_base_key.clone());
718 pub(super) fn set_their_to_self_delay(&mut self, their_to_self_delay: u16) {
719 self.their_to_self_delay = Some(their_to_self_delay);
722 pub(super) fn unset_funding_info(&mut self) {
723 match self.key_storage {
724 Storage::Local { ref mut funding_info, .. } => {
725 *funding_info = None;
727 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
728 panic!("Channel somehow ended up with its internal ChannelMonitor being in Watchtower mode?");
733 /// Gets the funding transaction outpoint of the channel this ChannelMonitor is monitoring for.
734 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
735 match self.key_storage {
736 Storage::Local { ref funding_info, .. } => {
738 &Some((outpoint, _)) => Some(outpoint),
742 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
748 /// Gets the sets of all outpoints which this ChannelMonitor expects to hear about spends of.
749 /// Generally useful when deserializing as during normal operation the return values of
750 /// block_connected are sufficient to ensure all relevant outpoints are being monitored (note
751 /// that the get_funding_txo outpoint and transaction must also be monitored for!).
752 pub fn get_monitored_outpoints(&self) -> Vec<(Sha256dHash, u32, &Script)> {
753 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.len() * 2);
754 for (ref txid, &(_, ref outputs)) in self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
755 for (idx, output) in outputs.iter().enumerate() {
756 res.push(((*txid).clone(), idx as u32, output));
762 /// Serializes into a vec, with various modes for the exposed pub fns
763 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W, for_local_storage: bool) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
764 //TODO: We still write out all the serialization here manually instead of using the fancy
765 //serialization framework we have, we should migrate things over to it.
766 writer.write_all(&[SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
767 writer.write_all(&[MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
769 // Set in initial Channel-object creation, so should always be set by now:
770 U48(self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor).write(writer)?;
772 match self.key_storage {
773 Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref payment_base_key, ref shutdown_pubkey, ref prev_latest_per_commitment_point, ref latest_per_commitment_point, ref funding_info, current_remote_commitment_txid, prev_remote_commitment_txid } => {
774 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
775 writer.write_all(&revocation_base_key[..])?;
776 writer.write_all(&htlc_base_key[..])?;
777 writer.write_all(&delayed_payment_base_key[..])?;
778 writer.write_all(&payment_base_key[..])?;
779 writer.write_all(&shutdown_pubkey.serialize())?;
780 if let Some(ref prev_latest_per_commitment_point) = *prev_latest_per_commitment_point {
781 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
782 writer.write_all(&prev_latest_per_commitment_point.serialize())?;
784 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
786 if let Some(ref latest_per_commitment_point) = *latest_per_commitment_point {
787 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
788 writer.write_all(&latest_per_commitment_point.serialize())?;
790 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
793 &Some((ref outpoint, ref script)) => {
794 writer.write_all(&outpoint.txid[..])?;
795 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(outpoint.index))?;
796 script.write(writer)?;
799 debug_assert!(false, "Try to serialize a useless Local monitor !");
802 if let Some(ref txid) = current_remote_commitment_txid {
803 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
804 writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
806 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
808 if let Some(ref txid) = prev_remote_commitment_txid {
809 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
810 writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
812 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
815 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => unimplemented!(),
818 writer.write_all(&self.their_htlc_base_key.as_ref().unwrap().serialize())?;
819 writer.write_all(&self.their_delayed_payment_base_key.as_ref().unwrap().serialize())?;
821 match self.their_cur_revocation_points {
822 Some((idx, pubkey, second_option)) => {
823 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(idx))?;
824 writer.write_all(&pubkey.serialize())?;
825 match second_option {
826 Some(second_pubkey) => {
827 writer.write_all(&second_pubkey.serialize())?;
830 writer.write_all(&[0; 33])?;
835 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(0))?;
839 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.our_to_self_delay))?;
840 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap()))?;
842 for &(ref secret, ref idx) in self.old_secrets.iter() {
843 writer.write_all(secret)?;
844 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*idx))?;
847 macro_rules! serialize_htlc_in_commitment {
848 ($htlc_output: expr) => {
849 writer.write_all(&[$htlc_output.offered as u8; 1])?;
850 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc_output.amount_msat))?;
851 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array($htlc_output.cltv_expiry))?;
852 writer.write_all(&$htlc_output.payment_hash)?;
853 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array($htlc_output.transaction_output_index))?;
857 macro_rules! serialize_htlc_source {
858 ($htlc_source: expr) => {
859 $htlc_source.0.write(writer)?;
860 $htlc_source.1.write(writer)?;
861 if let &Some(ref txo) = &$htlc_source.2 {
862 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
865 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
871 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_claimable_outpoints.len() as u64))?;
872 for (ref txid, &(ref htlc_infos, ref htlc_sources)) in self.remote_claimable_outpoints.iter() {
873 writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
874 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc_infos.len() as u64))?;
875 for ref htlc_output in htlc_infos.iter() {
876 serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output);
878 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc_sources.len() as u64))?;
879 for ref htlc_source in htlc_sources.iter() {
880 serialize_htlc_source!(htlc_source);
884 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.len() as u64))?;
885 for (ref txid, &(commitment_number, ref txouts)) in self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
886 writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
887 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(commitment_number))?;
888 (txouts.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
889 for script in txouts.iter() {
890 script.write(writer)?;
894 if for_local_storage {
895 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_hash_commitment_number.len() as u64))?;
896 for (ref payment_hash, commitment_number) in self.remote_hash_commitment_number.iter() {
897 writer.write_all(*payment_hash)?;
898 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(*commitment_number))?;
901 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(0))?;
904 macro_rules! serialize_local_tx {
905 ($local_tx: expr) => {
906 if let Err(e) = $local_tx.tx.consensus_encode(&mut WriterWriteAdaptor(writer)) {
908 encode::Error::Io(e) => return Err(e),
909 _ => panic!("local tx must have been well-formed!"),
913 writer.write_all(&$local_tx.revocation_key.serialize())?;
914 writer.write_all(&$local_tx.a_htlc_key.serialize())?;
915 writer.write_all(&$local_tx.b_htlc_key.serialize())?;
916 writer.write_all(&$local_tx.delayed_payment_key.serialize())?;
918 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($local_tx.feerate_per_kw))?;
919 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($local_tx.htlc_outputs.len() as u64))?;
920 for &(ref htlc_output, ref their_sig, ref our_sig) in $local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
921 serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output);
922 writer.write_all(&their_sig.serialize_compact(&self.secp_ctx))?;
923 writer.write_all(&our_sig.serialize_compact(&self.secp_ctx))?;
925 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($local_tx.htlc_sources.len() as u64))?;
926 for ref htlc_source in $local_tx.htlc_sources.iter() {
927 serialize_htlc_source!(htlc_source);
932 if let Some(ref prev_local_tx) = self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
933 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
934 serialize_local_tx!(prev_local_tx);
936 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
939 if let Some(ref cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
940 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
941 serialize_local_tx!(cur_local_tx);
943 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
946 if for_local_storage {
947 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(self.current_remote_commitment_number))?;
949 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(0))?;
952 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.payment_preimages.len() as u64))?;
953 for payment_preimage in self.payment_preimages.values() {
954 writer.write_all(payment_preimage)?;
957 self.last_block_hash.write(writer)?;
958 self.destination_script.write(writer)?;
963 /// Writes this monitor into the given writer, suitable for writing to disk.
965 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor), which
966 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
967 /// the "reorg path" (ie not just starting at the same height but starting at the highest
968 /// common block that appears on your best chain as well as on the chain which contains the
969 /// last block hash returned) upon deserializing the object!
970 pub fn write_for_disk<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
971 self.write(writer, true)
974 /// Encodes this monitor into the given writer, suitable for sending to a remote watchtower
976 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor), which
977 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
978 /// the "reorg path" (ie not just starting at the same height but starting at the highest
979 /// common block that appears on your best chain as well as on the chain which contains the
980 /// last block hash returned) upon deserializing the object!
981 pub fn write_for_watchtower<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
982 self.write(writer, false)
985 //TODO: Functions to serialize/deserialize (with different forms depending on which information
986 //we want to leave out (eg funding_txo, etc).
988 /// Can only fail if idx is < get_min_seen_secret
989 pub(super) fn get_secret(&self, idx: u64) -> Option<[u8; 32]> {
990 for i in 0..self.old_secrets.len() {
991 if (idx & (!((1 << i) - 1))) == self.old_secrets[i].1 {
992 return Some(ChannelMonitor::derive_secret(self.old_secrets[i].0, i as u8, idx))
995 assert!(idx < self.get_min_seen_secret());
999 pub(super) fn get_min_seen_secret(&self) -> u64 {
1000 //TODO This can be optimized?
1001 let mut min = 1 << 48;
1002 for &(_, idx) in self.old_secrets.iter() {
1010 pub(super) fn get_cur_remote_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
1011 self.current_remote_commitment_number
1014 pub(super) fn get_cur_local_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
1015 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1016 0xffff_ffff_ffff - ((((local_tx.tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (local_tx.tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor)
1017 } else { 0xffff_ffff_ffff }
1020 /// Attempts to claim a remote commitment transaction's outputs using the revocation key and
1021 /// data in remote_claimable_outpoints. Will directly claim any HTLC outputs which expire at a
1022 /// height > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER. In any case, will install monitoring for
1023 /// HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions.
1024 /// Return updates for HTLC pending in the channel and failed automatically by the broadcast of
1025 /// revoked remote commitment tx
1026 fn check_spend_remote_transaction(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32) -> (Vec<Transaction>, (Sha256dHash, Vec<TxOut>), Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>, Vec<(HTLCSource, Option<[u8;32]>, [u8;32])>) {
1027 // Most secp and related errors trying to create keys means we have no hope of constructing
1028 // a spend transaction...so we return no transactions to broadcast
1029 let mut txn_to_broadcast = Vec::new();
1030 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
1031 let mut spendable_outputs = Vec::new();
1032 let mut htlc_updated = Vec::new();
1034 let commitment_txid = tx.txid(); //TODO: This is gonna be a performance bottleneck for watchtowers!
1035 let per_commitment_option = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(&commitment_txid);
1037 macro_rules! ignore_error {
1038 ( $thing : expr ) => {
1041 Err(_) => return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs, htlc_updated)
1046 let commitment_number = 0xffffffffffff - ((((tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor);
1047 if commitment_number >= self.get_min_seen_secret() {
1048 let secret = self.get_secret(commitment_number).unwrap();
1049 let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &secret));
1050 let (revocation_pubkey, b_htlc_key, local_payment_key) = match self.key_storage {
1051 Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, ref payment_base_key, .. } => {
1052 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
1053 (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_base_key))),
1054 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &htlc_base_key))),
1055 Some(ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &payment_base_key))))
1057 Storage::Watchtower { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
1058 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
1059 (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &revocation_base_key)),
1060 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &htlc_base_key)),
1064 let delayed_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key), &self.their_delayed_payment_base_key.unwrap()));
1065 let a_htlc_key = match self.their_htlc_base_key {
1066 None => return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs, htlc_updated),
1067 Some(their_htlc_base_key) => ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key), &their_htlc_base_key)),
1070 let revokeable_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey, self.our_to_self_delay, &delayed_key);
1071 let revokeable_p2wsh = revokeable_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
1073 let local_payment_p2wpkh = if let Some(payment_key) = local_payment_key {
1074 // Note that the Network here is ignored as we immediately drop the address for the
1075 // script_pubkey version.
1076 let payment_hash160 = Hash160::from_data(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &payment_key).serialize());
1077 Some(Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::All::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&payment_hash160[..]).into_script())
1080 let mut total_value = 0;
1081 let mut values = Vec::new();
1082 let mut inputs = Vec::new();
1083 let mut htlc_idxs = Vec::new();
1085 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
1086 if outp.script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh {
1088 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
1089 txid: commitment_txid,
1092 script_sig: Script::new(),
1093 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
1094 witness: Vec::new(),
1096 htlc_idxs.push(None);
1097 values.push(outp.value);
1098 total_value += outp.value;
1099 } else if Some(&outp.script_pubkey) == local_payment_p2wpkh.as_ref() {
1100 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WPKH {
1101 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: commitment_txid, vout: idx as u32 },
1102 key: local_payment_key.unwrap(),
1103 output: outp.clone(),
1108 macro_rules! sign_input {
1109 ($sighash_parts: expr, $input: expr, $htlc_idx: expr, $amount: expr) => {
1111 let (sig, redeemscript) = match self.key_storage {
1112 Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
1113 let redeemscript = if $htlc_idx.is_none() { revokeable_redeemscript.clone() } else {
1114 let htlc = &per_commitment_option.unwrap().0[$htlc_idx.unwrap()];
1115 chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey)
1117 let sighash = ignore_error!(Message::from_slice(&$sighash_parts.sighash_all(&$input, &redeemscript, $amount)[..]));
1118 let revocation_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key, &revocation_base_key));
1119 (self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &revocation_key), redeemscript)
1121 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
1125 $input.witness.push(sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
1126 $input.witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1127 if $htlc_idx.is_none() {
1128 $input.witness.push(vec!(1));
1130 $input.witness.push(revocation_pubkey.serialize().to_vec());
1132 $input.witness.push(redeemscript.into_bytes());
1137 if let Some(&(ref per_commitment_data, _)) = per_commitment_option {
1138 inputs.reserve_exact(per_commitment_data.len());
1140 for (idx, ref htlc) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() {
1141 let expected_script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey);
1142 if htlc.transaction_output_index as usize >= tx.output.len() ||
1143 tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 ||
1144 tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].script_pubkey != expected_script.to_v0_p2wsh() {
1145 return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs, htlc_updated); // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user
1148 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
1149 txid: commitment_txid,
1150 vout: htlc.transaction_output_index,
1152 script_sig: Script::new(),
1153 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
1154 witness: Vec::new(),
1156 if htlc.cltv_expiry > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER {
1158 htlc_idxs.push(Some(idx));
1159 values.push(tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].value);
1160 total_value += htlc.amount_msat / 1000;
1162 let mut single_htlc_tx = Transaction {
1166 output: vec!(TxOut {
1167 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1168 value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000, //TODO: - fee
1171 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&single_htlc_tx);
1172 sign_input!(sighash_parts, single_htlc_tx.input[0], Some(idx), htlc.amount_msat / 1000);
1173 txn_to_broadcast.push(single_htlc_tx);
1178 if !inputs.is_empty() || !txn_to_broadcast.is_empty() { // ie we're confident this is actually ours
1179 // We're definitely a remote commitment transaction!
1180 watch_outputs.append(&mut tx.output.clone());
1181 self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, (commitment_number, tx.output.iter().map(|output| { output.script_pubkey.clone() }).collect()));
1183 if inputs.is_empty() { return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs, htlc_updated); } // Nothing to be done...probably a false positive/local tx
1185 let outputs = vec!(TxOut {
1186 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1187 value: total_value, //TODO: - fee
1189 let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
1196 let mut values_drain = values.drain(..);
1197 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx);
1199 for (input, htlc_idx) in spend_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(htlc_idxs.iter()) {
1200 let value = values_drain.next().unwrap();
1201 sign_input!(sighash_parts, input, htlc_idx, value);
1204 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
1205 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: spend_tx.txid(), vout: 0 },
1206 output: spend_tx.output[0].clone(),
1208 txn_to_broadcast.push(spend_tx);
1210 // TODO: We really should only fail backwards after our revocation claims have been
1211 // confirmed, but we also need to do more other tracking of in-flight pre-confirm
1212 // on-chain claims, so we can do that at the same time.
1213 if let Storage::Local { ref current_remote_commitment_txid, ref prev_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage {
1214 if let &Some(ref txid) = current_remote_commitment_txid {
1215 if let Some(&(_, ref latest_outpoints)) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(&txid) {
1216 for &(ref payment_hash, ref source, _) in latest_outpoints.iter() {
1217 htlc_updated.push(((*source).clone(), None, *payment_hash));
1221 if let &Some(ref txid) = prev_remote_commitment_txid {
1222 if let Some(&(_, ref prev_outpoint)) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(&txid) {
1223 for &(ref payment_hash, ref source, _) in prev_outpoint.iter() {
1224 htlc_updated.push(((*source).clone(), None, *payment_hash));
1229 // No need to check local commitment txn, symmetric HTLCSource must be present as per-htlc data on remote commitment tx
1230 } else if let Some(per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
1231 // While this isn't useful yet, there is a potential race where if a counterparty
1232 // revokes a state at the same time as the commitment transaction for that state is
1233 // confirmed, and the watchtower receives the block before the user, the user could
1234 // upload a new ChannelMonitor with the revocation secret but the watchtower has
1235 // already processed the block, resulting in the remote_commitment_txn_on_chain entry
1236 // not being generated by the above conditional. Thus, to be safe, we go ahead and
1238 watch_outputs.append(&mut tx.output.clone());
1239 self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, (commitment_number, tx.output.iter().map(|output| { output.script_pubkey.clone() }).collect()));
1241 if let Some(revocation_points) = self.their_cur_revocation_points {
1242 let revocation_point_option =
1243 if revocation_points.0 == commitment_number { Some(&revocation_points.1) }
1244 else if let Some(point) = revocation_points.2.as_ref() {
1245 if revocation_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 { Some(point) } else { None }
1247 if let Some(revocation_point) = revocation_point_option {
1248 let (revocation_pubkey, b_htlc_key) = match self.key_storage {
1249 Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
1250 (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_base_key))),
1251 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &htlc_base_key))))
1253 Storage::Watchtower { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
1254 (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &revocation_base_key)),
1255 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &htlc_base_key)))
1258 let a_htlc_key = match self.their_htlc_base_key {
1259 None => return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs, htlc_updated),
1260 Some(their_htlc_base_key) => ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &their_htlc_base_key)),
1263 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
1264 if outp.script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh() {
1265 match self.key_storage {
1266 Storage::Local { ref payment_base_key, .. } => {
1267 if let Ok(local_key) = chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_point, &payment_base_key) {
1268 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WPKH {
1269 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: commitment_txid, vout: idx as u32 },
1271 output: outp.clone(),
1275 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {}
1277 break; // Only to_remote ouput is claimable
1281 let mut total_value = 0;
1282 let mut values = Vec::new();
1283 let mut inputs = Vec::new();
1285 macro_rules! sign_input {
1286 ($sighash_parts: expr, $input: expr, $amount: expr, $preimage: expr) => {
1288 let (sig, redeemscript) = match self.key_storage {
1289 Storage::Local { ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
1290 let htlc = &per_commitment_option.unwrap().0[$input.sequence as usize];
1291 let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey);
1292 let sighash = ignore_error!(Message::from_slice(&$sighash_parts.sighash_all(&$input, &redeemscript, $amount)[..]));
1293 let htlc_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &htlc_base_key));
1294 (self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &htlc_key), redeemscript)
1296 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
1300 $input.witness.push(sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
1301 $input.witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1302 $input.witness.push($preimage);
1303 $input.witness.push(redeemscript.into_bytes());
1308 for (idx, ref htlc) in per_commitment_data.0.iter().enumerate() {
1309 let expected_script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey);
1310 if htlc.transaction_output_index as usize >= tx.output.len() ||
1311 tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 ||
1312 tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].script_pubkey != expected_script.to_v0_p2wsh() {
1313 return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs, htlc_updated); // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user
1315 if let Some(payment_preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
1317 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
1318 txid: commitment_txid,
1319 vout: htlc.transaction_output_index,
1321 script_sig: Script::new(),
1322 sequence: idx as u32, // reset to 0xfffffffd in sign_input
1323 witness: Vec::new(),
1325 if htlc.cltv_expiry > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER {
1327 values.push((tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].value, payment_preimage));
1328 total_value += htlc.amount_msat / 1000;
1330 let mut single_htlc_tx = Transaction {
1334 output: vec!(TxOut {
1335 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1336 value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000, //TODO: - fee
1339 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&single_htlc_tx);
1340 sign_input!(sighash_parts, single_htlc_tx.input[0], htlc.amount_msat / 1000, payment_preimage.to_vec());
1341 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
1342 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: single_htlc_tx.txid(), vout: 0 },
1343 output: single_htlc_tx.output[0].clone(),
1345 txn_to_broadcast.push(single_htlc_tx);
1349 // TODO: If the HTLC has already expired, potentially merge it with the
1350 // rest of the claim transaction, as above.
1352 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
1353 txid: commitment_txid,
1354 vout: htlc.transaction_output_index,
1356 script_sig: Script::new(),
1357 sequence: idx as u32,
1358 witness: Vec::new(),
1360 let mut timeout_tx = Transaction {
1362 lock_time: htlc.cltv_expiry,
1364 output: vec!(TxOut {
1365 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1366 value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1369 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&timeout_tx);
1370 sign_input!(sighash_parts, timeout_tx.input[0], htlc.amount_msat / 1000, vec![0]);
1371 txn_to_broadcast.push(timeout_tx);
1375 if inputs.is_empty() { return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs, htlc_updated); } // Nothing to be done...probably a false positive/local tx
1377 let outputs = vec!(TxOut {
1378 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1379 value: total_value, //TODO: - fee
1381 let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
1388 let mut values_drain = values.drain(..);
1389 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx);
1391 for input in spend_tx.input.iter_mut() {
1392 let value = values_drain.next().unwrap();
1393 sign_input!(sighash_parts, input, value.0, value.1.to_vec());
1396 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
1397 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: spend_tx.txid(), vout: 0 },
1398 output: spend_tx.output[0].clone(),
1400 txn_to_broadcast.push(spend_tx);
1405 (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs, htlc_updated)
1408 /// Attempst to claim a remote HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout s outputs using the revocation key
1409 fn check_spend_remote_htlc(&self, tx: &Transaction, commitment_number: u64) -> (Option<Transaction>, Option<SpendableOutputDescriptor>) {
1410 if tx.input.len() != 1 || tx.output.len() != 1 {
1414 macro_rules! ignore_error {
1415 ( $thing : expr ) => {
1418 Err(_) => return (None, None)
1423 let secret = if let Some(secret) = self.get_secret(commitment_number) { secret } else { return (None, None); };
1424 let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &secret));
1425 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
1426 let revocation_pubkey = match self.key_storage {
1427 Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
1428 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_base_key)))
1430 Storage::Watchtower { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
1431 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &revocation_base_key))
1434 let delayed_key = match self.their_delayed_payment_base_key {
1435 None => return (None, None),
1436 Some(their_delayed_payment_base_key) => ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &their_delayed_payment_base_key)),
1438 let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), &delayed_key);
1439 let revokeable_p2wsh = redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
1440 let htlc_txid = tx.txid(); //TODO: This is gonna be a performance bottleneck for watchtowers!
1442 let mut inputs = Vec::new();
1445 if tx.output[0].script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh { //HTLC transactions have one txin, one txout
1447 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
1451 script_sig: Script::new(),
1452 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
1453 witness: Vec::new(),
1455 amount = tx.output[0].value;
1458 if !inputs.is_empty() {
1459 let outputs = vec!(TxOut {
1460 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1461 value: amount, //TODO: - fee
1464 let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
1471 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx);
1473 let sig = match self.key_storage {
1474 Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
1475 let sighash = ignore_error!(Message::from_slice(&sighash_parts.sighash_all(&spend_tx.input[0], &redeemscript, amount)[..]));
1476 let revocation_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key, &revocation_base_key));
1477 self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &revocation_key)
1479 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
1483 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
1484 spend_tx.input[0].witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1485 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(vec!(1));
1486 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(redeemscript.into_bytes());
1488 let outpoint = BitcoinOutPoint { txid: spend_tx.txid(), vout: 0 };
1489 let output = spend_tx.output[0].clone();
1490 (Some(spend_tx), Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput { outpoint, output }))
1491 } else { (None, None) }
1494 fn broadcast_by_local_state(&self, local_tx: &LocalSignedTx, per_commitment_point: &Option<PublicKey>, delayed_payment_base_key: &Option<SecretKey>) -> (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>, Vec<TxOut>) {
1495 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
1496 let mut spendable_outputs = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
1497 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
1499 macro_rules! add_dynamic_output {
1500 ($father_tx: expr, $vout: expr) => {
1501 if let Some(ref per_commitment_point) = *per_commitment_point {
1502 if let Some(ref delayed_payment_base_key) = *delayed_payment_base_key {
1503 if let Ok(local_delayedkey) = chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base_key) {
1504 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WSH {
1505 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: $father_tx.txid(), vout: $vout },
1506 key: local_delayedkey,
1507 witness_script: chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&local_tx.revocation_key, self.our_to_self_delay, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key),
1508 to_self_delay: self.our_to_self_delay,
1509 output: $father_tx.output[$vout as usize].clone(),
1518 let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&local_tx.revocation_key, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), &local_tx.delayed_payment_key);
1519 let revokeable_p2wsh = redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
1520 for (idx, output) in local_tx.tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
1521 if output.script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh {
1522 add_dynamic_output!(local_tx.tx, idx as u32);
1527 for &(ref htlc, ref their_sig, ref our_sig) in local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1529 let mut htlc_timeout_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&local_tx.txid, local_tx.feerate_per_kw, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), htlc, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key, &local_tx.revocation_key);
1531 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
1533 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(their_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
1534 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1535 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
1536 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1538 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new());
1539 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &local_tx.a_htlc_key, &local_tx.b_htlc_key, &local_tx.revocation_key).into_bytes());
1541 add_dynamic_output!(htlc_timeout_tx, 0);
1542 res.push(htlc_timeout_tx);
1544 if let Some(payment_preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
1545 let mut htlc_success_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&local_tx.txid, local_tx.feerate_per_kw, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), htlc, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key, &local_tx.revocation_key);
1547 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
1549 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(their_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
1550 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1551 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
1552 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1554 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(payment_preimage.to_vec());
1555 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &local_tx.a_htlc_key, &local_tx.b_htlc_key, &local_tx.revocation_key).into_bytes());
1557 add_dynamic_output!(htlc_success_tx, 0);
1558 res.push(htlc_success_tx);
1561 watch_outputs.push(local_tx.tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].clone());
1564 (res, spendable_outputs, watch_outputs)
1567 /// Attempts to claim any claimable HTLCs in a commitment transaction which was not (yet)
1568 /// revoked using data in local_claimable_outpoints.
1569 /// Should not be used if check_spend_revoked_transaction succeeds.
1570 fn check_spend_local_transaction(&self, tx: &Transaction, _height: u32) -> (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>, (Sha256dHash, Vec<TxOut>)) {
1571 let commitment_txid = tx.txid();
1572 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1573 if local_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
1574 match self.key_storage {
1575 Storage::Local { ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref latest_per_commitment_point, .. } => {
1576 let (local_txn, spendable_outputs, watch_outputs) = self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, latest_per_commitment_point, &Some(*delayed_payment_base_key));
1577 return (local_txn, spendable_outputs, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs));
1579 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
1580 let (local_txn, spendable_outputs, watch_outputs) = self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, &None, &None);
1581 return (local_txn, spendable_outputs, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs));
1586 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1587 if local_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
1588 match self.key_storage {
1589 Storage::Local { ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref prev_latest_per_commitment_point, .. } => {
1590 let (local_txn, spendable_outputs, watch_outputs) = self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, prev_latest_per_commitment_point, &Some(*delayed_payment_base_key));
1591 return (local_txn, spendable_outputs, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs));
1593 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
1594 let (local_txn, spendable_outputs, watch_outputs) = self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, &None, &None);
1595 return (local_txn, spendable_outputs, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs));
1600 (Vec::new(), Vec::new(), (commitment_txid, Vec::new()))
1603 /// Generate a spendable output event when closing_transaction get registered onchain.
1604 fn check_spend_closing_transaction(&self, tx: &Transaction) -> Option<SpendableOutputDescriptor> {
1605 if tx.input[0].sequence == 0xFFFFFFFF && !tx.input[0].witness.is_empty() && tx.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len() == 71 {
1606 match self.key_storage {
1607 Storage::Local { ref shutdown_pubkey, .. } => {
1608 let our_channel_close_key_hash = Hash160::from_data(&shutdown_pubkey.serialize());
1609 let shutdown_script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::All::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&our_channel_close_key_hash[..]).into_script();
1610 for (idx, output) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
1611 if shutdown_script == output.script_pubkey {
1612 return Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
1613 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), vout: idx as u32 },
1614 output: output.clone(),
1619 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
1620 //TODO: we need to ensure an offline client will generate the event when it
1621 // cames back online after only the watchtower saw the transaction
1628 /// Used by ChannelManager deserialization to broadcast the latest local state if it's copy of
1629 /// the Channel was out-of-date.
1630 pub(super) fn get_latest_local_commitment_txn(&self) -> Vec<Transaction> {
1631 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1632 let mut res = vec![local_tx.tx.clone()];
1633 match self.key_storage {
1634 Storage::Local { ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref prev_latest_per_commitment_point, .. } => {
1635 res.append(&mut self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, prev_latest_per_commitment_point, &Some(*delayed_payment_base_key)).0);
1637 _ => panic!("Can only broadcast by local channelmonitor"),
1645 fn block_connected(&mut self, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], height: u32, block_hash: &Sha256dHash, broadcaster: &BroadcasterInterface)-> (Vec<(Sha256dHash, Vec<TxOut>)>, Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>, Vec<(HTLCSource, Option<[u8 ; 32]>, [u8; 32])>) {
1646 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
1647 let mut spendable_outputs = Vec::new();
1648 let mut htlc_updated = Vec::new();
1649 for tx in txn_matched {
1650 if tx.input.len() == 1 {
1651 // Assuming our keys were not leaked (in which case we're screwed no matter what),
1652 // commitment transactions and HTLC transactions will all only ever have one input,
1653 // which is an easy way to filter out any potential non-matching txn for lazy
1655 let prevout = &tx.input[0].previous_output;
1656 let mut txn: Vec<Transaction> = Vec::new();
1657 let funding_txo = match self.key_storage {
1658 Storage::Local { ref funding_info, .. } => {
1659 funding_info.clone()
1661 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
1665 if funding_txo.is_none() || (prevout.txid == funding_txo.as_ref().unwrap().0.txid && prevout.vout == funding_txo.as_ref().unwrap().0.index as u32) {
1666 let (remote_txn, new_outputs, mut spendable_output, mut updated) = self.check_spend_remote_transaction(tx, height);
1668 spendable_outputs.append(&mut spendable_output);
1669 if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() {
1670 watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
1673 let (local_txn, mut spendable_output, new_outputs) = self.check_spend_local_transaction(tx, height);
1674 spendable_outputs.append(&mut spendable_output);
1676 if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() {
1677 watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
1680 if !funding_txo.is_none() && txn.is_empty() {
1681 if let Some(spendable_output) = self.check_spend_closing_transaction(tx) {
1682 spendable_outputs.push(spendable_output);
1685 if updated.len() > 0 {
1686 htlc_updated.append(&mut updated);
1689 if let Some(&(commitment_number, _)) = self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.get(&prevout.txid) {
1690 let (tx, spendable_output) = self.check_spend_remote_htlc(tx, commitment_number);
1691 if let Some(tx) = tx {
1694 if let Some(spendable_output) = spendable_output {
1695 spendable_outputs.push(spendable_output);
1699 for tx in txn.iter() {
1700 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(tx);
1702 let mut updated = self.is_resolving_htlc_output(tx);
1703 if updated.len() > 0 {
1704 htlc_updated.append(&mut updated);
1708 if let Some(ref cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1709 if self.would_broadcast_at_height(height) {
1710 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&cur_local_tx.tx);
1711 match self.key_storage {
1712 Storage::Local { ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref latest_per_commitment_point, .. } => {
1713 let (txs, mut spendable_output, new_outputs) = self.broadcast_by_local_state(&cur_local_tx, latest_per_commitment_point, &Some(*delayed_payment_base_key));
1714 spendable_outputs.append(&mut spendable_output);
1715 if !new_outputs.is_empty() {
1716 watch_outputs.push((cur_local_tx.txid.clone(), new_outputs));
1719 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
1722 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
1723 let (txs, mut spendable_output, new_outputs) = self.broadcast_by_local_state(&cur_local_tx, &None, &None);
1724 spendable_outputs.append(&mut spendable_output);
1725 if !new_outputs.is_empty() {
1726 watch_outputs.push((cur_local_tx.txid.clone(), new_outputs));
1729 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
1735 self.last_block_hash = block_hash.clone();
1736 (watch_outputs, spendable_outputs, htlc_updated)
1739 pub(super) fn would_broadcast_at_height(&self, height: u32) -> bool {
1740 if let Some(ref cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1741 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in cur_local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1742 // For inbound HTLCs which we know the preimage for, we have to ensure we hit the
1743 // chain with enough room to claim the HTLC without our counterparty being able to
1744 // time out the HTLC first.
1745 // For outbound HTLCs which our counterparty hasn't failed/claimed, our primary
1746 // concern is being able to claim the corresponding inbound HTLC (on another
1747 // channel) before it expires. In fact, we don't even really care if our
1748 // counterparty here claims such an outbound HTLC after it expired as long as we
1749 // can still claim the corresponding HTLC. Thus, to avoid needlessly hitting the
1750 // chain when our counterparty is waiting for expiration to off-chain fail an HTLC
1751 // we give ourselves a few blocks of headroom after expiration before going
1752 // on-chain for an expired HTLC.
1753 // Note that, to avoid a potential attack whereby a node delays claiming an HTLC
1754 // from us until we've reached the point where we go on-chain with the
1755 // corresponding inbound HTLC, we must ensure that outbound HTLCs go on chain at
1756 // least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER blocks prior to the inbound HTLC.
1757 // aka outbound_cltv + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS == height - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
1758 // inbound_cltv == height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
1759 // outbound_cltv + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFER <= inbound_cltv - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
1760 // HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS + 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFER <= inbound_cltv - outbound_cltv
1761 // HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS + 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFER <= CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA
1762 if ( htlc.offered && htlc.cltv_expiry + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS <= height) ||
1763 (!htlc.offered && htlc.cltv_expiry <= height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER && self.payment_preimages.contains_key(&htlc.payment_hash)) {
1771 /// Check if any transaction broadcasted is resolving HTLC output by a success or timeout on a local
1772 /// or remote commitment tx, if so send back the source, preimage if found and payment_hash of resolved HTLC
1773 fn is_resolving_htlc_output(&mut self, tx: &Transaction) -> Vec<(HTLCSource, Option<[u8;32]>, [u8;32])> {
1774 let mut htlc_updated = Vec::new();
1776 'outer_loop: for input in &tx.input {
1777 let mut payment_data = None;
1779 macro_rules! scan_commitment {
1780 ($htlc_outputs: expr, $htlc_sources: expr) => {
1781 for &(ref payment_hash, ref source, ref vout) in $htlc_sources.iter() {
1782 if &Some(input.previous_output.vout) == vout {
1783 payment_data = Some((source.clone(), *payment_hash));
1786 if payment_data.is_none() {
1787 for htlc_output in $htlc_outputs {
1788 if input.previous_output.vout == htlc_output.transaction_output_index {
1789 log_info!(self, "Inbound HTLC timeout at {} from {} resolved by {}", input.previous_output.vout, input.previous_output.txid, tx.txid());
1790 continue 'outer_loop;
1797 if let Some(ref current_local_signed_commitment_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1798 if input.previous_output.txid == current_local_signed_commitment_tx.txid {
1799 scan_commitment!(current_local_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, _)| a), current_local_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_sources);
1802 if let Some(ref prev_local_signed_commitment_tx) = self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1803 if input.previous_output.txid == prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.txid {
1804 scan_commitment!(prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, _)| a), prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_sources);
1807 if let Some(&(ref htlc_outputs, ref htlc_sources)) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(&input.previous_output.txid) {
1808 scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs, htlc_sources);
1811 // If tx isn't solving htlc output from local/remote commitment tx and htlc isn't outbound we don't need
1812 // to broadcast solving backward
1813 if let Some((source, payment_hash)) = payment_data {
1814 let mut payment_preimage = [0; 32];
1815 if input.witness.len() == 5 && input.witness[4].len() == 138 {
1816 payment_preimage.copy_from_slice(&tx.input[0].witness[3]);
1817 htlc_updated.push((source, Some(payment_preimage), payment_hash));
1818 } else if input.witness.len() == 3 && input.witness[2].len() == 133 {
1819 payment_preimage.copy_from_slice(&tx.input[0].witness[1]);
1820 htlc_updated.push((source, Some(payment_preimage), payment_hash));
1822 htlc_updated.push((source, None, payment_hash));
1830 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
1832 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> ReadableArgs<R, Arc<Logger>> for (Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor) {
1833 fn read(reader: &mut R, logger: Arc<Logger>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1834 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1835 macro_rules! unwrap_obj {
1839 Err(_) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
1844 let _ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1845 let min_ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1846 if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION {
1847 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion);
1850 let commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor = <U48 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.0;
1852 let key_storage = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
1854 let revocation_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
1855 let htlc_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
1856 let delayed_payment_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
1857 let payment_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
1858 let shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
1859 let prev_latest_per_commitment_point = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
1861 1 => Some(Readable::read(reader)?),
1862 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
1864 let latest_per_commitment_point = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
1866 1 => Some(Readable::read(reader)?),
1867 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
1869 // Technically this can fail and serialize fail a round-trip, but only for serialization of
1870 // barely-init'd ChannelMonitors that we can't do anything with.
1871 let outpoint = OutPoint {
1872 txid: Readable::read(reader)?,
1873 index: Readable::read(reader)?,
1875 let funding_info = Some((outpoint, Readable::read(reader)?));
1876 let current_remote_commitment_txid = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
1878 1 => Some(Readable::read(reader)?),
1879 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
1881 let prev_remote_commitment_txid = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
1883 1 => Some(Readable::read(reader)?),
1884 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
1887 revocation_base_key,
1889 delayed_payment_base_key,
1892 prev_latest_per_commitment_point,
1893 latest_per_commitment_point,
1895 current_remote_commitment_txid,
1896 prev_remote_commitment_txid,
1899 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
1902 let their_htlc_base_key = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
1903 let their_delayed_payment_base_key = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
1905 let their_cur_revocation_points = {
1906 let first_idx = <U48 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.0;
1910 let first_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
1911 let second_point_slice: [u8; 33] = Readable::read(reader)?;
1912 if second_point_slice[0..32] == [0; 32] && second_point_slice[32] == 0 {
1913 Some((first_idx, first_point, None))
1915 Some((first_idx, first_point, Some(unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &second_point_slice)))))
1920 let our_to_self_delay: u16 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1921 let their_to_self_delay: Option<u16> = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
1923 let mut old_secrets = [([0; 32], 1 << 48); 49];
1924 for &mut (ref mut secret, ref mut idx) in old_secrets.iter_mut() {
1925 *secret = Readable::read(reader)?;
1926 *idx = Readable::read(reader)?;
1929 macro_rules! read_htlc_in_commitment {
1932 let offered: bool = Readable::read(reader)?;
1933 let amount_msat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1934 let cltv_expiry: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1935 let payment_hash: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(reader)?;
1936 let transaction_output_index: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1938 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1939 offered, amount_msat, cltv_expiry, payment_hash, transaction_output_index
1945 macro_rules! read_htlc_source {
1948 (Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?,
1949 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
1951 1 => Some(Readable::read(reader)?),
1952 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
1959 let remote_claimable_outpoints_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1960 let mut remote_claimable_outpoints = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(remote_claimable_outpoints_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 64));
1961 for _ in 0..remote_claimable_outpoints_len {
1962 let txid: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
1963 let outputs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1964 let mut outputs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
1965 for _ in 0..outputs_count {
1966 outputs.push(read_htlc_in_commitment!());
1968 let sources_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1969 let mut sources = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(sources_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
1970 for _ in 0..sources_count {
1971 sources.push(read_htlc_source!());
1973 if let Some(_) = remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, (outputs, sources)) {
1974 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
1978 let remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1979 let mut remote_commitment_txn_on_chain = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
1980 for _ in 0..remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len {
1981 let txid: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
1982 let commitment_number = <U48 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.0;
1983 let outputs_count = <u64 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?;
1984 let mut outputs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 8));
1985 for _ in 0..outputs_count {
1986 outputs.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
1988 if let Some(_) = remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(txid, (commitment_number, outputs)) {
1989 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
1993 let remote_hash_commitment_number_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1994 let mut remote_hash_commitment_number = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(remote_hash_commitment_number_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
1995 for _ in 0..remote_hash_commitment_number_len {
1996 let txid: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(reader)?;
1997 let commitment_number = <U48 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.0;
1998 if let Some(_) = remote_hash_commitment_number.insert(txid, commitment_number) {
1999 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
2003 macro_rules! read_local_tx {
2006 let tx = match Transaction::consensus_decode(reader.by_ref()) {
2009 encode::Error::Io(ioe) => return Err(DecodeError::Io(ioe)),
2010 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2014 if tx.input.is_empty() {
2015 // Ensure tx didn't hit the 0-input ambiguity case.
2016 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
2019 let revocation_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
2020 let a_htlc_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
2021 let b_htlc_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
2022 let delayed_payment_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
2023 let feerate_per_kw: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2025 let htlc_outputs_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2026 let mut htlc_outputs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlc_outputs_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
2027 for _ in 0..htlc_outputs_len {
2028 let out = read_htlc_in_commitment!();
2029 let sigs = (Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?);
2030 htlc_outputs.push((out, sigs.0, sigs.1));
2033 let htlc_sources_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2034 let mut htlc_sources = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlc_outputs_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
2035 for _ in 0..htlc_sources_len {
2036 htlc_sources.push(read_htlc_source!());
2041 tx, revocation_key, a_htlc_key, b_htlc_key, delayed_payment_key, feerate_per_kw, htlc_outputs, htlc_sources
2047 let prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2050 Some(read_local_tx!())
2052 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2055 let current_local_signed_commitment_tx = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2058 Some(read_local_tx!())
2060 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2063 let current_remote_commitment_number = <U48 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.0;
2065 let payment_preimages_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2066 let mut payment_preimages = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(payment_preimages_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
2067 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
2068 for _ in 0..payment_preimages_len {
2069 let preimage: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(reader)?;
2071 sha.input(&preimage);
2072 let mut hash = [0; 32];
2073 sha.result(&mut hash);
2074 if let Some(_) = payment_preimages.insert(hash, preimage) {
2075 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
2079 let last_block_hash: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
2080 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
2082 Ok((last_block_hash.clone(), ChannelMonitor {
2083 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor,
2086 their_htlc_base_key,
2087 their_delayed_payment_base_key,
2088 their_cur_revocation_points,
2091 their_to_self_delay,
2094 remote_claimable_outpoints,
2095 remote_commitment_txn_on_chain,
2096 remote_hash_commitment_number,
2098 prev_local_signed_commitment_tx,
2099 current_local_signed_commitment_tx,
2100 current_remote_commitment_number,
2115 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Script;
2116 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
2117 use crypto::digest::Digest;
2119 use ln::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor;
2120 use ln::chan_utils::{HTLCOutputInCommitment, TxCreationKeys};
2121 use util::sha2::Sha256;
2122 use util::test_utils::TestLogger;
2123 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
2124 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1, Signature};
2125 use rand::{thread_rng,Rng};
2129 fn test_per_commitment_storage() {
2130 // Test vectors from BOLT 3:
2131 let mut secrets: Vec<[u8; 32]> = Vec::new();
2132 let mut monitor: ChannelMonitor;
2133 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2134 let logger = Arc::new(TestLogger::new());
2136 macro_rules! test_secrets {
2138 let mut idx = 281474976710655;
2139 for secret in secrets.iter() {
2140 assert_eq!(monitor.get_secret(idx).unwrap(), *secret);
2143 assert_eq!(monitor.get_min_seen_secret(), idx + 1);
2144 assert!(monitor.get_secret(idx).is_none());
2149 // insert_secret correct sequence
2150 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
2153 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2154 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
2155 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2158 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2159 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
2160 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2163 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2164 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
2165 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2168 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2169 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
2170 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2173 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2174 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
2175 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2178 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2179 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
2180 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2183 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2184 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
2185 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2188 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2189 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
2190 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2195 // insert_secret #1 incorrect
2196 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
2199 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2200 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
2201 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2204 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2205 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
2206 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
2207 "Previous secret did not match new one");
2211 // insert_secret #2 incorrect (#1 derived from incorrect)
2212 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
2215 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2216 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
2217 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2220 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2221 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("dddc3a8d14fddf2b68fa8c7fbad2748274937479dd0f8930d5ebb4ab6bd866a3").unwrap());
2222 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2225 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2226 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
2227 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2230 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2231 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
2232 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
2233 "Previous secret did not match new one");
2237 // insert_secret #3 incorrect
2238 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
2241 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2242 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
2243 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2246 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2247 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
2248 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2251 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2252 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c51a18b13e8527e579ec56365482c62f180b7d5760b46e9477dae59e87ed423a").unwrap());
2253 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2256 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2257 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
2258 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
2259 "Previous secret did not match new one");
2263 // insert_secret #4 incorrect (1,2,3 derived from incorrect)
2264 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
2267 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2268 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
2269 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2272 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2273 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("dddc3a8d14fddf2b68fa8c7fbad2748274937479dd0f8930d5ebb4ab6bd866a3").unwrap());
2274 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2277 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2278 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c51a18b13e8527e579ec56365482c62f180b7d5760b46e9477dae59e87ed423a").unwrap());
2279 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2282 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2283 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("ba65d7b0ef55a3ba300d4e87af29868f394f8f138d78a7011669c79b37b936f4").unwrap());
2284 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2287 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2288 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
2289 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2292 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2293 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
2294 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2297 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2298 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
2299 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2302 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2303 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
2304 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
2305 "Previous secret did not match new one");
2309 // insert_secret #5 incorrect
2310 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
2313 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2314 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
2315 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2318 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2319 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
2320 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2323 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2324 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
2325 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2328 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2329 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
2330 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2333 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2334 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("631373ad5f9ef654bb3dade742d09504c567edd24320d2fcd68e3cc47e2ff6a6").unwrap());
2335 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2338 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2339 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
2340 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
2341 "Previous secret did not match new one");
2345 // insert_secret #6 incorrect (5 derived from incorrect)
2346 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
2349 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2350 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
2351 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2354 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2355 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
2356 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2359 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2360 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
2361 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2364 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2365 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
2366 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2369 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2370 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("631373ad5f9ef654bb3dade742d09504c567edd24320d2fcd68e3cc47e2ff6a6").unwrap());
2371 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2374 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2375 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("b7e76a83668bde38b373970155c868a653304308f9896692f904a23731224bb1").unwrap());
2376 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2379 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2380 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
2381 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2384 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2385 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
2386 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
2387 "Previous secret did not match new one");
2391 // insert_secret #7 incorrect
2392 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
2395 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2396 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
2397 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2400 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2401 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
2402 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2405 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2406 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
2407 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2410 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2411 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
2412 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2415 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2416 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
2417 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2420 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2421 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
2422 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2425 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2426 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("e7971de736e01da8ed58b94c2fc216cb1dca9e326f3a96e7194fe8ea8af6c0a3").unwrap());
2427 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2430 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2431 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
2432 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
2433 "Previous secret did not match new one");
2437 // insert_secret #8 incorrect
2438 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
2441 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2442 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
2443 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2446 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2447 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
2448 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2451 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2452 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
2453 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2456 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2457 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
2458 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2461 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2462 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
2463 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2466 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2467 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
2468 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2471 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2472 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
2473 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2476 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2477 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a7efbc61aac46d34f77778bac22c8a20c6a46ca460addc49009bda875ec88fa4").unwrap());
2478 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
2479 "Previous secret did not match new one");
2484 fn test_prune_preimages() {
2485 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2486 let logger = Arc::new(TestLogger::new());
2487 let dummy_sig = Signature::from_der(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("3045022100fa86fa9a36a8cd6a7bb8f06a541787d51371d067951a9461d5404de6b928782e02201c8b7c334c10aed8976a3a465be9a28abff4cb23acbf00022295b378ce1fa3cd").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
2489 let dummy_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap());
2490 macro_rules! dummy_keys {
2494 per_commitment_point: dummy_key.clone(),
2495 revocation_key: dummy_key.clone(),
2496 a_htlc_key: dummy_key.clone(),
2497 b_htlc_key: dummy_key.clone(),
2498 a_delayed_payment_key: dummy_key.clone(),
2499 b_payment_key: dummy_key.clone(),
2504 let dummy_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
2506 let mut preimages = Vec::new();
2508 let mut rng = thread_rng();
2510 let mut preimage = [0; 32];
2511 rng.fill_bytes(&mut preimage);
2512 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
2513 sha.input(&preimage);
2514 let mut hash = [0; 32];
2515 sha.result(&mut hash);
2516 preimages.push((preimage, hash));
2520 macro_rules! preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs {
2521 ($preimages_slice: expr) => {
2523 let mut res = Vec::new();
2524 for (idx, preimage) in $preimages_slice.iter().enumerate() {
2525 res.push(HTLCOutputInCommitment {
2529 payment_hash: preimage.1.clone(),
2530 transaction_output_index: idx as u32,
2537 macro_rules! preimages_to_local_htlcs {
2538 ($preimages_slice: expr) => {
2540 let mut inp = preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!($preimages_slice);
2541 let res: Vec<_> = inp.drain(..).map(|e| { (e, dummy_sig.clone(), dummy_sig.clone()) }).collect();
2547 macro_rules! test_preimages_exist {
2548 ($preimages_slice: expr, $monitor: expr) => {
2549 for preimage in $preimages_slice {
2550 assert!($monitor.payment_preimages.contains_key(&preimage.1));
2555 // Prune with one old state and a local commitment tx holding a few overlaps with the
2557 let mut monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
2558 monitor.set_their_to_self_delay(10);
2560 monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(dummy_tx.clone(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..10]), Vec::new());
2561 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[5..15]), Vec::new(), 281474976710655, dummy_key);
2562 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[15..20]), Vec::new(), 281474976710654, dummy_key);
2563 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[17..20]), Vec::new(), 281474976710653, dummy_key);
2564 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[18..20]), Vec::new(), 281474976710652, dummy_key);
2565 for &(ref preimage, ref hash) in preimages.iter() {
2566 monitor.provide_payment_preimage(hash, preimage);
2569 // Now provide a secret, pruning preimages 10-15
2570 let mut secret = [0; 32];
2571 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
2572 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secret.clone()).unwrap();
2573 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 15);
2574 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
2575 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[15..20], monitor);
2577 // Now provide a further secret, pruning preimages 15-17
2578 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
2579 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secret.clone()).unwrap();
2580 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 13);
2581 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
2582 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[17..20], monitor);
2584 // Now update local commitment tx info, pruning only element 18 as we still care about the
2585 // previous commitment tx's preimages too
2586 monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(dummy_tx.clone(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..5]), Vec::new());
2587 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
2588 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secret.clone()).unwrap();
2589 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 12);
2590 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
2591 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[18..20], monitor);
2593 // But if we do it again, we'll prune 5-10
2594 monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(dummy_tx.clone(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..3]), Vec::new());
2595 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
2596 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secret.clone()).unwrap();
2597 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 5);
2598 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..5], monitor);
2601 // Further testing is done in the ChannelManager integration tests.