_ Git - rust-lightning/blob - src/ln/channelmonitor.rs

   1 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
   2 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxIn,TxOut,SigHashType,Transaction};
   3 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Script;
   4 use bitcoin::util::hash::Sha256dHash;
   5 use bitcoin::util::bip143;
   6
   7 use crypto::digest::Digest;
   8
   9 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Message,Signature};
  10 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
  11
  12 use ln::msgs::HandleError;
  13 use ln::chan_utils;
  14 use ln::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment;
  15 use chain::chaininterface::{ChainListener, ChainWatchInterface, BroadcasterInterface};
  16 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
  17 use util::sha2::Sha256;
  18
  19 use std::collections::HashMap;
  20 use std::sync::{Arc,Mutex};
  21 use std::{hash,cmp};
  22
  23 pub enum ChannelMonitorUpdateErr {
  24         /// Used to indicate a temporary failure (eg connection to a watchtower failed, but is expected
  25         /// to succeed at some point in the future).
  26         /// Such a failure will "freeze" a channel, preventing us from revoking old states or
  27         /// submitting new commitment transactions to the remote party.
  28         /// ChannelManager::test_restore_channel_monitor can be used to retry the update(s) and restore
  29         /// the channel to an operational state.
  30         TemporaryFailure,
  31         /// Used to indicate no further channel monitor updates will be allowed (eg we've moved on to a
  32         /// different watchtower and cannot update with all watchtowers that were previously informed
  33         /// of this channel). This will force-close the channel in question.
  34         PermanentFailure,
  35 }
  36
  37 /// Simple trait indicating ability to track a set of ChannelMonitors and multiplex events between
  38 /// them. Generally should be implemented by keeping a local SimpleManyChannelMonitor and passing
  39 /// events to it, while also taking any add_update_monitor events and passing them to some remote
  40 /// server(s).
  41 /// Note that any updates to a channel's monitor *must* be applied to each instance of the
  42 /// channel's monitor everywhere (including remote watchtowers) *before* this function returns. If
  43 /// an update occurs and a remote watchtower is left with old state, it may broadcast transactions
  44 /// which we have revoked, allowing our counterparty to claim all funds in the channel!
  45 pub trait ManyChannelMonitor: Send + Sync {
  46         /// Adds or updates a monitor for the given `funding_txo`.
  47         fn add_update_monitor(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr>;
  48 }
  49
  50 /// A simple implementation of a ManyChannelMonitor and ChainListener. Can be used to create a
  51 /// watchtower or watch our own channels.
  52 /// Note that you must provide your own key by which to refer to channels.
  53 /// If you're accepting remote monitors (ie are implementing a watchtower), you must verify that
  54 /// users cannot overwrite a given channel by providing a duplicate key. ie you should probably
  55 /// index by a PublicKey which is required to sign any updates.
  56 /// If you're using this for local monitoring of your own channels, you probably want to use
  57 /// `OutPoint` as the key, which will give you a ManyChannelMonitor implementation.
  58 pub struct SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
  59         monitors: Mutex<HashMap<Key, ChannelMonitor>>,
  60         chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>,
  61         broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>
  62 }
  63
  64 impl<Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash> ChainListener for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
  65         fn block_connected(&self, _header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], _indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) {
  66                 let monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
  67                 for monitor in monitors.values() {
  68                         monitor.block_connected(txn_matched, height, &*self.broadcaster);
  69                 }
  70         }
  71
  72         fn block_disconnected(&self, _: &BlockHeader) { }
  73 }
  74
  75 impl<Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash + 'static> SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
  76         pub fn new(chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>, broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>) -> Arc<SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key>> {
  77                 let res = Arc::new(SimpleManyChannelMonitor {
  78                         monitors: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
  79                         chain_monitor,
  80                         broadcaster
  81                 });
  82                 let weak_res = Arc::downgrade(&res);
  83                 res.chain_monitor.register_listener(weak_res);
  84                 res
  85         }
  86
  87         pub fn add_update_monitor_by_key(&self, key: Key, monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
  88                 let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
  89                 match monitors.get_mut(&key) {
  90                         Some(orig_monitor) => return orig_monitor.insert_combine(monitor),
  91                         None => {}
  92                 };
  93                 match monitor.funding_txo {
  94                         None => self.chain_monitor.watch_all_txn(),
  95                         Some(outpoint) => self.chain_monitor.install_watch_outpoint((outpoint.txid, outpoint.index as u32)),
  96                 }
  97                 monitors.insert(key, monitor);
  98                 Ok(())
  99         }
 100 }
 101
 102 impl ManyChannelMonitor for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<OutPoint> {
 103         fn add_update_monitor(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr> {
 104                 match self.add_update_monitor_by_key(funding_txo, monitor) {
 105                         Ok(_) => Ok(()),
 106                         Err(_) => Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure),
 107                 }
 108         }
 109 }
 110
 111 /// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, don't try to claim it in a shared transaction,
 112 /// instead claiming it in its own individual transaction.
 113 const CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 12;
 114 /// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, force-close the channel to broadcast the
 115 /// HTLC-Success transaction.
 116 const CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 6;
 117
 118 #[derive(Clone)]
 119 enum KeyStorage {
 120         PrivMode {
 121                 revocation_base_key: SecretKey,
 122                 htlc_base_key: SecretKey,
 123         },
 124         SigsMode {
 125                 revocation_base_key: PublicKey,
 126                 htlc_base_key: PublicKey,
 127                 sigs: HashMap<Sha256dHash, Signature>,
 128         }
 129 }
 130
 131 #[derive(Clone)]
 132 struct LocalSignedTx {
 133         txid: Sha256dHash,
 134         tx: Transaction,
 135         revocation_key: PublicKey,
 136         a_htlc_key: PublicKey,
 137         b_htlc_key: PublicKey,
 138         delayed_payment_key: PublicKey,
 139         feerate_per_kw: u64,
 140         htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Signature, Signature)>,
 141 }
 142
 143 pub struct ChannelMonitor {
 144         funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
 145         commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64,
 146
 147         key_storage: KeyStorage,
 148         delayed_payment_base_key: PublicKey,
 149         their_htlc_base_key: Option<PublicKey>,
 150         // first is the idx of the first of the two revocation points
 151         their_cur_revocation_points: Option<(u64, PublicKey, Option<PublicKey>)>,
 152
 153         our_to_self_delay: u16,
 154         their_to_self_delay: Option<u16>,
 155
 156         old_secrets: [([u8; 32], u64); 49],
 157         remote_claimable_outpoints: HashMap<Sha256dHash, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>>,
 158         remote_htlc_outputs_on_chain: Mutex<HashMap<Sha256dHash, u64>>,
 159
 160         // We store two local commitment transactions to avoid any race conditions where we may update
 161         // some monitors (potentially on watchtowers) but then fail to update others, resulting in the
 162         // various monitors for one channel being out of sync, and us broadcasting a local
 163         // transaction for which we have deleted claim information on some watchtowers.
 164         prev_local_signed_commitment_tx: Option<LocalSignedTx>,
 165         current_local_signed_commitment_tx: Option<LocalSignedTx>,
 166
 167         payment_preimages: HashMap<[u8; 32], [u8; 32]>,
 168
 169         destination_script: Script,
 170         secp_ctx: Secp256k1, //TODO: dedup this a bit...
 171 }
 172 impl Clone for ChannelMonitor {
 173         fn clone(&self) -> Self {
 174                 ChannelMonitor {
 175                         funding_txo: self.funding_txo.clone(),
 176                         commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor.clone(),
 177
 178                         key_storage: self.key_storage.clone(),
 179                         delayed_payment_base_key: self.delayed_payment_base_key.clone(),
 180                         their_htlc_base_key: self.their_htlc_base_key.clone(),
 181                         their_cur_revocation_points: self.their_cur_revocation_points.clone(),
 182
 183                         our_to_self_delay: self.our_to_self_delay,
 184                         their_to_self_delay: self.their_to_self_delay,
 185
 186                         old_secrets: self.old_secrets.clone(),
 187                         remote_claimable_outpoints: self.remote_claimable_outpoints.clone(),
 188                         remote_htlc_outputs_on_chain: Mutex::new((*self.remote_htlc_outputs_on_chain.lock().unwrap()).clone()),
 189
 190                         prev_local_signed_commitment_tx: self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.clone(),
 191                         current_local_signed_commitment_tx: self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx.clone(),
 192
 193                         payment_preimages: self.payment_preimages.clone(),
 194
 195                         destination_script: self.destination_script.clone(),
 196                         secp_ctx: self.secp_ctx.clone(),
 197                 }
 198         }
 199 }
 200
 201 impl ChannelMonitor {
 202         pub fn new(revocation_base_key: &SecretKey, delayed_payment_base_key: &PublicKey, htlc_base_key: &SecretKey, our_to_self_delay: u16, destination_script: Script) -> ChannelMonitor {
 203                 ChannelMonitor {
 204                         funding_txo: None,
 205                         commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: 0,
 206
 207                         key_storage: KeyStorage::PrivMode {
 208                                 revocation_base_key: revocation_base_key.clone(),
 209                                 htlc_base_key: htlc_base_key.clone(),
 210                         },
 211                         delayed_payment_base_key: delayed_payment_base_key.clone(),
 212                         their_htlc_base_key: None,
 213                         their_cur_revocation_points: None,
 214
 215                         our_to_self_delay: our_to_self_delay,
 216                         their_to_self_delay: None,
 217
 218                         old_secrets: [([0; 32], 1 << 48); 49],
 219                         remote_claimable_outpoints: HashMap::new(),
 220                         remote_htlc_outputs_on_chain: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
 221
 222                         prev_local_signed_commitment_tx: None,
 223                         current_local_signed_commitment_tx: None,
 224
 225                         payment_preimages: HashMap::new(),
 226
 227                         destination_script: destination_script,
 228                         secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
 229                 }
 230         }
 231
 232         #[inline]
 233         fn place_secret(idx: u64) -> u8 {
 234                 for i in 0..48 {
 235                         if idx & (1 << i) == (1 << i) {
 236                                 return i
 237                         }
 238                 }
 239                 48
 240         }
 241
 242         #[inline]
 243         fn derive_secret(secret: [u8; 32], bits: u8, idx: u64) -> [u8; 32] {
 244                 let mut res: [u8; 32] = secret;
 245                 for i in 0..bits {
 246                         let bitpos = bits - 1 - i;
 247                         if idx & (1 << bitpos) == (1 << bitpos) {
 248                                 res[(bitpos / 8) as usize] ^= 1 << (bitpos & 7);
 249                                 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
 250                                 sha.input(&res);
 251                                 sha.result(&mut res);
 252                         }
 253                 }
 254                 res
 255         }
 256
 257         /// Inserts a revocation secret into this channel monitor. Also optionally tracks the next
 258         /// revocation point which may be required to claim HTLC outputs which we know the preimage of
 259         /// in case the remote end force-closes using their latest state.
 260         pub fn provide_secret(&mut self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32], their_next_revocation_point: Option<(u64, PublicKey)>) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
 261                 let pos = ChannelMonitor::place_secret(idx);
 262                 for i in 0..pos {
 263                         let (old_secret, old_idx) = self.old_secrets[i as usize];
 264                         if ChannelMonitor::derive_secret(secret, pos, old_idx) != old_secret {
 265                                 return Err(HandleError{err: "Previous secret did not match new one", msg: None})
 266                         }
 267                 }
 268                 self.old_secrets[pos as usize] = (secret, idx);
 269
 270                 if let Some(new_revocation_point) = their_next_revocation_point {
 271                         match self.their_cur_revocation_points {
 272                                 Some(old_points) => {
 273                                         if old_points.0 == new_revocation_point.0 + 1 {
 274                                                 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0, old_points.1, Some(new_revocation_point.1)));
 275                                         } else if old_points.0 == new_revocation_point.0 + 2 {
 276                                                 if let Some(old_second_point) = old_points.2 {
 277                                                         self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0 - 1, old_second_point, Some(new_revocation_point.1)));
 278                                                 } else {
 279                                                         self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((new_revocation_point.0, new_revocation_point.1, None));
 280                                                 }
 281                                         } else {
 282                                                 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((new_revocation_point.0, new_revocation_point.1, None));
 283                                         }
 284                                 },
 285                                 None => {
 286                                         self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((new_revocation_point.0, new_revocation_point.1, None));
 287                                 }
 288                         }
 289                 }
 290                 // TODO: Prune payment_preimages no longer needed by the revocation (just have to check
 291                 // that non-revoked remote commitment tx(n) do not need it, and our latest local commitment
 292                 // tx does not need it.
 293                 Ok(())
 294         }
 295
 296         /// Informs this monitor of the latest remote (ie non-broadcastable) commitment transaction.
 297         /// The monitor watches for it to be broadcasted and then uses the HTLC information (and
 298         /// possibly future revocation/preimage information) to claim outputs where possible.
 299         pub fn provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, unsigned_commitment_tx: &Transaction, htlc_outputs: Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>) {
 300                 // TODO: Encrypt the htlc_outputs data with the single-hash of the commitment transaction
 301                 // so that a remote monitor doesn't learn anything unless there is a malicious close.
 302                 // (only maybe, sadly we cant do the same for local info, as we need to be aware of
 303                 // timeouts)
 304                 self.remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(unsigned_commitment_tx.txid(), htlc_outputs);
 305         }
 306
 307         /// Informs this monitor of the latest local (ie broadcastable) commitment transaction. The
 308         /// monitor watches for timeouts and may broadcast it if we approach such a timeout. Thus, it
 309         /// is important that any clones of this channel monitor (including remote clones) by kept
 310         /// up-to-date as our local commitment transaction is updated.
 311         /// Panics if set_their_to_self_delay has never been called.
 312         pub fn provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, signed_commitment_tx: Transaction, local_keys: chan_utils::TxCreationKeys, feerate_per_kw: u64, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Signature, Signature)>) {
 313                 assert!(self.their_to_self_delay.is_some());
 314                 self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx.take();
 315                 self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(LocalSignedTx {
 316                         txid: signed_commitment_tx.txid(),
 317                         tx: signed_commitment_tx,
 318                         revocation_key: local_keys.revocation_key,
 319                         a_htlc_key: local_keys.a_htlc_key,
 320                         b_htlc_key: local_keys.b_htlc_key,
 321                         delayed_payment_key: local_keys.a_delayed_payment_key,
 322                         feerate_per_kw,
 323                         htlc_outputs,
 324                 });
 325         }
 326
 327         /// Provides a payment_hash->payment_preimage mapping. Will be automatically pruned when all
 328         /// commitment_tx_infos which contain the payment hash have been revoked.
 329         pub fn provide_payment_preimage(&mut self, payment_hash: &[u8; 32], payment_preimage: &[u8; 32]) {
 330                 self.payment_preimages.insert(payment_hash.clone(), payment_preimage.clone());
 331         }
 332
 333         pub fn insert_combine(&mut self, mut other: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
 334                 match self.funding_txo {
 335                         Some(txo) => if other.funding_txo.is_some() && other.funding_txo.unwrap() != txo {
 336                                 return Err(HandleError{err: "Funding transaction outputs are not identical!", msg: None});
 337                         },
 338                         None => if other.funding_txo.is_some() {
 339                                 self.funding_txo = other.funding_txo;
 340                         }
 341                 }
 342                 let other_min_secret = other.get_min_seen_secret();
 343                 let our_min_secret = self.get_min_seen_secret();
 344                 if our_min_secret > other_min_secret {
 345                         self.provide_secret(other_min_secret, other.get_secret(other_min_secret).unwrap(), None)?;
 346                 }
 347                 if our_min_secret >= other_min_secret {
 348                         self.their_cur_revocation_points = other.their_cur_revocation_points;
 349                         for (txid, htlcs) in other.remote_claimable_outpoints.drain() {
 350                                 self.remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, htlcs);
 351                         }
 352                         if let Some(local_tx) = other.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
 353                                 self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(local_tx);
 354                         }
 355                         if let Some(local_tx) = other.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
 356                                 self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(local_tx);
 357                         }
 358                         self.payment_preimages = other.payment_preimages;
 359                 }
 360                 Ok(())
 361         }
 362
 363         /// Panics if commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor doesn't fit in 48 bits
 364         pub fn set_commitment_obscure_factor(&mut self, commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64) {
 365                 assert!(commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor < (1 << 48));
 366                 self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor = commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor;
 367         }
 368
 369         /// Allows this monitor to scan only for transactions which are applicable. Note that this is
 370         /// optional, without it this monitor cannot be used in an SPV client, but you may wish to
 371         /// avoid this (or call unset_funding_info) on a monitor you wish to send to a watchtower as it
 372         /// provides slightly better privacy.
 373         pub fn set_funding_info(&mut self, funding_info: OutPoint) {
 374                 self.funding_txo = Some(funding_info);
 375         }
 376
 377         pub fn set_their_htlc_base_key(&mut self, their_htlc_base_key: &PublicKey) {
 378                 self.their_htlc_base_key = Some(their_htlc_base_key.clone());
 379         }
 380
 381         pub fn set_their_to_self_delay(&mut self, their_to_self_delay: u16) {
 382                 self.their_to_self_delay = Some(their_to_self_delay);
 383         }
 384
 385         pub fn unset_funding_info(&mut self) {
 386                 self.funding_txo = None;
 387         }
 388
 389         pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
 390                 self.funding_txo
 391         }
 392
 393         //TODO: Functions to serialize/deserialize (with different forms depending on which information
 394         //we want to leave out (eg funding_txo, etc).
 395
 396         /// Can only fail if idx is < get_min_seen_secret
 397         pub fn get_secret(&self, idx: u64) -> Result<[u8; 32], HandleError> {
 398                 for i in 0..self.old_secrets.len() {
 399                         if (idx & (!((1 << i) - 1))) == self.old_secrets[i].1 {
 400                                 return Ok(ChannelMonitor::derive_secret(self.old_secrets[i].0, i as u8, idx))
 401                         }
 402                 }
 403                 assert!(idx < self.get_min_seen_secret());
 404                 Err(HandleError{err: "idx too low", msg: None})
 405         }
 406
 407         pub fn get_min_seen_secret(&self) -> u64 {
 408                 //TODO This can be optimized?
 409                 let mut min = 1 << 48;
 410                 for &(_, idx) in self.old_secrets.iter() {
 411                         if idx < min {
 412                                 min = idx;
 413                         }
 414                 }
 415                 min
 416         }
 417
 418         /// Attempts to claim a remote commitment transaction's outputs using the revocation key and
 419         /// data in remote_claimable_outpoints. Will directly claim any HTLC outputs which expire at a
 420         /// height > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER. In any case, will install monitoring for
 421         /// HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions, and claim them using the revocation key (if
 422         /// applicable) as well.
 423         fn check_spend_remote_transaction(&self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32) -> Vec<Transaction> {
 424                 // Most secp and related errors trying to create keys means we have no hope of constructing
 425                 // a spend transaction...so we return no transactions to broadcast
 426                 let mut txn_to_broadcast = Vec::new();
 427                 macro_rules! ignore_error {
 428                         ( $thing : expr ) => {
 429                                 match $thing {
 430                                         Ok(a) => a,
 431                                         Err(_) => return txn_to_broadcast
 432                                 }
 433                         };
 434                 }
 435
 436                 let commitment_txid = tx.txid(); //TODO: This is gonna be a performance bottleneck for watchtowers!
 437                 let per_commitment_option = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(&commitment_txid);
 438
 439                 let commitment_number = (((tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor;
 440                 if commitment_number >= self.get_min_seen_secret() {
 441                         let secret = self.get_secret(commitment_number).unwrap();
 442                         let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &secret));
 443                         let (revocation_pubkey, b_htlc_key) = match self.key_storage {
 444                                 KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key } => {
 445                                         let per_commitment_point = ignore_error!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key));
 446                                         (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &ignore_error!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_base_key)))),
 447                                         ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &ignore_error!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &htlc_base_key)))))
 448                                 },
 449                                 KeyStorage::SigsMode { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
 450                                         let per_commitment_point = ignore_error!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key));
 451                                         (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &revocation_base_key)),
 452                                         ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &htlc_base_key)))
 453                                 },
 454                         };
 455                         let delayed_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &ignore_error!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key)), &self.delayed_payment_base_key));
 456                         let a_htlc_key = match self.their_htlc_base_key {
 457                                 None => return txn_to_broadcast,
 458                                 Some(their_htlc_base_key) => ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &ignore_error!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key)), &their_htlc_base_key)),
 459                         };
 460
 461                         let revokeable_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey, self.our_to_self_delay, &delayed_key);
 462                         let revokeable_p2wsh = revokeable_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
 463
 464                         let mut total_value = 0;
 465                         let mut values = Vec::new();
 466                         let mut inputs = Vec::new();
 467                         let mut htlc_idxs = Vec::new();
 468
 469                         for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
 470                                 if outp.script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh {
 471                                         inputs.push(TxIn {
 472                                                 prev_hash: commitment_txid,
 473                                                 prev_index: idx as u32,
 474                                                 script_sig: Script::new(),
 475                                                 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
 476                                                 witness: Vec::new(),
 477                                         });
 478                                         htlc_idxs.push(None);
 479                                         values.push(outp.value);
 480                                         total_value += outp.value;
 481                                         break; // There can only be one of these
 482                                 }
 483                         }
 484
 485                         macro_rules! sign_input {
 486                                 ($sighash_parts: expr, $input: expr, $htlc_idx: expr, $amount: expr) => {
 487                                         {
 488                                                 let (sig, redeemscript) = match self.key_storage {
 489                                                         KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
 490                                                                 let redeemscript = if $htlc_idx.is_none() { revokeable_redeemscript.clone() } else {
 491                                                                         let htlc = &per_commitment_option.unwrap()[$htlc_idx.unwrap()];
 492                                                                         chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey)
 493                                                                 };
 494                                                                 let sighash = ignore_error!(Message::from_slice(&$sighash_parts.sighash_all(&$input, &redeemscript, $amount)[..]));
 495                                                                 let revocation_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key, &revocation_base_key));
 496                                                                 (ignore_error!(self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &revocation_key)), redeemscript)
 497                                                         },
 498                                                         KeyStorage::SigsMode { .. } => {
 499                                                                 unimplemented!();
 500                                                         }
 501                                                 };
 502                                                 $input.witness.push(sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
 503                                                 $input.witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
 504                                                 if $htlc_idx.is_none() {
 505                                                         $input.witness.push(vec!(1));
 506                                                 } else {
 507                                                         $input.witness.push(revocation_pubkey.serialize().to_vec());
 508                                                 }
 509                                                 $input.witness.push(redeemscript.into_vec());
 510                                         }
 511                                 }
 512                         }
 513
 514                         if let Some(per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
 515                                 inputs.reserve_exact(per_commitment_data.len());
 516
 517                                 for (idx, htlc) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() {
 518                                         let expected_script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey);
 519                                         if htlc.transaction_output_index as usize >= tx.output.len() ||
 520                                                         tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 ||
 521                                                         tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].script_pubkey != expected_script.to_v0_p2wsh() {
 522                                                 return txn_to_broadcast; // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user
 523                                         }
 524                                         let input = TxIn {
 525                                                 prev_hash: commitment_txid,
 526                                                 prev_index: htlc.transaction_output_index,
 527                                                 script_sig: Script::new(),
 528                                                 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
 529                                                 witness: Vec::new(),
 530                                         };
 531                                         if htlc.cltv_expiry > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER {
 532                                                 inputs.push(input);
 533                                                 htlc_idxs.push(Some(idx));
 534                                                 values.push(tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].value);
 535                                                 total_value += htlc.amount_msat / 1000;
 536                                         } else {
 537                                                 let mut single_htlc_tx = Transaction {
 538                                                         version: 2,
 539                                                         lock_time: 0,
 540                                                         input: vec![input],
 541                                                         output: vec!(TxOut {
 542                                                                 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
 543                                                                 value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000, //TODO: - fee
 544                                                         }),
 545                                                 };
 546                                                 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&single_htlc_tx);
 547                                                 sign_input!(sighash_parts, single_htlc_tx.input[0], Some(idx), htlc.amount_msat / 1000);
 548                                                 txn_to_broadcast.push(single_htlc_tx); // TODO: This is not yet tested in ChannelManager!
 549                                         }
 550                                 }
 551                         }
 552
 553                         if !inputs.is_empty() || !txn_to_broadcast.is_empty() {
 554                                 // We're definitely a remote commitment transaction!
 555                                 // TODO: Register commitment_txid with the ChainWatchInterface!
 556                                 self.remote_htlc_outputs_on_chain.lock().unwrap().insert(commitment_txid, commitment_number);
 557                         }
 558                         if inputs.is_empty() { return txn_to_broadcast; } // Nothing to be done...probably a false positive/local tx
 559
 560                         let outputs = vec!(TxOut {
 561                                 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
 562                                 value: total_value, //TODO: - fee
 563                         });
 564                         let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
 565                                 version: 2,
 566                                 lock_time: 0,
 567                                 input: inputs,
 568                                 output: outputs,
 569                         };
 570
 571                         let mut values_drain = values.drain(..);
 572                         let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx);
 573
 574                         for (input, htlc_idx) in spend_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(htlc_idxs.iter()) {
 575                                 let value = values_drain.next().unwrap();
 576                                 sign_input!(sighash_parts, input, htlc_idx, value);
 577                         }
 578
 579                         txn_to_broadcast.push(spend_tx);
 580                 } else if let Some(per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
 581                         if let Some(revocation_points) = self.their_cur_revocation_points {
 582                                 let revocation_point_option =
 583                                         if revocation_points.0 == commitment_number { Some(&revocation_points.1) }
 584                                         else if let Some(point) = revocation_points.2.as_ref() {
 585                                                 if revocation_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 { Some(point) } else { None }
 586                                         } else { None };
 587                                 if let Some(revocation_point) = revocation_point_option {
 588                                         let (revocation_pubkey, b_htlc_key) = match self.key_storage {
 589                                                 KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key } => {
 590                                                         (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &ignore_error!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_base_key)))),
 591                                                         ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &ignore_error!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &htlc_base_key)))))
 592                                                 },
 593                                                 KeyStorage::SigsMode { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
 594                                                         (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &revocation_base_key)),
 595                                                         ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &htlc_base_key)))
 596                                                 },
 597                                         };
 598                                         let a_htlc_key = match self.their_htlc_base_key {
 599                                                 None => return txn_to_broadcast,
 600                                                 Some(their_htlc_base_key) => ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &their_htlc_base_key)),
 601                                         };
 602
 603                                         let mut total_value = 0;
 604                                         let mut values = Vec::new();
 605                                         let mut inputs = Vec::new();
 606
 607                                         macro_rules! sign_input {
 608                                                 ($sighash_parts: expr, $input: expr, $amount: expr, $preimage: expr) => {
 609                                                         {
 610                                                                 let (sig, redeemscript) = match self.key_storage {
 611                                                                         KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
 612                                                                                 let htlc = &per_commitment_option.unwrap()[$input.sequence as usize];
 613                                                                                 let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey);
 614                                                                                 let sighash = ignore_error!(Message::from_slice(&$sighash_parts.sighash_all(&$input, &redeemscript, $amount)[..]));
 615                                                                                 let htlc_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &htlc_base_key));
 616                                                                                 (ignore_error!(self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &htlc_key)), redeemscript)
 617                                                                         },
 618                                                                         KeyStorage::SigsMode { .. } => {
 619                                                                                 unimplemented!();
 620                                                                         }
 621                                                                 };
 622                                                                 $input.witness.push(sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
 623                                                                 $input.witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
 624                                                                 $input.witness.push($preimage);
 625                                                                 $input.witness.push(redeemscript.into_vec());
 626                                                         }
 627                                                 }
 628                                         }
 629
 630                                         for (idx, htlc) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() {
 631                                                 if let Some(payment_preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
 632                                                         let input = TxIn {
 633                                                                 prev_hash: commitment_txid,
 634                                                                 prev_index: htlc.transaction_output_index,
 635                                                                 script_sig: Script::new(),
 636                                                                 sequence: idx as u32, // reset to 0xfffffffd in sign_input
 637                                                                 witness: Vec::new(),
 638                                                         };
 639                                                         if htlc.cltv_expiry > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER {
 640                                                                 inputs.push(input);
 641                                                                 values.push((tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].value, payment_preimage));
 642                                                                 total_value += htlc.amount_msat / 1000;
 643                                                         } else {
 644                                                                 let mut single_htlc_tx = Transaction {
 645                                                                         version: 2,
 646                                                                         lock_time: 0,
 647                                                                         input: vec![input],
 648                                                                         output: vec!(TxOut {
 649                                                                                 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
 650                                                                                 value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000, //TODO: - fee
 651                                                                         }),
 652                                                                 };
 653                                                                 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&single_htlc_tx);
 654                                                                 sign_input!(sighash_parts, single_htlc_tx.input[0], htlc.amount_msat / 1000, payment_preimage.to_vec());
 655                                                                 txn_to_broadcast.push(single_htlc_tx);
 656                                                         }
 657                                                 }
 658                                         }
 659
 660                                         if inputs.is_empty() { return txn_to_broadcast; } // Nothing to be done...probably a false positive/local tx
 661
 662                                         let outputs = vec!(TxOut {
 663                                                 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
 664                                                 value: total_value, //TODO: - fee
 665                                         });
 666                                         let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
 667                                                 version: 2,
 668                                                 lock_time: 0,
 669                                                 input: inputs,
 670                                                 output: outputs,
 671                                         };
 672
 673                                         let mut values_drain = values.drain(..);
 674                                         let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx);
 675
 676                                         for input in spend_tx.input.iter_mut() {
 677                                                 let value = values_drain.next().unwrap();
 678                                                 sign_input!(sighash_parts, input, value.0, value.1.to_vec());
 679                                         }
 680
 681                                         txn_to_broadcast.push(spend_tx);
 682                                 }
 683                         }
 684                 } else {
 685                         //TODO: For each input check if its in our remote_htlc_outputs_on_chain map!
 686                 }
 687
 688                 txn_to_broadcast
 689         }
 690
 691         fn broadcast_by_local_state(&self, local_tx: &LocalSignedTx) -> Vec<Transaction> {
 692                 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
 693
 694                 for &(ref htlc, ref their_sig, ref our_sig) in local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
 695                         if htlc.offered {
 696                                 let mut htlc_timeout_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&local_tx.txid, local_tx.feerate_per_kw, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), htlc, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key, &local_tx.revocation_key);
 697
 698                                 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
 699
 700                                 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(their_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
 701                                 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
 702                                 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
 703                                 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
 704
 705                                 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new());
 706                                 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &local_tx.a_htlc_key, &local_tx.b_htlc_key, &local_tx.revocation_key).into_vec());
 707
 708                                 res.push(htlc_timeout_tx);
 709                         } else {
 710                                 if let Some(payment_preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
 711                                         let mut htlc_success_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&local_tx.txid, local_tx.feerate_per_kw, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), htlc, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key, &local_tx.revocation_key);
 712
 713                                         htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
 714
 715                                         htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(their_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
 716                                         htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
 717                                         htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
 718                                         htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
 719
 720                                         htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(payment_preimage.to_vec());
 721                                         htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &local_tx.a_htlc_key, &local_tx.b_htlc_key, &local_tx.revocation_key).into_vec());
 722
 723                                         res.push(htlc_success_tx);
 724                                 }
 725                         }
 726                 }
 727
 728                 res
 729         }
 730
 731         /// Attempts to claim any claimable HTLCs in a commitment transaction which was not (yet)
 732         /// revoked using data in local_claimable_outpoints.
 733         /// Should not be used if check_spend_revoked_transaction succeeds.
 734         fn check_spend_local_transaction(&self, tx: &Transaction, _height: u32) -> Vec<Transaction> {
 735                 let commitment_txid = tx.txid();
 736                 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
 737                         if local_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
 738                                 return self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx);
 739                         }
 740                 }
 741                 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
 742                         if local_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
 743                                 return self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx);
 744                         }
 745                 }
 746                 Vec::new()
 747         }
 748
 749         fn block_connected(&self, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], height: u32, broadcaster: &BroadcasterInterface) {
 750                 for tx in txn_matched {
 751                         for txin in tx.input.iter() {
 752                                 if self.funding_txo.is_none() || (txin.prev_hash == self.funding_txo.unwrap().txid && txin.prev_index == self.funding_txo.unwrap().index as u32) {
 753                                         let mut txn = self.check_spend_remote_transaction(tx, height);
 754                                         if txn.is_empty() {
 755                                                 txn = self.check_spend_local_transaction(tx, height);
 756                                         }
 757                                         for tx in txn.iter() {
 758                                                 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(tx);
 759                                         }
 760                                 }
 761                         }
 762                 }
 763                 if let Some(ref cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
 764                         let mut needs_broadcast = false;
 765                         for &(ref htlc, _, _) in cur_local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
 766                                 if htlc.cltv_expiry <= height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER {
 767                                         if htlc.offered || self.payment_preimages.contains_key(&htlc.payment_hash) {
 768                                                 needs_broadcast = true;
 769                                         }
 770                                 }
 771                         }
 772
 773                         if needs_broadcast {
 774                                 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&cur_local_tx.tx);
 775                                 for tx in self.broadcast_by_local_state(&cur_local_tx) {
 776                                         broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
 777                                 }
 778                         }
 779                 }
 780         }
 781
 782         pub fn would_broadcast_at_height(&self, height: u32) -> bool {
 783                 if let Some(ref cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
 784                         for &(ref htlc, _, _) in cur_local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
 785                                 if htlc.cltv_expiry <= height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER {
 786                                         if htlc.offered || self.payment_preimages.contains_key(&htlc.payment_hash) {
 787                                                 return true;
 788                                         }
 789                                 }
 790                         }
 791                 }
 792                 false
 793         }
 794 }
 795
 796 #[cfg(test)]
 797 mod tests {
 798         use bitcoin::util::misc::hex_bytes;
 799         use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Script;
 800         use ln::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor;
 801         use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
 802         use secp256k1::Secp256k1;
 803
 804         #[test]
 805         fn test_per_commitment_storage() {
 806                 // Test vectors from BOLT 3:
 807                 let mut secrets: Vec<[u8; 32]> = Vec::new();
 808                 let mut monitor: ChannelMonitor;
 809                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
 810
 811                 macro_rules! test_secrets {
 812                         () => {
 813                                 let mut idx = 281474976710655;
 814                                 for secret in secrets.iter() {
 815                                         assert_eq!(monitor.get_secret(idx).unwrap(), *secret);
 816                                         idx -= 1;
 817                                 }
 818                                 assert_eq!(monitor.get_min_seen_secret(), idx + 1);
 819                                 assert!(monitor.get_secret(idx).is_err());
 820                         };
 821                 }
 822
 823                 {
 824                         // insert_secret correct sequence
 825                         monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::new(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
 826                         secrets.clear();
 827
 828                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 829                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
 830                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
 831                         test_secrets!();
 832
 833                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 834                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
 835                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
 836                         test_secrets!();
 837
 838                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 839                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
 840                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
 841                         test_secrets!();
 842
 843                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 844                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
 845                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
 846                         test_secrets!();
 847
 848                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 849                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
 850                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
 851                         test_secrets!();
 852
 853                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 854                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
 855                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
 856                         test_secrets!();
 857
 858                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 859                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
 860                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
 861                         test_secrets!();
 862
 863                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 864                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
 865                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
 866                         test_secrets!();
 867                 }
 868
 869                 {
 870                         // insert_secret #1 incorrect
 871                         monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::new(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
 872                         secrets.clear();
 873
 874                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 875                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
 876                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
 877                         test_secrets!();
 878
 879                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 880                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
 881                         assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err,
 882                                         "Previous secret did not match new one");
 883                 }
 884
 885                 {
 886                         // insert_secret #2 incorrect (#1 derived from incorrect)
 887                         monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::new(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
 888                         secrets.clear();
 889
 890                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 891                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
 892                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
 893                         test_secrets!();
 894
 895                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 896                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("dddc3a8d14fddf2b68fa8c7fbad2748274937479dd0f8930d5ebb4ab6bd866a3").unwrap());
 897                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
 898                         test_secrets!();
 899
 900                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 901                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
 902                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
 903                         test_secrets!();
 904
 905                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 906                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
 907                         assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err,
 908                                         "Previous secret did not match new one");
 909                 }
 910
 911                 {
 912                         // insert_secret #3 incorrect
 913                         monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::new(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
 914                         secrets.clear();
 915
 916                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 917                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
 918                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
 919                         test_secrets!();
 920
 921                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 922                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
 923                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
 924                         test_secrets!();
 925
 926                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 927                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("c51a18b13e8527e579ec56365482c62f180b7d5760b46e9477dae59e87ed423a").unwrap());
 928                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
 929                         test_secrets!();
 930
 931                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 932                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
 933                         assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err,
 934                                         "Previous secret did not match new one");
 935                 }
 936
 937                 {
 938                         // insert_secret #4 incorrect (1,2,3 derived from incorrect)
 939                         monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::new(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
 940                         secrets.clear();
 941
 942                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 943                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
 944                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
 945                         test_secrets!();
 946
 947                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 948                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("dddc3a8d14fddf2b68fa8c7fbad2748274937479dd0f8930d5ebb4ab6bd866a3").unwrap());
 949                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
 950                         test_secrets!();
 951
 952                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 953                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("c51a18b13e8527e579ec56365482c62f180b7d5760b46e9477dae59e87ed423a").unwrap());
 954                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
 955                         test_secrets!();
 956
 957                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 958                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("ba65d7b0ef55a3ba300d4e87af29868f394f8f138d78a7011669c79b37b936f4").unwrap());
 959                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
 960                         test_secrets!();
 961
 962                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 963                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
 964                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
 965                         test_secrets!();
 966
 967                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 968                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
 969                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
 970                         test_secrets!();
 971
 972                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 973                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
 974                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
 975                         test_secrets!();
 976
 977                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 978                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
 979                         assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err,
 980                                         "Previous secret did not match new one");
 981                 }
 982
 983                 {
 984                         // insert_secret #5 incorrect
 985                         monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::new(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
 986                         secrets.clear();
 987
 988                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 989                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
 990                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
 991                         test_secrets!();
 992
 993                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 994                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
 995                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
 996                         test_secrets!();
 997
 998                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 999                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1000                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1001                         test_secrets!();
1002
1003                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1004                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1005                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1006                         test_secrets!();
1007
1008                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1009                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("631373ad5f9ef654bb3dade742d09504c567edd24320d2fcd68e3cc47e2ff6a6").unwrap());
1010                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1011                         test_secrets!();
1012
1013                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1014                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
1015                         assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err,
1016                                         "Previous secret did not match new one");
1017                 }
1018
1019                 {
1020                         // insert_secret #6 incorrect (5 derived from incorrect)
1021                         monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::new(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
1022                         secrets.clear();
1023
1024                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1025                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1026                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1027                         test_secrets!();
1028
1029                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1030                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1031                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1032                         test_secrets!();
1033
1034                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1035                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1036                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1037                         test_secrets!();
1038
1039                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1040                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1041                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1042                         test_secrets!();
1043
1044                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1045                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("631373ad5f9ef654bb3dade742d09504c567edd24320d2fcd68e3cc47e2ff6a6").unwrap());
1046                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1047                         test_secrets!();
1048
1049                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1050                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("b7e76a83668bde38b373970155c868a653304308f9896692f904a23731224bb1").unwrap());
1051                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1052                         test_secrets!();
1053
1054                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1055                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
1056                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1057                         test_secrets!();
1058
1059                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1060                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
1061                         assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err,
1062                                         "Previous secret did not match new one");
1063                 }
1064
1065                 {
1066                         // insert_secret #7 incorrect
1067                         monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::new(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
1068                         secrets.clear();
1069
1070                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1071                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1072                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1073                         test_secrets!();
1074
1075                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1076                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1077                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1078                         test_secrets!();
1079
1080                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1081                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1082                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1083                         test_secrets!();
1084
1085                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1086                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1087                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1088                         test_secrets!();
1089
1090                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1091                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
1092                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1093                         test_secrets!();
1094
1095                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1096                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
1097                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1098                         test_secrets!();
1099
1100                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1101                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("e7971de736e01da8ed58b94c2fc216cb1dca9e326f3a96e7194fe8ea8af6c0a3").unwrap());
1102                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1103                         test_secrets!();
1104
1105                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1106                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
1107                         assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err,
1108                                         "Previous secret did not match new one");
1109                 }
1110
1111                 {
1112                         // insert_secret #8 incorrect
1113                         monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::new(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
1114                         secrets.clear();
1115
1116                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1117                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1118                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1119                         test_secrets!();
1120
1121                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1122                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1123                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1124                         test_secrets!();
1125
1126                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1127                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1128                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1129                         test_secrets!();
1130
1131                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1132                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1133                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1134                         test_secrets!();
1135
1136                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1137                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
1138                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1139                         test_secrets!();
1140
1141                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1142                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
1143                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1144                         test_secrets!();
1145
1146                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1147                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
1148                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1149                         test_secrets!();
1150
1151                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1152                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("a7efbc61aac46d34f77778bac22c8a20c6a46ca460addc49009bda875ec88fa4").unwrap());
1153                         assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err,
1154                                         "Previous secret did not match new one");
1155                 }
1156         }
1157
1158         // Further testing is done in the ChannelManager integration tests.
1159 }