1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! Further functional tests which test blockchain reorganizations.
12 use chain::channelmonitor::{ANTI_REORG_DELAY, Balance};
13 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
14 use chain::chaininterface::LowerBoundedFeeEstimator;
16 use ln::channelmanager::BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT;
17 use ln::features::InitFeatures;
18 use ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
19 use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination};
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Builder;
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
23 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
24 use bitcoin::Transaction;
28 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
31 fn chanmon_fail_from_stale_commitment() {
32 // If we forward an HTLC to our counterparty, but we force-closed the channel before our
33 // counterparty provides us an updated commitment transaction, we'll end up with a commitment
34 // transaction that does not contain the HTLC which we attempted to forward. In this case, we
35 // need to wait `ANTI_REORG_DELAY` blocks and then fail back the HTLC as there is no way for us
36 // to learn the preimage and the confirmed commitment transaction paid us the value of the
39 // However, previously, we did not do this, ignoring the HTLC entirely.
41 // This could lead to channel closure if the sender we received the HTLC from decides to go on
42 // chain to get their HTLC back before it times out.
44 // Here, we check exactly this case, forwarding a payment from A, through B, to C, before B
45 // broadcasts its latest commitment transaction, which should result in it eventually failing
46 // the HTLC back off-chain to A.
47 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
48 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
49 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
50 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
52 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
53 let (update_a, _, chan_id_2, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
55 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 1_000_000);
56 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
57 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
59 let bs_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_id_2);
61 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
62 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
63 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false);
65 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
66 get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
67 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
69 // Don't bother delivering the new HTLC add/commits, instead confirming the pre-HTLC commitment
70 // transaction for nodes[1].
71 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &bs_txn[0]);
72 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
73 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
74 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
75 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
77 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
78 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_id_2 }]);
79 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
80 let fail_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
82 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
83 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], fail_updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
84 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, update_a.contents.short_channel_id, true);
87 fn test_spendable_output<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd>(node: &'a Node<'b, 'c, 'd>, spendable_tx: &Transaction) {
88 let mut spendable = node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
89 assert_eq!(spendable.len(), 1);
90 if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs } = spendable.pop().unwrap() {
91 assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
92 let spend_tx = node.keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(),
93 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &Secp256k1::new()).unwrap();
94 check_spends!(spend_tx, spendable_tx);
99 fn revoked_output_htlc_resolution_timing() {
100 // Tests that HTLCs which were present in a broadcasted remote revoked commitment transaction
101 // are resolved only after a spend of the HTLC output reaches six confirmations. Preivously
102 // they would resolve after the revoked commitment transaction itself reaches six
104 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
105 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
106 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
107 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
109 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
111 let payment_hash_1 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000).1;
113 // Get a commitment transaction which contains the HTLC we care about, but which we'll revoke
114 // before forwarding.
115 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
116 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1);
118 // Route a dust payment to revoke the above commitment transaction
119 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000);
121 // Confirm the revoked commitment transaction, closing the channel.
122 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
123 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
124 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
125 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
127 let bs_spend_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
128 assert_eq!(bs_spend_txn.len(), 2);
129 check_spends!(bs_spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
130 check_spends!(bs_spend_txn[1], chan.3);
132 // After the commitment transaction confirms, we should still wait on the HTLC spend
133 // transaction to confirm before resolving the HTLC.
134 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
135 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
136 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
138 // Spend the HTLC output, generating a HTLC failure event after ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations.
139 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &bs_spend_txn[0]);
140 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
141 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
143 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
144 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, false);
148 fn chanmon_claim_value_coop_close() {
149 // Tests `get_claimable_balances` returns the correct values across a simple cooperative claim.
150 // Specifically, this tests that the channel non-HTLC balances show up in
151 // `get_claimable_balances` until the cooperative claims have confirmed and generated a
152 // `SpendableOutputs` event, and no longer.
153 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
154 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
155 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
156 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
158 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
159 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 1_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
160 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
161 assert_eq!(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(), chan_id);
163 let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_id) as u64;
164 let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan_id);
166 assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
167 claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 1_000 - chan_feerate * channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) / 1000
169 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
170 assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose { claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000, }],
171 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
173 nodes[0].node.close_channel(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
174 let node_0_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
175 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), &node_0_shutdown);
176 let node_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
177 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), &node_1_shutdown);
179 let node_0_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
180 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_closing_signed);
181 let node_1_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
182 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_closing_signed);
183 let (_, node_0_2nd_closing_signed) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
184 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_2nd_closing_signed.unwrap());
185 let (_, node_1_none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
186 assert!(node_1_none.is_none());
188 let shutdown_tx = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
189 assert_eq!(shutdown_tx, nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0));
190 assert_eq!(shutdown_tx.len(), 1);
192 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &shutdown_tx[0]);
193 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &shutdown_tx[0]);
195 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
196 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
198 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
199 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
201 assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
202 claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 1_000 - chan_feerate * channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) / 1000,
203 confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
205 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
206 assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
207 claimable_amount_satoshis: 1000,
208 confirmation_height: nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
210 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
212 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
213 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
215 assert_eq!(Vec::<Balance>::new(),
216 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
217 assert_eq!(Vec::<Balance>::new(),
218 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
220 test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &shutdown_tx[0]);
221 test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &shutdown_tx[0]);
223 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
224 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
227 fn sorted_vec<T: Ord>(mut v: Vec<T>) -> Vec<T> {
232 /// Asserts that `a` and `b` are close, but maybe off by up to 5.
233 /// This is useful when checking fees and weights on transactions as things may vary by a few based
234 /// on signature size and signature size estimation being non-exact.
235 fn fuzzy_assert_eq<V: core::convert::TryInto<u64>>(a: V, b: V) {
236 let a_u64 = a.try_into().map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
237 let b_u64 = b.try_into().map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
238 eprintln!("Checking {} and {} for fuzzy equality", a_u64, b_u64);
239 assert!(a_u64 >= b_u64 - 5);
240 assert!(b_u64 >= a_u64 - 5);
243 fn do_test_claim_value_force_close(prev_commitment_tx: bool) {
244 // Tests `get_claimable_balances` with an HTLC across a force-close.
245 // We build a channel with an HTLC pending, then force close the channel and check that the
246 // `get_claimable_balances` return value is correct as transactions confirm on-chain.
247 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
248 if prev_commitment_tx {
249 // We broadcast a second-to-latest commitment transaction, without providing the revocation
250 // secret to the counterparty. However, because we always immediately take the revocation
251 // secret from the keys_manager, we would panic at broadcast as we're trying to sign a
252 // transaction which, from the point of view of our keys_manager, is revoked.
253 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
255 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
256 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
257 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
259 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
260 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 1_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
261 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
262 assert_eq!(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(), chan_id);
264 // This HTLC is immediately claimed, giving node B the preimage
265 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000);
266 // This HTLC is allowed to time out, letting A claim it. However, in order to test claimable
267 // balances more fully we also give B the preimage for this HTLC.
268 let (timeout_payment_preimage, timeout_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 4_000_000);
269 // This HTLC will be dust, and not be claimable at all:
270 let (dust_payment_preimage, dust_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000);
272 let htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
274 let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_id) as u64;
275 let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan_id);
277 let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_id);
278 // Before B receives the payment preimage, it only suggests the push_msat value of 1_000 sats
279 // as claimable. A lists both its to-self balance and the (possibly-claimable) HTLCs.
280 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
281 claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 3_000 - 4_000 - 1_000 - 3 - chan_feerate *
282 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
283 }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
284 claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
285 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
286 }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
287 claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
288 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
290 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
291 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
292 claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000,
293 }, Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
294 claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
295 expiry_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
296 }, Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
297 claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
298 expiry_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
300 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
302 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
303 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
304 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
306 let b_htlc_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(&nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
307 // We claim the dust payment here as well, but it won't impact our claimable balances as its
308 // dust and thus doesn't appear on chain at all.
309 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(dust_payment_preimage);
310 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
311 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], dust_payment_hash, 3_000);
313 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(timeout_payment_preimage);
314 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
315 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], timeout_payment_hash, 4_000_000);
317 if prev_commitment_tx {
318 // To build a previous commitment transaction, deliver one round of commitment messages.
319 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &b_htlc_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
320 expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
321 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &b_htlc_msgs.commitment_signed);
322 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
323 let (as_raa, as_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
324 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
325 let _htlc_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(&nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
326 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
327 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs);
328 let _bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
329 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
332 // Once B has received the payment preimage, it includes the value of the HTLC in its
333 // "claimable if you were to close the channel" balance.
334 let mut a_expected_balances = vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
335 claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - // Channel funding value in satoshis
336 4_000 - // The to-be-failed HTLC value in satoshis
337 3_000 - // The claimed HTLC value in satoshis
338 1_000 - // The push_msat value in satoshis
339 3 - // The dust HTLC value in satoshis
340 // The commitment transaction fee with two HTLC outputs:
341 chan_feerate * (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) +
342 if prev_commitment_tx { 1 } else { 2 } *
343 channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
344 }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
345 claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
346 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
348 if !prev_commitment_tx {
349 a_expected_balances.push(Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
350 claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
351 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
354 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(a_expected_balances),
355 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
356 assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
357 claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000 + 3_000 + 4_000,
359 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
361 // Broadcast the closing transaction (which has both pending HTLCs in it) and get B's
362 // broadcasted HTLC claim transaction with preimage.
363 let node_b_commitment_claimable = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32;
364 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &remote_txn[0]);
365 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &remote_txn[0]);
367 let b_broadcast_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
368 assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn.len(), if prev_commitment_tx { 4 } else { 5 });
369 if prev_commitment_tx {
370 check_spends!(b_broadcast_txn[3], b_broadcast_txn[2]);
372 assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn[0], b_broadcast_txn[3]);
373 assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn[1], b_broadcast_txn[4]);
375 // b_broadcast_txn[0] should spend the HTLC output of the commitment tx for 3_000 sats
376 check_spends!(b_broadcast_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
377 check_spends!(b_broadcast_txn[1], remote_txn[0]);
378 assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
379 assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
380 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[b_broadcast_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 3_000);
381 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[b_broadcast_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 4_000);
382 check_spends!(b_broadcast_txn[2], funding_tx);
384 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
385 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
386 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
387 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
388 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
389 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
390 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
391 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
392 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
393 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
395 // Once the commitment transaction confirms, we will wait until ANTI_REORG_DELAY until we
396 // generate any `SpendableOutputs` events. Thus, the same balances will still be listed
397 // available in `get_claimable_balances`. However, both will swap from `ClaimableOnClose` to
398 // other Balance variants, as close has already happened.
399 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
400 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
402 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
403 claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 3_000 - 4_000 - 1_000 - 3 - chan_feerate *
404 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
405 confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
406 }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
407 claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
408 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
409 }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
410 claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
411 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
413 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
414 // The main non-HTLC balance is just awaiting confirmations, but the claimable height is the
415 // CSV delay, not ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
416 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
417 claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000,
418 confirmation_height: node_b_commitment_claimable,
420 // Both HTLC balances are "contentious" as our counterparty could claim them if we wait too
422 Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
423 claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
424 timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
425 }, Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
426 claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
427 timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
429 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
431 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
432 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_payment_hash, false);
433 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
435 // After ANTI_REORG_DELAY, A will consider its balance fully spendable and generate a
436 // `SpendableOutputs` event. However, B still has to wait for the CSV delay.
437 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
438 claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
439 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
440 }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
441 claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
442 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
444 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
445 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
446 claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000,
447 confirmation_height: node_b_commitment_claimable,
448 }, Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
449 claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
450 timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
451 }, Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
452 claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
453 timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
455 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
457 test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &remote_txn[0]);
458 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
460 // After broadcasting the HTLC claim transaction, node A will still consider the HTLC
461 // possibly-claimable up to ANTI_REORG_DELAY, at which point it will drop it.
462 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &b_broadcast_txn[0]);
463 if prev_commitment_tx {
464 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
466 expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
468 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
469 claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
470 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
471 }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
472 claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
473 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
475 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
476 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
477 assert_eq!(vec![Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
478 claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
479 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
481 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
483 // When the HTLC timeout output is spendable in the next block, A should broadcast it
484 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], htlc_cltv_timeout - nodes[0].best_block_info().1 - 1);
485 let a_broadcast_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
486 assert_eq!(a_broadcast_txn.len(), 3);
487 check_spends!(a_broadcast_txn[0], funding_tx);
488 assert_eq!(a_broadcast_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
489 check_spends!(a_broadcast_txn[1], remote_txn[0]);
490 assert_eq!(a_broadcast_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
491 check_spends!(a_broadcast_txn[2], remote_txn[0]);
492 assert_ne!(a_broadcast_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout,
493 a_broadcast_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.vout);
494 // a_broadcast_txn [1] and [2] should spend the HTLC outputs of the commitment tx
495 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[a_broadcast_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 3_000);
496 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[a_broadcast_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 4_000);
498 // Once the HTLC-Timeout transaction confirms, A will no longer consider the HTLC
499 // "MaybeClaimable", but instead move it to "AwaitingConfirmations".
500 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &a_broadcast_txn[2]);
501 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
502 assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
503 claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
504 confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
506 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
507 // After ANTI_REORG_DELAY, A will generate a SpendableOutputs event and drop the claimable
509 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
510 assert_eq!(Vec::<Balance>::new(),
511 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
512 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], timeout_payment_hash, false);
514 test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &a_broadcast_txn[2]);
516 // Node B will no longer consider the HTLC "contentious" after the HTLC claim transaction
517 // confirms, and consider it simply "awaiting confirmations". Note that it has to wait for the
518 // standard revocable transaction CSV delay before receiving a `SpendableOutputs`.
519 let node_b_htlc_claimable = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32;
520 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &b_broadcast_txn[0]);
522 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
523 claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000,
524 confirmation_height: node_b_commitment_claimable,
525 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
526 claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
527 confirmation_height: node_b_htlc_claimable,
528 }, Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
529 claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
530 timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
532 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
534 // After reaching the commitment output CSV, we'll get a SpendableOutputs event for it and have
535 // only the HTLCs claimable on node B.
536 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_b_commitment_claimable - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
537 test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &remote_txn[0]);
539 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
540 claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
541 confirmation_height: node_b_htlc_claimable,
542 }, Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
543 claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
544 timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
546 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
548 // After reaching the claimed HTLC output CSV, we'll get a SpendableOutptus event for it and
549 // have only one HTLC output left spendable.
550 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_b_htlc_claimable - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
551 test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &b_broadcast_txn[0]);
553 assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
554 claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
555 timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
557 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
559 // Finally, mine the HTLC timeout transaction that A broadcasted (even though B should be able
560 // to claim this HTLC with the preimage it knows!). It will remain listed as a claimable HTLC
561 // until ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations on the spend.
562 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &a_broadcast_txn[2]);
563 assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
564 claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
565 timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
567 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
568 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
569 assert_eq!(Vec::<Balance>::new(),
570 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
574 fn test_claim_value_force_close() {
575 do_test_claim_value_force_close(true);
576 do_test_claim_value_force_close(false);
580 fn test_balances_on_local_commitment_htlcs() {
581 // Previously, when handling the broadcast of a local commitment transactions (with associated
582 // CSV delays prior to spendability), we incorrectly handled the CSV delays on HTLC
583 // transactions. This caused us to miss spendable outputs for HTLCs which were awaiting a CSV
584 // delay prior to spendability.
586 // Further, because of this, we could hit an assertion as `get_claimable_balances` asserted
587 // that HTLCs were resolved after the funding spend was resolved, which was not true if the
588 // HTLC did not have a CSV delay attached (due to the above bug or due to it being an HTLC
589 // claim by our counterparty).
590 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
591 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
592 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
593 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
595 // Create a single channel with two pending HTLCs from nodes[0] to nodes[1], one which nodes[1]
596 // knows the preimage for, one which it does not.
597 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
598 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
600 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 10_000_000);
601 let htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
602 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
603 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
605 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
606 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
607 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false);
609 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
610 expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000_000);
612 let (route_2, payment_hash_2, payment_preimage_2, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 20_000_000);
613 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_2, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
614 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
616 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
617 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
618 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false);
620 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
621 expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, payment_secret_2, 20_000_000);
622 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_2);
623 get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
624 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
625 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, 20_000_000);
627 let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_id) as u64;
628 let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan_id);
630 // Get nodes[0]'s commitment transaction and HTLC-Timeout transactions
631 let as_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_id);
632 assert_eq!(as_txn.len(), 3);
633 check_spends!(as_txn[1], as_txn[0]);
634 check_spends!(as_txn[2], as_txn[0]);
635 check_spends!(as_txn[0], funding_tx);
637 // First confirm the commitment transaction on nodes[0], which should leave us with three
638 // claimable balances.
639 let node_a_commitment_claimable = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32;
640 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_txn[0]);
641 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
642 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
643 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
645 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
646 claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - chan_feerate *
647 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
648 confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
649 }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
650 claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000,
651 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
652 }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
653 claimable_amount_satoshis: 20_000,
654 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
656 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
658 // Get nodes[1]'s HTLC claim tx for the second HTLC
659 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &as_txn[0]);
660 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
661 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
662 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
663 let bs_htlc_claim_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
664 assert_eq!(bs_htlc_claim_txn.len(), 3);
665 check_spends!(bs_htlc_claim_txn[0], as_txn[0]);
666 check_spends!(bs_htlc_claim_txn[1], funding_tx);
667 check_spends!(bs_htlc_claim_txn[2], bs_htlc_claim_txn[1]);
669 // Connect blocks until the HTLCs expire, allowing us to (validly) broadcast the HTLC-Timeout
671 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1);
672 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
673 claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - chan_feerate *
674 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
675 confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
676 }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
677 claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000,
678 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
679 }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
680 claimable_amount_satoshis: 20_000,
681 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
683 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
684 assert_eq!(as_txn[1].lock_time.0, nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1); // as_txn[1] can be included in the next block
686 // Now confirm nodes[0]'s HTLC-Timeout transaction, which changes the claimable balance to an
687 // "awaiting confirmations" one.
688 let node_a_htlc_claimable = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32;
689 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_txn[1]);
690 // Note that prior to the fix in the commit which introduced this test, this (and the next
691 // balance) check failed. With this check removed, the code panicked in the `connect_blocks`
692 // call, as described, two hunks down.
693 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
694 claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - chan_feerate *
695 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
696 confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
697 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
698 claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000,
699 confirmation_height: node_a_htlc_claimable,
700 }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
701 claimable_amount_satoshis: 20_000,
702 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
704 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
706 // Now confirm nodes[1]'s HTLC claim, giving nodes[0] the preimage. Note that the "maybe
707 // claimable" balance remains until we see ANTI_REORG_DELAY blocks.
708 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &bs_htlc_claim_txn[0]);
709 expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_2);
710 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
711 claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - chan_feerate *
712 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
713 confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
714 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
715 claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000,
716 confirmation_height: node_a_htlc_claimable,
717 }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
718 claimable_amount_satoshis: 20_000,
719 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
721 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
723 // Finally make the HTLC transactions have ANTI_REORG_DELAY blocks. This call previously
724 // panicked as described in the test introduction. This will remove the "maybe claimable"
725 // spendable output as nodes[1] has fully claimed the second HTLC.
726 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
727 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false);
729 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
730 claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - chan_feerate *
731 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
732 confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
733 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
734 claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000,
735 confirmation_height: node_a_htlc_claimable,
737 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
739 // Connect blocks until the commitment transaction's CSV expires, providing us the relevant
740 // `SpendableOutputs` event and removing the claimable balance entry.
741 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_a_commitment_claimable - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
742 assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
743 claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000,
744 confirmation_height: node_a_htlc_claimable,
746 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
747 test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &as_txn[0]);
749 // Connect blocks until the HTLC-Timeout's CSV expires, providing us the relevant
750 // `SpendableOutputs` event and removing the claimable balance entry.
751 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_a_htlc_claimable - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
752 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
753 test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &as_txn[1]);
757 fn test_no_preimage_inbound_htlc_balances() {
758 // Tests that MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC are generated for inbound HTLCs for which we do not
760 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
761 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
762 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
763 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
765 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
766 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
768 // Send two HTLCs, one from A to B, and one from B to A.
769 let to_b_failed_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10_000_000).1;
770 let to_a_failed_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 20_000_000).1;
771 let htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
773 let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_id) as u64;
774 let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan_id);
776 // Both A and B will have an HTLC that's claimable on timeout and one that's claimable if they
777 // receive the preimage. These will remain the same through the channel closure and until the
778 // HTLC output is spent.
780 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
781 claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 500_000 - 10_000 - chan_feerate *
782 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
783 }, Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
784 claimable_amount_satoshis: 20_000,
785 expiry_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
786 }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
787 claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000,
788 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
790 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
792 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
793 claimable_amount_satoshis: 500_000 - 20_000,
794 }, Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
795 claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000,
796 expiry_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
797 }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
798 claimable_amount_satoshis: 20_000,
799 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
801 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
803 // Get nodes[0]'s commitment transaction and HTLC-Timeout transaction
804 let as_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_id);
805 assert_eq!(as_txn.len(), 2);
806 check_spends!(as_txn[1], as_txn[0]);
807 check_spends!(as_txn[0], funding_tx);
809 // Now close the channel by confirming A's commitment transaction on both nodes, checking the
810 // claimable balances remain the same except for the non-HTLC balance changing variant.
811 let node_a_commitment_claimable = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32;
812 let as_pre_spend_claims = sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
813 claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 500_000 - 10_000 - chan_feerate *
814 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
815 confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
816 }, Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
817 claimable_amount_satoshis: 20_000,
818 expiry_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
819 }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
820 claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000,
821 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
824 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_txn[0]);
825 nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
826 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
827 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
828 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
830 assert_eq!(as_pre_spend_claims,
831 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
833 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &as_txn[0]);
834 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
835 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
836 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
838 let node_b_commitment_claimable = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
839 let mut bs_pre_spend_claims = sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
840 claimable_amount_satoshis: 500_000 - 20_000,
841 confirmation_height: node_b_commitment_claimable,
842 }, Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
843 claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000,
844 expiry_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
845 }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
846 claimable_amount_satoshis: 20_000,
847 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
849 assert_eq!(bs_pre_spend_claims,
850 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
852 // We'll broadcast the HTLC-Timeout transaction one block prior to the htlc's expiration (as it
853 // is confirmable in the next block), but will still include the same claimable balances as no
854 // HTLC has been spent, even after the HTLC expires. We'll also fail the inbound HTLC, but it
855 // won't do anything as the channel is already closed.
857 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1);
858 let as_htlc_timeout_claim = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
859 assert_eq!(as_htlc_timeout_claim.len(), 1);
860 check_spends!(as_htlc_timeout_claim[0], as_txn[0]);
861 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_conditions!(nodes[0],
862 [HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: to_a_failed_payment_hash }]);
864 assert_eq!(as_pre_spend_claims,
865 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
867 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
868 assert_eq!(as_pre_spend_claims,
869 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
871 // For node B, we'll get the non-HTLC funds claimable after ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations
872 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
873 test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &as_txn[0]);
874 bs_pre_spend_claims.retain(|e| if let Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { .. } = e { false } else { true });
876 // The next few blocks for B look the same as for A, though for the opposite HTLC
877 nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
878 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - (ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) - 1);
879 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_conditions!(nodes[1],
880 [HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: to_b_failed_payment_hash }]);
881 let bs_htlc_timeout_claim = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
882 assert_eq!(bs_htlc_timeout_claim.len(), 1);
883 check_spends!(bs_htlc_timeout_claim[0], as_txn[0]);
885 assert_eq!(bs_pre_spend_claims,
886 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
888 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
889 assert_eq!(bs_pre_spend_claims,
890 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
892 // Now confirm the two HTLC timeout transactions for A, checking that the inbound HTLC resolves
893 // after ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations and the other takes BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT confirmations.
894 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_htlc_timeout_claim[0]);
895 let as_timeout_claimable_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + (BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32) - 1;
896 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
897 claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 500_000 - 10_000 - chan_feerate *
898 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
899 confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
900 }, Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
901 claimable_amount_satoshis: 20_000,
902 expiry_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
903 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
904 claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000,
905 confirmation_height: as_timeout_claimable_height,
907 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
909 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &bs_htlc_timeout_claim[0]);
910 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
911 claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 500_000 - 10_000 - chan_feerate *
912 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
913 confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
914 }, Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
915 claimable_amount_satoshis: 20_000,
916 expiry_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
917 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
918 claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000,
919 confirmation_height: as_timeout_claimable_height,
921 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
923 // Once as_htlc_timeout_claim[0] reaches ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations, we should get a
924 // payment failure event.
925 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
926 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], to_b_failed_payment_hash, false);
928 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
929 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
930 claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 500_000 - 10_000 - chan_feerate *
931 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
932 confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
933 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
934 claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000,
935 confirmation_height: core::cmp::max(as_timeout_claimable_height, htlc_cltv_timeout),
937 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
939 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_a_commitment_claimable - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
940 assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
941 claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000,
942 confirmation_height: core::cmp::max(as_timeout_claimable_height, htlc_cltv_timeout),
944 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
945 test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &as_txn[0]);
947 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], as_timeout_claimable_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
948 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
949 test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &as_htlc_timeout_claim[0]);
951 // The process for B should be completely identical as well, noting that the non-HTLC-balance
952 // was already claimed.
953 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &bs_htlc_timeout_claim[0]);
954 let bs_timeout_claimable_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
955 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
956 claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000,
957 expiry_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
958 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
959 claimable_amount_satoshis: 20_000,
960 confirmation_height: bs_timeout_claimable_height,
962 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
964 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &as_htlc_timeout_claim[0]);
965 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
966 claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000,
967 expiry_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
968 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
969 claimable_amount_satoshis: 20_000,
970 confirmation_height: bs_timeout_claimable_height,
972 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
974 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
975 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], to_a_failed_payment_hash, false);
977 assert_eq!(vec![Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
978 claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000,
979 expiry_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
981 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
982 test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &bs_htlc_timeout_claim[0]);
984 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
985 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
988 fn sorted_vec_with_additions<T: Ord + Clone>(v_orig: &Vec<T>, extra_ts: &[&T]) -> Vec<T> {
989 let mut v = v_orig.clone();
991 v.push((*t).clone());
997 fn do_test_revoked_counterparty_commitment_balances(confirm_htlc_spend_first: bool) {
998 // Tests `get_claimable_balances` for revoked counterparty commitment transactions.
999 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1000 // We broadcast a second-to-latest commitment transaction, without providing the revocation
1001 // secret to the counterparty. However, because we always immediately take the revocation
1002 // secret from the keys_manager, we would panic at broadcast as we're trying to sign a
1003 // transaction which, from the point of view of our keys_manager, is revoked.
1004 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
1005 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1006 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1007 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1009 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
1010 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 100_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1011 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
1012 assert_eq!(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(), chan_id);
1014 // We create five HTLCs for B to claim against A's revoked commitment transaction:
1016 // (1) one for which A is the originator and B knows the preimage
1017 // (2) one for which B is the originator where the HTLC has since timed-out
1018 // (3) one for which B is the originator but where the HTLC has not yet timed-out
1019 // (4) one dust HTLC which is lost in the channel closure
1020 // (5) one that actually isn't in the revoked commitment transaction at all, but was added in
1021 // later commitment transaction updates
1023 // Though they could all be claimed in a single claim transaction, due to CLTV timeouts they
1024 // are all currently claimed in separate transactions, which helps us test as we can claim
1025 // HTLCs individually.
1027 let (claimed_payment_preimage, claimed_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000);
1028 let timeout_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 4_000_000).1;
1029 let dust_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 3_000).1;
1031 let htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
1033 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 10);
1034 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 10);
1036 let live_htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
1037 let live_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 5_000_000).1;
1039 // Get the latest commitment transaction from A and then update the fee to revoke it
1040 let as_revoked_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_id);
1041 let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan_id);
1043 let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_id) as u64;
1045 let missing_htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
1046 let missing_htlc_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 2_000_000).1;
1048 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(claimed_payment_preimage);
1049 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], claimed_payment_hash, 3_000_000);
1050 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1051 let _b_htlc_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(&nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1053 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], htlc_cltv_timeout + 1 - 10);
1054 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
1055 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1057 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1058 assert_eq!(events.len(), 6);
1059 let mut failed_payments: HashSet<_> =
1060 [timeout_payment_hash, dust_payment_hash, live_payment_hash, missing_htlc_payment_hash]
1061 .iter().map(|a| *a).collect();
1062 events.retain(|ev| {
1064 Event::HTLCHandlingFailed { failed_next_destination: HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id, channel_id }, .. } => {
1065 assert_eq!(*channel_id, chan_id);
1066 assert_eq!(*node_id, Some(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
1069 Event::HTLCHandlingFailed { failed_next_destination: HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }, .. } => {
1070 assert!(failed_payments.remove(payment_hash));
1076 assert!(failed_payments.is_empty());
1077 if let Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = events[0] {} else { panic!(); }
1079 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {},
1083 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], htlc_cltv_timeout + 1 - 10);
1084 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
1085 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1086 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
1088 // Prior to channel closure, B considers the preimage HTLC as its own, and otherwise only
1089 // lists the two on-chain timeout-able HTLCs as claimable balances.
1090 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
1091 claimable_amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 5_000 - 4_000 - 3 - 2_000 + 3_000,
1092 }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
1093 claimable_amount_satoshis: 2_000,
1094 claimable_height: missing_htlc_cltv_timeout,
1095 }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
1096 claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1097 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
1098 }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
1099 claimable_amount_satoshis: 5_000,
1100 claimable_height: live_htlc_cltv_timeout,
1102 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1104 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &as_revoked_txn[0]);
1105 let mut claim_txn: Vec<_> = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().drain(..).filter(|tx| tx.input.iter().any(|inp| inp.previous_output.txid == as_revoked_txn[0].txid())).collect();
1106 // Currently the revoked commitment is claimed in four transactions as the HTLCs all expire
1108 assert_eq!(claim_txn.len(), 4);
1109 claim_txn.sort_unstable_by_key(|tx| tx.output.iter().map(|output| output.value).sum::<u64>());
1111 // The following constants were determined experimentally
1112 const BS_TO_SELF_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT: usize = 483;
1113 const OUTBOUND_HTLC_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT: usize = 571;
1114 const INBOUND_HTLC_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT: usize = 578;
1116 // Check that the weight is close to the expected weight. Note that signature sizes vary
1117 // somewhat so it may not always be exact.
1118 fuzzy_assert_eq(claim_txn[0].weight(), OUTBOUND_HTLC_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT);
1119 fuzzy_assert_eq(claim_txn[1].weight(), INBOUND_HTLC_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT);
1120 fuzzy_assert_eq(claim_txn[2].weight(), INBOUND_HTLC_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT);
1121 fuzzy_assert_eq(claim_txn[3].weight(), BS_TO_SELF_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT);
1123 // The expected balance for the next three checks, with the largest-HTLC and to_self output
1124 // claim balances separated out.
1125 let expected_balance = vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1126 // to_remote output in A's revoked commitment
1127 claimable_amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 5_000 - 4_000 - 3,
1128 confirmation_height: nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 5,
1129 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1130 claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
1131 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1132 claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1135 let to_self_unclaimed_balance = Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1136 claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - 3_000 - chan_feerate *
1137 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 3 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
1139 let to_self_claimed_avail_height;
1140 let largest_htlc_unclaimed_balance = Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1141 claimable_amount_satoshis: 5_000,
1143 let largest_htlc_claimed_avail_height;
1145 // Once the channel has been closed by A, B now considers all of the commitment transactions'
1146 // outputs as `CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable`.
1147 assert_eq!(sorted_vec_with_additions(&expected_balance, &[&to_self_unclaimed_balance, &largest_htlc_unclaimed_balance]),
1148 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1150 if confirm_htlc_spend_first {
1151 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[2]);
1152 largest_htlc_claimed_avail_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 5;
1153 to_self_claimed_avail_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 6; // will be claimed in the next block
1155 // Connect the to_self output claim, taking all of A's non-HTLC funds
1156 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[3]);
1157 to_self_claimed_avail_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 5;
1158 largest_htlc_claimed_avail_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 6; // will be claimed in the next block
1161 let largest_htlc_claimed_balance = Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1162 claimable_amount_satoshis: 5_000 - chan_feerate * INBOUND_HTLC_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT as u64 / 1000,
1163 confirmation_height: largest_htlc_claimed_avail_height,
1165 let to_self_claimed_balance = Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1166 claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - 3_000 - chan_feerate *
1167 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 3 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000
1168 - chan_feerate * claim_txn[3].weight() as u64 / 1000,
1169 confirmation_height: to_self_claimed_avail_height,
1172 if confirm_htlc_spend_first {
1173 assert_eq!(sorted_vec_with_additions(&expected_balance, &[&to_self_unclaimed_balance, &largest_htlc_claimed_balance]),
1174 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1176 assert_eq!(sorted_vec_with_additions(&expected_balance, &[&to_self_claimed_balance, &largest_htlc_unclaimed_balance]),
1177 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1180 if confirm_htlc_spend_first {
1181 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[3]);
1183 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[2]);
1185 assert_eq!(sorted_vec_with_additions(&expected_balance, &[&to_self_claimed_balance, &largest_htlc_claimed_balance]),
1186 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1188 // Finally, connect the last two remaining HTLC spends and check that they move to
1189 // `ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations`
1190 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[0]);
1191 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[1]);
1193 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1194 // to_remote output in A's revoked commitment
1195 claimable_amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 5_000 - 4_000 - 3,
1196 confirmation_height: nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 1,
1197 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1198 claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - 3_000 - chan_feerate *
1199 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 3 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000
1200 - chan_feerate * claim_txn[3].weight() as u64 / 1000,
1201 confirmation_height: to_self_claimed_avail_height,
1202 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1203 claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000 - chan_feerate * OUTBOUND_HTLC_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT as u64 / 1000,
1204 confirmation_height: nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 4,
1205 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1206 claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000 - chan_feerate * INBOUND_HTLC_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT as u64 / 1000,
1207 confirmation_height: nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 5,
1208 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1209 claimable_amount_satoshis: 5_000 - chan_feerate * INBOUND_HTLC_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT as u64 / 1000,
1210 confirmation_height: largest_htlc_claimed_avail_height,
1212 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1214 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
1215 test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &as_revoked_txn[0]);
1217 let mut payment_failed_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1218 expect_payment_failed_conditions_event(&nodes[1], payment_failed_events.pop().unwrap(),
1219 dust_payment_hash, false, PaymentFailedConditions::new());
1220 expect_payment_failed_conditions_event(&nodes[1], payment_failed_events.pop().unwrap(),
1221 missing_htlc_payment_hash, false, PaymentFailedConditions::new());
1222 assert!(payment_failed_events.is_empty());
1224 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
1225 test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[if confirm_htlc_spend_first { 2 } else { 3 }]);
1226 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
1227 test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[if confirm_htlc_spend_first { 3 } else { 2 }]);
1228 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], live_payment_hash, false);
1229 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
1230 test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[0]);
1231 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
1232 test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[1]);
1233 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], timeout_payment_hash, false);
1234 assert_eq!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances(), Vec::new());
1238 fn test_revoked_counterparty_commitment_balances() {
1239 do_test_revoked_counterparty_commitment_balances(true);
1240 do_test_revoked_counterparty_commitment_balances(false);
1244 fn test_revoked_counterparty_htlc_tx_balances() {
1245 // Tests `get_claimable_balances` for revocation spends of HTLC transactions.
1246 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1247 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
1248 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1249 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1250 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1252 // Create some initial channels
1253 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
1254 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 11_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1255 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
1256 assert_eq!(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(), chan_id);
1258 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
1259 let failed_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000).1;
1260 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_id);
1261 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
1262 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, funding_tx.txid());
1264 // The to-be-revoked commitment tx should have two HTLCs and an output for both sides
1265 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 4);
1267 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage);
1269 let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_id) as u64;
1270 let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan_id);
1272 // B will generate an HTLC-Success from its revoked commitment tx
1273 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
1274 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
1275 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1276 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
1277 let revoked_htlc_success_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
1279 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_success_txn.len(), 2);
1280 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_success_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
1281 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
1282 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_success_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
1283 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_success_txn[1], funding_tx);
1285 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
1286 let revoked_htlc_timeout_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
1287 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_timeout_txn.len(), 1);
1288 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_timeout_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
1289 assert_ne!(revoked_htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_timeout_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
1290 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_success_txn[0].lock_time.0, 0);
1291 assert_ne!(revoked_htlc_timeout_txn[0].lock_time.0, 0);
1293 // A will generate justice tx from B's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
1294 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
1295 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
1296 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1297 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
1298 let to_remote_conf_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
1300 let as_commitment_claim_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
1301 assert_eq!(as_commitment_claim_txn.len(), 2);
1302 check_spends!(as_commitment_claim_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
1303 check_spends!(as_commitment_claim_txn[1], funding_tx);
1305 // The next two checks have the same balance set for A - even though we confirm a revoked HTLC
1306 // transaction our balance tracking doesn't use the on-chain value so the
1307 // `CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable` entry doesn't change.
1308 let as_balances = sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1309 // to_remote output in B's revoked commitment
1310 claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 11_000 - 3_000 - chan_feerate *
1311 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
1312 confirmation_height: to_remote_conf_height,
1313 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1314 // to_self output in B's revoked commitment
1315 claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000,
1316 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1
1317 claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
1318 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1319 claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000,
1321 assert_eq!(as_balances,
1322 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1324 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_htlc_success_txn[0]);
1325 let as_htlc_claim_tx = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
1326 assert_eq!(as_htlc_claim_tx.len(), 2);
1327 check_spends!(as_htlc_claim_tx[0], revoked_htlc_success_txn[0]);
1328 check_spends!(as_htlc_claim_tx[1], revoked_local_txn[0]); // A has to generate a new claim for the remaining revoked
1329 // outputs (which no longer includes the spent HTLC output)
1331 assert_eq!(as_balances,
1332 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1334 assert_eq!(as_htlc_claim_tx[0].output.len(), 1);
1335 fuzzy_assert_eq(as_htlc_claim_tx[0].output[0].value,
1336 3_000 - chan_feerate * (revoked_htlc_success_txn[0].weight() + as_htlc_claim_tx[0].weight()) as u64 / 1000);
1338 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_htlc_claim_tx[0]);
1339 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1340 // to_remote output in B's revoked commitment
1341 claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 11_000 - 3_000 - chan_feerate *
1342 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
1343 confirmation_height: to_remote_conf_height,
1344 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1345 // to_self output in B's revoked commitment
1346 claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000,
1347 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1348 claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000,
1349 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1350 claimable_amount_satoshis: as_htlc_claim_tx[0].output[0].value,
1351 confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
1353 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1355 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 3);
1356 test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
1357 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1358 // to_self output to B
1359 claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000,
1360 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1361 claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000,
1362 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1363 claimable_amount_satoshis: as_htlc_claim_tx[0].output[0].value,
1364 confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 2,
1366 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1368 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2);
1369 test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &as_htlc_claim_tx[0]);
1370 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1371 // to_self output in B's revoked commitment
1372 claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000,
1373 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1374 claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000,
1376 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1378 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], revoked_htlc_timeout_txn[0].lock_time.0 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
1379 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(&nodes[0],
1380 [HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: failed_payment_hash }]);
1381 // As time goes on A may split its revocation claim transaction into multiple.
1382 let as_fewer_input_rbf = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
1383 for tx in as_fewer_input_rbf.iter() {
1384 check_spends!(tx, revoked_local_txn[0]);
1387 // Connect a number of additional blocks to ensure we don't forget the HTLC output needs
1389 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
1390 let as_fewer_input_rbf = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
1391 for tx in as_fewer_input_rbf.iter() {
1392 check_spends!(tx, revoked_local_txn[0]);
1395 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_htlc_timeout_txn[0]);
1396 let as_second_htlc_claim_tx = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
1397 assert_eq!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx.len(), 2);
1399 check_spends!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx[0], revoked_htlc_timeout_txn[0]);
1400 check_spends!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
1402 // Connect blocks to finalize the HTLC resolution with the HTLC-Timeout transaction. In a
1403 // previous iteration of the revoked balance handling this would result in us "forgetting" that
1404 // the revoked HTLC output still needed to be claimed.
1405 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
1406 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1407 // to_self output in B's revoked commitment
1408 claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000,
1409 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1410 claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000,
1412 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1414 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_second_htlc_claim_tx[0]);
1415 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1416 // to_self output in B's revoked commitment
1417 claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000,
1418 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1419 claimable_amount_satoshis: as_second_htlc_claim_tx[0].output[0].value,
1420 confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
1422 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1424 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_second_htlc_claim_tx[1]);
1425 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1426 // to_self output in B's revoked commitment
1427 claimable_amount_satoshis: as_second_htlc_claim_tx[1].output[0].value,
1428 confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
1429 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1430 claimable_amount_satoshis: as_second_htlc_claim_tx[0].output[0].value,
1431 confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2,
1433 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1435 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
1436 test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &as_second_htlc_claim_tx[0]);
1437 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
1438 test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &as_second_htlc_claim_tx[1]);
1440 assert_eq!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances(), Vec::new());
1444 fn test_revoked_counterparty_aggregated_claims() {
1445 // Tests `get_claimable_balances` for revoked counterparty commitment transactions when
1446 // claiming with an aggregated claim transaction.
1447 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1448 // We broadcast a second-to-latest commitment transaction, without providing the revocation
1449 // secret to the counterparty. However, because we always immediately take the revocation
1450 // secret from the keys_manager, we would panic at broadcast as we're trying to sign a
1451 // transaction which, from the point of view of our keys_manager, is revoked.
1452 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
1453 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1454 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1455 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1457 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
1458 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 100_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1459 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
1460 assert_eq!(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(), chan_id);
1462 // We create two HTLCs, one which we will give A the preimage to to generate an HTLC-Success
1463 // transaction, and one which we will not, allowing B to claim the HTLC output in an aggregated
1464 // revocation-claim transaction.
1466 let (claimed_payment_preimage, claimed_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
1467 let revoked_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 4_000_000).1;
1469 let htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
1471 // Cheat by giving A's ChannelMonitor the preimage to the to-be-claimed HTLC so that we have an
1472 // HTLC-claim transaction on the to-be-revoked state.
1473 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).provide_payment_preimage(&claimed_payment_hash, &claimed_payment_preimage,
1474 &node_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(node_cfgs[0].fee_estimator), &nodes[0].logger);
1476 // Now get the latest commitment transaction from A and then update the fee to revoke it
1477 let as_revoked_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_id);
1479 assert_eq!(as_revoked_txn.len(), 2);
1480 check_spends!(as_revoked_txn[0], funding_tx);
1481 check_spends!(as_revoked_txn[1], as_revoked_txn[0]); // The HTLC-Claim transaction
1483 let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan_id);
1484 let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_id) as u64;
1487 let mut feerate = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1490 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
1491 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1493 let fee_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1494 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &fee_update.update_fee.unwrap());
1495 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], fee_update.commitment_signed, false);
1497 nodes[0].node.claim_funds(claimed_payment_preimage);
1498 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[0], claimed_payment_hash, 3_000_000);
1499 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1500 let _a_htlc_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(&nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1502 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
1503 claimable_amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 4_000 - 3_000,
1504 }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
1505 claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1506 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
1507 }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
1508 claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
1509 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
1511 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1513 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &as_revoked_txn[0]);
1514 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
1515 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
1516 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1518 let mut claim_txn: Vec<_> = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().drain(..).filter(|tx| tx.input.iter().any(|inp| inp.previous_output.txid == as_revoked_txn[0].txid())).collect();
1519 // Currently the revoked commitment outputs are all claimed in one aggregated transaction
1520 assert_eq!(claim_txn.len(), 1);
1521 assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input.len(), 3);
1522 check_spends!(claim_txn[0], as_revoked_txn[0]);
1524 let to_remote_maturity = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
1526 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1527 // to_remote output in A's revoked commitment
1528 claimable_amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 4_000 - 3_000,
1529 confirmation_height: to_remote_maturity,
1530 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1531 // to_self output in A's revoked commitment
1532 claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - chan_feerate *
1533 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
1534 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1
1535 claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1536 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1537 claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
1539 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1541 // Confirm A's HTLC-Success tranasction which presumably raced B's claim, causing B to create a
1543 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &as_revoked_txn[1]);
1544 expect_payment_sent!(nodes[1], claimed_payment_preimage);
1545 let mut claim_txn_2: Vec<_> = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
1546 claim_txn_2.sort_unstable_by_key(|tx| if tx.input.iter().any(|inp| inp.previous_output.txid == as_revoked_txn[0].txid()) { 0 } else { 1 });
1547 // Once B sees the HTLC-Success transaction it splits its claim transaction into two, though in
1548 // theory it could re-aggregate the claims as well.
1549 assert_eq!(claim_txn_2.len(), 2);
1550 assert_eq!(claim_txn_2[0].input.len(), 2);
1551 check_spends!(claim_txn_2[0], as_revoked_txn[0]);
1552 assert_eq!(claim_txn_2[1].input.len(), 1);
1553 check_spends!(claim_txn_2[1], as_revoked_txn[1]);
1555 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1556 // to_remote output in A's revoked commitment
1557 claimable_amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 4_000 - 3_000,
1558 confirmation_height: to_remote_maturity,
1559 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1560 // to_self output in A's revoked commitment
1561 claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - chan_feerate *
1562 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
1563 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1
1564 claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1565 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1566 // The amount here is a bit of a misnomer, really its been reduced by the HTLC
1567 // transaction fee, but the claimable amount is always a bit of an overshoot for HTLCs
1568 // anyway, so its not a big change.
1569 claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
1571 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1573 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 5);
1574 test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &as_revoked_txn[0]);
1576 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1577 // to_self output in A's revoked commitment
1578 claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - chan_feerate *
1579 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
1580 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1
1581 claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1582 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1583 // The amount here is a bit of a misnomer, really its been reduced by the HTLC
1584 // transaction fee, but the claimable amount is always a bit of an overshoot for HTLCs
1585 // anyway, so its not a big change.
1586 claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
1588 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1590 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn_2[1]);
1591 let htlc_2_claim_maturity = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
1593 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1594 // to_self output in A's revoked commitment
1595 claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - chan_feerate *
1596 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
1597 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1
1598 claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1599 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { // HTLC 2
1600 claimable_amount_satoshis: claim_txn_2[1].output[0].value,
1601 confirmation_height: htlc_2_claim_maturity,
1603 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1605 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 5);
1606 test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn_2[1]);
1608 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1609 // to_self output in A's revoked commitment
1610 claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - chan_feerate *
1611 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
1612 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1
1613 claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1615 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1617 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn_2[0]);
1618 let rest_claim_maturity = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
1620 assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1621 claimable_amount_satoshis: claim_txn_2[0].output[0].value,
1622 confirmation_height: rest_claim_maturity,
1624 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
1626 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty()); // We shouldn't fail the payment until we spend the output
1628 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 5);
1629 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], revoked_payment_hash, false);
1630 test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn_2[0]);
1631 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());