1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level network map tracking logic lives here.
12 use bitcoin::secp256k1::constants::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE;
13 use bitcoin::secp256k1::PublicKey;
14 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
15 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
17 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
18 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
19 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::TxOut;
20 use bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash;
24 use ln::chan_utils::make_funding_redeemscript;
25 use ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, NodeFeatures, InitFeatures};
26 use ln::msgs::{DecodeError, ErrorAction, Init, LightningError, RoutingMessageHandler, NetAddress, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
27 use ln::msgs::{ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelUpdate, NodeAnnouncement, GossipTimestampFilter};
28 use ln::msgs::{QueryChannelRange, ReplyChannelRange, QueryShortChannelIds, ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd};
30 use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer, MaybeReadable};
31 use util::logger::{Logger, Level};
32 use util::events::{Event, EventHandler, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
33 use util::scid_utils::{block_from_scid, scid_from_parts, MAX_SCID_BLOCK};
36 use io_extras::{copy, sink};
38 use alloc::collections::{BTreeMap, btree_map::Entry as BtreeEntry};
40 use sync::{RwLock, RwLockReadGuard};
41 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
43 use core::ops::{Bound, Deref};
44 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
46 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
47 use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
49 /// We remove stale channel directional info two weeks after the last update, per BOLT 7's
51 const STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS: u64 = 60 * 60 * 24 * 14;
53 /// The maximum number of extra bytes which we do not understand in a gossip message before we will
54 /// refuse to relay the message.
55 const MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY: usize = 1024;
57 /// Maximum number of short_channel_ids that will be encoded in one gossip reply message.
58 /// This value ensures a reply fits within the 65k payload limit and is consistent with other implementations.
59 const MAX_SCIDS_PER_REPLY: usize = 8000;
61 /// Represents the compressed public key of a node
62 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
63 pub struct NodeId([u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE]);
66 /// Create a new NodeId from a public key
67 pub fn from_pubkey(pubkey: &PublicKey) -> Self {
68 NodeId(pubkey.serialize())
71 /// Get the public key slice from this NodeId
72 pub fn as_slice(&self) -> &[u8] {
77 impl fmt::Debug for NodeId {
78 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
79 write!(f, "NodeId({})", log_bytes!(self.0))
83 impl core::hash::Hash for NodeId {
84 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
91 impl PartialEq for NodeId {
92 fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
93 self.0[..] == other.0[..]
97 impl cmp::PartialOrd for NodeId {
98 fn partial_cmp(&self, other: &Self) -> Option<cmp::Ordering> {
103 impl Ord for NodeId {
104 fn cmp(&self, other: &Self) -> cmp::Ordering {
105 self.0[..].cmp(&other.0[..])
109 impl Writeable for NodeId {
110 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
111 writer.write_all(&self.0)?;
116 impl Readable for NodeId {
117 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
118 let mut buf = [0; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE];
119 reader.read_exact(&mut buf)?;
124 /// Represents the network as nodes and channels between them
125 pub struct NetworkGraph<L: Deref> where L::Target: Logger {
126 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::VerifyOnly>,
127 last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp: Mutex<Option<u32>>,
128 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
130 // Lock order: channels -> nodes
131 channels: RwLock<BTreeMap<u64, ChannelInfo>>,
132 nodes: RwLock<BTreeMap<NodeId, NodeInfo>>,
135 /// A read-only view of [`NetworkGraph`].
136 pub struct ReadOnlyNetworkGraph<'a> {
137 channels: RwLockReadGuard<'a, BTreeMap<u64, ChannelInfo>>,
138 nodes: RwLockReadGuard<'a, BTreeMap<NodeId, NodeInfo>>,
141 /// Update to the [`NetworkGraph`] based on payment failure information conveyed via the Onion
142 /// return packet by a node along the route. See [BOLT #4] for details.
144 /// [BOLT #4]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md
145 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
146 pub enum NetworkUpdate {
147 /// An error indicating a `channel_update` messages should be applied via
148 /// [`NetworkGraph::update_channel`].
149 ChannelUpdateMessage {
150 /// The update to apply via [`NetworkGraph::update_channel`].
153 /// An error indicating that a channel failed to route a payment, which should be applied via
154 /// [`NetworkGraph::channel_failed`].
156 /// The short channel id of the closed channel.
157 short_channel_id: u64,
158 /// Whether the channel should be permanently removed or temporarily disabled until a new
159 /// `channel_update` message is received.
162 /// An error indicating that a node failed to route a payment, which should be applied via
163 /// [`NetworkGraph::node_failed`].
165 /// The node id of the failed node.
167 /// Whether the node should be permanently removed from consideration or can be restored
168 /// when a new `channel_update` message is received.
173 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(NetworkUpdate,
174 (0, ChannelUpdateMessage) => {
177 (2, ChannelFailure) => {
178 (0, short_channel_id, required),
179 (2, is_permanent, required),
181 (4, NodeFailure) => {
182 (0, node_id, required),
183 (2, is_permanent, required),
187 /// Receives and validates network updates from peers,
188 /// stores authentic and relevant data as a network graph.
189 /// This network graph is then used for routing payments.
190 /// Provides interface to help with initial routing sync by
191 /// serving historical announcements.
193 /// Serves as an [`EventHandler`] for applying updates from [`Event::PaymentPathFailed`] to the
194 /// [`NetworkGraph`].
195 pub struct P2PGossipSync<G: Deref<Target=NetworkGraph<L>>, C: Deref, L: Deref>
196 where C::Target: chain::Access, L::Target: Logger
199 chain_access: Option<C>,
200 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
201 full_syncs_requested: AtomicUsize,
202 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<MessageSendEvent>>,
206 impl<G: Deref<Target=NetworkGraph<L>>, C: Deref, L: Deref> P2PGossipSync<G, C, L>
207 where C::Target: chain::Access, L::Target: Logger
209 /// Creates a new tracker of the actual state of the network of channels and nodes,
210 /// assuming an existing Network Graph.
211 /// Chain monitor is used to make sure announced channels exist on-chain,
212 /// channel data is correct, and that the announcement is signed with
213 /// channel owners' keys.
214 pub fn new(network_graph: G, chain_access: Option<C>, logger: L) -> Self {
217 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
218 full_syncs_requested: AtomicUsize::new(0),
220 pending_events: Mutex::new(vec![]),
225 /// Adds a provider used to check new announcements. Does not affect
226 /// existing announcements unless they are updated.
227 /// Add, update or remove the provider would replace the current one.
228 pub fn add_chain_access(&mut self, chain_access: Option<C>) {
229 self.chain_access = chain_access;
232 /// Gets a reference to the underlying [`NetworkGraph`] which was provided in
233 /// [`P2PGossipSync::new`].
235 /// (C-not exported) as bindings don't support a reference-to-a-reference yet
236 pub fn network_graph(&self) -> &G {
240 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
241 /// Returns true when a full routing table sync should be performed with a peer.
242 fn should_request_full_sync(&self, _node_id: &PublicKey) -> bool {
243 //TODO: Determine whether to request a full sync based on the network map.
244 const FULL_SYNCS_TO_REQUEST: usize = 5;
245 if self.full_syncs_requested.load(Ordering::Acquire) < FULL_SYNCS_TO_REQUEST {
246 self.full_syncs_requested.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel);
254 impl<L: Deref> EventHandler for NetworkGraph<L> where L::Target: Logger {
255 fn handle_event(&self, event: &Event) {
256 if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { network_update, .. } = event {
257 if let Some(network_update) = network_update {
258 match *network_update {
259 NetworkUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage { ref msg } => {
260 let short_channel_id = msg.contents.short_channel_id;
261 let is_enabled = msg.contents.flags & (1 << 1) != (1 << 1);
262 let status = if is_enabled { "enabled" } else { "disabled" };
263 log_debug!(self.logger, "Updating channel with channel_update from a payment failure. Channel {} is {}.", short_channel_id, status);
264 let _ = self.update_channel(msg);
266 NetworkUpdate::ChannelFailure { short_channel_id, is_permanent } => {
267 let action = if is_permanent { "Removing" } else { "Disabling" };
268 log_debug!(self.logger, "{} channel graph entry for {} due to a payment failure.", action, short_channel_id);
269 self.channel_failed(short_channel_id, is_permanent);
271 NetworkUpdate::NodeFailure { ref node_id, is_permanent } => {
272 let action = if is_permanent { "Removing" } else { "Disabling" };
273 log_debug!(self.logger, "{} node graph entry for {} due to a payment failure.", action, node_id);
274 self.node_failed(node_id, is_permanent);
282 macro_rules! secp_verify_sig {
283 ( $secp_ctx: expr, $msg: expr, $sig: expr, $pubkey: expr, $msg_type: expr ) => {
284 match $secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa($msg, $sig, $pubkey) {
287 return Err(LightningError {
288 err: format!("Invalid signature on {} message", $msg_type),
289 action: ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
290 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
292 data: format!("Invalid signature on {} message", $msg_type),
294 log_level: Level::Trace,
302 impl<G: Deref<Target=NetworkGraph<L>>, C: Deref, L: Deref> RoutingMessageHandler for P2PGossipSync<G, C, L>
303 where C::Target: chain::Access, L::Target: Logger
305 fn handle_node_announcement(&self, msg: &msgs::NodeAnnouncement) -> Result<bool, LightningError> {
306 self.network_graph.update_node_from_announcement(msg)?;
307 Ok(msg.contents.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY &&
308 msg.contents.excess_address_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY &&
309 msg.contents.excess_data.len() + msg.contents.excess_address_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY)
312 fn handle_channel_announcement(&self, msg: &msgs::ChannelAnnouncement) -> Result<bool, LightningError> {
313 self.network_graph.update_channel_from_announcement(msg, &self.chain_access)?;
314 log_gossip!(self.logger, "Added channel_announcement for {}{}", msg.contents.short_channel_id, if !msg.contents.excess_data.is_empty() { " with excess uninterpreted data!" } else { "" });
315 Ok(msg.contents.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY)
318 fn handle_channel_update(&self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<bool, LightningError> {
319 self.network_graph.update_channel(msg)?;
320 Ok(msg.contents.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY)
323 fn get_next_channel_announcement(&self, starting_point: u64) -> Option<(ChannelAnnouncement, Option<ChannelUpdate>, Option<ChannelUpdate>)> {
324 let channels = self.network_graph.channels.read().unwrap();
325 for (_, ref chan) in channels.range(starting_point..) {
326 if chan.announcement_message.is_some() {
327 let chan_announcement = chan.announcement_message.clone().unwrap();
328 let mut one_to_two_announcement: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate> = None;
329 let mut two_to_one_announcement: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate> = None;
330 if let Some(one_to_two) = chan.one_to_two.as_ref() {
331 one_to_two_announcement = one_to_two.last_update_message.clone();
333 if let Some(two_to_one) = chan.two_to_one.as_ref() {
334 two_to_one_announcement = two_to_one.last_update_message.clone();
336 return Some((chan_announcement, one_to_two_announcement, two_to_one_announcement));
338 // TODO: We may end up sending un-announced channel_updates if we are sending
339 // initial sync data while receiving announce/updates for this channel.
345 fn get_next_node_announcement(&self, starting_point: Option<&PublicKey>) -> Option<NodeAnnouncement> {
346 let nodes = self.network_graph.nodes.read().unwrap();
347 let iter = if let Some(pubkey) = starting_point {
348 nodes.range((Bound::Excluded(NodeId::from_pubkey(pubkey)), Bound::Unbounded))
352 for (_, ref node) in iter {
353 if let Some(node_info) = node.announcement_info.as_ref() {
354 if let Some(msg) = node_info.announcement_message.clone() {
362 /// Initiates a stateless sync of routing gossip information with a peer
363 /// using gossip_queries. The default strategy used by this implementation
364 /// is to sync the full block range with several peers.
366 /// We should expect one or more reply_channel_range messages in response
367 /// to our query_channel_range. Each reply will enqueue a query_scid message
368 /// to request gossip messages for each channel. The sync is considered complete
369 /// when the final reply_scids_end message is received, though we are not
370 /// tracking this directly.
371 fn peer_connected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &Init) {
372 // We will only perform a sync with peers that support gossip_queries.
373 if !init_msg.features.supports_gossip_queries() {
377 // The lightning network's gossip sync system is completely broken in numerous ways.
379 // Given no broadly-available set-reconciliation protocol, the only reasonable approach is
380 // to do a full sync from the first few peers we connect to, and then receive gossip
381 // updates from all our peers normally.
383 // Originally, we could simply tell a peer to dump us the entire gossip table on startup,
384 // wasting lots of bandwidth but ensuring we have the full network graph. After the initial
385 // dump peers would always send gossip and we'd stay up-to-date with whatever our peer has
388 // In order to reduce the bandwidth waste, "gossip queries" were introduced, allowing you
389 // to ask for the SCIDs of all channels in your peer's routing graph, and then only request
390 // channel data which you are missing. Except there was no way at all to identify which
391 // `channel_update`s you were missing, so you still had to request everything, just in a
392 // very complicated way with some queries instead of just getting the dump.
394 // Later, an option was added to fetch the latest timestamps of the `channel_update`s to
395 // make efficient sync possible, however it has yet to be implemented in lnd, which makes
396 // relying on it useless.
398 // After gossip queries were introduced, support for receiving a full gossip table dump on
399 // connection was removed from several nodes, making it impossible to get a full sync
400 // without using the "gossip queries" messages.
402 // Once you opt into "gossip queries" the only way to receive any gossip updates that a
403 // peer receives after you connect, you must send a `gossip_timestamp_filter` message. This
404 // message, as the name implies, tells the peer to not forward any gossip messages with a
405 // timestamp older than a given value (not the time the peer received the filter, but the
406 // timestamp in the update message, which is often hours behind when the peer received the
409 // Obnoxiously, `gossip_timestamp_filter` isn't *just* a filter, but its also a request for
410 // your peer to send you the full routing graph (subject to the filter). Thus, in order to
411 // tell a peer to send you any updates as it sees them, you have to also ask for the full
412 // routing graph to be synced. If you set a timestamp filter near the current time, peers
413 // will simply not forward any new updates they see to you which were generated some time
414 // ago (which is not uncommon). If you instead set a timestamp filter near 0 (or two weeks
415 // ago), you will always get the full routing graph from all your peers.
417 // Most lightning nodes today opt to simply turn off receiving gossip data which only
418 // propagated some time after it was generated, and, worse, often disable gossiping with
419 // several peers after their first connection. The second behavior can cause gossip to not
420 // propagate fully if there are cuts in the gossiping subgraph.
422 // In an attempt to cut a middle ground between always fetching the full graph from all of
423 // our peers and never receiving gossip from peers at all, we send all of our peers a
424 // `gossip_timestamp_filter`, with the filter time set either two weeks ago or an hour ago.
426 // For no-std builds, we bury our head in the sand and do a full sync on each connection.
427 #[allow(unused_mut, unused_assignments)]
428 let mut gossip_start_time = 0;
429 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
431 gossip_start_time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
432 if self.should_request_full_sync(&their_node_id) {
433 gossip_start_time -= 60 * 60 * 24 * 7 * 2; // 2 weeks ago
435 gossip_start_time -= 60 * 60; // an hour ago
439 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
440 pending_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter {
441 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
442 msg: GossipTimestampFilter {
443 chain_hash: self.network_graph.genesis_hash,
444 first_timestamp: gossip_start_time as u32, // 2106 issue!
445 timestamp_range: u32::max_value(),
450 fn handle_reply_channel_range(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey, _msg: ReplyChannelRange) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
451 // We don't make queries, so should never receive replies. If, in the future, the set
452 // reconciliation extensions to gossip queries become broadly supported, we should revert
453 // this code to its state pre-0.0.106.
457 fn handle_reply_short_channel_ids_end(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey, _msg: ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
458 // We don't make queries, so should never receive replies. If, in the future, the set
459 // reconciliation extensions to gossip queries become broadly supported, we should revert
460 // this code to its state pre-0.0.106.
464 /// Processes a query from a peer by finding announced/public channels whose funding UTXOs
465 /// are in the specified block range. Due to message size limits, large range
466 /// queries may result in several reply messages. This implementation enqueues
467 /// all reply messages into pending events. Each message will allocate just under 65KiB. A full
468 /// sync of the public routing table with 128k channels will generated 16 messages and allocate ~1MB.
469 /// Logic can be changed to reduce allocation if/when a full sync of the routing table impacts
470 /// memory constrained systems.
471 fn handle_query_channel_range(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: QueryChannelRange) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
472 log_debug!(self.logger, "Handling query_channel_range peer={}, first_blocknum={}, number_of_blocks={}", log_pubkey!(their_node_id), msg.first_blocknum, msg.number_of_blocks);
474 let inclusive_start_scid = scid_from_parts(msg.first_blocknum as u64, 0, 0);
476 // We might receive valid queries with end_blocknum that would overflow SCID conversion.
477 // If so, we manually cap the ending block to avoid this overflow.
478 let exclusive_end_scid = scid_from_parts(cmp::min(msg.end_blocknum() as u64, MAX_SCID_BLOCK), 0, 0);
480 // Per spec, we must reply to a query. Send an empty message when things are invalid.
481 if msg.chain_hash != self.network_graph.genesis_hash || inclusive_start_scid.is_err() || exclusive_end_scid.is_err() || msg.number_of_blocks == 0 {
482 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
483 pending_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange {
484 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
485 msg: ReplyChannelRange {
486 chain_hash: msg.chain_hash.clone(),
487 first_blocknum: msg.first_blocknum,
488 number_of_blocks: msg.number_of_blocks,
490 short_channel_ids: vec![],
493 return Err(LightningError {
494 err: String::from("query_channel_range could not be processed"),
495 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
499 // Creates channel batches. We are not checking if the channel is routable
500 // (has at least one update). A peer may still want to know the channel
501 // exists even if its not yet routable.
502 let mut batches: Vec<Vec<u64>> = vec![Vec::with_capacity(MAX_SCIDS_PER_REPLY)];
503 let channels = self.network_graph.channels.read().unwrap();
504 for (_, ref chan) in channels.range(inclusive_start_scid.unwrap()..exclusive_end_scid.unwrap()) {
505 if let Some(chan_announcement) = &chan.announcement_message {
506 // Construct a new batch if last one is full
507 if batches.last().unwrap().len() == batches.last().unwrap().capacity() {
508 batches.push(Vec::with_capacity(MAX_SCIDS_PER_REPLY));
511 let batch = batches.last_mut().unwrap();
512 batch.push(chan_announcement.contents.short_channel_id);
517 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
518 let batch_count = batches.len();
519 let mut prev_batch_endblock = msg.first_blocknum;
520 for (batch_index, batch) in batches.into_iter().enumerate() {
521 // Per spec, the initial `first_blocknum` needs to be <= the query's `first_blocknum`
522 // and subsequent `first_blocknum`s must be >= the prior reply's `first_blocknum`.
524 // Additionally, c-lightning versions < 0.10 require that the `first_blocknum` of each
525 // reply is >= the previous reply's `first_blocknum` and either exactly the previous
526 // reply's `first_blocknum + number_of_blocks` or exactly one greater. This is a
527 // significant diversion from the requirements set by the spec, and, in case of blocks
528 // with no channel opens (e.g. empty blocks), requires that we use the previous value
529 // and *not* derive the first_blocknum from the actual first block of the reply.
530 let first_blocknum = prev_batch_endblock;
532 // Each message carries the number of blocks (from the `first_blocknum`) its contents
533 // fit in. Though there is no requirement that we use exactly the number of blocks its
534 // contents are from, except for the bogus requirements c-lightning enforces, above.
536 // Per spec, the last end block (ie `first_blocknum + number_of_blocks`) needs to be
537 // >= the query's end block. Thus, for the last reply, we calculate the difference
538 // between the query's end block and the start of the reply.
540 // Overflow safe since end_blocknum=msg.first_block_num+msg.number_of_blocks and
541 // first_blocknum will be either msg.first_blocknum or a higher block height.
542 let (sync_complete, number_of_blocks) = if batch_index == batch_count-1 {
543 (true, msg.end_blocknum() - first_blocknum)
545 // Prior replies should use the number of blocks that fit into the reply. Overflow
546 // safe since first_blocknum is always <= last SCID's block.
548 (false, block_from_scid(batch.last().unwrap()) - first_blocknum)
551 prev_batch_endblock = first_blocknum + number_of_blocks;
553 pending_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange {
554 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
555 msg: ReplyChannelRange {
556 chain_hash: msg.chain_hash.clone(),
560 short_channel_ids: batch,
568 fn handle_query_short_channel_ids(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey, _msg: QueryShortChannelIds) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
571 err: String::from("Not implemented"),
572 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
576 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
577 let mut features = NodeFeatures::empty();
578 features.set_gossip_queries_optional();
582 fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
583 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
584 features.set_gossip_queries_optional();
589 impl<G: Deref<Target=NetworkGraph<L>>, C: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for P2PGossipSync<G, C, L>
591 C::Target: chain::Access,
594 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
595 let mut ret = Vec::new();
596 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
597 core::mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut pending_events);
602 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
603 /// Details about one direction of a channel as received within a [`ChannelUpdate`].
604 pub struct ChannelUpdateInfo {
605 /// When the last update to the channel direction was issued.
606 /// Value is opaque, as set in the announcement.
607 pub last_update: u32,
608 /// Whether the channel can be currently used for payments (in this one direction).
610 /// The difference in CLTV values that you must have when routing through this channel.
611 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
612 /// The minimum value, which must be relayed to the next hop via the channel
613 pub htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
614 /// The maximum value which may be relayed to the next hop via the channel.
615 pub htlc_maximum_msat: u64,
616 /// Fees charged when the channel is used for routing
617 pub fees: RoutingFees,
618 /// Most recent update for the channel received from the network
619 /// Mostly redundant with the data we store in fields explicitly.
620 /// Everything else is useful only for sending out for initial routing sync.
621 /// Not stored if contains excess data to prevent DoS.
622 pub last_update_message: Option<ChannelUpdate>,
625 impl fmt::Display for ChannelUpdateInfo {
626 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
627 write!(f, "last_update {}, enabled {}, cltv_expiry_delta {}, htlc_minimum_msat {}, fees {:?}", self.last_update, self.enabled, self.cltv_expiry_delta, self.htlc_minimum_msat, self.fees)?;
632 impl Writeable for ChannelUpdateInfo {
633 fn write<W: ::util::ser::Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
634 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
635 (0, self.last_update, required),
636 (2, self.enabled, required),
637 (4, self.cltv_expiry_delta, required),
638 (6, self.htlc_minimum_msat, required),
639 // Writing htlc_maximum_msat as an Option<u64> is required to maintain backwards
640 // compatibility with LDK versions prior to v0.0.110.
641 (8, Some(self.htlc_maximum_msat), required),
642 (10, self.fees, required),
643 (12, self.last_update_message, required),
649 impl Readable for ChannelUpdateInfo {
650 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
651 init_tlv_field_var!(last_update, required);
652 init_tlv_field_var!(enabled, required);
653 init_tlv_field_var!(cltv_expiry_delta, required);
654 init_tlv_field_var!(htlc_minimum_msat, required);
655 init_tlv_field_var!(htlc_maximum_msat, option);
656 init_tlv_field_var!(fees, required);
657 init_tlv_field_var!(last_update_message, required);
659 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
660 (0, last_update, required),
661 (2, enabled, required),
662 (4, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
663 (6, htlc_minimum_msat, required),
664 (8, htlc_maximum_msat, required),
665 (10, fees, required),
666 (12, last_update_message, required)
669 if let Some(htlc_maximum_msat) = htlc_maximum_msat {
670 Ok(ChannelUpdateInfo {
671 last_update: init_tlv_based_struct_field!(last_update, required),
672 enabled: init_tlv_based_struct_field!(enabled, required),
673 cltv_expiry_delta: init_tlv_based_struct_field!(cltv_expiry_delta, required),
674 htlc_minimum_msat: init_tlv_based_struct_field!(htlc_minimum_msat, required),
676 fees: init_tlv_based_struct_field!(fees, required),
677 last_update_message: init_tlv_based_struct_field!(last_update_message, required),
680 Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
685 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
686 /// Details about a channel (both directions).
687 /// Received within a channel announcement.
688 pub struct ChannelInfo {
689 /// Protocol features of a channel communicated during its announcement
690 pub features: ChannelFeatures,
691 /// Source node of the first direction of a channel
692 pub node_one: NodeId,
693 /// Details about the first direction of a channel
694 pub one_to_two: Option<ChannelUpdateInfo>,
695 /// Source node of the second direction of a channel
696 pub node_two: NodeId,
697 /// Details about the second direction of a channel
698 pub two_to_one: Option<ChannelUpdateInfo>,
699 /// The channel capacity as seen on-chain, if chain lookup is available.
700 pub capacity_sats: Option<u64>,
701 /// An initial announcement of the channel
702 /// Mostly redundant with the data we store in fields explicitly.
703 /// Everything else is useful only for sending out for initial routing sync.
704 /// Not stored if contains excess data to prevent DoS.
705 pub announcement_message: Option<ChannelAnnouncement>,
706 /// The timestamp when we received the announcement, if we are running with feature = "std"
707 /// (which we can probably assume we are - no-std environments probably won't have a full
708 /// network graph in memory!).
709 announcement_received_time: u64,
713 /// Returns a [`DirectedChannelInfo`] for the channel directed to the given `target` from a
714 /// returned `source`, or `None` if `target` is not one of the channel's counterparties.
715 pub(crate) fn as_directed_to(&self, target: &NodeId) -> Option<(DirectedChannelInfo, &NodeId)> {
716 let (direction, source) = {
717 if target == &self.node_one {
718 (self.two_to_one.as_ref(), &self.node_two)
719 } else if target == &self.node_two {
720 (self.one_to_two.as_ref(), &self.node_one)
725 Some((DirectedChannelInfo::new(self, direction), source))
728 /// Returns a [`DirectedChannelInfo`] for the channel directed from the given `source` to a
729 /// returned `target`, or `None` if `source` is not one of the channel's counterparties.
730 pub(crate) fn as_directed_from(&self, source: &NodeId) -> Option<(DirectedChannelInfo, &NodeId)> {
731 let (direction, target) = {
732 if source == &self.node_one {
733 (self.one_to_two.as_ref(), &self.node_two)
734 } else if source == &self.node_two {
735 (self.two_to_one.as_ref(), &self.node_one)
740 Some((DirectedChannelInfo::new(self, direction), target))
743 /// Returns a [`ChannelUpdateInfo`] based on the direction implied by the channel_flag.
744 pub fn get_directional_info(&self, channel_flags: u8) -> Option<&ChannelUpdateInfo> {
745 let direction = channel_flags & 1u8;
747 self.one_to_two.as_ref()
749 self.two_to_one.as_ref()
754 impl fmt::Display for ChannelInfo {
755 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
756 write!(f, "features: {}, node_one: {}, one_to_two: {:?}, node_two: {}, two_to_one: {:?}",
757 log_bytes!(self.features.encode()), log_bytes!(self.node_one.as_slice()), self.one_to_two, log_bytes!(self.node_two.as_slice()), self.two_to_one)?;
762 impl Writeable for ChannelInfo {
763 fn write<W: ::util::ser::Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
764 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
765 (0, self.features, required),
766 (1, self.announcement_received_time, (default_value, 0)),
767 (2, self.node_one, required),
768 (4, self.one_to_two, required),
769 (6, self.node_two, required),
770 (8, self.two_to_one, required),
771 (10, self.capacity_sats, required),
772 (12, self.announcement_message, required),
778 // A wrapper allowing for the optional deseralization of ChannelUpdateInfo. Utilizing this is
779 // necessary to maintain backwards compatibility with previous serializations of `ChannelUpdateInfo`
780 // that may have no `htlc_maximum_msat` field set. In case the field is absent, we simply ignore
781 // the error and continue reading the `ChannelInfo`. Hopefully, we'll then eventually receive newer
782 // channel updates via the gossip network.
783 struct ChannelUpdateInfoDeserWrapper(Option<ChannelUpdateInfo>);
785 impl MaybeReadable for ChannelUpdateInfoDeserWrapper {
786 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Option<Self>, DecodeError> {
787 match ::util::ser::Readable::read(reader) {
788 Ok(channel_update_option) => Ok(Some(Self(channel_update_option))),
789 Err(DecodeError::ShortRead) => Ok(None),
790 Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) => Ok(None),
791 Err(err) => Err(err),
796 impl Readable for ChannelInfo {
797 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
798 init_tlv_field_var!(features, required);
799 init_tlv_field_var!(announcement_received_time, (default_value, 0));
800 init_tlv_field_var!(node_one, required);
801 let mut one_to_two_wrap: Option<ChannelUpdateInfoDeserWrapper> = None;
802 init_tlv_field_var!(node_two, required);
803 let mut two_to_one_wrap: Option<ChannelUpdateInfoDeserWrapper> = None;
804 init_tlv_field_var!(capacity_sats, required);
805 init_tlv_field_var!(announcement_message, required);
806 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
807 (0, features, required),
808 (1, announcement_received_time, (default_value, 0)),
809 (2, node_one, required),
810 (4, one_to_two_wrap, ignorable),
811 (6, node_two, required),
812 (8, two_to_one_wrap, ignorable),
813 (10, capacity_sats, required),
814 (12, announcement_message, required),
818 features: init_tlv_based_struct_field!(features, required),
819 node_one: init_tlv_based_struct_field!(node_one, required),
820 one_to_two: one_to_two_wrap.map(|w| w.0).unwrap_or(None),
821 node_two: init_tlv_based_struct_field!(node_two, required),
822 two_to_one: two_to_one_wrap.map(|w| w.0).unwrap_or(None),
823 capacity_sats: init_tlv_based_struct_field!(capacity_sats, required),
824 announcement_message: init_tlv_based_struct_field!(announcement_message, required),
825 announcement_received_time: init_tlv_based_struct_field!(announcement_received_time, (default_value, 0)),
830 /// A wrapper around [`ChannelInfo`] representing information about the channel as directed from a
831 /// source node to a target node.
833 pub struct DirectedChannelInfo<'a> {
834 channel: &'a ChannelInfo,
835 direction: Option<&'a ChannelUpdateInfo>,
836 htlc_maximum_msat: u64,
837 effective_capacity: EffectiveCapacity,
840 impl<'a> DirectedChannelInfo<'a> {
842 fn new(channel: &'a ChannelInfo, direction: Option<&'a ChannelUpdateInfo>) -> Self {
843 let htlc_maximum_msat = direction.map(|direction| direction.htlc_maximum_msat);
844 let capacity_msat = channel.capacity_sats.map(|capacity_sats| capacity_sats * 1000);
846 let (htlc_maximum_msat, effective_capacity) = match (htlc_maximum_msat, capacity_msat) {
847 (Some(amount_msat), Some(capacity_msat)) => {
848 let htlc_maximum_msat = cmp::min(amount_msat, capacity_msat);
849 (htlc_maximum_msat, EffectiveCapacity::Total { capacity_msat, htlc_maximum_msat: Some(htlc_maximum_msat) })
851 (Some(amount_msat), None) => {
852 (amount_msat, EffectiveCapacity::MaximumHTLC { amount_msat })
854 (None, Some(capacity_msat)) => {
855 (capacity_msat, EffectiveCapacity::Total { capacity_msat, htlc_maximum_msat: None })
857 (None, None) => (EffectiveCapacity::Unknown.as_msat(), EffectiveCapacity::Unknown),
861 channel, direction, htlc_maximum_msat, effective_capacity
865 /// Returns information for the channel.
866 pub fn channel(&self) -> &'a ChannelInfo { self.channel }
868 /// Returns information for the direction.
869 pub fn direction(&self) -> Option<&'a ChannelUpdateInfo> { self.direction }
871 /// Returns the maximum HTLC amount allowed over the channel in the direction.
872 pub fn htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
873 self.htlc_maximum_msat
876 /// Returns the [`EffectiveCapacity`] of the channel in the direction.
878 /// This is either the total capacity from the funding transaction, if known, or the
879 /// `htlc_maximum_msat` for the direction as advertised by the gossip network, if known,
881 pub fn effective_capacity(&self) -> EffectiveCapacity {
882 self.effective_capacity
885 /// Returns `Some` if [`ChannelUpdateInfo`] is available in the direction.
886 pub(super) fn with_update(self) -> Option<DirectedChannelInfoWithUpdate<'a>> {
887 match self.direction {
888 Some(_) => Some(DirectedChannelInfoWithUpdate { inner: self }),
894 impl<'a> fmt::Debug for DirectedChannelInfo<'a> {
895 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
896 f.debug_struct("DirectedChannelInfo")
897 .field("channel", &self.channel)
902 /// A [`DirectedChannelInfo`] with [`ChannelUpdateInfo`] available in its direction.
904 pub(super) struct DirectedChannelInfoWithUpdate<'a> {
905 inner: DirectedChannelInfo<'a>,
908 impl<'a> DirectedChannelInfoWithUpdate<'a> {
909 /// Returns information for the channel.
911 pub(super) fn channel(&self) -> &'a ChannelInfo { &self.inner.channel }
913 /// Returns information for the direction.
915 pub(super) fn direction(&self) -> &'a ChannelUpdateInfo { self.inner.direction.unwrap() }
917 /// Returns the [`EffectiveCapacity`] of the channel in the direction.
919 pub(super) fn effective_capacity(&self) -> EffectiveCapacity { self.inner.effective_capacity() }
922 impl<'a> fmt::Debug for DirectedChannelInfoWithUpdate<'a> {
923 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
928 /// The effective capacity of a channel for routing purposes.
930 /// While this may be smaller than the actual channel capacity, amounts greater than
931 /// [`Self::as_msat`] should not be routed through the channel.
932 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug)]
933 pub enum EffectiveCapacity {
934 /// The available liquidity in the channel known from being a channel counterparty, and thus a
937 /// Either the inbound or outbound liquidity depending on the direction, denominated in
941 /// The maximum HTLC amount in one direction as advertised on the gossip network.
943 /// The maximum HTLC amount denominated in millisatoshi.
946 /// The total capacity of the channel as determined by the funding transaction.
948 /// The funding amount denominated in millisatoshi.
950 /// The maximum HTLC amount denominated in millisatoshi.
951 htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>
953 /// A capacity sufficient to route any payment, typically used for private channels provided by
956 /// A capacity that is unknown possibly because either the chain state is unavailable to know
957 /// the total capacity or the `htlc_maximum_msat` was not advertised on the gossip network.
961 /// The presumed channel capacity denominated in millisatoshi for [`EffectiveCapacity::Unknown`] to
962 /// use when making routing decisions.
963 pub const UNKNOWN_CHANNEL_CAPACITY_MSAT: u64 = 250_000 * 1000;
965 impl EffectiveCapacity {
966 /// Returns the effective capacity denominated in millisatoshi.
967 pub fn as_msat(&self) -> u64 {
969 EffectiveCapacity::ExactLiquidity { liquidity_msat } => *liquidity_msat,
970 EffectiveCapacity::MaximumHTLC { amount_msat } => *amount_msat,
971 EffectiveCapacity::Total { capacity_msat, .. } => *capacity_msat,
972 EffectiveCapacity::Infinite => u64::max_value(),
973 EffectiveCapacity::Unknown => UNKNOWN_CHANNEL_CAPACITY_MSAT,
978 /// Fees for routing via a given channel or a node
979 #[derive(Eq, PartialEq, Copy, Clone, Debug, Hash)]
980 pub struct RoutingFees {
981 /// Flat routing fee in satoshis
983 /// Liquidity-based routing fee in millionths of a routed amount.
984 /// In other words, 10000 is 1%.
985 pub proportional_millionths: u32,
988 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(RoutingFees, {
989 (0, base_msat, required),
990 (2, proportional_millionths, required)
993 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
994 /// Information received in the latest node_announcement from this node.
995 pub struct NodeAnnouncementInfo {
996 /// Protocol features the node announced support for
997 pub features: NodeFeatures,
998 /// When the last known update to the node state was issued.
999 /// Value is opaque, as set in the announcement.
1000 pub last_update: u32,
1001 /// Color assigned to the node
1003 /// Moniker assigned to the node.
1004 /// May be invalid or malicious (eg control chars),
1005 /// should not be exposed to the user.
1006 pub alias: NodeAlias,
1007 /// Internet-level addresses via which one can connect to the node
1008 pub addresses: Vec<NetAddress>,
1009 /// An initial announcement of the node
1010 /// Mostly redundant with the data we store in fields explicitly.
1011 /// Everything else is useful only for sending out for initial routing sync.
1012 /// Not stored if contains excess data to prevent DoS.
1013 pub announcement_message: Option<NodeAnnouncement>
1016 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(NodeAnnouncementInfo, {
1017 (0, features, required),
1018 (2, last_update, required),
1020 (6, alias, required),
1021 (8, announcement_message, option),
1022 (10, addresses, vec_type),
1025 /// A user-defined name for a node, which may be used when displaying the node in a graph.
1027 /// Since node aliases are provided by third parties, they are a potential avenue for injection
1028 /// attacks. Care must be taken when processing.
1029 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1030 pub struct NodeAlias(pub [u8; 32]);
1032 impl fmt::Display for NodeAlias {
1033 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
1034 let control_symbol = core::char::REPLACEMENT_CHARACTER;
1035 let first_null = self.0.iter().position(|b| *b == 0).unwrap_or(self.0.len());
1036 let bytes = self.0.split_at(first_null).0;
1037 match core::str::from_utf8(bytes) {
1039 for c in alias.chars() {
1040 let mut bytes = [0u8; 4];
1041 let c = if !c.is_control() { c } else { control_symbol };
1042 f.write_str(c.encode_utf8(&mut bytes))?;
1046 for c in bytes.iter().map(|b| *b as char) {
1047 // Display printable ASCII characters
1048 let mut bytes = [0u8; 4];
1049 let c = if c >= '\x20' && c <= '\x7e' { c } else { control_symbol };
1050 f.write_str(c.encode_utf8(&mut bytes))?;
1058 impl Writeable for NodeAlias {
1059 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1064 impl Readable for NodeAlias {
1065 fn read<R: io::Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1066 Ok(NodeAlias(Readable::read(r)?))
1070 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1071 /// Details about a node in the network, known from the network announcement.
1072 pub struct NodeInfo {
1073 /// All valid channels a node has announced
1074 pub channels: Vec<u64>,
1075 /// Lowest fees enabling routing via any of the enabled, known channels to a node.
1076 /// The two fields (flat and proportional fee) are independent,
1077 /// meaning they don't have to refer to the same channel.
1078 pub lowest_inbound_channel_fees: Option<RoutingFees>,
1079 /// More information about a node from node_announcement.
1080 /// Optional because we store a Node entry after learning about it from
1081 /// a channel announcement, but before receiving a node announcement.
1082 pub announcement_info: Option<NodeAnnouncementInfo>
1085 impl fmt::Display for NodeInfo {
1086 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
1087 write!(f, "lowest_inbound_channel_fees: {:?}, channels: {:?}, announcement_info: {:?}",
1088 self.lowest_inbound_channel_fees, &self.channels[..], self.announcement_info)?;
1093 impl Writeable for NodeInfo {
1094 fn write<W: ::util::ser::Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1095 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
1096 (0, self.lowest_inbound_channel_fees, option),
1097 (2, self.announcement_info, option),
1098 (4, self.channels, vec_type),
1104 // A wrapper allowing for the optional deseralization of `NodeAnnouncementInfo`. Utilizing this is
1105 // necessary to maintain compatibility with previous serializations of `NetAddress` that have an
1106 // invalid hostname set. We ignore and eat all errors until we are either able to read a
1107 // `NodeAnnouncementInfo` or hit a `ShortRead`, i.e., read the TLV field to the end.
1108 struct NodeAnnouncementInfoDeserWrapper(NodeAnnouncementInfo);
1110 impl MaybeReadable for NodeAnnouncementInfoDeserWrapper {
1111 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Option<Self>, DecodeError> {
1112 match ::util::ser::Readable::read(reader) {
1113 Ok(node_announcement_info) => return Ok(Some(Self(node_announcement_info))),
1115 copy(reader, &mut sink()).unwrap();
1122 impl Readable for NodeInfo {
1123 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1124 init_tlv_field_var!(lowest_inbound_channel_fees, option);
1125 let mut announcement_info_wrap: Option<NodeAnnouncementInfoDeserWrapper> = None;
1126 init_tlv_field_var!(channels, vec_type);
1128 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
1129 (0, lowest_inbound_channel_fees, option),
1130 (2, announcement_info_wrap, ignorable),
1131 (4, channels, vec_type),
1135 lowest_inbound_channel_fees: init_tlv_based_struct_field!(lowest_inbound_channel_fees, option),
1136 announcement_info: announcement_info_wrap.map(|w| w.0),
1137 channels: init_tlv_based_struct_field!(channels, vec_type),
1142 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
1143 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
1145 impl<L: Deref> Writeable for NetworkGraph<L> where L::Target: Logger {
1146 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1147 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
1149 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
1150 let channels = self.channels.read().unwrap();
1151 (channels.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
1152 for (ref chan_id, ref chan_info) in channels.iter() {
1153 (*chan_id).write(writer)?;
1154 chan_info.write(writer)?;
1156 let nodes = self.nodes.read().unwrap();
1157 (nodes.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
1158 for (ref node_id, ref node_info) in nodes.iter() {
1159 node_id.write(writer)?;
1160 node_info.write(writer)?;
1163 let last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp = self.get_last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp();
1164 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
1165 (1, last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp, option),
1171 impl<L: Deref> ReadableArgs<L> for NetworkGraph<L> where L::Target: Logger {
1172 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, logger: L) -> Result<NetworkGraph<L>, DecodeError> {
1173 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
1175 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
1176 let channels_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1177 let mut channels = BTreeMap::new();
1178 for _ in 0..channels_count {
1179 let chan_id: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1180 let chan_info = Readable::read(reader)?;
1181 channels.insert(chan_id, chan_info);
1183 let nodes_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1184 let mut nodes = BTreeMap::new();
1185 for _ in 0..nodes_count {
1186 let node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
1187 let node_info = Readable::read(reader)?;
1188 nodes.insert(node_id, node_info);
1191 let mut last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp: Option<u32> = None;
1192 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
1193 (1, last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp, option),
1197 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::verification_only(),
1200 channels: RwLock::new(channels),
1201 nodes: RwLock::new(nodes),
1202 last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp: Mutex::new(last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp),
1207 impl<L: Deref> fmt::Display for NetworkGraph<L> where L::Target: Logger {
1208 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
1209 writeln!(f, "Network map\n[Channels]")?;
1210 for (key, val) in self.channels.read().unwrap().iter() {
1211 writeln!(f, " {}: {}", key, val)?;
1213 writeln!(f, "[Nodes]")?;
1214 for (&node_id, val) in self.nodes.read().unwrap().iter() {
1215 writeln!(f, " {}: {}", log_bytes!(node_id.as_slice()), val)?;
1221 impl<L: Deref> PartialEq for NetworkGraph<L> where L::Target: Logger {
1222 fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
1223 self.genesis_hash == other.genesis_hash &&
1224 *self.channels.read().unwrap() == *other.channels.read().unwrap() &&
1225 *self.nodes.read().unwrap() == *other.nodes.read().unwrap()
1229 impl<L: Deref> NetworkGraph<L> where L::Target: Logger {
1230 /// Creates a new, empty, network graph.
1231 pub fn new(genesis_hash: BlockHash, logger: L) -> NetworkGraph<L> {
1233 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::verification_only(),
1236 channels: RwLock::new(BTreeMap::new()),
1237 nodes: RwLock::new(BTreeMap::new()),
1238 last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp: Mutex::new(None),
1242 /// Returns a read-only view of the network graph.
1243 pub fn read_only(&'_ self) -> ReadOnlyNetworkGraph<'_> {
1244 let channels = self.channels.read().unwrap();
1245 let nodes = self.nodes.read().unwrap();
1246 ReadOnlyNetworkGraph {
1252 /// The unix timestamp provided by the most recent rapid gossip sync.
1253 /// It will be set by the rapid sync process after every sync completion.
1254 pub fn get_last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp(&self) -> Option<u32> {
1255 self.last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp.lock().unwrap().clone()
1258 /// Update the unix timestamp provided by the most recent rapid gossip sync.
1259 /// This should be done automatically by the rapid sync process after every sync completion.
1260 pub fn set_last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp(&self, last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp: u32) {
1261 self.last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp.lock().unwrap().replace(last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp);
1264 /// Clears the `NodeAnnouncementInfo` field for all nodes in the `NetworkGraph` for testing
1267 pub fn clear_nodes_announcement_info(&self) {
1268 for node in self.nodes.write().unwrap().iter_mut() {
1269 node.1.announcement_info = None;
1273 /// For an already known node (from channel announcements), update its stored properties from a
1274 /// given node announcement.
1276 /// You probably don't want to call this directly, instead relying on a P2PGossipSync's
1277 /// RoutingMessageHandler implementation to call it indirectly. This may be useful to accept
1278 /// routing messages from a source using a protocol other than the lightning P2P protocol.
1279 pub fn update_node_from_announcement(&self, msg: &msgs::NodeAnnouncement) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1280 let msg_hash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&msg.contents.encode()[..])[..]);
1281 secp_verify_sig!(self.secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.signature, &msg.contents.node_id, "node_announcement");
1282 self.update_node_from_announcement_intern(&msg.contents, Some(&msg))
1285 /// For an already known node (from channel announcements), update its stored properties from a
1286 /// given node announcement without verifying the associated signatures. Because we aren't
1287 /// given the associated signatures here we cannot relay the node announcement to any of our
1289 pub fn update_node_from_unsigned_announcement(&self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1290 self.update_node_from_announcement_intern(msg, None)
1293 fn update_node_from_announcement_intern(&self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement, full_msg: Option<&msgs::NodeAnnouncement>) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1294 match self.nodes.write().unwrap().get_mut(&NodeId::from_pubkey(&msg.node_id)) {
1295 None => Err(LightningError{err: "No existing channels for node_announcement".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
1297 if let Some(node_info) = node.announcement_info.as_ref() {
1298 // The timestamp field is somewhat of a misnomer - the BOLTs use it to order
1299 // updates to ensure you always have the latest one, only vaguely suggesting
1300 // that it be at least the current time.
1301 if node_info.last_update > msg.timestamp {
1302 return Err(LightningError{err: "Update older than last processed update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Gossip)});
1303 } else if node_info.last_update == msg.timestamp {
1304 return Err(LightningError{err: "Update had the same timestamp as last processed update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip});
1309 msg.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY &&
1310 msg.excess_address_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY &&
1311 msg.excess_data.len() + msg.excess_address_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY;
1312 node.announcement_info = Some(NodeAnnouncementInfo {
1313 features: msg.features.clone(),
1314 last_update: msg.timestamp,
1316 alias: NodeAlias(msg.alias),
1317 addresses: msg.addresses.clone(),
1318 announcement_message: if should_relay { full_msg.cloned() } else { None },
1326 /// Store or update channel info from a channel announcement.
1328 /// You probably don't want to call this directly, instead relying on a P2PGossipSync's
1329 /// RoutingMessageHandler implementation to call it indirectly. This may be useful to accept
1330 /// routing messages from a source using a protocol other than the lightning P2P protocol.
1332 /// If a `chain::Access` object is provided via `chain_access`, it will be called to verify
1333 /// the corresponding UTXO exists on chain and is correctly-formatted.
1334 pub fn update_channel_from_announcement<C: Deref>(
1335 &self, msg: &msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, chain_access: &Option<C>,
1336 ) -> Result<(), LightningError>
1338 C::Target: chain::Access,
1340 let msg_hash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&msg.contents.encode()[..])[..]);
1341 secp_verify_sig!(self.secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.node_signature_1, &msg.contents.node_id_1, "channel_announcement");
1342 secp_verify_sig!(self.secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.node_signature_2, &msg.contents.node_id_2, "channel_announcement");
1343 secp_verify_sig!(self.secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.bitcoin_signature_1, &msg.contents.bitcoin_key_1, "channel_announcement");
1344 secp_verify_sig!(self.secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.bitcoin_signature_2, &msg.contents.bitcoin_key_2, "channel_announcement");
1345 self.update_channel_from_unsigned_announcement_intern(&msg.contents, Some(msg), chain_access)
1348 /// Store or update channel info from a channel announcement without verifying the associated
1349 /// signatures. Because we aren't given the associated signatures here we cannot relay the
1350 /// channel announcement to any of our peers.
1352 /// If a `chain::Access` object is provided via `chain_access`, it will be called to verify
1353 /// the corresponding UTXO exists on chain and is correctly-formatted.
1354 pub fn update_channel_from_unsigned_announcement<C: Deref>(
1355 &self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, chain_access: &Option<C>
1356 ) -> Result<(), LightningError>
1358 C::Target: chain::Access,
1360 self.update_channel_from_unsigned_announcement_intern(msg, None, chain_access)
1363 /// Update channel from partial announcement data received via rapid gossip sync
1365 /// `timestamp: u64`: Timestamp emulating the backdated original announcement receipt (by the
1366 /// rapid gossip sync server)
1368 /// All other parameters as used in [`msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement`] fields.
1369 pub fn add_channel_from_partial_announcement(&self, short_channel_id: u64, timestamp: u64, features: ChannelFeatures, node_id_1: PublicKey, node_id_2: PublicKey) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1370 if node_id_1 == node_id_2 {
1371 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel announcement node had a channel with itself".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
1374 let node_1 = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_id_1);
1375 let node_2 = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_id_2);
1376 let channel_info = ChannelInfo {
1378 node_one: node_1.clone(),
1380 node_two: node_2.clone(),
1382 capacity_sats: None,
1383 announcement_message: None,
1384 announcement_received_time: timestamp,
1387 self.add_channel_between_nodes(short_channel_id, channel_info, None)
1390 fn add_channel_between_nodes(&self, short_channel_id: u64, channel_info: ChannelInfo, utxo_value: Option<u64>) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1391 let mut channels = self.channels.write().unwrap();
1392 let mut nodes = self.nodes.write().unwrap();
1394 let node_id_a = channel_info.node_one.clone();
1395 let node_id_b = channel_info.node_two.clone();
1397 match channels.entry(short_channel_id) {
1398 BtreeEntry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
1399 //TODO: because asking the blockchain if short_channel_id is valid is only optional
1400 //in the blockchain API, we need to handle it smartly here, though it's unclear
1402 if utxo_value.is_some() {
1403 // Either our UTXO provider is busted, there was a reorg, or the UTXO provider
1404 // only sometimes returns results. In any case remove the previous entry. Note
1405 // that the spec expects us to "blacklist" the node_ids involved, but we can't
1407 // a) we don't *require* a UTXO provider that always returns results.
1408 // b) we don't track UTXOs of channels we know about and remove them if they
1410 // c) it's unclear how to do so without exposing ourselves to massive DoS risk.
1411 Self::remove_channel_in_nodes(&mut nodes, &entry.get(), short_channel_id);
1412 *entry.get_mut() = channel_info;
1414 return Err(LightningError{err: "Already have knowledge of channel".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip});
1417 BtreeEntry::Vacant(entry) => {
1418 entry.insert(channel_info);
1422 for current_node_id in [node_id_a, node_id_b].iter() {
1423 match nodes.entry(current_node_id.clone()) {
1424 BtreeEntry::Occupied(node_entry) => {
1425 node_entry.into_mut().channels.push(short_channel_id);
1427 BtreeEntry::Vacant(node_entry) => {
1428 node_entry.insert(NodeInfo {
1429 channels: vec!(short_channel_id),
1430 lowest_inbound_channel_fees: None,
1431 announcement_info: None,
1440 fn update_channel_from_unsigned_announcement_intern<C: Deref>(
1441 &self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, full_msg: Option<&msgs::ChannelAnnouncement>, chain_access: &Option<C>
1442 ) -> Result<(), LightningError>
1444 C::Target: chain::Access,
1446 if msg.node_id_1 == msg.node_id_2 || msg.bitcoin_key_1 == msg.bitcoin_key_2 {
1447 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel announcement node had a channel with itself".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
1451 let channels = self.channels.read().unwrap();
1453 if let Some(chan) = channels.get(&msg.short_channel_id) {
1454 if chan.capacity_sats.is_some() {
1455 // If we'd previously looked up the channel on-chain and checked the script
1456 // against what appears on-chain, ignore the duplicate announcement.
1458 // Because a reorg could replace one channel with another at the same SCID, if
1459 // the channel appears to be different, we re-validate. This doesn't expose us
1460 // to any more DoS risk than not, as a peer can always flood us with
1461 // randomly-generated SCID values anyway.
1463 // We use the Node IDs rather than the bitcoin_keys to check for "equivalence"
1464 // as we didn't (necessarily) store the bitcoin keys, and we only really care
1465 // if the peers on the channel changed anyway.
1466 if NodeId::from_pubkey(&msg.node_id_1) == chan.node_one && NodeId::from_pubkey(&msg.node_id_2) == chan.node_two {
1467 return Err(LightningError {
1468 err: "Already have chain-validated channel".to_owned(),
1469 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip
1472 } else if chain_access.is_none() {
1473 // Similarly, if we can't check the chain right now anyway, ignore the
1474 // duplicate announcement without bothering to take the channels write lock.
1475 return Err(LightningError {
1476 err: "Already have non-chain-validated channel".to_owned(),
1477 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip
1483 let utxo_value = match &chain_access {
1485 // Tentatively accept, potentially exposing us to DoS attacks
1488 &Some(ref chain_access) => {
1489 match chain_access.get_utxo(&msg.chain_hash, msg.short_channel_id) {
1490 Ok(TxOut { value, script_pubkey }) => {
1491 let expected_script =
1492 make_funding_redeemscript(&msg.bitcoin_key_1, &msg.bitcoin_key_2).to_v0_p2wsh();
1493 if script_pubkey != expected_script {
1494 return Err(LightningError{err: format!("Channel announcement key ({}) didn't match on-chain script ({})", expected_script.to_hex(), script_pubkey.to_hex()), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
1496 //TODO: Check if value is worth storing, use it to inform routing, and compare it
1497 //to the new HTLC max field in channel_update
1500 Err(chain::AccessError::UnknownChain) => {
1501 return Err(LightningError{err: format!("Channel announced on an unknown chain ({})", msg.chain_hash.encode().to_hex()), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
1503 Err(chain::AccessError::UnknownTx) => {
1504 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel announced without corresponding UTXO entry".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
1510 #[allow(unused_mut, unused_assignments)]
1511 let mut announcement_received_time = 0;
1512 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
1514 announcement_received_time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
1517 let chan_info = ChannelInfo {
1518 features: msg.features.clone(),
1519 node_one: NodeId::from_pubkey(&msg.node_id_1),
1521 node_two: NodeId::from_pubkey(&msg.node_id_2),
1523 capacity_sats: utxo_value,
1524 announcement_message: if msg.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY
1525 { full_msg.cloned() } else { None },
1526 announcement_received_time,
1529 self.add_channel_between_nodes(msg.short_channel_id, chan_info, utxo_value)
1532 /// Marks a channel in the graph as failed if a corresponding HTLC fail was sent.
1533 /// If permanent, removes a channel from the local storage.
1534 /// May cause the removal of nodes too, if this was their last channel.
1535 /// If not permanent, makes channels unavailable for routing.
1536 pub fn channel_failed(&self, short_channel_id: u64, is_permanent: bool) {
1537 let mut channels = self.channels.write().unwrap();
1539 if let Some(chan) = channels.remove(&short_channel_id) {
1540 let mut nodes = self.nodes.write().unwrap();
1541 Self::remove_channel_in_nodes(&mut nodes, &chan, short_channel_id);
1544 if let Some(chan) = channels.get_mut(&short_channel_id) {
1545 if let Some(one_to_two) = chan.one_to_two.as_mut() {
1546 one_to_two.enabled = false;
1548 if let Some(two_to_one) = chan.two_to_one.as_mut() {
1549 two_to_one.enabled = false;
1555 /// Marks a node in the graph as failed.
1556 pub fn node_failed(&self, _node_id: &PublicKey, is_permanent: bool) {
1558 // TODO: Wholly remove the node
1560 // TODO: downgrade the node
1564 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
1565 /// Removes information about channels that we haven't heard any updates about in some time.
1566 /// This can be used regularly to prune the network graph of channels that likely no longer
1569 /// While there is no formal requirement that nodes regularly re-broadcast their channel
1570 /// updates every two weeks, the non-normative section of BOLT 7 currently suggests that
1571 /// pruning occur for updates which are at least two weeks old, which we implement here.
1573 /// Note that for users of the `lightning-background-processor` crate this method may be
1574 /// automatically called regularly for you.
1576 /// This method is only available with the `std` feature. See
1577 /// [`NetworkGraph::remove_stale_channels_with_time`] for `no-std` use.
1578 pub fn remove_stale_channels(&self) {
1579 let time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
1580 self.remove_stale_channels_with_time(time);
1583 /// Removes information about channels that we haven't heard any updates about in some time.
1584 /// This can be used regularly to prune the network graph of channels that likely no longer
1587 /// While there is no formal requirement that nodes regularly re-broadcast their channel
1588 /// updates every two weeks, the non-normative section of BOLT 7 currently suggests that
1589 /// pruning occur for updates which are at least two weeks old, which we implement here.
1591 /// This function takes the current unix time as an argument. For users with the `std` feature
1592 /// enabled, [`NetworkGraph::remove_stale_channels`] may be preferable.
1593 pub fn remove_stale_channels_with_time(&self, current_time_unix: u64) {
1594 let mut channels = self.channels.write().unwrap();
1595 // Time out if we haven't received an update in at least 14 days.
1596 if current_time_unix > u32::max_value() as u64 { return; } // Remove by 2106
1597 if current_time_unix < STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS { return; }
1598 let min_time_unix: u32 = (current_time_unix - STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS) as u32;
1599 // Sadly BTreeMap::retain was only stabilized in 1.53 so we can't switch to it for some
1601 let mut scids_to_remove = Vec::new();
1602 for (scid, info) in channels.iter_mut() {
1603 if info.one_to_two.is_some() && info.one_to_two.as_ref().unwrap().last_update < min_time_unix {
1604 info.one_to_two = None;
1606 if info.two_to_one.is_some() && info.two_to_one.as_ref().unwrap().last_update < min_time_unix {
1607 info.two_to_one = None;
1609 if info.one_to_two.is_none() && info.two_to_one.is_none() {
1610 // We check the announcement_received_time here to ensure we don't drop
1611 // announcements that we just received and are just waiting for our peer to send a
1612 // channel_update for.
1613 if info.announcement_received_time < min_time_unix as u64 {
1614 scids_to_remove.push(*scid);
1618 if !scids_to_remove.is_empty() {
1619 let mut nodes = self.nodes.write().unwrap();
1620 for scid in scids_to_remove {
1621 let info = channels.remove(&scid).expect("We just accessed this scid, it should be present");
1622 Self::remove_channel_in_nodes(&mut nodes, &info, scid);
1627 /// For an already known (from announcement) channel, update info about one of the directions
1630 /// You probably don't want to call this directly, instead relying on a P2PGossipSync's
1631 /// RoutingMessageHandler implementation to call it indirectly. This may be useful to accept
1632 /// routing messages from a source using a protocol other than the lightning P2P protocol.
1634 /// If built with `no-std`, any updates with a timestamp more than two weeks in the past or
1635 /// materially in the future will be rejected.
1636 pub fn update_channel(&self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1637 self.update_channel_intern(&msg.contents, Some(&msg), Some(&msg.signature))
1640 /// For an already known (from announcement) channel, update info about one of the directions
1641 /// of the channel without verifying the associated signatures. Because we aren't given the
1642 /// associated signatures here we cannot relay the channel update to any of our peers.
1644 /// If built with `no-std`, any updates with a timestamp more than two weeks in the past or
1645 /// materially in the future will be rejected.
1646 pub fn update_channel_unsigned(&self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1647 self.update_channel_intern(msg, None, None)
1650 fn update_channel_intern(&self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate, full_msg: Option<&msgs::ChannelUpdate>, sig: Option<&secp256k1::ecdsa::Signature>) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1652 let chan_enabled = msg.flags & (1 << 1) != (1 << 1);
1653 let chan_was_enabled;
1655 #[cfg(all(feature = "std", not(test), not(feature = "_test_utils")))]
1657 // Note that many tests rely on being able to set arbitrarily old timestamps, thus we
1658 // disable this check during tests!
1659 let time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
1660 if (msg.timestamp as u64) < time - STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS {
1661 return Err(LightningError{err: "channel_update is older than two weeks old".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Gossip)});
1663 if msg.timestamp as u64 > time + 60 * 60 * 24 {
1664 return Err(LightningError{err: "channel_update has a timestamp more than a day in the future".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Gossip)});
1668 let mut channels = self.channels.write().unwrap();
1669 match channels.get_mut(&msg.short_channel_id) {
1670 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Couldn't find channel for update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
1672 if msg.htlc_maximum_msat > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
1673 return Err(LightningError{err:
1674 "htlc_maximum_msat is larger than maximum possible msats".to_owned(),
1675 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
1678 if let Some(capacity_sats) = channel.capacity_sats {
1679 // It's possible channel capacity is available now, although it wasn't available at announcement (so the field is None).
1680 // Don't query UTXO set here to reduce DoS risks.
1681 if capacity_sats > MAX_VALUE_MSAT / 1000 || msg.htlc_maximum_msat > capacity_sats * 1000 {
1682 return Err(LightningError{err:
1683 "htlc_maximum_msat is larger than channel capacity or capacity is bogus".to_owned(),
1684 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
1687 macro_rules! check_update_latest {
1688 ($target: expr) => {
1689 if let Some(existing_chan_info) = $target.as_ref() {
1690 // The timestamp field is somewhat of a misnomer - the BOLTs use it to
1691 // order updates to ensure you always have the latest one, only
1692 // suggesting that it be at least the current time. For
1693 // channel_updates specifically, the BOLTs discuss the possibility of
1694 // pruning based on the timestamp field being more than two weeks old,
1695 // but only in the non-normative section.
1696 if existing_chan_info.last_update > msg.timestamp {
1697 return Err(LightningError{err: "Update older than last processed update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Gossip)});
1698 } else if existing_chan_info.last_update == msg.timestamp {
1699 return Err(LightningError{err: "Update had same timestamp as last processed update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip});
1701 chan_was_enabled = existing_chan_info.enabled;
1703 chan_was_enabled = false;
1708 macro_rules! get_new_channel_info {
1710 let last_update_message = if msg.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY
1711 { full_msg.cloned() } else { None };
1713 let updated_channel_update_info = ChannelUpdateInfo {
1714 enabled: chan_enabled,
1715 last_update: msg.timestamp,
1716 cltv_expiry_delta: msg.cltv_expiry_delta,
1717 htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
1718 htlc_maximum_msat: msg.htlc_maximum_msat,
1720 base_msat: msg.fee_base_msat,
1721 proportional_millionths: msg.fee_proportional_millionths,
1725 Some(updated_channel_update_info)
1729 let msg_hash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&msg.encode()[..])[..]);
1730 if msg.flags & 1 == 1 {
1731 dest_node_id = channel.node_one.clone();
1732 check_update_latest!(channel.two_to_one);
1733 if let Some(sig) = sig {
1734 secp_verify_sig!(self.secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &sig, &PublicKey::from_slice(channel.node_two.as_slice()).map_err(|_| LightningError{
1735 err: "Couldn't parse source node pubkey".to_owned(),
1736 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Debug)
1737 })?, "channel_update");
1739 channel.two_to_one = get_new_channel_info!();
1741 dest_node_id = channel.node_two.clone();
1742 check_update_latest!(channel.one_to_two);
1743 if let Some(sig) = sig {
1744 secp_verify_sig!(self.secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &sig, &PublicKey::from_slice(channel.node_one.as_slice()).map_err(|_| LightningError{
1745 err: "Couldn't parse destination node pubkey".to_owned(),
1746 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Debug)
1747 })?, "channel_update");
1749 channel.one_to_two = get_new_channel_info!();
1754 let mut nodes = self.nodes.write().unwrap();
1756 let node = nodes.get_mut(&dest_node_id).unwrap();
1757 let mut base_msat = msg.fee_base_msat;
1758 let mut proportional_millionths = msg.fee_proportional_millionths;
1759 if let Some(fees) = node.lowest_inbound_channel_fees {
1760 base_msat = cmp::min(base_msat, fees.base_msat);
1761 proportional_millionths = cmp::min(proportional_millionths, fees.proportional_millionths);
1763 node.lowest_inbound_channel_fees = Some(RoutingFees {
1765 proportional_millionths
1767 } else if chan_was_enabled {
1768 let node = nodes.get_mut(&dest_node_id).unwrap();
1769 let mut lowest_inbound_channel_fees = None;
1771 for chan_id in node.channels.iter() {
1772 let chan = channels.get(chan_id).unwrap();
1774 if chan.node_one == dest_node_id {
1775 chan_info_opt = chan.two_to_one.as_ref();
1777 chan_info_opt = chan.one_to_two.as_ref();
1779 if let Some(chan_info) = chan_info_opt {
1780 if chan_info.enabled {
1781 let fees = lowest_inbound_channel_fees.get_or_insert(RoutingFees {
1782 base_msat: u32::max_value(), proportional_millionths: u32::max_value() });
1783 fees.base_msat = cmp::min(fees.base_msat, chan_info.fees.base_msat);
1784 fees.proportional_millionths = cmp::min(fees.proportional_millionths, chan_info.fees.proportional_millionths);
1789 node.lowest_inbound_channel_fees = lowest_inbound_channel_fees;
1795 fn remove_channel_in_nodes(nodes: &mut BTreeMap<NodeId, NodeInfo>, chan: &ChannelInfo, short_channel_id: u64) {
1796 macro_rules! remove_from_node {
1797 ($node_id: expr) => {
1798 if let BtreeEntry::Occupied(mut entry) = nodes.entry($node_id) {
1799 entry.get_mut().channels.retain(|chan_id| {
1800 short_channel_id != *chan_id
1802 if entry.get().channels.is_empty() {
1803 entry.remove_entry();
1806 panic!("Had channel that pointed to unknown node (ie inconsistent network map)!");
1811 remove_from_node!(chan.node_one);
1812 remove_from_node!(chan.node_two);
1816 impl ReadOnlyNetworkGraph<'_> {
1817 /// Returns all known valid channels' short ids along with announced channel info.
1819 /// (C-not exported) because we have no mapping for `BTreeMap`s
1820 pub fn channels(&self) -> &BTreeMap<u64, ChannelInfo> {
1824 /// Returns information on a channel with the given id.
1825 pub fn channel(&self, short_channel_id: u64) -> Option<&ChannelInfo> {
1826 self.channels.get(&short_channel_id)
1829 #[cfg(c_bindings)] // Non-bindings users should use `channels`
1830 /// Returns the list of channels in the graph
1831 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<u64> {
1832 self.channels.keys().map(|c| *c).collect()
1835 /// Returns all known nodes' public keys along with announced node info.
1837 /// (C-not exported) because we have no mapping for `BTreeMap`s
1838 pub fn nodes(&self) -> &BTreeMap<NodeId, NodeInfo> {
1842 /// Returns information on a node with the given id.
1843 pub fn node(&self, node_id: &NodeId) -> Option<&NodeInfo> {
1844 self.nodes.get(node_id)
1847 #[cfg(c_bindings)] // Non-bindings users should use `nodes`
1848 /// Returns the list of nodes in the graph
1849 pub fn list_nodes(&self) -> Vec<NodeId> {
1850 self.nodes.keys().map(|n| *n).collect()
1853 /// Get network addresses by node id.
1854 /// Returns None if the requested node is completely unknown,
1855 /// or if node announcement for the node was never received.
1856 pub fn get_addresses(&self, pubkey: &PublicKey) -> Option<Vec<NetAddress>> {
1857 if let Some(node) = self.nodes.get(&NodeId::from_pubkey(&pubkey)) {
1858 if let Some(node_info) = node.announcement_info.as_ref() {
1859 return Some(node_info.addresses.clone())
1869 use ln::chan_utils::make_funding_redeemscript;
1870 use ln::PaymentHash;
1871 use ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
1872 use routing::gossip::{P2PGossipSync, NetworkGraph, NetworkUpdate, NodeAlias, MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY, NodeId, RoutingFees, ChannelUpdateInfo, ChannelInfo, NodeAnnouncementInfo, NodeInfo};
1873 use ln::msgs::{RoutingMessageHandler, UnsignedNodeAnnouncement, NodeAnnouncement,
1874 UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, ChannelAnnouncement, UnsignedChannelUpdate, ChannelUpdate,
1875 ReplyChannelRange, QueryChannelRange, QueryShortChannelIds, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
1876 use util::test_utils;
1877 use util::ser::{ReadableArgs, Writeable};
1878 use util::events::{Event, EventHandler, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
1879 use util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
1881 use super::STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS;
1883 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
1884 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
1885 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
1886 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
1887 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Script;
1888 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::TxOut;
1892 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, SecretKey};
1893 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{All, Secp256k1};
1896 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
1900 fn create_network_graph() -> NetworkGraph<Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>> {
1901 let genesis_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
1902 let logger = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
1903 NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash, logger)
1906 fn create_gossip_sync(network_graph: &NetworkGraph<Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>>) -> (
1907 Secp256k1<All>, P2PGossipSync<&NetworkGraph<Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>>,
1908 Arc<test_utils::TestChainSource>, Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>>
1910 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1911 let logger = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
1912 let gossip_sync = P2PGossipSync::new(network_graph, None, Arc::clone(&logger));
1913 (secp_ctx, gossip_sync)
1917 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
1918 fn request_full_sync_finite_times() {
1919 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
1920 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
1921 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
1923 assert!(gossip_sync.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
1924 assert!(gossip_sync.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
1925 assert!(gossip_sync.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
1926 assert!(gossip_sync.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
1927 assert!(gossip_sync.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
1928 assert!(!gossip_sync.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
1931 fn get_signed_node_announcement<F: Fn(&mut UnsignedNodeAnnouncement)>(f: F, node_key: &SecretKey, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> NodeAnnouncement {
1932 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_key);
1933 let mut unsigned_announcement = UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
1934 features: NodeFeatures::known(),
1939 addresses: Vec::new(),
1940 excess_address_data: Vec::new(),
1941 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1943 f(&mut unsigned_announcement);
1944 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1946 signature: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, node_key),
1947 contents: unsigned_announcement
1951 fn get_signed_channel_announcement<F: Fn(&mut UnsignedChannelAnnouncement)>(f: F, node_1_key: &SecretKey, node_2_key: &SecretKey, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> ChannelAnnouncement {
1952 let node_id_1 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_key);
1953 let node_id_2 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_key);
1954 let node_1_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[40; 32]).unwrap();
1955 let node_2_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[39; 32]).unwrap();
1957 let mut unsigned_announcement = UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
1958 features: ChannelFeatures::known(),
1959 chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash(),
1960 short_channel_id: 0,
1963 bitcoin_key_1: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_btckey),
1964 bitcoin_key_2: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_btckey),
1965 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1967 f(&mut unsigned_announcement);
1968 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1969 ChannelAnnouncement {
1970 node_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, node_1_key),
1971 node_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, node_2_key),
1972 bitcoin_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, node_1_btckey),
1973 bitcoin_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, node_2_btckey),
1974 contents: unsigned_announcement,
1978 fn get_channel_script(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> Script {
1979 let node_1_btckey = SecretKey::from_slice(&[40; 32]).unwrap();
1980 let node_2_btckey = SecretKey::from_slice(&[39; 32]).unwrap();
1981 make_funding_redeemscript(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &node_1_btckey),
1982 &PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &node_2_btckey)).to_v0_p2wsh()
1985 fn get_signed_channel_update<F: Fn(&mut UnsignedChannelUpdate)>(f: F, node_key: &SecretKey, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> ChannelUpdate {
1986 let mut unsigned_channel_update = UnsignedChannelUpdate {
1987 chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash(),
1988 short_channel_id: 0,
1991 cltv_expiry_delta: 144,
1992 htlc_minimum_msat: 1_000_000,
1993 htlc_maximum_msat: 1_000_000,
1994 fee_base_msat: 10_000,
1995 fee_proportional_millionths: 20,
1996 excess_data: Vec::new()
1998 f(&mut unsigned_channel_update);
1999 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_channel_update.encode()[..])[..]);
2001 signature: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, node_key),
2002 contents: unsigned_channel_update
2007 fn handling_node_announcements() {
2008 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2009 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
2011 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2012 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2013 let zero_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&[0; 32]);
2015 let valid_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2016 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2018 Err(e) => assert_eq!("No existing channels for node_announcement", e.err)
2022 // Announce a channel to add a corresponding node.
2023 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2024 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2025 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
2030 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2031 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
2035 let fake_msghash = hash_to_message!(&zero_hash);
2036 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(
2038 signature: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&fake_msghash, node_1_privkey),
2039 contents: valid_announcement.contents.clone()
2042 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Invalid signature on node_announcement message")
2045 let announcement_with_data = get_signed_node_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2046 unsigned_announcement.timestamp += 1000;
2047 unsigned_announcement.excess_data.resize(MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1, 0);
2048 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2049 // Return false because contains excess data.
2050 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&announcement_with_data) {
2051 Ok(res) => assert!(!res),
2055 // Even though previous announcement was not relayed further, we still accepted it,
2056 // so we now won't accept announcements before the previous one.
2057 let outdated_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2058 unsigned_announcement.timestamp += 1000 - 10;
2059 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2060 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&outdated_announcement) {
2062 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Update older than last processed update")
2067 fn handling_channel_announcements() {
2068 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2069 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
2071 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2072 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2074 let good_script = get_channel_script(&secp_ctx);
2075 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2077 // Test if the UTXO lookups were not supported
2078 let genesis_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
2079 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash, &logger);
2080 let mut gossip_sync = P2PGossipSync::new(&network_graph, None, &logger);
2081 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2082 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
2087 match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&valid_announcement.contents.short_channel_id) {
2093 // If we receive announcement for the same channel (with UTXO lookups disabled),
2094 // drop new one on the floor, since we can't see any changes.
2095 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2097 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Already have non-chain-validated channel")
2100 // Test if an associated transaction were not on-chain (or not confirmed).
2101 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
2102 *chain_source.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(chain::AccessError::UnknownTx);
2103 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash, &logger);
2104 gossip_sync = P2PGossipSync::new(&network_graph, Some(&chain_source), &logger);
2106 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2107 unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id += 1;
2108 }, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2109 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2111 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Channel announced without corresponding UTXO entry")
2114 // Now test if the transaction is found in the UTXO set and the script is correct.
2115 *chain_source.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(TxOut { value: 0, script_pubkey: good_script.clone() });
2116 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2117 unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id += 2;
2118 }, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2119 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2120 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
2125 match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&valid_announcement.contents.short_channel_id) {
2131 // If we receive announcement for the same channel, once we've validated it against the
2132 // chain, we simply ignore all new (duplicate) announcements.
2133 *chain_source.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(TxOut { value: 0, script_pubkey: good_script });
2134 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2136 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Already have chain-validated channel")
2139 // Don't relay valid channels with excess data
2140 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2141 unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id += 3;
2142 unsigned_announcement.excess_data.resize(MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1, 0);
2143 }, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2144 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2145 Ok(res) => assert!(!res),
2149 let mut invalid_sig_announcement = valid_announcement.clone();
2150 invalid_sig_announcement.contents.excess_data = Vec::new();
2151 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&invalid_sig_announcement) {
2153 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Invalid signature on channel_announcement message")
2156 let channel_to_itself_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2157 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&channel_to_itself_announcement) {
2159 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Channel announcement node had a channel with itself")
2164 fn handling_channel_update() {
2165 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2166 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
2167 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
2168 let genesis_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
2169 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash, &logger);
2170 let gossip_sync = P2PGossipSync::new(&network_graph, Some(&chain_source), &logger);
2172 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2173 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2175 let amount_sats = 1000_000;
2176 let short_channel_id;
2179 // Announce a channel we will update
2180 let good_script = get_channel_script(&secp_ctx);
2181 *chain_source.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(TxOut { value: amount_sats, script_pubkey: good_script.clone() });
2183 let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2184 short_channel_id = valid_channel_announcement.contents.short_channel_id;
2185 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement) {
2192 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2193 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2194 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
2199 match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id) {
2201 Some(channel_info) => {
2202 assert_eq!(channel_info.one_to_two.as_ref().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, 144);
2203 assert!(channel_info.two_to_one.is_none());
2208 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2209 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 100;
2210 unsigned_channel_update.excess_data.resize(MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1, 0);
2211 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2212 // Return false because contains excess data
2213 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2214 Ok(res) => assert!(!res),
2218 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2219 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 110;
2220 unsigned_channel_update.short_channel_id += 1;
2221 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2222 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2224 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Couldn't find channel for update")
2227 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2228 unsigned_channel_update.htlc_maximum_msat = MAX_VALUE_MSAT + 1;
2229 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 110;
2230 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2231 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2233 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "htlc_maximum_msat is larger than maximum possible msats")
2236 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2237 unsigned_channel_update.htlc_maximum_msat = amount_sats * 1000 + 1;
2238 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 110;
2239 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2240 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2242 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "htlc_maximum_msat is larger than channel capacity or capacity is bogus")
2245 // Even though previous update was not relayed further, we still accepted it,
2246 // so we now won't accept update before the previous one.
2247 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2248 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 100;
2249 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2250 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2252 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Update had same timestamp as last processed update")
2255 let mut invalid_sig_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2256 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 500;
2257 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2258 let zero_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&[0; 32]);
2259 let fake_msghash = hash_to_message!(&zero_hash);
2260 invalid_sig_channel_update.signature = secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&fake_msghash, node_1_privkey);
2261 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&invalid_sig_channel_update) {
2263 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Invalid signature on channel_update message")
2268 fn handling_network_update() {
2269 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
2270 let genesis_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
2271 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash, &logger);
2272 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2274 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2275 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2278 // There is no nodes in the table at the beginning.
2279 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 0);
2282 let short_channel_id;
2284 // Announce a channel we will update
2285 let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2286 short_channel_id = valid_channel_announcement.contents.short_channel_id;
2287 let chain_source: Option<&test_utils::TestChainSource> = None;
2288 assert!(network_graph.update_channel_from_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement, &chain_source).is_ok());
2289 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).is_some());
2291 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2292 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).unwrap().one_to_two.is_none());
2294 network_graph.handle_event(&Event::PaymentPathFailed {
2296 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
2297 payment_failed_permanently: false,
2298 all_paths_failed: true,
2300 network_update: Some(NetworkUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage {
2301 msg: valid_channel_update,
2303 short_channel_id: None,
2309 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).unwrap().one_to_two.is_some());
2312 // Non-permanent closing just disables a channel
2314 match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id) {
2316 Some(channel_info) => {
2317 assert!(channel_info.one_to_two.as_ref().unwrap().enabled);
2321 network_graph.handle_event(&Event::PaymentPathFailed {
2323 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
2324 payment_failed_permanently: false,
2325 all_paths_failed: true,
2327 network_update: Some(NetworkUpdate::ChannelFailure {
2329 is_permanent: false,
2331 short_channel_id: None,
2337 match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id) {
2339 Some(channel_info) => {
2340 assert!(!channel_info.one_to_two.as_ref().unwrap().enabled);
2345 // Permanent closing deletes a channel
2346 network_graph.handle_event(&Event::PaymentPathFailed {
2348 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
2349 payment_failed_permanently: false,
2350 all_paths_failed: true,
2352 network_update: Some(NetworkUpdate::ChannelFailure {
2356 short_channel_id: None,
2362 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 0);
2363 // Nodes are also deleted because there are no associated channels anymore
2364 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 0);
2365 // TODO: Test NetworkUpdate::NodeFailure, which is not implemented yet.
2369 fn test_channel_timeouts() {
2370 // Test the removal of channels with `remove_stale_channels`.
2371 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
2372 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
2373 let genesis_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
2374 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash, &logger);
2375 let gossip_sync = P2PGossipSync::new(&network_graph, Some(&chain_source), &logger);
2376 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2378 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2379 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2381 let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2382 let short_channel_id = valid_channel_announcement.contents.short_channel_id;
2383 let chain_source: Option<&test_utils::TestChainSource> = None;
2384 assert!(network_graph.update_channel_from_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement, &chain_source).is_ok());
2385 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).is_some());
2387 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2388 assert!(gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update).is_ok());
2389 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).unwrap().one_to_two.is_some());
2391 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_with_time(100 + STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
2392 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 1);
2393 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 2);
2395 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_with_time(101 + STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
2396 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
2398 // In std mode, a further check is performed before fully removing the channel -
2399 // the channel_announcement must have been received at least two weeks ago. We
2400 // fudge that here by indicating the time has jumped two weeks. Note that the
2401 // directional channel information will have been removed already..
2402 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 1);
2403 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 2);
2404 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).unwrap().one_to_two.is_none());
2406 use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
2407 let announcement_time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
2408 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_with_time(announcement_time + 1 + STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
2411 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 0);
2412 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 0);
2416 fn getting_next_channel_announcements() {
2417 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2418 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
2419 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2420 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2422 // Channels were not announced yet.
2423 let channels_with_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_channel_announcement(0);
2424 assert!(channels_with_announcements.is_none());
2426 let short_channel_id;
2428 // Announce a channel we will update
2429 let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2430 short_channel_id = valid_channel_announcement.contents.short_channel_id;
2431 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement) {
2437 // Contains initial channel announcement now.
2438 let channels_with_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_channel_announcement(short_channel_id);
2439 if let Some(channel_announcements) = channels_with_announcements {
2440 let (_, ref update_1, ref update_2) = channel_announcements;
2441 assert_eq!(update_1, &None);
2442 assert_eq!(update_2, &None);
2448 // Valid channel update
2449 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2450 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp = 101;
2451 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2452 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2458 // Now contains an initial announcement and an update.
2459 let channels_with_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_channel_announcement(short_channel_id);
2460 if let Some(channel_announcements) = channels_with_announcements {
2461 let (_, ref update_1, ref update_2) = channel_announcements;
2462 assert_ne!(update_1, &None);
2463 assert_eq!(update_2, &None);
2469 // Channel update with excess data.
2470 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2471 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp = 102;
2472 unsigned_channel_update.excess_data = [1; MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1].to_vec();
2473 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2474 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2480 // Test that announcements with excess data won't be returned
2481 let channels_with_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_channel_announcement(short_channel_id);
2482 if let Some(channel_announcements) = channels_with_announcements {
2483 let (_, ref update_1, ref update_2) = channel_announcements;
2484 assert_eq!(update_1, &None);
2485 assert_eq!(update_2, &None);
2490 // Further starting point have no channels after it
2491 let channels_with_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_channel_announcement(short_channel_id + 1000);
2492 assert!(channels_with_announcements.is_none());
2496 fn getting_next_node_announcements() {
2497 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2498 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
2499 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2500 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2501 let node_id_1 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_privkey);
2504 let next_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_node_announcement(None);
2505 assert!(next_announcements.is_none());
2508 // Announce a channel to add 2 nodes
2509 let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2510 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement) {
2516 // Nodes were never announced
2517 let next_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_node_announcement(None);
2518 assert!(next_announcements.is_none());
2521 let valid_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2522 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2527 let valid_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|_| {}, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2528 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2534 let next_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_node_announcement(None);
2535 assert!(next_announcements.is_some());
2537 // Skip the first node.
2538 let next_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_node_announcement(Some(&node_id_1));
2539 assert!(next_announcements.is_some());
2542 // Later announcement which should not be relayed (excess data) prevent us from sharing a node
2543 let valid_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2544 unsigned_announcement.timestamp += 10;
2545 unsigned_announcement.excess_data = [1; MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1].to_vec();
2546 }, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2547 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2548 Ok(res) => assert!(!res),
2553 let next_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_node_announcement(Some(&node_id_1));
2554 assert!(next_announcements.is_none());
2558 fn network_graph_serialization() {
2559 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2560 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
2562 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2563 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2565 // Announce a channel to add a corresponding node.
2566 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2567 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2568 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
2572 let valid_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2573 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2578 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
2579 assert!(!network_graph.read_only().nodes().is_empty());
2580 assert!(!network_graph.read_only().channels().is_empty());
2581 network_graph.write(&mut w).unwrap();
2583 let logger = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
2584 assert!(<NetworkGraph<_>>::read(&mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), logger).unwrap() == network_graph);
2588 fn network_graph_tlv_serialization() {
2589 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2590 network_graph.set_last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp(42);
2592 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
2593 network_graph.write(&mut w).unwrap();
2595 let logger = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
2596 let reassembled_network_graph: NetworkGraph<_> = ReadableArgs::read(&mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), logger).unwrap();
2597 assert!(reassembled_network_graph == network_graph);
2598 assert_eq!(reassembled_network_graph.get_last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp().unwrap(), 42);
2602 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
2603 fn calling_sync_routing_table() {
2604 use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
2607 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2608 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
2609 let node_privkey_1 = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2610 let node_id_1 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_privkey_1);
2612 let chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
2614 // It should ignore if gossip_queries feature is not enabled
2616 let init_msg = Init { features: InitFeatures::known().clear_gossip_queries(), remote_network_address: None };
2617 gossip_sync.peer_connected(&node_id_1, &init_msg);
2618 let events = gossip_sync.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2619 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
2622 // It should send a gossip_timestamp_filter with the correct information
2624 let init_msg = Init { features: InitFeatures::known(), remote_network_address: None };
2625 gossip_sync.peer_connected(&node_id_1, &init_msg);
2626 let events = gossip_sync.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2627 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2629 MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter{ node_id, msg } => {
2630 assert_eq!(node_id, &node_id_1);
2631 assert_eq!(msg.chain_hash, chain_hash);
2632 let expected_timestamp = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
2633 assert!((msg.first_timestamp as u64) >= expected_timestamp - 60*60*24*7*2);
2634 assert!((msg.first_timestamp as u64) < expected_timestamp - 60*60*24*7*2 + 10);
2635 assert_eq!(msg.timestamp_range, u32::max_value());
2637 _ => panic!("Expected MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery")
2643 fn handling_query_channel_range() {
2644 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2645 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
2647 let chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
2648 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2649 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2650 let node_id_2 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_privkey);
2652 let mut scids: Vec<u64> = vec![
2653 scid_from_parts(0xfffffe, 0xffffff, 0xffff).unwrap(), // max
2654 scid_from_parts(0xffffff, 0xffffff, 0xffff).unwrap(), // never
2657 // used for testing multipart reply across blocks
2658 for block in 100000..=108001 {
2659 scids.push(scid_from_parts(block, 0, 0).unwrap());
2662 // used for testing resumption on same block
2663 scids.push(scid_from_parts(108001, 1, 0).unwrap());
2666 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2667 unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id = scid;
2668 }, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2669 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2675 // Error when number_of_blocks=0
2676 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2680 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2682 number_of_blocks: 0,
2685 vec![ReplyChannelRange {
2686 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2688 number_of_blocks: 0,
2689 sync_complete: true,
2690 short_channel_ids: vec![]
2694 // Error when wrong chain
2695 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2699 chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin).header.block_hash(),
2701 number_of_blocks: 0xffff_ffff,
2704 vec![ReplyChannelRange {
2705 chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin).header.block_hash(),
2707 number_of_blocks: 0xffff_ffff,
2708 sync_complete: true,
2709 short_channel_ids: vec![],
2713 // Error when first_blocknum > 0xffffff
2714 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2718 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2719 first_blocknum: 0x01000000,
2720 number_of_blocks: 0xffff_ffff,
2723 vec![ReplyChannelRange {
2724 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2725 first_blocknum: 0x01000000,
2726 number_of_blocks: 0xffff_ffff,
2727 sync_complete: true,
2728 short_channel_ids: vec![]
2732 // Empty reply when max valid SCID block num
2733 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2737 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2738 first_blocknum: 0xffffff,
2739 number_of_blocks: 1,
2744 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2745 first_blocknum: 0xffffff,
2746 number_of_blocks: 1,
2747 sync_complete: true,
2748 short_channel_ids: vec![]
2753 // No results in valid query range
2754 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2758 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2759 first_blocknum: 1000,
2760 number_of_blocks: 1000,
2765 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2766 first_blocknum: 1000,
2767 number_of_blocks: 1000,
2768 sync_complete: true,
2769 short_channel_ids: vec![],
2774 // Overflow first_blocknum + number_of_blocks
2775 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2779 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2780 first_blocknum: 0xfe0000,
2781 number_of_blocks: 0xffffffff,
2786 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2787 first_blocknum: 0xfe0000,
2788 number_of_blocks: 0xffffffff - 0xfe0000,
2789 sync_complete: true,
2790 short_channel_ids: vec![
2791 0xfffffe_ffffff_ffff, // max
2797 // Single block exactly full
2798 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2802 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2803 first_blocknum: 100000,
2804 number_of_blocks: 8000,
2809 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2810 first_blocknum: 100000,
2811 number_of_blocks: 8000,
2812 sync_complete: true,
2813 short_channel_ids: (100000..=107999)
2814 .map(|block| scid_from_parts(block, 0, 0).unwrap())
2820 // Multiple split on new block
2821 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2825 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2826 first_blocknum: 100000,
2827 number_of_blocks: 8001,
2832 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2833 first_blocknum: 100000,
2834 number_of_blocks: 7999,
2835 sync_complete: false,
2836 short_channel_ids: (100000..=107999)
2837 .map(|block| scid_from_parts(block, 0, 0).unwrap())
2841 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2842 first_blocknum: 107999,
2843 number_of_blocks: 2,
2844 sync_complete: true,
2845 short_channel_ids: vec![
2846 scid_from_parts(108000, 0, 0).unwrap(),
2852 // Multiple split on same block
2853 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2857 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2858 first_blocknum: 100002,
2859 number_of_blocks: 8000,
2864 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2865 first_blocknum: 100002,
2866 number_of_blocks: 7999,
2867 sync_complete: false,
2868 short_channel_ids: (100002..=108001)
2869 .map(|block| scid_from_parts(block, 0, 0).unwrap())
2873 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2874 first_blocknum: 108001,
2875 number_of_blocks: 1,
2876 sync_complete: true,
2877 short_channel_ids: vec![
2878 scid_from_parts(108001, 1, 0).unwrap(),
2885 fn do_handling_query_channel_range(
2886 gossip_sync: &P2PGossipSync<&NetworkGraph<Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>>, Arc<test_utils::TestChainSource>, Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>>,
2887 test_node_id: &PublicKey,
2888 msg: QueryChannelRange,
2890 expected_replies: Vec<ReplyChannelRange>
2892 let mut max_firstblocknum = msg.first_blocknum.saturating_sub(1);
2893 let mut c_lightning_0_9_prev_end_blocknum = max_firstblocknum;
2894 let query_end_blocknum = msg.end_blocknum();
2895 let result = gossip_sync.handle_query_channel_range(test_node_id, msg);
2898 assert!(result.is_ok());
2900 assert!(result.is_err());
2903 let events = gossip_sync.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2904 assert_eq!(events.len(), expected_replies.len());
2906 for i in 0..events.len() {
2907 let expected_reply = &expected_replies[i];
2909 MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { node_id, msg } => {
2910 assert_eq!(node_id, test_node_id);
2911 assert_eq!(msg.chain_hash, expected_reply.chain_hash);
2912 assert_eq!(msg.first_blocknum, expected_reply.first_blocknum);
2913 assert_eq!(msg.number_of_blocks, expected_reply.number_of_blocks);
2914 assert_eq!(msg.sync_complete, expected_reply.sync_complete);
2915 assert_eq!(msg.short_channel_ids, expected_reply.short_channel_ids);
2917 // Enforce exactly the sequencing requirements present on c-lightning v0.9.3
2918 assert!(msg.first_blocknum == c_lightning_0_9_prev_end_blocknum || msg.first_blocknum == c_lightning_0_9_prev_end_blocknum.saturating_add(1));
2919 assert!(msg.first_blocknum >= max_firstblocknum);
2920 max_firstblocknum = msg.first_blocknum;
2921 c_lightning_0_9_prev_end_blocknum = msg.first_blocknum.saturating_add(msg.number_of_blocks);
2923 // Check that the last block count is >= the query's end_blocknum
2924 if i == events.len() - 1 {
2925 assert!(msg.first_blocknum.saturating_add(msg.number_of_blocks) >= query_end_blocknum);
2928 _ => panic!("expected MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange"),
2934 fn handling_query_short_channel_ids() {
2935 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2936 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
2937 let node_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2938 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_privkey);
2940 let chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
2942 let result = gossip_sync.handle_query_short_channel_ids(&node_id, QueryShortChannelIds {
2944 short_channel_ids: vec![0x0003e8_000000_0000],
2946 assert!(result.is_err());
2950 fn displays_node_alias() {
2951 let format_str_alias = |alias: &str| {
2952 let mut bytes = [0u8; 32];
2953 bytes[..alias.as_bytes().len()].copy_from_slice(alias.as_bytes());
2954 format!("{}", NodeAlias(bytes))
2957 assert_eq!(format_str_alias("I\u{1F496}LDK! \u{26A1}"), "I\u{1F496}LDK! \u{26A1}");
2958 assert_eq!(format_str_alias("I\u{1F496}LDK!\0\u{26A1}"), "I\u{1F496}LDK!");
2959 assert_eq!(format_str_alias("I\u{1F496}LDK!\t\u{26A1}"), "I\u{1F496}LDK!\u{FFFD}\u{26A1}");
2961 let format_bytes_alias = |alias: &[u8]| {
2962 let mut bytes = [0u8; 32];
2963 bytes[..alias.len()].copy_from_slice(alias);
2964 format!("{}", NodeAlias(bytes))
2967 assert_eq!(format_bytes_alias(b"\xFFI <heart> LDK!"), "\u{FFFD}I <heart> LDK!");
2968 assert_eq!(format_bytes_alias(b"\xFFI <heart>\0LDK!"), "\u{FFFD}I <heart>");
2969 assert_eq!(format_bytes_alias(b"\xFFI <heart>\tLDK!"), "\u{FFFD}I <heart>\u{FFFD}LDK!");
2973 fn channel_info_is_readable() {
2974 let chanmon_cfgs = ::ln::functional_test_utils::create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2975 let node_cfgs = ::ln::functional_test_utils::create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2976 let node_chanmgrs = ::ln::functional_test_utils::create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
2977 let nodes = ::ln::functional_test_utils::create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2979 // 1. Test encoding/decoding of ChannelUpdateInfo
2980 let chan_update_info = ChannelUpdateInfo {
2983 cltv_expiry_delta: 42,
2984 htlc_minimum_msat: 1234,
2985 htlc_maximum_msat: 5678,
2986 fees: RoutingFees { base_msat: 9, proportional_millionths: 10 },
2987 last_update_message: None,
2990 let mut encoded_chan_update_info: Vec<u8> = Vec::new();
2991 assert!(chan_update_info.write(&mut encoded_chan_update_info).is_ok());
2993 // First make sure we can read ChannelUpdateInfos we just wrote
2994 let read_chan_update_info: ChannelUpdateInfo = ::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut encoded_chan_update_info.as_slice()).unwrap();
2995 assert_eq!(chan_update_info, read_chan_update_info);
2997 // Check the serialization hasn't changed.
2998 let legacy_chan_update_info_with_some: Vec<u8> = hex::decode("340004000000170201010402002a060800000000000004d2080909000000000000162e0a0d0c00040000000902040000000a0c0100").unwrap();
2999 assert_eq!(encoded_chan_update_info, legacy_chan_update_info_with_some);
3001 // Check we fail if htlc_maximum_msat is not present in either the ChannelUpdateInfo itself
3002 // or the ChannelUpdate enclosed with `last_update_message`.
3003 let legacy_chan_update_info_with_some_and_fail_update: Vec<u8> = hex::decode("b40004000000170201010402002a060800000000000004d2080909000000000000162e0a0d0c00040000000902040000000a0c8181d977cb9b53d93a6ff64bb5f1e158b4094b66e798fb12911168a3ccdf80a83096340a6a95da0ae8d9f776528eecdbb747eb6b545495a4319ed5378e35b21e073a000000000019d6689c085ae165831e934ff763ae46a2a6c172b3f1b60a8ce26f00083a840000034d013413a70000009000000000000f42400000271000000014").unwrap();
3004 let read_chan_update_info_res: Result<ChannelUpdateInfo, ::ln::msgs::DecodeError> = ::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut legacy_chan_update_info_with_some_and_fail_update.as_slice());
3005 assert!(read_chan_update_info_res.is_err());
3007 let legacy_chan_update_info_with_none: Vec<u8> = hex::decode("2c0004000000170201010402002a060800000000000004d20801000a0d0c00040000000902040000000a0c0100").unwrap();
3008 let read_chan_update_info_res: Result<ChannelUpdateInfo, ::ln::msgs::DecodeError> = ::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut legacy_chan_update_info_with_none.as_slice());
3009 assert!(read_chan_update_info_res.is_err());
3011 // 2. Test encoding/decoding of ChannelInfo
3012 // Check we can encode/decode ChannelInfo without ChannelUpdateInfo fields present.
3013 let chan_info_none_updates = ChannelInfo {
3014 features: ChannelFeatures::known(),
3015 node_one: NodeId::from_pubkey(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()),
3017 node_two: NodeId::from_pubkey(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()),
3019 capacity_sats: None,
3020 announcement_message: None,
3021 announcement_received_time: 87654,
3024 let mut encoded_chan_info: Vec<u8> = Vec::new();
3025 assert!(chan_info_none_updates.write(&mut encoded_chan_info).is_ok());
3027 let read_chan_info: ChannelInfo = ::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut encoded_chan_info.as_slice()).unwrap();
3028 assert_eq!(chan_info_none_updates, read_chan_info);
3030 // Check we can encode/decode ChannelInfo with ChannelUpdateInfo fields present.
3031 let chan_info_some_updates = ChannelInfo {
3032 features: ChannelFeatures::known(),
3033 node_one: NodeId::from_pubkey(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()),
3034 one_to_two: Some(chan_update_info.clone()),
3035 node_two: NodeId::from_pubkey(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()),
3036 two_to_one: Some(chan_update_info.clone()),
3037 capacity_sats: None,
3038 announcement_message: None,
3039 announcement_received_time: 87654,
3042 let mut encoded_chan_info: Vec<u8> = Vec::new();
3043 assert!(chan_info_some_updates.write(&mut encoded_chan_info).is_ok());
3045 let read_chan_info: ChannelInfo = ::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut encoded_chan_info.as_slice()).unwrap();
3046 assert_eq!(chan_info_some_updates, read_chan_info);
3048 // Check the serialization hasn't changed.
3049 let legacy_chan_info_with_some: Vec<u8> = hex::decode("ca00020000010800000000000156660221027f921585f2ac0c7c70e36110adecfd8fd14b8a99bfb3d000a283fcac358fce88043636340004000000170201010402002a060800000000000004d2080909000000000000162e0a0d0c00040000000902040000000a0c010006210355f8d2238a322d16b602bd0ceaad5b01019fb055971eaadcc9b29226a4da6c23083636340004000000170201010402002a060800000000000004d2080909000000000000162e0a0d0c00040000000902040000000a0c01000a01000c0100").unwrap();
3050 assert_eq!(encoded_chan_info, legacy_chan_info_with_some);
3052 // Check we can decode legacy ChannelInfo, even if the `two_to_one` / `one_to_two` /
3053 // `last_update_message` fields fail to decode due to missing htlc_maximum_msat.
3054 let legacy_chan_info_with_some_and_fail_update = hex::decode("fd01ca00020000010800000000000156660221027f921585f2ac0c7c70e36110adecfd8fd14b8a99bfb3d000a283fcac358fce8804b6b6b40004000000170201010402002a060800000000000004d2080909000000000000162e0a0d0c00040000000902040000000a0c8181d977cb9b53d93a6ff64bb5f1e158b4094b66e798fb12911168a3ccdf80a83096340a6a95da0ae8d9f776528eecdbb747eb6b545495a4319ed5378e35b21e073a000000000019d6689c085ae165831e934ff763ae46a2a6c172b3f1b60a8ce26f00083a840000034d013413a70000009000000000000f4240000027100000001406210355f8d2238a322d16b602bd0ceaad5b01019fb055971eaadcc9b29226a4da6c2308b6b6b40004000000170201010402002a060800000000000004d2080909000000000000162e0a0d0c00040000000902040000000a0c8181d977cb9b53d93a6ff64bb5f1e158b4094b66e798fb12911168a3ccdf80a83096340a6a95da0ae8d9f776528eecdbb747eb6b545495a4319ed5378e35b21e073a000000000019d6689c085ae165831e934ff763ae46a2a6c172b3f1b60a8ce26f00083a840000034d013413a70000009000000000000f424000002710000000140a01000c0100").unwrap();
3055 let read_chan_info: ChannelInfo = ::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut legacy_chan_info_with_some_and_fail_update.as_slice()).unwrap();
3056 assert_eq!(read_chan_info.announcement_received_time, 87654);
3057 assert_eq!(read_chan_info.one_to_two, None);
3058 assert_eq!(read_chan_info.two_to_one, None);
3060 let legacy_chan_info_with_none: Vec<u8> = hex::decode("ba00020000010800000000000156660221027f921585f2ac0c7c70e36110adecfd8fd14b8a99bfb3d000a283fcac358fce88042e2e2c0004000000170201010402002a060800000000000004d20801000a0d0c00040000000902040000000a0c010006210355f8d2238a322d16b602bd0ceaad5b01019fb055971eaadcc9b29226a4da6c23082e2e2c0004000000170201010402002a060800000000000004d20801000a0d0c00040000000902040000000a0c01000a01000c0100").unwrap();
3061 let read_chan_info: ChannelInfo = ::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut legacy_chan_info_with_none.as_slice()).unwrap();
3062 assert_eq!(read_chan_info.announcement_received_time, 87654);
3063 assert_eq!(read_chan_info.one_to_two, None);
3064 assert_eq!(read_chan_info.two_to_one, None);
3068 fn node_info_is_readable() {
3069 use std::convert::TryFrom;
3071 // 1. Check we can read a valid NodeAnnouncementInfo and fail on an invalid one
3072 let valid_netaddr = ::ln::msgs::NetAddress::Hostname { hostname: ::util::ser::Hostname::try_from("A".to_string()).unwrap(), port: 1234 };
3073 let valid_node_ann_info = NodeAnnouncementInfo {
3074 features: NodeFeatures::known(),
3077 alias: NodeAlias([0u8; 32]),
3078 addresses: vec![valid_netaddr],
3079 announcement_message: None,
3082 let mut encoded_valid_node_ann_info = Vec::new();
3083 assert!(valid_node_ann_info.write(&mut encoded_valid_node_ann_info).is_ok());
3084 let read_valid_node_ann_info: NodeAnnouncementInfo = ::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut encoded_valid_node_ann_info.as_slice()).unwrap();
3085 assert_eq!(read_valid_node_ann_info, valid_node_ann_info);
3087 let encoded_invalid_node_ann_info = hex::decode("3f0009000788a000080a51a20204000000000403000000062000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000a0505014004d2").unwrap();
3088 let read_invalid_node_ann_info_res: Result<NodeAnnouncementInfo, ::ln::msgs::DecodeError> = ::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut encoded_invalid_node_ann_info.as_slice());
3089 assert!(read_invalid_node_ann_info_res.is_err());
3091 // 2. Check we can read a NodeInfo anyways, but set the NodeAnnouncementInfo to None if invalid
3092 let valid_node_info = NodeInfo {
3093 channels: Vec::new(),
3094 lowest_inbound_channel_fees: None,
3095 announcement_info: Some(valid_node_ann_info),
3098 let mut encoded_valid_node_info = Vec::new();
3099 assert!(valid_node_info.write(&mut encoded_valid_node_info).is_ok());
3100 let read_valid_node_info: NodeInfo = ::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut encoded_valid_node_info.as_slice()).unwrap();
3101 assert_eq!(read_valid_node_info, valid_node_info);
3103 let encoded_invalid_node_info_hex = hex::decode("4402403f0009000788a000080a51a20204000000000403000000062000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000a0505014004d20400").unwrap();
3104 let read_invalid_node_info: NodeInfo = ::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut encoded_invalid_node_info_hex.as_slice()).unwrap();
3105 assert_eq!(read_invalid_node_info.announcement_info, None);
3109 #[cfg(all(test, feature = "_bench_unstable"))]
3117 fn read_network_graph(bench: &mut Bencher) {
3118 let logger = ::util::test_utils::TestLogger::new();
3119 let mut d = ::routing::router::test_utils::get_route_file().unwrap();
3120 let mut v = Vec::new();
3121 d.read_to_end(&mut v).unwrap();
3123 let _ = NetworkGraph::read(&mut std::io::Cursor::new(&v), &logger).unwrap();
3128 fn write_network_graph(bench: &mut Bencher) {
3129 let logger = ::util::test_utils::TestLogger::new();
3130 let mut d = ::routing::router::test_utils::get_route_file().unwrap();
3131 let net_graph = NetworkGraph::read(&mut d, &logger).unwrap();
3133 let _ = net_graph.encode();