use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxOut,Transaction};
+use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
use ln::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage};
use ln::msgs::DecodeError;
use ln::chan_utils;
-use ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, HTLCOutputInCommitment, HTLCType, ChannelTransactionParameters, HolderCommitmentTransaction};
+use ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, HTLCOutputInCommitment, HTLCClaim, ChannelTransactionParameters, HolderCommitmentTransaction};
use ln::channelmanager::HTLCSource;
use chain;
use chain::{BestBlock, WatchedOutput};
use core::ops::Deref;
use sync::Mutex;
-/// An update generated by the underlying Channel itself which contains some new information the
-/// ChannelMonitor should be made aware of.
+/// An update generated by the underlying channel itself which contains some new information the
+/// [`ChannelMonitor`] should be made aware of.
+///
+/// Because this represents only a small number of updates to the underlying state, it is generally
+/// much smaller than a full [`ChannelMonitor`]. However, for large single commitment transaction
+/// updates (e.g. ones during which there are hundreds of HTLCs pending on the commitment
+/// transaction), a single update may reach upwards of 1 MiB in serialized size.
#[cfg_attr(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils"), derive(PartialEq))]
#[derive(Clone)]
#[must_use]
/// transaction which appeared on chain.
commitment_tx_output_idx: Option<u32>,
},
+ /// An output waiting on [`ANTI_REORG_DELAY`] confirmations before we hand the user the
+ /// [`SpendableOutputDescriptor`].
MaturingOutput {
descriptor: SpendableOutputDescriptor,
},
on_local_output_csv: Option<u16>,
/// If the funding spend transaction was a known remote commitment transaction, we track
/// the output index and amount of the counterparty's `to_self` output here.
+ ///
+ /// This allows us to generate a [`Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable`] for the
+ /// counterparty output.
commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output: CommitmentTxCounterpartyOutputInfo,
},
/// A spend of a commitment transaction HTLC output, set in the cases where *no* `HTLCUpdate`
/// * an inbound HTLC is claimed by us (with a preimage).
/// * a revoked-state HTLC transaction was broadcasted, which was claimed by the revocation
/// signature.
+ /// * a revoked-state HTLC transaction was broadcasted, which was claimed by an
+ /// HTLC-Success/HTLC-Failure transaction (and is still claimable with a revocation
+ /// signature).
HTLCSpendConfirmation {
commitment_tx_output_idx: u32,
/// If the claim was made by either party with a preimage, this is filled in
/// HTLCs which we sent to our counterparty which are claimable after a timeout (less on-chain
/// fees) if the counterparty does not know the preimage for the HTLCs. These are somewhat
/// likely to be claimed by our counterparty before we do.
- MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
- /// The amount available to claim, in satoshis, excluding the on-chain fees which will be
- /// required to do so.
+ MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
+ /// The amount potentially available to claim, in satoshis, excluding the on-chain fees
+ /// which will be required to do so.
claimable_amount_satoshis: u64,
/// The height at which we will be able to claim the balance if our counterparty has not
/// done so.
claimable_height: u32,
},
+ /// HTLCs which we received from our counterparty which are claimable with a preimage which we
+ /// do not currently have. This will only be claimable if we receive the preimage from the node
+ /// to which we forwarded this HTLC before the timeout.
+ MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
+ /// The amount potentially available to claim, in satoshis, excluding the on-chain fees
+ /// which will be required to do so.
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: u64,
+ /// The height at which our counterparty will be able to claim the balance if we have not
+ /// yet received the preimage and claimed it ourselves.
+ expiry_height: u32,
+ },
+ /// The channel has been closed, and our counterparty broadcasted a revoked commitment
+ /// transaction.
+ ///
+ /// Thus, we're able to claim all outputs in the commitment transaction, one of which has the
+ /// following amount.
+ CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
+ /// The amount, in satoshis, of the output which we can claim.
+ ///
+ /// Note that for outputs from HTLC balances this may be excluding some on-chain fees that
+ /// were already spent.
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: u64,
+ },
}
/// An HTLC which has been irrevocably resolved on-chain, and has reached ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
#[derive(PartialEq)]
struct IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC {
- commitment_tx_output_idx: u32,
+ commitment_tx_output_idx: Option<u32>,
+ /// The txid of the transaction which resolved the HTLC, this may be a commitment (if the HTLC
+ /// was not present in the confirmed commitment transaction), HTLC-Success, or HTLC-Timeout
+ /// transaction.
+ resolving_txid: Option<Txid>, // Added as optional, but always filled in, in 0.0.110
/// Only set if the HTLC claim was ours using a payment preimage
payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
}
-impl_writeable_tlv_based!(IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC, {
- (0, commitment_tx_output_idx, required),
- (2, payment_preimage, option),
-});
+// In LDK versions prior to 0.0.111 commitment_tx_output_idx was not Option-al and
+// IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC objects only existed for non-dust HTLCs. This was a bug, but to maintain
+// backwards compatibility we must ensure we always write out a commitment_tx_output_idx field,
+// using `u32::max_value()` as a sentinal to indicate the HTLC was dust.
+impl Writeable for IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC {
+ fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
+ let mapped_commitment_tx_output_idx = self.commitment_tx_output_idx.unwrap_or(u32::max_value());
+ write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
+ (0, mapped_commitment_tx_output_idx, required),
+ (1, self.resolving_txid, option),
+ (2, self.payment_preimage, option),
+ });
+ Ok(())
+ }
+}
+
+impl Readable for IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC {
+ fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
+ let mut mapped_commitment_tx_output_idx = 0;
+ let mut resolving_txid = None;
+ let mut payment_preimage = None;
+ read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
+ (0, mapped_commitment_tx_output_idx, required),
+ (1, resolving_txid, option),
+ (2, payment_preimage, option),
+ });
+ Ok(Self {
+ commitment_tx_output_idx: if mapped_commitment_tx_output_idx == u32::max_value() { None } else { Some(mapped_commitment_tx_output_idx) },
+ resolving_txid,
+ payment_preimage,
+ })
+ }
+}
/// A ChannelMonitor handles chain events (blocks connected and disconnected) and generates
/// on-chain transactions to ensure no loss of funds occurs.
// of block connection between ChannelMonitors and the ChannelManager.
funding_spend_seen: bool,
+ /// Set to `Some` of the confirmed transaction spending the funding input of the channel after
+ /// reaching `ANTI_REORG_DELAY` confirmations.
funding_spend_confirmed: Option<Txid>,
+
confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output: CommitmentTxCounterpartyOutputInfo,
/// The set of HTLCs which have been either claimed or failed on chain and have reached
/// the requisite confirmations on the claim/fail transaction (either ANTI_REORG_DELAY or the
pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
self.inner.lock().unwrap().best_block.clone()
}
+}
+
+impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
+ /// Helper for get_claimable_balances which does the work for an individual HTLC, generating up
+ /// to one `Balance` for the HTLC.
+ fn get_htlc_balance(&self, htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, holder_commitment: bool,
+ counterparty_revoked_commitment: bool, confirmed_txid: Option<Txid>)
+ -> Option<Balance> {
+ let htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx =
+ if let Some(v) = htlc.transaction_output_index { v } else { return None; };
+
+ let mut htlc_spend_txid_opt = None;
+ let mut holder_timeout_spend_pending = None;
+ let mut htlc_spend_pending = None;
+ let mut holder_delayed_output_pending = None;
+ for event in self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter() {
+ match event.event {
+ OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { commitment_tx_output_idx, htlc_value_satoshis, .. }
+ if commitment_tx_output_idx == Some(htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx) => {
+ debug_assert!(htlc_spend_txid_opt.is_none());
+ htlc_spend_txid_opt = event.transaction.as_ref().map(|tx| tx.txid());
+ debug_assert!(holder_timeout_spend_pending.is_none());
+ debug_assert_eq!(htlc_value_satoshis.unwrap(), htlc.amount_msat / 1000);
+ holder_timeout_spend_pending = Some(event.confirmation_threshold());
+ },
+ OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation { commitment_tx_output_idx, preimage, .. }
+ if commitment_tx_output_idx == htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx => {
+ debug_assert!(htlc_spend_txid_opt.is_none());
+ htlc_spend_txid_opt = event.transaction.as_ref().map(|tx| tx.txid());
+ debug_assert!(htlc_spend_pending.is_none());
+ htlc_spend_pending = Some((event.confirmation_threshold(), preimage.is_some()));
+ },
+ OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput {
+ descriptor: SpendableOutputDescriptor::DelayedPaymentOutput(ref descriptor) }
+ if descriptor.outpoint.index as u32 == htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx => {
+ debug_assert!(holder_delayed_output_pending.is_none());
+ holder_delayed_output_pending = Some(event.confirmation_threshold());
+ },
+ _ => {},
+ }
+ }
+ let htlc_resolved = self.htlcs_resolved_on_chain.iter()
+ .find(|v| if v.commitment_tx_output_idx == Some(htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx) {
+ debug_assert!(htlc_spend_txid_opt.is_none());
+ htlc_spend_txid_opt = v.resolving_txid;
+ true
+ } else { false });
+ debug_assert!(holder_timeout_spend_pending.is_some() as u8 + htlc_spend_pending.is_some() as u8 + htlc_resolved.is_some() as u8 <= 1);
+
+ let htlc_output_to_spend =
+ if let Some(txid) = htlc_spend_txid_opt {
+ debug_assert!(
+ self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_none(),
+ "This code needs updating for anchors");
+ BitcoinOutPoint::new(txid, 0)
+ } else {
+ BitcoinOutPoint::new(confirmed_txid.unwrap(), htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx)
+ };
+ let htlc_output_spend_pending = self.onchain_tx_handler.is_output_spend_pending(&htlc_output_to_spend);
+
+ if let Some(conf_thresh) = holder_delayed_output_pending {
+ debug_assert!(holder_commitment);
+ return Some(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
+ confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
+ });
+ } else if htlc_resolved.is_some() && !htlc_output_spend_pending {
+ // Funding transaction spends should be fully confirmed by the time any
+ // HTLC transactions are resolved, unless we're talking about a holder
+ // commitment tx, whose resolution is delayed until the CSV timeout is
+ // reached, even though HTLCs may be resolved after only
+ // ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations.
+ debug_assert!(holder_commitment || self.funding_spend_confirmed.is_some());
+ } else if counterparty_revoked_commitment {
+ let htlc_output_claim_pending = self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find_map(|event| {
+ if let OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput {
+ descriptor: SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput { .. }
+ } = &event.event {
+ if event.transaction.as_ref().map(|tx| tx.input.iter().any(|inp| {
+ if let Some(htlc_spend_txid) = htlc_spend_txid_opt {
+ Some(tx.txid()) == htlc_spend_txid_opt ||
+ inp.previous_output.txid == htlc_spend_txid
+ } else {
+ Some(inp.previous_output.txid) == confirmed_txid &&
+ inp.previous_output.vout == htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx
+ }
+ })).unwrap_or(false) {
+ Some(())
+ } else { None }
+ } else { None }
+ });
+ if htlc_output_claim_pending.is_some() {
+ // We already push `Balance`s onto the `res` list for every
+ // `StaticOutput` in a `MaturingOutput` in the revoked
+ // counterparty commitment transaction case generally, so don't
+ // need to do so again here.
+ } else {
+ debug_assert!(holder_timeout_spend_pending.is_none(),
+ "HTLCUpdate OnchainEvents should never appear for preimage claims");
+ debug_assert!(!htlc.offered || htlc_spend_pending.is_none() || !htlc_spend_pending.unwrap().1,
+ "We don't (currently) generate preimage claims against revoked outputs, where did you get one?!");
+ return Some(Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
+ });
+ }
+ } else if htlc.offered == holder_commitment {
+ // If the payment was outbound, check if there's an HTLCUpdate
+ // indicating we have spent this HTLC with a timeout, claiming it back
+ // and awaiting confirmations on it.
+ if let Some(conf_thresh) = holder_timeout_spend_pending {
+ return Some(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
+ confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
+ });
+ } else {
+ return Some(Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
+ claimable_height: htlc.cltv_expiry,
+ });
+ }
+ } else if self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash).is_some() {
+ // Otherwise (the payment was inbound), only expose it as claimable if
+ // we know the preimage.
+ // Note that if there is a pending claim, but it did not use the
+ // preimage, we lost funds to our counterparty! We will then continue
+ // to show it as ContentiousClaimable until ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
+ debug_assert!(holder_timeout_spend_pending.is_none());
+ if let Some((conf_thresh, true)) = htlc_spend_pending {
+ return Some(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
+ confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
+ });
+ } else {
+ return Some(Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
+ timeout_height: htlc.cltv_expiry,
+ });
+ }
+ } else if htlc_resolved.is_none() {
+ return Some(Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
+ expiry_height: htlc.cltv_expiry,
+ });
+ }
+ None
+ }
+}
+impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
/// Gets the balances in this channel which are either claimable by us if we were to
/// force-close the channel now or which are claimable on-chain (possibly awaiting
/// confirmation).
/// balance, or until our counterparty has claimed the balance and accrued several
/// confirmations on the claim transaction.
///
- /// Note that the balances available when you or your counterparty have broadcasted revoked
- /// state(s) may not be fully captured here.
- // TODO, fix that ^
+ /// Note that for `ChannelMonitors` which track a channel which went on-chain with versions of
+ /// LDK prior to 0.0.111, balances may not be fully captured if our counterparty broadcasted
+ /// a revoked state.
///
/// See [`Balance`] for additional details on the types of claimable balances which
/// may be returned here and their meanings.
let us = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
let mut confirmed_txid = us.funding_spend_confirmed;
+ let mut confirmed_counterparty_output = us.confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output;
let mut pending_commitment_tx_conf_thresh = None;
let funding_spend_pending = us.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find_map(|event| {
- if let OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation { .. } = event.event {
+ if let OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation { commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output, .. } =
+ event.event
+ {
+ confirmed_counterparty_output = commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output;
Some((event.txid, event.confirmation_threshold()))
} else { None }
});
}
macro_rules! walk_htlcs {
- ($holder_commitment: expr, $htlc_iter: expr) => {
+ ($holder_commitment: expr, $counterparty_revoked_commitment: expr, $htlc_iter: expr) => {
for htlc in $htlc_iter {
- if let Some(htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
- if let Some(conf_thresh) = us.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find_map(|event| {
- if let OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput { descriptor: SpendableOutputDescriptor::DelayedPaymentOutput(descriptor) } = &event.event {
- if descriptor.outpoint.index as u32 == htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx { Some(event.confirmation_threshold()) } else { None }
- } else { None }
- }) {
- debug_assert!($holder_commitment);
- res.push(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
- claimable_amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
- confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
- });
- } else if us.htlcs_resolved_on_chain.iter().any(|v| v.commitment_tx_output_idx == htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx) {
- // Funding transaction spends should be fully confirmed by the time any
- // HTLC transactions are resolved, unless we're talking about a holder
- // commitment tx, whose resolution is delayed until the CSV timeout is
- // reached, even though HTLCs may be resolved after only
- // ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations.
- debug_assert!($holder_commitment || us.funding_spend_confirmed.is_some());
- } else if htlc.offered == $holder_commitment {
- // If the payment was outbound, check if there's an HTLCUpdate
- // indicating we have spent this HTLC with a timeout, claiming it back
- // and awaiting confirmations on it.
- let htlc_update_pending = us.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find_map(|event| {
- if let OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { commitment_tx_output_idx: Some(commitment_tx_output_idx), .. } = event.event {
- if commitment_tx_output_idx == htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx {
- Some(event.confirmation_threshold()) } else { None }
- } else { None }
- });
- if let Some(conf_thresh) = htlc_update_pending {
- res.push(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
- claimable_amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
- confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
- });
- } else {
- res.push(Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
- claimable_amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
- claimable_height: htlc.cltv_expiry,
- });
- }
- } else if us.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash).is_some() {
- // Otherwise (the payment was inbound), only expose it as claimable if
- // we know the preimage.
- // Note that if there is a pending claim, but it did not use the
- // preimage, we lost funds to our counterparty! We will then continue
- // to show it as ContentiousClaimable until ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
- let htlc_spend_pending = us.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find_map(|event| {
- if let OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation { commitment_tx_output_idx, preimage, .. } = event.event {
- if commitment_tx_output_idx == htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx {
- Some((event.confirmation_threshold(), preimage.is_some()))
- } else { None }
- } else { None }
- });
- if let Some((conf_thresh, true)) = htlc_spend_pending {
- res.push(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
- claimable_amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
- confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
- });
- } else {
- res.push(Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
- claimable_amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
- timeout_height: htlc.cltv_expiry,
- });
- }
+ if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() {
+
+ if let Some(bal) = us.get_htlc_balance(htlc, $holder_commitment, $counterparty_revoked_commitment, confirmed_txid) {
+ res.push(bal);
}
}
}
if let Some(txid) = confirmed_txid {
let mut found_commitment_tx = false;
- if Some(txid) == us.current_counterparty_commitment_txid || Some(txid) == us.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
- walk_htlcs!(false, us.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&txid).unwrap().iter().map(|(a, _)| a));
+ if let Some(counterparty_tx_htlcs) = us.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&txid) {
+ // First look for the to_remote output back to us.
if let Some(conf_thresh) = pending_commitment_tx_conf_thresh {
if let Some(value) = us.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find_map(|event| {
if let OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput {
// confirmation with the same height or have never met our dust amount.
}
}
+ if Some(txid) == us.current_counterparty_commitment_txid || Some(txid) == us.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
+ walk_htlcs!(false, false, counterparty_tx_htlcs.iter().map(|(a, _)| a));
+ } else {
+ walk_htlcs!(false, true, counterparty_tx_htlcs.iter().map(|(a, _)| a));
+ // The counterparty broadcasted a revoked state!
+ // Look for any StaticOutputs first, generating claimable balances for those.
+ // If any match the confirmed counterparty revoked to_self output, skip
+ // generating a CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable.
+ let mut spent_counterparty_output = false;
+ for event in us.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter() {
+ if let OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput {
+ descriptor: SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput { output, .. }
+ } = &event.event {
+ res.push(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: output.value,
+ confirmation_height: event.confirmation_threshold(),
+ });
+ if let Some(confirmed_to_self_idx) = confirmed_counterparty_output.map(|(idx, _)| idx) {
+ if event.transaction.as_ref().map(|tx|
+ tx.input.iter().any(|inp| inp.previous_output.vout == confirmed_to_self_idx)
+ ).unwrap_or(false) {
+ spent_counterparty_output = true;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ if spent_counterparty_output {
+ } else if let Some((confirmed_to_self_idx, amt)) = confirmed_counterparty_output {
+ let output_spendable = us.onchain_tx_handler
+ .is_output_spend_pending(&BitcoinOutPoint::new(txid, confirmed_to_self_idx));
+ if output_spendable {
+ res.push(Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: amt,
+ });
+ }
+ } else {
+ // Counterparty output is missing, either it was broadcasted on a
+ // previous version of LDK or the counterparty hadn't met dust.
+ }
+ }
found_commitment_tx = true;
} else if txid == us.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid {
- walk_htlcs!(true, us.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|(a, _, _)| a));
+ walk_htlcs!(true, false, us.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|(a, _, _)| a));
if let Some(conf_thresh) = pending_commitment_tx_conf_thresh {
res.push(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
claimable_amount_satoshis: us.current_holder_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat,
found_commitment_tx = true;
} else if let Some(prev_commitment) = &us.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
if txid == prev_commitment.txid {
- walk_htlcs!(true, prev_commitment.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|(a, _, _)| a));
+ walk_htlcs!(true, false, prev_commitment.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|(a, _, _)| a));
if let Some(conf_thresh) = pending_commitment_tx_conf_thresh {
res.push(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
claimable_amount_satoshis: prev_commitment.to_self_value_sat,
});
}
}
- // TODO: Add logic to provide claimable balances for counterparty broadcasting revoked
- // outputs.
} else {
let mut claimable_inbound_htlc_value_sat = 0;
for (htlc, _, _) in us.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_none() { continue; }
if htlc.offered {
- res.push(Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
+ res.push(Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
claimable_amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
claimable_height: htlc.cltv_expiry,
});
} else if us.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash).is_some() {
claimable_inbound_htlc_value_sat += htlc.amount_msat / 1000;
+ } else {
+ // As long as the HTLC is still in our latest commitment state, treat
+ // it as potentially claimable, even if it has long-since expired.
+ res.push(Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
+ expiry_height: htlc.cltv_expiry,
+ });
}
}
res.push(Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
macro_rules! walk_htlcs {
($holder_commitment: expr, $htlc_iter: expr) => {
for (htlc, source) in $htlc_iter {
- if us.htlcs_resolved_on_chain.iter().any(|v| Some(v.commitment_tx_output_idx) == htlc.transaction_output_index) {
+ if us.htlcs_resolved_on_chain.iter().any(|v| v.commitment_tx_output_idx == htlc.transaction_output_index) {
// We should assert that funding_spend_confirmed is_some() here, but we
// have some unit tests which violate HTLC transaction CSVs entirely and
// would fail.
-> (Vec<PackageTemplate>, CommitmentTxCounterpartyOutputInfo) {
let mut claimable_outpoints = Vec::new();
let mut to_counterparty_output_info: CommitmentTxCounterpartyOutputInfo = None;
- if let Some(htlc_outputs) = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&commitment_txid) {
- if let Some(per_commitment_points) = self.their_cur_per_commitment_points {
- let per_commitment_point_option =
- // If the counterparty commitment tx is the latest valid state, use their latest
- // per-commitment point
- if per_commitment_points.0 == commitment_number { Some(&per_commitment_points.1) }
- else if let Some(point) = per_commitment_points.2.as_ref() {
- // If counterparty commitment tx is the state previous to the latest valid state, use
- // their previous per-commitment point (non-atomicity of revocation means it's valid for
- // them to temporarily have two valid commitment txns from our viewpoint)
- if per_commitment_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 { Some(point) } else { None }
- } else { None };
- if let Some(per_commitment_point) = per_commitment_point_option {
- if let Some(transaction) = tx {
- let revokeable_p2wsh_opt =
- if let Ok(revocation_pubkey) = chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(
- &self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &self.holder_revocation_basepoint)
- {
- if let Ok(delayed_key) = chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx,
- &per_commitment_point,
- &self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key)
- {
- Some(chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey,
- self.counterparty_commitment_params.on_counterparty_tx_csv,
- &delayed_key).to_v0_p2wsh())
- } else {
- debug_assert!(false, "Failed to derive a delayed payment key for a commitment state we accepted");
- None
- }
- } else {
- debug_assert!(false, "Failed to derive a revocation pubkey key for a commitment state we accepted");
- None
- };
- if let Some(revokeable_p2wsh) = revokeable_p2wsh_opt {
- for (idx, outp) in transaction.output.iter().enumerate() {
- if outp.script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh {
- to_counterparty_output_info =
- Some((idx.try_into().expect("Can't have > 2^32 outputs"), outp.value));
- }
- }
- }
+
+ let htlc_outputs = match self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&commitment_txid) {
+ Some(outputs) => outputs,
+ None => return (claimable_outpoints, to_counterparty_output_info),
+ };
+ let per_commitment_points = match self.their_cur_per_commitment_points {
+ Some(points) => points,
+ None => return (claimable_outpoints, to_counterparty_output_info),
+ };
+
+ let per_commitment_point =
+ // If the counterparty commitment tx is the latest valid state, use their latest
+ // per-commitment point
+ if per_commitment_points.0 == commitment_number { &per_commitment_points.1 }
+ else if let Some(point) = per_commitment_points.2.as_ref() {
+ // If counterparty commitment tx is the state previous to the latest valid state, use
+ // their previous per-commitment point (non-atomicity of revocation means it's valid for
+ // them to temporarily have two valid commitment txns from our viewpoint)
+ if per_commitment_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 {
+ point
+ } else { return (claimable_outpoints, to_counterparty_output_info); }
+ } else { return (claimable_outpoints, to_counterparty_output_info); };
+
+ if let Some(transaction) = tx {
+ let revokeable_p2wsh_opt =
+ if let Ok(revocation_pubkey) = chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(
+ &self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &self.holder_revocation_basepoint)
+ {
+ if let Ok(delayed_key) = chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx,
+ &per_commitment_point,
+ &self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key)
+ {
+ Some(chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey,
+ self.counterparty_commitment_params.on_counterparty_tx_csv,
+ &delayed_key).to_v0_p2wsh())
+ } else {
+ debug_assert!(false, "Failed to derive a delayed payment key for a commitment state we accepted");
+ None
}
+ } else {
+ debug_assert!(false, "Failed to derive a revocation pubkey key for a commitment state we accepted");
+ None
+ };
+ if let Some(revokeable_p2wsh) = revokeable_p2wsh_opt {
+ for (idx, outp) in transaction.output.iter().enumerate() {
+ if outp.script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh {
+ to_counterparty_output_info =
+ Some((idx.try_into().expect("Can't have > 2^32 outputs"), outp.value));
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
- for (_, &(ref htlc, _)) in htlc_outputs.iter().enumerate() {
- if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
- if let Some(transaction) = tx {
- if transaction_output_index as usize >= transaction.output.len() ||
- transaction.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 {
- // per_commitment_data is corrupt or our commitment signing key leaked!
- return (claimable_outpoints, to_counterparty_output_info);
- }
- }
- let preimage = if htlc.offered { if let Some(p) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) { Some(*p) } else { None } } else { None };
- if preimage.is_some() || !htlc.offered {
- let counterparty_htlc_outp = if htlc.offered {
- PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput(
- CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput::build(*per_commitment_point,
- self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key,
- self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_htlc_base_key,
- preimage.unwrap(), htlc.clone()))
- } else {
- PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput(
- CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput::build(*per_commitment_point,
- self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key,
- self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_htlc_base_key,
- htlc.clone()))
- };
- let aggregation = if !htlc.offered { false } else { true };
- let counterparty_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(commitment_txid, transaction_output_index, counterparty_htlc_outp, htlc.cltv_expiry,aggregation, 0);
- claimable_outpoints.push(counterparty_package);
- }
+ for (_, &(ref htlc, _)) in htlc_outputs.iter().enumerate() {
+ if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
+ if let Some(transaction) = tx {
+ if transaction_output_index as usize >= transaction.output.len() ||
+ transaction.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 {
+ // per_commitment_data is corrupt or our commitment signing key leaked!
+ return (claimable_outpoints, to_counterparty_output_info);
}
- }
+ }
+ let preimage = if htlc.offered { if let Some(p) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) { Some(*p) } else { None } } else { None };
+ if preimage.is_some() || !htlc.offered {
+ let counterparty_htlc_outp = if htlc.offered {
+ PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput(
+ CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput::build(*per_commitment_point,
+ self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key,
+ self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_htlc_base_key,
+ preimage.unwrap(), htlc.clone()))
+ } else {
+ PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput(
+ CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput::build(*per_commitment_point,
+ self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key,
+ self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_htlc_base_key,
+ htlc.clone()))
+ };
+ let aggregation = if !htlc.offered { false } else { true };
+ let counterparty_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(commitment_txid, transaction_output_index, counterparty_htlc_outp, htlc.cltv_expiry,aggregation, 0);
+ claimable_outpoints.push(counterparty_package);
}
}
}
+
(claimable_outpoints, to_counterparty_output_info)
}
let commitment_tx = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_holder_tx(&self.funding_redeemscript);
let txid = commitment_tx.txid();
let mut holder_transactions = vec![commitment_tx];
+ // When anchor outputs are present, the HTLC transactions are only valid once the commitment
+ // transaction confirms.
+ if self.onchain_tx_handler.opt_anchors() {
+ return holder_transactions;
+ }
for htlc in self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
if let Some(vout) = htlc.0.transaction_output_index {
let preimage = if !htlc.0.offered {
let commitment_tx = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_copy_holder_tx(&self.funding_redeemscript);
let txid = commitment_tx.txid();
let mut holder_transactions = vec![commitment_tx];
+ // When anchor outputs are present, the HTLC transactions are only final once the commitment
+ // transaction confirms due to the CSV 1 encumberance.
+ if self.onchain_tx_handler.opt_anchors() {
+ return holder_transactions;
+ }
for htlc in self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
if let Some(vout) = htlc.0.transaction_output_index {
let preimage = if !htlc.0.offered {
source: source.clone(),
htlc_value_satoshis,
}));
- if let Some(idx) = commitment_tx_output_idx {
- self.htlcs_resolved_on_chain.push(IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC { commitment_tx_output_idx: idx, payment_preimage: None });
- }
+ self.htlcs_resolved_on_chain.push(IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC {
+ commitment_tx_output_idx, resolving_txid: Some(entry.txid),
+ payment_preimage: None,
+ });
},
OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput { descriptor } => {
log_debug!(logger, "Descriptor {} has got enough confirmations to be passed upstream", log_spendable!(descriptor));
});
},
OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation { commitment_tx_output_idx, preimage, .. } => {
- self.htlcs_resolved_on_chain.push(IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC { commitment_tx_output_idx, payment_preimage: preimage });
+ self.htlcs_resolved_on_chain.push(IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC {
+ commitment_tx_output_idx: Some(commitment_tx_output_idx), resolving_txid: Some(entry.txid),
+ payment_preimage: preimage,
+ });
},
OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation { commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output, .. } => {
self.funding_spend_confirmed = Some(entry.txid);
}
fn should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> bool where L::Target: Logger {
+ // There's no need to broadcast our commitment transaction if we've seen one confirmed (even
+ // with 1 confirmation) as it'll be rejected as duplicate/conflicting.
+ if self.funding_spend_confirmed.is_some() ||
+ self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find(|event| match event.event {
+ OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation { .. } => true,
+ _ => false,
+ }).is_some()
+ {
+ return false;
+ }
// We need to consider all HTLCs which are:
// * in any unrevoked counterparty commitment transaction, as they could broadcast said
// transactions and we'd end up in a race, or
fn is_resolving_htlc_output<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
'outer_loop: for input in &tx.input {
let mut payment_data = None;
- let witness_items = input.witness.len();
- let htlctype = input.witness.last().map(|w| w.len()).and_then(HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype);
- let prev_last_witness_len = input.witness.second_to_last().map(|w| w.len()).unwrap_or(0);
- let revocation_sig_claim = (witness_items == 3 && htlctype == Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC) && prev_last_witness_len == 33)
- || (witness_items == 3 && htlctype == Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC) && prev_last_witness_len == 33);
- let accepted_preimage_claim = witness_items == 5 && htlctype == Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC)
- && input.witness.second_to_last().unwrap().len() == 32;
+ let htlc_claim = HTLCClaim::from_witness(&input.witness);
+ let revocation_sig_claim = htlc_claim == Some(HTLCClaim::Revocation);
+ let accepted_preimage_claim = htlc_claim == Some(HTLCClaim::AcceptedPreimage);
#[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
- let accepted_timeout_claim = witness_items == 3 && htlctype == Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC) && !revocation_sig_claim;
- let offered_preimage_claim = witness_items == 3 && htlctype == Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC) &&
- !revocation_sig_claim && input.witness.second_to_last().unwrap().len() == 32;
-
+ let accepted_timeout_claim = htlc_claim == Some(HTLCClaim::AcceptedTimeout);
+ let offered_preimage_claim = htlc_claim == Some(HTLCClaim::OfferedPreimage);
#[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
- let offered_timeout_claim = witness_items == 5 && htlctype == Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC);
+ let offered_timeout_claim = htlc_claim == Some(HTLCClaim::OfferedTimeout);
let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
- if accepted_preimage_claim {
- payment_preimage.0.copy_from_slice(input.witness.second_to_last().unwrap());
- } else if offered_preimage_claim {
+ if offered_preimage_claim || accepted_preimage_claim {
payment_preimage.0.copy_from_slice(input.witness.second_to_last().unwrap());
}
log_error!(logger, "Input spending {} ({}:{}) in {} resolves {} HTLC with payment hash {} with {}!",
$tx_info, input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, tx.txid(),
if outbound_htlc { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0),
- if revocation_sig_claim { "revocation sig" } else { "preimage claim after we'd passed the HTLC resolution back" });
+ if revocation_sig_claim { "revocation sig" } else { "preimage claim after we'd passed the HTLC resolution back. We can likely claim the HTLC output with a revocation claim" });
} else {
log_info!(logger, "Input spending {} ({}:{}) in {} resolves {} HTLC with payment hash {} with {}",
$tx_info, input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, tx.txid(),
if payment_data.is_none() {
log_claim!($tx_info, $holder_tx, htlc_output, false);
let outbound_htlc = $holder_tx == htlc_output.offered;
- if !outbound_htlc || revocation_sig_claim {
- self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(OnchainEventEntry {
- txid: tx.txid(), height, transaction: Some(tx.clone()),
- event: OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation {
- commitment_tx_output_idx: input.previous_output.vout,
- preimage: if accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim {
- Some(payment_preimage) } else { None },
- // If this is a payment to us (!outbound_htlc, above),
- // wait for the CSV delay before dropping the HTLC from
- // claimable balance if the claim was an HTLC-Success
- // transaction.
- on_to_local_output_csv: if accepted_preimage_claim {
- Some(self.on_holder_tx_csv) } else { None },
- },
- });
- } else {
- // Outbound claims should always have payment_data, unless
- // we've already failed the HTLC as the commitment transaction
- // which was broadcasted was revoked. In that case, we should
- // spend the HTLC output here immediately, and expose that fact
- // as a Balance, something which we do not yet do.
- // TODO: Track the above as claimable!
- }
+ self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(OnchainEventEntry {
+ txid: tx.txid(), height, transaction: Some(tx.clone()),
+ event: OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation {
+ commitment_tx_output_idx: input.previous_output.vout,
+ preimage: if accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim {
+ Some(payment_preimage) } else { None },
+ // If this is a payment to us (ie !outbound_htlc), wait for
+ // the CSV delay before dropping the HTLC from claimable
+ // balance if the claim was an HTLC-Success transaction (ie
+ // accepted_preimage_claim).
+ on_to_local_output_csv: if accepted_preimage_claim && !outbound_htlc {
+ Some(self.on_holder_tx_csv) } else { None },
+ },
+ });
continue 'outer_loop;
}
}
use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
use ln::chan_utils;
use ln::chan_utils::{HTLCOutputInCommitment, ChannelPublicKeys, ChannelTransactionParameters, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters};
- use ln::channelmanager::PaymentSendFailure;
- use ln::features::InitFeatures;
+ use ln::channelmanager::{self, PaymentSendFailure};
use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
use ln::script::ShutdownScript;
use util::errors::APIError;
let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
let channel = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(
- &nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
+ &nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
create_announced_chan_between_nodes(
- &nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
+ &nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
// Rebalance somewhat
send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10_000_000);