//! security-domain-separated system design, you should consider having multiple paths for
//! ChannelMonitors to get out of the HSM and onto monitoring devices.
-use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
+use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxOut,Transaction};
use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash, WPubkeyHash};
-use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Signature};
-use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
+use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, ecdsa::Signature};
+use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey, PublicKey};
use bitcoin::secp256k1;
use ln::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage};
use ln::channelmanager::HTLCSource;
use chain;
use chain::{BestBlock, WatchedOutput};
-use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, FeeEstimator};
+use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
use chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
use chain::keysinterface::{SpendableOutputDescriptor, StaticPaymentOutputDescriptor, DelayedPaymentOutputDescriptor, Sign, KeysInterface};
use chain::onchaintx::OnchainTxHandler;
/// An update generated by the underlying Channel itself which contains some new information the
/// ChannelMonitor should be made aware of.
-#[cfg_attr(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget", feature = "_test_utils"), derive(PartialEq))]
+#[cfg_attr(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils"), derive(PartialEq))]
#[derive(Clone)]
#[must_use]
pub struct ChannelMonitorUpdate {
pub(crate) payment_hash: PaymentHash,
pub(crate) payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
pub(crate) source: HTLCSource,
- pub(crate) onchain_value_satoshis: Option<u64>,
+ pub(crate) htlc_value_satoshis: Option<u64>,
}
impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCUpdate, {
(0, payment_hash, required),
- (1, onchain_value_satoshis, option),
+ (1, htlc_value_satoshis, option),
(2, source, required),
(4, payment_preimage, option),
});
HTLCUpdate {
source: HTLCSource,
payment_hash: PaymentHash,
- onchain_value_satoshis: Option<u64>,
+ htlc_value_satoshis: Option<u64>,
/// None in the second case, above, ie when there is no relevant output in the commitment
/// transaction which appeared on chain.
- input_idx: Option<u32>,
+ commitment_tx_output_idx: Option<u32>,
},
MaturingOutput {
descriptor: SpendableOutputDescriptor,
/// * a revoked-state HTLC transaction was broadcasted, which was claimed by the revocation
/// signature.
HTLCSpendConfirmation {
- input_idx: u32,
+ commitment_tx_output_idx: u32,
/// If the claim was made by either party with a preimage, this is filled in
preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
/// If the claim was made by us on an inbound HTLC against a local commitment transaction,
impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(OnchainEvent,
(0, HTLCUpdate) => {
(0, source, required),
- (1, onchain_value_satoshis, option),
+ (1, htlc_value_satoshis, option),
(2, payment_hash, required),
- (3, input_idx, option),
+ (3, commitment_tx_output_idx, option),
},
(1, MaturingOutput) => {
(0, descriptor, required),
(0, on_local_output_csv, option),
},
(5, HTLCSpendConfirmation) => {
- (0, input_idx, required),
+ (0, commitment_tx_output_idx, required),
(2, preimage, option),
(4, on_to_local_output_csv, option),
},
);
-#[cfg_attr(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget", feature = "_test_utils"), derive(PartialEq))]
+#[cfg_attr(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils"), derive(PartialEq))]
#[derive(Clone)]
pub(crate) enum ChannelMonitorUpdateStep {
LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
commitment_txid: Txid,
htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>,
commitment_number: u64,
- their_revocation_point: PublicKey,
+ their_per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
},
PaymentPreimage {
payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
},
}
+impl ChannelMonitorUpdateStep {
+ fn variant_name(&self) -> &'static str {
+ match self {
+ ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo { .. } => "LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo",
+ ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo { .. } => "LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo",
+ ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { .. } => "PaymentPreimage",
+ ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret { .. } => "CommitmentSecret",
+ ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { .. } => "ChannelForceClosed",
+ ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript { .. } => "ShutdownScript",
+ }
+ }
+}
+
impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep,
(0, LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo) => {
(0, commitment_tx, required),
(1, LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo) => {
(0, commitment_txid, required),
(2, commitment_number, required),
- (4, their_revocation_point, required),
+ (4, their_per_commitment_point, required),
(6, htlc_outputs, vec_type),
},
(2, PaymentPreimage) => {
/// An HTLC which has been irrevocably resolved on-chain, and has reached ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
#[derive(PartialEq)]
struct IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC {
- input_idx: u32,
+ commitment_tx_output_idx: u32,
/// Only set if the HTLC claim was ours using a payment preimage
payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
}
impl_writeable_tlv_based!(IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC, {
- (0, input_idx, required),
+ (0, commitment_tx_output_idx, required),
(2, payment_preimage, option),
});
counterparty_commitment_params: CounterpartyCommitmentParameters,
funding_redeemscript: Script,
channel_value_satoshis: u64,
- // first is the idx of the first of the two revocation points
- their_cur_revocation_points: Option<(u64, PublicKey, Option<PublicKey>)>,
+ // first is the idx of the first of the two per-commitment points
+ their_cur_per_commitment_points: Option<(u64, PublicKey, Option<PublicKey>)>,
on_holder_tx_csv: u16,
// deserialization
current_holder_commitment_number: u64,
+ /// The set of payment hashes from inbound payments for which we know the preimage. Payment
+ /// preimages that are not included in any unrevoked local commitment transaction or unrevoked
+ /// remote commitment transactions are automatically removed when commitment transactions are
+ /// revoked.
payment_preimages: HashMap<PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage>,
// Note that `MonitorEvent`s MUST NOT be generated during update processing, only generated
// the full block_connected).
best_block: BestBlock,
+ /// The node_id of our counterparty
+ counterparty_node_id: Option<PublicKey>,
+
secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>, //TODO: dedup this a bit...
}
/// Transaction outputs to watch for on-chain spends.
pub type TransactionOutputs = (Txid, Vec<(u32, TxOut)>);
-#[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget", feature = "_test_utils"))]
-/// Used only in testing and fuzztarget to check serialization roundtrips don't change the
-/// underlying object
+#[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils"))]
+/// Used only in testing and fuzzing to check serialization roundtrips don't change the underlying
+/// object
impl<Signer: Sign> PartialEq for ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
let inner = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
}
}
-#[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget", feature = "_test_utils"))]
-/// Used only in testing and fuzztarget to check serialization roundtrips don't change the
-/// underlying object
+#[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils"))]
+/// Used only in testing and fuzzing to check serialization roundtrips don't change the underlying
+/// object
impl<Signer: Sign> PartialEq for ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
if self.latest_update_id != other.latest_update_id ||
self.counterparty_commitment_params != other.counterparty_commitment_params ||
self.funding_redeemscript != other.funding_redeemscript ||
self.channel_value_satoshis != other.channel_value_satoshis ||
- self.their_cur_revocation_points != other.their_cur_revocation_points ||
+ self.their_cur_per_commitment_points != other.their_cur_per_commitment_points ||
self.on_holder_tx_csv != other.on_holder_tx_csv ||
self.commitment_secrets != other.commitment_secrets ||
self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints != other.counterparty_claimable_outpoints ||
self.funding_redeemscript.write(writer)?;
self.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
- match self.their_cur_revocation_points {
+ match self.their_cur_per_commitment_points {
Some((idx, pubkey, second_option)) => {
writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(idx))?;
writer.write_all(&pubkey.serialize())?;
writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc_infos.len() as u64))?;
for &(ref htlc_output, ref htlc_source) in htlc_infos.iter() {
+ debug_assert!(htlc_source.is_none() || Some(**txid) == self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid
+ || Some(**txid) == self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid,
+ "HTLC Sources for all revoked commitment transactions should be none!");
serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output);
htlc_source.as_ref().map(|b| b.as_ref()).write(writer)?;
}
(3, self.htlcs_resolved_on_chain, vec_type),
(5, self.pending_monitor_events, vec_type),
(7, self.funding_spend_seen, required),
+ (9, self.counterparty_node_id, option),
});
Ok(())
}
impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
+ /// For lockorder enforcement purposes, we need to have a single site which constructs the
+ /// `inner` mutex, otherwise cases where we lock two monitors at the same time (eg in our
+ /// PartialEq implementation) we may decide a lockorder violation has occurred.
+ fn from_impl(imp: ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer>) -> Self {
+ ChannelMonitor { inner: Mutex::new(imp) }
+ }
+
pub(crate) fn new(secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>, keys: Signer, shutdown_script: Option<Script>,
on_counterparty_tx_csv: u16, destination_script: &Script, funding_info: (OutPoint, Script),
channel_parameters: &ChannelTransactionParameters,
funding_redeemscript: Script, channel_value_satoshis: u64,
commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64,
initial_holder_commitment_tx: HolderCommitmentTransaction,
- best_block: BestBlock) -> ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
+ best_block: BestBlock, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey) -> ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
assert!(commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor <= (1 << 48));
let payment_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&keys.pubkeys().payment_point.serialize());
let mut outputs_to_watch = HashMap::new();
outputs_to_watch.insert(funding_info.0.txid, vec![(funding_info.0.index as u32, funding_info.1.clone())]);
- ChannelMonitor {
- inner: Mutex::new(ChannelMonitorImpl {
- latest_update_id: 0,
- commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor,
+ Self::from_impl(ChannelMonitorImpl {
+ latest_update_id: 0,
+ commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor,
- destination_script: destination_script.clone(),
- broadcasted_holder_revokable_script: None,
- counterparty_payment_script,
- shutdown_script,
+ destination_script: destination_script.clone(),
+ broadcasted_holder_revokable_script: None,
+ counterparty_payment_script,
+ shutdown_script,
- channel_keys_id,
- holder_revocation_basepoint,
- funding_info,
- current_counterparty_commitment_txid: None,
- prev_counterparty_commitment_txid: None,
+ channel_keys_id,
+ holder_revocation_basepoint,
+ funding_info,
+ current_counterparty_commitment_txid: None,
+ prev_counterparty_commitment_txid: None,
- counterparty_commitment_params,
- funding_redeemscript,
- channel_value_satoshis,
- their_cur_revocation_points: None,
+ counterparty_commitment_params,
+ funding_redeemscript,
+ channel_value_satoshis,
+ their_cur_per_commitment_points: None,
- on_holder_tx_csv: counterparty_channel_parameters.selected_contest_delay,
+ on_holder_tx_csv: counterparty_channel_parameters.selected_contest_delay,
- commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
- counterparty_claimable_outpoints: HashMap::new(),
- counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain: HashMap::new(),
- counterparty_hash_commitment_number: HashMap::new(),
+ commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
+ counterparty_claimable_outpoints: HashMap::new(),
+ counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain: HashMap::new(),
+ counterparty_hash_commitment_number: HashMap::new(),
- prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx: None,
- current_holder_commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
- current_counterparty_commitment_number: 1 << 48,
- current_holder_commitment_number,
+ prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx: None,
+ current_holder_commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
+ current_counterparty_commitment_number: 1 << 48,
+ current_holder_commitment_number,
- payment_preimages: HashMap::new(),
- pending_monitor_events: Vec::new(),
- pending_events: Vec::new(),
+ payment_preimages: HashMap::new(),
+ pending_monitor_events: Vec::new(),
+ pending_events: Vec::new(),
- onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf: Vec::new(),
- outputs_to_watch,
+ onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf: Vec::new(),
+ outputs_to_watch,
- onchain_tx_handler,
+ onchain_tx_handler,
- lockdown_from_offchain: false,
- holder_tx_signed: false,
- funding_spend_seen: false,
- funding_spend_confirmed: None,
- htlcs_resolved_on_chain: Vec::new(),
+ lockdown_from_offchain: false,
+ holder_tx_signed: false,
+ funding_spend_seen: false,
+ funding_spend_confirmed: None,
+ htlcs_resolved_on_chain: Vec::new(),
- best_block,
+ best_block,
+ counterparty_node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id),
- secp_ctx,
- }),
- }
+ secp_ctx,
+ })
}
#[cfg(test)]
txid: Txid,
htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>,
commitment_number: u64,
- their_revocation_point: PublicKey,
+ their_per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
logger: &L,
) where L::Target: Logger {
self.inner.lock().unwrap().provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(
- txid, htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_revocation_point, logger)
+ txid, htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_per_commitment_point, logger)
}
#[cfg(test)]
self.inner.lock().unwrap().provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(holder_commitment_tx, htlc_outputs).map_err(|_| ())
}
- #[cfg(test)]
+ /// This is used to provide payment preimage(s) out-of-band during startup without updating the
+ /// off-chain state with a new commitment transaction.
pub(crate) fn provide_payment_preimage<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
&self,
payment_hash: &PaymentHash,
payment_preimage: &PaymentPreimage,
broadcaster: &B,
- fee_estimator: &F,
+ fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
logger: &L,
) where
B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
&self,
updates: &ChannelMonitorUpdate,
broadcaster: &B,
- fee_estimator: &F,
+ fee_estimator: F,
logger: &L,
) -> Result<(), ()>
where
self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_cur_holder_commitment_number()
}
+ /// Gets the `node_id` of the counterparty for this channel.
+ ///
+ /// Will be `None` for channels constructed on LDK versions prior to 0.0.110 and always `Some`
+ /// otherwise.
+ pub fn get_counterparty_node_id(&self) -> Option<PublicKey> {
+ self.inner.lock().unwrap().counterparty_node_id
+ }
+
/// Used by ChannelManager deserialization to broadcast the latest holder state if its copy of
/// the Channel was out-of-date. You may use it to get a broadcastable holder toxic tx in case of
/// fallen-behind, i.e when receiving a channel_reestablish with a proof that our counterparty side knows
F::Target: FeeEstimator,
L::Target: Logger,
{
+ let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_estimator);
self.inner.lock().unwrap().transactions_confirmed(
- header, txdata, height, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger)
+ header, txdata, height, broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, logger)
}
/// Processes a transaction that was reorganized out of the chain.
F::Target: FeeEstimator,
L::Target: Logger,
{
+ let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_estimator);
self.inner.lock().unwrap().transaction_unconfirmed(
- txid, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
+ txid, broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, logger);
}
/// Updates the monitor with the current best chain tip, returning new outputs to watch. See
F::Target: FeeEstimator,
L::Target: Logger,
{
+ let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_estimator);
self.inner.lock().unwrap().best_block_updated(
- header, height, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger)
+ header, height, broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, logger)
}
/// Returns the set of txids that should be monitored for re-organization out of the chain.
macro_rules! walk_htlcs {
($holder_commitment: expr, $htlc_iter: expr) => {
for htlc in $htlc_iter {
- if let Some(htlc_input_idx) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
- if us.htlcs_resolved_on_chain.iter().any(|v| v.input_idx == htlc_input_idx) {
- assert!(us.funding_spend_confirmed.is_some());
+ if let Some(htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
+ if let Some(conf_thresh) = us.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find_map(|event| {
+ if let OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput { descriptor: SpendableOutputDescriptor::DelayedPaymentOutput(descriptor) } = &event.event {
+ if descriptor.outpoint.index as u32 == htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx { Some(event.confirmation_threshold()) } else { None }
+ } else { None }
+ }) {
+ debug_assert!($holder_commitment);
+ res.push(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
+ confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
+ });
+ } else if us.htlcs_resolved_on_chain.iter().any(|v| v.commitment_tx_output_idx == htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx) {
+ // Funding transaction spends should be fully confirmed by the time any
+ // HTLC transactions are resolved, unless we're talking about a holder
+ // commitment tx, whose resolution is delayed until the CSV timeout is
+ // reached, even though HTLCs may be resolved after only
+ // ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations.
+ debug_assert!($holder_commitment || us.funding_spend_confirmed.is_some());
} else if htlc.offered == $holder_commitment {
// If the payment was outbound, check if there's an HTLCUpdate
// indicating we have spent this HTLC with a timeout, claiming it back
// and awaiting confirmations on it.
let htlc_update_pending = us.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find_map(|event| {
- if let OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { input_idx: Some(input_idx), .. } = event.event {
- if input_idx == htlc_input_idx { Some(event.confirmation_threshold()) } else { None }
+ if let OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { commitment_tx_output_idx: Some(commitment_tx_output_idx), .. } = event.event {
+ if commitment_tx_output_idx == htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx {
+ Some(event.confirmation_threshold()) } else { None }
} else { None }
});
if let Some(conf_thresh) = htlc_update_pending {
// preimage, we lost funds to our counterparty! We will then continue
// to show it as ContentiousClaimable until ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
let htlc_spend_pending = us.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find_map(|event| {
- if let OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation { input_idx, preimage, .. } = event.event {
- if input_idx == htlc_input_idx {
+ if let OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation { commitment_tx_output_idx, preimage, .. } = event.event {
+ if commitment_tx_output_idx == htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx {
Some((event.confirmation_threshold(), preimage.is_some()))
} else { None }
} else { None }
macro_rules! walk_htlcs {
($holder_commitment: expr, $htlc_iter: expr) => {
for (htlc, source) in $htlc_iter {
- if us.htlcs_resolved_on_chain.iter().any(|v| Some(v.input_idx) == htlc.transaction_output_index) {
+ if us.htlcs_resolved_on_chain.iter().any(|v| Some(v.commitment_tx_output_idx) == htlc.transaction_output_index) {
// We should assert that funding_spend_confirmed is_some() here, but we
// have some unit tests which violate HTLC transaction CSVs entirely and
// would fail.
// indicating we have spent this HTLC with a timeout, claiming it back
// and awaiting confirmations on it.
let htlc_update_confd = us.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().any(|event| {
- if let OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { input_idx: Some(input_idx), .. } = event.event {
+ if let OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { commitment_tx_output_idx: Some(commitment_tx_output_idx), .. } = event.event {
// If the HTLC was timed out, we wait for ANTI_REORG_DELAY blocks
// before considering it "no longer pending" - this matches when we
// provide the ChannelManager an HTLC failure event.
- Some(input_idx) == htlc.transaction_output_index &&
+ Some(commitment_tx_output_idx) == htlc.transaction_output_index &&
us.best_block.height() >= event.height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1
- } else if let OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation { input_idx, .. } = event.event {
+ } else if let OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation { commitment_tx_output_idx, .. } = event.event {
// If the HTLC was fulfilled with a preimage, we consider the HTLC
// immediately non-pending, matching when we provide ChannelManager
// the preimage.
- Some(input_idx) == htlc.transaction_output_index
+ Some(commitment_tx_output_idx) == htlc.transaction_output_index
} else { false }
});
if !htlc_update_confd {
res
}
+
+ pub(crate) fn get_stored_preimages(&self) -> HashMap<PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage> {
+ self.inner.lock().unwrap().payment_preimages.clone()
+ }
}
/// Compares a broadcasted commitment transaction's HTLCs with those in the latest state,
/// as long as we examine both the current counterparty commitment transaction and, if it hasn't
/// been revoked yet, the previous one, we we will never "forget" to resolve an HTLC.
macro_rules! fail_unbroadcast_htlcs {
- ($self: expr, $commitment_tx_type: expr, $commitment_tx_conf_height: expr, $confirmed_htlcs_list: expr, $logger: expr) => { {
+ ($self: expr, $commitment_tx_type: expr, $commitment_txid_confirmed: expr,
+ $commitment_tx_conf_height: expr, $confirmed_htlcs_list: expr, $logger: expr) => { {
macro_rules! check_htlc_fails {
($txid: expr, $commitment_tx: expr) => {
if let Some(ref latest_outpoints) = $self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get($txid) {
// cannot currently change after channel initialization, so we don't
// need to here.
let confirmed_htlcs_iter: &mut Iterator<Item = (&HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = &mut $confirmed_htlcs_list;
+
let mut matched_htlc = false;
for (ref broadcast_htlc, ref broadcast_source) in confirmed_htlcs_iter {
- if broadcast_htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() && Some(&**source) == *broadcast_source {
+ if broadcast_htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() &&
+ (Some(&**source) == *broadcast_source ||
+ (broadcast_source.is_none() &&
+ broadcast_htlc.payment_hash == htlc.payment_hash &&
+ broadcast_htlc.amount_msat == htlc.amount_msat)) {
matched_htlc = true;
break;
}
}
});
let entry = OnchainEventEntry {
- txid: *$txid,
+ txid: $commitment_txid_confirmed,
height: $commitment_tx_conf_height,
event: OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate {
source: (**source).clone(),
payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash.clone(),
- onchain_value_satoshis: Some(htlc.amount_msat / 1000),
- input_idx: None,
+ htlc_value_satoshis: Some(htlc.amount_msat / 1000),
+ commitment_tx_output_idx: None,
},
};
- log_trace!($logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} counterparty commitment tx due to broadcast of {} commitment transaction, waiting for confirmation (at height {})",
- log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx, $commitment_tx_type, entry.confirmation_threshold());
+ log_trace!($logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} counterparty commitment tx due to broadcast of {} commitment transaction {}, waiting for confirmation (at height {})",
+ log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx, $commitment_tx_type,
+ $commitment_txid_confirmed, entry.confirmation_threshold());
$self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(entry);
}
}
} }
}
+// In the `test_invalid_funding_tx` test, we need a bogus script which matches the HTLC-Accepted
+// witness length match (ie is 136 bytes long). We generate one here which we also use in some
+// in-line tests later.
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+pub fn deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness_program() -> Vec<u8> {
+ let mut ret = [opcodes::all::OP_NOP.into_u8(); 136];
+ ret[131] = opcodes::all::OP_DROP.into_u8();
+ ret[132] = opcodes::all::OP_DROP.into_u8();
+ ret[133] = opcodes::all::OP_DROP.into_u8();
+ ret[134] = opcodes::all::OP_DROP.into_u8();
+ ret[135] = opcodes::OP_TRUE.into_u8();
+ Vec::from(&ret[..])
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+pub fn deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness() -> Vec<Vec<u8>> {
+ vec![Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness_program().into()].into()
+}
+
impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
/// Inserts a revocation secret into this channel monitor. Prunes old preimages if neither
/// needed by holder commitment transactions HTCLs nor by counterparty ones. Unless we haven't already seen
Ok(())
}
- pub(crate) fn provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx<L: Deref>(&mut self, txid: Txid, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>, commitment_number: u64, their_revocation_point: PublicKey, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
+ pub(crate) fn provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx<L: Deref>(&mut self, txid: Txid, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>, commitment_number: u64, their_per_commitment_point: PublicKey, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
// TODO: Encrypt the htlc_outputs data with the single-hash of the commitment transaction
// so that a remote monitor doesn't learn anything unless there is a malicious close.
// (only maybe, sadly we cant do the same for local info, as we need to be aware of
self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, htlc_outputs.clone());
self.current_counterparty_commitment_number = commitment_number;
//TODO: Merge this into the other per-counterparty-transaction output storage stuff
- match self.their_cur_revocation_points {
+ match self.their_cur_per_commitment_points {
Some(old_points) => {
if old_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 {
- self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0, old_points.1, Some(their_revocation_point)));
+ self.their_cur_per_commitment_points = Some((old_points.0, old_points.1, Some(their_per_commitment_point)));
} else if old_points.0 == commitment_number + 2 {
if let Some(old_second_point) = old_points.2 {
- self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0 - 1, old_second_point, Some(their_revocation_point)));
+ self.their_cur_per_commitment_points = Some((old_points.0 - 1, old_second_point, Some(their_per_commitment_point)));
} else {
- self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None));
+ self.their_cur_per_commitment_points = Some((commitment_number, their_per_commitment_point, None));
}
} else {
- self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None));
+ self.their_cur_per_commitment_points = Some((commitment_number, their_per_commitment_point, None));
}
},
None => {
- self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None));
+ self.their_cur_per_commitment_points = Some((commitment_number, their_per_commitment_point, None));
}
}
let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_outputs.len());
/// Provides a payment_hash->payment_preimage mapping. Will be automatically pruned when all
/// commitment_tx_infos which contain the payment hash have been revoked.
- fn provide_payment_preimage<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_preimage: &PaymentPreimage, broadcaster: &B, fee_estimator: &F, logger: &L)
+ fn provide_payment_preimage<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
+ &mut self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_preimage: &PaymentPreimage, broadcaster: &B,
+ fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
F::Target: FeeEstimator,
L::Target: Logger,
self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(self.funding_info.0));
}
- pub fn update_monitor<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, updates: &ChannelMonitorUpdate, broadcaster: &B, fee_estimator: &F, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ()>
+ pub fn update_monitor<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, updates: &ChannelMonitorUpdate, broadcaster: &B, fee_estimator: F, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ()>
where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
- F::Target: FeeEstimator,
- L::Target: Logger,
+ F::Target: FeeEstimator,
+ L::Target: Logger,
{
+ log_info!(logger, "Applying update to monitor {}, bringing update_id from {} to {} with {} changes.",
+ log_funding_info!(self), self.latest_update_id, updates.update_id, updates.updates.len());
// ChannelMonitor updates may be applied after force close if we receive a
// preimage for a broadcasted commitment transaction HTLC output that we'd
// like to claim on-chain. If this is the case, we no longer have guaranteed
// access to the monitor's update ID, so we use a sentinel value instead.
if updates.update_id == CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID {
+ assert_eq!(updates.updates.len(), 1);
match updates.updates[0] {
ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { .. } => {},
- _ => panic!("Attempted to apply post-force-close ChannelMonitorUpdate that wasn't providing a payment preimage"),
+ _ => {
+ log_error!(logger, "Attempted to apply post-force-close ChannelMonitorUpdate of type {}", updates.updates[0].variant_name());
+ panic!("Attempted to apply post-force-close ChannelMonitorUpdate that wasn't providing a payment preimage");
+ },
}
- assert_eq!(updates.updates.len(), 1);
} else if self.latest_update_id + 1 != updates.update_id {
panic!("Attempted to apply ChannelMonitorUpdates out of order, check the update_id before passing an update to update_monitor!");
}
ret = Err(());
}
}
- ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo { commitment_txid, htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_revocation_point } => {
+ ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo { commitment_txid, htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_per_commitment_point } => {
log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor with latest counterparty commitment transaction info");
- self.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(*commitment_txid, htlc_outputs.clone(), *commitment_number, *their_revocation_point, logger)
+ self.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(*commitment_txid, htlc_outputs.clone(), *commitment_number, *their_per_commitment_point, logger)
},
ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { payment_preimage } => {
log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor with payment preimage");
- self.provide_payment_preimage(&PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner()), &payment_preimage, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger)
+ let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&*fee_estimator);
+ self.provide_payment_preimage(&PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner()), &payment_preimage, broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, logger)
},
ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret { idx, secret } => {
log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor with commitment secret");
tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 {
return (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs)); // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user
}
- let revk_htlc_outp = RevokedHTLCOutput::build(per_commitment_point, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_htlc_base_key, per_commitment_key, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc.clone());
+ let revk_htlc_outp = RevokedHTLCOutput::build(per_commitment_point, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_htlc_base_key, per_commitment_key, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc.clone(), self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some());
let justice_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(commitment_txid, transaction_output_index, PackageSolvingData::RevokedHTLCOutput(revk_htlc_outp), htlc.cltv_expiry, true, height);
claimable_outpoints.push(justice_package);
}
}
self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, commitment_number);
- fail_unbroadcast_htlcs!(self, "revoked counterparty", height, [].iter().map(|a| *a), logger);
+ if let Some(per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
+ fail_unbroadcast_htlcs!(self, "revoked_counterparty", commitment_txid, height,
+ per_commitment_data.iter().map(|(htlc, htlc_source)|
+ (htlc, htlc_source.as_ref().map(|htlc_source| htlc_source.as_ref()))
+ ), logger);
+ } else {
+ debug_assert!(false, "We should have per-commitment option for any recognized old commitment txn");
+ fail_unbroadcast_htlcs!(self, "revoked counterparty", commitment_txid, height,
+ [].iter().map(|reference| *reference), logger);
+ }
}
} else if let Some(per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
// While this isn't useful yet, there is a potential race where if a counterparty
self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, commitment_number);
log_info!(logger, "Got broadcast of non-revoked counterparty commitment transaction {}", commitment_txid);
- fail_unbroadcast_htlcs!(self, "counterparty", height, per_commitment_data.iter().map(|(a, b)| (a, b.as_ref().map(|b| b.as_ref()))), logger);
+ fail_unbroadcast_htlcs!(self, "counterparty", commitment_txid, height,
+ per_commitment_data.iter().map(|(htlc, htlc_source)|
+ (htlc, htlc_source.as_ref().map(|htlc_source| htlc_source.as_ref()))
+ ), logger);
let htlc_claim_reqs = self.get_counterparty_htlc_output_claim_reqs(commitment_number, commitment_txid, Some(tx));
for req in htlc_claim_reqs {
fn get_counterparty_htlc_output_claim_reqs(&self, commitment_number: u64, commitment_txid: Txid, tx: Option<&Transaction>) -> Vec<PackageTemplate> {
let mut claimable_outpoints = Vec::new();
if let Some(htlc_outputs) = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&commitment_txid) {
- if let Some(revocation_points) = self.their_cur_revocation_points {
- let revocation_point_option =
+ if let Some(per_commitment_points) = self.their_cur_per_commitment_points {
+ let per_commitment_point_option =
// If the counterparty commitment tx is the latest valid state, use their latest
// per-commitment point
- if revocation_points.0 == commitment_number { Some(&revocation_points.1) }
- else if let Some(point) = revocation_points.2.as_ref() {
+ if per_commitment_points.0 == commitment_number { Some(&per_commitment_points.1) }
+ else if let Some(point) = per_commitment_points.2.as_ref() {
// If counterparty commitment tx is the state previous to the latest valid state, use
// their previous per-commitment point (non-atomicity of revocation means it's valid for
// them to temporarily have two valid commitment txns from our viewpoint)
- if revocation_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 { Some(point) } else { None }
+ if per_commitment_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 { Some(point) } else { None }
} else { None };
- if let Some(revocation_point) = revocation_point_option {
+ if let Some(per_commitment_point) = per_commitment_point_option {
for (_, &(ref htlc, _)) in htlc_outputs.iter().enumerate() {
if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
if let Some(transaction) = tx {
}
let preimage = if htlc.offered { if let Some(p) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) { Some(*p) } else { None } } else { None };
if preimage.is_some() || !htlc.offered {
- let counterparty_htlc_outp = if htlc.offered { PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput(CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput::build(*revocation_point, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_htlc_base_key, preimage.unwrap(), htlc.clone())) } else { PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput(CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput::build(*revocation_point, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_htlc_base_key, htlc.clone())) };
+ let counterparty_htlc_outp = if htlc.offered {
+ PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput(
+ CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput::build(*per_commitment_point,
+ self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key,
+ self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_htlc_base_key,
+ preimage.unwrap(), htlc.clone()))
+ } else {
+ PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput(
+ CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput::build(*per_commitment_point,
+ self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key,
+ self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_htlc_base_key,
+ htlc.clone()))
+ };
let aggregation = if !htlc.offered { false } else { true };
let counterparty_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(commitment_txid, transaction_output_index, counterparty_htlc_outp, htlc.cltv_expiry,aggregation, 0);
claimable_outpoints.push(counterparty_package);
let res = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx, height);
let mut to_watch = self.get_broadcasted_holder_watch_outputs(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx, tx);
append_onchain_update!(res, to_watch);
- fail_unbroadcast_htlcs!(self, "latest holder", height, self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|(a, _, c)| (a, c.as_ref())), logger);
+ fail_unbroadcast_htlcs!(self, "latest holder", commitment_txid, height,
+ self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter()
+ .map(|(htlc, _, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.as_ref())), logger);
} else if let &Some(ref holder_tx) = &self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
if holder_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
is_holder_tx = true;
let res = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(holder_tx, height);
let mut to_watch = self.get_broadcasted_holder_watch_outputs(holder_tx, tx);
append_onchain_update!(res, to_watch);
- fail_unbroadcast_htlcs!(self, "previous holder", height, holder_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|(a, _, c)| (a, c.as_ref())), logger);
+ fail_unbroadcast_htlcs!(self, "previous holder", commitment_txid, height,
+ holder_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|(htlc, _, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.as_ref())),
+ logger);
}
}
let block_hash = header.block_hash();
self.best_block = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
- self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger)
+ let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_estimator);
+ self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height, broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, logger)
}
fn best_block_updated<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
header: &BlockHeader,
height: u32,
broadcaster: B,
- fee_estimator: F,
+ fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
logger: L,
) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
where
txdata: &TransactionData,
height: u32,
broadcaster: B,
- fee_estimator: F,
+ fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
logger: L,
) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
where
mut watch_outputs: Vec<TransactionOutputs>,
mut claimable_outpoints: Vec<PackageTemplate>,
broadcaster: &B,
- fee_estimator: &F,
+ fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
logger: &L,
) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
where
// Produce actionable events from on-chain events having reached their threshold.
for entry in onchain_events_reaching_threshold_conf.drain(..) {
match entry.event {
- OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref source, payment_hash, onchain_value_satoshis, input_idx } => {
+ OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref source, payment_hash, htlc_value_satoshis, commitment_tx_output_idx } => {
// Check for duplicate HTLC resolutions.
#[cfg(debug_assertions)]
{
matured_htlcs.push(source.clone());
}
- log_debug!(logger, "HTLC {} failure update has got enough confirmations to be passed upstream", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
+ log_debug!(logger, "HTLC {} failure update in {} has got enough confirmations to be passed upstream",
+ log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), entry.txid);
self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(HTLCUpdate {
payment_hash,
payment_preimage: None,
source: source.clone(),
- onchain_value_satoshis,
+ htlc_value_satoshis,
}));
- if let Some(idx) = input_idx {
- self.htlcs_resolved_on_chain.push(IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC { input_idx: idx, payment_preimage: None });
+ if let Some(idx) = commitment_tx_output_idx {
+ self.htlcs_resolved_on_chain.push(IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC { commitment_tx_output_idx: idx, payment_preimage: None });
}
},
OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput { descriptor } => {
outputs: vec![descriptor]
});
},
- OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation { input_idx, preimage, .. } => {
- self.htlcs_resolved_on_chain.push(IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC { input_idx, payment_preimage: preimage });
+ OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation { commitment_tx_output_idx, preimage, .. } => {
+ self.htlcs_resolved_on_chain.push(IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC { commitment_tx_output_idx, payment_preimage: preimage });
},
OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation { .. } => {
self.funding_spend_confirmed = Some(entry.txid);
//- maturing spendable output has transaction paying us has been disconnected
self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.retain(|ref entry| entry.height < height);
- self.onchain_tx_handler.block_disconnected(height, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
+ let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_estimator);
+ self.onchain_tx_handler.block_disconnected(height, broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, logger);
self.best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, height - 1);
}
&mut self,
txid: &Txid,
broadcaster: B,
- fee_estimator: F,
+ fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
logger: L,
) where
B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
F::Target: FeeEstimator,
L::Target: Logger,
{
- self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.retain(|ref entry| entry.txid != *txid);
+ self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.retain(|ref entry| if entry.txid == *txid {
+ log_info!(logger, "Removing onchain event with txid {}", txid);
+ false
+ } else { true });
self.onchain_tx_handler.transaction_unconfirmed(txid, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
}
if *idx == input.previous_output.vout {
#[cfg(test)]
{
- // If the expected script is a known type, check that the witness
- // appears to be spending the correct type (ie that the match would
- // actually succeed in BIP 158/159-style filters).
- if _script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh() {
- assert_eq!(&bitcoin::Address::p2wsh(&Script::from(input.witness.last().unwrap().clone()), bitcoin::Network::Bitcoin).script_pubkey(), _script_pubkey);
- } else if _script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh() {
- assert_eq!(&bitcoin::Address::p2wpkh(&bitcoin::PublicKey::from_slice(&input.witness.last().unwrap()).unwrap(), bitcoin::Network::Bitcoin).unwrap().script_pubkey(), _script_pubkey);
- } else { panic!(); }
+ // If the expected script is a known type, check that the witness
+ // appears to be spending the correct type (ie that the match would
+ // actually succeed in BIP 158/159-style filters).
+ if _script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh() {
+ if input.witness.last().unwrap().to_vec() == deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness_program() {
+ // In at least one test we use a deliberately bogus witness
+ // script which hit an old panic. Thus, we check for that here
+ // and avoid the assert if its the expected bogus script.
+ return true;
+ }
+
+ assert_eq!(&bitcoin::Address::p2wsh(&Script::from(input.witness.last().unwrap().to_vec()), bitcoin::Network::Bitcoin).script_pubkey(), _script_pubkey);
+ } else if _script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh() {
+ assert_eq!(&bitcoin::Address::p2wpkh(&bitcoin::PublicKey::from_slice(&input.witness.last().unwrap()).unwrap(), bitcoin::Network::Bitcoin).unwrap().script_pubkey(), _script_pubkey);
+ } else { panic!(); }
}
return true;
}
fn is_resolving_htlc_output<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
'outer_loop: for input in &tx.input {
let mut payment_data = None;
- let revocation_sig_claim = (input.witness.len() == 3 && HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(input.witness[2].len()) == Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC) && input.witness[1].len() == 33)
- || (input.witness.len() == 3 && HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(input.witness[2].len()) == Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC) && input.witness[1].len() == 33);
- let accepted_preimage_claim = input.witness.len() == 5 && HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(input.witness[4].len()) == Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC);
+ let witness_items = input.witness.len();
+ let htlctype = input.witness.last().map(|w| w.len()).and_then(HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype);
+ let prev_last_witness_len = input.witness.second_to_last().map(|w| w.len()).unwrap_or(0);
+ let revocation_sig_claim = (witness_items == 3 && htlctype == Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC) && prev_last_witness_len == 33)
+ || (witness_items == 3 && htlctype == Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC) && prev_last_witness_len == 33);
+ let accepted_preimage_claim = witness_items == 5 && htlctype == Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC)
+ && input.witness.second_to_last().unwrap().len() == 32;
#[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
- let accepted_timeout_claim = input.witness.len() == 3 && HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(input.witness[2].len()) == Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC) && !revocation_sig_claim;
- let offered_preimage_claim = input.witness.len() == 3 && HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(input.witness[2].len()) == Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC) && !revocation_sig_claim;
+ let accepted_timeout_claim = witness_items == 3 && htlctype == Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC) && !revocation_sig_claim;
+ let offered_preimage_claim = witness_items == 3 && htlctype == Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC) &&
+ !revocation_sig_claim && input.witness.second_to_last().unwrap().len() == 32;
+
#[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
- let offered_timeout_claim = input.witness.len() == 5 && HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(input.witness[4].len()) == Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC);
+ let offered_timeout_claim = witness_items == 5 && htlctype == Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC);
let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
if accepted_preimage_claim {
- payment_preimage.0.copy_from_slice(&input.witness[3]);
+ payment_preimage.0.copy_from_slice(input.witness.second_to_last().unwrap());
} else if offered_preimage_claim {
- payment_preimage.0.copy_from_slice(&input.witness[1]);
+ payment_preimage.0.copy_from_slice(input.witness.second_to_last().unwrap());
}
macro_rules! log_claim {
self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(OnchainEventEntry {
txid: tx.txid(), height,
event: OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation {
- input_idx: input.previous_output.vout,
+ commitment_tx_output_idx: input.previous_output.vout,
preimage: if accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim {
Some(payment_preimage) } else { None },
// If this is a payment to us (!outbound_htlc, above),
txid: tx.txid(),
height,
event: OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation {
- input_idx: input.previous_output.vout,
+ commitment_tx_output_idx: input.previous_output.vout,
preimage: Some(payment_preimage),
on_to_local_output_csv: None,
},
source,
payment_preimage: Some(payment_preimage),
payment_hash,
- onchain_value_satoshis: Some(amount_msat / 1000),
+ htlc_value_satoshis: Some(amount_msat / 1000),
}));
}
} else if offered_preimage_claim {
txid: tx.txid(),
height,
event: OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation {
- input_idx: input.previous_output.vout,
+ commitment_tx_output_idx: input.previous_output.vout,
preimage: Some(payment_preimage),
on_to_local_output_csv: None,
},
source,
payment_preimage: Some(payment_preimage),
payment_hash,
- onchain_value_satoshis: Some(amount_msat / 1000),
+ htlc_value_satoshis: Some(amount_msat / 1000),
}));
}
} else {
height,
event: OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate {
source, payment_hash,
- onchain_value_satoshis: Some(amount_msat / 1000),
- input_idx: Some(input.previous_output.vout),
+ htlc_value_satoshis: Some(amount_msat / 1000),
+ commitment_tx_output_idx: Some(input.previous_output.vout),
},
};
log_info!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} timeout by a spend tx, waiting for confirmation (at height {})", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), entry.confirmation_threshold());
F::Target: FeeEstimator,
L::Target: Logger,
{
- fn block_connected(&self, block: &Block, height: u32) {
- let txdata: Vec<_> = block.txdata.iter().enumerate().collect();
- self.0.block_connected(&block.header, &txdata, height, &*self.1, &*self.2, &*self.3);
+ fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
+ self.0.block_connected(header, txdata, height, &*self.1, &*self.2, &*self.3);
}
fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
let funding_redeemscript = Readable::read(reader)?;
let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let their_cur_revocation_points = {
+ let their_cur_per_commitment_points = {
let first_idx = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
if first_idx == 0 {
None
let mut funding_spend_confirmed = None;
let mut htlcs_resolved_on_chain = Some(Vec::new());
let mut funding_spend_seen = Some(false);
+ let mut counterparty_node_id = None;
read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
(1, funding_spend_confirmed, option),
(3, htlcs_resolved_on_chain, vec_type),
(5, pending_monitor_events, vec_type),
(7, funding_spend_seen, option),
+ (9, counterparty_node_id, option),
});
let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
- Ok((best_block.block_hash(), ChannelMonitor {
- inner: Mutex::new(ChannelMonitorImpl {
- latest_update_id,
- commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor,
+ Ok((best_block.block_hash(), ChannelMonitor::from_impl(ChannelMonitorImpl {
+ latest_update_id,
+ commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor,
- destination_script,
- broadcasted_holder_revokable_script,
- counterparty_payment_script,
- shutdown_script,
+ destination_script,
+ broadcasted_holder_revokable_script,
+ counterparty_payment_script,
+ shutdown_script,
- channel_keys_id,
- holder_revocation_basepoint,
- funding_info,
- current_counterparty_commitment_txid,
- prev_counterparty_commitment_txid,
+ channel_keys_id,
+ holder_revocation_basepoint,
+ funding_info,
+ current_counterparty_commitment_txid,
+ prev_counterparty_commitment_txid,
- counterparty_commitment_params,
- funding_redeemscript,
- channel_value_satoshis,
- their_cur_revocation_points,
+ counterparty_commitment_params,
+ funding_redeemscript,
+ channel_value_satoshis,
+ their_cur_per_commitment_points,
- on_holder_tx_csv,
+ on_holder_tx_csv,
- commitment_secrets,
- counterparty_claimable_outpoints,
- counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain,
- counterparty_hash_commitment_number,
+ commitment_secrets,
+ counterparty_claimable_outpoints,
+ counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain,
+ counterparty_hash_commitment_number,
- prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx,
- current_holder_commitment_tx,
- current_counterparty_commitment_number,
- current_holder_commitment_number,
+ prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx,
+ current_holder_commitment_tx,
+ current_counterparty_commitment_number,
+ current_holder_commitment_number,
- payment_preimages,
- pending_monitor_events: pending_monitor_events.unwrap(),
- pending_events,
+ payment_preimages,
+ pending_monitor_events: pending_monitor_events.unwrap(),
+ pending_events,
- onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf,
- outputs_to_watch,
+ onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf,
+ outputs_to_watch,
- onchain_tx_handler,
+ onchain_tx_handler,
- lockdown_from_offchain,
- holder_tx_signed,
- funding_spend_seen: funding_spend_seen.unwrap(),
- funding_spend_confirmed,
- htlcs_resolved_on_chain: htlcs_resolved_on_chain.unwrap(),
+ lockdown_from_offchain,
+ holder_tx_signed,
+ funding_spend_seen: funding_spend_seen.unwrap(),
+ funding_spend_confirmed,
+ htlcs_resolved_on_chain: htlcs_resolved_on_chain.unwrap(),
- best_block,
+ best_block,
+ counterparty_node_id,
- secp_ctx,
- }),
- }))
+ secp_ctx,
+ })))
}
}
use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
- use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxIn, TxOut, SigHashType};
+ use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxIn, TxOut, EcdsaSighashType};
use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
- use bitcoin::util::bip143;
+ use bitcoin::util::sighash;
use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
- use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
+ use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
use hex;
+ use crate::chain::chaininterface::LowerBoundedFeeEstimator;
+
use super::ChannelMonitorUpdateStep;
use ::{check_added_monitors, check_closed_broadcast, check_closed_event, check_spends, get_local_commitment_txn, get_monitor, get_route_and_payment_hash, unwrap_send_err};
use chain::{BestBlock, Confirm};
use chain::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor;
- use chain::package::{WEIGHT_OFFERED_HTLC, WEIGHT_RECEIVED_HTLC, WEIGHT_REVOKED_OFFERED_HTLC, WEIGHT_REVOKED_RECEIVED_HTLC, WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT};
+ use chain::package::{weight_offered_htlc, weight_received_htlc, weight_revoked_offered_htlc, weight_revoked_received_htlc, WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT};
use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
use chain::keysinterface::InMemorySigner;
use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
use util::ser::{ReadableArgs, Writeable};
use sync::{Arc, Mutex};
use io;
+ use bitcoin::Witness;
use prelude::*;
fn do_test_funding_spend_refuses_updates(use_local_txn: bool) {
let broadcaster = TestBroadcaster::new(Arc::clone(&nodes[1].blocks));
assert!(
- pre_update_monitor.update_monitor(&replay_update, &&broadcaster, &&chanmon_cfgs[1].fee_estimator, &nodes[1].logger)
+ pre_update_monitor.update_monitor(&replay_update, &&broadcaster, &chanmon_cfgs[1].fee_estimator, &nodes[1].logger)
.is_err());
// Even though we error'd on the first update, we should still have generated an HTLC claim
// transaction
let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
let logger = Arc::new(TestLogger::new());
let broadcaster = Arc::new(TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))});
- let fee_estimator = Arc::new(TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) });
+ let fee_estimator = TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
let dummy_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
let dummy_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
+ SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
[41; 32],
0,
[0; 32]
(OutPoint { txid: Txid::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), index: 0 }, Script::new()),
&channel_parameters,
Script::new(), 46, 0,
- HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), best_block);
+ HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), best_block, dummy_key);
monitor.provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), preimages_to_holder_htlcs!(preimages[0..10])).unwrap();
let dummy_txid = dummy_tx.txid();
monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(dummy_txid, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[17..20]), 281474976710653, dummy_key, &logger);
monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(dummy_txid, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[18..20]), 281474976710652, dummy_key, &logger);
for &(ref preimage, ref hash) in preimages.iter() {
- monitor.provide_payment_preimage(hash, preimage, &broadcaster, &fee_estimator, &logger);
+ let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_estimator);
+ monitor.provide_payment_preimage(hash, preimage, &broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &logger);
}
// Now provide a secret, pruning preimages 10-15
let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
let privkey = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
let pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &privkey);
- let mut sum_actual_sigs = 0;
macro_rules! sign_input {
($sighash_parts: expr, $idx: expr, $amount: expr, $weight: expr, $sum_actual_sigs: expr, $opt_anchors: expr) => {
let htlc = HTLCOutputInCommitment {
- offered: if *$weight == WEIGHT_REVOKED_OFFERED_HTLC || *$weight == WEIGHT_OFFERED_HTLC { true } else { false },
+ offered: if *$weight == weight_revoked_offered_htlc($opt_anchors) || *$weight == weight_offered_htlc($opt_anchors) { true } else { false },
amount_msat: 0,
cltv_expiry: 2 << 16,
payment_hash: PaymentHash([1; 32]),
transaction_output_index: Some($idx as u32),
};
let redeem_script = if *$weight == WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT { chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&pubkey, 256, &pubkey) } else { chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, $opt_anchors, &pubkey, &pubkey, &pubkey) };
- let sighash = hash_to_message!(&$sighash_parts.signature_hash($idx, &redeem_script, $amount, SigHashType::All)[..]);
- let sig = secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &privkey);
- $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx).push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
- $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx)[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
- sum_actual_sigs += $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx)[0].len();
+ let sighash = hash_to_message!(&$sighash_parts.segwit_signature_hash($idx, &redeem_script, $amount, EcdsaSighashType::All).unwrap()[..]);
+ let sig = secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&sighash, &privkey);
+ let mut ser_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
+ ser_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
+ $sum_actual_sigs += ser_sig.len();
+ let witness = $sighash_parts.witness_mut($idx).unwrap();
+ witness.push(ser_sig);
if *$weight == WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT {
- $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx).push(vec!(1));
- } else if *$weight == WEIGHT_REVOKED_OFFERED_HTLC || *$weight == WEIGHT_REVOKED_RECEIVED_HTLC {
- $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx).push(pubkey.clone().serialize().to_vec());
- } else if *$weight == WEIGHT_RECEIVED_HTLC {
- $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx).push(vec![0]);
+ witness.push(vec!(1));
+ } else if *$weight == weight_revoked_offered_htlc($opt_anchors) || *$weight == weight_revoked_received_htlc($opt_anchors) {
+ witness.push(pubkey.clone().serialize().to_vec());
+ } else if *$weight == weight_received_htlc($opt_anchors) {
+ witness.push(vec![0]);
} else {
- $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx).push(PaymentPreimage([1; 32]).0.to_vec());
+ witness.push(PaymentPreimage([1; 32]).0.to_vec());
}
- $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx).push(redeem_script.into_bytes());
- println!("witness[0] {}", $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx)[0].len());
- println!("witness[1] {}", $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx)[1].len());
- println!("witness[2] {}", $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx)[2].len());
+ witness.push(redeem_script.into_bytes());
+ let witness = witness.to_vec();
+ println!("witness[0] {}", witness[0].len());
+ println!("witness[1] {}", witness[1].len());
+ println!("witness[2] {}", witness[2].len());
}
}
let txid = Txid::from_hex("56944c5d3f98413ef45cf54545538103cc9f298e0575820ad3591376e2e0f65d").unwrap();
// Justice tx with 1 to_holder, 2 revoked offered HTLCs, 1 revoked received HTLCs
- let mut claim_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
- for i in 0..4 {
- claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
- previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
- txid,
- vout: i,
- },
- script_sig: Script::new(),
- sequence: 0xfffffffd,
- witness: Vec::new(),
+ for &opt_anchors in [false, true].iter() {
+ let mut claim_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
+ let mut sum_actual_sigs = 0;
+ for i in 0..4 {
+ claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
+ previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
+ txid,
+ vout: i,
+ },
+ script_sig: Script::new(),
+ sequence: 0xfffffffd,
+ witness: Witness::new(),
+ });
+ }
+ claim_tx.output.push(TxOut {
+ script_pubkey: script_pubkey.clone(),
+ value: 0,
});
- }
- claim_tx.output.push(TxOut {
- script_pubkey: script_pubkey.clone(),
- value: 0,
- });
- let base_weight = claim_tx.get_weight();
- let inputs_weight = vec![WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT, WEIGHT_REVOKED_OFFERED_HTLC, WEIGHT_REVOKED_OFFERED_HTLC, WEIGHT_REVOKED_RECEIVED_HTLC];
- let mut inputs_total_weight = 2; // count segwit flags
- {
- let mut sighash_parts = bip143::SigHashCache::new(&mut claim_tx);
- for (idx, inp) in inputs_weight.iter().enumerate() {
- sign_input!(sighash_parts, idx, 0, inp, sum_actual_sigs, false);
- inputs_total_weight += inp;
+ let base_weight = claim_tx.weight();
+ let inputs_weight = vec![WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT, weight_revoked_offered_htlc(opt_anchors), weight_revoked_offered_htlc(opt_anchors), weight_revoked_received_htlc(opt_anchors)];
+ let mut inputs_total_weight = 2; // count segwit flags
+ {
+ let mut sighash_parts = sighash::SighashCache::new(&mut claim_tx);
+ for (idx, inp) in inputs_weight.iter().enumerate() {
+ sign_input!(sighash_parts, idx, 0, inp, sum_actual_sigs, opt_anchors);
+ inputs_total_weight += inp;
+ }
}
+ assert_eq!(base_weight + inputs_total_weight as usize, claim_tx.weight() + /* max_length_sig */ (73 * inputs_weight.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
}
- assert_eq!(base_weight + inputs_total_weight as usize, claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_sig */ (73 * inputs_weight.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
// Claim tx with 1 offered HTLCs, 3 received HTLCs
- claim_tx.input.clear();
- sum_actual_sigs = 0;
- for i in 0..4 {
+ for &opt_anchors in [false, true].iter() {
+ let mut claim_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
+ let mut sum_actual_sigs = 0;
+ for i in 0..4 {
+ claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
+ previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
+ txid,
+ vout: i,
+ },
+ script_sig: Script::new(),
+ sequence: 0xfffffffd,
+ witness: Witness::new(),
+ });
+ }
+ claim_tx.output.push(TxOut {
+ script_pubkey: script_pubkey.clone(),
+ value: 0,
+ });
+ let base_weight = claim_tx.weight();
+ let inputs_weight = vec![weight_offered_htlc(opt_anchors), weight_received_htlc(opt_anchors), weight_received_htlc(opt_anchors), weight_received_htlc(opt_anchors)];
+ let mut inputs_total_weight = 2; // count segwit flags
+ {
+ let mut sighash_parts = sighash::SighashCache::new(&mut claim_tx);
+ for (idx, inp) in inputs_weight.iter().enumerate() {
+ sign_input!(sighash_parts, idx, 0, inp, sum_actual_sigs, opt_anchors);
+ inputs_total_weight += inp;
+ }
+ }
+ assert_eq!(base_weight + inputs_total_weight as usize, claim_tx.weight() + /* max_length_sig */ (73 * inputs_weight.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
+ }
+
+ // Justice tx with 1 revoked HTLC-Success tx output
+ for &opt_anchors in [false, true].iter() {
+ let mut claim_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
+ let mut sum_actual_sigs = 0;
claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
txid,
- vout: i,
+ vout: 0,
},
script_sig: Script::new(),
sequence: 0xfffffffd,
- witness: Vec::new(),
+ witness: Witness::new(),
});
- }
- let base_weight = claim_tx.get_weight();
- let inputs_weight = vec![WEIGHT_OFFERED_HTLC, WEIGHT_RECEIVED_HTLC, WEIGHT_RECEIVED_HTLC, WEIGHT_RECEIVED_HTLC];
- let mut inputs_total_weight = 2; // count segwit flags
- {
- let mut sighash_parts = bip143::SigHashCache::new(&mut claim_tx);
- for (idx, inp) in inputs_weight.iter().enumerate() {
- sign_input!(sighash_parts, idx, 0, inp, sum_actual_sigs, false);
- inputs_total_weight += inp;
- }
- }
- assert_eq!(base_weight + inputs_total_weight as usize, claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_sig */ (73 * inputs_weight.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
-
- // Justice tx with 1 revoked HTLC-Success tx output
- claim_tx.input.clear();
- sum_actual_sigs = 0;
- claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
- previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
- txid,
- vout: 0,
- },
- script_sig: Script::new(),
- sequence: 0xfffffffd,
- witness: Vec::new(),
- });
- let base_weight = claim_tx.get_weight();
- let inputs_weight = vec![WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT];
- let mut inputs_total_weight = 2; // count segwit flags
- {
- let mut sighash_parts = bip143::SigHashCache::new(&mut claim_tx);
- for (idx, inp) in inputs_weight.iter().enumerate() {
- sign_input!(sighash_parts, idx, 0, inp, sum_actual_sigs, false);
- inputs_total_weight += inp;
+ claim_tx.output.push(TxOut {
+ script_pubkey: script_pubkey.clone(),
+ value: 0,
+ });
+ let base_weight = claim_tx.weight();
+ let inputs_weight = vec![WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT];
+ let mut inputs_total_weight = 2; // count segwit flags
+ {
+ let mut sighash_parts = sighash::SighashCache::new(&mut claim_tx);
+ for (idx, inp) in inputs_weight.iter().enumerate() {
+ sign_input!(sighash_parts, idx, 0, inp, sum_actual_sigs, opt_anchors);
+ inputs_total_weight += inp;
+ }
}
+ assert_eq!(base_weight + inputs_total_weight as usize, claim_tx.weight() + /* max_length_isg */ (73 * inputs_weight.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
}
- assert_eq!(base_weight + inputs_total_weight as usize, claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_isg */ (73 * inputs_weight.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
}
// Further testing is done in the ChannelManager integration tests.